26 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Second Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic Policies and Objectives - 25 August 1976

1. Attendees included:

Richard Pipes, team leader
General John Vogt
General Daniel Graham
William Van Cleave
Paul Wolfowitz

2. Dr. Pipes made a brief opening statement. He said that he wanted to prepare an agenda for the subteams and establish a definite list of briefers for the 15-17 September briefing sessions. He advised the members to read The Track Record in Strategic Estimating.

3. Pipes stated the Team has two tasks: (1) to reinterpret the data made available on strategic weapons and the threat they pose to see if a different estimate of threat is possible. If Team B does come up with a different interpretation, it should make as strong a case as possible for its position. Task (2) is to criticize the methodology underlying the NIE process. Pipes distributed a list of suggested topics for the Team to investigate.

4. The Team members agreed that a two part report would be produced.

1) evidence and conclusions: all contributing with Pipes drafting final text;
2) criticism of methodology: Pipes drafting with contributions from other members.

5. The meeting was opened to more general discussion. Graham said that he had read several of the NIE 11/8 reports. He said that he noted a change in tone and nomenclature over the years as well as a general tendency to put U.S. perceptions and terms into the Soviet vocabulary.

SECRET

25X1

Van Cleave believed that the topics suggested by Pipes were too technical. Pipes, with Vogt concurring, explained that he did not envision a technical paper but felt that the Team had to address and indicate areas of uncertainty. Vogt added that the incomplete evidence used in the NIE process often does not support the conclusions reached by the drafters. As an example, Graham cited the Soviet civil defense effort and agreed with Vogt's comment that the Soviet CD effort is aimed at a reconstitution capability. Graham said he believed the Soviets want to assure a sustaining force and a second strike capability.

There was general agreement that the NIE underestimates the seriousness of the Soviet CD effort and assumes that the U.S. could make an immediate response. Vogt said an immediate response is unlikely.

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Pipes and Graham, with agreement of the members present, commented that the NIE assumes, without evidence, that the Soviets want to spend as little as possible on defense.

6. The Team agreed on a list of topics and volunteered to direct their efforts as indicated below:

	Topics	Team Expert
1.	Capabilities of a break-through in ASW	[redacted] Graham, Van Cleave 25X1

	Topics	Team Expert
2.	Civil Defense	Graham
3.	Command and Control capability including Hardening and Redundancy	Vogt
4.	Backfire and Strategic Air Force	Vogt
5.	Anti-Satellite Testing	Welch (?)
6.	Directed Energy Weapons	Van Cleave
7.	ABM Research amended to include Air Defense	Van Cleave Wolfowitz
8.	Mobile ICBM's (SS 16 & SS 20)	Vogt
9.	Depressed Trajectory Threat	Van Cleave
10.	Soviet Defense Spending	Graham
11.	Soviet Doctrine of Strategy of Limited Nuclear Options	Wolfowitz
12.	Concealment and Deception	Van Cleave

The following topics were added at the suggestion of Team Members:

13.	Soviet Strategic Objectives in SALT II negotiations	Van Cleave
14.	Soviet efforts to acquire US technology	Wolfowitz
15.	Soviet view of non-central (non-strategic) systems	Wolfowitz
16.	Knowns and Unknowns in Soviet R&D	Team

The Team experts agreed to write contributions on the topics in their areas of expertise as indicated in the list. Each member will submit contributions of 200-500 words and be prepared to defend the Team position during conferences with Team A. Pipes will be principal drafter on the methodology section and put the entire report in final form. Target date for completion of draft contributions is 8 September.

25X1 [redacted] offered secretarial support for the Team.

Wolfe, Weiss, and Welch will be asked to work on topics in which they have particular expertise.

Team B Strategic Policies and Objectives will check with the other sections of Team B to see how broadly they have interpreted their charters.

In response to a question from Van Cleave, Pipes said that he felt there would be no problem with funds for moderate travel by Team members as this could be handled

25X1 [redacted]

7. Graham opened the discussion on methodology with the comment that the NIE, from the time of the McNamara era, has made net assessments which are not supported by the evidence. He also said there is a tendency to mirror-image when writing about the Soviet military effort. As a final point he noted that every estimate since 1962 has used the impact of economic pressures in the Soviet system as the fundamental reason for a judgment of the Soviet military effort.

Pipes said there should be two aspects to the critique of the NIE process:

1) noting that the estimate is based on assumptions which are not spelled out, for example, that the Soviet military effort is basically defensive and that the Soviets want to spend as little as possible on weapons, etc.;

2) technical flaws in the process of preparing the NIE.

Van Cleave commented that the NIE seems to reject the idea of unanimity in the Soviet decision making process and suggested that some attention be given to party-military relations.

Graham noted that the NIE process forces compromises on controversial issues.

3. The Team agreed to invite the following individuals to brief:

25X1 [redacted] - NIE process
Richard Foster - Soviet strategic weapons and their role in Soviet strategic thinking
Andrew Marshal - economic aspects of the Soviet strategic effort
General Keagan - lasers & other directed energy weapons
25X1 [redacted] - Soviet command and control, hardening as well as the thrust of the Soviet strategic effort
Sherman Kent - NIE process
James Schlesinger - NIE process
Thomas Moorer - JCS problems with the NIE process

Possible additional briefers:

Paul Nitze
James Angleton

25X1 [redacted] agreed to contact the briefers and schedule them for the 15-17 September briefing period. Tentatively it was agreed to schedule one briefing in the morning and two in the afternoon. Briefing sessions are to be limited to one and one-half hours.

[redacted] 25X1