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SECURITY INFORMATION

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
13 November 1/52

Memorandum to Mr. Dulles

Subject: Carrying Out Paragraph 5 of MSC 136 (Iran)

1. At the risk of jumping the gum, I would like to bring to your attention serious problems that may arise in carrying out paragraph 5 of the Iran policy. You will recall that this prowides for planning now of steps to be taken to support an anti-Communist government in the event of an attempted or actual Tudeh seizure of power. I have discussed the problems recur-25X1A9a rently with , and he concurs in this memorandum.

- 2. The present state of planning is fuzzy and uncoordinated. At an early stage in the paper, we undertook to provide a paper on "special political" capabilities, and Defense undertook to provide one on the military side. Ours is excellent so far as it goes, but on the questions that could arise under paragraph 5 we necessarily had to say that what we could do would depend heavily on military plans. The military paper, done by JCS, is not helpful and seems to imply that in a crisis about all the military could do would be to cheer us on. The two together do not add up to anything remotely resembling an adequate plan.
- 3. Buring the preparation of our paper, ¹ 25X1A9a his people made every effort to merge their efforts with those of JCS, or at least to get some idea of what JCS was thinking. He got some very informal cooperation, but nothing approaching what there should be. Meanwhile, the third party in interest, State, did not know much of dither plan, and its people evidenced fairly naive ideas of our capabilities, which they grossly overrated. 25X1A9a
- and I from the experience of the past month, feel strongly that the only adequate answer is an ad hoc consittee created for this perpose only -- and quite apart from any efforts under paragraph b. Such a committee should include State, Defense (with JCS), and CIA. It might possibly include



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a representative from PSB. To be efficient, it should not be larger than this. It is our strong impression that such a committee will not come into being unless it is created by the Senior Staff Steering Committee, whether acting as such or as individuals.

5. Assuming the creation of such a committee, the chairmanship would depend, presumably, on what department or agency is given execution responsibility under paragraph 5. State's relatively complacent view (reflected in NIE-75) and its lack of knowledge of the tools would make it a poor choice, in our judgment. Defense is anything but complacent, but the inadequacy of the JCS study gives the pause even if Mr. Noyes' office were better able to prod than it seems to be. In many ways CIA would be best suited to take the chair: both State (in its original draft of the paper) and Defense (in the JCS study) have placed heavy emphasis on our role in the given situation. Moreover, the psychological measures may be nearly as important as the "special political." However, so far as I know CIA has never been given execution responsibility unless the matter was wholly one for our type of action, and the negotiations with called for by the paragraph would be virtually impossible for us to take a leading role in, for many reasons. On balance, we believe that Defense would be the best choice, although we might conceivably indicate our willingness to take on the job.

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6. In any event, the question of chairmanship, at least as between Defense and CIA, is probably less important than the creation of the ad hoc committee. If you agree that such a committee is essential, I suggest that you propose it informally to Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Noyes in advance of the Senior Staff meeting, and that if agreement is reached there be a joint demarche to or consultation with Mr. Lay.

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