

Volume II

Development of the United States Intelligence Board
Under President Eisenhower, 15 September 1958 - 20 January 1961


1. The first meeting of the United States Intelligence Board was held in the "USIB Conference Room", of the CIA Administration Building at 1045 on 16 September 1958. General Charles P. Cabell chaired this initial meeting as Acting Director of Central Intelligence in the absence of Mr. Allen W. Dulles. The members present at this first meeting are listed as follows:

Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

General Graves B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance, Acting for Rear Admiral Lawrence H. Frost, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy



Major General James H. Walsh, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force

Lieutenant General John A. Samford, Director, National Security Agency

Brigadier General Robert A. Breitweiser, Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative to the USIB

Mr. Ralph R. Roach, Acting for Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Federal Bureau of Investigation representative to the USIB

2. General Cabell began the meeting with the following statement which implied that the functioning of the new Board was to be based upon and follow along the general lines of the previous progress which had been made in developing the intelligence community concept:

The Chairman noted that he had been advised on 15 September that NSC action necessary for the creation of the new United States Intelligence Board (USIB) had been completed. He stated that the members therefore were meeting for the first time as USIB. The Chairman and each of the members then expressed his views on the significance of this event, particularly with respect to matters such as the progress that had been made in recent years in developing the intelligence community concept and the potentialities of the new Board for increasing the coordination and integration of community activities. 1/



3. The Board then gave its formal approval to recommended actions providing for continuity in the normal functioning of intelligence community activities. These proposals as submitted by Mr. Dulles had been approved in principle with amendments at an earlier IAC meeting. The approved recommendations stated that the previous USCIB Executive Committee (less the executive secretary) would be redesignated as the USIB Committee on Communications Intelligence with expanded membership for all USIB agencies and a Chairman to be designated from its members by the DCI with the concurrence of the Board. It was further agreed that this Committee would not be charged with responsibilities for ELINT matters which were to continue to be handled by the ELINT Committee recently established by the USCIB. Each of these committees would report directly to the USIB but coordinate fully on matters cutting across their respective fields, and their Terms of Reference were to include this provision to assist and ensure close coordination. The Director of the National Security Agency was to chair a USIB Coordinating Committee for Signals Intelligence consisting also of the Chairmen of the COMINT and ELINT committees. The Executive Secretary of USIB was to work out arrangements for providing secretariat support for those two committees. Finally the COMINT Committee [and by subsequent action the ELINT Committee] were to recommend to the Board draft DCIDs stating their missions and Terms of Reference. 2/

4. The third item on the USIB agenda was noting the change in NSCID No. 1 authorizing USIB to establish subordinate and working groups, as submitted to the NSC by General Cabell following discussion with the Bureau of the Budget. 3/ Having completed these formalities of establishing itself and providing for continuity, the USIB then proceeded with the regular order of business which was reasonably representative of the Board's agenda for the remaining years of President Eisenhower's Administration.

A. Types of USIB Agenda Items

5. Following the first three items on the agenda of the first USIB meeting, the remaining eleven items listed below 4/ contain examples of most of the types of subjects, reports or discussions considered by the USIB from 15 September 1958 through 20 January 1961:

(a) Approval of minutes of the previous meeting of the IAC on 9 September 1958.

(b) A Situation Review in two parts consisting of:

(1) Consideration and approval of the Watch

Committee Report giving any indications of

hostilities by the USSR or its allies which could

endanger the security of the U. S.


(2) A Review of Sensitive Situations in which the Board exchanged views on developments in actual or potential crisis situations short of hostilities anywhere in the world.

(c) A report by the Critical Collection Priorities Committee on "Exploitation of Soviet-Long-Range Missile Test Activities", which was referred back to the committee for further review and report to the Board.



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(e) A memorandum on "Analysis of Bloc Radio and Press Propaganda" prepared by Mr. Abbot Smith of the Board of National Estimates (BNE), which was noted by the USIB.



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(g) Two estimates were approved with amendments as follows: a SNIE on "Chinese Communist and Soviet Intentions in the Taiwan Straits" and a NIE on "The Outlook in Poland". In addition the Board agreed to release each of these estimates to the United States Information Agency (USIA), which was a decision required by the Board in the case of each approved estimate.

(h) An Executive Session requested by the Chairman during which the members agreed that Mr. T. Achilles Polyzoides of the Department of State should be the initial Chairman of the new COMINT Committee of USIB.

6. These last eleven agenda items came very close to setting a precedent for the types of actions taken in USIB meetings for each of the fiscal year periods from 16 September 1958 through 20 January 1961 as indicated by the percentage of total actions for each type of item in the following table: 5/

Minutes	9-10%
Situation Reviews	9-10%
Estimates and Related Items	30%
USIB Committee Reports	26-29%
Ad Hoc Studies and Reports	7- 9%
Oral Reports and Briefings	4- 5%
Miscellaneous Discussions	5- 6%
Announcements and Presentations	5- 7%

During those years the Board was convened in Executive Session during one-third to one-half of the meetings. In addition to actions in USIB meetings, the USIB has also taken actions by the circulation of memoranda for approval, concurrence or noting for information. In such cases the members might transmit their votes by vote sheet or by telephone, while on items for information only it might be recorded that they had been noted in the absence

of any comment or objection by a member as of a certain date. During this particular period however there were very few Board actions taken by memoranda. The total actions by the USIB taken in meetings or by memoranda during this period are shown in the following table:

	<u>Meeting Items</u>	<u>Memo Actions</u>	<u>Total Actions</u>
16 Sept. 58 - 30 June 59	517	8	525
1 July 59 - 30 June 60	575	12	587
1 July 60 - 20 Jan. 61	<u>279</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>310</u>
Total	1,371	51	1,422

