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2 May 1977

SUBJECT: Reactions to US Troop Withdrawals from Korea

1. Since my LDX message to you this morning (which inadvertently did not include [redacted] questions) on subject above, further guidance has been received from the DCI.

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-- The paper, contrary to the set of questions, will focus on the impact of troop withdrawal on the two Koreas; it will also address reactions of Japan, the PRC, the USSR, and

-- CIA draft to be complete by COB Friday, 6 May.

2. I will LDX copies of draft to you over the weekend. A representatives' meeting will be held on Monday, 9 May.

[redacted]
A/NIO/EAP

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ATTACHMENT

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29 April 1977

Asian and Other Reactions to Ground
Force Withdrawal in Korea

Japan, the PRC, and the USSR will need the most extended treatment. Southeast Asia can probably be treated as a region with variations noted where necessary.

The paper should focus on perceptions and reactions -- when, as, and how we proceed with ground force withdrawals. Current attitudes toward our presence and perceived intentions should be treated as the point of departure; their description is not an end in itself. It will be necessary to deal both with expectations -- when decisions are announced -- of how our policies are likely to work out, and with perceptions for better or worse as implementation proceeds. Given the number of variables and our own uncertainties as we examine the problem over exactly what we will be doing and when, the answers it is possible to provide will probably be a lot less elaborate than the questions below. They are intended to suggest lines of thought, not as an outline.

How will the countries considered react to the prospect of complete ground force withdrawal?

-- How will our motives be perceived?

-- To what extent will concerns over the US role in Asia be accentuated?

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- To what extent will the move be seen as affecting the security of other countries?
- Will it cast doubt on the efficacy of US security commitments elsewhere? With what impact on our relations with the countries concerned? With what impact on their policies?
- Will other Asian countries be inclined to move closer to the ROK or draw further away from it? How will perceptions of future prospects of the ROK be affected?

Given a firm US commitment to ground force withdrawal, what would other countries concerned see as the most reassuring modes of implementation? the most disturbing?

- What confidence will be placed in the efficacy of the compensating measures we may adopt?
- What measures would be most confidence inspiring?
- What measures would be most likely to be regarded with skepticism?
- As we proceed what will be perceived as the principal benchmarks of success or failure?

Will perceptions of reduced US involvement correspondingly reduce the interest of Moscow and Peking in restraining North Korea?

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-- Or will Moscow/Peking concerns over the prospects for destabilizing actions by either Korea increase, and with what likely impact on policy?

-- How will Peking and Moscow envisage the impact of our drawdown on Japan?

-- Will either see significant implications -- advantages or disadvantages for their own broader interests?

How will Japan perceive the impact on its security?

-- How will it perceive the impact on its own security relationship with the United States?

-- Is it likely to adopt more supportive policies with respect to South Korea?

-- In what areas?

-- Is it likely to take initiatives of its own with respect to North Korea?

Will the commitment to withdrawal affect US/ROK diplomatic problems in the UN, Third World, elsewhere?

-- Will it bring us any diplomatic or foreign policy bonuses?

-- Will it increase pressures for direct US/North Korean contacts?

-- Will it move the waverers further away from the North Korean cause?

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