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COMIREX-M-61
23 January 1969

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NRO & DIA REVIEWS COMPLETED

Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

Page 19 NRO Satellite Launch Schedule, KH-4B, [Redacted]
[Redacted] (COMIREX-D-13.16/2 --
Note--this paper was distributed as 14.6/2 in error)

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NRO

Section VI (Other Business)

Page 22 Changes in COMIREX Membership

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Page 22 Need for [Redacted] on GIANT SCALE

Tab

25X1D

Page 23 Tab B - [Redacted] Coverage of North Vietnam
for 9-15 January 1969

[Redacted]

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Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

Approval of Minutes

[Redacted]

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1. The Executive Secretary apologized for the fact that COMIREX-M-59 and 60 had not been disseminated in time for the 23 January meeting.

Operational Briefing--Satellite

[Redacted]

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2. [Redacted] reported on satellite operations and scheduling as follows:

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
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COMIREX-M-61
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CORONA

1106 - Scheduled 5 February 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 13 February 1969, 1730L

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 20 February 1969, 1730L

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Film processing/distribution:

- Estimated arrival 1st bucket at Eastman Kodak - 14 Feb, 1300L
 - Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 17 Feb, 1100L
 - Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 18 Feb, 1100L
 - Estimated arrival 2nd bucket at Eastman Kodak - 21 Feb, 1300L
 - Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 24 Feb, 1100L
 - Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 25 Feb, 1100L
- Projected stereo coverage:

- 1st bucket - Land area - 1.68 million sq. n.m.
Targets - 2,400
- 2nd bucket - Land area - 1.68 million sq. n.m.
Targets - 2,400

1050 - Scheduled 19 March 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 27 March 1969, 1730L
Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 4 April 1969, 1730L

Film processing/distribution:

- Estimated arrival 1st bucket at Eastman Kodak - 28 March, 1300L
- Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 31 March, 1100L
- Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 1 April, 1100L
- Estimated arrival 2nd bucket at Eastman Kodak - 5 April, 1300L
- Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 8 April, 1100L
- Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 9 April, 1100L

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Projected stereo coverage:

1st bucket - Land area - 2.80 million sq. n.m.
Targets - 2,400

2nd bucket - Land area - 2,80 million sq. n.m.
Targets - 2,400

1051 - Scheduled 7 May 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 15 May 1969

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 23 May 1969

1107 - Scheduled 9 July 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 18 July 1969

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 27 July 1969

Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East

[Redacted]

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3. The DIA and CIA members reported a continuing standdown of FOOD FAIR and IDEALIST/TACKLE missions over the mainland of China. [Redacted] added that there had been no GIANT SCALE activity between 17 and 23 January.

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4. In the 17-23 January period, nine low-level BUMPY ACTION missions were flown without a single loss. Details are shown below:

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
17 Jan	Q822 (Low)	DMZ, Rte 1A	Successful, MARS
18 Jan	Q865 (Low)	Kep Afld, Haiphong Naval Base, Haiphong Port Fac, Haiphong RR Sta & Yd	Successful, MARS
19 Jan	Q878 (Low)	DMZ, Rte 1A, Dong Hoi Afld	Successful, MARS
19 Jan	Q874 (Low)	SAM Sites 55, 253, 70, 66	Successful, MARS
20 Jan	Q871 (Low)	SAM Son Coastal Def Site, Bai Thuong Afld, Thanh Hoa Transp Pt, Rte 1A, Vinh Afld	Successful, MARS
22 Jan	Q872 (Low)	Ha Tau Boat Rpr Fac, Hon Gai Port Fac, Haiphong Port Fac, Haiphong RR Sta, Kien An Afld	Successful, MARS
22 Jan	Q869 (Low)	Ben Thuy Transp Pt, Seg 5, Vinh Wtwy, Wtwy 5A and 5B, Rte 1A, Rte 15, RR 7, Dong Hoi Afld	Successful, MARS
23 Jan	Q857 (Low)	Seg Rte 1A, Nam Dinh Tpp, Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Ninh Binh RR Br, Thanh Hoa Cply	Successful, MARS
23 Jan	Q874 (Low)	SAMs 55, 253, 70, 66	Successful, MARS

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5. Mr. Moyer indicated that, as a follow-up to a recent question from [redacted] about the improved record of the drones, he had checked with JRC and was told that they are still getting reaction on these missions although maybe not trying as hard.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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23 January 1969

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6. [redacted] reported efforts at coverage of two priority South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:

a. Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 142. For the period 16-22 January 1969 no surveillance coverage was reported.

b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 9-15 January 1969. Two BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and reported as successful have not been reported. No SSM activity was observed.

Report on Aircraft Activities -- Cuba

[redacted]

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7. [redacted] reported there had been no GLASS LAMP missions flown during the period. [redacted] advised that for the 56-day period beginning 28 November 1968, ten GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 90 percent coverage of the area. During this period 168 of the 179 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography.

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8. The Chairman, ICRS, noted that there had been a standdown of GLASS LAMP missions January 21, 22, and 23 at the request of the JCS. [redacted] observed that because of the present level of coverage this standdown was not a cause for concern. He requested the Chairman, ICRS, to keep a close watch on the coverage figures and to advise him should it appear that a special request for coverage might be necessary.

