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17 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Staff

SUBJECT : Status Report on History of the USIB

REFERENCE : Memo, same subject, 23 June 1971

1. Since the reference report on my work in June, I continued working on the history of USIB beginning again in September under a contract initially terminating at the end of December 1971. In accordance with the original understanding I have also been serving as a consultant with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board when and as needed. It was initially contemplated that I would devote about three-fourths of my time to the USIB history. As a result of the planning for the President's reorganization of the foreign intelligence effort, however, I have spent a much larger part of my time than expected assisting in the staff work for the PFIAB in advising on this reorganization. My contract therefore has been extended through the end of April 1972.

2. During the period since 1 September 1971, I have completed the remaining sections of Volume II covering USIB activities from its creation in September 1958 through the end of the Eisenhower Administration in January 1961. In addition to the seven sections in 60 pages giving an overall description of the Board and types of agenda items which I finished in June, ten more sections of about 150 pages are now in first draft. Seven of these latter sections cover the reporting to the USIB by 14 of its more active committees, while the other three sections summarize the Procedures and Secretariat of the Board, the USIB Annual Status Reports to the NSC, and the Joint Study Group Report.

3. I am now doing research and preparing to draft the subsequent Volumes III and IV covering respectively (a) the growth and crises faced by the USIB under President Kennedy from 21 Jan 61 - 22 Nov 63, and (b) the increased and varied intelligence needs in support of President Johnson from 23 Nov 63 through the end of Mr. McCone's tenure as DCI on 28 Apr 65. Plans for these volumes as described in my June report are still being followed as of this time.

Signed

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
Volume I

A. ORIGIN OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created by National Security Council Directive in 1958 to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.<sup>1/</sup> The Director of Central Intelligence was designated as Chairman of the Board based on his statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as in his NSC-directed role of coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities. In addition, the membership of the Board included the chiefs of the intelligence components of the Departments of State and Defense, and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the Atomic Energy Commission. The establishment of the USIB in effect constituted a merger of two previous intelligence coordinating committees - the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

2. The stated purposes of the United States Intelligence Board were "to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully coordinated intelligence community, and to provide for a more effective integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort". This stress on

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more effective integration and guidance made clear that the USIB was to be a single forum in which the DCI could obtain the advice and assistance of all the intelligence chiefs in connection with all forms of intelligence activities. Previously coordination of the important field of communications intelligence or COMINT had been dealt with solely by the USCIB while the IAC was concerned with the coordination of all other intelligence activities. This pattern of compartmented coordination of COMINT separate from the mechanism for coordination of other intelligence activities had been in existence since World War II.

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A. The Joint Intelligence Committee in World War II

1. The concept of a coordinating committee composed of the intelligence chiefs from the various departments and agencies originated with the creation early in World War II of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 2/

The JIC

membership at its first meeting in March 1942 consisted of the intelligence chiefs of the Army and Navy, and one representative each from the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later the Foreign Economic Administration) and the Coordinator of Information (subsequently the Office of Strategic Services). The intelligence chief of the Army Air Corps was added in 1943. By agreement at its first meeting, the senior military service member of the Committee acted as Chairman. The JIC was supported by a Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) consisting of representatives designated by the committee members. The military service representatives on the JIS were detailed to full-time duty in the offices of the JCS. The civilian agency representatives were part-time until the JCS issued a charter for the JIS in 1944 which required that all JIS representatives be detailed to full-time duty. In addition, there was a secretariat of the JIC as a component of the secretariat of the JCS.

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2. The principal function of the Joint Intelligence Committee was to provide estimates of enemy capabilities and probable reactions for use in developing strategic war plans for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military service members of the Joint Intelligence Staff also contributed intelligence estimative support directly to the war planning committees of the JCS. In addition the JIC furnished advice and assistance to the JCS organization on other intelligence matters, as well as taking agreed actions to achieve more effective and coordinated intelligence operations by the member agencies. Toward this end a number of JIC subcommittees or groups were established in various fields such as preparation of a weekly current intelligence report, publication of basic intelligence studies on foreign areas, continuing study of the enemy oil position, and planning for intelligence exploitation of liberated areas. The JIC/also functioned as the U. S. representatives on the Combined Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in coordinating intelligence estimates with the British. Thus the Joint Intelligence Committee made a notable contribution to the over-all war effort and to the development of an intelligence capability which could be the basis for a post-war national intelligence effort. There were also many lessons learned from the JIC experience that could and would be applied in the post-war era. In fact, as early as 1944 the military and civilian members of the JIS had already been discussing amongst themselves the concept of a post-war intelligence organization.

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3. When General Donovan as head of the Office of Strategic Services made his first proposal for a post-war central intelligence service late in 1944, it was referred to the JCS. Through the work of the Joint Intelligence Staff and then the prolonged and sometime heated deliberations of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a single plan for a post-war National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Agency was developed and ultimately approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under this plan the National Intelligence Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was to be responsible for all federal intelligence activities related to the national security. Under this Authority, a Central Intelligence Agency was to be headed by a Director appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Intelligence Authority . The JCS plan also contemplated as advisors to the Director a Board consisting of the heads of the intelligence services of the Army, Navy, State and other agencies concerned with the national security. The JCS plan contained many of the basic concepts and proposals in the Donovan plan with the important exception that the JCS provided that the Central Intelligence Agency would be under the Cabinet-level National Intelligence Authority instead of reporting directly to the President as General Donovan contemplated. In fact, the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy would have been members of a board to advise and assist the director of the central intelligence service under the Donovan plan, as compared with the advisory board composed of the departmental intelligence chiefs in the JCS plan.

\*\*A full description of the various plans for a post-World War II intelligence organization is given in Chapter II of the history of CIA by Dr. Arthur B. Darling which also covers the period down to 1950. 3/

4. Thus, the Joint Intelligence Staff had contemplated a Board which would be advisory to and chaired by a Presidentially-appointed Director of the Central Intelligence Agency rather than the system of the Joint Intelligence Committee in which the Chairman was the senior military officer representing his own service on an equal basis with all the other members. The Staff was thoroughly familiar with the difficulty of achieving a coordinated viewpoint amongst such a committee none of whom had any superiority or leadership authority over any of the other members. In the case of substantive estimates this lack of an authoritative chairman had frequently resulted either in a mass of widely divergent views very confusing to the reader or in a watering down of the estimates and their conclusions in order to achieve what many considered the lowest common denominator. In the case of efforts to achieve coordination of intelligence activities the same difficulty applied to reaching agreement when there was no one who could determine when a reasonable consensus had been reached and a decision should be recorded, subject if necessary to appeal to higher authority. The Presidentially-appointed Director who would chair the proposed advisory Board would certainly be in a position to exercise a leadership role in determining when there should be no further compromise of judgment or principle in the deliberations of the Board, even though he did not have directive authority over the members.

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5. This concept in its basic essentials was ultimately incorporated in the directive by President Truman on 22 January 1946 creating a National Intelligence Authority, a Central Intelligence Group, a Director of Central Intelligence and an Intelligence Advisory Board.<sup>4/</sup> The Authority was composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and a personal representative of the President. The Central Intelligence Group, headed by the Director, was to be provided with persons and facilities assigned from the respective departments. Under the direction and control of the Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence was to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and to disseminate the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence, to plan for the coordination of intelligence activities and recommend overall policies and objectives to the Authority, to perform for the benefit of all agencies services of common concern as determined by the Authority, and to perform such other intelligence-related functions and duties as the President or the Authority might direct. In performing these functions the Director of Central Intelligence was to be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads or their representatives of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

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6. This 1946 Presidential directive therefore created the first post-war intelligence advisory committee to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in the performance of his functions. Moreover, it established three major areas of intelligence activities in which the DCI was to have varying and generally increasing degrees of responsibility and authority over the subsequent years:

a. Producing and disseminating strategic and national policy intelligence (later called national intelligence).

b. Planning and recommending policies and objectives for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security.

c. Performing for the benefit of all intelligence agencies such services of common concern as can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

7. The fundamental issue which continued to be debated for many years however was whether the committee of intelligence chiefs chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence was to advise and assist him in his individual responsibility for coordination as authorized by higher authority, or whether the committee itself had collective responsibility to higher authority for achieving such coordination. There have been many views and varying interpretations on this question of the principle of individual versus collective responsibility.

