

13 April 1973

Report of Study Group on Operations Centers

1. The Study Group was charged with examining Agency 24-hour activities and related message flows with a view to consolidation and rationalization. (See Annex A) Our recommendations are contained in this report. A separate report will deal with the role of the "reports" function in handling Agency-collected raw intelligence.

2. We took as our objective the creation of a 24-hour system which would provide a single, central point for:

--Scanning of electrical narrative traffic arriving in Headquarters from all sources for items of immediate concern.

--Alerting of senior Agency officials, action officers, and external consumers. (This function, of course, is usually carried out through command channels during duty hours.)

--Selection of important traffic for senior Agency officers.

--Response to queries from other government agencies when no established channel exists.

--Crisis management and task force activities.

--Monitoring of all Agency activities in non-duty hours.

Present Arrangements

3. By this yardstick, the present situation is not too bad. The Agency has a number of more or less

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autonomous duty officers and other activities, but cooperation among them is good. The present Operations Center: scans most incoming traffic; alerts some Agency officers and most external consumers; selects some important traffic, is the point of reference for other agencies; houses DDI crisis activities, but not those of the other Directorates; monitors most Agency 24-hour activities but controls none. More important, however, is the fact that all these activities take place within the traditional framework of the Agency; the individual baronies preserve their frontiers.

4. The Operations Center is the most comprehensive and most nearly "central" of the Agency's 24-hour activities. The DDI is executive agent for the Operations Center. DDI and DDO have duty officers there, each of whom answers to his Deputy. The DDI officer as the senior represents the DCI to a limited, but undefined, degree. Each is generally cognizant of most out-of-hours activities of his Directorate. The DDI officer in addition controls some housekeeping functions of the DDM&S.

5. In addition to the Operations Center, there are nine other centers, three stand-by centers, and three computer centers, as well as housekeeping functions. Four of these (IW, ██████████ FMSAC, SSOC) are highly specialized processing facilities that make their results available to the Operations Center. Two (OSP* and NPIC* Signal Centers) are independent duty facilities. NSO is a support function that cooperates with the Center. The OC headquarters complex, the Signal Centers and Cable Secretariat, receives and routes traffic to all the others except NSO. Several of these centers are located with their parent component away from the Headquarters Building. (An inventory of centers is included as Annex B.)

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*Manned by OC

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6. There is no obvious duplication of functions, although several centers may deal with the same traffic. There is, however, a division of the scanning, alerting, and selection functions among several centers.

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--Scanning is done: in the Operations Center and FMSAC by broadly qualified substantive officers, aware of current activities on an all-source basis; in Cable Secretariat, IW and [REDACTED] by substantive officers with limited access to other information; and in the other centers by technicians working by SOP.

--The Operations Center selects from NSA and press traffic; Cable Secretariat from CIA, State and DOD traffic; the various DDS&T offices and NPIC from "project" traffic.

--Alerting: of the DDO is divided among the DDO/DO in the Operations Center, IW, and the OC Complex; of the DDI between Operations Center and NPIC; of the DDS&T among OC (for several offices), FMSAC, and SSOC; of the DDM&S among the Operations Center, NSO, and OC Complex.

At no one point is there full knowledge of what is going on, and there is ample room for matters to fall between two stools.

7. Some of the anomalies noted above are historical carry-overs. Others are the results of compartmentation. Compartmentation is necessary for some of the operational traffic of the DDO and DDS&T. Protection must be given to sensitive intelligence collected by other agencies. There must be privacy for the personal concerns of the DCI and DDCI, and for the medical and security activities of the DDM&S. To meet these requirements, there has grown up a maze of improvised special procedures for particular categories of sensitive traffic. No two are alike and

no one element is aware of them all. Such a system maintains security, but at a considerable cost to efficiency. Eight years experience with the co-location and cooperation of the DDI and DDO Duty Officers, however, demonstrates that an Operations Center can do its job while maintaining compartmentation. But the more cable traffic is shared, the less chance of error.

8. Another weakness of the present system has been surmounted in the past largely by good will. This is the lack of clearly defined relationships among the centers. During duty hours the Agency has an established chain of command, but when senior officers are not on board its various parts operate with relative autonomy. The Operations Center is first among equals, but its relations with the others are largely consultative. The DDI and DDO duty officers speak (within certain limits) for their Deputies at night. No one speaks for the DCI or for the other Deputies.

New Considerations

9. The DCI has stated his desire to integrate the activities of the Agency and to eliminate barriers between Directorates. Present arrangements do not serve his purposes.

10. The DCI has ordered a much more intensive effort in support of the NSC Staff and the White House Situation Room. To achieve this, the OCI PDB Staff, located in the Operations Center, has been expanded and redesignated White House Support Staff. Its activities are hampered, however, because the Operations Center as now constituted cannot provide the full information flow it requires. Moreover, present Agency methods for transmission to the White House are not fully compatible with the WHSR data-handling system.

11. The Agency is developing a consolidated, computer-based system for dissemination of narrative

electrical traffic within Headquarters.

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12. [REDACTED] will add a new dimension to Agency night activities. The Headquarters terminal will be located in the Operations Center. This will not only bring in a new flow of information, but will also present new problems in managing the [REDACTED] systems. No single center exists in Washington, much less in the Agency, where such a process can take place.

