

Executive Registry
71-7157/3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11-15 Mar
I-23.1

1 APR 1976

Mr. Ramsey Forbush



Dear Mr. Forbush:

Helene Boatner has been kind enough to show me your thoughts on how National Intelligence should be produced. As you may know, I have a responsibility to reexamine the system and make changes if I think them necessary. Since I am approaching the problem cold, the views of those who, like yourself, have been deeply involved and understand what is required are especially valuable.

You might be interested to know that I had lunch a few weeks ago with several of your ONE colleagues, including Sherman Kent and John Huizenga. They and a number of others have urged me, as you have, to reestablish an advisory board. I have not yet decided to do so, but the arguments in favor are strong and you have reinforced them.

Again, many thanks for your suggestions. Please feel free to write again. I would like to stay in touch with our distinguished alumni.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush
George Bush

I-23.1
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Remarks:

Attached is the response you requested to Ramsey Forbush. I had had a copy of his paper earlier. Essentially, he wants to add the old ONE system to the NIO's. I suspect this is more structure than we need.



Richard Lehman

Executive Registry
Room 7-E-12
Headquarters

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Richard Lehman

7E44

Hqs.

30 Mar

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Dick Lehman

1. Dick please review
2. Please draft
a short note
to him from me
of thanks!

GB

Executive Registry
76-7157/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]

Special Asst. to DCI

STAT

Attached is another input to the "what to do about national intelligence" problem. It was sent to me by Ramsey Forbush. Ramsey, as you may recall, was the last head of ONE (during the months between Huizenga's retirement and abolition of ONE) and the first head of OPR. Between retirement and moving to Santa Fe, he headed the OTR-sponsored team that did the study on "CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making." This one is for you to pass on to the DCI if you think he'd be interested. I am sending a copy to Dick Lehman.

[Redacted] (DATE)
Helel Forbush -- 15 Mar 76

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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Basic
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REORGANIZING TO IMPROVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Recent Congressional cavortings aside, it is a fact that the performance of CIA and the Intelligence Community in the preparation of National Intelligence has been extremely uneven during the past few years. Improvement is both possible and necessary; it must stem principally from organizational change. For only if there is a more potent and skillful directing body can National Intelligence become more responsive to the needs of key policy makers, more supportive of their difficult tasks, and more anticipatory of emerging problems which they will have to face in the future.

A new Office for the Production of National Intelligence should be established, absorbing the effective practitioners among present National Intelligence Officers and taking on certain functions now sketchily handled by the Intelligence Community Staff (which should be appropriately reduced in size). This new office should be headed by a distinguished expert on international affairs who would report directly to the DCI and, at the same time, maintain close working relationships with the various intelligence production shops in the Community. The office itself would be relatively small but would command the best talent obtainable.

Responsibilities would include:


1. Preparation of National Intelligence Estimates of high quality and perceptiveness;
2. Intimate contact with policy makers and the provision of National Intelligence relevant to their concerns;
3. Looking ahead, independently, so as to identify and focus attention upon new international problems before they have fully emerged;
4. Regular review of the intelligence products of Community elements and the selection of the best for special

The main components of the new office would be:

1. Its director and a senior advisory panel of 8 or 10 distinguished intelligence figures who would take the lead in assuring the quality of National Estimates, exercising the independent anticipatory role, and overseeing the process of broad review;
2. A liaison staff of perhaps a dozen who would keep up regular, frequent contact with policy makers, making sure that National Intelligence was effectively transmitted -- and responsive as well as responsible;
3. A permanent substantive staff of 20 or 25 middle-grade intelligence officers, most of whom would be area specialists, and all of whom would be selected for perceptiveness of mind, for drafting talents, and for a bent toward predictive intelligence;
4. A changing cadre of highly specialized experts, secunded from other production offices in the Community for such periods as required to prepare particular National Intelligence Estimates or to carry through other projects of outstanding importance.

An office thus designed would be small enough to hold bureaucratic problems to a minimum so as to devote all its energies to the challenging assignments it would face. It would have the strength to do a superior job -- not only through the prowess and imagination of its own people, but also through its ability to call upon the very best resources available anywhere in the Intelligence Community.

It could, I am convinced, do much to overcome some of the most glaring weaknesses in present intelligence performance.


