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24 MAY 77

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

# A Super-Computer for the Soviets

Control Data is preparing to sell the Soviets a \$13 million electronic brain, which could be turned against us to track U.S. missiles, planes and submarines. It is also capable of decoding sensitive U.S. intelligence transmissions.

The miracle machine is the Cyber 76, which will soon be on its way to the Soviet Union unless there is a last-minute stop order. It not only will be the largest computer ever delivered behind the Iron Curtain, but it is more than a decade ahead of the Soviets' own computer technology. It operates at least 20 times faster than anything the Soviets produce.

A top-secret, interagency study warns tersely that the Soviets can convert the Cyber 76 to military use. Not only can it be used for tracking and decoding, but it could also improve the production of nuclear warheads, multiple-headed missiles, aircraft and other military hardware.

There is no sure safeguard to prevent this, the study declares. An intelligence source put it more bluntly. "For a few bucks," he told us, "we're willing to give the Soviets the means to destroy us. We're becoming our own executioners."

Government officials, citing the strict secrecy, refused to show us a copy of the study. But sources with access to the original draft have told us of its warnings. They fear it may be softened in order to make the computer deal more palatable.

Control Data executives, in repeated meetings with U.S. officials, have insisted that the Cyber 76 will be used by the Soviets strictly to study the

weather. The company kept hammering at Washington to get an export license. Final Commerce Department approval of the deal, according to our sources, was imminent until our inquiries caused some hesitation.

The sale of computers to Russia was pushed originally by ex-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Eager to promote detente, he overruled military objections to earlier computer sales. Now that the Soviets have already received lesser computers, they will be enraged if the Cyber 76 is withheld from them, say our sources.

One high official source, talking to us in confidence, related how a mysterious Soviet official showed up in the United States a few years ago. The Central Intelligence Agency immediately spotted him as a man with a purpose. He had come here, the CIA warned, to seek strategic U.S. computers.

The State Department, under Kissinger, persuaded the CIA to soften its warning and to pass off the visitor as merely the house guest of Soviet Ambassador Anatoli F. Dobrynin.

This helped lead to computer sales not only to Russia but also to China and Hungary. In return for these sophisticated computers, according to an International Trade Commission report, the Soviets have offered the U.S. "horses, asses and mules" at favored prices. Russia's famous vodka will also be sold to the United States at a tariff of \$1.25 a gallon, instead of the present \$5.

Frustrated U.S. officials complain that the Soviets are getting the best of the deal. They have gained strategic

advances from the computers that have already been delivered, these officials assert. But the Cyber 76 would give them a technological boost that no amount of vodka could justify, they say.

The secret study declares categorically that the wonder machine both could and would be misused by the Kremlin for military purposes. Those officials who favor the sale contend, however, that the Soviets will use the Cyber 76 to increase their participation in a world meteorological network. The result, they say, would be better international weather data, larger crops and fewer unexpected natural disasters.

A spokesman for Control Data assured our reporter John Schuber that the computer can be set up in Moscow in a way to prevent any misuse. Any diversion to military use, he said, could be detected immediately. Then Control Data would pull out its technicians and refuse parts to the Soviets, thus crippling the electronic monster.

But other computer experts told our reporter Tony Capaccio that Control Data's arguments are spurious. One former Control Data executive, referring to the alleged safeguards, said derisively: "That's a joke." Other experts agreed that the Soviets could train their own technicians, and eventually locate parts from other countries.

Footnote: At the Commerce Department, spokesmen confirmed that the secret study disclosed "some problems" relating to safeguards against the misuse of the Cyber 76. But the draft report, said the spokesman, wasn't final.

National Intelligence Officers

19 MAY 1977

Steve -

I hope you have  
passed on Korea NTK's  
paper to the President  
or do so before this  
meeting.