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13. The NMCC/NMIC and State Operations Centers are in process of modernization. To stay in the game, CIA must modernize too.

14. The Agency has developed, and is preparing to put forward for National Security Council approval, a proposal for a National Intelligence Operations Center. The primary purpose of NIOC is to pull together Community current intelligence support for the national authorities.

Conclusions

15. We believe the Agency needs a true centralized Operations Center. We believe it is feasible to modify the present system immediately to bring this about in a somewhat jury-rigged fashion. Finally, we believe that over the next 2-3 years the center can and should be transformed into a modern computer-based facility.

16. Taking the initial steps can be done cheaply, with a modest increase in personnel. The subsequent ones, however, will take money and space. (A preliminary estimate of initial resource requirements is included as Annex C.)

17. We have re-examined the NIOC prospectus (Annex E) in the light of what we propose below. The two appear compatible. Some changes in detail will be necessary for NIOC, and the need for compartmentation of Agency internal activities should be reaffirmed.

Recommendations

18. We recommend that the following steps be taken in the first 120 days after approval of this report.

- a. That DDI remain Executive Agent for the Operations Center; that the DDI Duty Officer be senior in non-duty hours.
- b. That DDS&T place a duty officer in the present Operations Center, at least during off-duty hours; that, at least initially, DDM&S delegate its off-duty responsibilities to the other Directorate duty officers; that DDM&S be prepared to install a duty officer in crisis situations.
- c. That each Directorate duty officer be responsible for activities of and alerting in his Directorate. (For relations with other centers see Annex D.) That the DDI Duty Officer normally be responsible for the needs of the DCI and DDCI in non-duty hours.
- d. That during crisis periods a senior Agency duty officer representing the DCI be placed over the four Directorate duty officers.
- e. That the OC complex make available to the Directorate duty officers all incoming narrative traffic received by the Agency (after screening out low precedence and administrative cables); that each message be seen by at least one duty officer; that the duty officers maintain necessary compartmentation; that exceptions to this provision be permitted only by specific direction of the DCI or his Deputies.

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- f. That State NODIS and [REDACTED] traffic, the only important category not usually received electrically, be routed through the appropriate duty officers in the Operations Center by LDX, if State will agree.
 - g. That the alerting and "call-in" functions of the OC complex, including those on behalf of DDS&T, be transferred to the appropriate Directorate duty officers in the Operations Center.
 - h. That all selection, including that by the OC Complex, be moved to the Operations Center; that the volume of cables selected be reduced; that the Night Journal and Cable Summary be combined, and issued on an all-source basis 2 or 3 times daily.
 - i. That to the extent possible with present facilities all dissemination of electrical narrative traffic within the Headquarters Building be transferred to the OC Complex.
 - j. That approximately 3,000 square feet of additional space adjacent to the Operations Center be made available as soon as possible.
 - k. If this space is on the 6th floor, that a connecting staircase be constructed as soon as arrangements can be made.
 - l. That the Agency obtain inter-Agency agreement on NIOC.
19. While these steps are underway, study should begin on the following problems in the design of a future Operations Center.

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- a. Should FMSAC and SSOC be physically consolidated with the Operations Center?
- b. How should the Headquarters terminal [REDACTED] be configured and staffed?
- c. How should the Agency, or NIOC, manage the interaction of collection systems?
- d. How to adapt CDS to an Operations Center fully meeting the objectives of Paragraph 2, and make it compatible with the systems of the WHSR, NMCC, and State Operations Center?

20. The additional space (paragraph 18j) will make it possible to move into Phase II. In Phase II we assume that NIOC has been approved. Thus the additional space will be used for:

- a. Offices and communications for inter-Directorate and inter-Agency crisis task forces.
- b. Offices for State, DIA, and NSA permanent representatives.
- c. Moving the IW into the Operations Center, where its officers can be more aware of current priorities.

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7 March 1973

ANNEX A

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Management Committee Study Group on Watch,
Indication and Warning Procedures

1. The following officers are appointed to a Study Group;

25X1A DD/I : Richard Lehman (Chairman)

DD/O : [REDACTED]

DD/S&T: Sayre Stevens

DD/S : [REDACTED]

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2. The Study Group will review the structure and function of all Agency 24-hour "watch" operations and situation rooms and make recommendations for their consolidation and rationalization. It will study the activity of these centers in initial handling of incoming information of all degrees of sensitivity from all sources, with a view to improving the processes of alerting, selection, and assignment of action. Finally, it will examine the role of these centers, and related activities in the field and at Headquarters, in the receipt, processing, and dissemination of raw intelligence acquired by the Agency from all sources.

3. On the basis of these findings, the Study Group will recommend any changes it believes necessary in the existing proposal for a National Intelligence Operations Center. Its recommendations with regard to Agency activities should not be dependent, however, on the establishment of an NIOC.


4. In general, the Study Group should work toward maximum simplification and centralization of Agency operations by the integration

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of related activities of the individual Directorates. In so doing, it should seek a reasonable balance among the conflicting objectives of effectiveness, security, and economy.

