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DDI 72-5292

## OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File

18 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman  
Director of Current Intelligence

REFERENCE: D/CI Memo dtd 17 Nov 72, Subject: DOD  
Study of the Watch Committee, Operations  
Center, etc.

Dick:

1. I admit that I am not as well versed in the intricacies of the matters dealt with in the Henderson paper and your suggested alternative, as many others around here, but I can't help feel that even your suggestions tend to downgrade the Director's general position and the Agency's proper preeminence in this area. Coming at a time when articles are being published, books are being written and general allegations are being made that the Agency's analytical and estimative functions are too heavily influenced by the military, I think we would be well advised strongly to resist the general thrust of the Henderson paper and it would be my guess that we would have firm support in this not only from the White House but also from the State Department. A move to superimpose a national center over the CIA center, even though the national center is considered under the DCI's authority and control, would downgrade the CIA center and would constitute the beginning of a development which could result in the separation of the DCI from the Agency. I would consider this a disaster. I think what we need to do is "get Colonel Henderson's attention" and tell him and Dr. Hall that what seems to be needed here is a better organization within the Department of Defense on these matters and not an attempt to move in on the Director's legislative and NSC responsibilities.

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Thomas H. Karamessines  
Deputy Director for Plans

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17 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

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RICHARD LEHMAN

Director of Current Intelligence


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RICHARD LEHMAN  
Director of Current Intelligence

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*Charles A. Briggs 401  
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Director of Current Intelligence

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## The National Alerting Structure

### Introduction

Dr. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has commissioned a study of the "interface" between strategic and tactical warning. The study is being prepared by an inter-agency committee chaired by Colonel Wallace Henderson.

Henderson has produced a draft report (attached to this paper as Annex A) which calls for a drastic restructuring of the Watch Committee, National Indications Center, and the whole complex of agency operations and intelligence centers. His proposal identifies a number of weaknesses in the present structure and makes several useful suggestions, but goes far beyond this to recommend that major elements of the DCI's authority and responsibility be transferred to ASD (I) and the military authorities.

Henderson's draft is his own. He puts it forward knowing well that State and CIA are strongly opposed. (NSA's position is less clear.) Nonetheless, he is speaking for and with the encouragement of those elements in the military who have never accepted the civilian role in intelligence. Moreover, many of his proposals, taken individually, will find support in a number of quarters beyond the Pentagon. Thus, although they

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reflect an Alice-in-Wonderland view of present power relationships in Washington, they must be taken seriously. They must be read as a direct and deliberate assault by Hall on the position of the DCI.

This paper is intended as the background for a CIA response to Hall's initiative. It attempts to analyze the Henderson recommendations against the broad background of other developments in intelligence and in the bureaucracy. Based on this analysis, it develops a counter-proposal which would:

- Override Henderson's proposal with a broader one in a truly national context;
- Preserve and strengthen the DCI's authority;
- Rectify some obvious shortcomings in the warning system;
- Provide a framework for solutions to a number of emergent problems in the national intelligence field.

### The Present Environment

1. A number of developments in recent years have come together to make the time ripe for a re-examination of

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the Community's Operations Center/Strategic Warning/Current Intelligence structure.

a. Perhaps the most important of these is that it is costing more to stay in the game. Systems are more expensive, salaries are higher, and the political authorities are demanding economies.

b. The authority of the DCI has been substantially strengthened. As a member of the various NSC Committees--SRG, WSAG, 40, NSCIC, DPRC, Verification Panel, VSSG--his position as the President's intelligence officer and the spokesman of the Intelligence Community to the political authorities has been institutionalized. In particular, through the WSAG he carries the central intelligence responsibility in crisis management. Equally important, his position has been further reinforced by the President's re-organization of last November. He has instructions to organize the Community more efficiently and, above all, to save money.

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c. New collection systems are forcing the Community toward more centralized control. In particular

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[REDACTED] are expensive, demand 24-hour manning and

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steering, and affect one another. In the near future they will impose their own requirements on processing, analysis, and control, but these requirements cannot yet be fully defined.

d. Competition among services and agencies and the uncontrolled application of outmoded doctrine have led to the development of a bewildering maze of operations centers, warning centers, and current intelligence periodicals. The NSC has never issued a clear directive on who shall do what in this field, which transcends the NSCID's. There does, however, seem to be a general, if unarticulated, feeling in the Community that the system needs rationalization.

e. In the atmosphere thus engendered, the long-term trend toward centralization of national security affairs in the White House has extended into the intelligence field. The White House situation room now receives a considerable volume of raw intelligence, some of which is disseminated nowhere else. The NSC staff officer is thus forced to do some of his own intelligence analysis.

f. White House obsession with secrecy, reaction to some devastating news leaks, bureaucratic jealousies, the development of new and sensitive collection systems and

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opportunities, the survival of outmoded compartments, and worries stemming from the broadcast of current intelligence by the military have set up serious barriers to information flow and have subverted the intent of the National Security Act of 1947. In no place except the White House does all sensitive information come together, and it is not equipped to handle what it gets. Under such conditions, no matter how strongly the NSC Staff resists in principle the idea of developing its own internal intelligence support, it tends to hire more and more people to do just that.

g. "Strategic warning"\* continues rightly to carry the highest priority, but the expensive resources which may provide it and which are justified for that reason have become--ninety-nine percent of the time--vastly more important for other reasons. It is no longer possible to devote major resources solely to strategic warning. In fact, it might be

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\*In simplest terms, warning of enemy preparations for and intent to launch a nuclear attack. "Tactical" warning is warning that such an attack has been launched. The former is uncertain as to time, heavily dependent on analyst judgment, and may be acquired in any form. The latter is immediate, concrete, and detectable by sensors designed for this specific purpose.

