

Executive Registry
76-5829


13 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
DDA
NIO

SUBJECT : Speaking Appearances

On occasion (e.g. Counterspy article based on Don Gregg's remarks to students at the University of Texas) a speaking appearance by an Agency official may be inaccurately reported. Although more often than not we are left with no possible or effective rebuttal anyway, absence of our own record frustrates this option in every case. Accordingly, I urge that Agency speakers make it a practice of recording their remarks, including Q & A exchanges. This is a standard procedure, I may add, whenever the DCI speaks in public. The tape should be retained for a reasonable period of time (45-60 days).

STATINTL


Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director

cc: DCI ✓
DDCI

Revelations from CIA's Former Korea Chief

Donald Gregg reveals CIA Could Overthrow Park Dictatorship

By Steve McGuire

On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speaking at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent left it open whether the CIA would support a coup against Park like the one in which Diem was assassinated in Vietnam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for sounding such a warning includes being the CIA chief of station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25 years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and Korea.

The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on "Policy Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was prevailed upon to provide a meeting place.

Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence information about the North. Gregg personally feels that the best thing which Park could do would be to resign. He could then be a national hero and also be responsible for South Korea's first peaceful change of government. However, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with information about coup attempts. Whether they will continue to do so in the future is unclear.

Gregg had high praise for Lt. General James F. 'Holly' Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in Korea. An article which appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as an old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill commies. Hollingsworth claimed that he could end another Korean War in nine days, four days of 'real violence' and five days to clean up. Gregg said he agreed with Hollingsworth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the *WSJ* article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth.

Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once caught the South Koreans with sophisticated weaponry which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confronted the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S. Admiral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his 'sources'.

Gregg suggested that aerial surveys be made to see if

the Koreans were building a berth for the weapon. Sure enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them.

The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor.

Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by CIA-backed Mafia-hit men, Gregg said that he once asked why Richard Helms failed to tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise.

Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelligence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kissinger has been one of the CIA's most 'avid customers'. Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were going to lose. The CIA was a major source of information during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action.

Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was a major nuclear weapons base. He said that the Marianas were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was not involved in squelching dissent on the islands.

From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it, the CIA 'did their job right'. Apparently meaning that the radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of Japan, was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA, employing one of their favorite techniques, provided support for moderate left opposition parties such as the Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working for the Department of Army and an employee of the American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the Japanese police.

Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was made no mention of

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Operation Phoenix.

Regarding CIA involvement in the overthrow of Allende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. government's design for South America. It was essential that Allende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World countries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist governments which it feels threaten U.S. interests.

On international terrorism Gregg felt that Libya was the 'patron saint' of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya appears to be the country which is providing a substantial part of the financial and moral support for the terrorists throughout the world.

After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of professors gathered in the plush surroundings of the University of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don Gregg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and the hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign, Don?"

"Sagittarius," he said.

"I knew it, a fire sign, a sign of adventure."

Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in the CIA. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in that time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it was the thing to do at that time."

In the midst of the polite chit-chat the CIA gets down to "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzi, director of the Center for Asian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow the CIA to train their people at the Center. Jannuzi equivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treatment. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia be more convenient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an arrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he apparently resists their blandishments.

Dr. Sidney Weintaub, who had invited Don Gregg to speak at the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people to remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet and interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been

approached twice by Bill Wood with the offer of a speech from the CIA, including one time shortly after Weintraub's arrival (Fall 1976).

Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local CIA office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "I don't believe we've met." No one escapes being asked: "Do you think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons than others.

The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion session of stressing the idea that the CIA is basically an "alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy, continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured.

The less public process of establishing liaison with the academic community engaged in foreign area studies also continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers represent valuable sources of training and expertise to the CIA and the centers are highly dependent upon an always uncertain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and students. That this might be morally wrong, that area specialists should not be agents of a particular government, and that they may be accordingly shut out of their countries of interest, is not brought up.

Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to recruit where possible, "When you get to the job hunting stage give me a call down at the Federal Building." In general, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty.