5. The Study Group's report will be submitted by 15 April 1973.

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W. E. Colby
Executive Secretary
CIA Management Committee

ANNEX C

RESOURCES

SUMMARY

PHASE I - Minimum costs.

- A. Space requirement - none.
- B. Manpower for four 24-hour positions.
 - 1. Four DDS&T Duty Officers.
 - 2. Six clerical personnel in the Operations Center. These can be provided by maintaining OCI's clerical strength at its present 85. Otherwise it would be reduced to about 80 in FY 74.
 - 3. Ten clerical personnel in OC. This figure is tentative and may well be substantially reduced as the mechanics are worked out. In any case, the need for these people will be eliminated when CDS becomes operational.
- C. One-time costs - Approximately [REDACTED] for construction and equipment.

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PHASE II - all estimates extremely tentative.

- A. Space - 3,000 sq. ft., plus an additional 2,000 if FMSAC/SSOC is moved.
- B. Manpower - No requirement for additional CIA personnel is envisaged, but needs of headquarters [REDACTED] terminal have not been established. NIOC will require personnel assigned by DIA, NSA, and State.
- C. One-time costs - [REDACTED] for construction; [REDACTED] for a data link to NSA/NSOC;

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an unknown amount for the [redacted] terminal;
[redacted] for construction and engineering
to move FMSAC/SSOC. Thus minimum [redacted]
maximum [redacted] in both cases plus [redacted]
costs. [redacted]

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Phase I

I. Objectives

- A. Establish a DDS&T duty officer position in the present CIA Operations Center and provide for a stand-by DDM&S duty officer.
- B. Rearrange traffic flow as feasible to allow appropriate Directorate Duty Officers to receive relevant traffic particularly after normal business hours.
- C. Transfer all alerting and selecting responsibilities to the Operations Center.

II. Costs

A. Objective I.A.

S&T and M&S Duty Officer coverage in the Operations Center.

1. Manpower

- a. Maximum coverage in the DDS&T would provide for Duty Officer and assistant coverage and would require assignment of 5 officers and 5 assistants.
- b. Minimum coverage would provide for Duty Officers only (no assistants) after normal business hours Monday through Friday and around-the-clock Saturday and Sunday and would require the assignment of four duty officers

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plus the use of reserves to cover schedule gaps.

2. Space Requirement


- a. To support maximum DDS&T coverage - 300 sq. ft. The 75 sq. ft. additional space not now available to Operations Center would be needed, plus stand-by space for DDM&S.
- b. To support minimum coverage - 150 sq. ft. Some 225 sq. ft. will be available after revamping of present Operations Center space already under discussion is completed. This will also provide stand-by space for DDM&S.

3. Money

a. Personal services


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Maximum DO coverage (DDS&T)



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Minimum DO coverage (DDS&T)



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b. Construction

Construction costs for either maximum or minimum coverage should not exceed [redacted] of this cost will be incurred by some restructuring within the present Operations Center to better allocation of working space.

c. Equipment

The traffic distribution facilities already in place in the Center would

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be used for servicing the expanded Center during Phase I.

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Minimum costs could be incurred through the installation of additional secure phones and some printer equipment; probably would not exceed [REDACTED]

B. Objective I.B.

Rearrange traffic flow as feasible to permit appropriate Directorate Duty Officers to receive relevant traffic.

1. Manpower

- a. No additional manpower will be required in Operations Center with the exception of some clerk/typist augmentation estimated at 6 GS-06s.
- b. The Office of Communications estimates that one additional position may be required in the Signal Center plus one additional position in the Cable Secretariat. Staffed around-the-clock these two positions would require a total of 10 personnel. The two positions would be used to screen, reproduce, sort, and dispatch to the Directorate Duty Officers in the Center all relevant traffic. This would mean that about 60 to 70% of the total OC complex volume of traffic would require additional processing not now done. The requirement for the two positions is tentative and subject to modification as Phase I is implemented. The traffic flow contemplated here is one which can be handled electronically with the completion of the CDS.

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2. Space

No additional space requirements are anticipated.

3. Money

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a. Personal services

A total of 16 clerical personnel at an estimated annual cost of [REDACTED]

b. Construction

So minimal as to be insignificant.

c. Equipment

Copy equipment and supplies [REDACTED]

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C. Objective I.C.

Transfer alerting and selecting responsibilities to the Operations Center.

1. Manpower

Provided for in Operations Center clerk/typist augmentation in Objective I.B.

2. Space

None

3. Money

Some additional workload may be placed on the printing facilities on the 7th floor as a result of the more frequent publication of the Journal and cable summaries. Costs should be negligible.

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Phase II

I. Objectives

- A. Physical expansion of the CIA Operations Center.
- B. Move the IW, FMSAC, and SSOC into the Operations Center.
- C. Superimpose NIOC on the expanded CIA Operations Center.

II. Costs

A. Objective I.A.

Physical expansion of the CIA Operations Center.