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more realistic to consider strategic warning as the most important single element of all national intelligence objectives, rather than as the first objective standing by itself.

h. "Warning", indeed is such an imprecise and ephemeral concept that the development of systems to handle it has been exceptionally difficult. Tactical warning systems have thus outrun strategic, and it is generally agreed that the Community's present arrangements for the latter are not adequate. This is particularly strongly felt in the Department of Defense, but efforts for improvement have foundered on the tendency of Defense to think in terms of machine solutions and wiring diagrams, rather than the human judgment and experience emphasized by the civilian agencies.

i. Both sides agree that the National Indications Center as presently constituted is obsolete. It was set up when arrangements in the USIB agencies were primitive, but its 24-hour watch functions are now carried out much better by the CIA and DIA centers. Furthermore, the advent of new systems will soon price it out of its remaining analytic functions. On the other hand, its functions as an inter-agency body providing the national conscience on warning, and as a research organization on warning are underdeveloped.

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j. The present state of the warning business is symptomatic of a larger problem, the need for better use of intelligence by the operational side. This need is reflected in a trend toward the merger of operations and intelligence centers--the NMCC/NMIC, the closer integration of INR with the State Operations Center, and the evolution in the NSC staff described above. But because in each of these establishments operations are top dog, intelligence produced there is likely to be less objective and independent and its impact more muffled than it is at present.

k. In the last year, two new personalities have begun to affect the rules of the game. Hall is pushing for economy and centralization under the JCS and ASD (I). Marshall, through the NSCIC, is criticizing the Community performance in crisis management, in particular the diffusion and blandness of intelligence reporting.

#### The Henderson Proposal

2. Into this complex and unsatisfactory situation, Hall has unleashed Henderson. Henderson was initially asked to see what money could be saved on tactical warning, but he progressed to the "interface" of tactical with strategic warning, thence to strategic warning itself,

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thence to the Operations Center complex, and finally to a synthesis which would restructure the national intelligence business and put the military in the driver's seat.

3. Henderson begins with the proposition that "Strategic early warning is vital to the U.S.", and then argues, citing some of the considerations listed above, that present arrangements are inadequate. "Without a systems approach at the national level for coordination and correlation of separate intelligence systems and center inputs, costs will continue to increase and confidence in the availability of strategic warning will decrease." He recommends that:

- a. "The DIA NMIC should be assigned unequivocal responsibility for the provision of national strategic early warning intelligence to national command authorities, the world-wide military command system and the various national intelligence activities. To accomplish this task the NMIC should be collocated with the NMCC and it must be operated on an all-source basis. No usable intelligence should be denied the NMIC on security grounds....Day-to-day management

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of the national strategic warning system should be vested in the NMIC with the Watch Committee setting standards."

b. The Watch Committee should continue to produce judgments on strategic warning and to exercise some sort of broad overview, not further defined, of the "national strategic warning system." It should also foster research on warning topics.

c. The military department command/intelligence centers should be reduced to satellites of the NMIC.

d. "The NIC should be abolished with personnel assigned to the NMIC. State, CIA and NSA.... representatives must be responsive to the operational needs of the NMCC/NMIC and have the means or responsibility of effecting immediate authoritative warning judgments to support NMIC operations especially on "hot" items. In addition, such representation should have the authority or capability to task, or query directly, subordinate elements of their principals. In this regard, the NMIC should

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orchestrate the entire strategic warning system in support of the NMCC with individual components responsible for subsystem integrity and performance...."

e. The NSA NSOC system should be used as a model for an all-source automated national warning system centered in the NMIC. All collection systems would apparently be subjected to a "single executive approval at the NMIC level".

f. "The national strategic warning system should be designed so as to provide current intelligence data for crisis management, strategic warning judgments and information to all users simultaneously so that the world-wide military command system, national command authorities, and intelligence activities are in the same levels of warning knowledge...."

g. "The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) within the defined relationship with the Director, Central Intelligence should be made executive agent for the fulfillment of these recommendations."

