


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World-wide Perspectives



KEY DATES

May 16 - 18	Stockholm	Emergency Action Conference on Vietnam, to step up condemnation of war in Vietnam. Announced by Gunnar Myrdal, Chairman of Swedish Vietnam Committee.
May 22	Moscow	1943 - End of Third International (Comintern) announced. The statement declared the autonomy of Communist parties outside the USSR (a principle once again at issue on the eve of the World Communist Conference).
May 23	Moscow	Meeting of Preparatory Commission for conference of world Communist parties.
June 4 - 26	Geneva	Annual International Labor Conference (ILO 50th Anniversary)
June 5 (maybe)	Moscow	World Communist Conference
June 11 - 12	Moscow	1937 - Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals arrested, tried secretly and executed. In ensuing Stalinist purge of Soviet military, about half of all officers, including all II Army and Navy Vice Commissars, disappeared (an event seemingly being ignored by those in the Soviet military now pushing for a revival of Stalinism).

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May 1969

THE COMMUNIST SCENE(22 March - 18 April 1969)1. Soviets Attain Objective in Czechoslovakia

After prolonged effort, the Soviets have finally succeeded in removing Alexander Dubcek from his key position of Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CzCP) by virtue of a Second Soviet Intervention. The CzCP Central Committee met on 17 April and announced major changes in the leadership. Slovak Party leader Gustav Husak replaced Dubcek, who, however, remains on the new 11-man Presidium (Politburo), which itself replaces the old 21-man Presidium and its 8-man Executive Committee ("Super-Politburo"). Josef Smrkovsky, the most consistent and outspoken of the reformist Czech party leaders, was dropped from the Presidium. To make the demotion of Dubcek and Smrkovsky palatable to the population and to forestall violent mass protests, it was arranged for the Presidium to contain a sprinkling of men of known liberal reputation, most notable among whom is Karel Polacek, the leading Czech trade union leader, in order to counterbalance the increased conservative coloring of the leadership. The inclusion of notorious pro-Moscow conservatives like Lubomir Strougal, Jan Piller, and Vasil Bilak is an ominous portent. The retention of President Svoboda and Premier Cernik helps give an air of stability and continuity. Husak himself is generally held to be a "realist"; he can hardly be labeled a complete conservative or a true liberal. The central fact is that he seems to consider accommodating the Soviets as the first and foremost task of the Czech leadership -- and it is unquestionably this fact, along with his reputation of being neither liberal nor conservative, that persuaded the Soviets to install him as the new leader.

The changeover was accompanied by extensive police action in the form of detention and questioning of hundreds of people. Whether this was a precautionary measure or a foretaste of a more aggressive police state should soon become clear. Also subject to doubt is the sincerity of Husak's claim that the change in leadership means no change in policy, that the liberal reform program will continue, and that there will be no return to the dark pre-Dubcek days of Novotny. The Soviets engineered these governmental changes and installed Husak in his key position for just the opposite purpose, namely to hasten "normalization," the Soviet euphemism for making Czechoslovakia conform to the colorless pattern of orthodoxy displayed in East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria. The main question to ask is not whether the new regime will re-impose an orthodox Communist dictatorship, but rather how they will go about it and how long it will take. The answer to these questions is to be found partly in the course of action that will be taken by the groups in the Czech population who consistently supported Dubcek's policies -- students, intellectuals, scientists, journalists, trade unionists -- but also in how much moral support they receive from the free world.

2. East and West: Two Communist Congresses

It would be hard to find two more widely divergent phenomena of current Communist activity than the Ninth Chinese Communist Party and the 15th Congress of the Finnish Communist Party. Both took place in April: the CCP Congress beginning on the first and the FCP Congress taking place 3-6 April. Apart from that coincidence, virtually all they had in common was the fact that both ignored the wishes of Big Brother CPSU, thus illustrating quite persuasively the ability of Communist parties to make their own decisions independently of the CPSU if they are but determined to do so, regardless of CPSU attempts to dictate.

The Chinese Congress

Ten years overdue and after only a brief announcement in January that the Ninth Party Congress would convene sometime in 1969, the Congress was suddenly pronounced assembled on 1 April at an undisclosed site in Peking. The Chinese radio announced that Mao Tse-tung made an "important speech" and Defense Minister Lin Piao, later officially confirmed as heir-apparent to Mao, gave a "political report." For typically mysterious, Maoist reasons, not even the substance, much less the text, of either report was made public. The 1,512 delegates to the Congress then were said to have broken up into discussion groups to study the reports in detail, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, and also to study the new draft constitution. This task, clearly a rubber stamp procedure, seems to have absorbed all the energies of the delegates for the next two weeks of the Congress. Free world "China watchers" have scrutinized the meager offerings from Chinese news media, including the slight television coverage of the Congress, for clues of its significance. The unconfident consensus, perhaps best expressed in the attached article by correspondent Peter Grose in the New York Times, is that a factional struggle is being silently waged between fanatic Mao adherents who want to continue the Cultural Revolution (a purge and purification of the Party) and more moderate leadership elements, including the military, who seek to restore a semblance of normalcy in the administration of the country.

The course of the Congress and a communiqué (attached) issued during the Congress on 14 April deserve study. Stalin was in command for roughly 25 years before the world fully realized and Communists, including his own countrymen, acknowledged that he was a megalomaniac. The wording of the 14 April communiqué, as a masterpiece of vacuity in content and of sycophancy in its flattery of Mao, apart from being an offense to human intelligence, contends for honors with the "cult of (Stalin's) personality." It seems reasonable to assume that many of Mao's colleagues are suffering under the burden of his manias just as Khrushchev and his colleagues suffered under Stalin's manias.

The conduct of the Congress, incidentally, illustrates the complete contempt in which the Chinese leadership holds its own people -- in whose name the Congress is held. Clearly it does not feel the slightest obligation to keep them informed of what the leadership thinks or has decided about the fate of the people, for this fate is supposedly what the Congress is determining.

The Finnish Party Congress

On the other side of the world, another important CP meeting was taking place: the Finnish Communist Party Congress. The FCP's claim to distinction is that it is among Europe's most powerful CP's. It holds 41 seats in a 200-member unicameral parliament, has polled some 20% or more of the popular vote in national elections since World War II, and is the only CP in non-Communist Europe to be participating in government (it holds three cabinet posts in coalition with Social Democrats and Centrists). Since Stalin's death in 1953, the party had been gradually liberalized under pressure from younger Communists of modern outlook who have little knowledge of, and less patience with, the irrelevant, ossified Stalinist (and even Leninist) dogma still espoused by their older, Moscow-trained, conspiracy-minded colleagues. The "generation conflict" of recent years unexpectedly reached crisis proportions on the occasion of the Congress, when key Stalinists, seeing the prospect of defeat after defeat on party statutes, program, and membership in key party offices, walked out in a huff, planning to meet separately on 25-26 April to discuss, among other things, whether they should establish a separate party. One of the obsolete pieces of Leninist baggage seemingly thrown out at the Congress was the traditional Communist aim of establishing a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the notion of the Communists' wielding exclusive power. This doctrine gave way to acceptance of the principle of multiple parties even after establishment of a "Socialist" State. It was largely due to this very heresy that the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Soviets seem not to have taken a public stand on these debates within the Finnish party, evidently because they are powerless to change the FCP stand. But in the matter of the split in the party they could not refrain from reverting to direct interference. The main Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, reported that representatives of the Finnish Old Guard and of the now dominant liberal group were summoned to the Soviet Embassy by Arvid Pelshe, visiting CPSU Politburo member and pressed to reconcile their differences with the admonition that whoever splits the Finnish Communist Party is no friend of the Soviet Union. Considering recent trends in the FCP toward independent decisions, (the dominant leadership firmly denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia), there is no guarantee that Soviet admonitions will have any appreciable effect.

3. Briefly Noted

a. Rumanian Foreign Minister to Moscow. Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu was greeted on his formal visit to Moscow, 7-9 April, with a not-so-subtle insult in the form of a strong reiteration in Pravda of the

Brezhnev Doctrine, among the main targets of which is Rumania. It is a matter of intriguing speculation for foreign correspondents in Moscow why this one-shot insult was printed. No other newspaper carried it, and there seems to have been no follow-up. One thing is clear: the Soviets are retaining their options concerning future action toward Rumania, and one of these options is to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to Rumania as they applied it to Czechoslovakia last August.

The purpose of Manescu's mission remains even now shrouded in mystery and Communist news media offer no enlightenment. His visit was completed with a non-committal joint announcement and an invitation to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny to pay a visit to Rumania. They accepted.

b. Brutal PCI-Soviet Polemics. Attached are translations of a bitter exchange of polemics started by Giuseppe Boffa, prominent journalist-commentator and former Moscow correspondent for the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unitá, who often speaks for the leadership of the party. Boffa, writing in L'Unitá on 9 April took the occasion of the Sino-Soviet border conflict to raise all the objections and apprehensions the PCI has about CPSU policies and intentions, including the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the role of the Soviet Union as a "guiding state" for the world's Communist parties. Stung badly, the Soviets lost little time in replying through Pravda on 13 April in an article by one Ivanov. Boffa's article may well be the PCI's way of serving notice on the CPSU that they still have grave doubts about participating in the World Communist Conference on 5 June 1969, at which it is expected that the CPSU will try once again to reassert a measure of control over the world's Communist parties.

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By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 4

Western diplomats have detected signs that Communist China's ninth party congress, now under way, is embroiled in dissension and serious argument, contrary to their expectation that it would be a rubber-stamp occasion.

Their analysis is that basic issues that have been fought over in the Cultural Revolution of the last three years have not yet been resolved.

Foremost among these are the conflicting demands of administrative stability and chairman Mao Tse-tung's dream of continuing the revolutionary zeal of his generation, along with the frictions and rivalries among the bureaucracy of the Communist party, the army and such revolutionary organizations as the Red Guards.

Finally, there is evidence that the central question of personnel — that of who, under the level of the top leadership, will actually carry out party and government functions in Peking — has not been decided.

Diplomatic analysts drew these conclusions four days after the long-awaited congress began in Peking. They are based, these specialists hasten to point

out, on their own analysis and not on hard information emerging from any authoritative source.

Indeed, the tight secrecy surrounding the congress is considered impressive evidence that significant issues are being threshed out. Since the opening day, Tuesday, the Chinese press and radio have maintained a total silence about the proceedings.

A bland communique of the opening day is still repeated regularly by Peking, four days later. No additional details have been given to the Chinese people about the speech of Chairman Mao or the political report of his heir apparent, Defense Minister Lin Piao.

When the eighth party congress first met, in 1956, the major opening day speeches were published in full two days later. That congress reconvened in 1958, and then the proceedings were not made known until a final report at the end.

Analysts believe that the 1958 meeting provoked considerable internal controversy over decisions leading up to the ambitious and unsuccessful economic program called the "Great Leap Forward."

Another sign that solidarity has not been achieved among

the 1,512 delegates at the current congress is the apparent absence of foreign delegations as observers.

Normally, Communist party congresses attract a large number of representatives from allied parties. Peking has not reported the presence of any foreigners, and diplomats know that in the weeks preceding the congress several potential delegations were discouraged from attending, at least at the early stages.

This suggests that the leadership did not want to have outside witnesses to whatever deliberations are taking place.

A final indication that unanimity was lacking on key issues was the long delay in convening the congress. Promised since August, 1967, the opening was repeatedly postponed, even, apparently, up to the last minute. Almost all the important provincial leaders are reported to have been in Peking for the congress from the beginning of March; yet the congress did not open until the beginning of April.

The most pressing question for Western analysts is the identity of the officials who will emerge with key Government and party jobs. The names of

the top leaders are not in doubt—the congress communique indicates no significant differences from the group of leaders that has dominated the Cultural Revolution for the last three years.

But there are as yet no clues to the personnel that will occupy ministerial and subministerial posts directly below the top group around chairman Mao.

The 176 persons listed as members of the congress presidium were initially supposed to constitute the approximate composition of the party's new Central Committee. Analysts now doubt that this will be borne out, since about 60 percent of the presidium members are local figures from the provinces.

These specialists believe that the governing Central Committee would have to include a larger representation of full-time officials at the center, who would operate the party and government apparatus.

Dispute over this question, over whether the administrative apparatus should be weighted toward the military or toward the established party bureaucracy, may well be at the center of the congress's debates, diplomats believe.

NEW YORK TIMES

5 April 1969

PARTY REMOLDING SEEN AS MAO AIM

Ideological Purity Believed Key Objective in Congress

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, April 4—The

congress of the Chinese Communist party now under way in Peking appears to be an attempt by Mao Tse-tung not only to rebuild the party but also to insure its future ideological purity.

It was the party chairman's conviction that the old party bureaucracy was riddled with men who opposed him personally and ideologically. That is believed to have led him to undertake in 1966 the prolonged purge known as the Cultural Revolution.

The party congress has met without press publicity since it opened Tuesday. It is believed to be deliberating on a political report given by Defense Minister Lin Piao. Mr. Mao's hand-picked heir apparent

A draft party constitution that reached Hong Kong in January defines a par-

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ty congress as "the highest leading organ of the party," and 1,512 delegates have gathered in Peking for the meeting.

To Adopt Party Charter

One of their jobs will be to adopt the new charter, the Peking radio has said. The draft document suggests much about the tactics that Mr. Mao evidently intends to follow in restructuring the party.

He is believed to have been obsessed in recent years with a belief that a "socialist" state is in danger of a restoration of capitalism or of "revisionist" ideas as it proceeds toward pure "communism."

The preamble, or "general program," of the draft constitution reflects this view when it says that in the stage of transition from socialism to communism "there will throughout exist classes, class contradictions and the class struggle, there will exist the struggle of the two roads between socialism and capitalism, there will exist the danger of a capitalist restoration."

A number of measures are planned to forestall these dangers.

Article 5 of the draft says the whole party must "obey a united front line... to encourage party members to protest and appeal any local branch decisions that may

be in violation of Mr. Mao's policies.

"If a party member does not agree with the decisions or directives of the party organization, he may reserve his opinions and has the right to pass over his superiors and report directly to the Central Committee and the chairman of the Central Committee," the draft charter said.

'Slavish Obedience' Scored

This provision is clearly meant to deal with what the Maoist press calls the concept of "slavish obedience." The Maoists say that men such as the former chief of state, Liu Shao-chi, and the party's former general secretary, Teng Hsiao-ping, used the concept of unwavering obedience to spread anti-Maoist policies, such as the extension of private land in agriculture.

It was the party secretariat headed by Mr. Teng that allowed the Liu forces to usurp so much day-to-day power from Mr. Mao, and the draft charter reflects suspicion of such bureaucracy.

It alludes to replacement of the old secretariat by saying that "there shall be established the necessary competent organs to unify and expedite the government and army."

Article 3 of the draft also

says that a party member "must particularly guard against careerists, plotters and two-faced persons and must prevent bad persons of this sort from usurping party or state leadership at any level."

This will probably encourage zealots to continue to bring their complaints of "bourgeois thinking" and revisionism to Mr. Mao and the group around him.

The preamble also asserts that the "party must unceasingly get rid of the old and absorb the new" and another article says that one must be a "revolutionary element" to gain admittance to the party.

A reading of the press in recent years shows that nothing has disturbed Mr. Mao more than the possibility that his old enemies would succeed in gaining political rehabilitation. An example is former Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai, who struggled for four years to be rehabilitated after his dismissal in 1958. In present jargon, this is called "the evil wind of reversing verdicts."

To prevent it, the new draft provides for no appeal procedures at all and says that "one who stubbornly refuses to reform" "must be purged from the party and never allowed to rejoin it."

Red China Issues List of Its New Aristocracy

HONG KONG—The ritualistic Chinese Communists, obsessed by the ceremonies of their unique theology, are forever making lists.

The professional China-watcher finds that habit both a major irritation and a blessing. It is bad for the eyes and trying for the memory, but the meticulous ranking clearly spells out the pecking order of the hierarchical society.

China-watchers were poring Thursday over a windfall—the list of 176 members of the Presidium of the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, finally convened after months of anticipation and years of delay.

Detailed examination of the new aristocracy yields some fascinating hypotheses. The Presidium is, after all, almost certain to be the new Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Now Aristocracy

The most obvious and politically most significant conclusion is that the new aristocracy is, as the Chinese put it, "like a radish — red outside and white inside." After the red skin of the 14 leading men and women is peeled away, several strange phenomena support that conclusion.

Most striking is the preponderance of the military: 74 of the 176 are either officers, soldiers, or unquestionably identified with the People's Liberation Army, China's regular army.

The second conclusion is that matrimony pays, even in China, where absolute equality of the sexes is a cardinal tenet of faith. Among approximately 18 women on the Presidium, five are listed largely because they are the wives of "senior cadres." A whiff of bourgeois nepotism ri-

Ranking of Presidium Members Clearly Spells Out Pecking Order in Hierarchy

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

... from the proletarian society.

Among those five women, two stand with the first 14 Presidium members. Chiang Ching, No. 6, is the wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and Yeh Chun, No. 12, is the wife of Dep. Chairman Lin Piao.

Power of Military

The list is also padded with essentially nonpolitical individuals. That anomaly both denigrates the Presidium and emphasizes the power of the military.

Chiang Ching's favorite musician, the man who introduced the abhorred Western piano into the traditional Peking Opera, stands 138th. Scattered through the Presidium are 17 model peasants, farmers, and workers, the gloss of the new "proletarian and poor peasant" complexion claimed for the Presidium. The political influence of two "model enlisted men" is also tenuous.

Somewhat more significant are about five scientists intimately associated with nuclear and rocketry development. Chief among them is Chien Hsueh-shen, former professor at the California Institute of Technology.

Former Officials

The list also displays six former governors, vice governors, mayors, and vice mayors. They are relics of the days when China was ruled by a normal governmental structure. Impromptu Revolutionary Committees have now displaced both the provincial and local organs of the Communist Party and the People's Government.

Those former officials

are also deliberate peace offerings to the disaffected "Old Party members," whose ranks were scythed by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Along with the dominant military, they, by and large, represent the prevailing conservative and compromising tendency.

Yet the full list includes only 42 survivors of 193 full and alternate members of the Central Committee appointed at the 8th National Congress in 1956. Their number was also thinned by 18 natural deaths.

Striking Contrast

The most striking contrast between the red outer skin and the white inner skin lies in the difference between the first group of 14 and the second of 10 set above the rank and file.

Chairman Mao and his deputy chairman, Lin Piao, stand at the head of the first 14.

The remaining 12 in this group include not only the indestructible Premier Chou En-lai, secretary general of the Presidium, but six soldiers, whose loyalties generally tend toward Lin Piao—as well as Lin's wife, who is a member of the People's Liberation Army's Cultural Revolutionary Group. The four civilians on the heights include not only Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and his ghostwriter, Chen Po-ta, but two opportunists distinguished primarily for their devotion to Chiang Ching.

Unless an extraordinary reversal occurs, those 14 will be the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist

Party. They should, in theory, exercise total power over all China.

But the next 10 names set above the commonalty make that conclusion hazardous. They are, by Maoist standards, the white inner skin just beneath the red outer skin.

That group includes six officers who were field marshals until formal military rank was abolished in 1965. Although at least one, former Generalissimo Chu Teh, is politically negligible at 83, the other field marshals are a significant force.

Remarkable Choice

Quite remarkably, Liu Po-cheng, the one-eyed general who once fought with Soviet troops against a Manchurian warlord, is first among the marshals. Yet Liu was, among those men, the most obdurate and the most viciously attacked by Red Guard extremists. He is, however, exceedingly powerful in the disputed southwest.

Among the four civilians in the second rank, Tung Pi-nu, 83, is a political monument like his contemporary, Chu Teh. The remaining three are all vice premiers, the technicians, managers and administrators of Premier Chou.

The balance is both precise and delicate. It is, also, obviously deliberate. "It is as if Peking had put up a big signboard reading: 'Communism at All Costs! We Will Create Our Own Paradise No Matter What Becomes of the Economy and Civil Order!'" one acute specialist remarked.

"But in small print underneath it reads: 'Business as Usual—Just as Soon as We Can Get Back to Business!'" he added.

CHINA'S REDS VOTE CHARTER MAKING LIN HEIR TO MAO

Party Congress Approves New Policy Program — Discloses No Details TO PICK LEADERS TODAY! Full Central Committee Is to Be Elected, Replacing Purged Ruling Group

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, April 14—The

ninth congress of the Chinese Communist party unanimously adopted today a new party charter that stipulates that Defense Minister Lin Piao will eventually succeed Mao Tse-tung as China's leader.

A communique made public today by the official press agency Hsinhua said the congress also unanimously adopted a political report by Mr. Lin that will probably become a blueprint for policy in foreign, economic and domestic political fields. But it gave no details of the report.

The communique added that the party congress would begin tomorrow to elect a new Central Committee. During the Cultural Revolution initiated by Mr. Mao three years ago, about two-thirds of the members of the old Central Committee were dismissed as "power-holders taking the capitalist road."

Unusual Occasion

A congress is described by Chinese Communists as the highest governing organ of their party, and such convocations are both rare and important. The ninth congress is only the second held since the Communists won control of China in 1949. The last congress was elected in 1956 and last met in 1958.

The 1,512 delegates to the present, or ninth, congress met in Peking 14 days ago on April 1. Until tonight there had been no further news on their deliberations, but today's communique indicated that the congress would soon adjourn.

The first two items on the congress agenda, as announced April 1, were the adoption of Mr. Lin's political report and a new party constitution. These tasks have been completed.

Mao Title in Doubt

Tonight's communique said the congress would begin electing a new Central Committee "starting from April 15." It was unclear how long this process would take.

The Central Committee will then meet to select a new Politburo, which, in turn, will elect a standing committee. This will be the supreme ruling party body in China.

The new Central Committee would technically be empowered also to elect a new chairman of the committee, but most analysts in Hong Kong assume that Mr. Mao will be re-elected to his post with Lin Piao the sole vice chairman.

Some observers in Washington have speculated that Mr. Mao may be elevated in title to something approximating "Great Leader" and Mr. Lin named party chairman.

In either case it seems clear that as long as the 75-year old

Mr. Mao is fit he will remain the paramount figure in the leadership.

Because of its ambiguity and lack of details, tonight's communique gave no real indication of any new departures in policy by China.

However, it said that the congress had entrusted the secretariat of its presidium, which is headed by Premier Chou En-lai, with publishing "two documents after making modifications in wording." From the context of the announcement, it seemed that these would be the texts of the new party constitution and of Mr. Lin's political report.

The announcement that the new constitution "clearly stipulated that Comrade Lin Piao is the successor of Chairman Mao" came as no surprise.

Second Rank Expected

A draft of the new constitution that reached Hong Kong in January had specified Mr. Lin as Mr. Mao's closest comrade and political heir. Soon after the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Mr. Lin displaced the former chief of state, Liu Shao-chi, as China's second-ranking Communist.

The draft constitution also declared the "thoughts of Chairman Mao" to be the guiding doctrine of Chinese communism. The text was worded "with the clear intent of attempting to perpetuate Mr. Mao's militant and "left-wing" version of communism.

If the discussions of the congress had resulted in any important realignment of personal power in China, tonight's com-

muniqué did not reveal it. The list of persons that showed the ranking of major delegates was the same as the one issued when the congress opened on April 1.

On the basis of past experience, specialists on China have speculated that the top names among the delegates to this congress will probably be selected to serve on the new Politburo.

Session on Peking TV

PEKING, Tuesday, April 15 (Agence France-Presse) — The congress delegates appeared relaxed and smiling yesterday when they named Lin Piao as future successor to Chairman Mao.

The delegates, who have been meeting behind closed doors since April 2, seemed in excellent humor when they appeared on television shortly after midnight today in a program devoted to the second plenary session of the congress.

The program offered viewers domestic, family-like shots of Chinese leaders—Premier Chou En-lai arranging the microphones for Chairman Mao, Chairman Mao drinking tea, wagging an admonishing finger at the audience and being enthusiastically applauded by his wife, Chiang Ching.

Viewers were able to see Lin Piao giving an extemporaneous speech, being applauded by Mr. Mao, Premier Chou and the whole Congress, and Mr. Chou reading his speech and being applauded by Mr. Mao, Mr. Lin and the congress.

The delegates approved the new party statutes by brandishing their little red books.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 April 1969

Text of the Chinese Communist Party's Communique

HONG KONG, April 14

(Reuters)—Following is the text of a communique made public today after a plenary session of the ninth national congress of the Communist party of China in Peking, as distributed in English by Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency:

The ninth national congress of the Communist party of China, at the plenary session held on the afternoon of April 14, unanimously adopted the new party charter by Comrade Lin Piao on behalf of the Central Commit-

tee of the Communist party of China and unanimously adopted the Constitution of the Communist party of China.

When the great leader chairman Mao-Tse-tung and his close comrade in arms Vice Chairman Lin Piao mounted the rostrum, prolonged, thunderous cheers and applause, resounded throughout the hall.

Chairman Mao presided over the two documents were unanimously adopted, the

whole hall burst into prolonged cheers: "Long live the Communist party of China! Long live the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung. Long live Chairman Mao, a long, long life to him!"

Starting from April 2 after the opening of the ninth national congress of the Communist party of China, all the delegates held group discussions.

All the delegates received a profound education after studying the extremely important speech made by

Chairman Mao at the opening session of the congress; they expressed their warm support to it and their determination to act accordingly.

Party History Reviewed

In accordance with Chairman Mao's teachings, the delegates reviewed the history of the party. In 1921, at the time of the party's first national congress, there were only a few groups with a few dozen party members, where-

powerful People's Republic of China.

The delegates said that this is the conclusion made by history on the great victory our party has won after its 48 years of heroic struggle, and is also the conclusion made by history on the complete bankruptcy of the "left" and right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu, Wang Ming and others, which did tremendous harm to the Chinese revolution.

Only by understanding the history of the party is it possible to understand how Chairman Mao has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism and understand the greatness of Chairman Mao, the greatness of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the correctness of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.

Chairman Mao said in his speech: "We hope that the present congress will be a congress of unity and a congress of victory and that, after its conclusion, still greater victories will be won throughout the country."

The delegates unanimously expressed with elation that they are determined to respond to the great call of Chairman Mao. With full confidence they declared: Our party is unprecedentedly united after shattering the bourgeois headquarters headed by Liu Shao-chi.

'Smoothly and in Unity'

Under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao, our congress has been going on very smoothly and in great unity and it is very fine; it is bound to be a congress of unity, a congress of victory and a congress of pledge for seizing still greater victories throughout the country.

All the delegates conscientiously discussed again and again the political report made by vice chairman Lin Piao, paragraph by paragraph and sentence by sentence.

The delegates held that this

report holds high the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, expounds profoundly Chairman Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, sums up systematically the experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of our country, analyzes the situation at home and abroad and sets forth the fighting tasks hereafter for the whole party, the whole army and the whole nation.

It is a great program guiding posts said that Comrade Lin Piao's report has summarized all that they want to say and that the more they read it the happier they feel. The more they read it the more it warms their hearts. The delegates have made many good proposals for additions to and revisions of the report.

All the delegates conscientiously discussed the revised draft constitution of the Communist party of China, chapter by chapter and article by article.

'A Vivid Manifestation'

The delegates held that the revised draft was jointly worked out by the whole party and the revolutionary masses throughout the country—it is the product of the integration of the great leader Chairman Mao's wise leadership with the broad masses and it is a vivid manifestation of the party's democratic centralism and the party's mass line.

The delegates pointed out that the draft constitution of the party has clearly reaffirmed Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, as the theoretical basis of the party's guiding thinking and clearly stipulated that Comrade Lin Piao is the succes-

or of Chairman Mao—this is a great victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a great victory of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought.

In accordance with the provisions of the new party Constitution, our party will surely be built to become still greater, still more glorious and still more correct.

Slogans Are Shouted

At the plenary session in April 14, the great leader chairman Mao made an extremely important and inspiring speech. Comrade Lin Piao made an important speech. Comrades Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Hguang Yung-sheng, Wang Hung-wen, Chen Yung-kuei, Sun Yu-kno Weii Feng-ying and Chi Teng-kuei also spoke.

They expressed their unanimous support for the extremely important speech made by the great leader Chairman Mao, for the political report made by Comrade Lin Piao and for the draft constitution of the Communist party of China.

Their speeches were punctuated by warm applause and shouting of slogans throughout the hall. After adopting Vice Chairman Lin Piao's political report and the Constitution of the Communist party of China, the congress decided to entrust the secretariat of the presidium of the congress with the publication of the two documents after making modifications in wording.

Seated in the front row of the rostrum today were Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Chun, Wang Tung-hsing and Wen Yu-cheng.

Also there were: Tung Pi-wu, Liu Po-cheng, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Chen Yi, Li Hsien-Nien, Hsu

Hsiang-chien, Nieh Jung-chen and Yeh Chien-ying.

Since the opening of the ninth national congress of the Communist party of China, the whole nation has been in jubilation. Hundreds of millions of revolutionary masses of all nationalities held grand parades and meetings to celebrate the convening of the congress. This is what was never witnessed before by the previous congresses of the Communist party of China.

A new high tide in the mass movement of the live study and application of Mao Tse-tung's thought and a new high tide of grasping revolution and promoting production and other work and preparedness against war are rising.

Messages From Albania

Since the opening of the ninth national congress of the Communist party of China, it has received 1,977 messages and letters of greetings from the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, many other fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations, from many friendly countries, foreign progressive organizations and friendly groups and personages.

They extend warm congratulations to the present congress of our party. The ninth national congress of the Communist party of China expresses heartfelt thanks to them for their greetings and support.

Starting from April 15, the ninth national congress of the Communist party of China takes up the third item on the agenda: to elect the Central Committee of the party.

All the delegates will continue to hold group discussions, in the light of the actual conditions of their localities, fields of work and their units on further implementing all the fighting tasks set forth by the congress.

NEW YORK TIMES

23 April 1969

CPYRGHT **Finnish Communists Assume Independent Line**

CPYRGHT

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

HELSINKI, Finland, April 20

The Finnish Communist party's leadership appears to have fought itself free of Soviet domination for the first time in the 50 years of its existence under the dynamic reform policies of its chairman, J. K. Paasikivi.

Mr. Saarinen and his team of young liberal Communists, including his deputy, Erkki Salomaa, and the new general secretary, Arvo Aalto, won a resounding victory over a powerful faction of Stalinists at the party's 15th congress over the Easter weekend.

Voted down on key issues, 263 to 214 the Stalinists walked out to begin a new meeting, leaving the reformers to elect

their own new 15-member Central Committee.

Mr. Saarinen's reform majority was backed by the Soviet Communist party before, during and after the Finnish party congress even though he has been critical of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and of Moscow's attempts to re-establish monolithic unity in the Communist movement.

The Soviet representative attending the congress, Arvid Pelshe, indicated that his party did not intend to interfere in the Finnish party's affairs and that Moscow prized the unity of the Finnish party above all else. At a Soviet Embassy reception after the congress, he assailed the Stalinist faction that walked out as "splitters."

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Weekend to determine whether to establish a rival party. But, it is reported, they have neither financial nor political support from the Soviet Union.