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B. The Evolution of the Intelligence Advisory Committee\*

1. The composition and procedures of the Intelligence Advisory Board were further defined in brief terms in National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 1, 8 February 1946, which primarily established basic policies and procedures for the Central Intelligence Group.<sup>5/</sup> The intelligence chiefs of State, Army, Navy and the Army Air Forces were designated permanent IAB members, with the heads of other intelligence agencies to be invited for matters within their province.

2. The CIG was to furnish national intelligence to the President and the State, War and Navy Departments and, as appropriate, other departments and agencies having national security functions. In preparing its intelligence reports, however, CIG was to utilize all available intelligence, and note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency. Note that this provision did not mention the IAB and consequently the extent to which that Board was used, if at all, to coordinate estimates was left up to each DCI and the IAB members. The manner in which this provision was applied during the existence of the IAB is described in the IAC history by Dr. Montague.\*

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\* A history of the Intelligence Advisory Committee up to 1954 prepared by Mr. L. L. Montague (HS/HC 195, Item 8) provides more detailed treatment of the evolution of the IAC and its role in the coordination of national intelligence estimates and of intelligence activities.

3. With respect to coordination of intelligence activities, NIA Directive No. 1 specified that all recommendations by the DCI were to be referred to the IAB for concurrence or comment before submission to the NIA. The DCI was also to submit any non-concurrence by a Board member. If however the DCI and IAB agreed unanimously on a recommendation and had the existing authority to execute it, it could be put into effect without action by NIA. NIA-approved recommendations would govern the intelligence activities of the departments represented, and each IAB member was responsible for ensuring execution within his department.

4. Therefore, any DCI recommendation on which he could obtain NIA approval, whether the IAB members concurred or dissented, was binding on all the intelligence agencies as well as CIG. Admiral Souers as the first DCI sought full consultation and concurrence with the IAB, and initiated the CIG as a "cooperative interdepartmental activity" which supplemented but did not attempt to duplicate or compete with departmental activities. General Vandenberg who was Admiral Souers' successor obtained NIA authorization, despite differing views of IAB members, to expand and strengthen the CIG with its own research and analysis, coordination and operational capabilities. Specifically, NIA Directive No. 5 as approved on recommendation of General Vandenberg permitted him to determine what research and analysis activities should be accomplished centrally, act for the NIA in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities, and conduct all organized Federal espionage and counterespionage operations outside the US and all Federal monitoring

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foreign press and propaganda broadcasts.<sup>6/</sup> General Vandenberg then concentrated on the build-up of CIG, consulting or meeting with the IAB only infrequently when necessary. In February 1947 General Vandenberg was authorized by the NIA to be executive agent for the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.<sup>7/</sup> When he became DCI on 1 May 1947 Admiral Hillenkoetter, in the few months before the National Security Act became effective, attempted by requesting NIA to revoke its recent designation of the DCI as executive agent and by other means to regain the cooperation and collaboration of the IAB.<sup>8/</sup>

5. The National Security Act of 1947 provided a statutory base for the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence, as an independent agency under the National Security Council.<sup>9/</sup> It specified that "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security . . ." the CIA under NSC direction would (1) advise the Council on intelligence matters, (2) make recommendations to the NSC for coordination of intelligence activities, (3) correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence relating to the national security, (4) perform services of common concern as determined by the Council, and (5) perform other functions and duties related to intelligence as directed by the NSC. In producing national intelligence under (3) above, CIA should use where appropriate existing agencies and facilities, while the departments and other agencies continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. The DCI was also made responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures.

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6. This Act, which continues to be the statutory foundation for coordination of the intelligence community under the direction of the National Security Council, defined the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the Director of Central Intelligence as its responsible head in differing ways with respect to the major areas of intelligence activity. In the first instance it clearly identified the DCI as the principal advisor to the President and the NSC on all intelligence matters. As to coordination of intelligence activities the DCI is the primary source of recommendations which, subject to the approval of the NSC, establish the policies and procedures to guide the foreign intelligence effort. Production of national intelligence is the direct responsibility of the DCI using all available agencies and facilities. The NSC, normally based on recommendations of the DCI, determines those services of common concern which the CIA performs centrally for the benefit of all intelligence agencies.

7. The National Security Council subject to the final approval of the President issues the basic policies and procedures under which all intelligence activities are to be conducted in the form of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). NSCID No. 1, the first version of which was effective 12 December 1947 (three months after the Council was established)<sup>10/</sup>, specifies the basic duties and responsibilities of the intelligence community. Other NSCIDs deal with particular areas of intelligence activity such as the various fields of collection, production and processing.

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8. The National Security Act does not contain any mention of or provision for a committee of the intelligence chiefs such as the previous Intelligence Advisory Board, thereby deliberately leaving it up to the National Security Council to decide the form of any such coordinating machinery. One of the first actions of the NSC therefore, based on a recommendation by Admiral Hillenkoetter, was to continue in effect all NIA Directives while directing the DCI to submit to the Council within sixty days proposed authorizations supplanting these former directives and specifying his functions and those of CIA in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act.<sup>11/</sup> The NSC also decided that the DCI should attend all of its meetings as observer and adviser.<sup>12/</sup> In dealing with such intelligence matters under its new authority, the NSC as well as the DCI and the intelligence community benefited greatly from the appointment by President Truman of Sidney W. Souers as the first Executive Secretary of the Council.

9. A few days before the first NSC meeting on 26 September 1947, Admiral Hillenkoetter had also recommended to the Council that, while not so obligated under the National Security Act, he be authorized to continue to have available to him an advisory body similar to the former IAB. The Acting Secretary of State, Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force, and the Chairman of the new National Security Resources Board approved this recommendation during October of 1947. The Secretary of the Army however late in November opposed the DCI's plan, insisting as had the Army and Navy intelligence chiefs that the new Intelligence Advisory Committee not only advise the DCI but also have the duty of insuring full departmental coordination of all matters before submittal to the NSC. This effort to establish collective responsibility of the new IAC rather than the individual

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responsibility of the DCI to the NSC was thwarted by direct and forceful intervention by Secretary of Defense Forrestal in favor of Admiral Hillenkoetter's position. Consequently the DCI, after further coordination with the former IAB members, submitted to the Council his first recommendations for National Security Council Intelligence Directives to guide the conduct and coordination of foreign intelligence activities.<sup>13/</sup>

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, as approved by the Council on 12 December 1947<sup>14/</sup> along with three other NSCIDs, stated that "to maintain the relationship essential to coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations," an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the intelligence chiefs from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Staff (JCS)\* and AEC would be established "to advise the Director of Central Intelligence". The DCI was to invite the chief of any other intelligence agency to sit with the IAC for matters within that agency's purview. This latter instruction included provision for FBI attendance whenever required on a case-by-case basis.

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\* This addition of the Joint Staff member to the IAC coincided with a reorganization of the Joint Intelligence Committee under which the State Department membership in JIC was withdrawn, leaving only military members on that Committee.

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As a general guideline NSCID No. 1 stressed that coordination of intelligence activities was to be designed primarily to strengthen the overall governmental structure, and that primary departmental requirements were to be recognized and receive cooperation and support of CIA. It also retained the proviso in the previous NIA directives that the DCI in recommendations or advice to the NSC pertaining to intelligence activities would include a statement indicating concurrence or non-concurrence of IAC members. If however unanimity was not obtained among the Military Department heads, the problem would be referred to the Secretary of Defense before presentation to the NSC.