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4. Henderson describes these recommendations as a device "to get our attention." They do. They are hard-hitting and superficially most attractive to the reader in, say, OMB because they promise to simplify the structure, save money, and provide a solution to a number of developing problems. They are also almost entirely unacceptable.

a. They require that the DCI relinquish his authority over much of national intelligence to the ASD (I).

b. They subordinate control of all major intelligence collection to the NMIC, and thus to the JCS and the ASD (I), at least under conditions of tension.

c. They place the intelligence flow to the President and the NSC at times of crisis under the control of the JCS and ASD (I).

d. They call for the provision to a large and unwieldy military apparatus of all sensitive information.

e. They repeat the error of making strategic warning the pillar which holds the structure up. Current

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intelligence and, by inference, crisis management become appendages to the warning system. (As noted above, the high priority assigned to warning is difficult to translate into organization and resource management.)

f. They deal only with the "center" aspects of warning, not with the analytic. The center is only the tip of the iceberg. For each officer in a center there are in each agency tens of specialized analysts, and these professionals--for whom warning is only a part of the job--are the ones we trust to make the basic judgment on enemy intentions. (The warning analyst has to play devil's advocate; he is valuable when indications are mostly negative, but dangerous when they are ambiguous.) CIA and State are fortunate in having their analytic base and operations center in the same building. DIA is severely handicapped by having its base at Arlington Hall. Henderson would compound the problem by placing all the responsibility on the center with the weakest immediate analytic back-up.

g. They place their faith in machines rather than people for the critical warning judgment. Henderson seems

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under the impression that a CRT can display even the political factors which are crucial to a judgment of enemy intentions and that a duty officer can derive strategic warning therefrom. Machines can assist many aspects of warning more than they do; the NSOC system is such a development. They cannot, however, show what is in the minds of the enemy's political leaders. Henderson's view on this is implicit in his distinction between strategic and tactical warning only in terms of time-- before launch and after launch. Our distinction is more complex. (See footnote to Paragraph 1g.)

5. Henderson finds his opening in a serious ambiguity in the national directives by which we live, one that has long been recognized but never rectified. The JCS are clearly responsible to the "National Command Authorities"\* for tactical warning: the detection of missile launch and a recommendation what to do about it. The DCI, now with the "advice" of USIB, is clearly responsible to the President and the NSC, including the Secretary of Defense, for assessment of enemy strategic intentions.

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\*Which they define as the President and Secretary of Defense.

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6. The essence of the analytic problem presented at the conjunction of strategic and tactical warning can be put simply: should evidence of missile launch derived from less than perfect sensors be accepted or questioned when reaction time is short? The answer depends on what strategic warning has been given: direct intelligence on enemy intentions, if any; the level of international tension; the state of enemy military preparations, etc. In the military view these questions tend to merge with tactical warning. Thus in the crucial last 24 or 12 hours, the definitions of responsibilities overlap. The JCS (and Henderson) simply assume that their mission is overriding, but they offer no point at which to draw the line.\*

7. We must recognize, however, that present arrangements do not permit the DCI to provide the JCS with the kind of immediate measurement of strategic warning which they need,

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\*This assumption is in fact concretely illustrated: at the relocation sites where that last 12 hours might be spent there are a seat and a bed for the DCI as Presidential advisor, but there is no provision for staff support or communication with his Agency. It is assumed that DIA will provide support to all.

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and which it is his responsibility to provide. The NIC is isolated and obsolete and cannot do the job. If we do not improve these arrangements, the JCS has considerable justification for acting unilaterally. The Community can provide the kind of continuous national judgment that is required when a nuclear exchange is threatened. The problem is to make the necessary readjustments which will enable us to respond to such a situation without permanently distorting the structure established by law and NSC directives. The DCI's responsibilities when nuclear exchange is not threatened are quite unambiguous, and this fortunately is most of the time.

#### A Counter-Proposal

8. Taken as a whole Henderson's proposals serve as a catalyst in an environment which badly needs one. Some of them are in fact highly desirable. Nonetheless they do distort the bureaucratic structure in unnecessary and destructive ways. We must find a way to modify them to reflect the true lines of power and authority in Washington and to preserve the integrity of intelligence reporting.

9. Formulation of a counter-proposal involves going back to first principles:

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a. The concept of national intelligence has three parts: bringing all the intelligence resources of the government to bear on a question; providing an answer which is objective and independent of any operational filter; avoiding duplication and contradiction.

b. This concept is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947, in the body of doctrine that has developed since, and most recently in the President's reorganization directive of November 1971. These establish the DCI as the President's intelligence officer, responsible for producing national intelligence.

c. One of his explicitly stated tasks is the provision of current intelligence to the President and the NSC. Under normal conditions he does this by providing the PDB (his personal communication) to the President and the CIB (a national publication) to the NSC, and its supporting staffs.

d. Under the "special case" of crisis, he supplements these publications with briefings of the NSC and WSAG (speaking personally as DCI) and with situation reports (prepared unilaterally by CIA). It is at least partly because these are unilateral that current reporting in crisis situations seems diffuse.

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e. Strategic warning is a sub-discipline of current intelligence, and depends largely on the current intelligence apparatus for its analytic base. Under normal conditions, the DCI meets his responsibilities in this field through the daily publications and the weekly Watch Report, a national issuance, roughly parallel to the CIB. A crisis which involves a large measure of strategic warning is in turn a special case of foreign policy crisis in general. Under crisis conditions, of this sort, the Watch machinery can, in theory, produce frequent special reports. In fact, for a number of reasons well put forth by Henderson, this arrangement is no longer fully satisfactory.

f. State and DOD have national responsibilities for operations, departmental responsibilities for intelligence. Integration of their operations with their intelligence centers is intended to provide better departmental support. There is little need for separate service centers, for the services no longer have operational responsibilities.

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g. CIA has no national operational responsibilities, but is responsible for national intelligence. Its present Operations Center, however, is departmental. There is no national intelligence center.

h. If it proves necessary to provide central management of collection systems individually managed by various agencies, it should be done under control of intelligence authorities, and specifically under the DCI. But the DCI has no mechanism, short of USIB itself, where this can be done.