In a recent interview, Mr. Saarinen and Mr. Aalto suggested that Moscow's tolerance of the Finnish Communist dissidence was a result of a Soviet need not only for making peace with as many of the world's Communist parties as possible but also for maintaining cooperation with Finland.

Most Finns, including Communists, believe it is an axiom of Soviet foreign policy to cultivate normal relations with Finland and to keep her out of the tensions besetting central Europe.

A further peculiarity of the Finnish Communist party is that it is the only one in Western Europe that is represented in a national government. Under Mr. Saarinen's guidance, it has committed itself to responsible participation both in the five-party coalition Government headed by Social Democrats, and in Parliament where it holds 41 of the 200

zation, the Finnish People's Democratic League.

Rejecting old slogans of "dictatorship of the proletariat," Mr. Saarinen has campaigned for "peace, democracy and socialism.

Elected in 1966

He has consistently fought for this approach since he was elected chairman in January, 1966, replacing Aimo Aaltonen, an old-time Stalinist.

The chairman and Mr. Aalto concede that the walkout of the Stalinists may cost the party some voter strength in next year's parliamentary elections, but they are hoping that the general trend in Finnish political thinking is leftward and that, as liberal Communists, they may one day be strong enough to form a government coalition alone with the Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats, under Premier Maunio Koivisto, are the strongest single party in Finland, with 55 seats in Parliament.

The Saarinen leadership's new freedom of maneuver is

confirmed by the ouster of the Stalinists from all positions of power in the Politburo and the Central Committee.

It is evident especially in the chairman's critical stance toward certain elements of Soviet policy, for example, his move to send a delegate to the Yugoslav Communist party congress last month, even after Moscow ordered the Soviet-bloc parties to boycott the Yugoslavs.

Ironically, the Finnish delegate to Belgrade was Mrs. Hertta Kuusinen, the grand old lady of the party who is the daughter of the late Otto Kuusinen, a Bolshevik who was prominent in both the Finnish and Soviet parties. Mrs. Kuusinen, 65 years old, was formerly a Stalinist and is now a member of the Saarinen reform majority and of the new 12-member Politburo.

The only other member of the Politburo previously identified with the orthodox group is the former general secretary, Ville Pessi, and he, like Mrs. Kuusinen, has pledged loyalty to Mr. Saarinen and his reform program.

Helsingin Sanomat, Helsinki

10 April 1969

CPSU SHARP WITH STALINISTS Splitting The FCP Irresponsible

He who embarks on splitting the Finnish Communist Party is not a friend of the CPSU and has no sense of responsibility. Arvid Pelshe, a member of the CPSU Politburo, extended these greetings to the former and present leaders of the Finnish Communist Party (FCP). In an exceptional procedure the present political committee, (Politburo) as well as the former one were summoned to the Soviet Embassy.

Taisto Sinisalo and Markus Kainulainen, who are former members of the political committee and belong to the FCP opposition, were at the dinner. Reportedly they listened solemnly as Pelshe read his carefully prepared speech many pages long.

Aarne Saarinen, chairman of the FCP, Erkki Salomaa, vice-chairman, and Arvo Aalto, Secretary General, also attended the dinner hosted by Ambassador A.E. Kovalev on Tuesday evening, 8 April.

The tone of the speech by Pelshe, the leader of the CPSU delegation attending the FCP congress, was said to be that those who walked out of the congress should return without delay to the mother party.

It is said that the feelings of the Stalinist have already calmed down

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and the founding of a new party is not considered very probable. Possibly Arvid Pelshe's message had some influence on this.

The preparatory committee of the FCP opposition camp is supposed to meet in a few days. The arrangements for the meeting have hit a snag: "A sufficiently large hall has not been found available in Helsinki," our paper was told.

Arvo Aalto, the new Secretary General of the FCP, is optimistic about the possibilities for a reconciliation: "Very likely these problems can be resolved. The desire for reconciliation is in the wind more than during the congress and it creates a favorable atmosphere," Aalto stated.

The 15th congress of the FCP was concluded on Easter with sharp differences between the two Communist camps. The Stalinist minority which walked out of the Culture House on Saturday held its own meeting in Koitto.

At the conclusion of the Koitto meeting, it was reported that a country-wide Communist meeting would be held on 26-27 April. The intention at that meeting is to consider the founding of a new Communist Party.

The regular congress placed Communists supporting the party line into FCP leadership positions; not even one Stalinist visibly participating in the opposition activity was elected to the FCP's leadership bodies.

KANSAN UTISET, Helsinki
11 April 1969
CPSU CONCERNED ABOUT THREAT TO SPLIT FCP

"The necessity to achieve unity in the FCP was strongly emphasized in the discussions which were held with the representatives of the CPSU already in Moscow and later during the congress. Similarly it was made clear that the difficulties arising from a party split would not concern internal policies only, but the situation would also lead to foreign policy problem," stated Aarne Saarinen, chairman of the FCP, on Thursday [10 April] when he presented an evaluation of the events of the congress to the SKDL executive committee. "The CPSU delegation presented the view at the congress and in discussions during the congress that the minority group should return from the Koitto hall to the congress," said Saarinen.

Chairman Saarinen stated that, "Arvid Pelshe, the leader of the CPSU delegation, dealt with the situation on Tuesday at the dinner at the Soviet Embassy, which was attended by the former and present members of FCP political committee. At that time, Pelshe repeated in his speech that the line of the FCP has been correct and this also holds true for the party's new program in principle, the immediate objectives, and the decisions for collaboration in the government. Similarly he stated in speech that there were no obvious reasons for splitting the party. Administrative measures do not resolve differences since they would continue despite everything."

Saarinen stated in his report that under no circumstances would it be possible to continue in the same way as before. Disciplinary actions are the extreme means when everything else has been tried. Saarinen mentioned that the new Central Committee would meet after the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) council meeting. The League council would meet 19-20 April.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Helsinki
10 April 1969

CPYRGHT

Nkp jyrkkänä stalinisteille: Skp:n jakaminen edesvastuutonta

Se, joka ryhtyy hajottamaan Skp:tä, ei ole Nkp:n ystävä eikä tunne vastuuta. Nämä terveiset esitti Neuvostoliiton kommunistisen puolueen (Nkp) politbyron jäsen Arvid P e l s h e Suomen kommunistisen puolueen (Skp) entisille ja nykyisille johtajille. Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystöön oli poikkeuksellisesti kutsuttu Skp:n nykyisen poliittisen toimikunnan lisäksi myös entinen.

Entisen poliittisen toimikunnan jäseninä olivat päivällispöydässä myös Skp:n opposition johtoryhmään kuuluvat Taisto S i n i s a l o ja Markus K a i n u l a i n e n. Heidän kerrottiin istuneen totisina Pelshen lukiessa huolellisesti valmistettua, useita liuskoja pitkää puheitaan.

Skp:n puheenjohtaja Arvo Saarinen, varapuheenjohtaja Erkki Salomaa ja pääsihteeri Arvo Aalto olivat myös läsnä suurlähettiläs A. E. Kovalevin tiistai-iltana tarjoamalla päivällisellä.

Skp:n edustajakokousta

seuranneen Nkp:n valtuuskunnan johtajan Pelshen puheen sävyn sanottiin olleen se, että edustajakokouksesta poistuneiden on viipymättä palattava emäpuolueeseen.

Stalinistileirin tunteiden kerrotaan jo viilentyneen edustajakokouksen jälkeen. Kiihkeimpiä kannanottoja kadutaan ja uuden puolueen perustamista pidetään varsin epätodennäköisenä. Tähän lienee Arvid Pelshen terveissillä ollut vaikutusta.

Skp:n oppositiolaitin kokousta valmistelevan toimikunnan on määrä kokoontua lähinäpäivinä. Kokouksen jär-

jestely on joutunut vastatuuleen: "Helsingistä ei ole löytynyt riittävän suurta vapaata salia", kerrottiin lehdellemme.

Kommunistipuolueen uusi pääsihteeri Arvo Aalto on optimistinen sovinnon mahdollisuuksista: "On hyvin todennäköistä, että nämä ongelmat selvitetään. Sovinnonhalua on ilmassa enemmän kuin edustajakokouksen aikana ja se luo suotuisan ilmapiirin", Aalto sanoi.

Skp:n 15. edustajakokous päättyi pääsiäisenä molempien kommunistileirien jyrkkiin erimielisyyksiin. Kult-

tuuritalosta lauantaina poistunut stalinistinen vähemmistö piti omaa kokouksiaan Koivossa.

Koivon kokouksen päätöseksi ilmoitettiin, että 26.-27. huhtikuuta pidetään koko maata käsittävä kommunistien kokous. Siinä on tarkoitus harkita uuden kommunistisen puolueen perustamista.

Varsinainen edustajakokous miehitti Skp:n johtopaikat puolueen linjaa kannattaneilla kommunisteilla; yksikään näkyvästi oppositiotoimintaan osallistunut stalinisti ei päässyt Skp:n johtoeleimiin.

CPYRGHT

KUNNAN KUNNIST, Helsinki
11 April 1969

NKP huolestunut SKP:n hajottamisen uhasta

Välttämättömyys saada aikaan yhtenäisyys Suomen kommunistisessa puolueessa korostui voimakkaasti niissä keskusteluissa, joita käytiin NKP:n edustajien kanssa jo Moskovassa ja myöhemmin edustajakokouksen aikana. Samoin todettiin, että puolueen hajotuksesta koituvat vaikeudet eivät jäisi vain sisäpoliittisiksi, vaan tilanne johtaisi myös ulkopoliittisiin ongelmiin, mainitsi SKP:n puheenjohtaja Aarne Saarinen esittäessään torstaina arvion

edustajakokoustahtumisista SKDL:n työvaliokunnalle. Kokouksessa ja sen aikana käydyissä keskusteluissa NKP:n valtuuskunta esitti kantanaan, että vähemmistöryhmän tulisi palata Koiton salista mukaan edustajakokoukseen, sanoi Saarinen.

Puheenjohtaja Saarinen totesi, että NKP:n valtuuskunnan johtaja Arvid Pelshe kosketti tilannetta myös puheessaan tilastana Neuvostoliiton tšekäläisessä suurlihetystössä järjestetyillä päivällisillä, jolle osallistuivat SKP:n poliittisen toimikunnan nykyiset ja entiset jäsenet. Tällöin Pelshe tois-

ti puheessaan, että SKP:n johdon linja on ollut oikea ja että tämä koskee myös puolueen uutta periaateohjelmaa, lähtäjän tavoiteohjelmaa ja päätöksä hallitusyhteistyöstä. Samoin hän ilmaisi puheessaan, ettei ole nähtävissä syytä puolueen hajottamiseen. Erinneisyyksiä eivät ratkaise hallinnolliset toimet, koska ne jatkuisivat kaikkea huolimatta.

Saarinen totesi selostuksessaan, että tähänastiseen tapaan ei voida jatkaa missään tapauksessa. Kurinpidolliset toimet ovat äärimmäisiä keinoja, kun jo kaikki muut on käytetty. Saarinen mainitsi että uusi keskuskomitea kokoontuu SKDL:n liittoneuvoston kokouksen jälkeen. Liittoneuvoston kokous pidetään 19-20. huhtikuuta.

Soviet Assails Views of Italian Communist Party

Special in The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 13.—Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, today sharply criticized the views of the Italian Communist party on one of the principal issues that divide the world Communist movement.

The criticism came in the form of a reply to an article printed last Wednesday in L'Unita, the Italian party daily. The article had questioned the Soviet contention that Mos-

cow, in its recent border clashes with Communist China, as well as in the invasion of Czechoslovakia last August, was representing the interests of the world Communist movement.

The article in L'Unita was written by Giuseppe Boffa, who usually presents the views of his party's leaders, particularly on relations between Italy's Communists and Communist countries.

Pravda accused Mr. Boffa of having demanded a new definition of the term "proletarian internationalism." Soviet use of the term to mean that it is the duty of the world's Communist parties to follow the Soviet lead in international relations.

Moscow defended the invasion of Czechoslovakia on the ground that communism had been endangered in Prague. Similarly, Moscow holds that in its military clashes with China on its eastern border, it

defends not only its own territory but also the cause of proletarian internationalism.

Observers believe that Moscow's decision to publicize its differences with leaders of the Italian party—the largest outside the Communist camp—indicates the depth of their differences as the June 5 conference of all Communist parties draws near.

Until now, Moscow has made no public comment on the divergencies.

L'UNITA, Rome
9 April 1969

CPYRGHT

"China Weighs Heavily, One Feels It"
by Guiseppe Boffa

Moscow, April--Throughout these recent weeks Soviet public opinion has been anxiously eyeing the country's eastern frontiers where the long border with China lies. It is a genuine concern. Any observer comes to realize it within a few hours. A few signs of nervousness in the streets--and I have seen more such signs that at any time in the past--suffice to reveal this concern at the beginning of March when, for the first time, it was learned that blood had been shed. Whereas no one among the better informed circles believes that graver dangers are imminent, among the "man in the street" there are those who fear the worst.

But let us clarify some points. Peking's claims over vast areas of Soviet territory are absolutely unjustified. There is little that is socialist in any territorial claim. This is particularly true when the territories in question are not inhabited by people of the claimant nation. And this is the case in the territories of the Soviet Far East, where there are in effect no Chinese and practically have never been any. The arguments of the unequal treaties, according to which those borders were fixed, is not convincing. On this basis one could, in fact, demand the revision of almost all frontiers in the world. Anyway, the Chinese themselves became aware that these treaties were unequal only in 1963 when they came into open conflict with the Soviets. Nor is there any validity in that other argument (which, in truth, even the Chinese themselves do not seem to use), according to which Chinese territory is too small for such a large population as that of the CPR. Quite apart from resembling other such dangerous theories, the fact is that there are in China enormous underpopulated areas where man's creative energy could be well applied. True, these areas are not all hospitable. But the same applies to the entire Asiatic area of the Soviet Union where the Soviets have invested colossal efforts and worked extremely hard to transform those lands in the past 50 years.

Despite these points in their favor, the Soviets have noticed with some embarrassment how during this very spring their position vis-a-vis the Chinese has become weaker, and particularly so from the viewpoint of the sympathy which international progressive opinion could have aroused for the Soviets. Why? Primarily because of the shock caused by the fact, in itself very grave, that such a conflict should have occurred between two large socialist countries which have both effected great revolutions of a socialist nature. But there are also more detailed reasons.

What has struck this time has been the Soviet difficulty in finding a socialist and positive reply to the Chinese claims. Let me explain. In 1963 Khrushchev was also faced with similar claims. Although some of his most serious errors were committed in the field of relations with China, Khrushchev knew then how to give a constructive

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answer, the capture of the borders. On that day all frontiers would disappear, that this was the communists' objective; but he also added that this could not be achieved by starting with an arbitrary shifting of existing frontiers, because this would open the way for a worldwide process which could culminate only in a general war. On this basis he then proceeded to propose negotiations which were at that time blocked by the prejudiced manner in which the Chinese asked that the existing treaties should be declared invalid--at least preliminarily and in principle.

This time, however, even before reaching the stage of a constructive offer to negotiate, Soviet propaganda has confined itself to getting excited about the theme of the "inviolable nature" of the "fatherland's sacred borders." This is certainly not the way to make an impression on leftwing opinion in the world, which is justly concerned about the very hypothesis of a possible Sino-Soviet conflict. To this have been added some absolutely deplorable voices such as that of the Soviet journalist who, addressing himself to the political forces of the West, went so far as to suggest in the Paris LE MONDE that the USSR is not defending only its own borders in the Far East. Irresponsible voice? Could be. However, it also indicates a certain climate and a certain mentality which is not that of one individual alone.

Let it be said that the support given to the Soviet positions in the ideological and political dispute with China by a large section of progressive world opinion, and by the communist movement in particular, has never been, nor could it have ever been support for the USSR as such and against China as such. And in my opinion, the reason it could not have been so has been explained excellently in a recent article by Comrade Carrillo, Spanish Communist Party secretary, who explained that the "unconditional defense of the USSR" was valid for the communist movement only when the Soviets were isolated and encircled by hostile countries. "Today," he added, "there are 13 socialist countries. When one of them--and it does not matter which one it is--finds itself in conflict with the imperialist camp, there are no problems and there can be no doubt as to the choice that must be made. But when there is a conflict, of whatever nature, between socialist countries, the question is no longer as clear and as simple. The old conditioned reflexes of the time when the Soviet Union was the only socialist country are no longer enough."

What, then, was the nature of the support given by so many parties (including the Spanish and Italian ones, among others) to the Soviet communists in their polemic with Peking? It was support primarily for a definite political line. To be quite clear about it, we could say briefly that it was support for the political line of the 20th CPSU Congress. It would be just as well, however, to recall some of the main points of that political line, points which were defended in the Peking polemic. They included, and still do, peaceful coexistence, understood not as a simple rejection of atomic war but as a struggle for a new system of international relations, a system particularly based on the peaceful resolving of controversies, noninterference, and respect for the sovereignty of others. They also included a confirmation of the need for socialist democracy and its continuous development; seen in this light, it included a criticism of Stalinism, its methods, and its consequences.

They included a new concept of relations between parties, a concept which was to do away with any residual idea of a leading center and would thus make room for the autonomy of every party in choosing its own path to socialism and its own model of socialism. That is what we Italian communists have been struggling for, and still are, in the international communist movement, and it seems to us that this is the path that must be followed, also in order to avoid the degeneration of disputes between socialist countries.

And precisely because these were the stakes, our polemic with the Chinese was also accompanied, as things developed, by criticism of what seemed to go against such a direction in the Soviet Union itself, a direction which was opened by the 20th CPSU Congress and for whose development we have always wished. But the real crisis of this direction happened in August 1969 as a result of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It suffices to read again what was written in Moscow and in other countries to justify

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the wrong decision (whose consequences have not been mitigated, as the more recent events have shown) to see that what was at stake were exactly those three points of the policy set forth by the 20th congress; that same policy in whose name the polemic with Chinese positions was conducted, that is, with positions which were explicitly in contradiction to that policy. The entire Soviet position with regard to China could only emerge seriously weakened.

These questions are not openly discussed in the USSR, either in the press or at party meetings. Nevertheless, they are talked about, although in more restricted circles. I myself have talked about such questions in Moscow. I do not know-- because it is rather difficult to measure--to what extent there is an awareness of the dilemmas which are facing Soviet policy so dramatically. What I have been able to ascertain is the bewildered feeling, at various levels, that grave dilemmas do exist. I think that the knowledge of the fact that, facing the conflicts between socialist states--which have all the characteristics of conflicts between states--it would serve public opinion of the left in the world nothing to simply take a position for one side and against the other, that this fact could help bring these dilemmas to maturity. It is far better to make an effort to discover the causes, so as to penetrate the contradictions, both theoretical and political, which are concealed behind them.

L'UNITA, Rome
9 April 1969

CPYRGHT

La Cina pesa, e lo si sente

Si registra ora, rispetto alla crisi del 1963, un'evidente difficoltà a trovare una risposta positiva, socialista, alle gravi rivendicazioni cinesi, e questa difficoltà si riflette anche su scala internazionale - Fatto è, come ha detto Santiago Carrillo, che « i vecchi riflessi condizionati del tempo in cui l'URSS era l'unico paese socialista non bastano più », e che l'appoggio alla polemica ideale con le posizioni di Pechino è stato innanzitutto, nel movimento comunista, appoggio alla linea politica elaborata dal XX Congresso

Dal nostro inviato

MOSCA, aprile.

In tutte queste ultime settimane l'opinione pubblica sovietica, dalla più amorfa alla più articolata, ha guardato con ansiosa preoccupazione alle frontiere orientali del paese, là dove è il lungo confine con la Cina. E' una preoccupazione sincera. Qualsiasi osservatore può rendersene conto in poche ore. Bastano alcuni episodi di nervosismo per le strade -- e ne ho visti più di quanti ne abbia visti in passato -- a rivelarlo. Per la prima volta, agli inizi di marzo, si è appreso che il sangue era stato versato. Se nei circoli più informati non si crede all'imminenza di pericoli più gravi, fra l'« uomo della strada » c'è invece chi teme il peggio. A questo punto vanno precisate alcune osservazioni. Le rivendicazioni che Pechino avanza su vaste porzioni di territorio sovietico sono assolutamente ingiuste. Qualsiasi rivendicazione territoriale ha ben poco di socialista. In particolare, questo è vero quando si rivendicano territori che non sono abitati da gente della propria nazione. E' questo il caso delle terre dell'Estremo oriente sovietico, dove effettivamente non vi sono cinesi e, in pratica, non vi sono mai stati. L'argomento dei trattati ineguali avrebbero fissato quel confine non è convincente. Allo stesso modo si potrebbe infatti richiedere la revisione di quasi tutte le frontiere del mondo. Gli stessi cinesi, del resto, si sono accorti che quei trattati erano ineguali solo dopo il 1963, quando sono entrati in aperto conflitto con i sovietici. Né può valere l'argomento per una popolazione tanto grande. A parte le somiglianze che ciò avrebbe con altre pericolose teorie, vi sono in realtà in Cina enormi regioni poco popolate, cui può benissimo applicarsi l'energia creatrice dell'uomo. Sono terre non sempre ospitate per tutta la parte asiatica dell'URSS, costituita da terre in cui proprio i sovietici negli ultimi cinquant'anni hanno investito energie colossali e durissimo lavoro per trasformarle. Ebbene, nonostante questi punti a loro favore, i sovietici hanno avvertito, magari confusamente, che proprio in questa primavera, la loro simpatia che nel loro con-

WASHINGTON POST
18 April 1968

Retention Of Reforms Is Pledged

By Kenneth Ames
Special to The Washington Post
PRAGUE, April 17—Al-

exander Dubcek, Czechoslovakia's national political hero since January, 1968, today was forced to resign as First Secretary of the Communist Party.

Dubcek, 47, was removed from the key Party post "at his own request" in the course of a plenum meeting of the Party Central Committee in Prague today. Elected in his place was another Slovak, Dr. Gustav Husak, 56, until now leader of the Slovakian Party.

Dubcek was forced into a position where he virtually had to resign after growing pressure from the Soviets and the conservative wing of the Party since the anti-Soviet demonstrations of March 28.

The announcement of changes was made tonight in a television appearance by President Ludvik Svoboda and Dr. Husak at the end of the first day's meeting of the 190-member Central Committee.

President Svoboda told a television audience: "We have been through many crises and experienced many difficulties. Provocative actions in recent weeks have hindered our efforts of many months and damaged the efforts of the Party, particularly in our relations with the Soviet Union."

Svoboda added: "The Central Committee is seeking ways out of the complicated situation. Comrade Dubcek has asked to be relieved of his post. The name of Dubcek will remain in our history. During the period of his work he has

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"Our present situation requires," President Svoboda continued, "an energetic First Secretary and Dr. Gustav Husak has been chosen. I know that Husak is an honest worker and ask for the trust of the people."

[AP reported the white-haired, bespectacled Husak told the television audience: "I beg you to keep calm and support the new leadership. We are not going to give up anything of the great ideas which in the past year have come into our public life."

[But, he added, "it will be necessary to determine how, when and in what order we can implement those ideas." He also warned that "some people imagine liberty is something without limits, but rules must be observed."]

The election of Husak to the top Party slot represents a concession to pressures which have been increasing from the Soviets and from the orthodox, left-wing elements of the Party.

It is significant that only a few hours earlier a statement was issued which virtually whitewashed 10 of these conservative members who had been under suspicion of collaborating with the Russians.

Husak, until now leader of the Slovak Party in Bratislava, has recently earned the reputation for being a Slovak nationalist and chauvinist. The newest joke in Prague tonight is that Husak will now change from being a Slovak nationalist to being a Czechoslovak nationalist.

It is generally conceded among Czechoslovaks that Dubcek was showing definite signs of falling down on the job. He has from the beginning been an extremely popular man but has never been mistaken for a strong or wily politician.

As some Czechs say, "He is too nice a guy for that. In fact he is just too nice period."

Husak has shown definite indications of knowing how to handle negotiations with the Russians.

There were strong security precautions today as the Central Committee met. Roads surrounding the Hradcany Castle above Prague were cordoned off and traffic diverted.

Police patrolled the surroundings and army trucks were kept in reserve to be used as road blocks against possible demonstrations. But a mere handful of 40 or 50 persons stood outside the palace gates as members of the Committee drove in.

Earlier it was announced that security forces had rounded up several thousand people in the country, the first action of this kind to be announced in many years, and had arrested persons suspected of being "anti-social and criminal" elements.

On television, Husak, a quiet, able speaker talking off the cuff, explained: "We believe it essential to request you not to cause a panic. For almost a year we have been trying to get out of a difficult situation and to produce the atmosphere for a calm life."

He added that one of the Central Committee resolutions was the election of a new Party Chairman and First Secretary.

At the same time, in response to Soviet pressure, the Party presidium has been reduced from 21 to 11 members, with the exclusion of the leading reformist Josef Smrkovsky and a number of other liberals. Apart from Smrkovsky, the original quartet of reformers remains intact. Oldrich Cernik, head of the Czechoslovak government, Svoboda and Dubcek stay as members of the smaller party presidium.

[A report carried by the Bulgarian news agency BTA, which could not be confirmed, said the new presidium's members would be: Husak, Cernik, Dubcek, Svoboda, union leader Karel Polacek, National Front chairman Evzen Erban, Slovak Premier Stefan Sadovsky, conservative Czech Party Bureau head Lubomir Strougal, conservative leader Vasil Bilak, former Interior Minister Jan Pillar and Federal Assembly

Chairman Peter Colotka.] Today's announced changes made this a turning point in the recent political history of Czechoslovakia. It was the moment which many Czechs have been awaiting since the August invasion, to see if the two leading figures of the 1968 progressive policy would be quietly dropped or shoved into the sidelines.

The immediate Party problem is now to make the new set-up palatable to the trade unions, the intellectuals and the students—all of whom have recently been united in a front against erosion of reformist policy.

Husak told the nation tonight in his first television appearance as party leader, "Our main task is to lead the country out of the crisis situation and return to a normal life, solving our problems with the Soviet Union."

[Reuters reported that Prague was tense but outwardly calm tonight after the announcement. City police, reinforced by blue-uniformed provincial police and troops, appeared on the streets in increasing numbers.]

A communique issued after the Central Committee meeting stated that Dubcek would be moving into "a high state function." It was assumed by officials that this meant chairmanship of the Federal Assembly.

Referring to the appointment of Husak to succeed Dubcek, the communique said, "We are convinced that in his new function he will do all possible to avoid repeating the practices and injustices of the 50's."

In a separate appeal to workers, the Party committee asked for maintenance of law and order and referred to "opposition elements which abused freedom."

There has been "serious danger from rightist forces which would bring us into a power conflict. The developments of the past weeks have made the situation unbearable," it said in a clear reference to the rift which had developed in the Party leadership on the Soviet occupation,

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DUBCEK IS OUSTED AS PRAGUE YIELDS TO THE RUSSIANS

To Remain in Party's Ruling Presidium — Husak Gets First Secretary's Post

SUCCESSOR URGES CALM

He Promises to Work for Liberalization as Soon as Present Crisis Ends

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times
PRAGUE, April 17—Alexan-

der Dubcek, who led Czechoslovakia's efforts for liberalization under communism, fell from power tonight.

The Communist party's Central Committee, yielding to Soviet pressure, named Gustav Husak, the 56-year-old leader of the Slovak party, to succeed Mr. Dubcek as First Secretary of the national Czechoslovak party.

Mr. Husak, who was arrested in 1951 in a Stalinist purge and spent nine years in prison, said that Mr. Dubcek would remain in a "high responsible position." Mr. Dubcek pledged himself to work for liberalization once the country emerged from the crisis set in motion by the Soviet-led invasion last August.

[The Bulgarian press agency said Mr. Dubcek would remain a member of the party's new ruling 11-member Presidium and Josef Smrkovsky, deputy chairman of the National Assembly, would be

dropped from the ruling party body.]

Svoboda Announces Shift

President Ludvik Svoboda announced the decision of the Central Committee on television tonight and appealed to the public to remain calm. He said that the 47-year-old Mr. Dubcek had "asked to be relieved of his post" and urged the public to give their support to Mr. Husak, whom General Svoboda described as "honest, experienced and farsighted."

"The name of Comrade Dubcek," the 73-year-old President said, "will be permanently linked in all our minds with the post-January policy of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia."

This is the policy of liberal reform initiated in January, 1968, when Mr. Dubcek succeeded Antonin Novotny, the Stalinist leader who had ruled for 11 years.

The Central Committee, still in session, also voted to establish a new ruling Presidium, but the names of its members were not disclosed immediately. Mr. Husak, appearing on television after President Svoboda, said the new leadership was intended to end disunity in the Presidium.

Mr. Husak was the second Slovak to assume leadership of this binational country since the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Mr. Dubcek, too, was First Secretary of the Slovak party, from 1963 to January, 1968, before becoming the leader of all of Czechoslovakia.

President Svoboda and Mr. Husak took note of the possibilities of public protests against the departure of Mr. Dubcek, who had become a popular Communist leader. Despite Mr. Dubcek's efforts to bend with the demands from Moscow after the August invasion, he remained at the top of the popularity polls.

Accordingly, this was a sad

dened country as the two leaders went on television to announce what citizens had begun to fear would happen, first after the invasion and then after the anti-Soviet riots that erupted following a Czechoslovak ice-hockey victory over the Russians last month.

"Keep calm," Mr. Husak said. "Preserve peace. Support this course. We expect the wide participation of the masses, of every citizen in creating our policy, in its realization and its control."

"We are not giving up on any fundamental principles of our post-January policy. But we have to know what to do and when."

It remained to be seen whether strikes and demonstrations would be called by students, intellectual groups and reform-minded trade unions. Tonight in Wenceslas Square, a small crowd of about 100 had gathered at the statue at St. Wenceslas, the informal memorial to those who died during the invasion. Police cars were patrolling the square.

In appealing for support, President Svoboda noted that the current crisis had resulted from extremists "who caused great damage to our country" in the anti-Soviet rioting last month.

Declaring that "we have had only a few hopeful and pleasant days," he urged the "majority of honorable journalists, representatives of culture and science, the intelligentsia and trade unions and youth" to "have nothing in common" with what he called the extremist forces.

The bespectacled Mr. Husak put the appeal with more bluntness.

"Some people think that freedom has no limits, no restrictions," he declared, and I would say that they would want some elements of anarchy in it. But in every orderly state there must be some rules of play. Laws must be kept. Social, party and civil discipline observed. And there must be stress on honest work."

Once the country is out of the crisis, he said, the party will move to carry out such liberal demands as another party congress and elections to the National Assembly.

With those comments, Mr.

Husak was apparently trying to strengthen his position with the reform-minded groups, which have been supporting Mr. Dubcek in his efforts to transform Czechoslovakia into a liberal Communist state.

Though considered a friend of the liberals at the height of the reform movement, Mr. Husak is now generally regarded as more likely than Mr. Dubcek to compromise with Moscow and continue with the restraints imposed under Soviet pressure after last month's violence.