While the DCI, therefore, was to determine the substance of any recommendations and advice he chose to submit to the Council, he was to seek to strengthen the overall structure, recognizing and supporting primary departmental needs, and reporting any lack of agreement in the IAC. This guidance put a premium on gaining as near unanimity as possible in the Committee's deliberations. Admiral Hillenkoetter arranged for a Standing Committee of the IAC in an attempt to achieve an increased measure of agreement between the various agencies on coordination matters. Divergent agency positions stemming from NIA/IAB experience were not appreciably resolved through this mechanism.

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NSCID No. 1 made clear that the DCI would "produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence," thereby reinforcing his individual responsibility for such substantive estimates and reports as provided in the National Security Act. The Council did however specify that the DCI should not duplicate departmental activities and research, but should make use of existing facilities and departmental intelligence for such production purposes. The DCI was also to disseminate national intelligence to the President, NSC, IAC agencies, and other departments and agencies as designated by the NSC. Intelligence so disseminated was to be "officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent." Estimates prepared by CIA following issuance of this directive were somewhat better coordinated with the working level representatives of the IAC agencies before circulation to the IAC itself. The final drafts however were invariably submitted to the IAC members for written concurrence or dissent without the benefit of discussion or deliberation at a committee meeting.

The continued unsatisfactory relationships of the DCI and CIA with the other intelligence chiefs and agencies, as reflected in the IAC and elsewhere, resulted in the creation by the NSC in 1948 of the Dulles-Correa-Jackson Intelligence Survey Group to make an overall review of the functioning of the intelligence community under the National Security Act.<sup>15/</sup>

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The Group's report was critical of CIA and the DCI for failing to gain cooperation and participation of the IAC in coordination. The report however stressed the leadership role of the DCI in coordinating activities with the IAC in an advisory capacity, but supported the concept of collective responsibility of the DCI and IAC in producing national estimates.

Comments by the DCI and IAC members on the Group's report were so diverse that the NSC referred it for study to the Secretaries of State and Defense who with the help of General Mc Narney recommended the actions subsequently approved by the Council on 7 July 1949.<sup>16/</sup> The NSC rejected the Survey Group concept of collective responsibility, endorsing instead the view that the IAC should participate as an advisory body under more forthright leadership of the DCI in coordinating intelligence activities and national estimates. A revision of NSCID No. 1 was also issued<sup>17/</sup> which made clear that the DCI was Chairman of the IAC and returned the Director of the FBI to full membership to assist coordination of foreign intelligence and internal security activities. In addition confusion as to whether "an agreed statement of substantial dissent" to a national intelligence estimate or report meant that there could be only one agreed dissent was overcome by substituting the wording "a statement of substantially differing opinions".

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The National Security Council actions on 7 July 1949 also referred a number of "particular intelligence questions" raised in the State/Defense report prepared under General McNarney, to the Director of Central Intelligence for further study and report back to the Council. One of these questions related to the handling of intelligence regarding crisis situations and the procedure for producing estimates thereon.<sup>18/</sup> Following a report by the DCI on this question, the NSC on 19 January 1950 added a paragraph to NSCID No. 1 calling for any IAC member obtaining information indicating an impending crisis situation seriously affecting U. S. security to furnish the information immediately to other IAC members and other appropriate officials. The DCI was immediately to convene the IAC and, after receiving the Committee's views, to prepare and disseminate promptly a national intelligence estimate on the situation.<sup>19/</sup>

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General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence from October 1950 to February 1953 set the stage in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) for many of the basic concepts and methods which are still applied in the United States Intelligence Board. General Smith, with his personal prestige based on a distinguished background and knowledge in military and diplomatic affairs, exercised "forthright leadership" as DCI beginning with his first meeting with the IAC on 20 October 1950. He stressed to the members the need for "rapid cooperative work" and "collective judgment" while making clear his individual authority as DCI. In effect, he was adopting the concept of Admiral Souers that the DCI should have individual responsibility based on coordinated effort. <sup>20/</sup> General Smith established the organization and procedures for preparing and coordinating national intelligence estimates essentially as they continue in the USIB. He also established an office responsible to him to develop plans for coordinating intelligence activities in close collaboration with representatives of the IAC. The head of this office served as IAC Secretary as well as chairman of various IAC subcommittees.\*

\*Dr. L. L. Montague has written an historical account elaborating more fully on the relationship General Smith established with the IAC. <sup>21/</sup>

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This transformation by General Smith of the IAC into an active and going concern under DCI leadership was accomplished without change in the basic charter of NSCID No. 1 except for one addition approved by the Council as of 28 March 1952. In order to clarify the authority for dissemination of national intelligence to foreign governments, the DCI recommended with the concurrence of IAC a new sub-paragraph in NSCID No. 1 authorizing such dissemination upon determination by the DCI with IAC concurrence

that such action would substantially promote  
the security of the United States. 22/

The only issue in this case involved insertion of a proviso that any disclosure of classified military information in such national intelligence be in accordance with U. S. National Disclosure Policy as determined by the military members. This general issue of the relationship between these two authorities to disclose information to foreign governments has been raised many times since then in the IAC and USIB.

Following his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence on 26 February 1953, Mr. Allen W. Dulles continued to make full use of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a forum for considering community problems. In producing national intelligence estimates, Mr. Dulles permitted

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full and frequently lengthy discussion but never hesitated to exercise his right to determine the final text and invite dissents on unagreed matters of importance. With regard to coordination of intelligence activities, however, he sought to resolve issues by achieving full agreement amongst all IAC members. Without derogating from his own authority, Mr. Dulles preferred to obtain cooperation and collaboration of all elements of the intelligence community by thorough discussion and negotiation rather than by appeal to higher authority.\*\*

The final version of the IAC charter was issued as NSCID No. 1 effective 21 April 1958. This directive was prepared in response to a report to President Eisenhower by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated 20 December 1956.<sup>24</sup> This report contained among others three recommendations directly concerned with the role of the DCI and his relations with the IAC.

Recommendation No. 1 of the report contained the following general statement:

We do not believe that drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence organization are required to make progress toward some of the objectives we outline below. We do suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and positive, coordinating responsibility and we feel that he can do this within the intent of existing laws. If directed and supported by you in discharging this responsibility, the Director of Central Intelligence can accomplish much in the direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination within the national intelligence effort without change in present statute or organization.

\*  has provided a further analysis of the approach adopted by Mr. Dulles in his relations with the IAC.<sup>23</sup>

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Recommendation No. 4 noted that:

With regard to the integration of the Intelligence Community, we are convinced that a strong centralized direction, under which the resources of the various elements would be brought closer together, would do much to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its cost. We therefore recommend that action be taken toward this end, both through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Both of these recommendations were approved by the President, after consideration of agency comments, and referred to the DCI for action.

Recommendation No. 9 of that report specifically recommended that:

the National Security Council review their Intelligence Directives and substitute a more coherent, consolidated Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's conditions.

President Eisenhower, after considering agency comments, approved this recommendation, in January of 1957, and referred it to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for review of all NSCID's and for early submission to the National Security Council (through the NSC Planning Board) of recommended revisions.<sup>25/</sup>

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These three recommendations taken together implied that, if the DCI did not "exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility" with "a strong centralized direction," it probably would mean that "drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence organization" would be required.

At the IAC meeting on 30 April 1957 Mr. Dulles presented a proposed revision of NSCID No. 1 and drafts of his interim responses to Recommendations No. 4 and 9. His approach to these and other recommendations by the President's Board of Consultants was expressed in his remarks emphasizing his feeling that, over the past few years, the members "had been achieving by agreement and mutual understanding a very great improvement in the intelligence effort". He expressed confidence that the members would cooperate in further developing and improving coordination, and generally carrying out the President's mandates. 26/

The IAC tentatively approved a revised NSCID No. 1 in June of 1957. Mr. Dulles informed the IAC at its 2 July meeting that he had designated General L. K. Truscott, USA (Retired) as Deputy Director (Coordination) of CIA, after consulting the President and to implement President's Board recommendations. 27/ General Truscott had primary responsibility for drafting and coordinating the subsequent revisions of the NSCIDs.



