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# SUGGESTED DCI TALKING POINTS 17 March 1977

SCC Subcommittee on PRM Task 2

## PRM 11

PRM 11 is (or should be) the culmination of a 2 1/2 year period of investigating the functions, structure, and performance of U.S. intelligence.

It should set the course and structure of U.S. intelligence for some years to come.

A number of vital issues are bound up in PRM 11, notably Task 1's examination of the right way to reconcile the legitimate needs of security with an open political process and the rights of Americans under a sound body of law.

Tasks 2 and 3 are essentially concerned with missions, structure, and management of the Intelligence Community. The role of the DCI is necessarily at the center of this discussion because the President and Congress have increasingly expected the DCI to take charge of the Community.

#### The President's Desires

The President desires a well and tightly managed national foreign intelligence effort. He clearly sees this as requiring a strong DCI. How that role is to be defined and empowered, however, is one of the open questions to be resolved by this PRM and the resultant Presidential decisions.

## DCI Views

Since this PRM is in large part about my job, I can be seen as having a major vested interest in its outcome. But I probably do not have any greater vested interest than do the other major departments affected by it. I am open minded as to how the role of the DCI should be configured. But I shall have to be making up my mind rapidly as we move toward the deadline of 1 June.

Moreover, there is one strong prejudice I do not expect to relax: Namely that the responsibilities and the powers of the DCI must be in balance. If I am to be held accountable by the President and the Congress for certain results, such as a rationally allocated NFIP budget, I shall argue for the powers I see as necessary to achieve those results.

I want to assure you, however, that I am very sensitive to the fact that U.S. national intelligence must serve many customers and that those customers must have means to influence and, in some respects, control the services they get. As a military officer, I am especially sensitive to the needs of the Defense Department. The essence of our problem is reconciling the need for a diversity of services to many with tight management of a tight budget and superlative service to our most important customer, the President.

## Task 2

Task 2, the focus of this subcommittee of the SCC, is essentially diagnostic and analytical: What is the character of the DCI's role today, and what are its problems? Options and decisions will come in Task 3. To a large degree the stage will be set for them by Task 2. What degree exactly is something we ought to discuss here.

#### Organization

In your folder there is a chart on how we are organizing Task 2. This subcommittee will provide overall direction and will review the product before submitting it to the full SCC. We shall probably meet at least two more times; once in early April and again in mid-April.

The next element down is a large working group of inherently flexible composition. It might better be called an argument group. Its purpose will be to argue out the substantive issues of the Task 2 report as they come up. The Executive Secretariat will be responsibile for pulling together the representatives and individual experts required for a given issue. This working group will also review draft parts of the report as they are prepared.

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I should emphasize here that I have a good understanding with Secretary Brown that intelligence officers sub-ordinate to him may participate candidly and directly in this process of argument.

The Executive Secretariat is really a drafting group headed by \_\_\_\_\_\_ It has several officers from the IC Staff, one from CIA, and one, I believe, from OSD. This Secretariat will handle administrative and scheduling matters as well.

# Outline for Task 2

We already have what seems to me to be a very serviceable outline of the report around which we can structure the needed work. It is, of course, subject to adjustment as work proceeds. At present we should not expect the deadline to slip. We must get Task 2 (and also Task 1) finished with sufficient time to handle the contentious issues in Task 3, chaired by Dr. Brzezinski.

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# MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

Talking points for 17 March 1977 meeting -- given to DCI, DDCI, and D/DCI/IC only.

Mm

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