In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA, throughout its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This includes both the 'legal and illegal' acts which the CIA committed in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted, the CIA is really in the 'people business'. We know that, and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which people.

Executive Registry

76-5827

10 December 1976
1:15 p.m.

Mr. Bush,
President, ABC Sports,
Roone Arledge/would like you to do him a favor. Larry Collins,
a writer (Oh Jerusalem), would like an appointment with you to
discuss a new book he is writing. Mr. Arledge was wondering if
you would see Mr. Collins.

Debbie

Jeannette (Mr. Arledge's sec.)
(212) 581-7777 X8844

A.T.F.
Please handle
What is book about etc?
Thanks -
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Pub Affs
THE AMERICAN OVERSIGHT

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700110006-5

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Executive Registry
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

12/18/76

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Fyi, particularly
because of the hometown
origin

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The Houston Post

2 December 1976

Donald Morris / an analysis

No cover-up in Oswald's Mexico visit



The current flurry of interest in Lee Harvey Oswald's 1963 visit to Mexico City is a perfect example of paranoia at work. It all looks so sinister, and who is trying to cover up what, and why?

The answer, of which nobody in the intelligence business has the slightest hope of convincing anyone outside the business, is that nobody was covering up anything.

The CIA had and has a large station in Mexico City, with excellent liaison ties with the Mexican internal service. The Mexicans and the Americans naturally monitor every telephone line into every Soviet installation — these are not "CIA" taps, although the agency may provide equipment and technical advice. (The agency, thoroughly tarred, may claim the taps simply to spare the Mexican government embarrassment.)

These taps do not provide as much substantive material as one might think. The Soviets do indeed meet American agents in Mexico City — but they are not children and they know perfectly well that their lines are tapped. Their communications arrangements with their agents include very firm instructions not under any circumstances ever to call the Soviet embassy, and they will shun like the plague anyone who does. What pops up on the taps, therefore, are the assorted nuts and cranks who for various reasons want contact with the Soviets.

Every shred of evidence shows that neither the Soviets nor the Cubans wanted anything to do with Oswald, whom they regarded as very bad news indeed. In September 1963 he went to Mexico City and called both the Soviets and the Cubans, offering "information" in return for a free trip to Moscow or Havana — a splendid example of how little Oswald knew about the intelligence world. (Nobody gives

free trips for unspecified "information." But nobody.)

The Soviets had no intention of letting him return to the USSR, where he had been a major nuisance. They told him it would take three or four months to "process his visa application." Oswald lied to the Cuban officials about what the Soviets had told him (another example of ignorance on his part — did he think they wouldn't check?) and left Mexico in a huff.

The agency — which turned over all information on contacts between Americans and Soviets in Mexico to the FBI — did in fact turn this contact over weeks before Nov. 22. But it was one crank call among scores of others, and the name Oswald, while known as a crank, had no significance whatsoever to anyone in October 1963. There are American nuts in every country calling Soviet installations for one reason or another, and Mexico is as fertile a source of such names as anywhere else.

The record of the call also went to the Warren Commission. It was not a verbatim transcript. No clerk typist whose work, week after week, is typing transcripts of tapes, can or does make absolutely verbatim tran-

scripts. (Just watch a TV show "captioned for the deaf" to see how impossible it is.)

On the whole, the CIA performed commendably in catching the contact, transcribing it and passing it to the FBI through its normal channels in such a short period. The transcription errors were minor. Had the conversation been reported even with absolute precision it would have had no more significance than what was passed on. It would simply have confirmed what was already known — that Oswald was one of a great number of left-wing nuts again rebuffed in one of his efforts to make himself attractive to the Soviets.

This was not sinister in October 1963. It did not even become sinister in November, although — because of what Oswald then did — it certainly became interesting. It was not sinister during the Warren hearings, and it isn't sinister now.

But no one inside the business will ever convince anyone outside of that. For which we can probably thank Ian Fleming and a host of nameless TV writers.

Donald Morris served with the CIA 17 years. He has been a columnist for The Houston Post since his retirement from government service in 1972.