B. USIB Minutes

7. Normally the first item on a USIB agenda would be approval of the minutes of the preceding meeting, subject to any corrections that may be agreed upon. A draft of these minutes was prepared and circulated after each Board meeting by the Executive Secretary with the assistance of his staff which is called the USIB Secretariat, abbreviated to USIB/S. The minutes first recorded the time and place of the meeting and the names of the presiding officers and members present. They presented a relatively brief summary of the pertinent discussion and actions taken by

the Board on each agenda item considered. They were not a verbatim transcript but were essentially a carefully stated record of the decisions or other forms of action taken by the Board together with a resume of the discussion sufficient to provide useful guidance to those who would need to implement the actions, whether they attended the meeting or not. The great majority of agenda items involved consideration of written documents circulated as far as possible in advance of each Board meeting. The minutes therefore tended to consist of an identification of each subject, a reference to the pertinent documentation, a summary of the comments and views, and an indication of the actions taken on the documents, whether approval or concurrence, noting for information, referring to the originator for reconsideration or other action. Actions taken by the Board by memorandum or other means between USIB meetings were usually recorded by "Secretary's Notes" at the end of the minutes of the following meeting. Approval by the Board at its next meeting gave official sanction to the minutes.

C. Watch Committee Reports

8. During the period under review, the next agenda item would normally be a "Situation Review" consisting first of a Watch Committee Report and then a "Review of Sensitive Situations." The preparation of a

weekly report for Board consideration was one of the major functions of the USIB Watch Committee. Its mission stemming from NSCID No. 1 and as stated in DCID No. 1/5 was 6/

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

The committee was composed of a senior officer representing each USIB member organization, one of whom was designated as Chairman by the DCI after consulting the Board. The committee was supported by a National Indications Center headed by a Director provided by CIA and an inter-agency staff. This Center conducted on a continuing basis analyses and evaluation of all-source information and intelligence relating to the imminence of hostilities, and developed conclusions as to indications of (a) Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against the United States, its possessions or forces abroad; U. S. allies or their forces; or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit; or (b) any other development susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize U. S. security. These conclusions were normally presented by the Center in the form of a weekly report for approval by the Watch Committee, consideration and noting by the USIB with any agreed amendments, and subsequent dissemination to the Principals of the USIB

(including the President, the NSC and the JCS) and other appropriate recipients. In the event of an impending critical situation however USIB Principals were to be immediately advised after which the DCI in consultation with the USIB were to prepare and disseminate immediately as appropriate a national intelligence estimate of the situation pursuant to NSCID No. 1. In practice, reports on such critical situations were prepared during an urgently-assembled special Watch Committee meeting, if necessary cleared by each committee member with his USIB Principal and disseminated by the quickest possible means. In this connection however the Terms of Reference of the Watch Committee stress that the proper discharge of the mission of providing warning of hostile action depended upon the carrying out of the complementary watch and estimating functions, and that the Watch Committee should avoid duplicating USIB estimative functions.

9. Watch Committee reports during the September 1958 - January 1961 period normally consisted of one or two page Conclusions on indications of hostilities, with an Attachment providing a background information summary of the pertinent developments on which the committee based its findings. 7/ The Conclusions were generally divided into three or four sections. Section A would normally state that

No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.

Section B began

No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future,

with the addition of "except as noted below" when needed. Section C

generally dealt with "situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet hostile action which would jeopardize U.S. interests", and these words were used as a leading statement in that section beginning in January 1959. Under Sections B, C and if needed D there would be a brief statement or "Note" identifying the nature and locale of the indications of hostile action threatening U.S. security. For example the Watch Report considered at the first USIB meeting had a "Note" under Section B which began by stating that the Chinese Communists would continue with the artillery barrages, interdict supply lines to the Offshore Islands in the Taiwan Straits by using artillery and military elements as necessary, and maintain a high state of readiness for air operations. It then went on to assess the Chinese Communists capability to launch major attacks against certain of the Offshore Islands and their seizure of one or more was possible. It concluded that the Chinese Communists probably would not intend/major military action against Taiwan and the Pescadores but possessed a capability for air attacks against them. The report further concluded that the Chinese Nationalists fearing U.S. concessions in talks with the Chinese Communists, might undertake independent provocative action calculated to embroil the U.S. in hostilities. This statement however was subject to a footnote indicating that the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff, agreed that this is possible, but

considered it unlikely in the immediate future. If of a substantial nature, such a dissenting or differing viewpoint could be expressed by any USIB member as a footnote to the final Watch Report. The final statement under Section B of this initial USIB report dealt with the possibility of Chinese Communist military action against U. S. Naval or Air Units operating in the area and the likelihood of Soviet involvement in support of the Chinese Communists. Section C of this report pointed out that although deliberate hostilities in the Middle East were unlikely in the immediate future the situation there remained unstable, particularly where U. S. and U. K. commitments were involved and incidents or coups could occur at any time. A following "Note" cited a threat to the survival of the Jordanian regime, warning that if it collapsed action by Israel and other neighboring countries to take control of Jordanian territory was likely.

10. The examples in that first USIB Watch Report cited above are typical illustrations of the format and character used throughout the period under consideration. Subsequent reports during the first nine months of the USIB's existence dealt with such diverse situations such as internal developments in Iraq and Lebanon, fighting between the French and Algerians, Soviet and East German threats to the four power status of Berlin and Western access thereto, Israeli-Syrian border clashes, Communist plotting in Cambodia, and instability in Sudan. There were

two Special Watch Reports, one in February 1959 regarding a Soviet trawler cutting North Atlantic cables and another in April involving reserve mobilization in Israel and Syria.

11. During FY-1960 critical situations continued regarding Berlin, the Middle East including Iran and increased instability in Iraq, the Communist guerrilla warfare and unstable political situation in Laos beginning in July 1959, the continued threat in the Taiwan Straits, and military tension between Israel and the UAR. Special reports in that fiscal year appraised unusual military developments in Communist China relating to the Taiwan Straits, and a Chinese Nationalist report of Chinese Communist fighters moving forward to coastal airfields opposite Taiwan.