Liberals first turned cool to Mr. Husak shortly after the invasion because he joined with conservatives in declaring illegal the results of the 14th party congress held secretly during the invasion to chose a liberal-minded Presidium.

An articulate, lifelong Communist, Mr. Husak has risen to power rapidly. He became one of four deputy Premiers under Premier Oldrich Cernik during last year's liberalization and, after the August invasion, took over as Slovak party leader from the Vasil Bilak, who had been out of favor for his support of Moscow.

Until after the invasion, Mr. Husak was not even a member of the National Central Committee that elected him today as First Secretary. In recent months, he was regarded generally as one of the three officials who controlled levers of power. The two others are Premier Cernik and Lubomir Strougal, a leader of the party for the Czech Republic of Czechoslovakia.

New Presidium Listed

SOFIA, April 17 (AP)—The Bulgarian press agency said the new 11-member Presidium of the Czechoslovak party was made up of Gustav Husak, Oldrich Cernik, Alexander Dubcek, Exzen Erban, Stefan Sadoyski, Ludvik Svoboda, Lubomir Strougal, Karel Polacek, Vasil Bilak, Jan Piller and Peter Colotka.

Mr. Polacek, liberal trade union leader, and Mr. Colotka, liberal chairman of the National Assembly, are new full members of the Presidium.

Among those dropped from the old 21-member Presidium were Josef Smrkovsky, deputy chairman of the National Assembly.

18 April 1969

Czech Backdown Laid To Efforts of Grechko

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, April 18 (Fri-
day)

With the deposition of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia the marshals of the Soviet army have manifested the greatest political power they have ever enjoyed in Communist Russia.

Marshal Andrei Grechko, the 66-year-old Defense Minister brought about in Prague what the Soviet Communist Party Politburo Secretariat and a host of Party and government envoys high and low were unable to do at conferences in Dresden Moscow Karlovy Vary Clerna Bratislava Prague Kiev and elsewhere over the past year.

Grechko's ultimatum to Czechoslovak President Ludvik Svoboda last week forced the rehabilitation of discredited Czechoslovak Soviet agents the ouster of Dubcek and liberal hero Josef Smrkovsky and the admission that last spring's Czechoslovak renaissance was a "counter-revolution." Grechko thus completed the political job that a half million Warsaw Pact soldiers commanded by his deputy Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky began with the invasion last August 20.

Grechko came to Czechoslovakia unaccompanied by any leader or official of Soviet Communist Party. He moved on to East Berlin to deal as an equal with Communist Party chiefs of occupied East Germany and Poland Walter Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka.

Even before this week's decisive "second round" in Prague, one of the highest leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party was telling visitors: "Do not overestimate the influence of such politicians as Andrei Kirilanko, Pyotr Shelest or even Alexei Kosygin. The political summit in the Soviet

Union today is composed of Brezhnev, Grechko and Yakubovsky and nobody else matters."

The Soviet army has been on almost continuous maneuvers in Eastern Europe for nearly a year, while the Soviet military budget has increased some 25 per cent

made the situation unbearable," it said in a clear reference to the rift which had developed in the Party leadership on the Soviet occupation, since 1967. Russia, according to London's Institute of Strategic Studies, has pulled even with the U.S. in the missile race, and new Soviet rocket tests have been announced for the Pacific next month.

Meanwhile, the Party Central Committee—theoretically the country's leading force—has been meeting less and less frequently, with virtually none of its debates ever made public. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Central Committee has met only once—briefly, late last October, ostensibly to hear a report on agriculture. (Preceding the meeting, there had been widespread rumors of resignations in the Politburo.)

Another Central Committee meeting may take place next week, to ratify the "Prague triumph," but there has been no confirmation so far. Nor has a date yet been set for the 24th Party congress.

Ironically, the Soviet marshal's Prague triumph today came on the 75th birthday of Nikita Khrushchev, the man who first called in the army to act as the final arbiter of inter-Party conflict. In 1957, the support of Marshal Georgi Zhukov and other army leaders enabled Khrushchev to overthrow a 7-to-4 Politburo majority and oust Georgi Malenkov, Vy-

acheslav Molotov and other foes. Zhukov was removed shortly afterwards, but the army's support cost Khrushchev dearly later on.

In 1960, the military influence committed Khrushchev to a doctrine of support for "wars of liberation" which helped doom prospects for the Paris Big Four summit conference even before the ill-fated U-2 incident. A glowering Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the new Defense Minister, accompanied Khrushchev to Paris to be sure that the agile premier did not strike a bargain with President Eisenhower, whom Khrushchev publicly had proclaimed to be "a man of peace."

In 1962 the military undoubtedly helped plunge Khrushchev into his greatest gamble—the installation of offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev was compelled to use extraordinary means of personal diplomacy to end the crisis by compromise with President Kennedy.

The new regime moved swiftly to supply arms aid to North Vietnam—on which Khrushchev had turned his back—and to accelerate the arms race with the United States.

The army entered last year's Czechoslovak crisis early. A group of leading Soviet marshals toured the country in May, and soon after large Red Army units entered for "maneuvers," which did not end until the apparent political compromise reached in Clerna last July 31. The army returned in force, however, three weeks later.

In 1964, the marshals remained neutral, at the very least, as Khrushchev was swiftly overthrown. He was replaced by Brezhnev, who had never joined his predecessor's unsuccessful cam-

paign to reduce the armed forces, curb the "metal eaters" of the Soviet Defense

Ministry, or thin out the Red Army occupation establishment in East Germany and Eastern Europe.

The new regime moved swiftly to supply arms aid to North Vietnam—on which Khrushchev had turned his back—and to accelerate the arms race with the United States. The role of the army and its intelligence services in bringing on the June, 1967, Mideast war remains to be clarified.

In a key test of strength two years ago, the marshals prevented the selection of Dmitri Ustinov to become a "Soviet McNamara" and chose Grechko as Defense Minister after Malinovsky's death.

Historically-minded Communists here-recalled how the late Joseph Stalin had defeated Leon Trotsky in the 1920s by stressing the danger of "Bonapartism."

Trotsky, although a professional revolutionary and intellectual, had organized and led the Red Army to victory in the Russian civil war. Stalin and his allies had stressed the parallel with the French Revolution, when a conservative Directory, or collective leadership, proved incapable of ruling and gave way to the victorious general of empire, Napoleon Bonaparte, who reconciled the remaining rhetoric of the revolution with the restoration of large elements of the old autocratic regime.

Marx had analyzed these developments in great detail, and until the last decade it was a primary article of faith that the army be kept under firm Party control. Some non-Soviet Communists, however, compare the present Soviet leadership to the old French Directory.

fronti poteva...
progressista internaziona-
le. Perché? Innanzitutto, per
la scossa che questa ha avu-
to dal fatto, di per sé gra-
vissimo, che un simile con-
flitto potesse aprirsi fra due
grandi paesi, i quali hanno
fatto entrambi grandi rivoluzi-
oni di carattere socialista.
Ma vi sono anche ragioni
più circostanziate.

Ciò che ha colpito questa
volta è stata la difficoltà da
parte sovietica di trovare
una risposta positiva, socialis-
ta, alle rivendicazioni cinesi.
Mi spiego. Nel 1963 lo
stesso Krusciov si trovò di
fronte ad analoghe richie-
ste. Egli, che pure aveva
commesso i suoi sbagli più
seri nei rapporti con la Cina,
seppe allora indicare una
risposta costruttiva, capace
di trovare più larghi consen-
si. In sostanza egli disse
che tutte le frontiere un
giorno avrebbero dovuto spari-
re nel mondo, che questo
era l'obiettivo cui puntavano
i comunisti, ma che questo
traguardo non poteva essere
raggiunto cominciando a spo-
stare arbitrariamente i con-
fini esistenti, perché ciò
avrebbe aperto un processo
mondiale che poteva culmi-
nare solo in una guerra ge-
neralizzata. Su questa base
propose già allora trattative,
che furono poi bloccate dal-
la pregiudiziale con cui i ci-
nesi chiedevano di invalidare
— prelliminarmente e almeno
in linea di principio — i trat-
tati esistenti.

Questa volta, prima che si
arrivasse all'offerta costrut-
tiva di negoziati, la propa-
ganda sovietica si è limitata
ad esaltare il tema del « ca-
rattere inviolabile » dei « sa-
crali confini della patria ». Si-
milli accenti non sono certo
tali da toccare nel mondo
un'opinione pubblica di sini-
stra, che è giustamente co-
sternata dalla sola ipotesi di
un possibile conflitto cino-so-

qualche voce assolutamente
depliorevole, come quella di
un giornalista sovietico, il
quale è arrivato a suggerire
a Parigi sul *Monde*, rivolgen-
dosi alle forze politiche del-
l'Occidente, che l'URSS dif-
fende in Estremo Oriente
non solo le sue frontiere.
Voce irresponsabile? Può
darsi. Purtroppo essa è an-
che indicativa di un certo
clima e di una mentalità
che non è quella di un solo
individuo.

Va detto che l'appoggio
dato alle posizioni sovietiche
nel contrasto ideologico e po-
litico con la Cina da una
gran parte dell'opinione pro-
gressista nel mondo — e, in
particolare, del movimento
comunista — non è mai sta-
to, nè poteva essere, un ap-
poggio all'URSS in quanto
tale contro la Cina. Perché
non potesse esserlo è stato
spiegato, a mio parere in
modo eccellente, in un suo
recente scritto dal compagno
Carrillo, segretario del Par-
tito comunista spagnolo, il
quale spiegava come la « di-
fesa incondizionata » dell'U-
nione Sovietica valesse per
il movimento comunista so-
lo quando i sovietici erano
isolati e accerchiati da pae-
si ostili. « Oggi — egli ag-
giungeva — ci sono tredici
Stati socialisti. Quando uno
di essi — qualunque esso sia
— si trova in conflitto col
campo imperialista, non ci
sono problemi e la scelta
non presenta dubbi. Ma
quando il conflitto, di qual-
siasi indole, sorge fra gli
stessi Stati socialisti, la co-
sa non è più così semplice
e chiara. I vecchi riflessi
condizionati del tempo in cui
l'URSS era l'unico paese so-
cialista non bastano più ».

Che cosa è stato dunque
l'appoggio che tanti partiti
— quello spagnolo come quel-

lo italiano, ed altri — non
no dato ai comunisti sovieti-
ci nella polemica con Pechi-
no? Ebbene, è stato innanz-
itutto l'appoggio ad una de-
terminata linea politica. Per
intenderci, potremmo dire
brevemente che è stato l'ap-
poggio alla politica del XX
congresso. Ma sarà bene ri-
cordare sommariamente qua-
li erano i capisaldi di que-
sta politica che venivano dife-
si nella discussione con
Pechino. Essi erano e sono
la coesistenza pacifica, intesa
non come semplice rifiuto
della guerra atomica, ma
come lotta per un nuovo si-
stema di rapporti internazio-
nali, fondati principalmente
sulla soluzione pacifica delle
controversie, sulla non inge-
renza e sul rispetto della so-
vrannità altrui. Essi erano
inoltre l'affermazione della
necessità di una democrazia
socialista, di un suo continuo
sviluppo e, in questa luce,
la critica allo stalinismo, ai
suoi metodi e alle sue con-
seguenze. Infine, essi erano
una nuova concezione dei
rapporti fra i partiti, che
sopprimesse ogni residua
idea di un centro dirigente,
e facesse quindi posto alla
autonomia di ogni partito
nella scelta della propria
via al socialismo e del pro-
prio modello di socialismo.
Per questo ci siamo battuti
e ci battiamo, nel movi-
mento internazionale, noi co-
munisti italiani: tale ci sem-
bra, tra l'altro, essere la via
per evitare che anche i con-
trasti fra paesi socialisti pos-
sano degenerare.

Proprio perché tale era la
posta in gioco, la nostra po-
lemica con i cinesi si è ac-
compagnata via via anche
con la critica di ciò che nel-
l'URSS ci sembrava e ci
sembra andare contro quella
direzione, aperta dal XX con-
gresso, di cui abbiamo sem-
pre auspicato l'approfondi-

no stati questi passi indietro
noi lo abbiamo detto. Ma la
vera crisi di questo indiriz-
zo è stata determinata nel-
l'agosto scorso dall'interven-
to in Cecoslovacchia. Basta
rileggere ciò che si è scrit-
to a Mosca e in altri paesi
per giustificare quella tragi-
ca decisione (le cui conse-
guenze, come gli avvenimen-
ti più recenti hanno dimo-
strato, sono ben lungi dal-
l'essere attenuate) per ve-
dere come fossero messi in
gioco proprio quei tre capi-
saldi della politica del XX
congresso, la stessa in no-
me della quale si era condot-
ta la polemica con le posi-
zioni cinesi, che ad essa erano
esplicitamente contrarie. Tut-
ta la posizione sovietica an-
che nei confronti della Ci-
na non poteva non risultarne
seriamente indebolita.

Di questi temi nell'URSS
oggi non si discute apertamente,
nè sulla stampa nè
nelle riunioni di partito. E-
ppure se ne parla, magari in
circoli più ristretti. Io stesso
ho discusso a Mosca.
Non so — perché è ben difficile
misurarli — fin dove
vi sia consapevolezza dei di-
lemmi che si pongono dram-
maticamente alla politica so-
vietica. Quello che io ho po-
tuto constatare è la confusa
sensazione, a diversi livelli,
dell'esistenza di dilemmi gra-
vi. Alla loro maturazione
credo possa contribuire la
costatazione che per l'opinione
pubblica di sinistra nel
mondo a nulla servirebbe —
di fronte a conflitti fra Stati
socialisti, che dei conflitti
fra Stati hanno tutte le ca-
ratteristiche — prendere sem-
plicitemente posizione per una
parte contro l'altra. Meglio
sforzarsi di scoprirne le cause
per venire a capo delle
contraddizioni, teoriche e po-
litiche, che dietro di esse
si celano.

Giuseppe Boffa

Pravda

13 April 1969

"Darkening a Clear Day"

by

I. Ivanov

CPYRGHT

As usual the world press devotes extensive commentaries to bloody
provocations by Maoists on the Ussuri River. These commentaries are of
course different. The imperialist press is engaged in searching for
something in favor of their masters. And why not! "the old red flag is
completely turn," exclaimed with malice a certain Karl Grobe in West

Germany's Frankfurter Rundschau. "Mao Tse-tung presumably was instrumental
in the rupture with the Soviet (only Soviet?—I.I.) form of Communism"

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The Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
 conclusions

Life says: "We should think about the perspectives that this Soviet-Chinese dispute opens for the West. America's interests demand this." And Life calls on the US to make a "unilateral first step" in establishing cooperation with Mao. It is clear from this magazine article that the logic of class war is being revealed.

On the other hand, the press of the progressive forces, led by the communist press, is indignant about the treacherous activities of the Peking leaders. Those in Peking only butter the bread of the enemies by resorting to armed provocations against a socialist state.

The press of socialist countries, the press of communist parties in capitalist countries, and the press of young states that consider the Soviet Union and other socialist countries their loyal friends angrily condemn the aggression of Mao's group. This is easy to understand. Here it is also possible to see the logic of class struggle.

It is much more difficult, however, to understand some journalists who seek to place themselves above the melee and to argue in general whether it is worthwhile supporting the party that was attacked. There are not many of these, and they could be ignored if among them were not included a contributor to the Italian communist paper, Comrade Giuseppe Boffa, who published an article on 9 April, under a strange, ostensibly neutral heading, "The Chinese are Exerting Pressure, and It is Being Felt."

Comrade Boffa admits that Peking's territorial pretensions are absolutely unjustified. Indeed, he also admits that any sort of territorial claim has little to do with socialism. Comrade Boffa immediately forgets this, however, and turns all his ardor against the CPSU. Yes, you understood perfectly. Comrade Boffa considers the present moment most suitable to darken the serene sky. You see, to begin with, immediately after the perfidious attack by the Maoists on our border guards, Soviet propaganda limited itself only to exalting the theme of the inviolability of the sacrosanct frontiers of the motherland.

Such statements, writes Comrade Boffa with the tone of a mentor, certainly cannot receive the approval of leftwing world public opinion. Did you hear that? What do you expect, dear sir, that we should renounce the defense of our brothers? And do you believe that in that case, leftwing world opinion, in whose name you claim to speak with astonishing courage, would have understood us? We wish to be sincere. You know very well that progressive world opinion actually esteems and supports our people precisely because, while defending just positions in international relations, they also know how to defend their own borders and to deliver a crushing blow to any aggressor.

In the second place, Comrade Boffa is indignant that a Soviet journalist in an article released by NOVOSTI and printed in the Parisian paper Le Monde observed that the Soviet Union is not defending merely Soviet borders in the Far East. "What is this?" He exclaims, "An irresponsible statement?" Actually, it is Comrade Boffa's statement that is irresponsible. He should not forget that the Soviet people defended not only their own freedom and independence, but also the freedom and independence of other peoples in the battles against fascism during World War II. And also today, the Soviet people are devotedly fighting for the cause of the freedom of the peoples and for peace in the world.

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borders of our country, Soviet soldiers are acting in the interests of all
peace-loving peoples.

And there is another important observation: Every communist keeps in his heart the idea of proletarian internationalism. Its importance is well understood by the working men of all countries, and in particular by Comrade Boffa's fellow countrymen, who remember the Soviet people's role in the destruction of the fascist regime in their country as well.

The Soviets also remember the fraternal aid that the Italian workers rendered to our country during the tempestuous half century following the October Revolution. Now Comrade Boffa is trying to argue that the time may have come to reexamine the question of proletarian internationalism. Referring to the observation made by Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party Carrillo that today the old beliefs dating back to the time when the Soviet Union was the only socialist country are no longer sufficient, he purses his lips and concludes that at present support for the Soviet Union should be determined within the framework of a given political direction. What direction is meant?

He claims that he is a supporter of the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress--as though there were communists who question these decisions-- Comrade Boffa cites the following: peaceful coexistence, confirmation of the necessity for socialist democracy, and finally a new concept of the relations between parties based on the renunciation of the idea of the existence of a directing center. And is that all? Yes, that is all. It is precisely in that, he states, that the way is to be found that will make it possible to avoid the intensification of differences between the socialist countries.

And Comrade Boffa adds: precisely because this was at stake, our argument with the Chinese gradually reduced itself to a criticism of those same phenomena in the Soviet Union--which it seemed to us and still seems to us--that are contrary to that trend. And here, he immediately refers to the intervention in Czechoslovakia. So it came to that! As we say, Comrade Boffa began praying for health, but finished praying for the dead. He began with an expression of sympathy for the Soviet people, but finished by blaming them for the "interference".

Comrade Boffa, it is a dangerous thing to forget the principles of proletarian internationalism, which imperatively oblige all revolutionaries to close ranks, compactly and firmly, every time that danger emerges. This occurred in Czechoslovakia, where the rightwing and the counterrevolutionary forces formed a bloc with external imperialist reaction. The fraternal aid of the socialist and allied countries was rushed there to defend socialist gains. It also occurred in the region of Damanskiy Island on the Ussuri River, where the Chinese soldiers, operating on Mao's directives, opened fire on their Soviet brothers.

We could explain all this to Comrade Boffa privately, so to speak, without using the pages of Pravda for this purpose. The fact is, however, that he printed his confused thoughts in the Italian Communist Party paper L'Unita. Everyone who has the Marxist-Leninist unity of our movement at heart will understand that it was impossible to leave such a public statement without a published reply.

PRAVDA
13 April 1969

CPYRGHT

РЕПЛИКА

ТЕМЬ НА ЯСНЫЙ ДЕНЬ

Мировая печать по-прежнему посвящает обильные комментарии кровавым провокациям маоистов на реке Уссури. Комментарии, конечно, различные.

Печать империалистов ищет выгоды для своих хозяев. Еще был «Старое красное знамя» окончательно разорвано, — зло радно воскликнул 8 апреля некий Карл Гробе в западногерманской газете «Франкфуртер рундschau». — Мао Цзэ-дун сам лично (!) осуществил разрыв с советской (только ли с советской? — И. И.) формой коммунизма». А американский журнал «Лайф» в номере от 11 апреля спешит сделать практические выводы: «Интересы Америки требуют, чтобы мы задумались над возможностями, которые открывает перед Западом этот советско-китайский конфликт». И «Лайф» призывает США «в одностороннем порядке» сделать «первый шаг» к установлению сотрудничества с Мао.

Тут все ясно: действует логика классовой борьбы.

Печать прогрессивных сил, и прежде всего коммунистов, выражает гнев и возмущение предательской акцией пекинских правителей, которые на радость врагам предприняли пооруженные провокации против соседнего социалистического государства. Пресса социалистических стран, коммунистических и капиталистических стран, молодых национальных государств так называемого «третьего мира», видящих в СССР и других социалистических государствах своих искренних друзей, клеймит агрессивные действия группы Мао.

И тут все ясно: действует логика классовой борьбы.

Куда труднее понять некоторых журналистов, пытающихся встать «над схваткой» и рассуждать о том, стоит ли вообще поддерживать того, на кого было совершено нападение? Таких немного, и на них можно было бы не обращать внимания, если бы в числе их не оказался сотрудник итальянской коммунистической газе-

ты тов. Джузеппе Боффа, опубликовавший 9 апреля статью под странным, внешне сугубо нейтральным заголовком: «Китай оказывает давление. — это чувствуется».

Тов. Боффа признает, что территориальные претензии Пекина «совершенно неоправданны». Больше того, он соглашается, что «любые территориальные притязания имеют мало общего с социализмом». Но тут же тов. Боффа забывает об этом и весь пыл своего красноречия обращает... против КПСС и Советского Союза.

Да, да, вы не ослышались: тов. Боффа считает свой момент вполне подходящим, чтобы навести тень на ясный день.

Вот послушайте: во-первых, сразу же после вероломного нападения маоистов на наших пограничников «советская пропаганда ограничилась (?) лишь прославлением темы «нерушимости священных границ родины». Подобные заявления, — наставительно пишет тов. Боффа, — несомненно, не могут вызвать отклик в левой мировой общественности». Какое? Что же вы предпочитаете, уважаемый, — чтобы мы отказались от защиты своих границ? И вы думаете, что в этом случае «левая мировая общественность», от имени которой вы с такой удивительной смелостью пытаетесь выступать, поняла бы нас?

Полноте, вам прекрасно известно, что в действительности мировая прогрессивная общественность уважает и поддерживает наш народ именно потому, что он, отстаивая справедливые позиции в международных отношениях, умеет защищать и свои границы, давая сокрушительный отпор любому агрессору.

Во-вторых, у тов. Боффа вызвало гнев то обстоятельство, что один советский журналист в статье, распространенной Агентством печати «Новости» и напечатанной в парижской газете «Мондо», заметил, по его словам, что Советский Союз защищает на Дальнем Востоке не только советские границы. «Что это?» — восклицает он, —

Безответственное заявление? В действительности безответственным является вопрос тов. Боффа. Ему не следовало бы забывать о том, как защищал советский народ не только свою свободу и независимость, но также свободу и независимость других народов в битвах против фашизма во второй мировой войне. И ныне советский народ последовательно отстаивает дело свободы народов и всеобщего мира. Давая отпор маоистским провокациям на рубежах нашей страны, советские воины действуют в интересах всех миролюбивых народов.

И еще одно важное замечание. Каждому коммунисту дорога идея пролетарского интернационализма. Ее значение хорошо понятно людям труда всех стран, и в частности соотечественникам тов. Боффа, которые помнят о роли советского народа в уничтожении фашистского режима и на их родине. Советские люди также помнят о той братской помощи, которую оказывали нашей стране итальянские трудящиеся на протяжении бурного полувека после Октября.

Сейчас тов. Боффа пытается дать понять, будто пришло время пересмотреть вопрос о пролетарском интернационализме. Ссылаясь на замечание секретаря Компартии Испании Каррильо о том, что нынче «старых положений, обусловленных тем временем, когда СССР был единственной социалистической страной, уже недостаточно», он делает ловкий вольт и заключает, что теперь поддержка Советского Союза должна проводиться в рамках... «определенного политического курса».

Что же это за курс? Ссылаясь на то, что он — за решения XX съезда КПСС (как будто бы есть коммунисты, которые ставят эти решения под сомнение!), тов. Боффа перечисляет: «мирное сосуществование», «подтвержденно необходимость социалистической демократии» и, наконец, «новая концепция отношений между партиями, основанная на отказе от идеи о

существовании руководящего центра».

И это все? Все! Именно в этом, утверждает он, «путь, позволяющий предотвратить усугубление разногласий между социалистическими странами». И, добавляет тов. Боффа, «именно потому, что такова была ставка в игре(?), наша полемика с китайцами постепенно стала сочетаться с критикой всех тех явлений в Советском Союзе, которые, как нам казалось и кажется (!), идут вразрез с этим направлением». И тут же он приплел... «вмешательство в Чехословакию».

— Вот те и на! Как говорится, начал тов. Боффа за здравие — кончил за упокой. Начал с сочувствия советским людям по поводу «давления Китая», а кончил обвинением их самих во «вмешательстве». Эх, товарищ Боффа, опасное это дело — забвение принципов пролетарского интернационализма, которые властно диктуют всем революционерам необходимость выступать сплоченно и непоколебимо всякий раз, когда на горизонте вырисовывается опасность, — будь то в Чехословакии, где правые, контрреволюционные силы сблизивались с внешней империалистической реакцией, где понадобилась братская помощь союзных социалистических стран для защиты социалистических завоеваний; будь то в районе острова Даманского на Уссури, где китайские солдаты, действовавшие по указке Мао, открыли огонь по своим советским братьям.

Все это мы могли бы разъяснить тов. Боффа, так сказать, в приватном порядке, не используя для этого страницы «Правды», но дело в том, что свои путаные рассуждения он напечатал в газете Итальянской компартии «Унита». Каждый, кому дорого марксистско-ленинское единство нашего движения, поймет, что оставлять публичные выступления такого рода без публичного ответа невозможно.

И. ИВАНОВ.

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May 1969

THE FORGOTTEN WAR IN LAOS

While military action in Vietnam and political maneuvering in Paris dominate the headlines, a war goes on in neighboring Laos, a war that persists in spite of the Geneva Accords and great nation guarantees of independence and neutrality. For most of the free world Laos has been a matter of almost subliminal concern -- crowded out by Vietnam, the Middle East, the events in Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet clashes. And in the meantime the Communist Pathet Lao, led and bolstered by North Vietnamese troops, has gained control of at least half the territory of Laos. The Communist forces do not yet control half the population, although the long, wearing struggle has rendered the Laotian people and economy anemic, its youth cynical and many of its leaders corrupt.

From 1964 through 1967, the military situation in the field at least looked hopeful and Government forces were able to maintain the military initiative and provide protection against the Communists for most non-Communist elements of the population. But in 1968 the number of North Vietnamese regulars (Peoples' Army of Vietnam - PAVN) in Laos reached 40,000 and the Communist forces were able to inflict a series of shattering military setbacks on the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) forces. Governmental defeats on the battlefield not only wiped out many of the earlier territorial gains, but also badly eroded the confidence of the political and military establishment. The start of the Paris negotiations to end the war in Vietnam gave many Laotians a psychological breather in May 1968, but they felt so badly deceived when their hopes for a speedy end to the war were dashed that the general loss in fighting spirit intensified on the home front and battlefield alike.

Despite the military edge they are believed to enjoy, the Communist forces have let pass many recent opportunities to seize governmental garrisons and important towns by frontal attack. They seem instead to be trying to force the RLG to evacuate towns and garrisons of strategic or psychological importance without a pitched battle, the ultimate objective being to enable the Pathet Lao to quietly win more territorial control and therefore more leverage for political bargaining with Premier Souvanna Phouma. (Phouma's neutralists hold eight of the RLG's sixteen cabinet posts under the 1962 Geneva Accords and, although he could not allow the Pathet Lao much more power and hope to survive, he could probably add two to their present four Cabinet posts on condition that the North Vietnamese forces withdraw from Laos.)

Of course, a political settlement with its native Communists would by no means solve Laos' security problems because the ambitions of other nearby Communist powers must also be considered. China has been looking hungrily at Laos for a long time. The Soviet Union also has a lively interest in Laos. Under the terms of the Geneva Accords the Soviet Union and Great Britain are Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Convention on Laos and Moscow tries to appear to be the responsible mediator. It is suspected, however, that the Soviets are more interested in increasing their influence

over the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) which is the political organization of the Pathet Lao, than in establishing any serious dialogue between the NLHS and the RLG aimed at a political settlement. Certainly the recent affair of Soviet Ambassador to Laos, Viktor Minin, hints at this possibility. In February, Minin, with Souvanna Phouma's agreement, traveled to the NLHS stronghold in Sam Neua to talk with NLHS Chairman, Prince Souphanouvong. His alleged purpose was to persuade Souphanouvong to begin talks with his half-brother, Souvanna Phouma. Rather than preparing the ground for an RLG-NLHS dialogue, Minin's trip was almost immediately followed by a major Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese offensive, which is still going on. A real dialogue has yet to begin.

Increasing its influence over the Pathet Lao is probably not Moscow's only reason for moving into Laos, although it may be the most compelling. Moscow probably believes that the Pathet Lao has a brighter political future in the long run than the politicians and generals who lead the present government in Vientiane. However, Moscow also has another objective: to pre-empt Chinese influence in Laos. And, of course, a Pathet Lao government in Laos would give the USSR a foothold in the center of Southeast Asia.

China's view of Laos appears to be the one she traditionally casts on any small neighbor: potential food for the tiger. In September 1968 Peking, without permission from the RLG, resumed road building in northern Laos after a lapse of five years. By late January 1969 the Chinese had completed a motorable road between the Chinese-Laotian border town of Batene and Muong Sai, a Laotian town 70 kilometers from the border. It took two more months to push the next section of the road through difficult terrain to a point 10 kilometers northeast of Muong Sai. That branch of the Chinese-built road will lead into North Vietnam near Dienbienphu; the other branch will go south and west and could be extended south to the Mekong River and into Thailand.

Estimates of the number of Chinese involved in this venture range from two to ten regular Chinese army (PLA) battalions, equipped with mobile anti-aircraft batteries, who are assigned to defend from 2,000 to 5,000 Chinese coolies and engineers working on the roads. There are also reports of PLA fighting units in northwest Laos with estimates on their numbers also widely varied. Support for the Chinese forces in Laos comes from Yunnan Province, from which hundreds of Chinese trucks pass into Laos monthly carrying food and construction materials and, presumably, military equipment for the PLA units in the area.

Peking's possible reasons for being in Laos include her search for more territory, but there are others, as well: she may be seeking to create both a buffer zone and a sphere of influence in the region in anticipation of a settlement in Vietnam; she may be striving to prevent further growth of North Vietnam's influence with the Pathet Lao which the great number of PAVN regulars deployed in Laos gives to Hanoi; Peking may be establishing

a road link to old route 46 which runs southwest of Muong Sai and has long been used by Thai Communist terrorists to move into and out of Thailand. The new road system could also be intended to facilitate shipment of Chinese supplies to the Thai Communists, to the Chinese and North Vietnamese laborers keeping the Ho Chi Minh Trail operating, and to PAVN and Viet Cong units fighting in South Vietnam.

