

MAR 1977

PRM-11, Task 2

Working Group Discussion

Date: 22 March 1977  
Time: 2:00  
Place: Room 6E0708 CIA Hqs. Bldg.

DCI and DOD: The National-Tactical Relationships and  
Peace-War Issues

1. What de facto definitions currently apply with respect to national versus tactical intelligence:
  - a. Products or kinds of intelligence?
  - b. Users?
  - c. Resources or assets?
2. Is it better to admit we are dealing with an unbroken continuum or must we hammer out some definite distinctions?
3. What are good examples of (a) programmatic, and (b) tasking issues that illustrate current relations between the DCI and DOD on the national-tactical problem?
4. Are there not serious confusions and disagreements within DOD about program and tasking issues in the national-tactical relationship?
5. What basic model of US government decisionmaking would apply in a major war short of an unlimited nuclear exchange? A tight, vertical NCA concept? in which such authorities as Secretary of State and DCI seem to disappear? Or a crisis-management variant of peace-time government in which they would continue to operate? How do these models govern our thinking about peace-war transitions for intelligence?
6. Why have DCI's and CIA given so little attention to war-time functions?
7. How would present national-level, Washington-based intelligence production and collection management systems really work in a major war or deep crisis of more than some days duration?