


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USIB-D-46. 8/7
(COMIREX-D-25.17/107)
8 August 1967
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : South China/North Vietnam and Sino-Indian Border
Photographic Reconnaissance, 1 - 7 August 1967

1. The attached report on the subject by the Chairman, Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), is circulated for the information of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. It is not contemplated that the attached report will be placed on the USIB agenda unless a USIB Principal so requests prior to the close of business on 11 August 1967. In the absence of such a request it will be considered for record purposes that USIB "noted" the subject report on that date.


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Executive Secretary

Attachment

NRO review(s)
completed.



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Attachment
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8 August 1967
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Report to the United States Intelligence Board
by
Chairman, COMIREX
on
South China/North Vietnam and Sino-Indian Border
Photographic Reconnaissance
1 - 7 August 1967

1. The following is a report on photographic coverage of:
 - a. Priority "Base Line" targets in South China and North Vietnam, as defined by the Board on 3 March 1966^a (paras 2 - 6);
 - b. North Vietnam to detect the introduction of offensive missile systems^b (paras 7 and 8);
 - c. Targets in Laos adjacent to the South China border^c (no coverage);
 - d. Targets in the Sino-Indian Border area^d (no coverage).


South China/North Vietnam - "Base Line"

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2. Changes to Priority Targets: Since the last report the total number of priority targets increased from [] and the base line total decreased from [] because of the following actions:
 - a. Because of its size Chang Ning/Hsin Hsu Army Barracks was divided into two targets.

a USIB-D-41.14/283 (COMOR-D-25/207), 4 March 1966
 b Memo to Holders of USIB-D-41.14/308, (COMOR-D-25/220), 23 May 1967
 c USIB-D-41.14/260 (COMOR-D-25/184), 13 September 1965
 d USIB-D-41.14/276 (COMOR-D-25/201), 19 January 1966

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b. The barracks at Chien Chuan, Hai Kang, and Po Shang were added since they meet the criteria for indicator targets of Chinese Communist build-up to enter the war in Southeast Asia.

c. Two rail line segments, Kep to Thai Nguyen and Hanoi to Ping Hsiang (Segment 4), were deleted from the priority list. The segments are too long to get even near complete coverage within a space of time pertinent to the indications required to determine possible Chinese Communist military build-up. Principal installations, however, located along these rail segments remain priority targets.

d. The net loss of one in the base line score is accounted for by the fact that whereas the split in the barracks area described in "a" adds one to the base line total, the dropping of the two rail segments, both of which had base line, results in a net decrease, [redacted]

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3. Missions during the Period:

According to field reporting, two BUMBLE BUG (formerly BLUE SPRINGS) missions, flown 1 and 2 August, photographed priority targets in South China. Two additional missions on 4 and 7 August photographed targets in North Vietnam.

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
4. Base Line/Surveillance Coverage: A BLUE SPRINGS and three [redacted] missions, flown in previous reporting periods, provided surveillance coverage of 6 targets in North Vietnam and 3 targets in South China.

5. Tab A: Lists all priority targets and shows the status of Base Line/Surveillance coverage as follows:

Column 2 - Underlining indicates base line or surveillance coverage added since the last report.

Column 4 - Base Line coverage since 1 March 1966, shown by date.

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Column 5 - The number of times surveillance coverage has been added to the base line photography.

Column 6 - Date of the most recent base line/surveillance quality coverage.

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
6. The Map at Tab B: Shows the distribution of [] targets illustrating the primary areas for lines of communication by shading. [] targets listed in Tab A which have been covered by base line quality photography since 1 March 1966 are shown by a black dot, the remainder of [] by a black circle. Arrows indicate base line/surveillance coverage added during the reporting period.

North Vietnam - "Offensive Missiles"

7. There has been no report of photographic detection of the introduction of offensive missile systems into North Vietnam.

8. The Map at Tab C: Shows the high-resolution photographic coverage of North Vietnam (80% or better cloud-free) that has been reported in the three week period ending 7 August. This has been reported in accordance with the photo reconnaissance area grid system. In addition to area coverage, the map shows the nine targets that could most likely reveal the introduction of offensive missile systems into North Vietnam.

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


Chairman

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

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