The prolonged fighting has propelled the nation into a vicious cycle, for as long as the war continues the RLG is compelled to keep up a large military establishment which now consumes 50% of the national budget. The growth of this military establishment and the readiness of some to profit by built-in opportunities for special privileges, law evasion and corruption have discouraged the Laotian people and made cynics of many among the younger element in politics. The swelling Swiss bank accounts of the elderly, non-military upper classes, who make up the Laotian ruling elite, have further alienated a vital group -- the men in their thirties who are at the beginning of their political careers.

The small nation of Laos lives in very real peril. The most immediate menace comes from North Vietnam, already on the scene with 40,000 troops. But Communist China's thrust over the border with roads, laborers and her own troops shows she is as firmly committed as Hanoi to territorial expansion and subversion. And the Soviet Union stands in the wings. Any Asian knows that events in the Southeast Asian area will be largely determined by what happens in Vietnam, and Laos' future is no exception. Failure to reach peace in Vietnam will lead to additional fighting in Laos, and a peace in Vietnam without reference to Laos will surely mean more trouble for Laos, whose Communist-occupied areas will not readily submit to the discipline of any central government except one controlled by the Pathet Lao.

CPYRGHT

ASSOCIATED PRESS

1 March 1969

Laos Prince Says Red Activity Up

VIENTIANE, Laos, March 1 (A.P.)—Prince Souvanna

Phouma said today that Communist military activities have increased in Laos since the United States halted its bombing of North Vietnam last

Nov. 1.

The Laotian premier in a speech marking National War Victims' Day, said Pathet Lao terrorists supported by "many

opposing countries" have stepped up their sabotage raids in Vientiane and the provinces in an effort to destroy the neutralist government.

JAPAN TIMES
2 March 1969

CPYRGHT

Changing War in Laos

CPYRGHT

New Communist Attempt to Stir Up Disorder

By CHU SAITO

During the past three years the Communist Pathet Lao forces in the kingdom of Laos have refrained from spearheading any major attack. Now, however, they have started unleashing daring attacks in the neighborhood of Vientiane, the headquarters of Premier Souvanna Phouma's Government. And for the first time since 1962, when the big powers tactically divided this Southeast Asi-



an kingdom into an eastern half for the Communists and a western half for the Royal Lao and neutralist forces, the Royal Lao capital of Luang Prabang is seriously threatened.

It was just a year ago that in a battle at Nam Bac, located to the north of the royal capital, the Government force lost 2,500 troops—about four per cent of its 70,000 men. The Government has not recovered from the heavy defeat since.

The Communists are apparently preparing for a straightforward assault in northern Laos against the Government base of Nakhang, which is not far from the Pathet Lao area of Xieng Khouang.

Their main objective, presumably, is to widen their territorial control in an apparent effort to reinforce the leverage of the Pathet Lao for a possible political bargain with Souvanna Phouma in the future. They want to hold as much ground as possible in this country when the Paris talks reach a climactic point.

Pathet Lao Objective

In 1962, the coalition Government under the national auspices featured

Souvanna Phouma's neutralists holding eight Cabinet seats, and the rightist and leftist factions with four seats respectively.

The Pathet Lao, led by Prince Souphanouvong, quit the coalition in the year that followed. Ever since then, the Communists have claimed that Souvanna Phouma now has become a mere puppet of the American imperialists. They assert that the only authentic group in the center is the so-called "patriotic neutralists" they control. Implicit in this claim is the suggestion that the Communists may come forth with the contention that they now deserve half the Government seats.

North Vietnamese troops, at present, surround both Saravan and Attopeu. They could capture the two strategic towns tomorrow. They are attacking the nearby road junction of Thateng, which guards the approaches to the plateau of Bolevens, in an apparent attempt to force the Government in Vientiane to evacuate these towns.

Control of these two towns would naturally serve to substantiate the Pathet Lao claim that the situation in their country has utterly changed. They could openly demand more than the four seats they were originally accorded in the 16-member coalition created in Geneva.

At present there are some 40,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos, most of them based near the South Vietnam frontier. They constitute the backbone of the Communist forces in this country.

Road to Thai Border

It may be significant for the future of Southeast Asia that the Communist forces are now pushing southward through the territory of Laos

to gain access to the border regions of Thailand.

Through territory controlled by the Pathet Lao, a major road is being constructed at high speed with bulldozers, graders, trucks and other modern equipment. From the Chinese town of Mengia, in the province of Yunnan, it crosses the Laotian border at Ban Botene, and runs into Laos to a distance of about 30 miles. It is now roughly three miles from the strategic Laotian town of Muong Sai, which guards the approaches to the valley of Nambang leading south directly to the Thai border.

From this town, the Chinese Communists can build a road link eastward to the present Route 19, which leads to the important North Vietnamese base at Dienbienphu. They can also head south to Ban Houei Sai, on the bank of the Mekong across from Thailand.

This may signify a Chinese Communist attempt to stir up confusion and disorder in this region to prompt the United States, who is wary of another Vietnam war in Asia, to withdraw its military forces.

Or they may be seeking to create a buffer zone and a sphere of influence there, anticipating that an eventual settlement in Vietnam could lead to some new kind of political formula for Laos, her immediate neighbor.

At all events, a settlement in Laos depends on a settlement in Vietnam. Until that is achieved, this troubled land is likely to be tormented by continuing skirmishes and obscure maneuvers.

New Cause of Trouble

The peace talks launched and encouraged the war efforts of the North Vietnamese. They

...had to be
...tration in Laos.

Every Pathet Lao company or battalion has advisers from North Vietnam. Pathet Lao soldiers only serve as reinforcements. Or they are to be used as occupation forces to keep towns and villages under their control.

This sometimes provokes a dispute between the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese troops. The North Vietnamese side blames the

...net
...alone. The Pathet Lao, on the other hand, protest that they have to go around the Lao towns and villages to look for food to feed the North Vietnamese fighting in their country.

This, in fact, was the cause of the bitter armed conflict which took place between the two on Dec. 11 last year at an area about 13 kilometers south of Muong Phong Sa Thone in the province of Sam Neua.

JAPAN TIMES
8 March 1969

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Over the Horizon

By SHINROKU NOZAKI

Stirrings in Laos

Pathet Lao, the leftist Laotian forces entrenched in the eastern half of the country, have been stepping up their military and political activities as the world uneasily watches the slow progress of the Paris talks.

Their recent behavior would seem to show that they are planning to settle the muffled civil war in Laos by the same tactics as those employed by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.



On Sept. 21 last year, just 10 days before the United States announced the complete suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam, Radio Pathet Lao declared that if the U.S. halted the bombing of the "liberated areas" in Laos, conditions favorable for discussing the Laotian issue would be created.

About three weeks after the complete suspension of the American bombing of North Vietnam, Radio Hanoi report-

ed the new Pathet Lao political tenet to the effect that Pathet Lao aims at setting up a "democratic, national coalition Government" in collaboration with "patriotic, national forces" in Laos.

Pathet Lao's call for the suspension of bombing is identical with Hanoi's appeal while their slogan for a national coalition Government is an exact replica of the appeal made by the NLF in South Vietnam.

After the American bombing halt against the north, however, U.S. air attacks on the "liberated areas" of Laos were reportedly tripled in intensity, presumably because of the increased need to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail following the bombing halt against North Vietnam.

Last January, Prince Souphanouvong, who is the leader to the Pathet Lao, again called for the suspension of U.S. bombing of Laos' "liberated areas" as a condition for peace and threatened to intensify Pathet Lao military activities "until peace materializes."

The U.S., however, cannot be expected to halt the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh

Trail that runs through the "liberated area" in view of the uneasy situation in South Vietnam.

Thus, the Pathet Lao forces, with the support of 40,000 North Vietnamese troops, are stepping up guerrilla attacks against the Royal Laotian region under Premier Souvanna Phouma. Their tactics resemble those of North Vietnam and the NLF in South Vietnam, whose Vietnam war strategy consists of "breaking the military balance" and "winning the political war."

In another significant development, Yue Tai-hong, Communist China's first high-ranking diplomat to return to an overseas post following a long diplomatic hiatus, resumed his assignment early last month as counselor in the Communist Chinese Embassy in Vientiane. Meanwhile, the Soviet ambassador to the Laotian capital, Viktor Minine, visited Hanoi early in February and then proceeded to the Pathet Lao headquarters in Sam Neua. He carried with him Premier Phouma's letter to his half brother Prince Souphanouvong, who is known as the Red Prince.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1969

CPYRGHT

Laos Killings

VIENTIANE—Five French civilians were killed by 12 Communist Pathet Lao soldiers at a French-supported agricultural school 22 miles north of here.

Three French technicians

were bound and shot at the school where they worked, despite the pleas of local

Laotians that they were French, not American. Two other visiting Frenchmen heard the shots and rushed over, also to be gunned down.

CPYRGHT

Peking Steps Up Pressure on Laos

CPYRGHT

Apparent Goal Seen as Control of Border Areas

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—Peking appears to be stepping up its efforts to establish buffer areas of influence or control in the border provinces of Laos and Burma adjoining mainland China's southern border.

The same effort also is being made in the extreme northern areas of Thailand. Thailand does not have a common border with China but its northern provinces are easily accessible to infiltrators through short stretches of Laos or Burma.

One Chinese aim seems to be to reach more easily into areas of possible subversion.

In Laos the province of Phong Saly protruding into China's Yunnan province is conceded by officials in the Laotian capital of Vientiane to be entirely dominated by Chinese.

The only unpredictable force in that densely jungled mountainous province is a renegade Laotian band of perhaps 1,000 men commanded by a Col. Khammouane, which operates much like the war lord armies of pre-Communist China.

Orders Taken From Chinese

But even Khammouane, who formerly was loyal to Vientiane, now grudgingly takes orders from the Chinese consul in the town of Phong Saly, according to intelligence sources.

There has been extensive road construction by the Chinese in the three Laotian provinces of Phong Saly, northern Luang Prabang and Houa Khong bordering Thailand, since 1963.

Using up to 10,000 Chinese coolies, who are directed by Communist Chinese engineers and protected by Chinese guards, a network of roads has been built. All stem from the inconspicuous town of Mengla, ap-

in southernmost Yunnan province. One road leads to Phong Saly to the east. A second road goes south to Muong Sai in Laos and there turns east where it has progressed a third of the way to connecting with North Vietnam's famed border town of Dien Bien Phu. This is the site of Ho Chi Minh's climactic victory over the French in 1954 and now is a way stop on Route 19 to Hanoi.

A third road from Mengla leads southwest to Nam Tha in Laos and is now being pushed west to the Burma border.

The New China News Service, Peking's propaganda agency, has boasted about these Lao road projects, calling them free aid to Laos.

There is a certain legitimacy to this construction for shortly after the Geneva accords of 1962 which sought to bring peace to Laos, neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma gave his approval to Chinese assistance.

The zeal with which the road builders go forward—using a mixture of trucks, bulldozers and coolie labor to cut through jungle and mountains, plus the selection of routes—indicates the Chinese aim is to reach more easily areas of possible subversion.

American aerial surveillance has kept track of this activity, and informed sources can say exactly how far along the all-weather road has reached from Muong Sai toward Dien Bien Phu. They estimate it will take only one more dry season (next November to March or April of 1970) to complete that road.

Recently Soviet Ambassador Victor Minin in Vientiane visited Prince Souphanouvong, the Red ruler in the Communist-held portion of Laos. One of his missions, according

to speculation, was to learn more about Chinese involvement in Laos with the Americans hope—Moscow effort in mind to subvert it.

The increase of Pathet Lao attacks in areas adjacent to the Thai border indicates an effort to protect and enlarge infiltration routes into Thailand. The province abutting Laos is mountainous and inhabited by aborigine tribes which have always been scorned by the lowland Thais.

Communist agents trained either in China or North Vietnam are seeking to exploit this historic discrimination by Thais against the upland Meo, Yao and lesser tribes.

Insurgency Peril

Westerners who live in this remote area, mainly anthropologists, missionaries and American agents, consider the northern Thai insurgency more dangerous now than the more-publicized struggle in the barren flat country of northeast Thailand fronting the middle belt of Laos.

American counterinsurgency efforts have been reasonably successful among the Thal farmers.

Seeking to eliminate the low-level but apparently firm foothold the Communists have gained in the mountain tribe country, Thai officials some

Vang Pao, a Laotian Meo leader and staunch anti-Communist, to a parley. The hope was that he could regain the loyalty of the Meos in Thailand for the Bangkok government.

Vang Pao, it is confirmed in Vientiane, was flown to Thai Third Army advanced headquarters at the village of Chiang Klang in an American plane. But little resulted from the conference, possibly because the Thai government does not look favorably on a Vang Pao private army in Thailand.

So does intrigue and insurgency in the Laos-Thailand border areas.

In Burma and India

Less is known about Chinese activities across the borders into Burma and India. But lack of detailed information available here does not dampen the belief of qualified specialists that the Burma and Indian hill country adjoining China is also a target of Chinese insurgency efforts.

The Shan tribes in northern Burma have made an accommodation of sorts with the Rangoon government. But the guerrilla

continues between Chinese-backed insurgents and loyal Shans and Burmese troops.

The same situation is present in Assam in India, where the defiant Nagas opposing any settlement with New Delhi continue to resist with Chinese support Indian army pacification efforts.

In all of the four border countries the unanswered question is whether the Chinese motive is only to create a buffer against hostile neighbors or is a creeping offensive for political or military gain.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

8 April 1969

CPYRGHT

65 Hanoi Battalions Reported Active in Laos

VIENTIANE, April 8 (AP)—

Khamchanh Pradith, the information director general of Laos, said today at least 65 North Vietnamese battalions are operating in Laos.

He told a news conference that some of these, 25 battalions are reported around Samneua and Phong Saly in northern Laos. He said others are scattered in areas near Luang Prabang, Savannakhet in southern Laos, and Pakse and Champassak.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON STAR

14 April 1969

Order of the People's Army

Laos Looks to Russia to Help Stop Pathet Lao

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By DONALD KIRK

Asia Correspondent of The Star

VIENTIANE, Laos—Officials

here are counting on the Soviet Union to help stem the gradual Communist advance across the mountains and jungles of Laos.

Leaders of the royal government as well as Western diplomats believe Russia eventually may try to persuade the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese leaders to abandon the military phase of their struggle. The reasoning is that Russia wants the war to end before Communist China begins to include the country within its sphere of influence.

One hopeful sign of Soviet interest in settling the war, an integral phase of North Vietnam's struggle for domination over all the former French Indochinese states, was the journey this winter of the Soviet ambassador to the Pathet Lao "capital" in Sam Neua, the northeastern Laotian province largely controlled by North Vietnamese troops.

The ambassador, who flew from Vientiane to Hanoi and then traveled by road from Hanoi to Sam Neua, carried a message from Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma to his younger half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet Lao.

The ambassador returned to Vientiane, again by way of Hanoi, with a reply from Souphanouvong indicating he was not ready to think of rapprochement, at least as long as American warplanes were bombing parts of the country.

Despite the inconclusive results of the trip, analysts here believe it showed the Russian interest in exerting direct influence over the Communists war for Laos. The Communists rely to some extent on Soviet arms, but they are shipped from Hanoi and not consigned directly for Laos by Moscow.

Laotian officials, notably Souvanna, believe the Russians would work even more actively

in Vietnam.

One view is that the question of Laos might finally enter the peace talks in Paris at the stage at which the participants had reached some solution, however temporary, for a Vietnam cease-fire.

Before the talks reach this stage, however, the Communists appear determined to solidify their hold over vast stretches of the Laotian jungle.

During the current "dry-season offensive," they have knocked out small government installations from the northern to the southern provinces, have built new roads and ambushed vehicles on old roads leading to important towns in the Mekong River lowlands. The Communists, spearheaded by an estimated 40,000 regular north Vietnamese troops, seem bent on developing a bargaining position on Laos that would enable the Pathet Lao to gain de facto control of the government through negotiations.

Then, without having to attack the major towns along the river, they could rule the entire country. And North Vietnam, as a result of its military and political control over the Pathet Lao, could turn Laos into a satellite kingdom under a figurehead king.

Some analysts believe the Russians might favor these objectives. At the same time, Russian policy at the moment calls for full recognition of Souvanna, whom the Russians originally supported as neutralist leader when the accords on Laos were signed in Geneva nearly seven years ago. Souvanna steadfastly insists on holding to the letter of the accords, which called for the departure of all foreign troops. Despite his present reliance on U.S. military aid, he has often indicated he might revert to a pro-Soviet neutralist position if the North Vietnamese withdrew.

Such a denouement to the struggle, while probably acceptable to the Americans, would

inevitably arouse the ire of Communist China, which for years has accused the Soviet "revisionists" of collaborating with the American "imperialists."

CPYRGHT

ECONOMIST

15 March 1969

Laos

Peace has its dangers

FROM A CORRESPONDENT LATELY IN LAOS

"What we want is an independent life, blessed equally by both America and Red China. We must build together a peaceful, independent, democratic, united, neutral and prosperous Laos." So runs the manifesto just published by a group of right-wing politicians in Vientiane.

Their leader, Mr Chao Sopsaisana, vice-chairman of the national assembly, has been no friend in the past of the neutrality imposed on Laos by the 1962 Geneva agreement, and certainly no supporter of moves to find a fresh basis for co-operation with the communist Pathet Lao. But the Vietnam peace talks raise the possibility of a new attempt to reunify Laos. If it happens these conservatives do not wish to be caught with their trousers down.

"We have no political organisation to match the communists," Chao Sopsaisana told this correspondent in Vientiane. "We may well have to face a general election in Laos before 1971. We must now set up a political movement of all Buddhists and non-communists." He is trying, with sympathy from the Americans, and support from certain politicians and generals.

These are mostly relatively young men, in their forties, professing opposition to social injustice, corruption and inefficiency in the royal government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. But there is little sign that they have captured the idealism of the still younger men, generally disgusted with their elders—including most of those involved in Laotian politics since the early 1960s—and with a good deal to be disgusted about. Power politics have propelled the Laotians abruptly into the twentieth century, and mountains of American money. Economic aid in 1967-68 amounted to \$63 million (for a population of some 1.5 million under royal government control). A fair part has gone to line the pockets and Swiss bank accounts of the numerous potentates who

employees of the Soviet news agency Novosti in Vientiane can be seen distributing in the streets anti-Chinese literature in French. One of the booklets, entitled "Duplicité," describes Chinese policies as "irresponsible and insane."

The Chinese are now building a road, through northern Laos, to link Yunnan with Dien Bien Phu, just across North Vietnam's western border. They are permanently represented in Pathet Lao territory by a consulate. Yet the Pathet Lao has given its full approval to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians evidently can still pull strings.

The royal government claims the Pathet Lao threat would quickly evaporate if North Vietnamese units withdrew from Laos. It reckons they total 18,000 combat troops and over 21,000 men in support units. They have been responsible for the communist military successes of the last four years. Recently North Vietnamese reinforcements are reported to have come in from South Vietnam. Communist troops have also recently been supplied with 140 mm rockets and other new weaponry. Meanwhile the royal army, now some 75,000 men strong, has been reorganised with American assistance and advisers. Able officers have been given responsible command. American air force support has increased greatly since the attacks on North Vietnam were halted.

Events in Laos are bound to be influenced by what happens to Vietnam. A failure to reach peace there will probably lead to more fighting in Laos. But peace in Vietnam may not mean peace in Laos. Even if the Ho Chi Minh trails lose their significance, the large areas bordering on China and North Vietnam now occupied by the communists will not easily return to the control of any central government, except a Pathet Lao one.

make up the Laotian ruling class.

No Laotian politician, right-wing or Pathet Lao, could survive if he did not pay at least lip service to the need for national reunification. But neither of the warring parties is prepared to work for union except on its own terms. The royal government unrealistically asks Prince Souphanouvong and three of his left-wing colleagues simply to endorse the old tripartite formula, return to Vientiane and take up their vacant cabinet seats, as if nothing had happened in the six years since the left-wing ministers fled from a right-wing coup. (The Pathet Lao, in fact, now controls at least half the territory, although somewhat less than half the population.) And except for Souvanna Phouma himself it is hard to name anyone in the non-communist ruling group who can be considered a neutralist. Some of the neutralists have joined the Pathet Lao, as a separate group, and may now demand representation in a coalition government.

The Russians could do much to help Prince Souvanna Phouma (for whom they have a great liking) out of his predicament, if they wanted to. But there is no real evidence to suggest that they do. Far from wishing to mediate they seem to be principally anxious to rebuild their bridges to the Pathet Lao. This would explain the unexpected recent visit of the Soviet ambassador in Vientiane to Prince Souphanouvong's headquarters in Sam Neua, in northern Laos.

They evidently do not wish to create the impression of being in collusion with the Americans over a possible settlement. And they believe that the Pathet Lao has a brighter future as a political movement than the conservative politicians and generals in Vientiane, whose fortunes may depend on how long the Americans choose to support them. Not that they want Chinese-sponsored disorder, Russian

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NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1969

CPYRGHT

Foreign Affairs: How the War Must End

By C. L. SULZBERGER

SAIGON—There can be no valid settlement of the Vietnam war that does not specifically include Laos and Cambodia. Otherwise Southeast Asia would face the following paradoxical situation: Communist troops could withdraw from South Vietnam but continue *de facto* occupation of eastern Laos and eastern Cambodia. They now control the entire strip running from the Laotian border of China to the Cambodian Parrot's Beak that points right at Saigon.

Therefore no basis for evacuating foreign forces from South Vietnam can be devised that does not also include evacuation of foreign forces from Laos and Cambodia. If there is to be a return to the formula of the 1954 Geneva agreement governing Vietnam and Cambodia, there must also be a return to the 1962 Geneva agreement neutralizing Laos.

Threats to Saigon

Any other settlement would be meaningless. It might provide for restoring peace to South Vietnam, but the Saigon regime would be permanently threatened not only by the access routes from North Vietnam that lead along the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and the Sihanouk trail through

Cambodia; it would also be threatened by sizable North Vietnamese forces actually in both Laos and Cambodia.

This problem is so acute that the Paris Vietnam negotiations must ultimately be expanded to take in diplomatic representatives from Laos and Cambodia. The Laotian situation is increasingly bad. Hanoi, which has been violating the 1962 agreement with mounting effrontery, is now pushing its most serious drive into Laos since 1962-63. If it advances any further it will destroy the heartland of the Meo tribes, crumbling their especially dedicated resistance.

At the same time, the Ninth Vietcong Division (80 per cent North Vietnamese) is stationed in the Cambodian Parrot's Beak. Some strategists guess it will eventually be committed with two other divisions sent through Cambodia in the present offensive against Saigon. Others speculate it will attack the provincial capital of Tay Ninh. It is worth considering, however, that Hanoi prefers to leave the Ninth just where it is. This menaces the Cambodian Government and prevents it from reaching accommodation with the United States and its allies.

The Ninth Division alone is strong enough to overwhelm

Prince Sihanouk's army. Sihanouk himself admitted last month: "There are Vietnamese

infiltrating Cambodia, I am deeply worried. There are Vietcong and Vietminh [meaning North Vietnamese] infiltrating. If you look at a map near Mondolkiri is Sen Mororom, is O Raing. After O Raing is Mount Nam Lean and there are plenty of Vietcong and Vietminh there. If you go up to Ratanakiri you will see Laban Siek. Farther north is Bo Khanh. Let us stop there—a few meters from Bo Khanh. It is full of Vietcong and Vietminh."

Sihanouk's Dilemma

These are Sihanouk's first detailed admissions of the Communist military advance into Cambodia, which is now their outright sanctuary against Saigon and U.S. troops. The Communist military presence is even more extensive than the Prince acknowledges and Sihanouk doesn't know how to get them out.

Sihanouk still proclaims Cambodia has "only four enemies—Thailand, Laos, Vietnam [South] and the United States." But he hints he is prepared for accommodation with all of them if they will only recognize Cambodia's existing frontiers. He insists he will "always support" the Vietcong "in their just

cause" but he is angling for Washington's help.

President Nixon quietly seeks a diplomatic solution to this impasse. Both Bangkok and Saigon have recently indicated willingness to recognize present Cambodian frontiers, thus abandoning their own previous claims. One suspects U.S. prompting. Furthermore, Nixon sent Sihanouk a personal letter and encouraged Robert McNamara and David Rockefeller to contact him.

But Sihanouk complains that Nixon has not yet granted "unconditional recognition of my frontiers" and adds: "Whether I swing toward the right or left depends on me alone." He does, of course, have the alternative of temporarily resigning—which he has done before—and letting General Lon Nol, the pro-Western Acting Premier, take responsibility for a difficult transition.

What is also taking place in Laos—where there is heavier North Vietnamese military occupation—is vitally important to South Vietnam. There can be no final settlement here until there is settlement as well in its westerly neighbors. Southeast Asia cannot approach stability until Laos and Cambodia are brought into the Paris talks. War shouldn't be escalated but peace must be.

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LONDON TIMES

31 January 1969

CPYRGHT

From Fred Emery, lately in Vientiane

OSTENTATIOUS RULE

It does seem that precious little has been done by Prince Souvanna Phouma in the way of political galvanization during the past seven years. In the face of many frustrations the inclination is not to rock the boat.

The proclamation of the Lao Patriotic Front's political programme moved him to respond with a political statement on New Year's Eve in which he implored his countrymen "not to remain passive and take the easy way". Most observers estimate, however, that "government" as an entity beneficial to the people still means little more than it did seven years ago.

The Americans, meanwhile, have not waited for peace to attempt efforts at economic development. While it is true that U.S.A.I.D. props up the country with aid (excluding military) at some \$58m. last year, moves have been made to stimulate rice production. Some

optimistic assessments reckon that self-sufficiency could be hoped for next year, with even some rice exports in 1971. An American-backed purchasing agency is trying to make the short cut from subsistence to a market economy without the intercession of money lenders, and may succeed. Timber exploitation has been stepped up considerably, and in the towns there has been transformation since the "village days" of only 10 years ago. Cars, taxis and motor cycles—nearly all Japanese—fill the streets.

The question is, how much of this advance do the people associate with government and how much with the Americans. An honest answer is: "The Americans"—and therein lies a great problem.

There have been radical changes in administering American aid since the 1950s, younger Laotians are asserting themselves in economic planning; and there is a sense of mission. But there is far to go—and nowhere farther, in the eyes of the young men, than in

correcting the flagrant luxury and ostentation of the lives of the ruling families and cliques. It is generals, government ministers and high officials who have built all the stylish villas for renting to the many foreigners.

It may well be true the future of Laos will depend more on external than internal decisions. But a healthier internal situation would obviously help to decide that future in more positive terms. It seems clear that the Americans, in return for their own withdrawal from Vietnam, will insist on North Vietnamese withdrawal from the Ho Chi Minh trails complex. But it seems doubtful that the North Vietnamese will leave northern Laos, where people have so long been directed towards Hanoi rather than Vientiane.

In this sense all depends on the United States, Russia, and of course China. Can they improve on the present miserable reality—that a buffer state is only a cover for hostile partition?

May 1969

Compiled from Newspapers and Periodicals
On Laotian Protests at Hanoi Aggression

Continuing military activity of the North Vietnamese in Laos has caused the Laotian Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, to protest to the co-Chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference, Britain and the Soviet Union. The Protest, published in Laos on 19 March 1969, has been circulated by Britain to other countries which took part in the Conference - Cambodia, North Vietnam, France, Laos, China, South Vietnam, the United States, Burma, Canada, India, Poland and Thailand. Britain has also suggested to the Soviets that the International Control Commission (ICC) for Laos (India, Poland and Canada) be asked to report on the situation.

Although the Geneva Agreement provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and guaranteed her neutrality, the Laotians have frequently protested at the North Vietnamese military presence. Because of the refusal of the Communist Pathet Lao to allow the ICC to investigate areas under their control, the strength and composition of the guerrillas could not be assessed, but Prince Souvanna Phouma gave an estimate on 24 October 1968, that there were now some 40,000 to 50,000 North Vietnamese troops in his country, either fighting with the Pathet Lao or protecting the Ho Chi Minh trail (the route through Laotian territory by which the North Vietnamese have been infiltrating men and supplies into South Vietnam).

All foreign troops were supposed to leave Laos after the 1962 Agreement, and although there were then some thousands of North Vietnamese in the country, only 40 North Vietnamese civilian technicians departed from Laos via the checkpoints set up by the ICC.

Both Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have since denied that any North Vietnamese men or materiel are in Laos, but in September 1964, three North Vietnamese soldiers were captured. At Souvanna Phouma's request the ICC inspected documents found on the prisoners, considered their statements and confirmed their nationality and military status.

In March 1965 nine more prisoners were captured at Dong Hene in Southern Laos. The evidence they provided formed the basis of a majority report published by the ICC on 22 August 1966, which amounted to a major indictment of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos. (Poland refused to be associated with this.)

In an article published by the Far Eastern Economic Review on 21 November 1968, Guy Hannoteaux, who had been captured and held for a month by the Pathet Lao, confirmed the existence of a "sizeable number" of North Vietnamese in Pathet Lao-held territory. He spoke to one who said he was North Vietnamese "like the others you have seen in this camp;" he had come to Laos only ten days previously. According to Hannoteaux, it was generally the North Vietnamese who directed Pathet Lao operations.

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On 4 December, Sergeant Cao Van Mai, of the Second Battalion, 505th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army, told a press conference in Vientiane that he had been fighting in Laos since 1965 and had taken part in five attacks before being taken prisoner.

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All About a Forgotten War

World Affairs

As the world at large feels alternately relieved and distressed at the course of the Vietnam talks in Paris, the anguish of little Laos deepens, as do its wounds. Either because of over-concentration of attention on Vietnam or because of its seeming demographic negligibility Laos indeed writhes in agony unnoticed and unappreciated. A knife cuts at its heart, yet Laos cannot cry. The world seems to have little time for it.

Some 40,000 North Vietnamese soldiers are on its soil. Two new divisions were reported arrived in the last fortnight. Hanoi, of course, questions not only the figure but the fact itself of the presence of its soldiers in Laos. That the North Vietnamese armed forces have been in Laos was however confirmed by the International Control Commission some years ago though their number then could not be as large. The ICC consists of the representatives of Canada and Poland with India as its Chairman. It was set up in 1954 as part of the so-called accords arrived at the first Geneva Conference on the problems of the former States of Indo-China.

The ICC has not always been able and active enough to discharge its responsibility at least in Laos. Indeed it does not have the requisite capacity. This is probably the reason why Prince Souvanna Phouma, the country's, universally acclaimed neutralist, Prime Minister, has been seeking expansion of its role and personnel. But the smallness of its size and number of the men at its disposal is not the only weakness of the ICC. Every time, the Government of Laos has made a complaint involving the North Vietnamese, its Polish member has opposed action. According to Warsaw no decision of the ICC is binding unless it is unanimous.

What seems to be the crassest example of this strange legalism came when Prince Souvanna Phouma requested the ICC to set up checkpoints at access points into Laos from North Vietnam. Poland frustrated the implementation of this request. Obviously this explains how the North Vietnamese managed to be in Laos in such massive strength.