10. This statement of principles itself identifies several organizational shortcomings. It also points the way to improvement in our handling of a number of the problems laid out in para 1 above. A possible solution is outlined in the following recommendations:

a. CIA support Hall/Henderson fully in their departmental efforts to simplify the military structure and develop a strong NMIC. (With NSA remaining a national service of common concern.)

b. We superimpose on the CIA Operations Center a National Intelligence Operations Center, with representation

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from State and DIA. A unilateral CIA element would be retained. The NIOC would initially be skeletal. Under normal conditions it would be the instrument for coordinating and issuing the CIB, perhaps retitled the National Intelligence Bulletin. Under crisis conditions it would be augmented by an interagency task force to produce "National Intelligence Situation Reports", replacing the reports now issued individually by DIA, State, and CIA. The DCI would continue to brief the NSC and WSAG unilaterally, but would use these national reports as a base, as the PDB uses the CIB.

c. The NIOC would move immediately to exploit

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better links to collectors of "strategic-tactical" intelli-

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provide whatever eventually appears necessary in central

\*This paper does not attempt to judge whether NSOC can deliver as advertised or whether it is worth the money. It exists, and can deliver some of the elements of warning in something close to real-time.

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direction of collection systems. (Its existence would make it the logical place for such operations.)

d. The present NIC would be reconstituted as a branch of NIOC devoted to strategic warning, as a "special case" of current intelligence. It would be collocated within and supported by NMIC, but answering to the DCI through NIOC. It would represent a USIB presence in the NMIC, prepared to provide the NMIC that continuous judgment on strategic warning which tactical warning demands. It would have a small research component on warning methods, but its analytic base would be the current analysts of the USIB Agencies. It would not deal in reporting information, which would be furnished by NIOC and NMIC, but in interpretation.

e. Under normal conditions, the new NIC would serve as a duty-hours secretariat for the Watch Committee. The present 24-hour watch function would be handled by NIOC and NMIC. The Watch Committee would function as at present.

f. Under crisis conditions which raise a serious threat of general war, NIC would be augmented to task force status in support of NMCC/NMIC. It would, in close coordination with its parent USIB agencies, be prepared to revise strategic

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warning judgments continuously as new information is received. It would also provide a channel for intelligence from all agencies to NMCC and for requirements and operational developments to flow from NMCC. The relative weight of resources and activities assigned to NIOC and NIC would vary according to the scale and imminence of hostilities.

11. This proposal would rationalize USIB's crisis management structure, while rectifying many of the shortcomings which Henderson identifies. In relation to the developments listed in Paragraph 1, it would:

- a. Be less expensive for the government as a whole than present and projected programs.
- b. Strengthen and clarify the authority of the DCI.
- c. Provide for whatever centralized control of collection is necessary, but retain this control under the DCI.
- d. Simplify, at least to some degree the current intelligence and alerting system.
- e. Provide a mechanism for serving White House needs which might at least slow the growth of the NSC Staff.

f. Provide a small, tightly controlled central mechanism in civilian hands for handling sensitive intelligence.

g. Link strategic warning more closely to tactical.

h. Rejuvenate the National Indications Center.

i. Maintain an intelligence voice independent of operational considerations.

j. Provide some of the improvements Marshall is seeking in general crisis management.

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ATTACHMENTS

National strategic warning processes are centered about the USIB Watch Committee operation and the DoD Indications and Warning System with heavy involvement by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the State Department Operations Center, the NSA Current SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC), and various military current intelligence activities. A description of these strategic warning activities are contained in the following attachments.

1. USIB Watch Committee/National Indications Center (NIC)
2. DIA National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the DoD Indications System
  - A. DoD Indications System
  - B. Field Indications Centers
    - Physical relation with Field Command Centers
  - C. Field Indications Centers - Reporting Mechanisms
  - D. Field Indications Center - Personnel
  - E. Field Indications Center - Secure Voice Communications Links
  - F. Field Indications Center - Secure Communications
  - G. Field Indications Center - ADP Systems
3. CIA Operations Center

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5. U.S. Navy Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC)
6. DIA Strategic Posture Display Program

13 November 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Warning Study

1. The attached study was produced by the Chairman of an interagency group which has been examining warning, and specifically the interface between strategic and tactical warning, for the past several months.


2. The Chairman of the committee is Col. Wallace Henderson of the ASD (I) office. There are two members of the committee from CIA, two from JCS, one from DIA, one from State and one from NSA.

3. Most of the committee's effort has been involved in visiting warning and operations centers. Written inputs were submitted by some members but were confined largely to descriptions of how the warning process works.

4. The Chairman presented the attached study, written mostly by the NSA member, as a means of "provoking discussion" at the next meeting. None of these recommendations have been discussed yet by the committee, and the Chairman is aware that some of the recommendations are strongly opposed by members.

5. We will convene to discuss this study in the Operations Center Situation Room on Tuesday, 14 November 1972, at 2PM with a view to developing an agency position and formulating counter-proposals. We request that each recipient of this memorandum be represented at the meeting.