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1. The tangible costs connected with physically expanding the Center to include space on the sixth floor immediately below the present Center would be [REDACTED] to construct and install a circular stairway to link up the two floors internally, and a rough estimate of [REDACTED] for space rearrangement. 3-5,000 sq. ft. would become available. 25X1A

2. Expansion of the present Center also could take place on the 7th floor across the F corridor from the present center. Costs here would be only those incurred through rearrangement of partitions, painting, etc., perhaps [REDACTED] 1,835 sq. ft. would be available. This arrangement would provide no room for growth and is intrinsically less desirable.

B. Objective I.B.

Move the IW, FMSAC, and SSOC into the Operations Center.

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1. The results of the study to be made on this objective as part of Phase I implementation will determine whether or not any advantage is to be gained by the proposed move.
2. Cost of moving the IW would be minimal, say [redacted] Engineering, wiring, space renovation, construction for the FMSAC and SSOC move to the 6th floor space made available in II, A, I, above is estimated at [redacted]

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C. Objective I.C.

Superimpose NIOC on the expanded CIA Operations Center.

1. Achieving this objective requires manpower augmentation from other USIB agencies, over the number already assigned to other Operations/Command Centers.

DIA	none
NSA	4
STATE	8

2. Space requirements can be met through the physical expansion of the CIA Operations Center.
3. No attempt has been made to establish the cost of personal services for NIOC since the proposal at this stage does not deal with grade structures.
4. Equipment costs to link NIOC with NSA/NSOC have been estimated at [redacted]

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Other one-time equipment cost projections can be obtained only through the feasibility/cost studies to be undertaken as a result of approval of the NIOC proposal.

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Phase III

I. Objectives

Installation of automated equipment for full integration of the total system.

II. Costs

Not determinable at this time.


Annex D

This annex deals with 24-hour centers and standby facilities other than the Operations Center. The language is subject to modification in the light of Management Council decisions on the degree of their subordination to the Operations Center.

A. Office of the Director

1. VASRAC. To be discontinued as soon as conditions in Vietnam permit, and its remaining functions returned to the Operations Center.

B. DDI



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2. [redacted] Decision on [redacted] should await decision whether [redacted] is to be transferred to the DDO. In any case, [redacted] traffic should be scanned by the DDI Duty Officer at all times.

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3. NPIC/IAS. To be under guidance of the DDI/DO. All cable traffic not already routed to the Operations Center by OC or NPIC should be so routed.

C. DDO

1. DDO/DO. The existing DDO/DO should be continued. He should be sufficiently senior and be provided with adequate guidelines to enable him to speak for the DDO in non-duty hours with only a minimum recourse

outside for decisions in exceptional cases. He should receive all the sensitive traffic now handled by the OC Complex, and the alerting and "call-in" function should be handled by him or by the other Directorate duty officers as appropriate.

2. Intelligence Watch. The Intelligence Watch should operate under the guidance of the DDO duty officer. It should be physically located in the Operations Center in order to take advantage of the information available there.
3. The Operating Divisions. The Ad Hoc 24-hour task forces occasionally established by DDO elements should be housed in Operations Center facilities for crisis management, when they are constructed.

D. DDS&T

1. A DDS&T duty officer and necessary supporting staff should be installed in the Operations Center. He should have the same relationship to his Deputy Director and to the activities of his Directorate as those of the DDI and DDO duty officers.
2. [REDACTED] The branch Signal Center on the 6th floor which supports DDS&T is in process of consolidation with the main Signal Center. Its alerting function should be transferred to the DDS&T Duty Officer.
3. FMSAC. The FMSAC Center should be monitored out of hours by the DDS&T Duty Officer. Consideration should be given to the possibility of moving

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this center and the adjacent OEL facilities into the Operations Center.

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4. OEL. SSOC should be handled in a similar fashion to FMSAC.
5. [REDACTED] The present standby OSA Control Center in the [REDACTED] should remain where it is, although the DDS&T Duty Officer should see its traffic. It is a reasonable assumption that this program will not survive much longer in any case.

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E. DDM&S

1. OC. The OC Complex should be monitored by the Operations Center Duty Officer out of duty hours. There is clearly no requirement for, and a great deal of inefficiency in, physically consolidating the Operations Center and the CIA Communications facilities.
2. OS. The Night Security Officer is a specialized function properly located on the first floor. The NSO, however, should be monitored by the Operations Center Duty Officer.
3. OL. The Operations Center Duty Officer should maintain cognizance over the out of hours motor pool, courier, printing, telephone, etc., activities of OL.
4. OJCS. The consolidated computer centers of OJCS should be monitored by the Operations Center Duty Officer.

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ANNEX E

Attachment 1

A National Intelligence Operations Center

1. Twenty-odd years ago the CIA Operations Center consisted of a graduate student sleeping by a telephone at night. Twelve years ago the White House had no 24-hour watch apparatus except its communications center, and the Department of Defense had no central command center at all. Today there exists an intricate network of round-the-clock operations and intelligence centers, linked by secure communications, and among them controlling virtually all the essential national security activities of the Federal Government.

2. Despite the progress that has been made, the solution has never quite caught up with the problem. No rationale other than individual agency interests has ever been applied to operations center development. The true lines of authority and responsibility within the National Security Council structure have never been reflected in organization. New developments in collection and communications have overtaken present operating concepts. In recent months, a number of these matters have reached a stage at which another quantum jump forward in Community organization appears feasible and desirable.