In response to Presidential request, the DCI submitted a report on the progress of the NSCID revisions in September of 1957. The first set of proposed revisions were completed by the IAC in January of 1958 and considered by the National Security Council in March.

While the IAC was engaged in preparing these revised NSCIDs and following the September progress report by the DCI, however, the President's Board of Consultants submitted a semi-annual report to the President on 24 October 1957<sup>28</sup>. This report contained a Recommendation No. 2 that the responsibilities of the United States Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee be vested in a single Board to be known as the United States Intelligence Board. The President before taking action requested that the DCI consult with the USCIB and IAC agencies and furnish to the NSC his views and comments on this recommendation. It was suggested that Mr. Dulles take into account the then current review of the NSCIDs in providing his report on this new recommendation for NSC consideration by 15 January 1958.

The sequence of events on this latter recommendation and on the NSC actions regarding the revised NSCIDs will be resumed in a subsequent section following the next section on the USCIB.

C. Compartmented Coordination in the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board\*

1. The establishment of an entirely separate mechanism to coordinate communications intelligence (COMINT) after World War II followed the wartime concept and practice that this extremely sensitive source must be handled in a compartmented system with severely restricted access. Accordingly, the number of people specially cleared for the conduct of COMINT activities or the resulting product was held to an absolute minimum. Consequently, the officials permitted to have knowledge of this field during the war, other than those actually engaged in COMINT operations, were almost exclusively confined to key military officers and a few top civilian officials of the armed services.

2. The first meeting of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) was held on 14 March 1945 based on a formal directive signed by General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. 29/ Previous to that meeting there had been regular monthly meetings of an Army-Navy coordinating committee which continued as a sub-unit of the ANCIB. The members of ANCIB were the Army and Navy intelligence chiefs and the heads of the COMINT organizations in those two services.

3. The reasons for the creation of this Board quickly became apparent in the subjects discussed at its third meeting on 21 August 1945. The first item was a recent memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral King proposing that ANCIB be asked to examine and make

\*A more comprehensive history of the background and development of the USCIB is contained in the history of the CIA SIGINT effort prepared by [redacted]

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[redacted] on which many sections of this Chapter are based.

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
[REDACTED]

"recommendations as to the advisability of combined Army and Navy intercept, cryptographic and cryptanalytical activities under appropriate joint direction, and if this should be impossible for any reason to recommend procedure to ensure complete integration. " The next item concerned [REDACTED] the necessity for a governmental decision "by the highest authorities of the Nation". The Board also discussed the "cryptanalytical activities of the F.B.I. ", and "participation by the State Department". 30/

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4. Discussion of the memorandum from General Marshall during the fourth ANCIB meeting on 4 October 1945 forecast the great concern of the military services that "a centralized national intelligence agency" might take over the COMINT functions of the Army and Navy unless unnecessary duplication was eliminated. The Army stressed the advantages of merging the two service cryptanalytic units. The Navy, favoring continued collaboration and coordination between these two "operational intelligence" units which must remain under Military Command, proposed establishment of a joint intelligence center for strategic evaluation. 31/

5. Based on an ANCIB recommendation at its 13 December 1945 meeting approved by General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, the Department of State



became a member of the Board early in 1946 and its name was changed to State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB). The first State member was the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. 32/

6. Meanwhile General Eisenhower in a 2 January 1946 memorandum to Admiral Nimitz had suggested "a fresh start" on the entire subject of Army and Navy signal intelligence activities. Specifically, General Eisenhower proposed that the question of integration of these activities again be referred to ANCIB which should approach the problem without limitation and present detailed approaches for its solution, including alternatives if agreement could not be reached. 33/ General Eisenhower agreed with Admiral Nimitz that this step need not await the final result of the study being made by a State-War-Navy Committee on the formation of a Central Intelligence Agency. Admiral Nimitz indicated his agreement with these proposals.

7. Subsequently, at a meeting on 15 February 1946, the Board (then STANCIB) approved in principle that the responsibility for technical operations be divided into three categories: (a) Navy work on purely naval communications, (b) Army work on purely military communications, and (c) work on diplomatic and other communications

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be considered a joint project under the direction of a Coordinator of Joint Operations responsible to the Board. The Board also agreed that a report on these plans to the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations should indicate that further coordination of intelligence functions is planned. <sup>34/</sup> On 22 April 1946 STANCIB approved a memorandum outlining the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Joint Operations, and appointed the Chief of the Army Security Agency as the first CJO. 35/

8. On 14 February 1946 the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a letter to the Senior Member of STANCIB had outlined the Bureau's interest in communications intelligence and in membership on the Board. 36/ With the approval of the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations and the State member of STANCIB, the FBI was invited to appoint a permanent representative on the Board. On acceptance of this invitation, the Board's name was changed to United States Communications Intelligence Board as of 13 June 1946. The FBI Member, an Assistant to the Director, attended his first meeting on 31 July 1946. 37/

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9. Prior to this first USCIB meeting, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group had not participated in any of the activities of the communications intelligence boards and committees. Admiral Souers shortly after his appointment as the first DCI attended a STANCIB meeting on 11 February 1946 to discuss National Intelligence Authority requirements for the use and handling of COMINT. He said that the NIA was not primarily concerned with arrangements and procedures for COMINT production which were the responsibility of STANCIB as well as coordination with other agencies in this field. Admiral Souers stated however that NIA was particularly concerned with the availability and selection of intelligence (including COMINT) required for use by the Authority or by various government organizations.<sup>38/</sup> During the remainder of Admiral Souers' tenure, the NIA, DCI and CIG concentrated on the development of general policies and directives for the postwar intelligence effort, organization and functioning of the CIG, and initial arrangements for coordination among the intelligence agencies.

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10. General Vandenberg who succeeded Admiral Souers as DCI on 10 June 1946 had been the Air Force representative on the USCIB and therefore was thoroughly familiar with the activities of that Board. With the approval of the Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and FBI Director based on a USCIB recommendation, General Vandenberg was invited to become a member by 3 July 1946 memorandum from the Senior Member of that Board, and accordingly attended the first USCIB meeting on 31 July 1946. 39/

11. There was no designated chairman of this Board until it became USCIB. Meetings of ANCIB during 1945 were held in the Navy Department with the senior Naval member leading the discussion. During the first half of 1946, meetings of STANCIB were held under Army auspices with the Army intelligence chief presiding. At the first USCIB meeting an Organizational Bulletin was approved including a rule requiring unanimous votes on Board decisions. General Vandenberg was unanimously elected to be the chairman. The Board also agreed at that meeting that a Diplomatic Summary ("Black Book") be prepared by the State, War and Navy Departments under the auspices of the USCIB as a means of briefing selected senior officials on information obtained from cryptanalysis

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12. The activities of the USCIB during the period from mid-1946 to mid-1947 were largely concerned with the coordination of U. S. COMINT activities including the relationship of the Board and its subordinate bodies such as the "Coordinator of Joint Operations" to the Army and Navy COMINT agencies. The Board also devoted considerable attention to legislation affecting its responsibilities 

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13. Just prior to approval on 26 July 1947 of the National Security Act of 1947, the USCIB on 10 July convened with an Army Air Force member (in addition to two Army members). After discussion in which Admiral Hillenkoetter who had become DCI on 1 May 1947 declined the State member's nomination to be the regular Chairman, the Board elected General Chamberlain of the Army as Chairman for one year. USCIB also agreed on an annual election with the provisos that the same agency could not have the chair twice in succession, a new chairman would be elected if an incumbent could not complete his term, and the chairman would be elected by majority vote. During discussion General Chamberlain said that the chairman was only a parliamentary head with no influence to dominate the Board, 41/




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14. The USCIB began in November 1947 to consider the need <sup>42/</sup> for a new charter, and to hold regular monthly meetings. Debate on a proposed Executive Order and accompanying charter continued until drafts were accepted by the Board on 3 February 1948. <sup>43/</sup> The basic issues were (1) the "parent body" of the USCIB, and (2) the extent of the Board's authority to "control" or "coordinate" the national COMINT effort. As to the first issue, State, <sup>Navy</sup> and the DCI preferred the NSC or the Secretary of Defense, while Army and Air Force favored the JCS. The State compromise adopted <sup>, originally suggested by Navy,</sup> was a "Committee of Four" as an appellate body composed of the three Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of State. On the second issue, <sup>the</sup> DCI, State and Navy thought the Board should be given "control" because the national effort was broader than its military aspects and might become more so in the future. The Army and Air Force favored "coordinating" authority with control residing in the respective departments and agencies. In fact the Army thought the Board should be confined to establishing priorities and the Coordinator under the JCS handle allocation of tasks. The Board finally agreed on "authoritative coordination" but not "unified direction".