12. In the period July 1960 - January 1961 an early report had negative conclusions on indications of hostilities in Sections A, B and C followed by a "Note" warning that the current militancy of Soviet foreign policy tactics could give rise to a situation in which the danger of hostilities would be increased. Beginning with the 9 August 1960 coup in Laos the Watch Report concluded that internal developments there were favoring Communist exploitation. It added however that there were no indications of Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese intent to intervene overtly but that this danger would be greater if Thailand or South Vietnam intervened militarily, prompting an Army and Navy footnote saying that the situation was best described as presenting an opportunity

for Communist exploitation without regard to the many possibilities for which there were as yet no indicators. The critical situation in Laos continued to be a major concern but beginning in September 1960 the deteriorating situation in the Congo was frequently reported. Soviet and East German moves regarding Berlin and access thereto were appraised as well as evidence of stepped-up guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, and the threat posed by Soviet military aid to Cuba. Possible Soviet military aid to Algeria and Morocco were also assessed. Special reports were prepared on East German threats to Berlin, unusual developments in Soviet communications security, and major Communist attacks in Laos. Reporting on the military situation in Laos dominated the Watch Report at the end of 1960, including Army and Joint Staff footnotes differing with "estimative statements" regarding possible increased Communist military pressure and commitments. The Watch

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inauguration. The report was evaluated as probably false with no information to corroborate it, but added that the possibility could not be completely discounted. The final 18 January 1961 Watch Report to President Eisenhower dealt with the situation in Laos, and the threat of radical nationalist Communist Bloc African and/ diplomatic support for the Lumumba regime in the Congo.

13. In summary the Watch Reports during this 1958 - 1961 period performed the warning function primarily by citing indications of hostile actions in the areas of the Taiwan Straits (especially the Offshore Islands), Berlin, the Middle East (particularly Jordan, Iraq, Iran and Israeli tensions with Syria and the UAR), Indochina (mainly Cambodia and Laos) and the Congo. It is interesting to note that South Vietnam and Cuba were first mentioned in October of 1960. There were ten special reports during this period, many of them dealing with possible indications of hostile action which were correctly assessed as false or exaggerated. In general, the Watch Reports appraised military capabilities and states of readiness ^{for} hostilities without giving a definite forecast of their occurrence. There appeared to be a tendency to mention possibilities which, while considered unlikely, could not be discounted. In a number of these cases, dissenting footnotes expressed alternative conclusions. Some of these cases highlighted the continuing problem of trying to draw a line between the warning and estimative functions.

D. Review of Sensitive Situations

14. As compared with the Watch Report which was primarily concerned with the imminence of hostilities, this agenda item which was initiated by a January 1957 proposal by Mr. Dulles 8 / to the IAC provided the USIB with an opportunity to review developments in actual or potential crisis situations (short of hostilities) anywhere in the world. Such a review was regularly placed on the agenda of meetings with each of the Board members free to propose matters for discussion. Most of the "Sensitive Situations" were presented orally by one or more of the members, although in some cases a short paper was handed out at the meeting. Generally the discussions consisted of a brief identification and analysis of the situation by a Board member, followed by any additional information or comments by other Board members and when warranted by members of their staff having pertinent knowledge of the situation. These discussions usually involved a short exchange of views by the Board, primarily designed to keep the members current on actual or potential crisis situations which deserved attention or scrutiny by the USIB members and perhaps by their respective Principals. Frequently the Chairman might indicate that he considered a particular subject being discussed of sufficient importance or

interest to merit including it as an item in his regular briefings at National Security Council meetings. On other occasions the discussion would lead to agreement by the Board that a particular situation had such critical aspects or potentialities that an estimate should be initiated or a committee should be assigned to report on it. 9/

15. While the Watch Reports cited some 20 situations where there were indications of possible hostile action endangering U. S. security during the September 1958 - January 1961 period, the "Reviews of Sensitive Situations" during this period included discussions of actual or potential crises (short of hostilities) in over 70 countries or areas of the world. This difference in the areas covered is readily explained by the concept that the "Sensitive Situations" were concerned not only with new developments relating to existing crises but also an effort to anticipate any potential trouble spots which might be prevented or prepared/ for in the near future. Understandably the USSR was the country most frequently discussed during this entire period in an overall average of one-third of the meetings. These discussions covered a wide spectrum of subjects including threatening developments in Soviet foreign and military policies, military capabilities/ especially related systems, or efforts at penetration or subversion of other nations particularly through military and economic aid. The Board gave second attention to the increasingly serious situation in Cuba at about one-third of its meetings,

although it was only in the latter part of this period that indications of hostile actions ^{by Cuba} against the U. S. were mentioned in the Watch Report. Frequent concern was also evidenced, in order of frequency, by discussions of developments in Laos, Iraq, the Congo, Indonesia, the Taiwan Straits and Berlin. The situations in Panama, Communist China (other than the Taiwan Straits), [redacted] Algeria, Sudan, Iran, Venezuela and the Caribbean area especially the Dominican Republic were reviewed on a number of occasions. 10/

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E. USIB Committee Reports

16. Following the Review of Sensitive Situations at the first USIB meeting, the next agenda item was a report by the Critical Collection Problems Committee on "Exploitation of Soviet Long-Range Missile Test Activities". This item was a good example of the types of reports prepared by USIB committees or working groups, which appeared on the agenda of Board meetings during the September 1958 to January 1961 period on an average of three reports per meeting.