A. Factors Bearing on Such a Reorganization:

3. The authority of the DCI has been substantially strengthened. As a member of the various NSC Committees--SRG, WSAG, 40, NSCIC, DPRC, Verification Panel, VSSG--his position, first defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as the President's intelligence officer and the spokesman of the Intelligence Community to the political authorities has been further institutionalized. In particular, through the WSAG he carries the national intelligence responsibility in crisis management. Equally important, his position was reinforced by the President's reorganization of November 1971. He has instructions to organize the Community more efficiently and to save money. These changes have not so far been reflected in Community organization for crisis management.

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4. Existing and programmed SIGINT and photographic collection systems provide powerful new capabilities for warning and crisis intelligence and, in general, enhance the flow of timely data into the current intelligence process. No central facility exists, however, whereby these new capabilities, in conjunction with conventional sources, may be used to full advantage in response to national intelligence requirements, particularly those which emerge in rapidly moving situations.

5. NSCID #3 is permissive in its wording on the production of national current intelligence. There is no clearly defined responsibility, a lack especially felt under conditions of crisis. The result is an uncontrolled, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory outpouring of raw information as well as current intelligence to the national authorities, a problem under study by the NSCIC Working Group.

6. Technical collection-analysis-dissemination systems have been developed which provide tactical warning that a strategic attack against the US is under way. The problem of longer range ("strategic") warning is much more difficult since it involves judgments on enemy intent in the absence of clear-cut, unambiguous actions; technical systems are unlikely to resolve the problem. Strategic warning can only be the product of a continuing and comprehensive analysis of all relevant information. The national military authorities, however, have defined their needs for strategic warning in terms parallel to those for tactical; they require a degree of timeliness and specificity which the Intelligence Community is unable to provide. The National Indications Center, originally conceived for this purpose, is growing obsolete and is increasingly isolated. It should be replaced with a system more responsive to present military needs.

7. The ASD(I) is preparing to put forward a proposal to solve some of these problems. He would concentrate all crisis management activities in the NMCC/NMIC, in support of the "National Command Authorities", defined as the President and the Secretary of Defense. While we agree that there are problems that need solving, and that a great deal of simplification and centralization within the DOD is desirable, we find this specific solution unacceptable.

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a. It confuses the national military command line (President-Secretary of Defense-JCS-NMCC) with the national intelligence support channel (DCI-NSC-President), and in so doing ignores the role of the Secretary of State. The intelligence judgment is put in the hands of the military authorities who must act on it.

b. It narrows the focus of crisis management to the ultimate military threat. The problem of crisis management is really much broader, and involves equally important economic and political considerations.

c. It relies on machine and organizational solutions to the strategic warning problem, and gives no attention--or even access--to the broad analytic base on which strategic warning judgment depends. In so doing, it down plays the political and economic factors essential to a judgment on strategic warning.

d. It does not reflect the actual authority and responsibility of the DCI, and in particular his responsibilities to the national authorities in all varieties of crisis, political, economic, and military.

B. A Conceptual Framework:

8. In the national security field, operational or command channels run from the President to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and from them to their deputies or to the State Operations Center and (through the JCS) to the NMCC. The State Operations Center and the NMCC are supported departmentally by INR and the NMIC. Although the DCI does not stand in the command line for any major matters, he nonetheless has national responsibilities for intelligence support to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the NSC Staff mechanism. National intelligence channels run from the DCI to the President.

9. The DCI must thus supply current intelligence support to the national authorities. This comes in three phases:

a. Under normal conditions, the DCI represents the Intelligence Community in the NSC and its subordinate

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bodies: SRG, Verification Panel, etc. He must provide daily reporting on current events and their significance, fuller analysis as required, a systematic and continuous examination of the strategic warning problem, and a 24-hour alert system. The first of these requirements he meets through the Central Intelligence Bulletin, a national publication in all but name. The second he meets through National Intelligence Estimates, fully coordinated, and CIA Memoranda, unilateral. The weekly Watch Report, coordinated and national, is an effort to meet the strategic warning requirement, but one which is effective only when there is no warning to give. An ad hoc 24-hour alert system exists, but no center has clearly defined national intelligence responsibilities.

b. Under crisis conditions, whether the primary threat be political, economic, or military, the DCI represents the Community in the WSAG. In addition to his normal responsibilities, he must supply the national authorities with periodic situation reports. At present, he does this unilaterally, as do other USIB agencies. There is no mechanism for national situation reports.

c. Under the threat of general war (a particular kind of crisis), the DCI must supplement his situation reports with a continuously reviewed judgment on enemy strategic intentions, both for the national authorities and for the military authorities responsible for interpreting tactical warning. The present Watch Committee/NIC structure is supposed to provide such a judgment, but is less and less capable of doing so.