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Director Current Intelligence

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WORKING PAPERS

SUMMARY

The United States does not now have a truly effective national system to provide National Command Authorities (NCA) with comprehensive credible warning information. Warning services currently provided the NCA are too fragmented and asynchronous to adequately support timely selection of the best possible course of national action to achieve, or defend, in a responsible manner, vital national interests. The problem does not result from the lack of resources allocated to the warning problem. Rather, there is at present a sufficiency of such resources. The difficulty lies in the proper direction, disposition and netting of these assets. At the present time no single center is the point of convergence for the continuous interaction of all-source intelligence data, information on military or diplomatic operations, tactical warning data and national policy information and direction. All of these elements are essential for the proper workings of an effective national warning system. Against these standards our present warning process can best be described as marginal.

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## REQUIREMENT

2. A credible and responsive national warning system to service the NCA is essential for the proper operation of the national control mechanism.

a. Missile flight times vary from 25-30 minutes for an ICBM to 10-20 minutes for an SLBM. These times are too short to permit independent time consuming verification processes by the various national strategic and tactical warning systems. The compressed time available for action greatly reduces the range for innovative thinking by the NCA concerning the selection of the appropriate response options.

b. Timely coupling of strategic early warning data with tactical warning alarms in an operational environment is essential for warning credibility. Properly applied, valid and useable warning will increase force survivability and provide maximum achievable NCA flexibility to select appropriate response.

c. Experiences gained from the netting of the strategic and tactical warning processes will provide a real-world data bank from which to conduct realistic force planning. In this context it is noted that present force acquisition policy is based on the assumption of no strategic warning but bomber defense planning assumes two days warning and NATO planning 30 days. Realistic warning experiences will permit a more balanced approach to force planning.

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PRESENT STRATEGIC WARNING OPERATIONS \*

1. For some years, the United States has been developing a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). It has established as a part of this system, a National Military Command Center (NMCC) to permit central direction of U. S. military forces by National Command Authorities (NCA). The NMCC, operated by the J3 - JCS, is the recipient of all operational information on U. S. forces essential for national-level decision making. The NMCC can communicate directly with national command authorities, subordinate military echelons and laterally with Washington level agencies involved in operations and intelligence.
2. Current intelligence operations are not so well structured. Indeed, at the national level they are more diffused <sup>than</sup> ~~then~~ at lower echelons. The National Indications Center (NIC) of the Watch Committee is the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agent for the continuous receipt, assessment and reporting of strategic early warning intelligence. [It is not staffed sufficiently or appropriately.] It does not have timely communications directly with strategic intelligence producers nor with tactical warning processors. It cannot task nor lay requirements on intelligence producers except through the Watch Committee, which itself does not operate continuously. The principal efforts of the NIC are in

\*Strategic and tactical warning are differentiated in time from the instant an attack is launched. Strategic warning is received before and tactical warning is received as soon after that instant.

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support of the Watch Committee effort and it is not a viable factor in the formulation and provision of strategic early warning information to the NCA. \*

3. The USIB Watch Committee, itself, performs a valuable strategic warning function through its multi-agency periodic review of warning contained in overall intelligence developments. This assessment is generally conducted on a weekly basis and however valuable such overview by the Watch Committee may be to the NCA and participating intelligence agencies, it is not a direct factor in the provision of strategic early warning to the NCA. Its utility to the NMCC during a rapidly developing crisis situation is probably low.

4. The DIA National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC)\*\* recently renamed from the DIA Intelligence Support and Indications Center (ISIC) operates continuously and has direct and timely communications with U&S command intelligence centers and the NSA National SIGINT Operation Center (NSOC). However, it must rely on others to perform the essential functions of source correlation, assessment, judgment and tasking. In addition, because of security compartments, the NMIC analyst is denied the use of some intelligence data which bear directly on the warning problem. It is not an all-source center.

\* See Attachment 1 for details on the Watch Committee/NIC process.

\*\* See Attachment 2 for details on the NMIC/DoD INDIC System.

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5. The NMIC also participates in the DoD Indications System - a confederation of 21 field indications centers collocated with major military commands. While the DIA NMIC gives national-level guidance to the system, it neither tasks nor controls individual center operations.

6. While the NMIC is charged with providing strategic warning and intelligence support to the NMCC it cannot be considered equal to the task. Its duty complement is spread too thin to cover all world areas adequately and its capability to rapidly survey target posture is restricted to a review of published reports or telephonic/telegraphic consultations with other centers. If during a fast moving situation, the NMCC Operations Officer needs to know the current Soviet Navy deployment and readiness condition his best sources for this information are the all-source centers at either the Naval Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center (NOSIC) at Suitland, Maryland\* [REDACTED]

7. Indeed, this is the essence of the problem of establishing the NMIC as the focal point for intelligence support to the NMCC. Each of the military departments has or is creating its own center in the Washington area - the Navy, NOSIC and FLAG PLOT; the Air Force, Crisis Management Center; and the Army is establishing the Army Operations Center (AOC). The talents and resources necessary to an effective NMIC will

\* For details of NOSIC see Attachment 5.

\*\* For details of [REDACTED]

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
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be diluted and distributed in separate service centers. Further, each of the services and NSA are creating or have in operation different systems for the exchange and display of strategic warning information. Systems commonality is essential to effect a smooth interface with the WWMCCS system.