That in spite of its internal quarrels, the Communist world as a whole has been acting in concert in relation to Laos became evident on another occasion. Apprehending that the little country might be engulfed in "Tonkinese expansionism," in his own phrase, Prince Souvanna Phouma first

approached the Russians for military assistance. Moscow refused to comply with his request, with the result that he had to turn to the Americans. The Americans initially agreed only to provide him facilities for reconnaissance information, though later they began bombing North Vietnamese reinforcement and supply convoys along the Ho Chi-Minh Trail in Laos used by Hanoi to keep up its war effort in South Vietnam. It may also be of some interest to note that Communist China has been using its army men to build a road to connect Yunnan with Muong Sai, in that part of Laos which is now under the control of the Pathet Lao.

Involuntary Role

What is the extent of North Vietnamese-assisted insurgency in Laos that is harrying the otherwise idyllic kingdom that resembles Nepal in several ways? If we are to believe Soth Phetrasi, the leader of the Lao Patriotic Front, a counterpart of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, three-fifths of the territory and half of the population of Laos are controlled by the Pathet Lao. Even Prince Souvanna Phouma concedes that one-third of the territory of Laos is under Pathet Lao control and one-third in contest between his Government and the Communist guerrillas. How long the Government of Laos can on its own be a match for the challenge it faces is an open question.

It has been assumed not only by the Americans, who find their basic emotions at war with their involuntary role of the biggest world power, but also by Prince Souvanna Phouma himself that once the war in Vietnam comes to an end Laos will regain its peace, neutrality and independence. The Prince told a Western journalist some time ago that Hanoi would not then find it necessary to maintain its presence in Laos. This is indeed a chicken-and-egg story.

It was in 1962 that the Geneva Conference, after prolonged wrangling, was supposed to have settled "once for all" the question of Laos. A Government of "national unity" was established. It comprised the nationalists, Prince Souvanna Phouma's neutralists and the Pathet Lao. But not long after, the Pathet Lao representatives walked out of it. In touching faith that the word given is the word honoured, Prince Souvanna Phouma still keeps the vacated chairs unoccupied in the Cabinet. He has also reiterated more than once his hope that the Pathet Lao would agree to talk with him on whatever the points of dispute between them. But this has been an invitation without response. Are the Communists in Laos, or more pertinently their mentors abroad, being merely absent-minded or do

they have wider ambitions? We may find the answer to this question in military geography as it obtains in Laos today.


Mere Coincidence

Pathet Lao forces are in occupation of Laotian territory not only along the borders of South Vietnam but also in all the northern and north-western regions that bring them to the borders of Burma and Thailand. And they came into that possession quite some time before the "war-mongering" U.S. President Johnson "escalated" the war in Vietnam. It was perhaps necessary for the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao to occupy the territory that constitutes the Ho Chi-minh trail. Their friends in South Vietnam had to be supported and sustained. But why was it necessary for them to occupy Laotian territory up to the borders of these two countries? To vary somewhat the same question, is it merely a coincidence that the Laotian territory under the control of the Pathet Lao is contiguous with those areas of Burma and Thailand where insurgency is growing on an increasing scale?

In an ostensible bid for an alibi, Mr Soth Phetrasi has accused the Laotian Government of being in "tow with the Americans." He calls upon Prince Souvanna Phouma and other members of his Government "to return to reason." But one fact seems to show that either Prince Souvanna Phouma's Government is utterly inefficient or not as much sold to the Americans as Soth would have us believe. While his friends are carrying on a vicious war against Vietnamese, Soth maintains an office in the Laotian capital. The office is guarded by 120 Pathet Lao armed men. Soth has been noticeably busy in keeping contacts not only with the foreign embassies in the Laotian Capital but also with different departments in Prince Souvanna Phouma's Government. An "imperialist stooge" has seldom before been known to allow such facilities to a known enemy.

Prince Souvanna Phouma may or may not be the best practitioner of neutralism—he was at one time believed to derive inspiration from Jawaharlal Nehru—but one cannot in reason ignore the lesson of his troubles and travails. His country's future is in jeopardy mainly because he and most of his countrymen refuse to be sucked into the Communist bloc of one variety or another. It is indeed distressing that his country's war should be forgotten when it is unforgettable, at least for this part of the world. Noise about one part of the world should not be allowed to mean silence about another.

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NOT FOR REPRODUCTION

NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY

LAOS

- International boundary
- - - Province boundary
- ⊙ National capital
- Province capital
- +—+— Railroad
- Road
- - - Trail
- PL/NVN-held area

0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

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May 1969

ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN CUBA

After an initial period of growth and expansion, the Cuban economy has stagnated, in spite of the approximately \$350 million in subsidies and credits which Cuba receives annually from the Soviet Union. Since 1957, the record pre-revolutionary year, the Cuban Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has risen by an average of only 1.5 per cent per year -- one of the poorest records in the region. Since the population has steadily grown, this means that per capita consumption has declined 15 to 20 per cent in the past decade.

Change in Economic Objectives

During its ten years in power, the Castro regime has changed its economic policies and objectives. Soon after taking over the government, Castro announced broad and ambitious plans to achieve rapid agrarian reform and agricultural diversification, rapid industrialization, nationalization of the economy, redistribution of income, improved living conditions and other benefits for the lower classes. After trying, without success, to attain so many objectives simultaneously for the first two to three years, the regime ordered a change in priorities.

In 1963, after several disastrous sugar harvests and other economic failures, the government gave highest priority to increasing sugar production, while its earlier goals for industrialization and an increase in popular welfare were postponed until after 1970, the year the regime expected to meet its goal of a ten-million-ton sugar harvest. Emphasis has also been given to cattle raising, with the aim of developing livestock products for export purposes. The year 1963 marked the low point in the transition of the Cuban economy to a socialist structure. Since then, Cuba's GNP has grown at an average annual rate of less than two per cent, or about the same as the growth in population.

Problems of the Economy

The major reason for the general lack of economic progress in Cuba has been gross mismanagement of the economy. Most of those who now belong to the managerial class are poorly educated and inexperienced, while the system itself gives little authority to lower echelon managers and excessive authority to higher level officials. The administrative structure has been frequently reorganized and personnel has been freely shifted about, with consequent duplication and conflict in authority. There has been a perpetual shortage of labor in the agricultural sector, while at the same time a labor surplus has existed in other sectors. The U.S. trade embargo has forced Cuba to import capital goods to replace U.S.-built equipment and so has limited Cuba's ability to import other goods. And even this limited ability must be sustained by large infusions of economic aid from Communist countries, most of it from the Soviet Union. In spite of government efforts to increase the value of exports, there has been a decline. This is the result of a lower volume of sugar exports as well as a drop in non-sugar exports because of production problems, increased domestic demand and the loss of U.S. markets.

Sugar Production

Current prospects indicate that the 1969 sugar crop will not be much larger than -- if as large as -- the 5.2 million tons of 1968, and Castro himself has admitted the crop has "gone badly." During a recent tour of Camaguey Province, a major sugar-producing area, Castro declared the delays in harvesting this year's crop could cost Cuba ten million dollars in foreign exchange, the same amount he hoped to earn by sugar rationing which was started the first of this year. Far from reaching the nine-million-ton-goal originally planned for 1969, this year's harvest should yield 5½ million tons, according to Castro's own estimates at the beginning of the year. Even that figure now appears unlikely since no production statistics have so far been published, although in the past the harvesting of one or two million tons early in the season has been widely publicized. Furthermore, it is said that preparations to meet the 1970 target of 10 million tons are interfering with the current harvest, with rumors that sugar from the current crop may even be concealed in order to appear to increase the yield next year.

According to the official Communist Party newspaper Granma, Cubans must work harder to bring in the 1969 harvest and to cope with other economic tasks. A fresh drive in harvesting and planting was begun on 30 March and is to last until 1 May. This custom was started in 1966, when Castro proposed the Easter holidays be replaced by a week of intensive work in honor of his victory at Playa Giron. In 1967 Playa Giron week as it is now called was extended to two weeks, and in 1968 it was extended to a month. Now Castro has suggested there be no public holidays at all between October 1969 and July 1970 in order to meet economic goals. Such a drive, however, is in addition to the now regular mass mobilizations of thousands of citizens who are required to spend at least a month between February and May in the harvesting of sugarcane. All other activity -- governmental, business and educational -- suffers as a result, as it must either cease or slow down during this period.

Dependence on the Soviet Union

In early February the 1969 Soviet-Cuban trade protocol was signed, including the grant of long-term credit to finance the Cuban trade deficit, presumably not only to cover the deficit for this year, but also whatever may be necessary to cover the unfinanced portion of past trade deficits. Thus Cuba may well need more Soviet aid than last year when it totaled \$328 million. (The 1968 trade deficit was larger than planned because Cuba shipped considerably less than the 2.7 million tons of sugar required by last year's protocol. Thus her deficit is estimated to be close to \$400 million, or an increase of \$150 million over the 1967 deficit.)

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Dismal Outlook for Average Cuban

In general, the average consumer is faring poorly under the Cuban revolution. Per capita consumption of goods and services has declined about 15 per cent since 1957. Except for landless farm workers and urban service workers, who now receive higher wages and increased health and education benefits, consumption levels for most other groups have declined, and high income groups have lost nearly everything. Acute shortages of almost all types of consumer goods have developed, and the people now must queue up daily for many essentials. Prices in the controlled retail market are forty per cent above 1957, and prices in the widespread black market are five times higher than legal prices. Because the supply of goods and services is expected to grow only slightly faster than the population, there will apparently be little improvement in living conditions for the average Cuban in the foreseeable future. Added to this is the fact that the average citizen can no longer find temporary escape in such simple pleasures as playing the lottery or visiting his neighborhood cantina, since the regime considers such past-times out of line with economic austerity and its concept of the "new Communist man." All told, there is little in this bleak situation to appeal to would-be instigators or followers of the revolution elsewhere in Latin America. And, indeed, the widespread admiration which the Cuban revolution once inspired in Latin America is now almost entirely dissipated. The cause is not hard to find: the Cuban revolution has simply failed to live up to its promise.

May 1969

ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN CUBA

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ESTANCAMIENTO ECONOMICO EN CUBA

Tras un período inicial de crecimiento y expansión, la economía cubana se ha paralizado a pesar de los subsidios y créditos que con valor aproximado de 350 millones de dólares recibe cada año de la Unión Soviética. Desde 1957, año extraordinario de la era prerevolucionaria, el Producto Nacional Bruto de Cuba (PNB) ha promediado un aumento de uno y medio por ciento anual, una de las cifras más bajas de la región. Dado que la población ha aumentado regularmente, el porcentaje significa que el consumo per capita ha decrecido en un veinte por ciento en los últimos diez años.

Cambios en los objetivos económicos.

El régimen de Castro ha modificado su política y objetivos económicos durante los diez años que ha permanecido en el poder. A raíz de asumir el control del gobierno, Castro dio a conocer programas vastos y ambiciosos encaminados a lograr la reforma agraria rápida, la diversificación de la agricultura, la industrialización del país, la nacionalización de la economía, la redistribución de los ingresos, la mejora de las condiciones de vida y otras medidas beneficiosas para las clases pobres. Después de intentar infructuosamente de alcanzar simultáneamente tan variadas metas en los primeros dos o tres años, el régimen ordenó una modificación de las prioridades.

En 1963, tras algunas zafras azucareras desastrosas y otros fracasos económicos, el gobierno otorgó la prioridad más alta al aumento de la producción azucarera, abandonando la industrialización y el mejoramiento del bienestar del pueblo hasta después de 1970, año en que el gobierno espera alcanzar la meta que se fijó: la zafra azucarera de diez millones de toneladas. Asimismo, se ha puesto énfasis en la cría de ganado con vista a la exportación.

El año de 1963 marcó el punto más bajo en la transición de la economía cubana hacia una estructura socialista. Desde

entonces el PNB de Cuba ha promediado un aumento de menos del dos por ciento anual, más o menos igual a la tasa de crecimiento de la población.

Problemas de la economía.

La causa principal de la falta de progreso económico general de Cuba ha sido la malísima administración de la economía. La mayoría de los dirigentes son personas inexpertas y de poca preparación, y por otra parte, el sistema le otorga poca autoridad a los funcionarios de segunda categoría mientras que le concede excesivo poder a los dirigentes principales.

La estructura administrativa ha sufrido numerosas reorganizaciones, transfiriéndose al personal de un lugar a otro con la consiguiente duplicación y conflicto de autoridad. Ha habido una constante escasez de mano de obra en el sector agrícola, mientras que en otros sectores se ha registrado exceso de empleados. El embargo de los Estados Unidos ha forzado a Cuba a importar bienes capitales para remplazar los equipos de manufactura norteamericana, limitándose así la capacidad para importar otros bienes. Y aun esta capacidad limitada necesita ser sostenida por las grandes dosis de ayuda exterior que Cuba recibe de los países comunistas, mayormente de la Unión Soviética.

A pesar de los esfuerzos del gobierno por aumentar las exportaciones éstas han disminuído a consecuencia de la disminución en los embarques de azúcar y de otros productos por los problemas en la producción, el aumento de la demanda interna y la pérdida de los mercados norteamericanos.

La producción azucarera.

Las perspectivas actuales indican que la zafra de 1969 no será mayor que las 5,200,000 toneladas logradas en 1968... si es que se llega a esta cifra. El propio Castro ha admitido que la zafra "no marcha bien."

Durante un recorrido reciente por la provincia de Camaguey, que es una de las regiones de mayor producción de azúcar, Castro declaró que las demoras en el acopio

de la caña este año le podrían costar a Cuba diez millones de dólares en divisas: la misma cantidad que él esperaba obtener del racionamiento del azúcar que se implantó a principios de año.

Lejos de alcanzar la meta de nueve millones de toneladas planeada para 1969, la zafra de este año deberá llegar a 5,500,000 de toneladas, según el estimado del propio Castro a principios de año. Pero esta cifra ya luce ser inalcanzable: no se han publicado hasta ahora datos de la producción, a diferencia del pasado en que se le daba gran publicidad a la obtención de uno o dos millones de toneladas al principio de la zafra.

Además, se afirma que los preparativos para lograr las diez millones de toneladas en 1970 están interfiriendo con la zafra actual y se rumora que hasta se está escondiendo el azúcar de la presente zafra con el objeto de dar la apariencia el año próximo de que se ha aumentado la producción.

Según Granma, órgano oficial del Partido Comunista, los cubanos deben trabajar más arduamente para acabar la zafra de 1969 y hacer frente a otras tareas económicas. El 30 de marzo se inició una nueva campaña de cosecha y cultivo que durará hasta el primero de mayo. Esta costumbre comenzó en 1966, año en que Castro propuso que las vacaciones de Semana Santa fuesen sustituidas por una semana de trabajo intensivo para conmemorar la victoria de Playa Girón.

En 1967 la Jornada de Girón, como se la llama ahora, se extendió a dos semanas y en 1968 a un mes. Ahora Castro ha sugerido que no haya días festivos públicos en lo absoluto desde octubre de 1969 a julio de 1970 con el propósito de alcanzar las metas económicas. Sin embargo esa campaña es adicional a las movilizaciones, ya regularizadas, de miles de ciudadanos a los que se les exige que laboren por lo menos un mes en el corte de caña. Como resultado toda otra actividad, ya sea gubernamental, comercial o educacional, prácticamente cesa o disminuye durante ese período.

Dependencia en la Unión Soviética.

A principios de febrero se firmó el protocolo comercial

cubano-soviético para 1969, incluyéndose la concesión de créditos a largo plazo para financiar el déficit comercial de Cuba (este comprende posiblemente no sólo el del año en curso, sino también la porción no financiada de antiguos déficits). Por tanto, es posible que Cuba necesite más ayuda soviética que los 328 millones de dólares recibidos el año pasado.

(El déficit comercial de 1968 resultó mayor de lo que se había planeado debido a que Cuba embarcó mucho menos azúcar que las 2,700,000 toneladas estipuladas en el protocolo. Se estima que el déficit asciende a unos 400 millones de dólares; o sea, 150 millones más que en 1967.)

No es de esperar que la exportaciones soviéticas a Cuba aumenten durante 1969, aunque sí se cree que la URSS continuara proporcionando maquinaria y equipos en grandes cantidades para los proyectos establecidos con ayuda soviética, así como materias primas, productos alimenticios y casi todo el petróleo que consume Cuba.

Aun si las entregas de petróleo soviético a Cuba sobrepasaran el total de 5,300,000 toneladas de 1968, no hay indicios que señalen el cese del racionamiento de combustible implantado en Cuba hace ya más de un año.

El protocolo comercial de 1969 se firmó dentro del marco del convenio por seis años de 1964. No se cree que los cubanos hayan obtenido promesas en firme por parte de la Unión Soviética para los años siguientes a 1970, fecha en que vence ese convenio básico. Es obvio que la necesidad de Castro de contar con un subsidio seguro continuará siendo tan grande como siempre, principalmente porque el planeamiento económico incluye la progresiva mecanización y diversificación de la agricultura cubana, y la expansión general requiere grandes inversiones de capital.

Perspectivas lúgubres para la mayoría de los cubanos.

En general, al consumidor cubano le va mal bajo la revolución. El consumo per capita de bienes y servicios ha disminuído alrededor de un quince por ciento desde 1957. Con excepción de los trabajadores agrícolas que no poseían tierras y los empleados de servicios urbanos, quienes reciben ahora salarios más altos y mayores beneficios en

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cuanto a salud y educación, los niveles de consumo de la mayoría de los otros grupos ha disminuído, y aquellos que gozaban de altos ingresos lo han perdido casi todo.

Se han producido escaseces agudas de casi todos los bienes de consumo y en la actualidad los cubanos se ven obligados a hacer colas diarias para adquirir muchos de los productos básicos. Los precios en el mercado controlado son un cuarenta por ciento más altos que en 1957, y en la bolsa negra que es bastante extensa, son cinco veces por arriba de los precios legales. Puesto que se espera que la oferta de bienes y servicios crezca sólo un poco más rápido que la población, se hace aparente que las condiciones de vida del cubano medio no mejorarán en el futuro cercano.

A esto se añade el hecho que al ciudadano medio ya no se le permite buscar refugio en placeres tan simples como la lotería o la visita al "café" del barrio dado que el régimen considera que estos pasatiempos no están en línea con la austeridad económica ni con el concepto del "nuevo hombre comunista."

Dicho todo esto, hay poco en esta situación sombría que pueda servir de aliciente a los posibles seguidores de la revolución en la América Latina. En realidad, la admiración que en el pasado despertó la revolución cubana en toda Latinoamérica se ha disipado casi por completo. No es difícil descubrir por qué: la revolución cubana simplemente ha fracasado en cumplir sus promesas.

Cuban Agriculture—Ten Years Under Castro

CPYRGHT

*Although Cuban farms have changed
drastically over the past decade
sugar remains the No. 1 crop—
and the mainstay of the economy.*

By WILBUR F. BUCK
*Foreign Regional Analysis Division
Economic Research Service*

This January 1, Fidel Castro's Government observed its 10th anniversary—a suitable vantage point from which to review the major events in Cuba's agricultural development under the present regime.

Although the decade has been a period of significant change in the political, social, and economic structure of Cuba, the change has not necessarily meant progress. Tangible benefits to the populace—such as free schools, free medical services, and minimal rents—have been offset by such negative factors as increased food costs and severe rationing of food, clothing, gasoline, and other daily requisites.

Under Castro, Cuba's gross national product has risen from \$2.7 billion in 1958 to nearly \$3.0 billion in 1967. But per capita income has declined nearly 14 percent, to \$368; population is now 8 million compared with 6.5 million in 1958. The Cuban economy continues to be weak, requiring massive aid from the Soviet Union (reportedly some \$360 million annually) plus additional assistance in the form of credits from Free World countries to stave off collapse.

Cuba continues, almost fanatically, to focus its agriculture on sugar—a commodity that faces already-glutted world markets and low prices. The tourist business, once an important source of revenue, has disappeared. Migration of professional and other skilled citizens continues, and Cuba remains isolated from nearly all its Hemisphere neighbors.

Cuba has a preferential sugar-price agreement with the Soviet Union (incidentally the world's largest producer of sugar), but most payment is taken in the form of barter, leaving considerable doubt with respect to actual price. Castro's 10 years in office have produced a trade balance overwhelmingly in favor of the Soviet Union, which has had the effect of mortgaging the Cuban sugar crops for years to come.

Land confiscation a first step

months of fighting, revolutionary forces led by Fidel Castro succeeded in toppling the Batista Government. On January 1, 1959, Castro gained control of the government, and the people of Cuba—after long civil strife—welcomed the prospects of change.

The change they encountered exceeded their expectations. Premier Castro, promptly revealing his Communist sympathies, lost no time in calling for sweeping agricultural and political reforms. His government set out "to eradicate the effects of a colonial and imperialist heritage and to build a new life."

The blueprint for Castro's agricultural programs appeared in the first Agrarian Reform law passed May 17, 1959. This legislation established the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), an agency to carry out government directives relating to agriculture. The agency promised land for the landless, arranged for expropriation of the large estates (with provisions for indemnification), prohibited sharecropping, and endeavored to diversify agriculture to increase the island's food production and thereby conserve scarce foreign exchange.

Under INRA supervision, all lands in excess of 402 hectares (about 1,000 acres) were promptly confiscated; in some instances 2-caballeria units (about 66 acres) were redistributed to former tenants. Few of the estate owners received indemnification. The estates were not subsequently dissolved as planned; rather the government began to operate the seized lands as Soviet-type state farms with hired workers.

Confiscation of agricultural properties proved a severe blow to United States interests. U.S. holdings were said to equal about 35 percent of the entire sugar industry (some 39 of the 157 sugar mills and their estates were U.S. owned), and U.S. interest was also heavy in rice production and cattle ranches.

The few remaining large landholders were eliminated by the second Agrarian Reform law passed October 3, 1963, which nationalized all farmlands in excess of 67 hectares (167 acres). These properties were added to the established state farms. The remaining 200,000 small farmers were bracketed into the government-directed National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP). By mid-1960, the INRA had taken title to 60 percent of all Cuba's privately owned cropland. By 1966, the number of small farmers reportedly had dwindled to 120,000.

Loss of a U.S. good neighbor

In the meantime, diplomatic and trade relations with the United States, Cuba's major trading partner, continued to deteriorate. In 1958, Cuba was shipping two-thirds of all its agricultural exports to the United States and purchasing a similar share of its agricultural needs from U.S. firms. Value of Cuban imports of U.S. farm products came to \$145 million in 1958; wheat and flour, rice, pulses, meat, and lard were the principal import commodities. Cuba ranked seventh among U.S. foreign markets.

Early in 1960, Castro's Government negotiated trade agreements with many of the Communist countries and systematically began shifting its traditional trade with the United States in another direction. In less than a year, 70 percent of all Cuban agricultural exports were being routed to Communist country destinations.

In July 1960, the United States announced a partial embargo (700,000 tons) of Cuba's lucrative 1960 sugar quota and suspended further sugar purchases. Steadily worsening U.S.-Cuban relations reached a climax when refineries owned by the United States and Britain refused to process Soviet crude oil and their properties were seized by the Cuban Government.

In February 1962 the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba and severed diplomatic relations. Thus, 60 years of mutually beneficial trade between the two countries went down the drain.

The changing economic plan

The early years of central planning for the Cuban economy were characterized by intensive efforts to increase domestic food production and to expand the industrial base. A plan for development during the years 1962-65, specifically designed to increase the gross national product at least 10 percent a year, followed. In 1963, this plan was abandoned when its impracticality became evident.

The policy then reverted to emphasis on sugar production, frequently at the expense of rice and other food crops; commercial development was limited to industries either connected with agriculture or to other enterprises requiring relatively small investments. This policy remains in force today.

Agricultural development has included such programs as land reclamation, irrigation, pasture improvement, and development of the cattle industry. Between 1955 and 1965, cropland was increased by 22 percent and much of the wasteland was returned to pasture. Acquisition of a number of bulldozers and other farm machinery in recent years reportedly has accelerated the rate of land improvement.

A sugar dependency

Cuba and sugar are synonymous; the island has always been highly dependent on this crop.

In 1958 the sugar industry employed half a million workers and accounted for four-fifths of the value of all Cuban exports. An estimated 60 percent of the cropland was in sugarcane. On a world basis, Cuba produced 15 percent of all the sugar manufactured and accounted for one-third of all sugar moving in foreign trade. Production was reasonably good that year—about 5.6 million metric tons compared with the 4.9-million-ton average for the preceding 5 years; it was valued at nearly \$400 million. The United States had an agreement to purchase approximately 60 percent of the 1958 crop at preferential prices.

In 1958 and other pre-Castro years, Cuba's sugar-producing capacity was probably much greater than production because growers were then deliberately trying to hold output to market requirements. Emphasis seemed more on factory efficiency in extraction than on efficiency in cane production.

In 1959, production of sugar in Cuba reached 6 million metric tons. It continued at approximately the same level (5.9 million tons) the following year. In 1961—the best sugar-producing year of the Castro administration—6.8 million tons were produced. In 1962, however, sugar output declined sharply to 4.8 million tons, as redirection of production resources and a general falling-off in efficiency of both equipment and management began to have their influence. The low point of sugar production in the Castro period came in 1963 when only 3.5 million metric tons of sugar were produced.

1964 production plan adopted in 1964
10 million tons of sugar is the target programmed for 1970.

This was to be achieved by stages according to the following timetable of annual production:

<i>Million metric tons</i>		<i>Million metric tons</i>	
1965	6.0	1968	8.0
1966	6.5	1969	9.0
1967	7.5	1970	10.0

Since the establishment of these goals, sugar production has reached the target only in 1965. In 1966, output was short by as much as 30 percent. In 1968, the goal will likely be underachieved by more than 35 percent. Prospects for the oncoming 1969 harvest have already been dimmed by an extended period of drought.

Attainment of the 10-million-metric-ton sugar goal by 1970 may be remotely possible but only under fortuitous climatic conditions and at great cost to the Cuban people and their economy. This would entail the mobilization of a vast army of cane-cutters and other workers to man the expanded acreage in cane, converting of transportation and other facilities to the sugar industry, plus intensive application of fertilizer, farm machinery, and other resources to the crop.

Undoubtedly much 1969 cane will be "left over," and in all probability subsequent crops will suffer as a result of over-cutting. In past efforts to reach sugar goals, few production resources have been spared; high priorities have been set for labor and machinery, and large allocations of funds have been made for the purchase of fertilizer and the modernization and expansion of milling facilities.

Cuba's present exports of coffee are being accomplished by squeezing an undersupplied domestic market—a sharp contrast with the situation in 1958 when, from a relative surplus 20 percent of its crop was sold abroad. Coffee production for 1968 is estimated at 30,000 tons, up somewhat from the previous year but still 25 percent short of the 1957-59 average.

The 1968 rice harvest is less than the 1967 tonnage and just slightly over half the output of pre-Castro days. Production of tobacco, an important earner of foreign exchange, is only about two-thirds the prerevolution volume. There has been some improvement recently in the production of livestock and meat, but the totals still remain substantially below the 1957-59 averages.

Diets deteriorate

When the Castro regime came to power in 1959 the Cubans were one of the best-fed peoples in Latin America. Excessive and indiscriminate livestock slaughter in 1959 and early 1960, however, caused a sharp drop in meat supplies. A decline in the output of food crops, especially rice, during Castro's early years in office was precipitated by rapid nationalization of farm properties and the shift in direction of trade.

The past decade has witnessed a deterioration in the average Cuban's diet, particularly in its quality, as grain protein has replaced much of the animal protein.

Food production in 1968 is estimated to have been about 10 percent less than the 1957-59 average. But food production per capita has declined some 25 to 30 percent from that of a decade earlier, necessitating heavy imports of food products, such as wheat and wheat flour from Canada on Soviet account.

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Cuba Striving to Boost Size of Vital Sugar Crop

By Fenton Wheeler

HAVANA (AP)—Fidel Castro named it "the year of decisive endeavor." Everybody agrees 1969 will be a year of unprecedented hard work, sacrifice and probably less consumer comfort for Cuba's eight million people.

There is little doubt the government is making its most serious effort so far to strengthen the economy. The goal: A record 10 million tons of sugar production next year.

Present indications are that the government will have to hustle to make it.

Premier Castro already says this year's harvest—billed as a rehearsal for next year—is not going well. It may make five million tons.

Cuba needs a big sugar harvest to meet credit obligations on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Trade experts say it is possible that Castro can get by financially in 1970 with less than 10 million tons—say eight million tons—if sugar prices stay up.

But the Cuban leader himself has tied political considerations to the 1970 harvest by pledging the honor of his Communist government on reaching the goal. He says the Cuban revolution can be judged once and for all on whether the country makes it.

The result has been to make the 10 million tons a national motto. Huge posters dot the countryside proclaiming "the 10 million are coming." A big neon sign flashes the same news in red, white and blue on Havana's main street.

Along with sloganeering has come more work. Some examples:

- More than 110,000 volunteers, mostly young people, are working in hot, Texas-like Camaguey province. Many will stay up to three years.

- Workers in westernmost Pinar del Rio province have pledged to work 12 hours daily. Some in Las Villas province have given up vacations this year. Most factory workers have agreed to work one hour extra daily without pay to make up the production loss of fellow workers toiling in agriculture.

- High school students who normally spend 45 days in agricultural work are doing 90 this year. Some are staying for 120 days.

Castro has indicated the traditional Christmas and New Year's holidays will be postponed until July, 1970, when the harvest is finished. This year will be 18 months long, he says.

Meanwhile, the country's food and clothing shortages continue. Thousands of man-hours are still being lost in queues and in a breakdown of services as employees leave their jobs to work in agriculture.

Castro has blamed bad organization for this year's dawdling harvest. He also has noted that many state work centers are run by administrators who have no more than a sixth-grade education.

Nature, too, is a persistent problem for one-crop Cuba. After the 1967 drought battered sugar production, Castro rushed ahead plans on dam building and irrigation. Now too much rain has slowed planting for next year although the really rainy season doesn't begin until mid-May. After that comes the hurricane season!

Oriente: 5,000 jóvenes a la caña en la "Operación 14 de Junio"

CPYRGHT

• SANTIAGO DE CUBA.—

Desde el primero de abril hasta el 14 de junio, cinco mil jóvenes orientales se movilizarán hacia plantaciones cañeras del norte de Oriente para rendir homenaje a los aniversarios de natalicio de los grandes héroes: Antonio Maceo y Ernesto Che Guevara, nacidos ambos un día 14 de junio.

El movimiento que desplegarán los jóvenes orientales lleva este nombre: "Operación 14 de junio" y se desarrollará fundamentalmente en la zona de Manatí, Puerto Padre, atendiendo los resultados y experiencias acopiados en la "Operación 13 de Marzo".

El anuncio del desarrollo de este movimiento se dio a conocer en una reunión que

presidió René Anillo, segundo secretario del Partido en Oriente, celebrada en Pinares de Mayarí.

En ella se dijo, además, que se promoverán 7,100 jóvenes y 1,200 muchachas a la Columna Juvenil del Centenario, así como que se tomarán medidas para la organización de la "Columna Cien Años de Lucha", integrada por jóvenes de 13 a 16 años, para marchar a la zafra del café.