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Approved For Release 2002/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700110006-5

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 57

PENTHOUSE
January 1977

Executive Registry

76-5811

ATF
This is
a lousy
piece
GPB
2-8

BY TAD SZULC

STAYING SPOOKED

The spy agencies have been ordered to behave themselves. But as these sensational, top secret schemes make painfully clear, it's business as usual in the land of dirty tricks.

These five items, touching upon the whole spectrum of United States intelligence activities, are among the many subjects about which Americans have not been told despite three separate investigations of the intelligence community conducted in 1975 and 1976.

In some instances the investigators simply were not informed about highly sensitive operations. The intelligence agencies volunteered very little and, as a rule, were responsive to questions only when the committees developed independent leads or stumbled upon information (as in the case of the cover-up by the CIA and the FBI of crucial facts pertaining to the assassination of John F. Kennedy).

In other instances the intelligence agencies invoked "national security" as a reason for denying investigators access to certain material. Finally, there were compromises: the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, for example, negotiated the extent to which information would be "sanitized" by them—censored, of course, is a better word—before appearing in public reports.

Perhaps the most important area of such compromise on the part of the Senate committee, which engaged in the most exhaustive investigation of all the groups looking into the intelligence scandals, concerned the CIA's use of American news media and the involvement of university professors and administrators—the "academics"—in the recruitment of foreign students by the agency. The majority of the academics, some 60 percent of them, were "witting" (they knew that they were used by the CIA to finger prospective recruits); some were paid for their talent-scouting; others acted out of their perceived sense of patriotism.

But it's not entirely the CIA's fault that this description of the recruiting process failed to surface in the final report. The burden lies chiefly on Sen. Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who served as the committee's chairman, and who, despite his many public pronouncements of indignation over CIA operations, tended to be rather reluctant to embarrass the intelligence community.

This tendency increased when Church entered the Democratic presidential primaries, a period coinciding with the drafting of his committee's final report. As a former committee staff member observed privately, "Church was away a lot, he was not willing to risk his candidacy on pushing too hard, he'd keep things out of the report even if the CIA was willing to let them be printed."

In the case of the academics, the committee staff and the CIA arrived at an agreed "sanitized" draft; but in the rush of things, as the report was being written, Church said, "The hell with it!" and the section on academics was thrown out. Thus this whole subject of foreign student recruitment is dismissed in the report with the comment that "American academics are now being used for such operational purposes as making introductions for intelligence purposes."

The Church committee also compromised to a significant degree on the question of how the CIA's collection of intelligence, a legitimate pursuit, often becomes entangled with covert operations, which was a matter of substantial concern to the investigators. In the year-long tug-of-war between the Senate committee and the agency over what materials could be made available to the senators, the CIA often refused to discuss any number of covert actions on the grounds that intelligence-collection activities could have been compromised in the process. This also applied to "black" propaganda, the CIA's planting of provocative or erroneous information in foreign news organs with the aim of achieving specific political gains.

The agency's argument, forcefully expressed by its outside attorney, Mitchell Rogovin, was that disclosures of all types of covert actions—including political

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Pub Affs

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After Frank Church became a presidential candidate, he kept some things secret even if the CIA was willing to let them be printed.

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covert action—could damage intelligence collection. The CIA, in fact, would not even agree to the use of the word *espionage* to describe its supposedly legitimate work. Committee staffers came to suspect that the agency was using the sacrosanct shield of protecting intelligence collection to conceal covert actions of which the Senate should have been aware.

These distinctions are, of course, extremely hard to document, but the committee's frequent compromises serve to make one wonder how aggressive the individual members of the committee were. Church himself, in the judgment of some of his staffers, was "too soft." Senators Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota and Gary Hart of Colorado, both Democrats, were said to have been "the best," with Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, the Kentucky Democrat, a close second. Tennessee's Republican Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr., was described as "okay, but pro-administration." John G. Tower, the Texas Republican who was the committee's vice-chairman, won the reputation of acting with "benign neglect."