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9. The CIA Operations Center is a continuous alert system for receiving information and making dissemination of critical intelligence to key CIA officials/offices, the National Indications Center and member agencies of the USIB. The Center is staffed by a Senior Duty Officer and three supporting Watch Officers on duty at all times plus supporting clerical and editorial personnel. The OPS Center is housed in the

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CIA Office of Current Intelligence (OCI)\* and it is responsible for providing quick evaluation of worldwide all-source intelligence information on a twenty-four hour basis. Incoming information that might indicate a threat or potential threat to U.S. security is processed immediately by the CIA Operations Center to the White House, Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community. In addition to the CIA Operations Center, OCI personnel are on duty at the NIC, White House and NMCC.

10. The Department of State maintains an operations center which is supported by a small staff of intelligence professionals. It is postured to provide rapid intelligence/information from diplomatic sources and is supported by a modern communications distribution system which includes direct service to the Pentagon. A State Department representative is available at the NMCC only during normal working hours.

\*For details of the CIA Operations Center see Attachment 3.

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PROBLEMS

1. Strategic early warning is vital to the U.S. in the preservation and effective employment of its forces and crisis management.

Strategic early warning must derive from U.S. current intelligence operations, but if these are not postured effectively to provide warning or if data correlation and distribution is inhibited then we have no assurance that strategic warning data will meet the information needs of the NCA and of force commanders.

2. As explained earlier current warning (intelligence) operations at the Washington level are conducted by various centers having disparate systems, with varying levels of both timeliness and credibility. These operations are asynchronous partly because of the nature of their intelligence source<sup>s</sup> and partly because of center modus operandi or capability.

3. Without a systems approach at the national level for coordination and correlation of separate intelligence systems and center inputs, costs will continue to increase and confidence in the availability of strategic warning will decrease. Current and projected budget constraints add emphasis to the fact that the United States can no longer afford the luxury of permitting commands and agencies to duplicate another's processes merely to assure their own credibility or to preserve organizational prerogatives.

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
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4. United States strategic warning operations are hampered by the lack of authoritative direction and established requirements. The functioning of an effective national warning system, however loose or tight the administrative ties may be, depends upon the authoritative formulation of common warning standards (including threat report terminology and display) and a constant review of sensor and intelligence developments for application and use in the warning arena. Unfortunately, this systems approach to the warning function does not now exist.
5. Strategic early warning requirements are far more complex than tactical warning requirements. The former deal with capabilities and intent, the latter with an act. While it has been possible to translate specific tactical warning requirements directly into specific intelligence systems,\* the same has not been true, except very indirectly, with strategic warning requirements.
6. When confronted with an incident with high crisis potential the NCA and force commanders must know the disposition and readiness condition of the opposing force and whether the prevailing situation represents a deviation from previously observed norms. Knowledge of enemy force readiness is one of the principal means of determining possible intent. Intent is extremely difficult to sense and few intelligence assets have been tied directly to satisfying this strategic

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warning requirement. \*



Because probability ranges broadscale, many collectors, organizations and analysts are involved in the strategic warning process with varying degrees of responsibility and capability, and yet there is no single authority to specify and validate the warning requirement nor is there an identifiable system tasked with the requirement. If significant improvements in capability or reductions in cost are to be made, such centralized system management must be achieved. Finally strategic warning operations are most efficacious when they are interacted in a timely face-to-face manner with command operations. The present intelligence/operations interface is plagued with security compartments, inadequate communications and physical separateness to the detriment of both systems. This must be rectified.

\* This has not deterred programming of resources for strategic early warning requirements based on the most tenuous of rationale.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

INSERT A

1. " The DIA NMIC should be assigned unequivocal responsibility for the provision of national strategic early warning intelligence to national command authorities, the ~~World Wide Military Command System~~ WWMCCS and the various national intelligence activities. To accomplish this task the NMIC should be collocated with the NMCC and it must be operated on an all-source basis. No usable intelligence should be denied the NMIC on security grounds. - - - ←

2. The USIB Watch Committee should continue to provide periodic, authoritative judgments on broad strategic warning developments and to serve as the sounding board where agencies can present for review subjects having a warning connotation. Under ASD(I) DCI guidance the Watch Committee should foster investigations leading to the establishment of a credible strategic threat assessment matrix to facilitate the simultaneous alarming of the nations command and intelligence mechanisms.\*

3. Day-to-day management of the national strategic warning system (NSWS) should be vested in the NMIC with the Watch Committee setting standards."

\* In this regard, we note the preliminary work done by the Rome Air Development Center program to upgrade the DoD indications system and the DIA Strategic Posture Display Program. See Attachment 6 for details.

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4. Military department command/intelligence centers should be limited to a small fixed complement equipped with NMIC compatible remote terminal displays to handle on a user basis that strategic warning information necessary to fulfill service peculiar requirements. To ensure achievement of this objective, the intelligence functions and associated personnel of the Army (AOC), the Navy (NOSIC/FLAG PLOT) and the Air Force (CMC) should be reassigned to the DIA NMIC as its initial complement.