Ramsey Forbush

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Remarks:			
<p>You asked for reorganization suggestions from anyone with ideas. Here are two from Helene Boatner, who has had experience in the DDI (OER) and ONE and has been detailed twice to the NIO for special assignments.</p> <p>to 3: Thought you might wish to see this.</p> <p>cc: Richard Lehman (w/attachments)</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
John D. Iams, Comptroller JDI			MAR 1976
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PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE PRODUCTION OFFICES

- FACTS:
1. The notion of a geographic, rather than functional, organization of CIA intelligence production offices has been discussed often but never tried.
 2. We have considerable evidence (e.g., [redacted] DCI Correspondence, OTR Study of Jan. 1976) that more cross-disciplinary analysis is desired by consumers.

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THESIS: Geographic organization should be tried now.

ADVANTAGES:

Encourage inter-disciplinary analysis.

Better basic organization for forming temporary task forces.

Provide opportunities for most talented analysts and analyst-supervisors, whether or not the talent is divided in proportion to the number of functional specialists.

Eliminate duplications of production staffs, editorial reviews.

Reduce proliferation of types of publications and shift emphasis to publishing: (1) Agency and (2) intelligence documents, instead of scientific, economic, or military documents.

Relate allocation of production resources to intelligence subjects rather than analytical specialties.

Force a rethinking of the need for every currently existing position.

Fresh chain of command for all, providing new opportunities for those who may have potential unrecognized by current supervisors.

DISADVANTAGES:

Substantial discomfort. Most people don't like sweeping changes, and some employees will feel severely threatened by it.

Probably some initial (and temporary) reduction of output while changes are being effected.

SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION - MAJOR COMPONENTS

- O/DDI -- Management and Executive Staffs
- Production Staff
- Central Reference Service (ex. Info. Services Group)
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- Imagery Analysis Service
- Cartography Service (ex. Geography Division)
- Experimental Analysis Service -- to include CDAM of ORD

Office of:

- *Soviet/East European Affairs
- European Affairs
- Western Hemisphere Affairs
- Asian Affairs
- Near East/African Affairs

Drawn from:

- OCI, OER, OPR, OSR,
- CRS - Info. Services Group,
- OGCR - Geography Division,
- OSI, OWI, Life Sciences
- Division of ORD

REMOVED FROM DIRECTORATE:

- Operations Center to O/DDCI
- COMIREX to IC or S&T
- Collection Guidance and Assessment Staff to O/DDCI (?)

*Probably would need specialized military components. Others probably do not; they need military specialists in the branches.

PRODUCING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The "NIO SYSTEM"

- Prime Strengths -- Publicity expressed confidence of DCI;
careful selection of top personnel.
- Emphasis on Community-wide and Agency-wide contacts.
- Role in requirements, collection, etc.
- Basic Weaknesses -- Analysts lack responsibility for (and pride in)
final product. Directorate and component
managers do not "value" it as highly as
their "own" products.
- Regular, routine duties compete for attention of drafters.
- Problems approached by narrow specialists and by the same experts who do the component publications. Scope is too often single-discipline and small-region. Few challenges to conventional wisdom.

THE "ONE SYSTEM"

- Prime Strengths -- Analyst/author concern for product from beginning to end.
- Competitive views challenging the conventional wisdom of other components.
- Cross-disciplinary, world-view analysis. Collective approach minimizing one-person dictation of conclusions.
- Basic Weaknesses -- Lack of special DCI concern or imprimatur.
- Too Agency-centered.
- Too production-centered.
- Too formalized.

A PROPOSAL - THE "OFFICE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE"

- SIZE: 75-85 including 8-10 NIO's, plus staffs of 3-6 each and necessary clerical and production staff support.
- PERSONNEL: Largely CIA but drawn also from Community at large. No more than 2/3 of the Agency professionals from DDI. All initial appointments on 1-year trial -- taken seriously. Normal full tour -- 3 years.
- SUBORDINATION: Part of CIA, reporting to DCI on Community matters and new DDCI on Agency ones. Responsibility vested in CIA more clearly than ever by Executive Order. Must have all resources of Agency rapidly and easily at hand. Must not be subordinate to any Directorate.
- PROCEDURES: ONI staffers to draft most, but not all, papers and follow them through to completion. Other drafters (CIA and other) move temporarily to ONI, devote full time and attention to the job, become temporary members of ONI team, and submit drafts to NIO, not through parent channels.
- All terms of reference and drafts referred to each NIO for review by each Staff. ONI review of draft for Community coordination to include (inter alia) detailed joint review by at least 3 NIO's or their delegates.
- ONI to continue all non-production activities now under NIO purview.