A nombre del Buró Ejecutivo Provincial del Partido, René Anillo felicitó a la UJC y a todos los jóvenes que en Oriente han respondido a los llamados del Partido; los exhortó además a mantener ese espíritu y entusiasmo ante las nuevas tareas.

• René Camacho Albert

Fidel recorre la provincia de Camagüey

Amancio-Santa Cruz: una

batalla contra el tiempo y las aguas

● PINO CUATRO, Camagüey, marzo 20.—Unas horas después de haber recorrido las áreas cañeras del central "Amancio Rodríguez", lugares en que departió respectivamente con trabajadores de una brigada de caminos del DAP y con jóvenes macheteros de la Subagrupación 1 del Ejército de Oriente, el primer ministro, comandante Fidel Castro, sostuvo una importante reunión con los factores regionales envueltos en la presente zafra.

El punto único del encuentro, que tuvo lugar en este puesto de mando de la agricultura, fue el análisis y adopción de medidas ante una situación de zafra retrasada y amenaza de las lluvias primaverales en la región de Amancio-Santa Cruz.

De acuerdo a lo examinado, la región resulta ser el punto más crítico de la provincia en materia de zafra, con un estimado de caña por cortar y moler superior a 80 millones de arrobas. Este total deberá ser asimilado por los tres centrales de la región—"Amancio Rodríguez", "Haití" y "Cándido González"— así como por el central "Colombia", que también molerá cañas de esta zona.

En un contacto previo a la reunión, Fidel discutió pormenorizadamente los casos de aquellas colonias con mayor volumen de caña en tierras bajas y más compleja situación en cuanto a caminos cañeros, a los efectos de viabilizar las operaciones de zafra en dichos lugares antes de la llegada de las lluvias. De este modo fueron analizadas situaciones como la imperante en la zona "Santa Amelia", "Junco" y "La Lucha", en la cual 7 millones de arrobas de caña corren peligro de no poder ser convertidas en azúcar, en caso de que se iniciaran las lluvias.

Amancio-Santa Cruz enfrenta la doble característica de un régimen de lluvias tempranas y vastas áreas cañeras en terrenos muy bajos.

Sucesivamente fueron examinados casos análogos en las zonas cañeras de los centrales "Amancio Rodríguez" (35 millones de arrobas pendientes);

"Haití" (17 millones de arrobas pendientes); "Cándido González" (12 millones de arrobas pendientes); y "Colombia" (24 millones de arrobas).

Fidel se interesó en detalle por el estado de los caminos cañeros, la localización respectiva de los centros de recepción, así como los equipos de tiro, y solicitó de los dirigentes locales información sobre ello.

"Aquí no hay un día que esperar; no estamos en condiciones de esperar ni 24 horas", comentó el Primer Ministro a varios de los presentes, para esbozar a continuación un plan de construcción de caminos cañeros de emergencia, mediante el apoyo de cuatro brigadas de caminos del DAP. Subrayó Fidel que el mencionado personal deberá ejecutar los caminos cañeros para la Zafra de 1970, después de haber solucionado la contingencia presente, es decir, luego de priorizar y construir o reconstruir los caminos más afectados actualmente.

"Ahora hay que prestarles atención a los caminos—orientó Fidel—y al mismo tiempo ver dónde va haciendo falta alguna cosa, arreglar algo, poner un tubo, para acometerlo cuando sea posible".

El Primer Ministro resumió la estrategia allí trazada como un conjunto de medidas tendientes a apresurar los trabajos en las zonas bajas y conjurar así los posibles efectos de las lluvias en el próximo mes de abril. Igualmente, Fidel fue informado por el comandante Rogelio Acevedo, delegado del Buró Político, de algunas limitaciones técnicas de los ingenios de la región, que serán atenuadas mediante la vinculación, respectiva de algunas áreas cañeras hacia los centrales de mayor capacidad en la región, a los efectos de un aprovechamiento pleno de las capacidades instaladas, factor que también agilizará la zafra.

● TRES REGIONES CON LA ZAFRA "APRETADA"

A este respecto, el "Colombia" absorberá parte de las áreas de "Amancio Rodríguez", quien a su vez recibirá caña desvinculada de los centrales "Haití" y "Cándido González".

A continuación, el Comandante en Jefe se dirigió a los presentes y señaló que "dentro de la provincia de Camagüey hay tres regiones donde

está "apretada" la zafra, que son: Amancio, Panamá y la zona de Punta Alegre".

"Amancio es la peor—agregó Fidel—debido a las lluvias tempranas y las tierras bajas. Los drenajes no son suficientes aún; el año pasado se hicieron varios canales pero no son todavía suficientes, y se está mal de caminos, con una cantidad grande de caña. La caña que queda aquí significa 10 millones en divisas para nosotros".

"El propósito de esta reunión—señaló—debe ser enfrentar estas condiciones difíciles y tomar las medidas necesarias para lograr cortar esa caña. Me parece que si en esta región se resuelve el problema, será más fácil resolverlo en otras regiones. Si aquí se termina la zafra, no nos podrá quedar ninguna otra región en la provincia sin terminar la zafra".

Más adelante, Fidel previno que si toda la caña no era cortada, podía afectarse la economía del país, ya que la presente zafra se había visto mermada básicamente por el vasto plan de siembra, y en consecuencia 200 ó 300 ó 400 mil toneladas de azúcar cobraban en 1969 una importancia relevante".

● SEMBRADA TODA LA CAÑA DEL PAÍS A FINES DE MAYO

"Todo el plan de siembra que se ha estado haciendo desde abril del año pasado—subrayó el Primer Ministro—hace un total de más de 40 mil caballerías netas. Y aquí hay que añadir las caballerías que hubo que sembrar dos veces, por pérdidas ocasionadas en unos casos por sequías y en otros por lluvias excesivas".

"Eso significó un empleo de semilla—prosiguió—suficiente como para producir un millón de toneladas de azúcar".

Anunció seguidamente que entre el 20 y 30 de mayo se habrá sembrado la última caña en todo el país para la zafra de 1970, y que de las últimas 10 mil caballerías a sembrar, 7,500 se atenderán con hierbicida, de las cuales 4,000 corresponderán a Camagüey.

Luego de referirse a las ventajas económicas de la utilización experimentalmente el año pasado en esta región: Amancio

clo-Santa Cruz— Fidel resaltó el enorme esfuerzo que se ha hecho en el plan de zafra, donde gran parte de este esfuerzo corresponde a Camagüey, que para mayo debería haber sembrado un total de alrededor de 12,000 caballerías de caña.

"Estamos al borde ya de culminar ese esfuerzo —puntuualizó— y esa situación se ha enfrentado cuando todavía la química y la máquina no han sustituido al hombre, y en especial aquí, donde ni siquiera teníamos los hombres".

Recalcó el Primer Ministro la merma ocasionada en la presente zafra por la utilización de caña para semilla y dijo que la de 1969, sin ser la de los diez millones, tiene una gran trascendencia, ya que el país ha hecho compromisos comerciales con vistas al desarrollo nacional, "y esos compromisos también hay que pagarlos con la zafra de 1969".

Se refirió asimismo a la seriedad de la Revolución Cubana en sus operaciones comerciales y agregó que "toda la maquinaria empleada en las grandes obras fue adquirida cuando el azúcar estaba a 1.3. El país ha logrado consolidar su crédito en condiciones, en que el azúcar tenía el precio más bajo de los últimos 30 años. Podemos decir con satisfacción —añadió— que Cuba es un país que paga con puntualidad religiosa".

Subrayó que por primera vez en su historia, Cuba ha firmado un convenio azucarero internacional sin tener que restringir la producción nacional, aparte de que el precio ha subido casi en tres veces. Anunció Fidel que "hemos pensado en adquirir para después de la zafra del 70, hierbicida para la mayor parte de las cañas a cultivar".

• NUNCA NOS PARECIO, JAMÁS... QUE NO PODÍAMOS HACER UNA TAREA

Después de referirse a otros planes económicos simultáneos que se desarrollan en todo el país, expresó:

"Pero queda mucho por hacer. En Camagüey quedan unas 20,000 caballerías de buldoceo. En caminos estamos prácticamente incomunicados; hay 104 brigadas en todo el país y no se ven. En Camagüey hay 19 y calculamos que necesita 40 brigadas".

"Creo que esta batalla aquí en la región de Amancio se puede ganar porque lo fundamental está, que es la gente: los 6,000 soldados y los 3,000 columnistas, además de los obreros agrícolas. Aquí está la fuerza. Pero no es suficiente la voluntad y la energía para cortar y transportar la caña. Hay que arreglar rápidamente los caminos con las brigadas que llegan de re-

fuerto. Hay problemas de piezas, problemas a veces de gomas o de acumuladores, en fin, las dificultades múltiples que se presentan en toda lucha dura e intensa como ésta".

"Incluso nuestros equipos —añadió Fidel— no son siempre los equipos ideales, a veces están muy lejos de serlo, pero con ellos se están haciendo miles de kilómetros de buenos caminos y carreteras".

Refirió su visita a la brigada de caminos que construye el tramo comprendido entre "El 21" y Amancio Rodríguez, donde algunos trabajadores expresaban su preocupación por algunos problemas de equipos, y apuntó:

"Cuando oía eso recordaba cuando nosotros estábamos en la Sierra, estábamos soñando siempre con ametralladoras, soñábamos tener un automático. Ahora, cuando agarrábamos un fusil de esos de cerrojo, en ocasiones agarrábamos un fusil con defectos, y no había ningún metal para repararlo y hasta con un pedazo de madera, había que repararlo. Nuestros propios zapatos teníamos que coserlos con alambre de cerca. Apareció un fusil "Springfield" y le faltaba la mitad del cañón. Si disparaba también servía, aparecían tres balas y eran tres balas. Nunca nos pareció, ¡jamás!, que no podíamos hacer una tarea".

• HUBO QUE LUCHAR DURO CON LO POCO QUE TENÍAMOS Y TODO LO QUE TENEMOS HOY ES EL RESULTADO DE TODO AQUELLO

"Con lo que teníamos, tratábamos de arreglarlo y resolver. Y claro, se agarraba una ametralladora, un día se agarró una bazuka y un mortero. Si hubiéramos empezado con todo eso, con tanques, con todo lo que tenemos ahora, ¿cuántos días hubiera durado todo aquello? Cinco minutos duraba todo aquello. Pero en fin, hubo que luchar duro con lo poco que teníamos y todo lo que tenemos hoy es el resultado de todo aquello".

"Hoy hemos avanzado bastante, tenemos máquinas buenas y máquinas malas, pero todavía hay cosas que no aprovechamos bien, falta mucho por hacer, hay muchos detallitos que traban las cosas, a veces no se logra toda la cooperación".

"Tenemos mucho más de lo que hemos tenido nunca, incluso más compañeros experimentados que nunca, pero todavía nos falta mucho. Tenemos que hacer un gran esfuerzo de organización, de análisis. Hay que tener todas las respuestas; don-

de están la grúa o el transportador. En este año, en una zafra importantísima, en una provincia importante y en el punto más difícil de esa provincia, van a representar la Revolución y van a representar esa voluntad, el sentido del honor y del deber revolucionarios".

"Y no será sólo ganar la batalla, sino ganarla lo más inteligentemente posible, lo antes posible, lo mejor posible. Ustedes deberán llevar este mensaje, esta apelación de la Revolución, y la seguridad de la Revolución en que esos miles de hombres van a cumplir esta tarea".

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• Félix Pitta Astudillo

En relación a la zafra de 1970, el Primer Ministro anunció que "para el año que viene vamos a concentrar en la provincia de Camagüey todos los cuadros necesarios del ejército y vamos a contar con la ayuda de la Facultad de Tecnología de la Universidad. Será un Estado Mayor, bajo la dirección del comandante Acevedo, como delegado del Buró Político, con toda la capacidad organizativa del Ejército".

"En Amancio —agregó— se debe comenzar ya esa organización y unir en un solo cuerpo los cuatro centrales, con la tarea de llevar la zafra hasta el final. Hay que prepararse por si llueve en abril, trabajar como si fuera a llover en abril y después en mayo; hacer los arreglos por delante de los hechos; prever lo que va a suceder. Tomar esas medidas, detalle por detalle, como en una guerra: con eso estaríamos adelantando el trabajo del año próximo".

A continuación, Fidel instó a los allí reunidos a transmitir a todos los compañeros que laboran en tareas de zafra en esa región, las razones que determinan la necesidad de terminar la presente zafra:

"Nosotros tenemos los medios y tenemos los hombres. Faltan algunos medios que están en camino. Ahora de ustedes depende cómo programan esta batalla. Tienen los hombres, la voluntad de luchar de esos hombres. Es duro, pero en este país los revolucionarios han vencido dificultades superiores".

"Por esta misma zona pantanosa pasó la Columna de Camilo y pasó la Columna del Che. Por duras que sean las condiciones de cualesquiera de ustedes en este momento, todas esas incomodidades no se pueden comparar a aquellos 40 ó 50 días que ellos pasaron enterrados por estos pantanos... Y podemos remontarnos más atrás, hasta las luchas por la independencia, cuando los orientales atravesaron esta zona".

Finalmente, el Comandante en Jefe expresó:

"Y vamos a poner a prueba en este punto crítico la voluntad y la decisión. En este

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May 1969

THIRD WORLD IMPATIENCE WITH SINO-SOVIET MEDDLING

Among the large numbers of African, Asian, and Latin American students returning from the Soviet Union, East Europe, Communist China, Cuba, or North Korea, those who have been subverted and trained as "professional revolutionaries" are in the minority; the politically naive and "duped" make up a larger group. Once the students are home, the distinction is of little import since the naive, both foreign and native-educated, can be easily led by the professionals into stirring discontent among other students. Too often, the disciplined, disruptive minority succeeds in capturing the leadership of entire student unions and associations.

The professional revolutionaries do not operate alone, without outside guidance. Activities are carefully monitored and directed either by Bloc representatives in the country (or in neighboring countries), or by Communist-front organizations, such as the International Union of Students or the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Since guidance is given clandestinely and is unknown to persons not directly involved, its existence can be all too readily denied. Occasionally, when student dissidence threatens to run out of control, the revolutionaries are put down, the participants exposed, and the clandestine curtain parted to provide a true insight into the dangers of such subversion.

Two recent cases in Ethiopia and Kenya in which the curtain parted, as outlined below, should be especially meaningful to countries of the Third World since the Communist effort is directed principally against them.

Ethiopian Restraint

As illustrated by the following chronology of events, the Imperial Ethiopian Government (IEG) has consistently been sympathetic to the students' point of view in internal university matters but became increasingly concerned about the way extremists, with Communist backing, exploited the situation for purely political ends:

March-April 1968 - Outbreak of student disturbances, the most widespread since the attempted coup of 1960. A police search of the National Union of Ethiopian University Students (NUEUS) headquarters revealed large quantities of propaganda pamphlets prepared by the Communist-(Soviet-) controlled International Union of Students (IUS) and numerous propaganda and instruction films, some made in Czechoslovakia. East European embassies (especially Soviet and Czechoslovak) which had had contact with the students were thought to have trained them in demonstration techniques. A former NUEUS leader had spent July and August 1967 in the Soviet Union. IEG action in April 1968 was limited to imprisoning and later releasing student agitators, to banning

the university's two student unions (NUEUS and another), and to prohibiting publication of an extremist student monthly, Struggle.

November 1968 - A boycott of classes at the University of Addis Ababa, which began on 14 November, ended two days later when student leaders met with the Prime Minister and received his assurances that a student Union could again be established at the university and a newspaper published, provided it respected the libel laws. At a 17 November student meeting, leaders who had met with the Prime Minister were accused by extremist students of being too soft because they had agreed to a referendum on the new union. Those same extremists captured the leadership of the student movement and threatened continued boycotts until three days later when the Government abandoned its request for a referendum. A pamphlet distributed early in November and credited to a radical extremist student cell, "The Crocodiles," made it clear that the new student leadership was aiming at political action against the government. It called on peasants, the urban proletariat, soldiers and "revolutionary students" to unite in opposition to feudalists, bourgeoisie, "top-brass" military leaders and "perfidious imperialism." The IEG was described as a "treacherous, senile and cynical feudal regime." It was the pamphlet's Marxist terminology which pinpointed "The Crocodiles" as its authors and suggested that the extremist students belong to or were influenced by this Marxist-Maoist cell, known to exist in the university at the time of the April disturbances and known as the publishers of Struggle.

February-March 1969 - A resurgence of dissidence throughout provincial secondary schools and among students at Haile Selassie University culminated in a school shutdown on 4 March. During this period, Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Ethiopia were harshly critical of the IEG, degrading to Haile Selassie, and usually prefaced by the remark that the broadcaster's information "came directly from our Addis Ababa correspondents." One broadcaster, on 7 or 8 March, prefaced a strident vituperation of the Emperor by identifying himself as Vladimir Sharayev, a cultural attaché at the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa and at that time on vacation in the Soviet Union. Such flagrancy could only have been interpreted by the IEG as sanctioned by the Government of the USSR. In addition, Radio Moscow propaganda was repeated in student-circulated, mimeographed flyers mass distributed throughout Addis Ababa.

13 March 1969 - An editorial in the morning Ethiopia Herald, probably inspired by the government (copy of text attached), warned against the subversive activities of certain foreign agents (meaning Soviet) and noted that there is a point beyond which patience ceases to be a virtue.

14 March 1969 - A front-page news feature in the Ethiopia Herald (reprint attached) announced the expulsion of six Soviet Bloc officials, to be effected within 24 hours, on charges of fomenting subversion among students.

Who Was Expelled?

Names of the ousted Communist officials are given in the attached Ethiopia Herald news story. The three Czechoslovak officials were fairly recent arrivals -- unknown, minor functionaries in the Addis Ababa commercial mission. Perhaps their expulsion can be explained as a backlash of IEG anger stirred up by Soviet blatancy; or as the IEG's belated reaction to Czechoslovak involvement in the 1968 disturbances; or even as an indirect IEG slap at the trouble-making, Soviet-controlled IUS, which is headquartered in Prague. The Soviet officials, at least two of them, are better known: Victor Matveyev, TASS correspondent; Mikhail Novikov, Novosti correspondent; and Vladimir Sharayev, cultural attaché and director of the Soviet Permanent Exhibition in Addis Ababa.

Bombay's Current of 12 April 1969 discusses the "Soviet Agents Chucked Out" of Ethiopia and recalls the early 1950's when Victor Matveyev headed TASS in New Delhi, where he was active in agitating students and trade union subversion (excerpts from text attached).

Vladimir Sharayev was associated with Radio Moscow long before his now-famous broadcast of early March and has long been known in Ethiopia. A feature article published in the 25-26 February 1967 edition of Rome's independent daily, Il Giornale d'Italia, describes Sharayev as being, in the mid-1960's, the broadcaster from Radio Moscow of all the Amharic-language scripts which openly attacked IEG policies. Sharayev acquired his fluency in the Amharic language in the early 1960's as an exchange student at the University in Addis Ababa.

Kenya Not in the Mood

In Kenya, student agitators have been abetted by both Peking and Moscow and have been helped by the Soviet-controlled International Union of Students (IUS):

January-February 1969 - An article in the 6 February 1969 Hindustan Times (copy attached) described the closing in early 1969 of the University College in Nairobi and noted that in Kenya the government was in no mood to "tolerate trouble from students -- or anyone else." A Radio Peking broadcast to Africa, which claimed 34 deaths and police disobedience caused by the university closure, was scored by the Kenya press:

"The broadcast shows how far removed from reality the authorities in China have become.... They can no longer even lie intelligently.... There is no doubt the Chinese technique of the big lie has gained some dupes in Africa who are eager to parrot the tired slogans which Peking and its supporters feed them...." (East Africa Standard, 3 February 1969)

The Communist Bloc role in training young men and students in subversion came to light with the appearance at Nairobi court hearings, 7-11 February, of eight defendants charged with circulating banned Communist Chinese publications, most of which advocated violent revolution. One defendant was a Moscow University postgraduate research student, one admitted to having attended a "school of professional revolution" in North Korea, one was just a student in Nairobi, and five were students in the mid-1960's at the Wuhan Military Training College in Peking.

March 1969 - A 14 March Kenya Gazette article announced that a considerable number of scholarships would be awarded Kenyan students by the Soviet Union under terms of a new cultural agreement which is presently under discussion. Kenyan officials had in the past expressed public concern about the qualifications of the many IUS-sponsored scholarship students returning from the USSR and East Europe and the prospect now of facing "considerable numbers" of graduates of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University could not have been very reassuring. Someone may have recalled an East African Standard article of 10 May 1965 which discussed Kenyan students in Bulgaria under IUS auspices and stated that the students were studying "nothing but Communist ideology and guerrilla warfare." They were reported to have attended a "Party Students' School" and to have taken part in a Communist revolutionary course.

April 1969 - A banner headline in 13 April 1969 Nairobi Nation read "Russian Envoy Ordered Out": the Nairobi-based Pravda correspondent, Mikhail Domogatskikh, and a secretary at the Soviet embassy, Victor Elisseev (Yeliseyev), were declared personae non gratae by the Government of Kenya. "Russian diplomatic sources," the article said, "had clamped a news blackout on the situation ... and there was no comment from Home Office sources." The story continued that in February 1968 Kenya had expelled a Soviet Novosti correspondent (Venyamin D. Zakharov) and the Soviet representative of Sovexportfilm (Eduard B. Agadzhanov). At that time, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs, said: "Methods adopted by hostile intelligence services to subvert and undermine governments and to carry their ideological battles into countries which have repeatedly expressed their intention to remain unaligned are too well known to require repetition." In a brief follow-up story on 14 April, the Nation iterated "the Russian Embassy refrained from commenting and the Kenya Government has made no comment ... Vice President Moi said of the Sunday Nation front page story, 'You have got it all there. What more do you want?'"

ETHIOPIA HERALD, Addis Ababa
13 March 1969

Editorial

Time for Action

"There is a point beyond which patience ceases to be a virtue. The subversive activities of certain foreign agents are now pushing Ethiopia to this point.

"The problem of subversion and interference in the affairs of other states by major powers is an old but continuing cause for concern, not only among the now developing nations of the third world, but even among some highly industrialized but nevertheless subjugated satellite nations. Nor is Ethiopia a stranger to such intervention. The annals of our history bear witness to many instances of foreign intervention, interference and invasion. The whole long and lamentable era of colonialism is replete with examples of intervention under the guise of the so-called civilizing mission of imperialist powers. The Fascist invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was one example of such intervention which the world -- to its subsequent sorrow -- chose to ignore. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the latest but apparently not the last example of such foreign intervention.

"Sometimes foreign interference takes a more subtle form than the naked aggression of 1935 and that of 1968. Interference in national sovereignty may take the form of efforts to divide a country against itself, efforts to divide generation against generation, region against region. The undermining of developing nations may even take the more insidious form of posing as a protector. When the need in developing countries is for economic advancement, some major powers prefer to sow the seeds of discord and conflict by offering aid only in the form of arms.

"Ethiopia has experienced and survived if not all at least most of the forms of direct and indirect interference and subversion. On her part, Ethiopia, as a founding member of the United Nations and the seat of the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity, has stood fast against all instances of interference by outside powers against the sovereignty of any nation. Nor will Ethiopia view interference against herself any more lightly than she would against a sister state.

"For sometime outside agents have been trying to dupe students and some other groups of Ethiopians not only into betrayal of their own best interests but even into violence against the very fabric of their nation. Those who would try to tear Ethiopia apart should be warned: the cloth of our unity is durable and tough.

"Ethiopia did not become aware only yesterday or today of the subversive activities being fomented here by foreign agents. The various

acts of subversion attempted through bribery and corruption that have perpetrated have been known since their inception. Diplomatic hints have been dropped to the countries responsible. The soft hints seem to have fallen on deaf ears. The hand of friendship which Ethiopia continued to hold out to these countries seems to have been misinterpreted. If the open hand of brotherhood is misunderstood, perhaps it is time to show the closed fist.

"Many diatribes against Ethiopia, broadcast recently by a foreign radio have lately been circulated in the streets of Addis Ababa under the name of Ethiopian students. Subversion should at least be more subtle; duplicity, less obvious. Were the circumstances not so tragically sad, such an act might be viewed as an absurd and amateurish betrayal of itself. In this sophisticated age, even the intended vic-time of subversion might expect it to be carried out with more skill.

"Ethiopia, as a cornerstone of the non-aligned world, has made the principle of non-interference in the integrity and sovereignty of nations the foundation of its own foreign policy. We believe equally in national unity. We expect our sister nations to do the same. A country which has not bent to the Fascist sword will not bend to subversion from any source. Ethiopia's determination to defend herself against foreign aggressors has inscribed itself in the pages of history. A new page in this long and honorable history must now be written. The time for concern is passed. The time for action is here. Those responsible for subversive interference and cowardly attacks against Ethiopia will now have to pay the price. It has been said that those who do not know history are forced to repeat it. Those who ignore Ethiopia's long and heroic history of self-defense now have to be taught the lesson at first hand."

ETHIOPIAN HERALD
14 March 1969

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“Duping Students”

Ethiopia Bans Three Czech, Three Russian Officials For Sub- versive Activities

ADDIS ABABA, Thursday, (ENA) — Two Russians and three Czechs will be expelled from Ethiopia within 24 hours effective this evening for activities in Ethiopia “detrimental to the national interest of the country,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced this evening.

A third Russian will be prohibited from entering Ethiopia, a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry announced.

The three Russians and three Czechs were declared *persona non-grata* for their activities which were detrimental to the national interest of Ethiopia in general and for their activities in the recent student agitation in particular. The two Russians who will be expelled within 24 hours are Mikhail Novikov, the A.P.N. (Moscow) correspondent in Ethiopia, Mr. Victor Matweév, the Tass correspondent. The third Russian, Mr. Vladmir Charaev, of the Soviet Permanent Exhibition here, who is presently outside of Ethiopia, will be prohibited from entering Ethiopia.

The three Czechs who will be expelled within 24 hours are Mr. Josef Barton, an attache in the Czechoslovak Embassy and Mr. Vincent Stefanek and Mr. Ladislav Poslusny, both of the commercial section of the Czechoslovak Embassy.

The university and secondary schools in Addis Ababa were closed March three by government order. The closure announcement said the action was taken “to avert possible damage to property and even human lives in the wake of recent student agitation.”

Government sources said at the time a few student agitators were duped by foreign elements to disrupt national unity.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said last night the expulsion was necessary for “the normalization of student life in Ethiopia.”

Security sources revealed that they had “full proof” of the subversive activities of the expelled Soviet and Czech agents. They said a “compartmentalized” system had been set among students. Various “cells” of students were said to have been given separate tasks to perform, some of whom were apparently innocent or even pat-

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riotic in themselves, but which together in a pattern pre-conceived by the foreign agents but unknown to the full group of students, amounted to a course of activity which was a calculated betrayal of the people of Ethiopia.

One official said the government is now proceeding to "break the back" of the cell system set up by Soviet agents.

Another official said Radio Moscow had made obvious the Soviet complicity in subversive activities here. "Their recent broadcasts against Ethiopia were virtually an admission of guilt," he said.

Security officials, however, had already uncovered some of the details of the clandestine operations undertaken here by Soviet and Czech agents. Investigations are continuing into the subversive cell structure set up among a small minority of Ethiopian students by the foreign agents, official sources said.

CURRENT, Bombay
12 APRIL 1969

"Soviet Agents Chucked Out"
(Excerpts)

"In New Delhi there is nothing but love between the Indians and Soviets but in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, it is different. Ethiopian intelligence is smarter than ours for recently, following serious student unrest, the Ethiopian government chucked out two Russians and three Czechs as being the brains behind this student agitation.

"Now the interesting thing is that among those expelled was Comrade Victor Matveyev former TASS correspondent in New Delhi who was regarded as an old friend of India. Matveyev was head of the TASS bureau in the capital city in the early 1950's.

"Also expelled was Mikhail Novikov, representative of the 'unofficial' Novosti news agency. 'Unofficial' only because the Russians continue to claim that this news agency has nothing to do with the Soviet government.

"These strong and firm measures taken by the Ethiopian government are in striking contrast to the attitude of laissez-faire shown by India in exactly the same kind of student agitation. For years Soviet personnel have been active in subverting Indian University students but with Mrs. Indira Gandhi as the head of our government, so anxious not to displease her guru, Mr. Kosygin, no action is being taken here. Mrs. Gandhi is known to have passed the word down the line that under no circumstances should Soviet 'feelings' ever be hurt.

"In the case of Victor Matveyev, who was known as the TASS correspondent in India and who is now expelled from Ethiopia, the Ethiopians bluntly said that he is no journalist. They dub him as a propaganda activist for the KGB which he also was during his Indian tour of duty. Matveyev was not only an activist among students but he also did a great deal of damage in the trade union field. He was, of course, an accredited correspondent to the Government of India. The Indian government gives facilities to Soviet agents to do their work in our country.

"While Matveyev was regarded as a journalist in New Delhi and was treated as a pen-pal by local journalists, he was even then working with Soviet intelligence personnel. In the Soviet set up -- KGB and others -- it is often the number two who control the number one and so it was with Matveyev who had an 'assistant' Comrade Protyannikov. Yet it was Protyannikov who was the control man and the main liaison with the headquarters of the KGB in Moscow.

"Under Matveyev's regime the TASS office in New Delhi was greatly expanded. Propaganda work particularly at the time of the Telengana riots erupted and soon Matveyev had to push aside his student 'side line' to others to perform. The bigger subversive activity, namely Telengana riots, needed his attention first and foremost.

"After Matveyev's departure a number of Soviet intelligence men have been in charge of Indian student 'cells.' At least two of these did not come to the attention of the Indian authorities chiefly because the Indian authorities are not suspicious of Soviet activity in this country. There was for instance, Comrade Ramiz Ibrahimov, a Central Asian, who specialized in infiltration of what is known as the Muslim wing of the student movement. When Ibrahimov was whisked away, his successor in the job was Alexandr Dmitrievich Terekhin, a very efficient operator in India, who established many close contacts but always managed to keep his nose clean. Ibrahimov and Terekhin were the kingpins of the KGB personnel attached to the student wing in India during the middle 1960's."

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THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
6 February 1969

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Student Unrest in E. Africa

Hindustan Times Correspondent

The incidence of student unrest is being increasingly felt in universities and colleges of East Africa.

In common with the students of France, Britain, India and Japan, the movement here is leftist oriented and becoming increasingly militant although shorn of actual violence. The confrontation with the authorities is generally confined to demonstrations and strikes.

Last year about 1,400 students of University College, Dar es Salaam, confronted President Nyerere when he directed that they should serve a spell in the Tanzania National Youth Service to work on various social projects in the field. The students defied the order and boycotted lectures. President Nyerere retaliated by closing down the institution and sacking them all.

Today a similar phenomenon is being witnessed at the University College in Nairobi. The Kenya Government has closed down the college and packed off home its 1,800 inmates, including over 200 of Indian and Pakistani origin. The confrontation in Nairobi arose from the refusal of the authorities to allow the Opposition Kenya Peoples Union leader, Mr Odinga, to address the students.