5. "The NIC should be abolished with personnel assigned to the NMIC. State, CIA and NSA should participate in the NMIC as they do (did in the case of State) in the NMCC except that such representation should not be restricted to a liaison capacity. These representatives must be responsive to the operational needs of the NMCC/NMIC and have the means or responsibility of effecting immediate authoritative warning judgments to support NMIC operations especially on "hot" items. In addition, such representation should have the authority or capability to task, or query directly, subordinate elements of their principals. In this regard, the NMIC should orchestrate the entire strategic warning system in support of the NMCC with individual components responsible for subsystem integrity and

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4. " The national strategic warning system (NSWS) should be designed so as to provide current intelligence data for crisis management, strategic warning judgments and information to all users simultaneously world wide military command systems, national command authorities, so that the ~~WWMCGS~~, NCA and intelligence activities are in the same alert posture and can take action from the same levels of warning knowledge. [ Competition between agencies to be first to the NCA with a "hot" item is not in the national interest. ]

5. "The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) with the guidance and consent of the Director, Central Intelligence should be made executive agent for the fulfillment of these recommendations."

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ATTACHMENTS

National strategic warning processes are centered about the USIB Watch Committee operation and the DoD Indications and Warning System with heavy involvement by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the State Department Operations Center, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and various military current intelligence activities. A description of these strategic warning activities are contained in the following attachments.

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1. USIB Watch Committee/National Indications Center (NIC)
2. DIA National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the DoD Indications System
  - A. DoD Indications System
  - B. Field Indications Centers  
Physical relation with Field Command Centers
  - C. Field Indications Centers - Reporting Mechanisms
  - D. Field Indications Center - Personnel
  - E. Field Indications Center - Secure  
Voice Communications Links
  - F. Field Indications Center - Secure Communications
  - G. Field Indications Center - ADP Systems
3. CIA Operations Center
4. [REDACTED]

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5. U.S. Navy Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC)
6. DIA Strategic Posture Display Program

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*Attachment 1*

The Charter

*WATCH COMMITTEE/NIC OPERATIONS  
DETAILS*

The definition of strategic warning is spelled out in the documents setting up the Watch Committee strategic warning intelligence mechanism. *In the Charter*

The intelligence community's legal charter (DCID 1/5) calls upon the USIB's Watch Committee to follow strategic warning, and defines the terms of reference as follows:

A. Name

Watch Committee of the USIB

B. Mission

To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest possible intelligence warning of and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.

C. Functions

(1) To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements and recommending priorities necessary.

(2) To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to engage in aggressive action.

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(3.) Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional estimative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and developments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to report promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.

2. With this as guidance, the Watch Committee normally summarizes its findings, in its regular report, in the following language:

Based on available evidence we conclude that neither the USSR, China nor North Korea will initiate major military action in the near future against the US, its overseas forces or its Allies.

## II. Mechanics for Handling Strategic Warning

3 As noted above, the Watch Committee/National Indications Center (NIC) structure provides the formally established USIB framework for handling strategic warning.

4. One outstanding feature of this structure should be noted from the start. By and large it constitutes an intelligence reporting mechanism superimposed on existing current intelligence units, and it draws upon the expertise of these units in order to arrive at its strategic warning judgments. The system thus avoids the establishment

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of any sizable analytical "empires," and instead ~~calls~~ <sup>relies</sup> upon capable and experienced analysts in existing current intelligence offices to "take a second look," in the warning context.

5. Thus, the Watch Committee, aided by its small staff at the NIC, sets up a "parallel reporting circuit," a sort of devil's advocate reporting discipline. This "satelliting" system is designed to prod ~~current~~ intelligence analysts in the USIB community into narrowing their concentration and directing it toward one goal -- the analysis of intelligence specifically related to warning of enemy attack. This system includes eliciting intelligence from appropriate analytical units in the field.

6. The system provides for a regular reporting discipline, through the weekly meeting of the Watch Committee which produces a regular report, and through the system of approval of this report each week by the USIB principals. In addition, special meetings have been called when necessary to review more urgent indications of hostilities.

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IV. The Watch Committee and NIC Reporting Structure

Nature of the Committee

7. The Watch Committee was formed in January 1951, shortly after the Chinese intervened in Korea. It replaced several more limited warning groups in the separate agencies. The National Indications Center (NIC) was set up as its executive staff in 1954. The goal was to create one committee/center where warning information would come together for quick analysis.

8. CIA by charter provides the Chairman of the Watch Committee. Over the years this position has always been filled by a high-ranking CIA official, either by the Deputy Director, or one of the top assistants to the Director. Currently the Acting Chairman is Richard Lehman, Director of Current Intelligence (the head of OCI). He replaced Gen. Robert Cushman a year ago at the head of the Committee.

9. The Committee working membership, at roughly the Colonel level, is two members each from CIA, DIA, NSA, and State, and one each from the FBI and the AEC. The Director NIC has a full voice at the table, and NIC staffers as well as officers from the service intelligence organizations attend the meetings as observers.

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The NIC

10. The National Indications Center (NIC) itself is a small complex located at 1E821 in the Pentagon. Its area houses the large conference room used by the Watch Committee, offices for use of the analytical staff, and a Watch Center manned 24-hours.

11. The NIC has a small interagency staff. There are approximately 30 people, including 15 from DIA (including Army and Air but no Navy rep), 9 from CIA and 4 from NSA, but there are none from State. Including the CIA civilian Director and DIA Deputy (a Colonel), there are 12 analytical personnel. Ten people are assigned to the 24-hour Watch function.

