

Approved For Release 2007/01/17 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000600050006-6

NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE AND
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER

4301 SUITLAND ROAD
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20390

TOP SECRET

File

IN REPLY REFER TO

Code: 441
WO# 6408770.01
02 JUL 1969

TOP SECRET RUFF

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Reconnaissance and Technical Support
Center, Washington, D. C. 20309

To: Chairman, Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation


Subj: List of additional KH-4 photography sanitized for the COMSIXTHFLT
Contingency Plan for the Middle East; forwarding of

Ref: (a) DIA ltr ser TCS 657850-68 of Nov 68
(b) OPCEN 2985 dtg 061950Z of Feb 69

Encl: (1) List of KH-4 Photography Sanitized

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with references (a) and (b).
It contains an identification of the additional photography sanitized by
the Naval Reconnaissance and Technical Support Center on targets selected
by COMSIXTHFLT for the Contingency Plan for the Middle East.

J. W. TAFT



J. J. BURGER
By direction

STATOTHR

DIA and NAVY review(s) completed.

TCS 19516769

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
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
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List of KH-4 Photography Sanitized

1. The following photography was used to provide COMSIXTHFLT with sanitized target material on one target in Algeria.

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Pass</u>	<u>Frame</u>	<u>Date</u>
[Redacted]			



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
2. A total of 18 prints were produced, consisting of nine 6X and nine 10X enlargements. These prints were forwarded to FICEUR for distribution.

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Enclosure (1)

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


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
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Contingency Plan files

RI, HC, ED

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24 JUN 1969

Vice Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, U.S. Navy
Acting Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Rebel:

In line with our conversation following the 19 June USIB meeting,
there is attached a copy of Admiral Moorer's letter of 23 May and
our response to that letter.


Sincerely,

R. E. Cushman, Jr.

R. E. Cushman, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USMC
Acting Director

Attachments

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EA/DDCI/ 
Distribution.

- Cys 1 and 2 - Addressee
- ~~3~~ - DDI
- 4 - DDCI
- 5 - ER



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DDI-1808-69

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23 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Navy Request for Additional Downgrading of T-XH Photography

1. On 23 May Admiral Moorer wrote you requesting that a COMIREX Subcommittee examine and report on the possibility of sanitizing KH-4 photography outside the present SIOP procedures. The Admiral apparently did not discuss this with [redacted]

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2. This is not a good idea. In the first place, the COMIREX Subcommittee is not where one would start such a project; it would start with a request from DIA as a USIB member. Secondly, what Admiral Moorer seems to be suggesting is that in the long run the Navy be given a blank check for downgrading KH-4 photography to the SECRET level. Finally, and most important, there is a perfectly good procedure for handling requests of this nature through established channels.

3. I have drafted a letter to Admiral Moorer for your signature. General Cushman has seen this letter in draft and has discussed it with Lowrance, who is in complete accord with this way of handling Moorer's request.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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4. In essence, you are suggesting that the Admiral give established procedures a try before asking for special dispensation.

5. I am attaching, in addition to the letter for your signature, a copy of Admiral Moorer's letter of 23 May, a copy of the COMIREX procedures, and a copy of the letter written by [redacted] on 29 April to Admiral Moorer. At that time Joe pointed out that it was really a simple matter to get selected photography downgraded and that he would be most happy to see that the process was handled as expeditiously as possible.

6. A copy of your letter to Moorer will go to Admiral Lowrance.

[redacted]
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

- ODDI [redacted]
Distribution:
Cys 1 and 2 - Addressee
3 - Deputy Director
4 - DDI
5 - Chief/IRS
6 - ER
7 - O/DDI File Copy

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


CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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23 MAY 1969

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The Honorable Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

Dear Dick,

Your attention to the problem of Admiral Hyland's photographic requirements for contingency planning is deeply appreciated.

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
[Redacted] letter clarified pertinent aspects regarding more expedient procedures for sanitization. More efficient procedures have been worked out between members of his staff and that of Admiral Harlfinger, and have been forwarded to Admiral Hyland.

Although the more streamlined sanitization process noted above will be helpful, the constant preparedness of operational forces continues to be a matter of concern. Procedures still require formal submission and approval for contingency targets, even though new targets may develop and new crises may occur with little or no warning. The emergency situations which developed last year in Korea and the Middle East received rapid approval for sanitization authority throughout certain countries, however there were delays of days and weeks before sufficient up-to-date intelligence materials were in the hands of operational forces. Additionally, these are the only two areas of the world, outside of SIOP targets, where operational forces can be provided updated materials continuously without further formal authority.

It is strongly recommended, therefore, that the problem of providing operating forces with the latest and best intelligence materials in the most expeditious manner, while at the same time maintaining a sufficient security system, be given immediate attention. A possible course of action would be the tasking of the COMIREX Downgrading and Sanitization Working Group to examine and prepare a comprehensive report on this problem. Such

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
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a study might be used for determining courses of action at this time, and also serve as a basis for deliberations on this same question in the future.


Warmest regards,

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T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

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