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Section II (NPIC Report)

Mission Highlights

[redacted]

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1. [redacted] briefed COMIREX on recent mission highlights as follows:

a. North Vietnam. A BUMPY ACTION mission on 24 December revealed two columns of troops, over 600 personnel, moving south on two trails in the vicinity of Dong Hoi. The presence of a possible mortar training range in the area suggests that this might be a training/rest area for troops.

b. North Vietnam. A composite board made up from several missions illustrates the well integrated logistics network to move supplies from Vinh through Bai Duc Thon to Mu Gia Pass. Evidence provided by photography shows that supplies have been moved in unprecedented quantities since the 1 November 1968 bombing halt. Extensive use is made of water as well as truck and some rail transportation.

c. North Vietnam. Photography of 7 December reveals considerable activity at the Cu Lac transshipment point. Cu Lac is 10 nm southwest of Quang Khe on the south bank of the Song Troc River. It is near the junction of route 101 and 137. Route 137 shares with route 15 the distinction of being a major infiltration route into Laos.

d. North Vietnam. 12 December photography shows a large transshipment point under construction near the village of Xom Hoai. This village is 25 nm south of Vinh at the confluence of the Ngan Sau and Rao No rivers.

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Provision of direct transloading from barge to rail car will be a major improvement in the logistics net between Vinh and the Mu Gia Pass.

e. Cuba. Photography of the entire port and naval facilities at Havana shows the greatest number of Komars located here since the deployment to Santiago de Cuba on 3 December 1968. Construction activity is noted at the Mambisa dry dock and ship repair yards.

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Section IV (Action Items)

Planning Parameters to Assist NRO in Designing Satellite Launch Schedule

[Redacted]

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1. [Redacted] observed that while he was appreciative of the detailed work done by EXSUBCOM in delineating dates when the film from particular satellite missions should arrive at Eastman, proceed to NPIC, and when various stages of readout results should then be given to ICRS, he considered NRO would react more satisfactorily to guidance cast in a different form. NRO would like planning parameters simply identifying such things as the number of days from CORONA recovery [Redacted] and a restatement of the desired [Redacted]. [Redacted] noted that it was apparent from the EXSUBCOM attempts at scheduling that this subcommittee had paid full attention to previous statements [Redacted] but sometimes other factors entered into planning which might make it difficult if not impossible for NRO to know how it might jigger schedules without upsetting the balance between exploitation and writing new requirements. [Redacted] observed that the present [Redacted] scheduling looks fine to ICRS, just so long as NPIC can handle incoming missions at the present rate. The Chairman, ICRS, also commented that [Redacted] it is not essential.

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2. [Redacted] identified an immediate and novel problem in scheduling as stemming from the decision of authorities to update tracking station facilities. In reply to a question from [Redacted] noted that the importance of these tracking stations varies but [Redacted] which is to be updated in the middle of summer, is extremely important. He noted that so far compromises have been made, so as to minimize interference with launches, but at about this point in time it seems to be necessary for launch slippage of about two weeks for both May and July.

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3. Following some further discussion about what slippages might do to mapping, charting, and geodesy coverage, should slippages have impact 14 months from now, the Chairman observed that the task force on launches which is headed by [redacted] is supposed to represent the entire gamut of COMIREX interest. This coin has two sides. In the first place, it means that suggestions to NRO from the task force presumably have taken into account all COMIREX requirements; secondly, it means that if any aspects of the task force recommendations are unrealistic from the NRO standpoint [redacted] should refer the problem immediately to COMIREX. The Chairman concluded with a request that [redacted] and his task team come up with standard planning parameters for the guidance of NRO. These parameters should be drawn up in an order of priority and with an adequate identification of the interrelationship of actions. NRO should be able to apply these parameters to any need to warp its schedule of launches in such a way as to make the change with least damage to the harmony of the exploitation-to-collection-to-NRO double play.

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Soviet COSMOS Reconnaissance Missions As Potential Indicators
(Reference COMIREX-M-60, page 16, paras 1-4) [redacted]

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- 4. Discussion of the use that might be made of early reporting of anomalies appearing in the operation of Soviet reconnaissance satellites was essentially broken down into consideration of benefits of early readout of real time telemetry intercepts which:
 - a. might be of advantage to COMIREX in programming its imagery satellites; and,
 - b. how to make information available to those who might evaluate anomalies in terms of indications.

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It was the consensus that the National Indications Center, the SIGINT Committee, and the Office of Current Intelligence of CIA might all be in a position to analyze anomalies in terms of potential indicators. It was also noted that the Strategic Warning Working Group of [Redacted] had tangled with this problem and that General Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, might also have a keen interest in the indications type of analysis.

5. The CIA member indicated that he would request those agency elements already studying Soviet reconnaissance satellite operations to identify potential targets to ICRS. The Chairman advised that, with regard to indications, he would write to the Watch and SIGINT Committees, making note of the general awareness of the indicator possibilities and the value of leads to possible targets while volunteering COMIREX assistance as it might be appropriate.