17. These USIB committees constituted the principal means of assisting the Board in coordinating the intelligence activities in each of their fields, aside from the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates which was the responsibility of the Board of National Estimates meeting with the "USIB Representatives". In particular, the committees supported the Board in carrying out the responsibilities stated in Paragraph 2 a. of NSCID No. 1

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of (1) establishing policies and developing programs for guidance of the intelligence community, (2) establishing intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities, (3) reviewing and reporting to the NSC, (4) making recommendations on intelligence matters to appropriate U. S. officials, (5) developing and reviewing security standards and practices relating to protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures and (6) formulating appropriate policies regarding intelligence arrangements with foreign governments. These were matters on which the Board was to reach decisions by agreement, with the understanding that when the Chairman determined that a given position represented a consensus of the Board it should be considered as agreed unless a dissenting member requested a reference of the issue to the NSC. 11/

18. The USIB was authorized by NSCID No. 1 to establish subordinate committees and working groups as appropriate. The Terms of Reference of these committees varied as to their missions, organization and procedures depending upon the field of intelligence assigned to them. Some were standing committees while others were ad hoc committees or working groups. Most of the standing committees were established by the issuances of DCIDs. In general all members of the Board could designate representatives on the committees if they desired or had an interest in the particular field. In many cases the committees were authorized not only to advise and assist the Board by submitting reports but also to act for the Board in their respective fields within the limitations of established Board policies and guidance. Consequently, once the Board had

provided sufficient guidance, most of the committees acted on their own by agreement in achieving coordination in their respective fields, reporting to the Board only when the actions they proposed to take were beyond established policy or their Terms of Reference, were specifically requested by the Board, or were of such significant importance or urgency as to require USIB endorsement. This history therefore will be primarily concerned with the reports prepared by the committees for the consideration of the USIB.

19. Following the first USIB meeting the Board agreed that all IAC and USCIB committees and working groups should continue to function under existing Terms of Reference until changed by USIB action. It also agreed that these committees and working groups should consider whether changes in their organization or functions were appropriate, and that the Chairman of each group should report thereon to the Board. By memorandum dated 19 September 1958 the Executive Secretary of USIB requested that each group initiate such action including recommendations regarding revision of Charters or other basic documents covering their activities. 12/

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at that time

20. The 17 standing committees covered the following fields:

- COMINT
- ELINT
- Critical Collection Problems
- Interagency Defector
- Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities
- Procurement of Foreign Publications
- Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications
- Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
- Economic Intelligence
- Economic Defense Intelligence
- Guided Missile Intelligence
- Scientific Estimates
- National Intelligence Survey
- International Communism
- Critical Communications
- Documentation
- Watch

21. In addition responses were requested from the following 5 ad hoc subcommittees and working groups:

- Domestic Exploitation Committee
- Committee on Exchanges
- Resistance Intelligence Committee
- Warning Systems Survey Committee
- Working Group on Arab-Israeli Situation

22. During the spring and summer of 1958 the Charters or Terms of Reference of many of these committees had been reviewed in light of the revised NSCIDs approved in March and April and the impending merger of the IAC and USCIB into USIB. Among the significant changes made during that time was the separation of a single Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications into two committees on Exploitation and Procurement respectively, the establishment of a standing Committee on Critical

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Communications replacing an ad hoc committee, establishment of a Committee on Documentation replacing an ad hoc committee, and the creation of a Critical Collection Problems Committee under IAC-USCIB auspices in February 1958. Consequently most of the committees responded by reaffirming their Charters subject to identifying them as USIB committees and to the additional membership of representatives of the Assistant to the Secretary for Defense for Special Operations and the Director of the National Security Agency who were members of the USCIB but not of the IAC. The principal change in the committee structure was the establishment of the COMINT and ELINT committees (in place of the USCIB) by the issuance of DCID Nos. 6/1 and 6/2 respectively, effective 21 October 1958. 13/ At the 14 October 1958 USIB meeting the Economic Defense Intelligence Committee was dissolved and established as a subcommittee of the Economic Intelligence Committee, while the Committee on International Communism was kept in existence until the remaining Collection Requirements Lists were completed, and renamed the Committee on Intelligence Priorities and Requirements relating to International Communism. 14/ As of 14 November 1958 a new Charter for the Watch Committee was approved. 15/

23. During the first half of 1959 a number of committee Charters were revised and some new committees were established in support of the USIB. Revised Charters were issued for the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence

Committee 16/, the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (replacing the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee) 17/, the Scientific Intelligence Committee (replacing the Scientific Estimates Committee) 18/, and the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee. 19/ On the recommendation of Mr. Dulles based on the increased responsibility for protection of intelligence and of sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures which NSCID No. 1 placed upon the DCI with the assistance and support of USIB, the Board approved establishment of a standing Security Committee in March 1959. 20/ That same month the USIB approved a recommendation by the CIA Deputy Director for Coordination for the establishment of a Space Intelligence Surveillance/Support Committee to facilitate development and utilization of a national space surveillance system against foreign space vehicles for the benefit of the intelligence community. The Board also approved General Truscott's recommendation to establish a regular Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (replacing an existing ad hoc committee) to provide intelligence guidance and support to U. S. reconnaissance satellite programs. 21/ In April a revised Charter for the Committee on Exchanges was approved, establishing it as a permanent rather than an ad hoc committee. 22/ In June 1959 an Ad Hoc Working Group on Intelligence Costs which had been formed in the fall of 1958 reported on

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its efforts to provide a medium by which the DCI and USIB could develop cost data broadly applicable to the intelligence community as a whole. The working group stressed the need to prevent misinterpretations which might damage the intelligence effort because of the differences in cost estimating practices involved in unilateral agency reports to the Bureau of the Budget. The working group therefore recommended and the Board approved the establishment of a standing Cost Estimates Committee responsible for compiling an estimated foreign intelligence cost report for FY-1959 and each year thereafter after the close of the fiscal year, as well as any cost data reports required by the Board. 23/ Then effective as of 26 June 1959 the Board acted on a memorandum by the Executive Secretary on necessary changes, largely of a routine nature, in the Charters or Terms of Reference of USIB committees or working groups which had not been brought up-to-date since the USIB was created. As recommended in this memorandum, in the case of the ad hoc Soviet Weapons Requirements Committee and the ad hoc Resistance Intelligence Committee, the Board instructed them to submit recommendations regarding their future activities and organization. 24/ With these actions completing the reorganization of the committee structure under the USIB, the General Truscott who had shepherded revisions of NSCIDs and DCIDs throughout the process of merging the IAC and USCIB into USIB was commended for his outstanding contribution to intelligence at the 30 June 1959 Board meeting prior to his retirement from CIA.

