


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**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION**

**Stage 1 Report of the Staff for the Community
Information Processing Study (SCIPS)**

USIB-D-39.7/5

CODIB-D-82/28

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WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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<u>Members Involved</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>General Activity</u>	<u>Specific Activity</u>
			19. (continued) Revisits, requeries, spot queries, etc, may have to be made here. Group will also list major jobs remaining to be done on collection end and in major <u>field</u> biographic systems.
Full Team	3 weeks	REPORT	20. Reports will be prepared to SCIPS and, if necessary, by SCIPS to USIB through COMIB.
Full Team	1 week		

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1. Names appear in most incoming information documents (with exception of special sources such as ELINT, SEISMINT, ACOUSTINT). More generally, information used in the Intelligence Community deals with foreign activities, capabilities and intentions. People are always the agents of these activities or intelligence events. For the collector, in addition, people are the means by which information about events is obtained. It follows that almost every organization processing or producing intelligence receives a vast amount of information on people and is in turn interested in biographic data on those people.

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2. As in other areas, there has been a tendency for each organization or major command to survey existing information processing centers, find that none produces exactly the type of information needed--and then to proceed to set up its own biographic processing system, large or small. This may, of course, be necessary. There may also be a considerable amount of overlap and duplication present.

3. There is a great variety in the uses to which biographic information is put (e.g. name-tracing for derogatory information, background for contact, searching for individuals with particular skills or accesses, assessment of research potential by studying personalities known to be engaged in an effort, etc). This has also tended to create a number of different processing systems. However, two further facts may be noted: first, many of these uses require the same kind of biographic information inputs; second, there are only a limited number of ways to control biographic information for retrieval, only a limited number of possible control fields. So although many organizations have


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radically different uses for biographic information, there may be overlap in inputs processed towards these different ends and overlap in types of processing.

4. A particular manifestation of this problem can be seen in the exploitation of open literature. Biographic information for intelligence uses depends to a very great extent on this type of source. As a result of the great dependence of many different organization on biographic information, a number of different exploitation systems for open literature in the biographic field have been established. There is considerable duplication or potential duplication here:

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The time is propitious,

therefore, for an examination of the biographic information processing throughout the Community. In addition to the directive features of DCID 1/9, a permissive clause states that any organization may set up biographic files provided that the results of the effort are made available to the agency of prime concern. Therefore, in addition to the changes which have recently taken place or which might be planned for the near future in basic assigned biographic processing coverage, other biographic systems continue to exist and new ones contemplated (e.g. biographic indexing is

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part of the plan for SAC's 438 L, is being considered for ACSI's ACSIMATIC, etc). An examination now into the various biographic processing systems, their input, their purpose, their processing and output, would therefore serve a real need.

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Annex to
CODEB-D-

Initial Tentative Plan for Biographic Sub Group
of SCIP Fact Gathering Support Team (NSG/ST/SCIP)

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
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1. Scope Notes

- * 1. The group is intended to aid SCIPS in the fact-gathering phase.
- 2. The group will not travel overseas, but will flag to SCIPS those overseas units and processes needing study.
- 3. The group cannot provide complete flow information since communication is not exclusively from biographic processing unit to biographic processing unit. The remaining SCIPS fact-gathering forces must fill in here.
- 4. Special sources are ~~not~~ included.
- 5. CI systems are not included. These will have to be eventually be included in SCIPS investigation and fact-gathering in order to study the biographic problem in its context. Such CI systems include:



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- * This is a key point. Task I of SCIPS Plan (design ideal system) which leads to Tasks J and K (develop guidelines and recommendations) presupposes total systems fact-gathering and analysis. It also presupposes Task F and Task G (state-of-the-art and applications).

In other words: solutions to biographic problems may lie in part outside the rather artificially defined "biographic world" of the above scope notes. The solutions should ideally stem from total systems analysis plus state-of-the-art considerations.

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USIB-D-39.7/5

CODIB-D-82/28
26 February 1964

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

Stage I Report of the Staff for the Community Information
Processing Study (SCIPS)

REFERENCES: (a) USIB-D-39.7/1, 24 July 1961
(b) USIB-D-39.7/3, 23 February 1962
(c) USIB-M-202, 23 February 1962

1. This is a report on Stage I of the Community Information Processing Study which was undertaken by CODIB pursuant to USIB direction contained in Reference (c). The original terms of reference were set forth in Reference (a) and modified and reduced in scope in Reference (b), which constitutes the Stage I plan for this study, completion of which is now reported.

2. Information processing, as used in the SCIPS Stage I Report and in this report, includes those activities sequentially following initial or field acquisition and preceding intelligence analysis, except that language translation and photo interpretation activities are included. Thus the term as used by SCIPS is primarily concerned with receipt, dissemination, indexing, storage and retrieval functions.

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3. The directive to the Staff called essentially for doing four things:
 - a. To inventory intelligence information holdings;
 - b. To measure the flow of information between intelligence activities;
 - c. To recommend format and indexing specifications, particularly as required by automated systems;
 - d. To recommend what further study should be made in the information processing area (defined as the portion of the intelligence cycle between the collection of information and the production of intelligence therefrom).