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15. When the proposed Executive Order and Charter were accepted, the Board agreed each intelligence chief would submit them for approval by the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force prior to transmittal by the DCI to Admiral Leahy for consideration by the President. Secretary of Defense Forrestal reacted to these proposed documents by writing a memorandum to the three Service Secretaries stating that instead of an Executive Order "the objects desired can more appropriately be accomplished" by means of a National Security Council directive in accordance with Section 102 of the National Security Act which deals with the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>44</sup> / He sent a copy to the Secretary of State and the DCI.

16. With this support CIA drafted an NSC Intelligence Directive which established USCIB under the NSC to effect "authoritative coordination and unified direction" of COMINT activities and to advise the DCI in matters relating to protection of sources of COMINT and "those matters in the field of communications intelligence for which he is now or may hereafter be made responsible".<sup>45</sup> / When the Navy Member of USCIB objected, Admiral Hillenkoetter again compromised and, after further consideration in both IAC and USCIB, a proposed NSCID was forwarded by the DCI to the Executive Secretary of the NSC on 18 May 1948.<sup>46</sup> / This proposed directive would establish the USCIB under the NSC and authorize it to act for the NSC, under the


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principle of unanimity (except in electing a chairman by majority vote), in carrying out its responsibility for "authoritative coordination" (but not "unified direction") of COMINT activities. The Board was also to advise the DCI (who was one of its members) in those COMINT matters "for which he is responsible," which were not otherwise defined. When the Board could not reach a unanimous decision, it was to refer the matter to the NSC for resolution, except that lack of unanimity in the military departments was to be presented to the Secretary of Defense before reference to the NSC. USCIB decisions and policies within its jurisdiction were to be applicable to all executive departments and agencies. Moreover, COMINT activities were to "be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities", and any orders, directives, etc. relating to such other activities (including other NSCIDs and DCIDs) were to be non-applicable to COMINT activities.

17. Admiral Souers as Executive Secretary of the NSC, in an effort to clarify and strengthen the role of the DCI, referred this proposed NSCID back to Admiral Hillenkoetter for reconsideration and discussion with the IAC of two points. First, Admiral Souers noted that previous NSC policy had been to look to the DCI as the channel for achieving intelligence coordination, and that the proposed directive would make it necessary for the NSC to coordinate USCIB activities with those of the DCI in all other

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intelligence fields. He believed that "this complication could be obviated without changing the intent" by providing that USCIB advise and assist the DCI in achieving coordination of COMINT, while retaining the requirement for unanimous concurrence prior to taking coordinating action. Second, Admiral Souers questioned whether the NSC directive could be made applicable to all executive departments and agencies. 47/

18. Admiral Hillenkoetter immediately sent a new draft NSCID revised in accordance with Admiral Souers' memorandum to the USCIB and then to the IAC. 48/ The State member of IAC having achieved State's main objective of placing USCIB under the NSC, opposed the new DCI draft and supported the previous USCIB version, and he was of course joined by the Army, Navy and Air Force members. Admiral Hillenkoetter, after having compromised so many times before, tried to maintain his position this time by submitting his redraft of the NSCID to the Council despite the nonconcurrence of the other IAC members who recommended the previous USCIB version. 49/ The National Security Council on 1 July 1948 issued NSCID No. 9 "Communications Intelligence" which adopted the previous USCIB version practically unchanged except for amended provisions stating that the President would designate those departments and agencies authorized to engage in COMINT activities (rather than "only those\*\*represented on the Board"), and that USCIB decisions and policies within its jurisdiction would be applicable to departments and agencies

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represented on or subordinate to the NSC or others designated by the President (rather than "all" executive departments and agencies).<sup>50/</sup> This NSCID No. 9 remained in effect until December 1952 except for a revision approved on 10 March 1950 which reinstated FBI membership on USCIB.<sup>51/</sup>

19. Following the issuance of NSCID No. 9 in July 1948 Secretary Forrestal sent terms of reference to the three Service Secretaries for the creation of an Armed Forces Security Agency<sup>52/</sup> (AFSA). / A report prepared by representatives of the three services and of Secretary Forrestal's staff / which proposed an "Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board" (AFCIB) as well as the AFSA was sent in January 1949 to the DCI and State, both of whom objected that functions proposed for the AFCIB were in direct conflict with the USCIB functions in NSCID No. 9.<sup>53/</sup> After Secretary Forrestal resigned in March 1949, the new Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson two weeks after taking office advised Admiral Hillenkoetter that on 20 May 1949 an Armed Forces Security Agency and an Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC) had been established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the President. Secretary Johnson stated however that the new directive and its implementation would not interfere with the functions of USCIB under NSCID No. 9.<sup>54/</sup> At a 17 June USCIB meeting the DCI and the State Member enumerated specific points of conflict between the directive establishing AFSA and NSCID No. 9.<sup>55/</sup> The DCI

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subsequently informed Secretary Johnson of these issues and asked that an effort be made to resolve them but no reply was ever received.<sup>56/</sup> Admiral Hillenkoetter with the support of State however had expressed during this exchange the basic concern that the creation of the new committee "with such broad power would give hegemony to a major source of intelligence which, in the national interest, should daily be operating increasingly to service those departments and agencies charged with prosecuting the cold war".

20. Despite the confused relationships within the COMINT structure, the USCIB dealt with a wide variety of subjects during the period from 1949 until the major revision of the concept and organization of COMINT activities occurred with the approval of the 29 December 1952 version of NSCID No. 9. The overall review and strengthening of U. S. national security policies and programs after the Soviet atomic bomb explosion of September 1949, based upon the approval of NSC 68 and its implementation, were directly reflected in a greatly increased COMINT effort. The requirements of the Korean War beginning in June 1950 added to and speeded up the mobilization and deployment of augmented COMINT capabilities. The Korean War also prompted new consideration of the security of U. S. communications for which an existing but inoperative Cryptographic Security Board (CSB) had authority. USCIB therefore


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discussed whether it should take cognizance over such COMSEC matters. At its 9 March 1951 meeting all USCIB members agreed to recommend to the NSC that it be given authority over COMSEC, except the State member who favored modernizing the CSB as a separate body under the NSC. State postponed its submission of a minority position until the USCIB in 1952 agreed to defer its report to the NSC pending completion of the Brownell report (discussed in the following paragraphs). Other items frequently considered by USCIB during 1949-52 included numerous and serious security

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problems,



21. The 1952 revision of NSCID No. 9 was based directly on an overall survey of COMINT activities conducted by a committee chaired by Mr. George A. Brownell with Ambassador Charles Bohlen, General John Magruder and Mr. William H. Jackson as members. This survey was recommended to the NSC in December 1951 by the DCI based on a study by Mr. Kingman Douglass who was then the CIA COMINT Officer.<sup>57/</sup> Following Presidential approval of this recommenda-<sup>58/</sup> tion on 13 December 1951, the Brownell Committee was appointed and

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submitted its report in June 1952. / The main recommendations in this report for a new concept and general reorganization of the COMINT effort were accepted by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, the only significant exception being that the military services were allowed to retain membership on the new USCIB.

