IHC-M-4
17 July 1968

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HANDLING COMMITTEE

Minutes of Fourth Meeting, 15 July 1968

Members or Representatives Present

Chairman
DIA
CIA
NSA
State
Army
Navy
Air Force
FBI
AEC
Secretary

25X

Others Present

Secret Service –
(Observers)

25X1

IHC Support Staff –

DIA	– 11
CIA	– 63
Air Force	– 3
Navy	– 5
State	– 5
ACDA	– 2
AEC	– 13
FBI	– 4
NSF	– 1
Army	– 5
NSA	– 4
DCA	– 1
NPIC	– 1

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

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1. **Introduction of the IHC Support Staff Members.** [   ]　25X
who served as Executive Secretary for CODIB, introduced the new
Executive Secretary and the other five members of the Support Staff
who were present. [   ] was the only member　25X1
who was absent.

25X1　　　2. **Briefing by** [   ] **of the RAND Corporation.**

25X1　　　　a. [   ] acknowledged [   ] introduction and　25X1
commented on the size of the committee (approximately 135 people
were present).

　　　b. In his preliminary comments [   ] emphasized　25X
that the views he would present were not those of an official
government agency. He urged the attendees not to make operational
decisions based on this talk. The concept of remote access
computing was briefly introduced and cited as a major influence in
this security investigation.

25X1　　　　c. [   ] then presented a series of viewgraphs which
portrayed the potential security problems in a system which has
remote consoles, a switching computer, and a processing computer
along with standard components such as communication lines, files,
software, etc. He commented at some length also on the capabilities
of the people in the network to violate the security of the system.
In commenting on the various security violation areas and how they
25X1　　are being handled, [   ] summarized present progress by saying
that physical, personal, communication, and radiation security were
well in hand. He said that this left the areas of hardware, soft-
ware, and procedures to be considered by his task force.

25X1　　　　d. [   ] then spoke of the task force he chairs and
its mission. He said that it was chartered to identify hardware,
software, and system procedures security problems and to recommend
technical solutions. The task force, originally under ARPA, is now
under the Defense Science Board. There are two panels -- a Technical
25X1　　Panel under [   ] of Case Western and a Doctrine Panel
under [   ] The former addresses what special
characteristics hardware and software should have in a computer
central. This panel was also concerned with interface problems
between communications and terminals, and between communications
and processers. The Doctrine Panel is concerned with procedures,
what is the role of the security man, what to do in case of a
security violation and so on.

25X1　　　　e. [   ] said that each panel at this time has
prepared a draft position paper. He emphasized that no one knows
how to handle all of the security problems in these complex systems.
Among those areas which cannot be handled with today's art, he cited

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the cost to an agency of using such a system. Operational
degradation through using a security system was another effect
which could not be predicted. In determining the scope of the
25X1 problems to be solved, [   ] suggested implementing a few of
these systems and learning from experience. He stressed the need
for system adjustment and feedback to the task force on which
operational decisions were effective.

f. The role of the security officer in these systems
25X1 was emphasized. [   ] suggested that the security people
had to be trained in systems and EDP concepts. He sees the security
officer as the security monitor in such a system, hence the need
for extensive training and orientation.

g. In commenting on the system design which will be
set forth by the task force, [   ] said that it will be   25X1
sufficiently general for all federal agencies with the need for
such a capability. It will not be tailored to DIA, CIA, or any
other component. As a consequence the system suggested by the
Task Force must be adapted to that set of problems faced by the
implementing agency. He also stressed that the system must be
maintainable. In order to avoid the cost, clearance problems,
inconvenience, and incompatability of developing system software
25X1 at each installation, [   ] said that the task force proposed
to supply procedures (at the SECRET level or lower) which will be
particularized by the using agency to suit its needs.

h. A second major role for the security man, [   ]   25X
said, would be the establishment of parameters which, when combined
with these general procedures, would result in the requisite
security software. He emphasized that the security officer must
be the watch dog in the system, coping with violations and deciding
the extent of a breach in security.

25X1   i. [   ] then spoke of an area which was not within
the purview of his task force, i.e., the administrative problems
in establishing mutually acceptable procedures and regulations.
He feels that standardization will be the inevitable outcome of
setting common procedures for security in EDP systems. In this
context, he stressed the danger in agencies adopting official
positions too early in the establishment of regulations since they
may have great difficulty in retreating from these positions as time
and experience provided better insight.

25X1   j. [   ] then called for questions. The first question
posed the problem of security on consoles in uncleared space.

25X1   [   ] in answering this question, spoke at length on
the problem of privacy versus security. After a week's deliberation
at Princeton, the Task Force concluded that the state of the art

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could not solve the problem of protecting the security of data in
a remote access system against deliberate acts of penetration.
Therefore his Task Force assumed that consoles, hardware, and so
on are located in a non-hostile environment. Otherwise, he
confessed, the goals of his Task Force are not achievable with
today's technological developments.

The second question addressed the problem of setting up a
remote console room which would be used by many system users. It was
asked who had done work in this area.

25X1   ☐ indicated that System Development Corporation was
doing some work in this area with ADEPT-50. Also DIA has ideas
on file access control for ANSRS. He suggested that initial
systems should have security protection which is a bit too strong.
He feels that redundancy checks are desirable until experience
dictates otherwise. In support of this he pointed out that users
are never quite sure when hardware or software is completely free
of errors which have been there since the system was built.

Another questioner probed the problem of how much extra
protection can be tolerated.

The fourth question also addressed security at consoles.

25X1   ☐ felt that the question related to personal security.
He went on to point out that it may be desirable to establish
different security controls depending on whether the console user
is simply searching files or whether the user may also develop
programs on that console to manipulate files. He pointed out that
debugging programs may violate security safeguards quite accidentally.

The fifth question was about industry's role.

25X1   ☐ said that to date, industry had not participated in
Task Force deliberations. He feels, however, that industry will
soon be faced with requirements and so should be aware of what
the Task Force was recommending. So far as he is concerned, no
member of industry is capable of supplying a secure system at this time.

The sixth question related to commercial interests.

25X1   ☐ indicated that the procedures involved in running
separate systems is uneconomical and so defense contractors are
interested. He went on to say that government got into the picture
regarding the design of secure systems at about the right time.

The seventh questioner expressed a need to fix on procedures
and security standards now.

25X1   ☐ said that his Task Force is attempting to provide
guidance to system developers in a similar position, e.g., ADEPT-50
and the AF Satellite Control Facility at Sunnyvale.

The eighth question was about distribution of Task Force papers.

25X1

[   ] indicated that distribution of position papers will be decided Thursday (18 July). He said that he would be happy to hear from people concerned with the problem but did not wish to hear from those interested in portraying an official position of their parent agency.

The ninth questioner asked if the technical panel was designing a monitor.

25X1

[   ] said that he had not read the current draft from the technical panel. He feels that the panel will establish performance criteria for the monitor at a general level. Detailed specifications may come from a reconstituted panel. However, he would prefer that local installations handle the details. Hardware details, however, will probably be handled by vendors.

The last question related to conflicting procedures regarding the sanitizing of disc surfaces.

25X1

[   ] answer was that he had heard that triple writing of random streams constituted a secure erase of the disc surface. However, there was disagreement on this.

This concluded the meeting. (A tape recording of the meeting is available in the IHC Support Staff office, Room 2E49, Hqs.).

[   ]   25X1

Executive Secretary