The performance of these committee members raises the larger question of how effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities is likely to be in the future. Some of these senators serve on the new permanent intelligence-oversight committee created by the Senate. Will they be aggressive and insistent that the White House and the intelligence agencies live up to their commitments? Or will they lapse back into the traditional "benign neglect" that characterized Congress when it came to keeping the intelligence community honest, protecting our civil rights, and sheltering the best interests of the United States from mindless and dangerous foreign adventures?

These questions lead, in turn, to the fundamental problem of accountability for the actions of the intelligence community. Notwithstanding Gerald Ford's eminently reasonable view (which, somehow, had not occurred to his predecessors) that the intelligence agencies must ultimately be accountable to the president of the United States, who must take total responsibility for their deeds and misdeeds, Americans still cannot be certain *who*, if anybody, is in charge.

The CIA, which was the target of the greatest criticism during the two-year investigation, still insists, of course, on secrecy and on the need for such operations—highly questionable according to a great many outsiders—as the recruitment of foreign students as "agents in place," and on a variety of other covert actions. But oddly enough, the CIA seems to have taken the new strictures more to heart than have most of its fellow members of the intelligence community.

Considerable credit for this state of affairs is given by intelligence experts to the CIA's new director, George Bush, who has turned out to be much more assertive about the control and management of the agency than had been generally anticipated. Presumably, he has not yet discovered all the skeletons in all the closets of the 10,000-employee agency that for decades had a virtually free rein in what it did at home and abroad—and that had long tolerated such private fiefdoms as Counterintelligence and Clandestine Services. Nonetheless, Bush has shaken up the CIA with new top-level headquarters appointments and major changes overseas. Moreover, he appears to be presiding over the crumbling of the "old-boy network," which for many years had a free run of the agency and was responsible for some of its most damaging policies and enterprises.

But while the CIA is, at least temporarily, accommodating itself to some of the requirements of an open society while retaining its operational capabilities, the same cannot be said of the military agencies—the largest, richest, and most powerful segment of the intelligence community—and, still less, of the FBI.

Military intelligence has become an empire unto itself, supposedly controlled by the secretary of defense (who reports to the president and the National Security Council) but wholly autonomous for all practical purposes. The FBI, even late in 1976,

seemed to be run by the minions of the late J. Edgar Hoover, with neither Clarence Kelley, the director, nor Ford's attorney general, Edward Levi, having much of an idea of what the bureau had done in the past or what it is doing now. As a Church committee senior staffer, who helped investigate both organizations, remarked recently, "Next to the FBI, the CIA smells like a rose."

Both the military intelligence establishment and the FBI pose serious accountability problems. Under a 1976 internal reorganization plan, the Pentagon has brought all its agencies under a director of defense intelligence (a new post) who, in turn, reports to a second deputy secretary of defense (also a new slot), with special responsibility for intelligence. This was judged necessary by the Pentagon bosses because several of their intelligence agencies, notably the huge and supersecret National Security Agency (NSA), had long enjoyed quite a bit of independence from just about everybody in Washington.

But there was a double purpose in reorganizing the military intelligence establishment. First, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted to tighten up the operation, an intention which is probably commendable. But the reorganization has also served to isolate this whole empire from direct civilian control.

In theory, the director of central intelligence (who is also the CIA director) runs the entire United States government intelligence complex. In the past, agencies such as the NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (as well as the CIA) were directly responsible to him—at least operationally—and they couldn't ignore him. Under the Rumsfeld reorganization, they no longer have this responsibility. Now the director of central intelligence, known as the DCI in professional parlance, has to go through the Pentagon intelligence command to deal with these military agencies. Thus a filter has been established.

Moreover, the DCI (George Bush) has lost control over the intelligence community's purse strings, which is the real power. In November 1971 Nixon decided, in one of the few rational moves he made in this area of government, to vest in the DCI the full power to allocate budget resources to the various intelligence agencies—including the military. The idea was that a strong DCI was essential to keep order in the community. However, the DCI (then Richard Helms) never chose to exercise this authority. Responding to military pressures in 1976, Ford moved the budget allocation authority to a new steering committee, in which this responsibility is now divided among the DCI, the deputy secretary of defense, and the deputy director of the National Security Council staff.