C. Proposed Reorganization:

10. There is clearly a need for an organizational structure which will permit the DCI to carry out all these responsibilities to the national authorities in a coherent way and on a national basis. He therefore proposes to establish a National Intelligence Operations Center in the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. The NIOC will be organized as follows:

a. Mission

i. To provide 24-hour national current intelligence support to the President, the National Security Council, the heads of departments and agencies involved in national security affairs, and their supporting staffs. (Hereafter referred to as the National Security Authorities.)

ii. To support the Director of Central Intelligence in such others of his responsibilities as he may from time to time designate.

b. Functions

i. To scan, on a 24-hour, 7-day basis, all incoming information available to the United States Government on activities of foreign governments.

ii. To alert the National Security Authorities, through appropriate channels, to the receipt of significant intelligence.

iii. To produce all-source national current intelligence periodicals, coordinated among the USIB agencies to the extent possible, for dissemination to the National Security Authorities.

iv. To carry on a continuing analysis of incoming intelligence for indications that a foreign power intends to engage in aggressive military action against the United States or its interests; to provide through USIB and its Watch Committee a status report, at least weekly, on this analysis; to conduct research to improve techniques in indications analysis.

v. To establish and administer a system of "national intelligence alerts".

vi. When a crisis--be it political, economic or military--occurs or is threatened, to establish an inter-agency task force in the NIOC to provide intelligence support to the National Security Authorities.

These task forces will produce, or as appropriate task others to produce, national intelligence situation reports and such other intelligence as is requested by these authorities. When requests are of a character that would call for estimative treatment, as in a Special National Intelligence Estimate, task forces will consult the DCI's Office of National Estimates and the latter will initiate a SNIE according to its customary procedures.

vii. When a crisis occurs which threatens to involve the United States in hostilities with a foreign power, to provide the National Security Authorities and the NMCC/NMIC with a continuous analysis of, and judgment on, enemy intentions with respect to military action, under the guidance to the extent possible of the USIB Watch Committee.

viii. In support of these objectives, to provide a centralized facility to act as the focal point for the issuance of timely current intelligence requirements to all major collection systems in rapidly moving situations. In crisis situations NIOC requirements will be given precedence by collection system managers as necessary to meet the immediate requirements of the national security authorities.

ix. To be informed of US diplomatic and military activities in order to improve understanding of the actions and reactions of foreign governments and to achieve optimum timeliness and relevance of intelligence support.

x. To maintain such briefing facilities as may be required.

c. Relationships

i. The National Intelligence Operations Center is a national facility established by the DCI, with the advice and assistance of USIB, under the provisions of NSCID's #1 and #3.

ii. The chain of command is from the President to the appropriate committee of the NSC to the DCI to the Director, NIOC.

iii. The NIOC's primary responsibility is to the President and NSC Staff. It will normally be responsive,

however, to requirements of the State Operations Center and the NMCC/NMIC, and in certain circumstances (see para b, section vii above) has specified responsibilities to the NMCC/NMIC.

iv. The Director, NIOC will be designated by the DCI. His deputy will be designated by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the DCI. The NIOC will be jointly manned by CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA, and each agency will maintain a senior representative accredited thereto. Any task forces that may be formed will be jointly manned by CIA, DIA and INR analysts assigned to augment NIOC for this purpose, under the direction of an officer designated by the DCI.

v. The NIOC will establish 24-hour liaison with the White House Situation Room, the State Operations Center, the NMCC/NMIC, and the National SIGINT Operations Center. At least in the case of the NMCC/NMIC this liaison will be maintained by an interagency team (CIA, DIA, INR, NSA) on duty in the NMCC.

vi. All major collection categories will be represented on a 24-hour basis in the NIOC.

vii. The Directorates of Intelligence and Science and Technology, CIA, will furnish first-line analytic support to the NIOC.

viii. CIA will supply the facilities, communications, funding, and other logistic support of the NIOC as a service of common concern.

d. Organization

i. NIOC will be headed by a Director and Deputy Director, as stated above. It will consist of six groups: Watch, Collection, Liaison, Indications, Production, and Support, plus the senior CIA, DIA, NSA and INR representatives. The CIA representative will handle CIA's departmental operations center responsibilities. (At least

initially, some NIOC personnel will serve concurrently in more than one position.)

ii. The watch group will consist of sufficient watch teams to man the center on a 24-hour basis. Each team will consist of CIA, INR and DIA duty officers, with the CIA officer in charge, and a number of watch officers furnished by CIA.

STATSPEC

iii. The collection group will consist of sufficient teams to provide 24-hour representation for NSA, COMIREX, CIA (Clandestine Service, DCS, [REDACTED] and DD/S&T), State, and DIA. Representatives for other collection systems will be added as required. The State, DIA and certain CIA positions will normally be filled by the corresponding watch team members.

iv. The liaison group will consist of CIA officers on duty at the White House Situation Room and State Operations Center (if a requirement for these jobs is established), and round-the-clock USIB teams in the NMCC/NMIC. These teams will consist of CIA, DIA, NSA and State members. The CIA member will be in charge, and will be under control of the senior duty officer in the NIOC. Team members may also serve as departmental representatives of their agencies in the NMCC.

v. The indications group will have two elements, a USIB Watch Committee Secretariat and a research element, manned jointly by CIA, DIA, and NSA. (State participation will be invited.) The Secretariat will draft the weekly Watch Report.

vi. The production group, furnished by CIA, will consist of sufficient editorial, graphics, and publications personnel to meet NIOC's requirements.