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24. From mid-1959 through 20 January 1961 there were a number of revisions, additions, or deletions in the USIB committee structure. The Ad Hoc Weapons Requirements Committee was disbanded on its own recommendation in August 1959. 25/ In September 1959 an Emergency Planning Steering Committee was established to coordinate emergency planning activities by the intelligence community for ensuring continued intelligence support to the Government under conditions of nuclear attack. 26/ The Resistance Intelligence Committee recommended and the USIB approved that it be dissolved as a formal standing committee of the Board in September 1959. 27/ In January 1960 an Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Intelligence Publications was formed to draft a reply to a request by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities for a review of such issuances. 28/ In March 1960 the USIB approved recommendations by the Committee on Intelligence Requirements relating to International Communism, including changing its title back to Committee on International Communism and broadening the scope of its activities. 29/ Based on an earlier suggestion by General Cabell for the possible consolidation of the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee and the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, the USIB in August 1960 approved / the creation of a Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to replace those two committees. 30/

25. In addition to the committees and working groups described above, the USIB during the period September 1958 - January 1961 also established a number of temporary committees to handle specific problems which arose. In March 1959 the Board established a Special Committee on the Berlin Situation to monitor significant developments bearing on that situation, including preparing special indicators, keeping abreast of current ^{reporting,} suggesting allocation of collection resources and making other appropriate reports to the Board. 31/ Beginning in mid-March 1959 this Berlin committee reported at almost every USIB meeting until mid August when it was recessed until further notice. 32/ In mid-October 1960 the USIB concurred in General Cabell's suggestion that the Berlin committee be reconstituted and function generally as before, submitting a report in two weeks and thereafter on a monthly basis. 33/ In March of 1959 the USIB approved as a descriptive Board document a proposed paper on Procedures and Secretariat for the USIB. 34/ In September 1960, based upon a study by the Security Committee of personnel security procedures related to classified foreign intelligence, the Board constituted an ad hoc committee of legal and security personnel to consider certain legislative proposals recommended by that Committee which would help to effect overall improvement of the standards of personnel security within USIB departments and agencies. 35/ On 22 November 1960 the USIB noted a report by an ad hoc committee on the Cuban Situation and

agreed that future reports need not be produced at precise intervals but that the committee should watch the situation closely and produce future reports on its own initiative or as requested by a Board member. 36/

26. The frequency with which the work of each of these committees appeared upon the USIB agenda varied widely depending upon the particular types of functions. During the 28 months / ^{from} September 1958 to January 1961 only five of the 23 standing committees at the end of that period were the subject of Board actions on an average of more than once per month. As might have been expected based on the USCIB experience, actions related to the work of the COMINT Committee were recorded in the USIB minutes on an average of ^{once} / / per week, far more than any other committee. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee was the subject of Board concern about twice per month. (on matters other than its regular weekly reports) The Watch Committee/ Critical Collection Priorities Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee each appeared, in order of frequency, on an average of more than once per month. Other committees appearing in descending frequency on the Board's agenda were those dealing with Security, Defectors, Critical Communications, Scientific Intelligence, ELINT, Overhead Reconnaissance, Exchanges, / Documentation, Economic Intelligence, National Intelligence Surveys and Cost Estimates. Action relating to all the remaining standing committees

(Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, Procurement of Foreign Publications, International Communism, [REDACTED] Space Surveillance Intelligence Support and Emergency Planning Steering Committees) were recorded in USIB minutes three or less times during this period, with the exception of the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee which did not report to the Board except for approval of its Charter. The six ad hoc committees or working groups all reported to the Board except the one dealing with Legislative Proposals Regarding Personnel Security which had just been formed in September 1960. The most active in reporting to the Board were the Special Committee on the Berlin Situation and the Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation. The Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Intelligence Publications submitted three reports to USIB, the Working Group on the Cuban Situation reported once and the Warning Systems Survey Committee made a preliminary report in January 1961.*

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* An analysis of significant actions taken by USIB related to the work of the more active committees will be the subject of later sections of this Volume.

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
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F. National Intelligence Estimates and Related Agenda Items


27. The last five items on the agenda of the first USIB meeting before the Board went into Executive Session were concerned with various aspects of the functions of the Board of National Estimates. BNE as it was called was primarily responsible for assisting the Director of Central Intelligence with the support of the USIB in producing National Intelligence Estimates pursuant to Paragraph 4 a. of NSCID No. 1. 37/ These estimates, along with the Watch Reports, constituted "the national intelligence" defined/as therein "that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency." In effect it is the principal end product of the intelligence community prepared for the President and the National Security Council, as well as the USIB member departments and agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The term "produce" as related to this national intelligence is also defined in NSCID No. 1 as meaning "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" which is one of the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency specified in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Section 102 (d) (3). 38/ Consequently the production of national intelligence was assigned personally to the DCI with the support of the USIB, with the proviso that intelligence so produced shall have the concurrence, as appropriate of the USIB members or shall carry a statement of any substantially differing opinion of such a member.

