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11 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : CIA Requirements for Initial Debriefing
of Pueblo Crew

1. You asked the DDI what CIA's interests would be during the early stages of the debriefing of the Pueblo crew. The views of officers in the Offices of Current Intelligence, Strategic Research, and National Estimates, the Information Requirements Staff, and the Directorate of Plans were solicited in drawing up the questions below, which are illustrative of the general areas into which they are grouped. Other questions are probably best handled during the continuing debriefing, along with following up on the key areas highlighted below.

a. Pueblo seizure and crisis: The events leading to the seizure, and the immediate circumstances surrounding the taking of the ship--including hints of foreknowledge--as a gauge of North Korean reactions to future reconnaissance efforts;

b. Any indication of North Korean expectations of and preparations for US counteraction, including retrieving the crew and ship or a retaliatory strike;

c. Prisoner handling, including degree of preplanning evident, attempts to induce defections and methods of extracting confessions, and exposure to outside materials--letters, radio, press--during confinement; changes in location or degree of security;

d. Indications of uncertainty in crisis management during the period after the seizure;

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e. Intelligence exploitation: The positive intelligence material and collection information captured or otherwise obtained, to measure North Korean appreciation of current US capabilities;

f. North Korean interest in and knowledge of US collection activities as evidenced by the interrogations;

g. Inferences as to the capabilities of the North Korean cryptologic service derived from the questions posed or the knowledgeability of the interrogators;

h. Identification of the interrogators, including their organizational affiliation and rank;

i. Major interrogation subjects, including any emphasis on US politics and domestic situations;


k. Foreign assistance: Participation of Soviet, Chinese Communist, or other personnel in debriefings, examination of equipment, or exploitation of documents, as a gauge of North Korean cooperation with the USSR and China and the resultant intelligence damage;

l. Disposition of captured documents or equipment, including shipment to the USSR or Communist China;

m. Other matters: Disposition of any crew members not returned; and

~~Intended disposition of the ship.~~

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Strategic Research

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