12. The equipment consists of secure grey phone and KY-3 ("green") connections, wire services, a pneumatic tube to the DIA (the relay point at the Pentagon for much of NIC's traffic), and a COINS outlet. Other equipment such as LDX, can be used at the NMCC or DIA-NMIC.

13. The primary function of the analytical staff is to review indications intelligence and prepare the draft Watch Report. The staff also carries out some research on warning topics.

14. The NIC also produces, and disseminates widely in the warning community, the Watch Officers' Notes (WONS),

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a daily collection of warning intelligence items. Most of these items are reproduced in the WONS without further NIC comment.

16 The Reporting Cycle

15 The Watch Committee meets regularly on Wednesday mornings, and special meetings are called periodically--at any time of day or night--to discuss urgent items of warning intelligence.

16 The reporting cycle is kicked off on Fridays by the NIC, which sends out a Preliminary Agenda calling attention to various developments of possible interest for the next week's report. This agenda is circulated widely within USIB agencies, and DIA cables it to certain field commands and warning centers.

17 The agencies turn in their contributions to NIC on Monday, and NIC drafts the report and circulates it by Tuesday noon. The agencies grey-phone their changes to NIC late Tuesday.

18 Wednesday morning the Committee meets at NIC and reviews the text and debates the recommended changes. It may also discuss other warning items which are not included in the report.


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14 Thursday the Watch Report is reviewed as the first order of business of the meeting of USIB. If USIB is not meeting, the report is coordinated telephonically. This may take some anguished hours, because USIB principals have to be tracked down in order to get their personal agreement.

20 The final version of the report is cabled to some field stations by CIA and to various major commands by DIA, and disseminated in Washington Friday morning. A

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The Product

21 In Washington the report is circulated to policy level officials within the USIB agencies and the parent organizations. Its warning message, by nature of the present world situation, is obviously often a negative, "all-clear" signal, so the report is probably not in most cases shown to the highest policy level officials.

[ On some recent occasions, however, the report has been shown to the Secretary of State.]

22 In any case, the warning message does require the reading and concurrence of the principals of USIB--the

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chiefs of the various intelligence agencies. This system therefore at the very least assures that the report, bland as it may often appear, at least tells the intelligence chiefs that the USIB's Watch Committee has once again reviewed intelligence bearing on a potential surprise military attack on the US and intelligence concerning broader enemy strategy in any ongoing fighting which involves US troops.

23 In addition, the system always provides the option to USIB member agencies of calling a special meeting of the Committee to review some possibly alarming indicator. In the days of Colder War, these special meetings were held at least several times a year; none have taken place since 1970.

24 The report seems to be well-received by certain field elements as a good capsulized regular roundup of potentially scary situations. [REDACTED]

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also tend to be generally appreciative of the report as a uniquely USIB community weekly report, and often are quick to note nuances in the tone of the reporting.

25 Generally the bland quality of the report is one of its greatest weaknesses. This invariably results



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from the need to fall back on compromise language to  
paper over major differences between agency "positions."  
There can be footnotes but there usually are not.



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On occasion the Task Forces have also worked directly with the Watch Committee. In the summer of 1969, for example, a Task Force worked out of the Operations Center and reviewed the reporting on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Its personnel also took part directly in a three-day Watch Committee discussion of this situation, as well as in later ONE discussions of a Special NIE on the topic.

*Attachment 3*

CIA Operations Center

1, The CIA Ops Center can be described as follows:

The CIA Operations Center is a continuous alert system for receiving information and making dissemination of critical intelligence to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to on-call officials in CIA, National Indications Center (NIC), member agencies of the United States Intelligence Board, and to such other persons as the Director of Central Intelligence may designate.

The CIA Operations Center is set up to:

1) Operate on a round-the-clock basis (twenty-four hours a day, including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays). (With a Senior Duty Officer and three supporting Watch Officers on duty at all times.) (Plus clerical and editorial personnel.)

2) Maintain a current record of the availability of on-call officials in order that prompt action in the fulfillment of CIA mission may be taken upon the receipt of critical intelligence, including, as necessary, the introduction of critical intelligence received through regular communications channels into the CRITICOM (critic communications) system.

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In addition to the above, the Center is responsible for:

- A. Providing nine trained Duty officers for the White House Situation Room, five for the CIA desk in the NMCC, and one for NIC.
- B. Maintaining a Situation Room in CIA for presentation of current information on US and friendly operations and force deployments.
- C. Supporting CIA's current intelligence analytic and reporting responsibilities.
- D. Providing space, facilities and substantive support to the Clandestine Service Duty Officer.
- E. Providing space, facilities and substantive support to crisis task forces when such are established by the DCI.
- F. Providing a single round-the-clock CIA point of contact for other US Government Operations Centers.

The Center receives incoming cable traffic from CIA and State Department posts directly in the Center, and has press service tickers including FBIS. It uses LDX extensively, and the four secure phones lines: CIA internal red line, grey phone, KY-3 "green," and the Air Force KY-9. A direct telex connection [REDACTED] *has just been installed. (in OSR)* ~~is currently being considered.~~

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