22. On 24 October 1952, President Truman approved a directive submitted by the Secretaries of State and Defense with the concurrence of the DCI based on the Brownell Committee Report which:

a. Established communications intelligence as a national responsibility which must be organized and managed to exploit available resources and satisfy legitimate intelligence requirements of all participating departments and agencies.

b. Designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT which, with DCI assistance, would establish policies governing COMINT, keeping the President appropriately advised. The Attorney General was to be a member when matters of interest to the FBI were before the Committee.

c. Designated the Secretary of Defense as executive agent of the government for the production of COMINT information.

d. Instructed the Special Committee to issue a new NSCID No. 9 along the lines recommended by the Brownell Committee as accepted by the Secretaries and the DCI.



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23. This NSCID No. 9 issued 29 December 1952 /reconstituted the USCIB under the Special Committee with a membership consisting of the DCI as the permanent non-voting Chairman; a representative of the Secretaries of State and of Defense, /the Director of the FBI and of CIA (each with two votes); the Director of the new National Security Agency and a representative of the Army, Navy and Air Force (each with one vote). This voting pattern thus gave equal representation to Defense and the civilian agencies. The Board was to reach decisions by majority vote subject to appeal to the Special Committee. In accord with these procedures, the Board would advise and <sup>make</sup> recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on COMINT matters within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA, and recommendations of the Board would be binding on the Secretary. On matters not in NSA's jurisdiction, USCIB was to coordinate COMINT activities among departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate therein, to initiate and supervise COMINT arrangements with foreign governments except for those of a clandestine nature covered by NSCID No. 5, and to recommend COMINT policies of common interest including security standards and practices for which purpose the Board could investigate and study such standards and practices of departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information. Any unanimous recommendation of USCIB on these matters would be binding on all departments



and agencies, while those approved by a majority were to be sent to the Special Committee for action.

24. The 1952 NSCID No. 9 also contained a directive to the Secretary of Defense which stated that the COMINT mission of NSA was to provide an effective, unified organization and control of such activities, and for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. The Director of NSA was to be a career military officer serving a minimum term of 4 years with at least 3-star rank, with a civilian deputy primarily responsible for cryptologic research and development. Under the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with approved policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA was given operational and technical control over all COMINT collection and production resources, and could centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he was responsible. In certain circumstances where the Armed Forces and other agencies required close support, however, direct operational control of specified facilities and resources would be delegated by the Director, for periods and tasks determined by him, to military commander and agency chiefs. The Director of NSA was responsible for making plans and policies, conducting and determining logistic requirements for COMINT activities, as well as prescribing security regulations and conducting foreign liaison except that covered by NSCID No. 5.

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25. Finally this NSCID stated that the special nature of COMINT activities required that they be treated in all respects as outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Therefore all other orders, directives (including NSCIDs and DCIDs), policies or recommendations relating to intelligence and/or classified material were not applicable to COMINT activities unless specifically so stated and issued by competent authority or NSC directive. This provision with all of the compartmented structure specified in the 1952 NSCID No. 9 was to keep the COMINT field a special preserve not subject to other controls or coordination governing foreign intelligence activities until 15 September 1958 when an NSCID No. 1 was approved which merged USCIB and the IAC into a United States Intelligence Board.

26. At the same time that President Truman issued his directive on communications intelligence on 24 October 1952, he approved a separate directive on communications security (COMSEC). This latter directive stated that the security of Federal communications is a national responsibility and that COMSEC policies and procedures must be integrated to achieve effective cooperation and to satisfy legitimate requirements. The Secretaries of State and Defense were designated as a Special Committee of the NSC for COMSEC matters to establish policies related thereto. This Special Committee was also directed to establish a United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) for integrating policies and procedures, and to assure establishment of appropriate responsibilities and authorities in this field. An NSC directive on COMSEC, including a charter for USCSB, was issued by the Special Committee as NSC 168 on 20 October 1953 for a trial period of one year. After a number of extensions of this trial period, the USCSB recommended and the Special Committee approved a permanent COMSEC directive as NSC 5711 dated 25 April 1957,<sup>61/</sup> which continued in effect until a revised "NSC Communications<sup>Security</sup>/Directive" was issued by the Special Committee on 4 June 1968.

27. Hence the fields of communications intelligence (COMINT) and communications security (COMSEC) have been coordinated by separate boards from 1952 to the present. The question of combining these



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coordinating functions under one board has been raised a number of times - by the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission in 1955, by the Chairman of USCSB in connection with release of cryptographic equipment to NATO nations in 1960, and by the Executive Office of the President in 1961 - with a negative answer in each case. In addition to the differing types of functions and responsibilities in these two fields, one of the prime considerations favoring separate boards has been the need to distinguish between the possible desirability of U. S. assistance to friendly or allied nations in improving their communications security/as compared with the possible adverse impact of such assistance on U. S. COMINT capabilities (USCSB) (USCIB or USIB).

28. The last major change in the authority of the USCIB before it was merged into USIB came in 1955 when it was made the national policy body for "Electronics Intelligence" (ELINT). Prior to that time ELINT operations had been conducted by the military services (the most extensive being those of the Air Force) and by CIA, with no national coordinating body in this field. At the USCIB meeting on 9 April 1954, General G. B. Erskine as the Defense Member had proposed that the Board's authority be extended to cognizance of ELINT. Supported by Lt. General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as Acting Chairman despite some temporizing by various service members, the USCIB agreed in principle

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to recommend to the NSC that its authority be extended to ELINT in the same manner as COMINT except as it applied to the COMINT operations of the Director of NSA. The Board also agreed to form an ad hoc committee under a Defense Department chairman to recommend specific proposals. 62/

29. On 16 May 1955 the National Security Council issued NSCID No. 17 establishing the following organization and procedures "in order that Electronics Intelligence, hereinafter called ELINT, may be made more effective." The USCIB in addition to its authority and responsibility in NSCID No. 9 became the national policy body for ELINT, including policy related to the new Technical Processing Center, arrangements with foreign governments, and recommendations concerning research and development requirements. In this field the USCIB was to operate under the procedures in paragraph 1-(f) of NSCID No. 9; namely, its recommendations were to be binding on all departments and agencies only if adopted by unanimous vote. Subject to these provisions, Defense and CIA were responsible for their respective ELINT collection activities. Technical processing was to be accomplished in a center administered by Defense and jointly staffed by individuals detailed from Defense and CIA. All data collected was to be available to the center, subject only to minimum delay in field exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes. The center was to effect expeditious processing, furnishing the results to interested agencies and if practicable in the form they desired. 63/

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30. Thus was the coordination of ELINT made subject to the same body that coordinated COMINT, but under separate and distinct terms of reference with operations conducted under differing organizational structures. COMINT continued to be the major concern of the USCIB until it was merged into USIB. In fact a separate subcommittee to handle ELINT was not established by USCIB on the urging of General Cabell until March 1958, the same month the NSC directed that IAC and USCIB be combined into a single board.

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D. Forced Consolidation into the United States Intelligence Board

1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created in 1958 by merging the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) pursuant to the personal direction of President Eisenhower based on the advice of his Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, despite a recommendation by the Director of Central Intelligence that this action be deferred primarily because of the "strong and sincerely motivated opposition" of the military intelligence chiefs. 64/

2. During the Eisenhower Administration there was increasing concern with the rising size and cost of national security programs reflected in the deliberations of the National Security Council, expressed particularly by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shared by some Secretaries of Defense. As a result the foreign intelligence effort, as well as the military and foreign aid programs, came under critical review as to efficiency, effectiveness and cost from an organizational and management viewpoint.