Bob

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## U.S. General: Korea Pullout Risks War

By John Saar

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, May 19—One of the top-ranking U.S. generals in South Korea says that President Carter's plan to withdraw U.S. troops here in the next four to five years is a mistake that will end in war with North Korea.

"If we withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested it will lead to war," said Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, chief of staff in the U.S. Forces Korea headquarters.

Singlaub, the third-ranking U.S. Army general in Korea, said that he and "many other senior military people" challenge the wisdom of Carter's plan, and predicted that withdrawal of the war-ready 2d Infantry Division in that time-frame would seriously weaken defenses in the south and encourage North Korean President Kim Il-sung to attack.

The unusual situation of serving generals openly differing with the President's declared policy arises on the eve of talks to implement that policy.

Philip C. Habib, under secretary of state for political affairs, and Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are to arrive in Seoul May 24 as the President's special representatives.

Some military officers, saying the planned withdrawal may jeopardize gains made here over the past 24 years and pose serious military and credibility problems, are trying to influence Washington policy decisions.

"I don't know anybody who is not staggered by it," a headquarters Army officer said of the planned withdrawal. "There's no military or strategic logic for withdrawal. In fact, there's a very good case for reinforcing" American strength in South Korea.

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Singlaub, a World War II veteran with a distinguished combat record, said he is deeply concerned that decision-makers may be working from outdated intelligence that substantially underestimates current North Korean strength.

"The question asked after U.S. setbacks in China and Vietnam was, 'Did the military people in the know express themselves loudly and clearly enough that the decision-makers understood?' We want to make sure," he added. "If the decision is made we will execute it with enthusiasm and a high level of professional skill."

The apprehensions voiced by Singlaub are echoed to some degree by many, if not all, U.S. military leaders in South Korea. "No one understands why they are being pulled out," said a well-informed American source. "Carter says the withdrawal won't endanger South Korean security or upset the military balance. Our military people say that would be a miracle. They think it can't be done."

The commander-in-chief of United Nations and U.S. forces in South Korea, Gen. John W. Vessey, has expressed his misgivings directly to President Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, sources here say.

Singlaub and Vessey's deputy, Lt. Gen. John J. Burns, expressed their concerns in separate lengthy interviews today.

Burns said he would prefer the ground troops to stay.

"The withdrawal must be managed to avoid any disastrous change in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula or credibility of the American commitment. American Air Force Units which Carter has said will stay in Korea should be reinforced," added Burns, who flew 102 combat missions as a fighter pilot in the Korean War.

Some officers stress the fear that, despite all assurances to the contrary, the drawdown will be interpreted in

South and North Korea as a disengagement.

A well-connected U.S. colonel says that South Korean officers who believe that the United States abandoned South Vietnam are asking: "Why are you giving up everything you've accomplished here? They quote the old Korean proverb, 'Don't trust the Russians and Don't believe the Americans,'" he recounted unhappily.

The concern centers around the 14,000-man 2D Division, which has a vital role covering the main southbound invasion route to this capital.

The division's firepower, mobility, ground-surveillance radar and technology give it a far higher combat value than any single South Korean Division. It has more helicopters, and TOW missiles to stop North Korea's 2,000 tanks, than the whole South Korean army. Even if Seoul could afford to buy the advanced weaponry, it would take longer than the scheduled five years to train the South Koreans in its use and maintenance, U.S. officers here say.

The 2d Division is also the controversial "tripwire," which doves argue could lead to U.S. embroilment in another Asian land war, and which hawks maintain has successfully deterred aggression since 1953.

Reinforced American air power, which could be flown out as easily as it could be flown in, is not seen as a full replacement for the ground commitment. "Warplanes are like geese," said a U.S. source. "They can honk and fly away. Who really believes that if we don't have the resolve to keep troops in Korea that we're going to bring them back if a war starts?"

"An intensive intelligence effort over the last 12 months has discovered North Korea to be much stronger than we thought," Singlaub said. "My deep concern is that people making the decisions are basing them on information that's two or three years old."

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