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Because Defense controls 90 percent of the overall intelligence budget (which stands around \$25 billion annually, although the administration insists it is no more than \$10 billion—actual figures are secret—by ignoring the vast sums spent on research and development of electronic intelligence hardware), it becomes clear that today the Pentagon is actually the most powerful voice in foreign intelligence.

And considering the qualitative weakness in military intelligence evaluations—analysis is the strong suit of the CIA, and most of it is remarkably honest—there is a growing danger that the intelligence product given to the president and top policymakers will be slanted toward "worst-case" assessments endemic with the military. These assessments, of course, influence the formulation of national defense and foreign policies. It should also be added that covert-action responsibilities including paramilitary operations, are increasingly being shifted from the CIA to military intelligence agencies.

So, once again, we face the question of full-time civilian control (including the president's) of the intelligence apparatus. With the DCI effectively deprived of his role as the president's principal adviser on intelligence, it becomes debatable whether the chief executive can truly be accountable and responsible for all the actions of the intelligence community.

The principal conclusion of the Senate Intelligence Committee after its lengthy investigation is that the president must be fully accountable for United States intelligence. Speaking of the CIA, the committee's report noted that "Washington is where the problem arises. No one outside the CIA, unless it be the president himself, is responsible for directing and supervising CIA clandestine intelligence operations or is authorized access to the information necessary to do so." This, of course, applies equally to the military agencies, particularly the NSA; as matters stand now, the law even prohibits the public disclosure of the NSA's mission.

It is generally known, nevertheless, that the NSA is in charge of everything affecting technological intelligence. It monitors all electronic communications in the world, military and civilian (it illegally eavesdrops on all international telephone calls by Americans and reads all the cable and telex traffic sent and received by Americans); it surveys developments in Soviet and Chinese strategic-arms testing and deployments (as it should); and it is deeply involved in breaking secret foreign codes and devising U.S. codes it hopes will be unbreakable.

Investigators for the Senate Intelligence Committee acknowledge privately that, as a practical matter, they were unable to study adequately the NSA and other military agencies. But they have seen enough to conclude that the NSA's principal weakness is that it is not allowed to analyze the data it obtains. Raw data, often wholly meaningless, is sent on to the White House,

sometimes described as not items. The trouble is that often nobody can make any sense out of it. As one staffer noted, "The state of Maryland [NSA headquarters are located at Fort Meade in Maryland] is sinking under the weight of NSA material that nobody has the time or capability to use." When investigators for another congressional committee, which was pursuing NSA's illegal eavesdropping on private telephone and cable traffic by American citizens, requested pertinent information, NSA officials asked them to sign first a secrecy pledge, which meant that they would be unable to pass on their findings to members of Congress. The investigators refused and went home.

In terms of domestic intelligence, the FBI was—and is—by far the worst offender. In testimony before the Senate committee, Attorney General Levi simply refused to make data available on the FBI's illegal operations ranging from wiretapping to physical surveillance and "black-bag jobs," unauthorized break-ins into homes and offices of individuals and organizations considered radical, dissident, or subversive. FBI director Kelley first convinced committee staffers that he was lying when he said that these operations had ended in 1966; later they learned that Kelley did not know what he was saying.

In what unquestionably was one of the most pathetic public performances on record, Kelley kept repeating on the CBS program "Face the Nation" on August 8, 1976, that he had been "deceived" by his own bureau about "black-bag jobs"—the latest had occurred three weeks earlier—and other lawless FBI operations. Just as pathetically, he acknowledged that he had been unable to find out who in the bureau had so deceived him.

If the FBI director and the attorney general cannot control their runaway bureau, how can the president be accountable for its actions? Considering that the FBI is a vital agency in domestic law enforcement, how long can American presidents tolerate this state of affairs, including the emerging evidence of financial corruption in the bureau? (Kelley himself has been accused of misusing government services and property and accepting expensive gifts from his subordinates.)

