

TOP SECRET
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

16 May 1966


**MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board**

**SUBJECT: Intelligence Community's Audio
Surveillance Countermeasures
Effort**

1. Your memorandum of April 19, 1966 requested a status report on the implementation of DCID No. 1/12 which established the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee (TSCC) under USIB on December 23, 1964.

2. Since its establishment the TSCC and its two subcommittees have met some 16 times. On March 25th the Committee submitted its First Annual Report to USIB and the Report was considered by the Board at its meeting on April 14th. When discussing and approving the Report, which was classified SECRET, the Board directed that the classification be raised to TOP SECRET. Reprinting of the Report has just been completed and a copy is attached.

3. The TSCC Annual Report reviews the U. S. Government's efforts to counter the audio surveillance threat and is divided into two parts. Part I deals primarily with activities and efforts behind the Iron Curtain or in crisis areas, while Part II presents an account of the totality of the intelligence community's efforts and a quick survey of the active programs under way to improve our countermeasures capabilities. The Report contains specific information on the subjects requested in paragraphs 1 and 2 in your memorandum. Technical inspections are covered in Chapters II and VI while secure acoustic rooms are dealt with in Chapter IX and the in-place receiver program in Chapter X.



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4. Paragraph 3 of your memorandum requested information on action which would be taken upon the discovery of a technical penetration in a U. S. installation. At its ninth meeting on October 22nd the TSCC adopted Procedural Guide No. 1 -- Requirements for Reporting and Testing of Technical Surveillance Penetrations, copy of which is attached. Pages 2, 4 and 5 of this Guide outline the mechanism through which a decision is reached on the feasibility of intelligence exploitation of a hostile penetration. Actions to be taken with respect to nullification, removal and testing of the technical devices involved in the penetration and subsequent preparation of technical reports and damage assessments are covered elsewhere in the Procedural Guide.

5. Paragraph 4 of your memorandum requested information on the status of current Research and Development projects. I personally feel that a meaningful report on this subject would be much too detailed and sensitive to put in writing. I would be glad to have [redacted] brief you or a small group of Board members at your convenience.

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6. On pages 6 through 8 of the TSCC Annual Report you will find a listing of the significant weaknesses and problems connected with our attempts to combat the audio surveillance threat. These have been divided into three categories. The first includes problems which are not soluble at the level of the TSCC and represent difficulties present in varying degrees at our different diplomatic installations overseas. The second category of problems includes those which can properly be attacked by one or more member agencies of the TSCC, while the third category includes problems only partially soluble at best regardless of how much effort or emphasis is placed on them.

W. F. Raborn

W. F. RABORN
Chairman

Attachments

TSCC:CR:ng:dm

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#1 & #2 w/1 set atts. - Addressee

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reply to 66-1863, 19 Apr 66

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V. TS 188824
16 May 66
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Executive Registry
66-1863

April 19, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance Countermeasures Effort

REFERENCE: DCID No. 1/12

At the direction of Board Chairman Clark Clifford, and as an outgrowth of discussions at the last Board meeting, it is requested that you arrange for the submission of a current status report on the implementation of DCID No. 1/12.

In addition to the requested report, and in order to be responsive to questions raised by several of the Board members at the last meeting, it would be appreciated if your submission would include the following:

1. The status of actions taken within the intelligence community to provide sensitive Government installations overseas with countermeasures to defend against audio surveillance penetrations.

2. A summary of current policies guiding audio surveillance sweep operations at such installations including current requirements for the frequency of such sweeps in (a) Iron Curtain countries and (b) other countries.

3. A statement of existing policy guidance relating to the actions to be taken upon the discovery of a technical penetration of sensitive U. S. installations abroad, including (a) procedures for obtaining a decision concerning the feasibility of intelligence exploitation of a discovered device or audio surveillance system, and (b) action with respect to nullification and removal of such device or system.

4. A status report on research and development projects presently under way for the purpose of producing new and improved devices and techniques for the detection of audio penetration attempts by hostile intelligence and security services.

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5. An identification of any significant gaps and deficiencies in the countermeasures effort which have been identified in the course of implementing NSAM 317, dated November 15, 1964.

It would be appreciated if your report could be received in this office by May 15, 1966, in time for study by interested Board Panels prior to the next regular scheduled meeting of the full Board on May 26 and 27, 1966.

Your assistance in this matter will be appreciated.


J. Patrick Coyne

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Executive Priority
166-1863

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

April 19, 1966

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