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25X1	USIB-D-41.14/286 (COMOR-D-25/209) 11 March 1966 Special Limited Distribution	25X1
	UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD	
	MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD	
	SUBJECT: Requirement for Photographic Coverage of South China and North Vietnam	25X1
_	REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-41.14/285 (COMOR-D-25/208) 7 March 1966, Special Limited Distribution b. USIB-D-41.14/283 (COMOR-D-25/207) 3 March 1966, Special Limited Distribution c. USIB-D-41.14/281 (COMOR-D-25/206) 1 March 1966, Limited Distribution	
ILLEGÍB	1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB), at its 10 Man meeting with the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO present, considered and discussed the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) report on the subject in reference a., and took the following actions:	
ILLEGI	a. Following discussion of the Recommendations in paragraph 6. of reference a., agreed that, recognizing the urgency of the JCS intelligence requirement stated in the Attachment to USIB-D-41.14/281, it is the opinion of the USIB that the stated intelligence requirement can only be met in a timely and satisfactory way by the combined intelligence collection assets plus OXCART.	
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	NRO review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2004/14/12. CYPROPABITO9A002300020006-0	25X1

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