3. Consequently the first recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants in its 20 December 1956 report stressed the need for the DCI "to exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility" in order to "accomplish much in the direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination within

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the national intelligence effort without change in present statute or organization." Recommendation No. 4 called for "a strong centralized direction, under which the resources of the various elements would be brought closer together, \*\*\* to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its cost." The Ninth Recommendation was that the NSC "review their Intelligence Directives and substitute a more coherent, consolidated Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's conditions." Recommendations No. 1 and 4 were approved by the President and referred to the DCI for action on 29 January 1957, while Recommendation No. 9 was also approved and referred to the IAC for review of all NSCIDs and early submission to the NSC of recommended revisions.\*

4. On 30 April 1957 after discussion in an IAC meeting, Mr. Dulles sent a report on the status of the review of NSCIDs indicating anticipation that the revisions would be presented to the NSC by 1 August. <sup>66/</sup> On 18 July 1957 Mr. Dulles addressed a letter to the President referring to the above-quoted Recommendations/No. 1 and 4 on coordination and centralized direction, expressing full agreement with them, and advising that he had designated General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. as his Deputy Director for Coordination. The DCI said that General Truscott would be charged with reviewing "all possibilities for

\*See Section B, pages \_\_\_\_\_ for the full text of these three recommendations. <sup>65/</sup>

"increasing integration, reducing duplication, and improving coordination in the national intelligence effort" in consultation with representatives of the intelligence agencies concerned. 67/ Mr. Dulles also submitted to the President for his approval a proposed memorandum to the Statutory Members of the NSC and the DCI as a response to the above letter. The JCS had commented on the DCI letter and proposed Presidential memorandum by noting a strengthening of the intelligence effort through the existing machinery for coordination, stressing that mutual respect and community of effort by the various intelligence activities while discharging their statutory responsibilities must be preserved, and stating that they would render the DCI fullest possible cooperation. 68/ President Eisenhower on 5 August signed the proposed memorandum in which concurred in the need for centralized direction and coordination, and in the appointment of a Deputy Director for Coordination. He concluded by stating that all members of the intelligence community will render the DCI the fullest possible cooperation in accomplishing this objective. 69/ General Truscott concentrated on completing the review of NSCIDs as chairman of an ad hoc IAC group. Revisions of NSCID No. 1 along with four others were concurred in by the IAC on 21 January 1958 and submitted to the NSC on 28 January. 70/

5. While the above actions were being taken by the DCI and the IAC, the President's Board of Consultants had submitted to the President on 24 October 1957 a semi-annual report which contained among others the following Recommendation No. 2:

"That, in order to achieve a better integration of our national intelligence resources (1) the policy, coordinating and supervisory responsibilities presently being discharged separately by the USCIB and IAC be vested in a single Board (to be known as the United States Intelligence Board) established at the present level of the USCIB, with appropriate membership, under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence and responsible directly to the National Security Council, (2) the operation of the National Indications Center be made the direct responsibility of the new Board, and (3) the remaining functions of the USCIB and IAC (and their sub-committee) be redistributed on the advice of the Special Comint Committee and the Director of Central Intelligence respectively. "

Before taking action on this recommendation the President requested that the DCI consult with the USCIB and IAC agencies and furnish to the NSC his views and comments on this recommendation. The NSC Executive Secretary in transmitting this request suggested that the DCI take into account the then current review of NSCIDs and actions under way regarding the recent report on COMINT and ELINT activities by the Baker Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization. 71/

6. The above recommendation obviously indicated that the President's Board had changed its mind since its 20 December 1956 report in which it believed that the DCI could accomplish needed

integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination "without change in present statute or organization". In explaining its new recommendation the Board saw no good reason why the IAC and USCIB should continue as separate entities. On the other hand it felt there were many reasons why they should be reconstituted into a single body to provide appropriate advice and assistance to the DCI in discharging his coordinating function. 72/

7. After brief discussions at the 8 November 1957 USCIB meeting and the 12 November 1957 IAC meeting, it was agreed that General Truscott would consult with each of the members individually prior to developing a draft reply for consideration at a joint meeting on 6 January 1958. General Truscott sent a memorandum to the members of USCIB and IAC reporting the results of his discussions. He indicated that the members would oppose any overall Board which impaired the national intelligence production functions of the IAC. He presented the concept of a single ten-man Board in which members would participate actively to the extent of their agencies' responsibilities and capabilities, and to profit from exposure to community problems when their agencies were not directly involved. General Truscott cited the advantages and disadvantages of the merger, indicating that the merger should facilitate better coordination in overall collection efforts, intelligence security, and intelligence

communications. He concluded that there were two lines of action: (1) nonconcurring in the President's Board recommendation and recommending Presidential disapproval, or (2) concurring in the merger and recommending Presidential approval in principle. 73/

8. At a joint USCIB - IAC meeting on 22 January 1958 the views of the respective members were expressed, and it was recommended that the DCI reply regarding the President's Board recommendation reflecting these views and concluding that USCIB and IAC believed that a merger was not desirable at that time. The opposition of the three service chiefs was highlighted by a memorandum tabled at the meeting by the Army Intelligence Chief, General Robert A. Schow, expressing the considered judgment that the merger would have an adverse effect on national security, and would impede the effective conduct of both US COMINT operations and the production of national intelligence. 74/ Accordingly, Mr. Dulles on 29 January 1958 submitted to the NSC his response on the President's Board recommendation. He summarized the positions of the IAC and USCIB members as follows: (a) the Army, Navy and Air Force believed the merger would entail grave disadvantages, (b) State and the AEC were favorable, while the Joint Staff was unfavorable, (c) the Defense Representative believed it inappropriate to make a decision without more detail on implementation, (d) NSA felt that, so long as he received adequate and authoritative policy guidance, he

could operate under the merger or the present situation, but would not wish to participate in considering national estimates or other related IAC work, and (e) the FBI expressed a neutral view.

9. Mr. Dulles then summarized the disadvantages of the merger advanced by opposing members to be: (a) violation of the principle that COMINT must be compartmented and treated outside other intelligence activities, with the DCI's role in this field insuring that intelligence production and other "normal" operations are coordinated with COMINT, (b) an increase in the number of individuals cleared for COMINT, thus jeopardizing security, (c) involvement of agencies in producing national intelligence that have no related concern or capability, (d) longer agendas, larger attendance and waste of time and personnel at meetings, (e) impairment of the favorable USCIB status in international COMINT relationships and (f) combining essentially dissimilar functions of policy and procedures governing the COMINT effort in contrast with the production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

10. Mr. Dulles then explained that members favoring the merger also favored further study of responsibilities, procedures and safeguards prior to final decision. They pointed out that a merger would be in harmony with the general trend toward better integration and more central direction of national security activities, and would promote closer understanding and better knitting-together of the

intelligence community. They cited the advantages to be: (a) improved stature of the community in the government and improved attention paid to the intelligence product, (b) expedited consideration of overall intelligence policies, coordination and supervision; and more effective community support for requirements, budgetary and otherwise, (c) improvement in the production process by reduction of barriers caused by greater compartmentation than required for security and (d) improved relationships and product resulting from "cross-fertilization" of ideas and more intimate associations and appreciations of problems.

11. The DCI then concluded that, while there was much to recommend a merger and it might eventually be desirable, it should not be directed at that time because: (a) there was strong and sincerely motivated opposition by many of the most important USCIB members, (b) the two Boards were functioning smoothly in close coordination, (c) a consolidation would not in his opinion result in any early saving of time or effort, possibly it would lead to a waste of time since the supporting staffs and subcommittees were wholly distinct and joint meetings would require both staffs and (d) the merger would call for a prior major decision in principle regarding the position of the DCI which should be reached independently prior to a merger. Mr. Dulles therefore recommended that action on the President's Board recommendation be deferred, and that he be directed to make further recommendations after an

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opportunity to test the revised NSCIDs, and after the extent and scope of the reorganization steps being contemplated within the Department of Defense had been clearly defined. 75/

12. The President's Board of Consultants commented on 4 March 1958 that the DCI appeared to misunderstand the purpose and intent of the Board's recommendation which was to establish a single group to advise and assist him in coordinating all operations, both special and other forms of intelligence, such a group to be concerned with policy and guidance matters. The Board explained that operational and non-policy functions performed by the IAC and USCIB separately should be dealt with by committees at the departmental level, with continued compartmented handling to the extent desirable for security. 76/

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13. With all interested parties having had their say, the time of decision arrived with a National Security Council meeting on 13 March 1958 with the Chairman of the President's and USIB Board of Consultants and the members of the IAC/in attendance. The meeting began with a discussion of the draft NSCIDs and the views regarding them of the JCS and of the President's Board. With respect to the comments of the JCS relative to "joint intelligence" as a part of military intelligence with which the IAC was not concerned, President Eisenhower responded by stating that:

"Nearly every department and agency of Government (not only the military departments) would have responsibilities under the conditions of a modern war; that each significant intelligence appraisal would have implications for the national security, useful in the preparation of 'national intelligence'; and that appraisals which were in effect 'national intelligence' would be prepared under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence."