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28. This assignment to the DCI of individual responsibility for the substantive content of national intelligence meant that, after considering all of the facts, views and opinions of the USIB, the final version of an NIE, SNIE or Watch Report was to be determined solely by the DCI. The other Board members however had the right to have any substantially differing opinion recorded in the document as disseminated to the President and other national security officials. In practice Mr. Dulles and most DCIs have sought to achieve a meaningful consensus on these estimates or Watch Reports, short of compromising essential judgments or watering them down to the least common denominator. This line is difficult to draw in terms of value and service to the policy makers since neither a weak and ambiguous agreed estimate or a widely split and contentious version carries much weight in official circles. On the other hand differences of view are quite sincere and understandable considering that all the essential facts can never be available and these estimates are inevitably projections into an uncertain future. Under these circumstances expressions of rational divergencies can be useful to policy makers in judging various options.



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29. The operating procedures for producing National Intelligence Estimates were specified in a DCID No. 1/1 effective 5 August 1959, which superseded a similar Directive issued on 21 April 1958. 39/ This Directive charged the Board of National Estimates periodically, but not less than quarterly, with ~~presenting to the USIB for approval a~~ Program of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) for production ^{during} / the following six months. In preparing this Program BNE was to consult with the NSC Planning Board and appropriate committees of the USIB and to coordinate with USIB agencies. In developing this Program BNE and its Staff in the Office of National Estimates took into account its knowledge of the world situation in terms of subjects or areas in which actual or potential developments merited a new ^{updated} ~~or~~ / analysis and appraisal through the estimative process. The proposed Program was also based upon any specific request from senior policy making or operating bodies or officials. In particular during President Eisenhower's Administration, the Board was guided by the policy making requirements or plans of the NSC and its Planning Board which drafted most of its policy papers under the Chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, with the assistance of the career NSC Staff. The CIA

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Deputy Director for Intelligence as the representative of the DCI and the intelligence community on the NSC Planning Board was able to provide continuing guidance to BNE in programming estimates to meet the needs of the NSC for intelligence support in developing national security policies. By DCID No. 1/1 requests for estimates not programmed were to be transmitted to USIB via BNE which was to take appropriate action such as preparing comments, initiating immediate action subject to USIB ratification, or attaching draft Terms of Reference to its recommendation that the estimate be approved for production.

30. The normal preparation of estimates as provided in DCID No. 1/1 consisted of four stages:

a. BNE after consulting USIB agencies would circulate Terms of Reference indicating the scope and the intelligence material needed. The agencies or a USIB committee or other appropriate group would then prepare contributions for submission to BNE.

b. After considering the contributions and appropriate consultation with the contributor BNE would prepare a draft.

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c. Representatives of the USIB agencies, referred to as the "USIB Representatives", would meet with BNE to review, comment on and revise the draft as necessary.

d. The final draft was then submitted to the USIB for approval.

Under exceptional or unusual circumstances, which have occurred a number of times, any of these above steps could be omitted. Any USIB agency could dissent to any feature of an estimate, in which case the dissenter would be identified and his position stated. The finished estimates were disseminated by the DCI under established procedures, and carried a note of the extent of coordination within the intelligence community. Specifically this note would show the USIB members who participated in the coordination of a particular estimate, as well as those members such as the Atomic Energy Commission and Federal Bureau of Investigation Representatives who wished on occasion to be recorded as abstaining because the subject matter was not within their jurisdiction.

31. Estimates identified as NIEs were generally those scheduled in the regular six-month programs submitted by BNE for USIB approval at quarterly intervals. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were usually unprogrammed estimates prepared on a relatively urgent

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
basis in response to actual or potential developments of an unanticipated or crisis nature or at the specific request of policy making or operating bodies or officials. In many cases /were requested in terms of probable foreign reaction to particular or alternative U. S. policies or courses of action under consideration. During the September 1958 to January 1960 period, estimates specifically scheduled each quarter on the Program for the next six-months averaged between three or four estimates per month 40/, while the estimates actually produced during the six-month periods averaged between five or six per month. In part this difference between scheduled and produced estimates was deliberate to provide some leeway for preparing unanticipated SNIEs. Of the 144 estimates published during the period under review, 64 or about 44 percent were SNIEs. 41/

32. From 15 September 1958 through 20 January 1961, NIEs covering or SNIEs were produced / developments in every major area of the world. The wide diversity of coverage was illustrated by the two estimates on the first USIB agenda, one a SNIE on "Chinese Communist and Soviet Intentions in the Taiwan Straits" and the other a NIE on "The Outlook in Poland". Of the 144 estimates published during this period* nearly

*This figure includes a few multiple copies of certain sensitive estimates which were issued in two (or once each in 3 or 4) versions, including the full text for special limited dissemination and sanitized versions for wider U. S. distribution or release to selected foreign governments.


one-quarter (32) of them concerned the Communist Bloc, in which the USSR was naturally the predominant interest. About one-fifth (29) of the estimates were on the Middle East, with the situation in Iraq being the country receiving most attention. Southeast Asia was the area third on the list (13) followed in order by the Caribbean (12), Africa (10), the Far East (8), Western Europe (7), South Asia (6) and South America (4). There were 23 miscellaneous estimates, most of them resulting from requests for SNIEs. The total number of estimates during the period averaged about five per month, although their actual production varied considerably from month to month. 42/

33. In producing the 144 published estimates referred to above, the USIB had them under consideration as an item at Board meetings a total of 177 times, indicating that about one-fifth of the estimates required consideration at more than one meeting. 43/ The estimates normally requiring the greatest effort were the important estimates regarding Soviet military capabilities which were regularly produced each year as one of the main bases for the development of U. S. military programs. During the 1958 - 1960 period these estimates covered the following subjects (with the calendar years shown in parentheses):