The problem of accountability also underlies the five secret intelligence community endeavors mentioned earlier.

(1) *Foreign students' recruitment.* In general, according to the Church committee's report, "The CIA considers . . . operational relationships with the United States academic community as perhaps its most sensitive domestic area." The report added that "the committee has far from the full picture of the nature and extent of these relationships and the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations. Nevertheless, it has enough . . . to underscore its serious nature."

The report spoke out against the overall use of the United States academic community by the CIA, which ranges from pay-

ing scholars to engage in intelligence collection while they travel abroad to provide "leads" and making "introductions" for intelligence purposes. It was unable, as noted above, to go in any detail into the recruitment of foreign students as agents (it did not even mention the subject) but it emphasized that "time and experience would . . . give increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for a democracy to resort to such practices as the clandestine use of free American institutions and individuals—practices that tended to blur the very difference between "our" system and "theirs" that these programs were designed to preserve."

The foreign students' recruitment program has a long history. It was initiated in the 1950s by military intelligence and then taken over by the CIA, which simply refuses to terminate the program although it is now supposedly at a much lower level than in past years.

The idea behind this extraordinary program, concentrating on students from Latin America, the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa—the Third World—was that through recruitment on American campuses, the CIA would in time acquire "deep-cover assets" inside foreign governments, educational and cultural centers, private industry, the military, and so on. These are known as "agents of influence" or, more commonly, as "moles."

The CIA created this covert program on the theory that many young foreigners educated in the United States would become part of ruling elites in their countries. Embedded in governmental or private power, these agents can render two types of services to the CIA: influencing policies favoring the United States, and supplying vital inside intelligence.

Such recruitment is, of course, a long-term investment. The CIA does not expect results for years, even decades. But patience is a hallmark of intelligence work, and the agency is working for the future. However, the agency cannot be certain that, once recruited, these students will remain faithful to the CIA and respond to the control of case officers. The rule of thumb is that no more than one out of ten recruited agents will actually remain in CIA service once he matures and acquires a responsible position.

To assure itself of loyalty, the agency can, and on occasions does, avail itself of blackmail; if a "subject" refuses to cooperate, discreet ways are found to spread the word about his CIA connections—which could ruin him at home. Yet blackmail in this instance could be double-edged: disclosure of recruitment could be immensely damaging to the CIA, to say nothing of the reputation of the United States educational system. But, as a CIA official remarked in a recent conversation, "It was a risk worth taking."

It is impossible to say how many such "agents of influence" are nowadays operational. This is one of the CIA's closest kept

secrets, known only to a handful of people in the agency. But we can suggest the magnitude of the potential pool of recruits available to the CIA.

In 1955, for example, there were 34,232 foreign students in the United States. The number went up to 82,045 in 1965, and to close to 250,000 in 1975. Over a twenty-year period, therefore, the CIA had its pick of some 1 million foreign students. But those familiar with the program doubt that more than 100 or so foreigners would be recruited during an average year. Extremely high selection standards had to be applied, considering both the promise a student held for the future and his political receptivity to CIA enticements.

It is believed that one of the most important recruitment areas was the foreign training program of the Agency for International Development. AID in the past has served as a "cover" for other CIA operations, most notably through its refugee relief program in Indochina. The CIA believed that a foreign "contract" student had at least a moral debt to the United States and thus might be more open to its persuasion.

Agency officials still claim that this is a necessary ingredient in building an effective foreign-intelligence network. They profess to see no difference between it and the open recruitment of American students.

Another side of this story is the way in which the CIA has been using—and continues to use—"academics" (professors and administrators) to help in its recruitment. As noted above, some 60 percent of these academics were selecting promising candidates for recruitment and making "introductions" in full knowledge that they were acting on the CIA's behalf. In an undetermined number of cases, money would change hands. The other 40 percent of these academics were "unwitting": they did not know that they were fingering recruits for the CIA, thinking, instead, that they were being helpful to the students by introducing them to prospective above-board employers. The CIA recruiters worked, of course, under deep cover.