vii. The support group, furnished by CIA, will supply administrative, data-processing, communications, and logistic support as required.

e. Organizational Changes

i. The National Indications Center will be abolished and its functions and CIA personnel transferred to the NIOC. (The USIB Watch Committee, however, will continue to function; NIOC will furnish its secretariat.)

ii. The NIOC will absorb the present CIA Operations Center, and most of its functions, facilities, and personnel. The exceptions will be those functions which must remain internal to CIA.

iii. The CIA chief of the NIOC representation in the NMCC will also serve as the DCI's representative to the Secretary of Defense.

iv. The Watch Committee Secretariat will absorb the scanning functions of the CIA Indications Officer.

v. The Central Intelligence Bulletin will become the National Intelligence Bulletin.

vi. The USIB agency representatives in the NIOC will serve as the coordination panel for the NIB, under the guidance of the NIB chairman.

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Attachment 2


CIA Considerations for an NIOC

1. By definition, a National Intelligence Operations Center must answer to the DCI. Much of its activity will be in close support of the DCI and some of its instructions will come from him. Provision must also be made for a number of other unilateral CIA activities within the center. Among others, these include operations of the Clandestine Service, DDI production, and CIA representation on the Watch Committee. Furthermore, the NIOC must retain the present integration of the CIA Operations Center with its analytic base. The center must be a service organization with its analytic capability provided by the production offices of the DDI and DD/S&T. This capability must, however, be available to the center around the clock and on short notice, and must underpin all center activities (and vice versa). These considerations argue strongly that the existing command relationships remain unchanged-- i.e., that the DDI be the executive agent for the NIOC on much the same basis he is for the present Operations Center.

2. The following pages describe the resources that would be required for an NIOC. They include charts showing NIOC organization, a typical manning shift, and estimated manpower, space and equipment requirements.

CIA Internal Use Only

NIOC ORGANIZATION




-2-

*positions round-the-clock manning requires 5 officers for each position except WHSR where 9 officers staff two positions

**position covered by Sr. Duty Officers

WATCH TEAM



-3-

STATSPEC * CIA SDO is responsible for DCI special interests as well as for [redacted] collection guidance.

As indicated by asterisks, CIA, State, and DIA Duty officers have certain collection responsibilities as well.

RESOURCES

MANPOWER

	<u>REQUIREMENT</u> (tentative)	<u>AVAILABLE</u>
	107	99
CIA	67*	67
DIA	16	20
NSA	13	9
STATE	11	3

*Does not include possible requirement for skilled ADP and COMMO personnel.

SPACE REQUIREMENT (tentative)

WATCH/COLLECTION BULLPEN (+50%)	1300
ADMIN	400
COMMO	1000
OFFICES	1200
SIT ROOM COMPLEX (+50%)	700
WATCH COM. SECRETARIAT	800
TASK FORCE SPACES (2)	1200
PDB SPACE	400
	<u>7000</u>
Plus 10%	700
	<u>7700</u>

The present CIA Operations Center is allocated 4,900 sq. feet on the 7th floor, F corridor, south. This space together with 4,500 sq. feet in use by other components immediately below the Operations Center on the 6th floor would make available 9,400 sq. feet for NIOC.

MONEY

Total one-time costs and an annual operating budget cannot be forecast now. However, partial one-time cost estimates can be projected for some of the following:

CONSTRUCTION

- a. Circular stairway to provide internal passage between 7th and 6th floor F corridor south ----- 25X1A [REDACTED]
- b. Internal 6th and 7th floor space realignment ----- ? 25X1A
- c. Additional furnishings for Situation Room ----- [REDACTED]

EQUIPMENT (not already present in CIA Operations Center)

- a. OPSCOM console circuit with NSA NSOC Ft. Meade ----- ?
- b. OPSCOM Teletype circuit with NSA NSOC Ft. Meade and drop to OSR ----- [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED] processing facility ----- 25X1A
- d. Other one-time cost projections:
Feasibility/cost studies to be undertaken on: 25X1A
- USIB community secure TV system
 - ADP supported scanning system using CRTs to eliminate insofar as possible paper processing.
 - Query terminal to CRS ADP files systems as they develop using printers and visual display techniques.

*being staffed separately

Reports Systems

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13 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Report of Study Group on the Reports System

1. In addition to its charge to examine Operations Centers, information flows, etc., the Study Group was asked by the Executive Secretary of the Management Committee to examine the DDO reports system, both field and Headquarters, with a view to breaking down barriers or even transfer to the DDI. This report is devoted entirely to that question, and may be viewed as supplemental to the main Study Group.

2. The report reflects the views of DDO and DDI, as the organizations primarily affected. The other members have abstained.

3. This is a split report. Section I is a description of the present reports system. This is DDO's and DDI's joint draft. Section II is DDI's draft of an approach to this issue. Section III is DDI's comment and Section IV is DDO's comment.

4. In principle, DDI favors the proposal as a major step toward breaking down barriers between the Directorates. As to the field activities, it sees advantage in giving its officers more overseas experience. On the other hand, it sees substantial practical difficulties in providing enough qualified officers, [REDACTED] etc. At Headquarters, the specific advantages lie primarily in the possibility of personnel savings achievable through combination of like functions. The disadvantages lie largely in practical problems raised by the physical separation of DDI and DDO elements.