34. Estimates on the other areas of the world depended upon actual or anticipated developments. In many cases the subject covered by the estimates paralleled those dealt with the Watch Reports although

the estimates covered a much wider variety of subjects and dealt primarily with estimates of future developments rather than indications of imminent hostilities. In the September - December 1958 period the situations in the Middle East and the Taiwan Straits were dealt with a number of times. During calendar year 1959 the USSR, the Middle East (especially Iraq), Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia and Laos), Berlin, the Taiwan Straits and South America were of major concern. In calendar year 1960 interest continued in the USSR, the Middle East, Indonesia and Laos as well as the addition of Cuba, Korea and Sino-Indian relations. The last estimates published during 1-20 January 1961 were "The Estimate of the World Situation", "Probable Short-Term Reaction to U. S. Resumption of Nuclear Tests" and "Main Elements in the Congo Situation". 45/



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37. In addition to [redacted] considering and approving National Intelligence Estimates and approving international estimates, the USIB considered^a variety of other matters related to the estimative process which are generally functions of the Board of National Estimates. For example at the first USIB meeting, the USIB not only approved two estimates and concurred in the procedures for producing [redacted] but also noted a memorandum by Mr. Abbot Smith of BNE on "Analysis of Bloc Radio and Press Propaganda" [redacted]

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During the September 1958 - January 1961 period, while the Board was considering and acting on the estimates themselves a total of 177 times, the Board also acted on 255 agenda items related in one way or another to the estimative process. 48/ Most of these related actions were of a routine or nonsubstantive nature but each required consideration by the Board. One of the most unusual in fact was the Analysis of Bloc Radio and Press Propaganda prepared by Mr. Abbot Smith for the information of the Board based upon an interest in this subject expressed by the IAC members in connection with the Review of Sensitive Situations at the 12 August 1958 meeting. 49/

38. By far the greatest number of USIB actions related to estimates involved decisions on [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Such releases were governed by the provisions of Paragraph 4 d. of NSCID No. 1 which authorized the DCI, in addition to disseminating national intelligence as appropriate within the U. S. government, also authorized him to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence produced within the USIB structure on a strictly controlled basis [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] upon his determination, [redacted] /with the concurrence of USIB, that such action would substantially promote the security of the U. S. / Such dissemination had to be consistent with existing statutes and Presidential policy, and disclosure of FBI intelligence information had to receive prior clearance with that agency. 50/ Dissemination of NIEs and SNIEs therefore had to be determined on a case by case basis as substantially promoting U. S. security. By Board direction BNE was instructed to submit its recommendations on such releases for consideration normally at the USIB meeting following approval of the estimate.

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41. The USIB also had a standing procedure for determining which National Intelligence Estimates were authorized for release to the United States Information Agency (USIA). Except in the case of estimates of a sensitive nature or based on sensitive sources, the Executive Secretary of USIB would normally record in the Minutes, immediately after indicating approval of an estimate, ^{that} "there was no objection to the release of this estimate to USIA". Accordingly if and when the Board approved the Minutes of the next meeting, it would signify that the Board had authorized release to the USIA. In addition the Board ^{some-} times authorized release of an estimate to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration if they were related to that agency's responsibility.

42. In presenting each NIE or SNIE, the Board of National Estimates normally submitted two other documents related thereto for Board approval or noting. One of these was designated ^a "Post-Mortem" on the particular estimate, in which deficiencies were noted that identified areas in which intelligence information was inadequate due either to gaps in collection or in research or analysis. No attempts were made in the ^{to deal} Post-Mortem/with the validity of the substantive judgments. The nature and purpose of these ^{Post-Mortems} can be illustrated by

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G. Other USIB Agenda Items

44. In addition to the types of agenda items described in Sections B - F above, the USIB also considered a wide variety of other subjects and reports which constituted nearly one-quarter of all USIB actions during the September 1958 - January 1961 period. These miscellaneous agenda items could be generally divided into the following categories (with an indication of the frequency of Board action on each category):

- a. Priority National Intelligence Objectives,
(normally reviewed annually).
- b. Ad hoc studies and reports, (averaging about four times per month).
- c. Oral reports and briefings, (approximately twice per month).
- d. Miscellaneous discussions, (about three times per month).
- e. Announcements and presentations, (on an average of more than three times per month).

Although these items were not regular types of Board actions, they constituted a very important part of the Board's activities both in terms of facilitating the Board's functions and in dealing with some of the more unusual but frequently very important problems.

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45. The requirement for Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs) was specified in Paragraph 3 b. (1) of NSCID No. 1 which stated that DCIDs to be issued should include "general guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and / ^{other} intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof." This was to be carried out, by the establishment of comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives generally applicable to foreign countries and areas, and by the identification on a current basis of Priority National Intelligence Objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects. These comprehensive and priority objectives were to be issued for general intelligence guidance and formal transmission to the NSC, which took the forms of DCID Nos. 1/2 and 1/3 respectively. 57/

At the third USIB meeting on 30 September 1958, the Board approved recommendations by the Board of National Estimates that the DCID No. 1/3 containing the PNIOs as approved by the IAC on 18 March 1958 not be amended but that two topics should be added to one of the / ^{specialized} Annexes to that DCID. The Board also agreed that the PNIOs together with the subsidiary objectives contained in its Annexes which had been temporarily approved at the 1 July 1958 IAC meeting, should be considered as finally approved by USIB and published in one volume. 58/ The next revision of the PNIOs

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was approved by the USIB at its 15 December 1959 meeting to supersede the 30 September 1958 version. At that meeting the Board also agreed that appropriate committees or other staffs should proceed at once to develop revisions of the specialized annexes to the 30 September 1958 version. 59/ On 24 May 1960 however the USIB after further consideration decided that the December 1959 revision of DCID No. 1/3 and succeeding revisions should be published without the annexes other than Annex A which stated the criteria for determining PNIOs. At the same time the Board instructed the Economic Intelligence Committee, Scientific Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Committee, Guided Missile Intelligence Committee and the Committee of International Communism to take cognizance of the implementation of the PNIOs in their respective fields, and report in six months on the effectiveness of their implementation. 60/ The last version of PNIOs to be issued under President Eisenhower was approved by the USIB at its meeting on 4 January 1961. The Board also noted the committee reports submitted in response to the May 1960 instructions, and then agreed that the committees were authorized, but not required, to issue on their own authority more in detailed statements of priorities in their respective fields / implementation of the overall PNIOs, and that they could use the phrase "published by the authority of USIB" if these statements were submitted for Board

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approval. 61/ The trend indicated in this series of Board actions constituted an effort to refine the PNIOs and to make them more meaningful in providing guidance to the intelligence community as to those factors requiring priority attention and treatment, leaving the application of that guidance to the committees and agencies in their respective fields.