The NSC then approved the draft NSCIDs Nos. 1 through 5 subject to modifications to be submitted later in No. 1 and No. 2. Action on the draft NSCID No. 6 dealing with ELINT was deferred pending later consideration of a new NSCID dealing with COMINT. Further studies and reports were directed regarding the draft NSCID No. 7 on Critical Intelligence Communications. The NSC then was informed of a decision made by President Eisenhower prior to the meeting which was recorded as follows:

"Noted that the President had approved a recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities that there be established a single group to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence, which, together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the United States; such single group to be assigned the policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the remaining functions of USCIB and IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees)."

The NSC also noted that the President had directed the DCI to prepare, in consultation with the IAC and USCIB, and to submit within six months for Council consideration, a draft NSCID to carry out the approved recommendation; with the necessary modifications of other draft NSCIDs to follow. 77/

14. Aside from the directive to establish the USIB, the action at this meeting represented a major milestone in the concept of the role and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The new NSCID No. 1, as subsequently approved to be effective 21 April 1958, gave the DCI for the first time the clear mandate to "coordinate the foreign intelligence effort of the United States, in accordance with the principles established by statute and pertinent National Security Council Directives". The DCI was to be advised by the IAC, and in providing advice and recommendations to the NSC the DCI was to transmit a statement indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence of the IAC members. This NSCID

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also defined "national intelligence" as that intelligence required for formulation of national security policy, concerning more than one department or agency, and transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The DCI was made responsible for producing national intelligence, which was to have the concurrence of the members of the IAC or carry a statement of substantially differing opinion. Departmental intelligence was defined as that which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission. The modification of NSCID No. 1 discussed at the NSC meeting and subsequently incorporated in the approved version was designed to strengthen the role of the DCI, in consultation with the IAC, in the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. 78/

15. Mr. Dulles arranged a meeting on 22 April 1958 at which General Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and General Hull, Chairman of the President's Board of Consultants, accompanied by the Executive Secretary, NSC, discussed with the members of the IAC and USCIB the Presidential Directive to establish a single USIB. General Hull explained that the aims of the President's Board in making the recommendation were "to improve organization, increase coordination and enhance the prestige of the intelligence community within the government". General Cutler noted the President's personal interest in a further integration and coordination of the activities of the intelligence community and the importance he attached to the ready availability of an integrated end-product in a time of crisis. Both Generals Hull and Cutler expressed the opinion that the new Board should review national intelligence estimates and General Cutler emphasized the importance of preserving the integrity, worth and utility of these estimates. In summary this discussion made clear that the two basic missions of the new Board were (1) to achieve better organization and coordination of all intelligence activities, and (2) to improve the timeliness and quality of the substantive "national intelligence" required by the President and the NSC members, departments, and agencies. 79/

16. Pursuant to agreement at that 22 April meeting, General Truscott circulated proposed changes in NSCID No. 1 for accomplishing the merger of the IAC and USCIB into a single USIB, based on the decisions at the NSC meeting of 13 March. 80/ Following preliminary discussion at a 10 June IAC-USCIB meeting 81/ and further discussions by General Truscott with IAC and USCIB members, draft NSCIDs No. 1 and No. 6 were approved for forwarding to the NSC at a joint IAC-USCIB meeting on 15 July 1958. 82/ The DCI sent to the Executive Secretary, NSC <sup>on 29 July</sup> the draft NSCID No. 1, the draft NSCID No. 6 to replace the previous Nos. 9 and 17 dealing with COMINT and ELINT respectively, and minor changes necessary in NSCID Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as a proposed new NSCID No. 7 on "Critical Intelligence Communications." 83/

17. The National Security Council approved, to be effective 15 September 1958, NSCIDs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The approved NSCID No. 1 contained only three non-substantive changes from the draft submitted by the IAC and USCIB. 84/ The only change affecting the United States Intelligence Board provided, based on the discussions with the Bureau of the Budget, authority for the Board to establish subordinate and working groups as appropriate. 85/ The

only change made by the NSC in the IAC/USCIB draft of NSCID No. 6 was to specify that the Secretary of Defense would determine those ELINT collection and processing activities which are essential to provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations, the responsibility for which would be delegated by him to those commanders or the cryptologic agencies supporting them. 86 /

18. The primary modifications in NSCID No. 1 as approved by the NSC on 15 September 1958 compared with the 21 April version were in the strengthening of the concepts that the U. S. intelligence effort is a national responsibility, to be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence (including "both special and other forms of intelligence") with the advice and the assistance of a United States Intelligence Board under his Chairmanship. It was stressed that the purpose of the Board was "to provide/a more effective integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort". The USIB was given specific functions including: (1) establishing policies and developing programs for guidance, (2) establishing intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities, (3) reviewing and reporting to the NSC on the national effort as a whole, (4) making recommendations on intelligence matters to appropriate U. S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense on matters within the jurisdiction of NSA, (5) developing and reviewing security standards and practices to protect

intelligence and intelligence sources and methods and (6) formulating appropriate policies regarding intelligence arrangements with foreign governments. It was stated that the Board would reach its decisions (other than on substantive "national intelligence") by agreement, but the decision-making authority of the DCI was strengthened by providing that when the Chairman determines a given position represents a consensus it is to be considered as agreed unless a dissenting member requests referral to the NSC. The new NSCID defined "interdepartmental intelligence" as integrated departmental intelligence which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce, for which the sub-committee structure of USIB may be utilized for production and dissemination. 87 /

19. NSCID No. 6 as approved by the National Security Council covered both communications intelligence and electronics intelligence superseding the 1952 NSCID No. 9 88/ and the 1955 NSCID No. 17. 89/ The basic change was contained in the statement that " COMINT and ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities except as otherwise established under this directive". Consequently the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT was eliminated, and the types of functions performed by the USCIB were generally assigned to the USIB. The National Security Agency

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was given the mission of providing " an effective unified organization and control" of ELINT as well as COMINT intercept and processing activities, integrated operation policies and procedures pertaining thereto, and <sup>of</sup> producing "COMINT information and ELINT information in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board". Thus the function of the DCI as overall coordinator of foreign intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the USIB, was extended to include the previously / <sup>separate preserve</sup> of COMINT and ELINT. The functions of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the conduct of COMINT activities were also extended to include ELINT. The roles of the Director of NSA and of the military departments in the COMINT and ELINT fields were specified. COMINT and ELINT arrangements with foreign governments were to be conducted in accordance with policies established by USIB. The DCI, with technical advice and assistance of the Director of NSA, was made the Executive Agent



responsibility of the Director of NSA in general consultation with the DCI. 90/

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20. Thus the United States Intelligence Board was created to replace the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board, with the membership combining the representation on both of those Boards. President Eisenhower and the National Security Council<sup>in</sup> / NSCID No. 1 had stated that "The intelligence effort of the United States is a national responsibility, and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government and to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council and of the departments and agencies of the Government". Now it was up to the USIB to provide the best possible advice and assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating all foreign intelligence activities in an effort to achieve the above goals in the interest of our national security. 91 /

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