


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NSC BRIEFING

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15 NOVEMBER 1955

NICARAGUA



II. Somoza's plan for re-election would be "justification" for revolt.

A. Gen. Anastasio ("Tacho") Somoza, dictator since 1934.

B. Plans to be "re-elected" next November.

1. General citizenry apathetic and intimidated.
2. Opposition Conservative Party frightened and divided.
3. Exiles desperate and have been plotting for years.

DOCUMENT NO. 38
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C

DATE REVIEWED: 1998

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- a. Scattered throughout Central America.
- b. Last attempt to kill Somoza in April 1954 almost succeeded.

III. Somoza's National Guard is crucial factor.

- A. 3,500 well-trained men.
 - 1. Somoza's chief prop
 - 2. Directly controlled by Somoza.
- B. To succeed, revolt would have to be joined by part of Guard.



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- 2. Guard has been united and loyal for past 8 years.

- C. Somoza takes elaborate precautions against assassination.

IV. New outbreak might again endanger peace in Central America.

- A. Five Central American countries traditionally involved in each other's affairs.


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- B. Somoza would blame unsuccessful attempt on Costa Rica.
 - 1. Costa Rican president Figueres and Somoza enemies since 1948.
 - 2. Somoza tried to oust Figueres in January 1955 "revolt."
 - 3. Somoza convinced that Figueres is out to get him.

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