46. During this period Annex A to DCID No. 1/3 stated the criteria for determining the PNIOs that were to be directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy, flowing directly from the intelligence mission set forth by the NSC and ^{were} therefore more detailed specifications of that intelligence. ^{that} The criteria stressed that most of/intelligence would be the product of normal collection and research, and that the PNIOs should be limited to the critical factors requiring special attention and effort. They should afford a stable basis for intelligence planning and therefore be designed to remain valid over an extended period, excluding topics of urgent or transitory interest. Since broad generalities were of little practical use, the PNIOs should be specific enough to provide for planning the allocation of collection and research resources but not so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection requirements. This last statement sums up the dilemma which the Board has always faced in determining the scope

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of the PNIOs. Where to draw the line between general guidance which can be interpreted in many ways and specific statements which are too detailed has been the subject of debate throughout USIB history. Finally the criteria noted that some PNIOs would be of greater urgency or importance than others, and therefore the objectives must be based on an analysis of the world situation and U. S. security interests and should be reviewed annually. 62/

47. The PNIOs themselves were divided into three categories in general order of priority, with no significance to the order of listing items within each group. It was emphasized that not every bit of information related to a given priority subject would be required with equal urgency and that some/procured by routine means. This made it incumbent upon research personnel to exercise discrimination in allocating analytical resources and in formulating requirements so as to accord priority only to those aspects requiring priority effort. Similarly if specific/and analytic facilities were inadequate to satisfy all requirements levied upon them, then priority in their use would have to be determined under general PNIO guidance but in terms of specific operational capabilities.

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51. Of the miscellaneous agenda items, one-third of them dealt with ad hoc studies and reports which were considered by the Board on 120 occasions during the September 1958 through January 1961 period. Reference has been made in connection with the USIB committee reports to a number of ad hoc committees to or working groups which were established /study and report on the Arab-Israeli situation, the Berlin situation, foreign intelligence publications and the Weapons Systems Survey Group, all of whose reports are included in the above total. Another important group which reported to the Board in 1958 and in 1959 (and was subsequently used in the following Administrations) was the DCI's Ad Hoc Panel on the Status of the Soviet ICBM Program. This group, also referred to as the Hyland Panel for its Chairman, consisted of distinguished scientists and military operational officers especially qualified in the ballistic missiles field. Each of these years they were assembled under the / auspices of and briefings by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, submitting their views on the subject orally and subsequently in writing. They made a very important contribution in the ICBM field. Temporary ad hoc groups were formed from time to time to report on such problems as a study of the Soviet cable cutting incident in the North Atlantic,

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56. Oral reports and briefings solely for the information of the Board were given a total of 66 times during the period under review. Mr. Dulles as Chairman frequently reported orally to the Board on information or developments relating to NSC activities, his briefings to the President's Board, Congressional testimony, incidents of unauthorized disclosures of sources and methods, special intelligence coordination arrangements and the scope of intelligence briefings provided the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the 1960 election. The Chairman as well as other members, committee chairmen or their staffs gave oral reports on many of their foreign trips or attendance at international conferences. The Board also received briefings by various Cabinet Members who travelled abroad, U.S. Ambassadors to selected countries, committee chairmen and representatives of the military services, especially on technical matters relating to intelligence. The USIB members also reported on significant developments regarding intelligence projects or organization as well as breaches of security.

57. Under the heading of miscellaneous discussions which totaled 74 during this period, there were 52 Executive Sessions attended only by the Chairman, the Board members and the Executive Secretary and

his Deputy, and as required one or two senior intelligence officials cognizant of the problem under discussion. These Executive Sessions were a very useful and vital part of the Board's activity in permitting the USIB Principals to engage in a free and largely unrecorded exchange of views or information of a particularly sensitive or critical nature or concerning appointments of committee chairmen. On a number of occasions the Chairman or a Board member would ask for an Executive Session to present a very difficult or serious problem on which he sought the Board's wisdom or help. In regular sessions of the Board there were useful miscellaneous discussions of such matters as various intelligence programs and projects (particularly relating to technical collection or information processing), the dissemination and control of intelligence information, and serious intelligence problems involving international negotiations (the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, Berlin and Cyprus). Critical situations were discussed such as the Soviet shoot-down in 1960 of the U-2 and an RB-47. [REDACTED]

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58. Finally various announcements and presentations were made to the Board involving changes in USIB membership and in staffs and committee chairmen, scheduling of USIB meetings and of agenda items, tributes to deceased or retiring officials, and the appropriate distribution of USIB documents.

59. All of these miscellaneous agenda items were a very valuable and in many cases equally important supplement to the regular order of business relating to minutes, Watch Reports, estimates and committee reports. Some of the more serious problems, critical situations, controversial subjects and sensitive matters were handled by special means particularly appropriate to their character or urgency. These miscellaneous reports and discussions also provided a forum through which the Board members could keep better informed regarding the community as a whole and hence develop a better coordinated and more coherent approach to intelligence problems.

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