There is no doubt that Mr

Odinga, with his radical leftist views, is quite popular with the student body. In the past his talks have been applauded not only by the Nairobi students but also in Dar es Salaam and at the Makerere College in Uganda. However following tougher measures against the KPU in Kenya, the Government on two occasions this year, refused to let him address them on "the role of elections in a democratic society."

Municipal Elections

Mr "Double O" would have of course, in his talk scathingly referred to last year's municipal elections in Kenya when almost all KPU candidates were disqualified for various alleged irregularities. His talk would also have focussed attention on the forthcoming General Elections next year and received publicity, as in the past, in the local and overseas press.

Whatever the reasons, the Nairobi students were deprived of listening to Mr Odinga. On the first occasion the authorities stated that a proper procedure had not been followed by the students when inviting him to the college campus. On the second occasion, however, it was clear that the college principal, West Indian Dr Arthur Porter, had been directed by the Government not to let Mr Odinga address them at all.

This sparked off the students, they staged a demonstration at the college campus and resolved not to attend lectures. The authorities rushed into campus with armed police units, closed down the college and forcibly evicted the students from the halls of residence.

While the rumpus was going on in Nairobi, students of Kampala's Makerere College came out in open support of their Nairobi colleagues by staging a demonstration there, followed by a 24-hour college strike. A copy of the East African Standard, which had denounced the action of the Nairobi students, was ceremoniously set ablaze. The Makerere chaps also sought to send a delegation to Nairobi to see President Kenyatta but were stopped from entering Kenya.

Academic Freedom

The Nairobi students accuse the Kenya Government of interfering with academic freedom guaranteed in the college constitution. They claim that the debarring of Mr Odinga from the college campus is only incidental to this basic issue.

Fighting out a verbal battle with them is the Minister of Education, Julius Kioko, who asserts that the students must obey the Government "without question."

The college, he says, will be opened only on certain conditions, that no politician will be allowed to address them without prior Government approval. The Minister is being fully backed by President Kenyatta.

The college staff, which includes a fair number of foreign professors and lecturers, is maintaining a cautious attitude to the whole affair. While expressing support for academic freedom and, as Dr Porter puts it, "free circulation of ideas" at campus, it has urged the students to play it cool and enter into "negotiations" with the Government.

The confrontation has now become a trial of strength between the students and the Kenyan authorities. Although in many overseas countries students have sometimes come out victorious in such contexts, students in Africa are generally tame and lack staying power compared to their colleagues in the West or in Asia. In Dar es Salaam last year, students backed down after staging a similar confrontation and returned sheepishly with tails between their legs following President Nyerere's tough attitude. It is likely that this will be repeated in Kenya where the Government is in no mood to tolerate any trouble from the students—or anyone else.

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May 1969

SOVIET SCIENTISTS: DISAFFECTION AND DISAPPOINTMENT

Contradictions between the USSR's self-proclaimed image and Soviet reality are nowhere so glaring as in the broad realm of science. Marx repeatedly referred to the scientific soundness of his analyses of conditions and of his forecasts of the historically inevitable victory of communism. Stalin in 1927 predicted that in the communist society of the USSR, "Science and art will enjoy conditions conducive to their highest development." Khrushchev in 1957 boasted of achievements of the USSR which "mark a new epoch in the development of science and technology" and acclaimed the "greatest feats of workers of Soviet science and technology" in solving complicated problems. In January 1966 Soviet Academy of Sciences member Peter Kapitsa spoke of "the great advantages offered by our socialist system in the organization of our science and industry." In February 1969 the World Marxist Review called science and technology "one of the principal and determinative fields in the contest between the two opposed social systems" and asserted that socialism offers "the greatest scope for scientific worth." Finally, in Moscow News of 29 March 1969, Soviet Academy of Sciences member Janis Peive asserted that the Soviet state "displays great concern for developing science, which is making an important contribution to the acceleration of engineering progress, to the solution of major problems of the economy, and to the further raising of cultural standards in our country."

How does this picture of a science-oriented society square with the actual achievements of Soviet science and the situation of Soviet scientists? Several recent documents and commentaries shed considerable light on this subject. It can be clearly concluded that Soviet science, except in military support work, has fallen far short of the Kremlin's expectations. Moreover, Soviet scientists, who as a class have long been favored by the regime, have demonstrated that they are deeply disaffected by the Soviet system and some recent Kremlin policies.

Major Conclusions Concerning Soviet Science

An exhaustive study entitled "Soviet Science Policies" was completed in June 1968 by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Richly documented and offering cogent discussions in its 738 pages, it has only recently been distributed in limited numbers to reviewers in Great Britain and the United States. In the reviews, three of which are attached, several of the OECD compendium's findings are highlighted:

- a. Soviet science has scored tangible achievements in military research and development and, as a companion effort, in space exploration.

b. In other selected scientific pursuits, such as research in mathematics, theoretical physics, earth sciences, and physiology, the Soviets have done well; but it is noted that these are pursuits in which pre-Revolutionary Russian scientists also did well.

c. In technology, besides aerospace, the USSR has done reasonably well in electric power equipment, machine tools, steelmaking equipment, and some aspects of medicine.

d. As for the balance, according to one reviewer, "There remain huge deserts in Soviet science, both in academic work and in industry."

e. Soviet achievement in almost every science-based industry lags far behind that of Western Europe and even farther behind that of the United States. The need to call on Italian and other Western European help in the present effort to develop the automobile industry is a case in point.

f. The Soviet bureaucracy has been able to marshal scientists for selected military-related projects, but the clumsy unresponsiveness of the bureaucracy has severely impaired scientific and technical development in other fields.

g. Soviet science and technology has yielded only meager returns on the huge outlays -- three per cent of gross national product -- invested in science. An important reason for this is that research is given an unduly large emphasis at the expense of developmental and experimental work related to industry.

h. Soviet scientists are estimated to be only one half as productive as American scientists. (This is admitted by Soviet scientists; one reviewer believes the comparison is even more unfavorable to the Soviets.)

i. The critical failing in Soviet science is the incentive to innovate. Soviet scientists have been judged mainly on the volume of their research as measured in money terms, and not on the quality and number of projects which yield genuine benefits to the society.

j. The most evident shortcoming of Soviet science is in the technology of the USSR's consumer goods industries (automobiles, refrigerators, TV's, sewing machines, etc.). Soviet consumer goods are so shoddy that cash-heavy and goods-poor Soviet citizens deposit increasing percentages of their income in savings banks.

Past Soviet Efforts to Improve Scientific Work

It would be inaccurate to say that the Soviets fail to recognize the plain fact that they have obtained poor overall results from their vast array of scientific institutes and industrial research establishments. To refute that notion it is enough to note (as does the OECD study) that the Soviets have reorganized their scientific and technical establishment time and again over the years. These reorganizations, however, were superficial and even frequently repeated systems resembled solutions which had been tried and found wanting in the past.

A departure from this dependency on reorganization was started in January 1966, when a speech by the prominent physicist Peter Kapitsa was published in the Communist youth newspaper. Kapitsa noted Premier Kosygin's statements in September 1965 about the declining growth of labor productivity and linked that decline to the unsatisfactory application of the achievements of Soviet science and technology. Asserting that the Soviets had not been closing the scientific gap between them and the Americans, he made a series of recommendations, the most important of which was that some means be found to offer monetary incentives for useful innovations. Kapitsa was quite candid in attributing his suggestion to American experience and, possibly for this reason, little was done about it for almost three years. (See the attached translation of Kapitsa's speech.)

New Proposals to Improve Scientific Work

In October 1968 the Soviet Government issued a decree entitled "Measures to Raise the Efficacy of the Work of Scientific Organizations and to Accelerate the Utilization of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the National Economy." (See attached article from Pravda.) The published report of the decree is largely a rehash of familiar, nagging problems, but it contains a remarkable new feature: a proposed system of material incentives to be introduced gradually, starting 1 January 1969. Under this system, both the institutes and their employees will be rewarded in proportion to the profits that their innovations earn for industry. Institutes and scientists are to be rated every three years by committees composed of scientists, Party representatives, and trade union officials. Those who fail to measure up will be demoted or dismissed. Scientific and professional competence will no longer be the criterion of success; rather, it will be the practical economic results of the work performed.

How this profit and incentive system will work out is an open question. One obstacle is the deeply entrenched system under which Soviet scientists have been working for decades; demoting veterans for failure to meet new criteria is not easy, especially for their contemporary supervisors in the institutes. Getting industry to accept new and better methods has always been difficult, for the simple reason that factory managers customarily avoid the kinds of work slowdowns and loss of production which result from experiments with, or the introduction of new equipment. It would jeopardize their profits. Moreover, the profit

system for science will depend largely on the profit system introduced since 1965 in Soviet industry, which has fared poorly during the past several years, largely because bureaucrats have resisted changes and Party ideologists have been suspicious of reforms which would lead in the direction of a market economy. These shortcomings won't encourage the scientists to hope that their system will work any better.

Soviet Scientists Are Increasingly Disaffected

Signs that Soviet scientists are disaffected are apparent not only from the above-noted deficiencies in scientific achievement and the regime's moves to redirect scientists' work and make it more profitable. There are also signs that many prominent Soviet scientists are questioning the basic Soviet system, and that many young scientists are, at the least, politically apathetic.

The best-known figure among disaffected Soviet scientists is Andrei Sakharov, the physicist who in 1954, when still in his early thirties, was made the youngest full member in the history of the USSR's Academy of Sciences as a reward for making a major contribution to the USSR's hydrogen bomb. In 1968 Sakharov, in an essay circulated widely amongst leading Soviet scientists, set forth his theses of convergence of communist and capitalist systems in the interest of serving mankind, and of the essential need of intellectual freedom in human society. Sakharov's essay scathingly condemns the Stalinist survivals in the Soviet society, and proposes measures which would radically change the political philosophy and structure of the USSR.

Other leading Soviet scientists have since 1966 joined with prominent intellectuals in protesting against moves taken or contemplated by the Soviet regime. The attached article by Victor Zorza entitled "Scientists' Rebellion Upsets the Kremlin" describes some of these protests by scientists, as well as steps being taken by the regime to discredit the scientists and thus minimize the effect of their protests. Also described are Soviet press articles indicating that residents of the "science town" of Obninsk have held "misguided" political seminars and have invited "dubious people who preached incorrect views" to speak to them.

Causing further concern to the regime is the indication that young Soviet scientists are either apathetic to political affairs or are taking unorthodox views of wrestling with national problems. The Soviet press particularly attacks young scientists who "lack the political experience to get to the bottom of even simple questions" and are unable to draw the line between "correct" criticism and "criticism which seeks to undermine the foundations of our society." The press maintains they wrongly dispute the party's right to restrict their personal and political freedom.

* * * * *

The Soviet regime shows little evidence that it can solve the substantial problems posed by the long-tolerated shortcomings in science and technology and at the same time contain the stirrings of disaffection among prominent and young scientists. Offering more money for more results will undoubtedly help some. However, the Soviet regime would be very naïve to believe that scientists, who have undergone many years of rigorous training, will confine their thoughts to strictly scientific matters and agree not to encroach upon the party's monopoly over political questions.

Scientists' rebellion upsets the Kremlin

The COMMUNIST WORLD:
by VICTOR ZORZA

THE Kremlin's thought-police is moving in slowly, circumspectly, on the Soviet scientific community whose rebellion is threatening to undermine the party's totalitarian rule. Professor Andrei Sakharov, whose call for a multi-party system in Russia is circulating ever more widely through underground channels inside the country, is still at liberty.

To arrest this man—who made a signal contribution to the Soviet nuclear programme—for demanding freedom of thought for scientists and the public alike would be to provoke a powerful wave of public protest. The scientists took a prominent part in the recent protests against the arrests of "freedom writers." They would fight that much harder against the arrest of one of their own.

The Sakharov manifesto, with its closely argued plea for the "convergence" of the Communist and capitalist systems, clearly shook the party establishment. There was no public condemnation, nor even any direct mention, of the Sakharov document in the Soviet press, but the problem which he created for the party's control of the scientific community is being tackled with increasing vigour in the party journals.

The latest contribution to the debate appears in "Kommunist," the party's chief ideological magazine, in an article signed by N. Sviridov—whose position as deputy head of the party propaganda department is tactfully glossed over. He complains that some scientists, whom he does not name, get hold of "casual" political information "and on this shaky foundation they sometimes build far-reaching conclusions."

At the same time, without actually threatening them with the sack for political nonconformity, he mentions that a check on the qualifications of scientists in Leningrad has led to 100 dismissals. This appears to be the first such check since the announcement recently of the new system under which all scientists would have to undergo examination as the price of retaining their posts.

The examination panel consists not only of the scientists' own peers, but also of party and trade union officials. It is thus clear that political as well as professional criteria enters into the decision. Indeed, the "attestation" procedure now extended to scientists is a long-standing Soviet practice, which is specifically defined in a Soviet law encyclopaedia as being concerned, among other things, with the "political qualifications" of the people being "attested."

Clearly, the Kremlin cannot afford anything like a real purge of free-thinkers among the scientists, because this would pull the rug from under its own feet. All the evidence suggests that too large and too influential a part of the scientific community shares, to a greater or lesser extent, many of Sakharov's ideas. The thought-police must, therefore, proceed circumspectly, using both stick and carrot.

Material conditions for scientists, who already comprise the most privileged section of the community, have recently been further improved as part of a general reorganisation of the administration of science. Steps have been taken to cut out the dead wood, about which there have been many complaints from younger scientists, whose career prospects were frustrated by old men hanging on to lucrative posts. The "re-attestation" programme is partly directed to this end.

In science, however, the intellectual rebellion is maturing among both the old and the young, as distinct from most other walks of Soviet life, where the young are the rebels. Sakharov himself was joined by such old pillars of Soviet science as Kapitsa and Tamm in a widely distributed protest to the Politburo at the time of the last party congress against the proposed rehabilitation of Stalin.

At the same time, "young scientists" are criticised, as in the recent "Kommunist" article, for taking an "abstract and classless" view of such ideas as "democracy, freedom of the person, and humanism." This is to say that they dispute the party's right to impose restrictions on personal and political freedom—just as Sakharov did. He was worried about the situation in a particular section of society;

they convene a special meeting and issue a thumping resolution which publicly condemns the shortcomings and demands immediate improvements. It would seem that in the present matter they have behaved with much greater discretion. A meeting has certainly been held and the appropriate minority resolution passed—but it was all done in secret, in order not to stir up the scientific hornets' nest.

The evidence of the party's secret moves is to be found in articles which began to appear shortly after the Sakharov manifesto had emerged from the

underground. Many of them use precisely the same phrases and the same evidence of ideological backsliding among scientists, thus indicating that they are all based on the same original document—that is, on the secret party resolution about the scientific rebellion.

Brezhnev's warning to the Soviet intelligentsia in general, issued in the early stages of the Czechoslovak reformation, has now been made to apply to the scientists in particular. The scientists are told that "the enemies of communism are clutching at any evidence of political immaturity among its individual representatives, whom they are attempting to use in their hostile activity against our country." They should, as "Kommunist" instructs them, stand firm "against the attempts of the ideological saboteurs to introduce ideas and views that are alien to socialism into our midst."

But what happens if "alien" ideas are somehow conceived by thoroughly patriotic scientists, who base their case for political and social modernisation of the system on grounds of national interest? The party's answer is to ridicule the scientists as politically immature.

Many young scientists, complains the newspaper "Soviet Culture," take a "snobbish" attitude to the public activities in which the party asks them to participate. Instead, it would seem, they demand the democratic right to take part in the discussion and shaping of policy, almost as if this was not the exclusive province of the party. With heavy irony, the paper comments that "they are only interested in 'major' problems if not of universal, then at least of national importance—which they are ready to discuss and to 'solve' without thinking

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whether these problems are within their grasp."

Young scientists in particular "lack the political experience to get to the bottom of even simple questions." They are unable to distinguish between criticism that is "correct"—and therefore permissible—and criticism which seeks to undermine the foundations of our society."

Club lectures

Soviet scientists are privileged not only materially but also ideologically, for the party has had to give them with one hand the right to independent thinking which it is trying to take away from them with the other. If they are to produce the scientific wonders that the party keeps pressing them for, they must be free to play with scientific ideas—and they use this freedom to play with political ideas which are barred to other sections of the community.

In the "science town" of Obninsk, which is being used by

the party press as the example of what is wrong with Soviet scientists, the local club "readily granted its platform to dubious people who preached incorrect views." This could hardly happen in other "cultural" clubs, which are usually firmly controlled by party supervisors, but it can and does happen repeatedly in the Soviet scientific communities which control their own club lectures.

Political seminars, according to an article in "Party Life," lacked "a clear political direction." Topics for discussion were chosen "thoughtlessly." In Soviet double-talk this means the very opposite of what it says—that is, the "political direction" was all too clear, and the choice of topics only too thoughtful. The party's thought-police can do little about it unless it demands the dismissal and arrest of many scientists. Even the Kremlin cannot afford to fall in with such demands. Sakharov is still free—and so are 770,000 others who are officially classified as "scientific workers."

NEW STATESMAN
28 March 1969

How Bad is Soviet Science?

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NIGEL CALDER

If Americans land safely on the moon this summer, they will do at least some service to truth, by laying the ghost of *Sputnik 1*. Since October 1957, when the West was quite unnecessarily surprised by the first of the 'firsts' in space, the myth of Soviet scientific and technological excellence has been hard to dispel. The resurgence of public support for education, research and engineering, following the sputnik, helped the US and Europe much more than Khrushchev could have intended. There was a wish to be deceived: for those urging the cause of science in the West the Russian bogey came in very handy. (Nowadays, for Europeans, it's an American bogey.) The fact is that the numerically equal scientific armies of the US and the USSR are amazingly unequal in performance. Let's score the Americans at eight out of 10. Last month I'd have given the Russians four out of 10; after reading a new analysis, shortly to be published, I'm not inclined to be even that generous.

Let me add, right away, that you cannot have large numbers of talented people at work in laboratories, as the Russians have, and produce nothing, however much you mismanage them. In a few fields, the Soviet record is good; on the research side, mathematics and theoretical physics, earth sciences and physiology are areas in which the Russians traditionally do well; on the technological side, in aerospace, power generation, machine tools, steel-making and medicine

they have nothing to be ashamed of. The trouble is that there remain huge deserts in Soviet science, both in academic work and in industry.

In chemistry and biology, in agriculture, in almost every science-based industry except those mentioned, Soviet achievement lags far behind Western Europe's, never mind that of America. The USSR failed to produce even a good automobile without Italian help. For a nation officially committed to automation and computerisation, the Soviet computer technology runs pathetically behind the times, as shown by the 'Ural-4' fiasco. To say all this is not needlessly to attack a country that has had a bitter struggle to modernise itself. Leading Soviet commentators have been very self-critical. In any case, Soviet science is an object lesson to bureaucratic planners in all countries, especially because the regime is allegedly founded on science and rationality, and science is doctrinally a productive force. The failure is politically embarrassing, economically crippling, culturally depressing.

The space flights, the bomb, the missiles, the supersonic aircraft — these are proof of a concentration of skill in special areas which give the USSR superpower status in the strategic sense. They can have been achieved only by military crash-programme procedures that cut through the red tape. On the other hand, the military secrecy surrounding even the top military space flights

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has been sending up experiments in spacecraft, never saw the vehicles, or even the box that carried the experiment. Outside these and the few other special areas which have tied up a disproportionate fraction of the money and best manpower, it is hard to find very much that is strikingly original, or applied with exceptional vigour - and originality is the essence of science, as application is of technology. Whether you're interested in pulsars or psychology, in chemical plant or TV sets, the Russian lag is unmistakable. Attempts from time to time to promote originality of thought have led to grotesque publicity for cranks in the Soviet press.

Yet there are many very bright and forceful Russian scientists. Of the various reasons why the system is rotten, the most obvious is Lysenko, who not only succeeded in arresting agricultural progress for a generation, but also created an atmosphere of terror that devastated biology. The physicists were in a stronger position to shrug off ideological attacks on quantum theory and the like, yet the intellectual freedom so necessary for creative ideas, in science as in anything else, is still badly compromised. On top of that is a disastrous institutional system which segregates the leading research institutes both from the universities on the one hand and the factories on the other.

So much has long been clear to Western visitors, and admitted by internal critics like Kapitza and Lisichkin. Now I have before

in the USSR, prepared by Western experts for the OECD's Directorate for Scientific Affairs. In its cool and statistical way, drawing on Soviet documents, it amounts to a formidable indictment of the bureaucrats, academicians and party bunglers.

Although its tone is more kindly than mine, it persuades me that, if anything, I have tended to be too charitable about the glories of Soviet science. The report shows how ineptitude has permeated the system, from the local criterion that a laboratory has fulfilled its plan if it spends its budget (and done better if it's overspent!) to the failure at the national level effectively to disburse the allotted funds for research and development. The chapter on science and industry, by R. W. Davies and his colleagues at Birmingham University, is particularly revealing, not least in its account of official efforts to circumvent a pricing system that has made innovation unattractive to managers.

The communist regime is failing at the very point where ideologically it should have been strongest, where in the popular imagination it offers its greatest challenge to the West, and where its greatest chance for building true communism once lay. The Czech academicians who inspired the Dubcek reforms understood what was going wrong. The reactionary forces in Moscow now being in the ascendancy again, we cannot expect more than occasional twitches from the smothered genius of Russian scientists.

WASHINGTON POST

3 April 1969

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Russia Found Still Lagging Industrially

By Eric Wentworth
Washington Post Staff Writer

For a half-century, the Soviet Union has looked to science to take the country to the forefront of the modern industrialized world.

For all their solid achievements on the space and military frontiers, the Russians today still suffer a chronic technology gap in countless other, important sectors of their vast and cumbersome economy. Indeed, by one definition, the Soviet Union still falls short of being an industrialized nation.

In an exhaustive new treatise dissecting Soviet science policies and programs, the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development finds the Rus-

sians are turning to Western approaches in some cases in hopes of improving their system.

When the Soviet leaders once decide to assign top priority to some technological program, the soon-to-be-published OECD report concludes, they can marshal their resources effectively and usually achieve results on a par with anything the United States accomplished.

But such crash efforts are limited, and the Russians lag well behind their American rivals in the crucial computer and chemical industries and in almost all consumer products. Rigid, centralized planning, and unwieldy bureaucracy, limited research support, failures to follow up research with development and frequent resistance to innovation on the factories have all contributed to this Soviet gap.

"The centralized planning system in its present form," a summary of the 738-page OECD report suggests, "im-

poses definite limits on the efficiency of Soviet research and development."

In terms of sheer manpower, the Soviet education system has been turning out masses of scientists, engineers and technicians. As of 1965, for example, an estimated one-third of the 4,891,000 citizens with higher-level schooling were engineers and technicians. By another estimate, between 1,655,000 and 2,291,000 persons—accurate data are elusive—were engaged in re-

search and development work in 1966.

However, the OECD study finds "reasons for believing, that with the possible exception of the high priority sectors a lower level of equipment and other facilities per scientist means that the 'productivity' per man of R and D is lower in the U.S.S.R. than in the United States."

A knottier factor in the Russian technological lag appears to be frequent failure to develop laboratory achievements into practical, assembly-line use.

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Soviet sources according to the OECD opns have claimed development spending in their country is less than 50 per cent of the total R and D budget against 65.5 per cent in the United States. While questioning these specific figures, the OECD experts don't quarrel with the basic contention.

They report running across numerous complaints about skimping on provision of testing facilities, production of prototypes and construction of pilot plants. In addition, they relate, "The Soviet press frequently publishes accounts of the failure to introduce new products, processes, once developed, into large-scale production, and of the slow rate at which new products and processes, even when they are fully introduced into production, replace existing products and processes.

Bureaucratic barriers within the Soviet governmental hierarchy and between the academic and industrial worlds are one cause of the lag but more basic still is the stubborn resistance to change built into the present Soviet system.

Thanks to traditional industrial planning that sets ar-

bitrary output targets for factories and their parent ministries with limited budgets available to attain them, harried factory managers and officials have been prone to reject any innovations that might cause current production to break stride or divert available funds from existing needs.

Aware of their system's failings, the Russians in the past few years have been undertaking some remedial steps with what the OECD analysts view so far as mixed results. They are experimenting, for example, with "factory centers," "research complexes" and "research corporations"—patterned to some extent on United States structures and designed to bring laboratories and assembly lines into common harness.

Borrowing further on Western approaches, the Soviet leaders have moved toward financing research work through contracts and have accepted the idea of fostering competition among research groups.

Beyond that, they are beginning the use of bonuses to inspire scientists, designers and factory workers engaged in re-

search and development toward faster, more effective work—with the size of the reward related to the economic return from what they produce.

The OECD experts consider this last a healthy step but not a panacea. "It seems certain," their summary observes "that successful innovations in the West cannot entirely be explained in terms of the higher profit margins obtainable from innovation."

At the same time, they add, "Soviet efforts in the next few years to measure and reward the economic return on research and development are nevertheless likely to be relevant and interesting to Western countries."

The 22-nation OECD's analysts recognize that despite its shortcomings, the Soviet Union has made immense strides toward becoming a modern society over the past 40 years. But by one OECD definition they conclude that Russia, with more than 30 per cent of its labor force still on the farm and reportedly producing more than 20 per cent of its national income, cannot yet be classified as an industrialized nation.

THE ECONOMIST
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The Technological Gap — in Russia

Looking at the Russians' achievements in space, one finds it hard to believe that one of their obsessions at home is with the technological gap between themselves and the United States, and the way to close it. The Russians are, after all, training a quite staggering number of scientists and engineers; half the students coming out of the universities have qualified as either the one or the other, making the number of young, technically qualified graduates coming out each year substantially higher than it is in the United States.

And the pool of technically qualified manpower is substantial, even for a country the size of the Soviet Union; it could be well over 2½ mn, of whom nearly 700,000 are university graduates or the equivalent. The American pool of qualified man-power is not all that different, although the ratio of university-trained scientists and engineers is much higher—about 1½ mn graduates sets of figures excluding the social

sciences. It is not lack of trained men that explains the gap, nor is it lack of money. The sums spent on science have been increasing annually and very rapidly, trebling in a decade and running at 3% of gross national product, roughly the same ratio as in America; whatever else they lack, those Soviet scientists are not short of money. Then what are they short of? The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has been making its own, if not exactly clandestine, then not exactly official assessment for the last two or three years, and the resulting report*, nearly 750 pages long, is now being given a restricted circulation. Because of the notorious unreliability of official Soviet figures, and the still more notorious difficulty of matching them to any comparable

western data, the specialists who compiled the report have been careful to explain their sources and methodology at every step, and the rash attempt to make some comparison with the American research is ours, not theirs. But we thought it useful to show, however notionally, that the Russians have tried the brute force approach of throwing in masses of men and money on a scale approaching the American—but failed to get the results they were looking for. They are now groping for some more subtle key to technological innovation and this is having a profound effect on the whole of their economic thinking.

Why they lag

For what the Russians appear to have found is that innovation requires first of all an attitude of mind that is not fostered by a normal Marxist economy. If a factory manager's success is measured by his volume of output and his workers'

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wage bonuses depend on exceeding targets. The manager is going to object to any form of re-tooling that is going to interfere with production. He is also going to run into difficulty in pricing the new product so that it pays for its re-tooling and still remains competitive enough to sell. And even when a plant manager is prepared to innovate, he runs the risk of being landed with a half-baked scheme badly worked out and only partially tested. The Russian scientific establishment, it seems, prefers to spend its time on research rather than development work. Few of the big research institutes have adequate facilities for pilot plant design. The lack of these has hit the chemical industry particularly hard and probably goes a long way to explain why so much chemical and synthetic fibre technology has been imported from the west. But there have been complaints about electronics, engineering, atomic energy, computer controlled machine tools and iron and steel as well. And these are nearly all fields where a big technological fall-out from the Soviet space effort might have happened—but has not.

The Russians themselves estimate that the productivity of their researchers is only about half the Americans' and that innovations take two or three times as long to put into effect. One likely reason is lack of development facilities, another is the lack of supporting staff. Senior scientists consider that they should have between two and three junior scientists and three to five laboratory assistants to help them when they are doing fundamental research, and double that number when they are on development.

It is reasonably certain that they get nothing of the sort in practice. The evidence of some universities indicates that scientists are doing well if two of them share the services of three laboratory assistants. They also complain, as university professors so often do in communist countries, that senior staff are expected to spend so much of their time teaching that little margin remains for research, and without the stimulus of research, they are hardly equipped to teach.

But when the Soviet machine, and the meanness of the local republics has taken all the blame they unquestionably deserve, the suspicion remains that the scientists themselves may be short on intellectual curiosity. Soviet industrial research tends to be organised on lines rather like the British government industry research establishments and we do

know how patchy their performance is. The industry really wanted to know. The same tendencies are at work in the Soviet Union with a few outstanding exceptions like the two major iron and steel research institutes that have established a two-way flow of information with the factories which has made this one of the most advanced of Russian industries.

The Russian press, like the British, has been irritated by the number of times ideas that originated in Russia have been exploited commercially by other countries, notably the United States; instances of work on certain electronic components seem to rankle the most. And to put beside this is a number of spectacular failures: OECD cites computers (the infamous Ural 4 series) and car design. This, in the report, is contrasted with Soviet successes in what are classed as priority industries like space, defence research and atomic energy. But except for space, is this strictly true?

No one questions the quality of Soviet military equipment, including aircraft, but the performance of Soviet civil aircraft is open to challenge, and so is the country's record in atomic energy. Early Soviet planners made such basic mistakes as drawing up energy policies that tied the country to coal rather than oil, and transport policies that were based on steam locomotives rather than diesels.

But Russia was also the first country to have a working nuclear power station—a small one, admittedly but pre-dating Calder Hall by several years. However, this never materialised into a nuclear power programme. Similarly very few Soviet civil aircraft have ever gone into quantity production.

Russian remedies

These examples are important because the OECD seems to think that the reason that scientists in these industries got more done than their colleagues in other research institutes is because they knew what they were attempting to do. They had a clear goal that allowed them to co-ordinate the efforts of researchers and industries scattered the breadth of the Soviet Union and had government backing from the top to by-pass the normal labyrinthine scientific planning machine to get their hands on key materials and equipment of good quality, to get

building work done quickly and on a wide range of the headaches of the Soviet industrial and frustrated life. Maybe they did, but

the end-product has not always been of high quality. Take the Soviet supersonic prototype airliner now flying; the evidence is that it suffers from all the shortcomings that have given supersonic airliners in the west such a chequered record. Yet aircraft is a shining example of a Russian industry where development work and the construction of prototypes is given its due importance, and where the designer and his supporting engineers outrank the factory manager, which they do not do elsewhere.

Among the remedies the Russians have sought to prevent the dissipation of their scientific effort, are reforms aimed at cutting down the power of the scientific establishment, as represented by the Academy of Sciences, and the giving of more autonomy to the individual research centres including the famous Novosibirsk laboratories in Siberia. Around this a "centre of excellence" is building up on American lines, and attracting advanced industries to set up locally to cater for its advanced needs. The result of these reforms should in the long term be to reduce the status somewhat of the pure scientist and increase that of the engineer—Russian intellectuals are as big culture-snobs as any in the west and engineers have (like teachers) had to put up with a good deal of patronising. But this merely alters the climate slightly, of itself it will not close the technological gap.