5. DDO distinguishes between the assignment of individuals and the relocation of functions. More importantly, however, it takes exception to the proposal on philosophical grounds. It believes that the involvement of CIA analysts in the processing of raw information will raise doubts as to the integrity of the CIA analytic function in the minds

25X1C

SECRET Sensitive

of analysts in other agencies.

25X1C

25X1C

6. Thus the two Directorates fundamentally disagree on the functional allocation of both Headquarters and field reporting. The DDI is willing over time, to provide the personnel to fill all field posts, on the understanding that some of the present DDO reports officers will be assigned to the DDI. (It should be understood that this assumption carries with it the implication that the Headquarters reports system is transferred to the DDI in any case. Personnel management would be impossible if the Headquarters function were in one Directorate and the field function in another.) The DDO is willing for an increasing number of these posts to be filled by properly qualified DDI officers detailed as individuals to the DDO for the purpose.

7. To me, it would appear we present the Committee with four distinct choices, two on functional responsibilities and two on manning:

--Leave arrangements as they are.

--Transfer the function, both in the field and in Headquarters, to the DDI in toto, allowing a considerable degree of flexibility in timing and in disposition of personnel.

--Leave the system essentially unchanged and allot a limited number of field reports slots to the DDI (say, WE-4, NE-4, AF-2, FE-4, WH-4).

--Leave the system essentially unchanged but consider individuals for field reports slots without regard to directorate affiliation.

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Richard Lehman
Chairman


I. CIA Clandestine Reports System

1. This section describes the Agency's present clandestine reporting system, including the role of the Intelligence Watch and the functions of reports officers.

General

2. CIA's present reporting system is structured such that the preparation and processing of clandestine reports are performed totally within the Operations Directorate. The Intelligence Directorate participates only to the extent that DDI analysts are occasionally consulted for opinions as to the suitability of information prior to dissemination. The DDI does participate in the reports process by providing requirements and contributing to the evaluation of reports.

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
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III. DDI COMMENTS ON SECTION TWO

Summary:

1. The transfer of the headquarters reports processing and dissemination responsibilities to the DDI would contribute to integration of the Agency's information handling and editorial activities. Less delay would occur in making reports and other substantive information available to the analyst. The chance of the Agency's speaking with more than one voice would be reduced. In the field, the reports function would remain unchanged, with DDI officers gradually filling the reports specialist slots that are retained. In the long run these procedural and personnel changes would encourage cooperation between the DDI and DDO, particularly among those elements working on the same geographical areas. DDI officers would of necessity be exposed to operational information of the clandestine services. This presents no particular problem. They are accustomed to handling other kinds of sensitive information with full discretion.

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Headquarters: Pros and Cons

7. The adjustments required to assign the headquarters reports responsibility to the DDI should not be extremely complex, once familiarity with procedures is gained. The DDI officer's writing skills and analytical expertise would be brought to bear on the preparation and processing of reports. OCI country desks and branches, with assistance from OER and OSR analysts, would be appropriate units to perform the reports duties. An additional officer in each branch could probably handle the increased workload in most instances, particularly if the anticipated shift to direct dissemination occurs. A centralized reports staff would be less effective because it would lack the substantive expertise. There are similarities between many of the activities of the analyst and the substantive functions of the reports officers, e.g., evaluation of reports, formulation of requirements, and briefing. Thus, a substantial reduction in headquarters personnel might be realized.

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DDI ANALYST DUTIES


Reads all source traffic for substantive content

Prepares analysis for various publications

Prepares comments on TDCS reports and other traffic for White House support

Drafts intelligence memoranda and briefing papers

Briefs senior officers in CIA and other agencies



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
Prepares requirements
for field collectors

Maintains contact with
counterparts in CIA and
other agencies

Participates in assess-
ments of reporting by
DDO and other collectors

Represents DDI in sub-
stantive discussions

Maintains reference
files



8. The preparation of requirements is already an important part of the analyst's work and one for which he is well equipped because of his familiarity with developments in his area of responsibility and his awareness of policy needs. He has readily available a wide variety of collateral information to assist him in identifying gaps.

III-4

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9. A number of problems would have to be solved. For example, some of the non-sensitive information that does not now reach the DDI would have to be channelled to the DDI desks if the information were not to be lost to the intelligence community. 25X1C

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
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
CIA OPERATIONS CENTER TRAFFIC FLOW

SOURCES



25X1A

ACTION



DISTRIBUTION

● NON-"SELECT" TRAFFIC TO:

OCI DIVISIONS PDB
OSR/RAD INDICO
OER/CSS CS/DO
VAS/RAC SITUATION RM
 TASK FORCES

● "SELECTS" DISSEMINATED TO:

DCI D/OCI USIB SECT'Y
DDCI D/OSR CHMN. WATCH COM.
EX DIR D/ONE OCI DIVISIONS
DDI D/OER PDB
DDP (CS/DO) SAVA INDICO
DDS&T OSR/RAD C/IRS
DDS CIA/DOD OTHERS
 TASK FORCES