4. The SCIPS Report does include an inventory of intelligence information holdings (or files) in a large part of the Intelligence Community; and it identifies and has measured the flow of information between the many components surveyed. The study effort did not yield the hoped-for specifications, because automated systems generally have not been implemented or in some cases even developed to a level where input requirements are determinable. Recommendations are made concerning what to do next.

5. Our plan of presentation in this paper is first, to comment on the study effort itself, since this is necessary to an understanding of what the Report is or is not; second, to summarize the major SCIPS findings with CODIB comment thereon, giving cross-references to the relevant portions of the SCIPS Report; third, to

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present some additional CODIB observations; fourth, to present our own (i.e., CODIB's) recommendations for USIB action.

COMMENTS ON THE STUDY EFFORT

6. The SCIPS Report consists of six volumes; its sheer bulk and various classifications preclude its submission as a single unit. Volume I, which contains the Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations as well as a Table of Contents for all volumes, is attached hereto as Tab A. The remaining volumes are being forwarded separately to the USIB member agencies. A selection of 20 of 193 charts from the body of the report is also attached as Tab B. To minimize possible misinterpretation of the charts, they should be studied together with the text of Volume II, of which they are a part.

7. In spite of the necessary curtailment of the scope of the survey as originally conceived, the results represent the most comprehensive fact-finding study of this kind that has yet been undertaken in the Intelligence Community, covering perhaps one half of the Community's information processing activities. The extensive data base that has been created will continue for some time to yield information of considerable value to the individual participating agencies as well as to the community as a whole. This data base consists of the Stage I Report itself and, in addition, exhibits, survey forms, punched cards, magnetic tape files, tally sheets, and machine listings.

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The machined portion contains statistical information on the kinds and quantities of people, equipment, files, processes, documents and document movement in the Intelligence Community. The analysis contained in the SCIPS report, although appreciable, has not by any means exhausted the potential of the data.

8. Some 250 organizational components were considered to be of significance in the total processing system; 62 were covered in the Stage I study. Of this number, 42 were surveyed on site by members of the SCIPS Staff who had themselves participated in the formulation of the intricate and detailed survey system described in the report. These surveyors, on assignment from the various USIB agencies, were almost all experienced intelligence officers in the senior grades, some of them with extensive backgrounds in the area of information processing, but virtually none with previous experience in this type of systems study. Another 10 components were surveyed by SCIPS personnel from existing documents and the 10 remaining were surveyed on site by personnel provided by the component being studied. The average size of the SCIPS Staff during this exercise was 15; a total of 81 persons participated in the Study for varying periods of time. A list of all of the components covered is given in Volume V, Appendix G, Section XIV h.

9. Some conception of the magnitude of the SCIPS effort may be obtained by citing a few statistics from the report. Almost 3000 different units, many of which are outside the Intelligence Community, were identified as sending or

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receiving intelligence items.

10. In order to obtain the benefits of an objective and independent analysis of the results of the Stage I study, a panel of outside experts in related fields

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was convened to review the data base and the findings over a period of five days.

The following served in this capacity:

Mr. Willard R. Fazar, Bureau of the Budget

[redacted]
Dr. John H. Kennedy, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

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In addition, Dr. William O. Baker, Vice President (Research), Bell Laboratories, and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, spent a day at SCIPS headquarters while the panel was in session. The report of the panel has been considered by CODIB in reaching its conclusions and is attached as Tab C for information.

11. The members of CODIB, members of the SCIPS Staff, and others spent two days at [redacted] for the purpose of reviewing the report and its findings. The group was unanimous in concluding that the SCIPS Staff, and in particular its director, [redacted] should be commended for a useful job well done.

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12. A word should be said about the factual data reported and the conclusions reached by SCIPS. In the main, the information may be considered one year old, though it varies in age from 8 to 24 months. However, since processing procedures change more slowly than organizations or subject interests, it is believed that these data will remain valid and useful for some time even if not updated. It should further be noted that not all conclusions reached by SCIPS were derived directly

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from the factual data alone. Some conclusions were reached as a result of the broad experience acquired by the Staff during their long and intensive exposure to the survey's environment, supplemented by a high degree of expertise in this field that some of them already possessed. Conclusions so reached may be no less valid or valuable, but the reader should know that judgment as well as fact played parts in their formulation. Those conclusions which seem less valid or even, in our judgment, invalid if based on the data accumulated will be noted in the CODIB comments. The mixture of subjective conclusions with a presentation perhaps sometimes overdrawn for purposes of emphasis, presents a picture of the Intelligence Community which must be carefully examined if misinterpretation or unsound action are to be avoided.

13. One further note. The study consists, virtually, of a picture of considerable size of files and flows. By its terms of reference it did not study the analyst - the user of these files and the recipient of these flows. Hence, some of the dynamics of the situation are missing. We know a good deal about what goes on, but little about why. Moreover, the study deals primarily with the flow of documents, not of information; careful consideration must be given any recommended action to insure that its impact would not impair the flow of information.

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