

TOP SECRET

25X1

M. Reports to USIB by the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee and the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

111. In March 1959 the USIB established two new committees, the Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee (SSISC) and the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC). These two committees took over functions previously performed by inter-departmental ad hoc groups organized under Defense Department auspices chaired respectively by the Advance Research Projects Agency and by the Air Force. In response to a January 1959 letter from the DCI requesting views on the desirability of USIB assuming such responsibilities, Acting Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles had expressed agreement in a March 1959 letter to Mr. Dulles that the work of these two ad hoc groups should now be formalized within the USIB structure. 202 / Consequently the two USIB committees were established based on recommendations by the Office of the CIA Deputy Director for Coordination. The SSIRC was to facilitate development and utilization of a national space surveillance system against foreign space vehicles for the maximum benefit of the intelligence community, particularly in connection with substantive

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

intelligence requirements and the utilization of data. The SIRC was to provide intelligence guidance and support to U.S. reconnaissance satellite programs, particularly in connection with substantive intelligence requirements and the utilization of data. The Board agreed that the two committees should after an appropriate interval make recommendations with respect to the Board's future approach to problems in their respective fields. ^{203/}

112. Accordingly the first reports to USIB by these two committees were seven month progress reports/on the actions accomplished by each of them to date and those currently pending.

The (SSISC) indicated it had provided guidance to the Advance Research Projects Agency and to the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and had maintained cognizance of three Air Force surveillance operations [redacted] and

25X1

their availability to meet community requirements. The SIRC reported on their comprehensive discussions with the Air Force regarding [redacted] which was responsible for the development of the SAMOS satellite reconnaissance system. Both committees expressed their intention to continue their efforts to ensure that all intelligence requirements of the participating USIB members were given due consideration in the space surveillance and satellite reconnaissance programs. The USIB in November 1959 noted these

25X1

progress reports and agreed that for the present time, the two

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

committees should continue as separate committees, working toward their current objectives. 204/

113. The SSISC did not normally report to USIB during the remainder of its existence until it was abolished in February of 1962. At the meeting prior to the establishment of the SSISC, USIB had approved a statement of space vehicle surveillance requirements developed by the predecessor ad hoc group under Defense auspices. This statement indicated the data required regarding the nature and purpose of the space vehicle, in order of priority (a) immediately available prior to and a few hours after launch, (b) results of interim analysis for a continuing period after launch, and (c) data and analysis on all aspects including scientific findings over an extended period. This statement was considered as preliminary national intelligence objectives, and GMAIC was to study and recommend the relative priorities for the various requirements. 205/ Based on these stated requirements, SSISC subsequently monitored for the intelligence community the space surveillance system, and provided intelligence guidance and advice for its development. In January of 1962, the Chairman of the SSISC recommended that the committee be abolished since its main purpose had been fulfilled with the assignment by the Secretary of Defense of operational control and command of the space surveillance system to NORAD and CONAD, and the integration of intelligence requirements compiled by

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SSISC into the NORAD operational requirement for the system. The USIB approved that recommendation with the understanding that GMAIC would assume responsibility for developing and coordinating future space surveillance intelligence requirements. 206/

114. The SIRC, in addition to its November 1959 progress report to USIB, submitted two reports to the Board on intelligence requirements for satellite reconnaissance systems. The first in March 1960 recommended a proposed letter from the Chairman of USIB to the Secretary of Defense revalidating statements of intelligence requirements for the SAMOS system (then known as Project SENTRY) which had been previously developed in November and December of 1958 by the interagency ad hoc group under ^{the} Air Force which was the predecessor to SIRC. The draft letter also requested vigorous action to expedite completion of the development of the SAMOS system. This committee report was based on a re-examination of the 1958 requirements in view of the estimated date for an initial operational capability of a Soviet ICBM/IRBM force which made it highly desirable to achieve a collection capability with SAMOS at the earliest possible date. This SIRC report appended copies of the 1958 requirements statements which contained

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

operational and technical characteristics for ELINT and COMINT subsystems, as well as for a photographic intelligence capability which contemplated obtaining raw information by electronic transmission, although recoverable satellites were also being considered. National objectives reconnaissance requirements for these subsystems were also stated in priority order particularly in terms of offensive and defensive weapons systems. The photographic requirements specified the use and frequency of coverage desired with ground resolution of objects approximately

25X1

In the December 1958 statement, the highest priority need was said to be intelligence related to warning of the Soviet air offensive threat, but the relative priority of the various collection capabilities was provided for the 1959 - 1960 and 1961 - 1962 time periods. 207/

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

115. The second SIRC report to USIB stemmed from a statement at the 1 June 1960 USIB meeting by Robert Amory, CIA/DDI who was presiding, noting that the President's Scientific Advisory Board was undertaking an overall review of DOD's space-satellite programs and that this matter would be considered at the NSC level at an early date. After the Board members discussed the desirability that any briefing at the highest level include a presentation of relevant intelligence requirements, the Board agreed that the Chairman, SIRC should convene his committee to develop urgently an up-to-date statement of satellite intelligence requirements, bearing in mind the feasibility and practicability of these requirements. 208/ Although the reason for this high level review is not recorded, the termination of U-2 reconnaissance over the USSR after the 1 May 1960 shoot down of Gary Power's U-2 aircraft heightened the urgent need for a satellite reconnaissance capability. Difficulties with the SAMOS system by that time also made a re-examination of intelligence requirements a necessity.

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

missions. COMOR was also directly and frequently concerned with specific problems regarding the security, handling, dissemination and release of TKH material.

120. Reports prepared for the USIB during this period included a special report on the handling of TALENT photography of Cuba which was concurred in by USIB in November 1960. 212/ At the same meeting, USIB concurred in a proposal by the Acting DCI that each agency should decide the applicability of TALENT material which had been downgraded in any presentations to Congressional Committees at the SECRET NOFORN level, bring such questions to USIB if desired. 213/ COMOR also assisted the USIB by issuing a revision clarifying a USIB decision in August 1960 which ^{provided} that release of materials, reports and information obtainable through overflights of the USSR prior to 1 May 1960 (the U-2 shoot down) in the TALENT security control system was authorized after such material had been downgraded to SECRET and bore the dissemination limitation of NOFORN

25X1

214/ Another COMOR report was approved by USIB in December 1960 authorizing the downgrading and release of TALENT material on the Eastern European Satellites, Communist China and

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Indochina obtained prior to December 1959. The procedure was to be the same as for the USSR material, namely downgrading to SECRET NOFORN [redacted] but in this case material on Communist China and Indonesia might also be

25X1

25X1

[redacted] This COMOR report was only approved after resolution of objections by the State USIB member. 215/ In contrast to this early period, COMOR during many subsequent years made more reports to the USIB than any other committee as the overhead reconnaissance program was developed and became operational in providing critically important intelligence.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6