*NRO see TCS-5131-69
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Reece files*

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Latent Imagery and Security Problems Associated with Disposal of Film

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8. The Chairman, SDWG, reported that in accordance with the COMIREX assignment of October 1968 the SDWG had made a preliminary review of the security problems associated with the possibility that latent imagery might remain on stripped and shredded film. Following this preliminary discussion, the Exploratory Laboratory of NPIC made an analysis of the latent imagery problem and on 5 December reported to SDWG that in certain instances it was possible to restore an identifiable image. NPIC also reported to SDWG that following the findings of the Exploratory Laboratory it had opted to go to a system which employed a grinder producing chaff passed by 1/16th of an inch screen followed by treatment in a caustic solution that is available commercially and also permitted recovery of the silver. Following silver recovery, the film was subjected to treatment which removed all possibility of imagery recovery. [Redacted] added that there is also a market for what is left of the film.

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9. The Chairman, SDWG, reported that some members of his working group had inquired as to how generally available the NPIC process may be and whether it may be used readily at various places around the world having a film disposal problem.

[Redacted] requested that [Redacted] comment on this. [Redacted] repeated that the caustic solution used in the NPIC process is available commercially and observed that there has been a considerable amount of discussion on film disposal problems within the community. He would be surprised if departments and agencies with film disposal problems were not aware of the process.

[Redacted] confirmed that film disposal is a very current question within the EXRAND community and he, like [Redacted], feels that the three services are quite familiar with the status of the NPIC methods.

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10. COMIREX agreed that it would go on record that there is a security problem involved if the stripping and shredding technique is followed; but, with regard to alternatives, COMIREX considered that each agency should make its own decision whether to follow the NPIC route or whether to dispose of film through burning or some other secure means. COMIREX agreed also that any agency with further questions should approach EXRAND for information and guidance.

Use of Sanitized KH-4 Photography for SAC Contingency Plan in China
(T-KH)

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11. The Chairman, SDWG, advised that in accordance with USIB approved action DIA had requested approval of a SAC request to use sanitized KH-4 photography for a SAC contingency plan on China. [redacted] reminded COMIREX that the USIB authorization (USIB-D-46.2/7, COMIREX-D-2.7/7, 19 September 1968) required referral of such requests to COMIREX on a case-by-case basis. The Chairman, SDWG, advised that his working group had studied the request and recommended approval. [redacted] suggested that his working group be responsible for maintaining files on such requests /this will actually be done by DIA/ and that they not be forwarded to COMIREX in detail unless there was some question which need be discussed at COMIREX.

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12. COMIREX approved the SDWG recommendation that SAC be permitted to use sanitized KH-4 photography in support of the contingency plan submitted by DIA [redacted]

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Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

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NRO Satellite Launch Schedule, KH-4B, [Redacted]
[Redacted] (COMIREX-D-13.16/2--Note--this paper was distributed
as 14.6/2 in error) [Redacted]

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1. Both the CIA and DIA members requested more time to consider this paper. After questioning NRO on its timing with regard to the requirement to submit draft guidance for its financial program and observing that the Chairman and a number of members would not be in town on 6 February, it was agreed that this paper should be rescheduled for reconsideration 30 January.

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5. [Redacted] next raised the question of EEIs, reminding COMIREX that NRO still wishes to have defined to it what objects may be photographed satisfactorily [Redacted]

[Redacted] as compared to those requiring [Redacted] In reply to a

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question from the Chairman as to how he is coming on his EEI task, [redacted] advised that he has defined those categories requiring [redacted] and has farmed these out to analysts within CIA with a request that specific targets be designated. Referring to the [redacted] criteria, [redacted] advised that his work was not broken down in quite that fashion. He had been responsive to [redacted] request simply to indicate those categories of targets requiring the [redacted]. The Chairman, ICRS, expects to submit his EEI study to ICRS after analysts have provided him with targets for his categories.

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Section VI (Other Business)

Changes in COMIREX Membership

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1. The Executive Secretary noted that as the COMIREX Directory is only updated approximately every six months he would resume the practice of announcing changes to membership at COMIREX in order to make such changes part of the record in the Minutes. [] noted that Lt. Colonel Raymond N. Barry, present, had replaced Colonel Charles C. Clayton and that the Navy member and first and second alternates now are, respectively, Captain Lloyd W. Moffit, Cdr. James A. Richardson, and Cdr. H. Kelly Sims. Cdr. Richardson was at the table acting for Captain Moffit.

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Need for [] Sensor on GIANT SCALE

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2. The Chairman, ICRS, reported that his subcommittee had been asked to address a message from DIA on the removal of the [] from GIANT SCALE. DIA felt that [] had not added anything to intelligence not duplicated by other sensors. ICRS feels that it has no requirement from a national point of view, but all DoD elements (e.g. CINCPAC) have not been heard from. It was generally agreed that COMIREX would go on record as stating that the [] has not made any unique contribution to intelligence and we do not have any requirements for continuing its use.

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Executive Secretary
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachment
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