

*NI Working File*

**Top Secret**

**Interagency  
Intelligence  
Memorandum**


*The Significance of Soviet TU-95 Bear D  
Deployments in West Africa*

**Top Secret**

NI IIM 77-010C

April 1977

25X



Copy **N<sup>o</sup> 166**

5X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET TU-95 BEAR D DEPLOYMENTS IN WEST AFRICA<sup>1</sup>

### KEY JUDGMENTS

- Deployment of Soviet naval TU-95 Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft to Conakry and the staging of operational flights from there is in keeping with the pattern of evolving Soviet out-of-area naval operations.
- Bear D deployments to Conakry begun in 1973 are one element of a Soviet effort to expand the area of its maritime surveillance which includes deployments to Cuba, Somalia, and, very recently to Angola. Operating from all four of these countries, as well as from Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula, Bear Ds can conduct operations over virtually any area of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- In general, Bear D operational missions add little to the Soviet strategic threat to the continental US. However, Bear Ds staging from Conakry, Cuba, and Soviet bases in the Kola Peninsula, contribute to the threat to Western naval forces operating in the northern Atlantic Ocean, including the western approaches to the Mediterranean.
- The use of airfields in Guinea and Angola has extended the Soviets' area of air reconnaissance into parts of the South Atlantic which they could not reach from Cuba or the USSR.
- In peacetime Bear Ds operating from Conakry can perform ocean surveillance, collect intelligence, fly search and rescue missions, and provide support to the Soviet manned space flight program.

<sup>1</sup> This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces with contributions and concurrence from CIA, State/INR, and DIA.

Top Secret

25X1


The ocean surveillance mission is part of a worldwide Soviet effort to monitor Western naval surface forces to provide reasonably accurate knowledge of the dispositions of these forces at the inception of a crisis or hostilities.

- In peacetime much of the reconnaissance effort and intelligence collection in the eastern Atlantic now performed by Bear Ds from Conakry could be accomplished by missions staged from the Kola Peninsula or Cuba. However, flight time to these surveillance areas would be increased and on-station time over the objective would be reduced.
- The wartime roles of the Bear Ds include tactical reconnaissance in support of Soviet naval operations, direct targeting of US/NATO naval forces—particularly aircraft carriers—and provision of additional means for relaying wartime commands to deployed ballistic missile submarines.
- Bear Ds constitute an extremely important component of the Soviet ocean surveillance system for locating and targeting surface forces at sea.
- The other components, singly or in combination, do not provide a comparable alternative to Bear D, but enhance the effectiveness of Bear D operations.
- With advanced warning of impending Bear D operations, certain technological countermeasures such as electronic emission control can reduce the effectiveness of the flights. However, short of hostile action the US has no totally effective means of negating the capability of Bear D.
- If the Soviets should lose access to Guinea, they would probably seek to reestablish their capability in another African country. Most of the countries are poor and some might be tempted to allow Soviet use of facilities in return for aid. However, a variety of factors—political, logistic, technical, and geographic—would hamper or thwart a Soviet effort to reestablish a Bear D reconnaissance capability in West Africa.

X1

Top Secret

### Potential Scope of TU-95D Surveillance Coverage of Atlantic Ocean



621264 3-77

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6


Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6

1581

Presidential Library A-18

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500010001-6