Evidently, both the CIA and the "witting" academics were guilty of vastly reprehensible behavior. They were—and still are—responsible for polluting, prostituting, and degrading the American educational system, one of our most admired institutions. The CIA is guilty of suborning the academics. The academics, in turn, are guilty of allowing themselves—and their institutions—to be corrupted. Often they do it because they have individual CIA contracts for research or books that they do not wish to jeopardize.

Curiously, no investigative body has ever thought of looking into these relationships that exist in more than 100 American colleges and universities.

(2) *Use of American news media.* In 1976 the CIA admitted that it had relations with some fifty United States journalists "accredited" abroad, although it refused to disclose their names. It also said that "effective immediately, CIA will not enter into

any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station."

The Senate committee believes, however, that "fewer than one-half [of the fifty] will be terminated under the new CIA guidelines." At least one staffer believes that 194 American news-media personnel had CIA ties if "infrastructure" workers, such as telex operators, are included.

In some instances American journalists were CIA employees while performing *bona fide* professional functions. "Infrastructure" workers used these jobs as "covers" for other activities, usually taking advantage of the fact that they had unusual working hours and thus their movements escaped suspicion. Speaking of CIA-employed newsmen, a Church committee staffer said, "They were CIA case officers masquerading as journalists rather than newsmen who were used 'wittingly.'"

Although the Senate report has not gone into these operational details, it is also known that in numerous instances special relationships existed between CIA officials and legitimate newsmen based either on professional favors or even payments for specific jobs performed. For example, according to a Senate staffer, "a correspondent would be told by a CIA officer that 'so long as you're going to such or such city, why don't you look into this or that for me?'" This procedure, it should be noted, is distinct from normal relationships between foreign correspondents and CIA officials, who maintain special contacts and exchange information or opinions on a "two-way-street basis." A great many newsmen engage in such relationships, just as they do with State Department or U.S. Information Agency personnel.

The CIA's use of the media is dangerous because it undermines the credibility of the American press both abroad and at home. Thus it is, in the long run, a disservice to United States institutions. That the Soviet Union, say, uses its journalists for intelligence work is, obviously, not an excuse. As the Senate report observed, the line between "our" system and "their" system should not be blurred.

(3) *Vietnam "stay-behind" spies.* The Vietnam peace agreement, negotiated by Henry Kissinger for the United States and signed in January 1973, provided that "the United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam" and that within sixty days of the signing, the United States would withdraw all "troops, military personnel . . . and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material."

Two months earlier, however, the Pentagon approved a top-secret plan designed to violate the peace agreement the moment it was signed. Worked out between

the American military command in Saigon (MACV) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, this plan, denominated "Organizational Changes in Southeast Asia," provided for the establishment of a covert minicommand in South Vietnam, heavily emphasizing intelligence operations, when the peace agreement went into effect. The cover for this minicommand was the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) at the American Embassy in Saigon.

Normally, defense attaché offices are staffed with a handful of military personnel. The new Saigon DAO, however, was assigned 50 military personnel and 1,345 persons described in the document as "Department of Defense civilians." In this case "Department of Defense civilians" were created by changing from military uniforms to slacks and sport shirts. Of the 1,395 personnel attached to the Saigon DAO, 219 were described as "intelligence personnel." The operational order noted candidly that six military personnel in DAO "will perform traditional DAO missions and/or functions." It was a carefully engineered piece of deception.

Dated November 27, 1972, this immensely detailed order included a contingency plan for the reintroduction of American tactical air operations into Vietnam should the Communists violate the cease-fire. But the main emphasis was on intelligence operations.