So efforts are being made to devise a Soviet-type formula for measuring the possible cost-effectiveness of innovation; for giving factory managers a choice of innovations to adopt in their own plant—say, to choose which of several possible designs of machine tool they think worth putting into development; and combining this with some incentive to adopt innovation on the factory floor, together with a price system that will not penalise the manager who does so. If this sounds as if the Russians are moving, at industry level, towards a more western approach to cost accounting, this is precisely what the OECD specialists who have studied the research and development end of Russian industry think they are doing. How far this can be carried without a wholesale revision of the industrial cost structure, and of economic policy generally, the next few years may show. Sufficient for the moment that the Russians are increasingly conscious of the age of the majority of their machine tools, of the obsolete design of many of their

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textile looms, and of the fact that many factories are continuing to churn out obsolete designs because it is less bother than to adopt the new ones that have been developed and could be supplied were there a demand for them.

And that the necessary demand can only be created by supplying some kind of western-style incentive for it. Moscow is also beginning to realise that incentives in a Marxist economy are less easy to provide than one might think. The first attempt at offering factory managers "innovation bonuses" ended with a fair proportion of the budget for bonuses underspent.

The degree of success that the Russians have in getting round these difficulties has more bearing

on western science than one might think. The Russians' problem from the outset has been how to combine planning with initiative. The west's is increasingly how to combine initiative with planning. As more and more "big" science gets government financed, so the west runs into more and more Soviet-type muddles, and all the short-comings highlighted in the OECD report, the cumbersome planning structure, the poor standards of outlying and distant laboratories, the low status of science teachers, the reluctance of managers to adopt new ideas, the difficulty in getting new projects started, combined with the even greater difficulty of getting them finished within a reasonable time. Already it is being argued

quite strongly in the west that innovation now comes not from big but small companies that have overheads low enough to allow them to improvise and experiment on a scale no big corporation can. If their innovation is successful, they get taken over by big companies who then look after the problems of quantity production and marketing that no small enterprise can handle. But if tax, and financial and institutional factors make it increasingly difficult for small companies to live—as is becoming the case in Britain and western Europe but not yet in the United States—this source of ideas is cut off from big industry and you get Soviet-type problems, with, presumably, Soviet-type results.

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Resolution to Spur Scientific Research and Development

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In the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers: ON MEASURES TO RAISE THE EFFICACY OF THE WORK OF SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS AND TO ACCELERATE THE UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. (Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 23, p. 1. Complete text:) The C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers have examined the question of measures to raise the efficacy of the work of scientific organizations and to accelerate the utilization of scientific and technical achievements in the national economy. The resolution adopted on this question notes that in a short historical period Soviet science and technology have attained a high degree of development and exert a decisive influence on the pace of the country's technical progress. Soviet science is first in the world in several major fields; this makes it possible to resolve important tasks in developing the economy and strengthening the country's defense capacity.

The 23rd C.P.S.U. Congress defined the chief trends of technical progress that are connected with the growth of production forces, the strengthening of the Soviet state and a steady increase in the people's material and cultural standards of living. To resolve these tasks, it is essential to improve the work of scientific organizations substantially and to eliminate the obstacles retarding utilization of scientific and technical achievements in the national economy.

A common shortcoming in the work of scientific-research, design, drafting and technological organizations and scientific subdivisions of higher schools is that their work is not focused to the proper extent on solving the most important scientific-technical problems, especially questions related to accelerating the growth rate of labor productivity in industry, agriculture, construction, transport and other branches of the national economy. The time it takes to apply scientific achievements is still considerable; the chief explanation for this lies in the insufficient responsibility exercised by scientific institutions for the level of performance of scientific and technical projects, and by enterprises for the timely production of items of new technology.

Clear-cut specialization of scientific, design and drafting organizations has not been provided, and scientific-technical competition among them is poorly developed. There is a large gap between the time scientific research and design and technological elaborations are done and the time they are put into practice. To a considerable degree the reason for this lies in the inadequate role played by design subdivisions and laboratories at enterprises and in the slow development of capacities for the production of technological equipment and tools.

The existing system of economic incentives for scientific research and for assimilation in production of the results of this research does not promote a rise in the efficacy of the scientific organizations' work. The scientific base at enterprises is being developed inadequately, and the technical equipment of many scientific-research institutions and higher schools is lagging. Adequate measures have not been taken to make rational use of scientific cadres and to increase their responsibility for the technical-economic level of research.

The C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, on the basis of the tasks of the country's further economic development, have proposed to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. State Construction Administration, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the ministries and departments and the Union-republic Councils of Ministers that in drafting long-term, five-year and annual national-economic plans, broader use be made of the latest achievements of domestic and foreign science and technology and advanced experience and urgent measures be taken to raise substantially the efficacy of the work of scientific institutions, to improve the organization of scientific research and the management of scientific and technical development and to increase the responsibility of heads of enterprises, scientific organizations and higher schools for the creation of new technology and applying it in the national economy.

It has been deemed necessary that long-term scientific-technical forecasts (covering the next 15-20 years and more) be elaborated for the most important problems in the development of the national economy. The elaboration of

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these to be carried out by the State Committee for Science and Technology, the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and the U.S.S.R. State Construction Administration, together with interested ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers.

On the basis of the scientific-technical forecasts, ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers have been instructed to organize long-term elaboration of drafts for enterprises and production branches, as well as models of machinery and equipment for the future. The intention of all this is to provide the necessary scientific and technical backlog for the transition to qualitatively new technological processes making it possible to raise labor productivity severalfold over the present level. By the time enterprises now being designed go into operation, they should substantially surpass existing enterprises in our country and abroad in terms of technical-economic indices and technical level of output.

The basic form of state planning of science and technology is the five-year plan, which is drafted in accordance with the tasks of the country's economic development and the basic trends in science and technology over the long run. Proposals on the basic trends in scientific and technical development, as well as a list of major scientific-technical problems, are drawn up by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology jointly with the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, with the participation of ministries and departments, Union-republic Councils of Ministers and scientific-technical societies. These proposals define the level of technical development for various branches of the national economy that is to be attained by the end of the plan period, as well as the most important scientific research and projects necessary to create a scientific-technical backlog.

The chief components of the plan to solve the basic scientific-technical problems should be:

- creation and use of highly productive machinery and equipment for industrial production, construction, agriculture, transport and the communal economy, as well as both effective means of mechanizing and automating of production processes and new, more economical materials;
- creation and use of highly effective technological production processes to ensure integrated utilization of raw and other materials, improvement in the quality of output, reduction in outlays of labor and material expenses, increased productivity and improved working conditions;
- further improvement in the methods of organizing and managing production and in scientific organization of labor; and the creation and use of automated control and data processing systems in enterprises, associations, ministries and departments and of automated systems for the control of technological processes—these systems are to be based on the application of mathematical methods, computers and control machinery;
- solution of problems in the area of construction, architecture, agriculture and public health.

In order to improve scientific and technical leadership, when necessary pilot organizations will be appointed to deal with fundamental scientific-technical problems, and scientific directors or chief designers will be appointed from among leading scientists and specialists; their assistants will also be appointed and will be responsible for solving particular parts of the problem.

In addition to the five-year plan for scientific-research projects—a component part of the State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the U.S.S.R. National Economy—coordinated plans are being drawn up to solve basic scientific-technical problems, as well as annual plans for applying new machinery and technology in the national economy. It has also been deemed necessary to have branch and republic five-year and annual plans for research work and for utilization of scientific and technical achievements in production, as well as analogous plans for every scientific institution and enterprise.

The coordinated plans to solve fundamental scientific-technical problems must embrace a whole complex of projects starting with the application of research results in the national economy, and must coordinate

U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers have been instructed to provide the projects stipulated in the coordinated plans with the necessary cash and material-technical resources on a top-priority basis. Control over fulfillment of these plans has been entrusted to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology.

U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers have been permitted to have in their possession an undistributed reserve of up to 2% of budget appropriations, within the limits of the total expenditures on research projects. These funds are to be used to strengthen the most important areas of scientific-technical research. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology has been granted the right to redistribute, in consultation with the ministries and departments, expenditures on research work, including the salary fund.

The research institutions of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, of the Union-republic Academies of Sciences, of branch academies and of several ministries and committees have been permitted to undertake projects with clients on a contract basis over and above the volume of expenditures on scientific research established by the national-economic plan.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences have been charged with elaborating a system of planning, statistical and accounting indices for scientific and technical development that will make it possible to evaluate the actual economic effectiveness derived from applying the results of scientific-technical projects and to determine the correctness of technical policy in the branches of the national economy.

The resolution charts steps to develop wide-scale competition in the scientific-technical area and to prevent a monopoly in solving the most important scientific and technical problems. Toward this end it has been recommended that when necessary the ministries and departments, Union-republic Councils of Ministers, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and branch Academies of Sciences assign the conduct of exploratory research, as well as design, drafting and technological projects, to several organizations that are following different paths. This will make it possible to choose the best scientific and economic solutions at the early stages of research and technological-drafting projects. In performing particularly important tasks, research projects should be carried to the stage of making experimental models for purposes of comparing them and selecting the best ones for use in production.

It is recommended that branch research, design and drafting organizations and enterprises participate widely in the most important scientific work done in general-science institutes and higher educational institutions, with the intention of ensuring continuity in scientific-technical projects, all the way to their utilization in production. It is essential to determine beforehand the enterprises and construction sites that will apply the results of the most important research, experimental-design and technological projects. This will enable enterprises and construction organizations (with joint rights of co-authorship) to join with the scientific institutions at the proper time in working out the technical documentation with scientific institutions and to prepare production for the use of new machinery.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, with the participation of U.S.S.R. ministries and departments, should draw up and ratify, in consultation with the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, a model statute on the procedure for testing samples of new types of equipment.

The executives of ministries and departments have been instructed to increase the responsibility of enterprises, research and drafting-and-design organizations for fulfilling the established plans to produce new types of output and elaborate technological processes. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Labor and Wages Committee has been instructed to coordinate the work of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee and the

appropriate ministries and departments, will draft proposals on additional material incentives for enterprises and scientific institutions and on material inducements for their employees to accelerate the mastery of new equipment, as well as on the responsibility of enterprises and scientific and design organizations that fail to fulfill assignments for elaborating and mastering new types of output and technological processes within the established time limits.

It has been recommended that U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers expand cooperation between research, design, drafting and technological organizations and industrial enterprises on the one hand and the corresponding organizations and enterprises in the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid [C.M.E.A.] on the other. If licenses or technical documentation for new types of industrial products and technological processes are acquired abroad, ministries and departments must prevent organizations and enterprises under their jurisdiction from starting similar projects or must halt them in good time. It is essential to use licenses and technical documentation acquired abroad as the basis for achieving a still higher technical level for the corresponding products, materials and technological processes.

Ministries and departments, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and branch Academies of Sciences are instructed to define in a clear-cut manner the basic scientific-technical fields of activity of the general-science institutes, higher schools, research, design, drafting and technological organizations with industrial-branch emphasis, keeping in mind that these organizations must bear the responsibility for specific stages of scientific-technical progress. Scientific institutions that have failed to meet the technical-economic indices stipulated in contracts and orders are obligated, at the client's demand, to make the necessary amendments in designs and projects at their own expense and as quickly as possible. The provision on material responsibility for the quality and time limits of jobs done on the basis of economic contracts (or orders) have been made applicable to research organizations.

It has been made the duty of U.S.S.R. and Union-republic ministries and departments, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, branch Academies of Sciences and Union-republic Academies of Sciences to evaluate, at least once every three years, the work of research, design, drafting and technological organizations under their jurisdiction, including the scientific subdivisions of higher educational institutions. In doing this it is necessary to be guided by such indices as the novelty, promise and quantity of the suggested and effected scientific and technical proposals, the overall economic effect the national economy derives from using completed and implemented projects and the fulfillment of commitments to cooperate with the research and design organizations of the C.M.E.A. countries. The number and significance of discoveries and inventions by institute employees and the number of licenses sold abroad on behalf of organizations or individual staff members should also be taken into account.

On the basis of assessment of the work of institutes, decisions will be made on further development of them and on additional material incentives for collectives; such incentives are to be financed by the centralized bonus funds of ministries and departments. If the scientific institutions do not fulfill the tasks imposed upon them, the direction of their activity can be altered, and in certain cases decisions may be made on strengthening the administration of an institute or organization or on closing them according to the established procedure.

Ministries and departments and Councils of Ministers of the Union republics have been instructed to further organize in the near future the network of research, design, drafting and technological organizations, to bring branch institutions closer to production, to merge small, homogeneous organizations and abolish low-yield ones, and to reduce expenditures on the administrative apparatus in all these organizations. Blueprints for the rational siting of scientific institutions in the country's economic regions must also be elaborated, taking into account the prospects for development in various branches of the national economy.

It is recommended that U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers create, where necessary, in appropriate ministries and departments, design, drafting and technological work; scientific-production

associations, including both research institutes with design, drafting and technological subdivisions and industrial enterprises; specialized, economically accountable technical-production associations; and research institutes at major industrial enterprises.

The executives of industrial ministries have been instructed to take measures to strengthen drafting and technological services and research laboratories at enterprises that are independently developing new products, materials and technological processes and to examine and decide the question of turning over to the authority of enterprises the research, design, drafting and technological organizations that are now under the direct jurisdiction of the ministries.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology has been granted the right, on the basis of proposals by Union-republic ministries, departments and Councils of Ministers, to regard the research laboratories of leading enterprises as scientific institutions. The executives of enterprises and organizations have been granted the right to give specialists with academic degrees who work in production in their own specialty the salaries provided for scientific personnel at institutes.

In 1969, certification will be introduced for the employees of research, design, drafting and technological organizations and research subdivisions of higher educational institutions, with the exception of science workers who fill the corresponding positions through competition, administrative and management personnel and junior service personnel. The certification will be performed periodically, once every three years, by certifying commissions appointed from highly qualified scientists and representatives of Party and trade union organizations. On the basis of the certification results, institution executives will make decisions to reward individual employees for successes achieved in work or, in the appropriate cases, to demote or dismiss individuals whose occupational qualities are unsuited to the positions they hold. Labor disputes on questions of job dismissal and reinstatement of employees who after certification were deemed unsuited to their jobs will be heard according to the established procedure.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology has been instructed to ratify, in consultation with the Central Council of Trade Unions, provisions on the procedure for certification, bearing in mind that it must be conducted on the basis of objective criteria in evaluating each employee's work.

The resolution of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers specifies measures for further equipping research institutes, higher schools and enterprises, in the next three or four years and on a top-priority basis, with experimental apparatus, testing units and means of mechanization of scientific and engineering work. By 1972 the capacities of the major experimental centers will have been increased so that the results of research and design projects can be tested within one year. In agriculture the experimental base for raising new varieties of farm crops and breeds of farm animals and for perfecting the technology of agricultural production is to be consolidated and expanded. A procedure has been established to finance the construction and installation of experimental apparatus and to provide them with materials and basic and complementary equipment on a top-priority basis.

The U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers are instructed not to plan the production of industrial output on experimental apparatus. The designs for new industrial enterprises must provide for mandatory construction and commissioning, on a top-priority basis, of experimental laboratories, shops and testing units necessary for researching, perfecting and testing new products.

It has been deemed necessary to make economic incentives for the collectives of research institutions, scientific subdivisions of higher schools and industrial enterprises, as well as material rewards for their employees, directly dependent on the actual economic effectiveness that the national economy derives from using scientific-technical projects and new equipment. As of Jan. 1, 1969, a new system of economic incentives and material rewards is scheduled to be introduced on an experimental basis at research, design, drafting and technological organizations and at enterprises of the Ministry of the

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Electrical Equipment Industry. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers adopted a special resolution on this question. In 1969 the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry will establish a procedure to determine the volume of research, design, drafting and technological projects as a function of the planned volume of commodity output. These projects will be financed by a single fund for scientific and technical development, to be formed by deductions from the plan profits obtained as a result of technical progress in the branch and the economic activity of the ministry's enterprises and organizations.

In order to accumulate the necessary experience, the industrial ministries and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Agriculture have each been permitted to convert in 1969 one to three research institutes or design-and-drafting organizations to the new system of economic incentives and material rewards.

The U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee's State Price Committee has been charged with developing and approving within three months a methodology of price formation for new types of products (and materials). It must stipulate that part of the additional savings the national economy derives from using these products will remain at the industrial enterprises' disposal and that a certain share of these savings be turned over by the enterprises in the form of inventors' and designers' rewards and in accordance with economic contracts to the research institutes and design, drafting and technological organizations and higher schools that participated in the creation of the new equipment. It is also planned to define the procedure for reducing prices of output that has been produced for a long time and is obsolete in its technical-economic indices.

A material reward fund for awarding bonuses to employees and a social and cultural fund are being created in research institutes, design, drafting and technological organizations that have been converted to the new system of economic incentives and material rewards; these funds are largely financed by deductions from profit formed at enterprises as a result of reduced production costs connected with applying new scientific and technical solutions, as well as by the additional profits provided for in the prices of new types of products. In institutes and organizations that have not been converted to the new system of work, material incentive funds are created from bonus money in accordance with existing statutes.

In every research, design-and-drafting and technological institute a fund is formed for the organization's development; this fund serves as an additional source for financing capital investments; acquiring scientific equipment, instruments and materials for continuous technical supply; and improving the quality of work. This fund is created with the accumulations from jobs done by institutes under economic contracts or intraministry orders, as well as with revenues from selling licenses on inventions.

The resolution emphasizes that the unused remainders of all funds are to be carried over to the following year and are not

subject to confiscation from the scientific organization.

Annual plans must provide, as a separate item, for the allocation of material-technical resources for research, experimental-design and technological work, and also for equipping laboratories, the experimental bases of enterprises, scientific organizations and higher educational institutions. The executives of institutes and design-and-drafting and technological organizations and the rectors of higher educational institutions have been permitted to exchange instruments, materials, semimanufactures and finished products for research and experimental work, without the assent of higher organizations but with subsequent notification of them. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' Committee on Standards, Measurements and Measuring Instruments has been charged with organizing the rental of measuring devices for scientific institutions, enterprises and higher schools. The U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Chemical Industry has been instructed to organize, on a contract basis, the provision of certain types of reagents, extra-pure substances and biochemical preparations urgently needed by scientific establishments.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, jointly with the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. State Construction Committee, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance and with the participation of ministries and departments, has been assigned to draft and within six months submit to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers a general statute on research institutes and design-and-drafting and technological organizations; the statute is to stipulate the basic obligations and rights of the institutes and organizations and their responsibility for fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them. It is necessary that these same bodies also draft a model statute on the procedure for concluding economic contracts and issuing intraministry orders for research, experimental-design and technological work, as well as a general statute on the procedure for accepting and evaluating completed scientific-technical projects.

U.S.S.R. ministries and departments, Union-republic Councils of Ministers, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and branch Academies of Sciences have been charged, based on the present resolution, with preparing measures to raise the efficacy of the work of their scientific, design, drafting and technological organizations and research subdivisions of higher educational institutions.

The C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers call the attention of Party, Soviet, economic, trade union and Y.C.L. organizations to the necessity of substantially raising the efficacy of the work of scientific institutions, rapidly eliminating existing shortcomings in the application of scientific and technical achievements and further accelerating technical progress in all branches of the national economy.

Kapitsa on Overcoming the Lag in Scientists' Output

CPYRGHT

A WORD ABOUT PROGRESS.* (By Academician P. L. Kapit-
sa. Komsomolskaya pravda, Jan. 20, p. 2. Complete text:) It
is well known that the basic index of the progress of the na-
tional economy is labor productivity, and a rise in labor pro-
ductivity is achieved for the most part by the assimilation of
new technology and the achievements of science.

In his report at the September plenary session of the
C.P.S.U. Central Committee, A. N. Kosygin noted that "the
rate of growth of labor productivity in industry***has slowed
down somewhat in recent years."

To my mind, this is linked to the fact that the process of
assimilating the achievements of science and technology in our
country is not satisfying the needs of our industry.

I would like to dwell on the factors that hinder the assimi-
lation of the achievements of science and technology. This
assimilation is proceeding slowly and laboriously in our coun-
try.

What is impeding it?

My many years' experience indicates that if industry is to
assimilate the achievements of science and new technology
successfully, six conditions must be fulfilled. I shall enumer-
ate them, and we shall see what is needed to fulfill them.

The assimilation of new technology means that industry
must learn to do something it has not done previously. Con-
sequently, the assimilation of new technology must be consid-
ered a process of learning, and it must be conducted by the
same pedagogical methods that we ordinarily apply when we
teach a person something new.

When we teach university students or schoolchildren, the
chief condition that is essential is the desire of the individual
to learn. If there is no such desire, you cannot hammer in
knowledge with a club. Is our industry always willing to learn
something new? Do we always create conditions in which in-
dustry really feels that it is profitable to learn new technology?

Obviously, in order for such a desire to appear, it is neces-
sary to create favorable moral and material conditions under
which our industry and our factories will be interested in
learning new things. They must feel that it is advantageous,
useful and honorable for them. And that is condition No. 1.

Condition No. 2 is that when you teach a person something
new, he must always have the proper preparation. It is im-
possible to teach higher mathematics if the pupil does not know
algebra and trigonometry. Therefore the learner must be suf-
ficiently prepared. This is often overlooked when introducing
new technology in our country. I know a number of cases in
which a factory has been charged with making a new apparatus
but has been completely unprepared, and despite all its efforts
has been unable to cope successfully with the assignment.

The third condition, also well known from pedagogy, is that
the pupil must not be overloaded. Each factory, each branch
of industry can assimilate in one year only a certain amount of
new technology, even if it has sufficient preparation and wants
to learn. But it happens in our country that as soon as a fac-
tory shows its worth and begins to master something well, they
begin to overload it inordinately. One must remember that
industry's ability to master new knowledge, like man's, has its
limits.

The fourth condition: When you set out to teach someone
something, sufficiently favorable material conditions must be
created. It is irrational to try to teach men or factories only
on their own internal material resources. It is necessary in
teaching always to provide a good material base corresponding
to the task that is set. To put it bluntly, adequate means must
be furnished to those who are learning something new.

The necessity of the four conditions already mentioned is a simple matter, especially now, after the resolutions of the September plenary session of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.

The fifth condition, less obvious and much harder to fulfill, lies in the following. It is well known from pedagogical practice that if you are going to teach somebody, it is always necessary to work out a clear-cut program by which the training will be conducted. Similarly, when something new is to be introduced in industry, then if it is to be assimilated quickly and successfully there must be a well worked-out program indicating the way the assimilation will proceed most successfully. But as a rule this receives little attention in our country, and the assimilation is often allowed to take its course.

In working out such programs the following is essential. First, the program must take into account the production possibilities of the factory; second, it must consider the specific nature of the new technology. As a rule there is no one person at the factory who is familiar with both. Consequently, when a scientist or an inventor, or even a research institute, is assigned to work out the program, specific production features are overlooked. When the factory itself works out the program, the special requirements of the new technology are not considered. In either case the program turns out to be defective.

What is the way out of this situation? Life shows that there exists a type of broadly educated engineer who knows both sides of the program. So far there are very few such engineers, and they should be valued highly. We need these highly skilled engineers as much as we need design engineers, so they must be trained and given the opportunity to work actively in production on introducing new technology. Bureaus staffed with such specialists should be set up at ministries and chief administrations. The task of these bureaus will be the elaboration of programs for assimilating new technology and the organization of their practical implementation. A general rule should be established that a well worked-out program must exist whenever something new is being introduced in production. But this important condition for assimilating new technology has so far received little attention in our country.

Finally, the sixth condition has to do with the teacher. If there is a pupil, there must be a teacher. It is well known that for successful training, good, amicable relations are essential between the teacher and pupil. In addition, the creator of new technology who is turning his projects over to industry—whether he be a scientist, an inventor or the collective of a research institute or design bureau—must be as personally interested in its successful assimilation as is the factory. Are our scientists, inventors and engineers personally interested in industry's mastering of their achievements, and how are they linked with the enterprises and with industry?

I shall cite only the case in which the teacher is a scientist.

As is generally known, under our laws a scientist who is working on introducing an innovation in industry does not receive material compensation for this. It is customary in our country that the scientist works with industry as a public obligation. This is completely different from the situation in capitalist countries. When I lived in England and received my doctorate, I joined a professional association of scientific workers and had to sign a commitment not to act as a consultant to industry for less than a definite scale of fees corresponding to my scientific rank. This is done in capitalist countries so that members of professional associations may not undercut one another's scale of payment. Naturally, we have totally different conditions, and measures of this kind can have no place in our country.

I do not want to insist that material reward is decisive in our country, but it is beyond question that moral conditions for the work of scientists with industry must always be favorable. It is essential that the scientist have an interest in his work, and conditions must be created so that his work will receive broad public recognition and so that collaboration with industry will be considered useful public activity. Unfortunately, when one is obliged to deal with a ministry nowadays, one rarely receives "gentle" treatment. All this, of course, does not help the development of good relations between teacher and pupils.

It is often thought in our country that it is sufficient to hand down an order that one or another innovation be assimilated, and the process of "introduction" may be considered already finished. But from the above analysis it follows that the pro-

cess of assimilating new technology cannot be regarded simply more as a "pedagogical poem." Therefore, in organizing the assimilation of new technology by industry, it is necessary to adopt an individual, nonstereotyped approach, taking into account the character of the people concerned and the external conditions in each separate case. The financial and personnel side is, of course, basically determined by the official orders issued, but the successful assimilation of new technology rests on good relations between pupils and teacher and on their common personal interest in the successful execution of a well worked-out program, and this unfortunately is not always the case in our country.

Now I would like to touch upon another, no less important question: Does our science produce enough for introduction in the national economy, is the labor productivity of the scientists sufficiently high? We must give these questions serious attention. In order to examine them, I think the best thing would be to compare some data of our scientific activity with that of the Americans.

It is interesting to note that the U.S. is at present seriously occupied with questions of the development of science in the country and its connection with industry.

I shall cite some figures of interest to us. This year the United States of America is spending \$21,000,000,000 on all scientific work, of which two-thirds is given by the government from the federal budget and one-third by patrons and industry. Of this sum, 11%, or \$2,500,000,000, goes to academic science. Thus the bulk of the expenditures goes to the science that directly serves industry, or as we say, goes to scientific work on applied projects.

Further, the Americans assert that their industry, with the high cultural level that has been attained and the availability of free capital, does not have a sufficient research backlog to satisfy industry's needs for new technology.

The Americans assert that the insufficient scale of development of their science is basically a consequence of a shortage of highly skilled scientists and engineers. They consider that scientific research could get even more money, but that at present it has too few of the type of highly talented people whose guidance of scientific work it is that chiefly points the development of science in the needed direction. Therefore in recent years they have begun to import scientists from Britain and West Germany in large numbers. In the past ten years, according to statistical data, 53,000 scientists, most of them young, have been brought to America, of whom 30,000 have engineering training, 14,000 are physicists and 9,000 are experts in other fields. If one considers that each higher educational institution graduates an average of 500 specialists a year, this means that in the past ten years ten higher educational institutions in Europe, in effect, have been training cadres for America gratis. Since the Americans have taken only the best people, they have skimmed the cream of approximately 50 higher educational institutions.

The Americans allocate their funds for scientific work a little differently than is done in other countries. The bulk of the funds is not assigned to scientific institutions. Americans more readily give money either for a definite project or to individual eminent scientists whose work should be supported, usually leaving the choice of theme to them. Only a few per cent (apparently not more than 2% or 3%) of the total budget is allocated to scientific institutions. To be the independent master of his own material base is, of course, very attractive for a scientist. He feels that his work will be completely provided for.

Now let us compare the American statistical data with ours. To make a reliable comparison is not only difficult but almost impossible, since there is a considerable difference between the organization of science and its financing in a capitalist country and in a socialist one. The difficulty is multiplied by the fact that, unfortunately, we are still weak in the collection of statistical data having to do with the organization of science.

First of all, let us compare the numbers of scientific workers. The Americans consider that they have 800,000 people engaged in scientific work, including those in the lower engineering and technical occupations. We have, according to official

statistics, about 700,000, including all scientific workers beginning with the junior personnel. From these data it is apparent that we differ little in the number of scientific workers, within the limits of the statistical data's trustworthiness.

In order to determine the labor productivity of scientists, it is necessary to evaluate scientific production. It is, of course, difficult to do this precisely. The Americans try to do it as follows. They calculated the number of scientific works in the leading fields of natural and technical sciences published by scientists in all languages in various countries in the major scientific journals. To judge from this American data, it appears that they are responsible for one-third of world science. We are responsible for one-sixth of world science—that is, half as much as they. Each of the remaining countries is responsible for less than we. So in scientific production we are second in the world. But if the figures are accepted, it turns out that with about the same number of scientific workers we produce only half as much scientific work as the Americans. Consequently, we must consider the labor productivity of our scientists lower than that of scientists in the U.S.A. Therefore it is time to ask how we are to develop our science in the existing conditions so as to raise the productivity of our scientists.

Labor productivity in science is determined basically by the quality of preparation and selection of the personnel of scientific institutions.

In order to raise labor productivity, evidently it would be advisable to improve the quality of our scientific personnel—that is, it is necessary to eliminate those who are inadequately qualified and who cannot justify the advantages that a scientist's position gives him in our country.

Evidently it would be correct for those whose work in science is insufficiently effective to be gradually transferred to industry, where they can be of more use to the country. Of course, it is impossible to turn such a serious step into a campaign. But the development of our scientific institutions must have precisely such a policy. For instance, each year 15% to 20% of the personnel of scientific institutions could be transferred to industry and (somewhat fewer) well-selected and well-trained young people could be taken into research work, so as to raise quality in this way and not close the door to an influx of fresh forces. But it should be noted that even if it were decided to follow this path, we could not carry out such a measure under the laws and rights that now apply to the directors of institutes in the Academy of Sciences.

We should not be afraid to say that in the past few years the scientific gap between our country and America has not narrowed. It is all the more important to search for ways to close this gap. To do this it is necessary to increase the labor productivity of our scientists and improve the conditions for introducing the achievements of science and technology in industry. If the great advantages offered by our socialist system in the organization of our science and industry are used resolutely and skillfully, then this lag in growth will be only temporary. I deeply believe that if we are not afraid to speak the truth about our shortcomings and if we jointly search for ways to eliminate them, then we will soon regain the previous record pace in the growth of our scientific work.

The fact that since the September plenary session of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee we have again turned from economic-council management of our industry to specialized management (by the ministries) will be of great benefit to us scientists, since the previous system impeded the assimilation of new technology by industry. But this measure alone is insufficient; it is necessary gradually but steadily to perfect organizational forms for the development of our science; to improve the material base, increase the labor productivity of the scientists and raise the quality of cadres, chiefly through attracting young forces into science.