The minicommand thus encompassed the 219-man "Intelligence Division" charged with responsibility for "continuing essential aspects of operations, intelligence and contingency planning, [and] force development." An "Intelligence Branch" of DAO's "Readiness Operations Section" acted as the "primary U.S. element for collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information pertaining to NVA/VC [North Vietnam Army/Viet Cong] activities in the Republic of Vietnam [RVN]." A "Surveillance Section" coordinated "Humint" (human intelligence) activities, which was the Pentagon's espionage network to be left behind after the cease-fire. This surveillance section was also the "in-country contact point for coordinating unilateral 'Humint' operations with Department of Defense collection units from out-country." This was the plan for secretly introducing military intelligence teams into Vietnam from abroad. These teams, crossing by air from Thailand to be dropped in Vietnam, worked with the South Vietnam army's intelligence units under DAO's coordination.

Additionally, DAO provided daily intelligence summaries on South Vietnam and "adjacent territories," indicating that military intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos (and, presumably, North Vietnam) were run out of Saigon by Americans. A "Counter Intelligence Section" formulated "security policies to prevent, detect, neutralize hostile espionage and subversion attempts, conduct discreet liaison with ARVN [Army of Republic of Vietnam] counterintelligence and police agencies."

The plan took into account the possibility that United States military intelligence operations would "not be authorized" in South Vietnam under the DAO cover, probably because they would be violating the peace agreement. Noting that in such an event there "would be appreciable degradation of intelligence available to support U.S. objectives," the document devised alternative methods.

Thus a small group within DAO "would be required to obtain the total intelligence output" of the South Vietnamese military intelligence and "to forward it in some meaningful format to an agency capable of collating, analyzing, and disseminating this intelligence." This would be "externally" coordinated. The top-secret "Fast Pass" operation—the standing arrangement for exchange of intelligence with South Vietnam—"would be appreciably expanded."

Because Americans held South Vietnamese intelligence in low esteem and were particularly concerned about "coverage" along the borders and in Laos and Cambodia, United States military intelligence personnel were stationed not only in Saigon but also in Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, "and other areas as required."

This Pentagon intelligence network had to be removed when South Vietnam was taken over by the Communists in the spring of 1975. But intelligence experts say that

there are still American, or American-directed, "stay-behinds" working under deep cover in Vietnam.

(4) *Insurgent training.* Military intelligence agencies, with CIA assistance, are training foreign insurgent groups at abandoned airfields in out-of-the-way areas in California. The purpose of this effort is unclear except for the likelihood that the United States wishes to have ready-to-move foreign guerrilla units for possible covert operations in different parts of the world.

Among several hundred guerrillas being trained in California there are Laotians and Cambodians drawn from post-1975 refugees as well as Afghans, Kurds, and Russians. The Kurds are the survivors of the Kurdish tribal army that fought for years the government of Iraq with help from the Iranians next door and from the CIA under a secret program approved by Nixon in 1972. The Kurdish army was destroyed in 1975 when the shah of Iran, who struck a deal with Iraq, withdrew his support and the CIA followed suit.

There are, of course, ample precedents for secretly training foreign guerrillas on American soil. It was done with Cuban exiles in preparation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and with Tibetans secretly brought to Colorado by the CIA in the mid-1960s for reasons that still remain mysterious.

The California training program suggests that the Pentagon is increasingly taking over paramilitary covert operations responsibilities from the CIA.

(5) *Space warfare.* This information is extremely limited and closely held in the White House. Reliable sources say, however, that during 1976, Soviet satellites damaged one United States "spy-in-the-sky" satellite and destroyed another by firing a laser-beam charge.

Under the provisions of the 1972 Soviet-American agreement on limiting strategic arms, both sides are permitted to use space satellites and other "national means of verification" to police the enforcement of the pact.

Washington specialists are perplexed over these Soviet attempts to interfere with United States satellite verification procedures. Some of them suggest that the United States has not yet fully developed its laser-firing capability in space.

In any event, these attacks on American satellites are a top intelligence secret. As far as can be determined, the Ford administration does not wish them to be known publicly so as not to damage current negotiations on a new strategic-arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

But it seems that the government always feels there is a reason why Americans "should" be kept in the dark about what the intelligence community is up to. Clearly the time has come to end the cover-ups and stonewalling, and to inform our citizens about what the intelligence agencies are doing that affects all of us and the legitimate interests of the United States. ~~Of~~