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23 May 1969

SOVIET DISSIDENTS IN PROTEST TO U.N.

Text Given to Newsmen Says
Rights Are 'Repressed'

CPYRGHT

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 22 — More than 50 Soviet dissidents, alarmed at the growing number of arrests of their fellows, have drawn up a petition to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, calling for an investigation of "the repression of basic civil rights in the Soviet Union."

The petition was drafted two days ago and it was not known whether the text had actually been sent out of the Soviet Union. The dissidents made it available to Western correspondents apparently in the hope of reaching the United Nations through Western newspapers.

The petition said the recent arrests have compelled us to think that Soviet punitive organs have decided finally to bar the activity of people protesting against arbitrariness in our country."

Coincident with the petition, it was also learned today that Ilya Burmistrovich, a 31-year-old mathematician, was sentenced yesterday by a Moscow court to three years in prison for circulating typescripts of works of the imprisoned authors Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel to some friends.

He was arrested on April 16, 1968, and spent more than a year in jail before his one-day trial.

He was convicted under Articles 190 and 191 of the Russian Federation criminal code against the spreading of anti-Soviet slander.

Earlier this week, Ilya Gabai, a teacher of the Russian language, was arrested, and documents putting forth the case of Crimean Tatars were seized with him.

On Satlin's orders the Crimean Tatars were expelled from their homeland during World War II on charges of collaboration with the Germans. Even though the minority has been officially rehabilitated, its members have not been able to return to the Crimean area around the Black Sea from their places of exile, mostly in Soviet Central Asia.

Their plight has attracted the interest of many dissidents, who have tried to publicize their case through western media.

The dissident group is virtually unknown to the Soviet public and has little influence. But their presence and the publicity they have received in the West has been a constant irritant to the authorities.

Prominent Members Arrested

In recent months some of the more prominent members of the group have been arrested, and some of them have been sentenced.

The acknowledged leader and most active in the group, Pyotr G. Grigorenko, a former Soviet Army general, was arrested early this month in Tashkent, where he had gone at the invitation of 2,000 Crimean Tatars to help represent in court 10 other Tatars who are also due to go on trial on charges of spreading anti-Soviet slander.

Many of the names on the petition to the United Nations commission have appeared on other documents that have made their way to the West. These documents have protested the trials of writers, reported evidence of growing Stalinists trends in Soviet Society and denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The most prominent name on the petition is that of Pyotr Yakir, a historian, now working as a librarian, who is the son of Iona E. Yakir, one of the most famous Soviet army commanders, who was arrested on May 30, 1937, and executed that year on June 11 during a purge of the military conducted by Stalin.

Pyotr Yakir, who himself was arrested in September, 1937, when he was only 14 years old, spent the next 14 years in confinement in various camps before finally gaining his freedom.

In 1966, he ran afoul of the authorities when he began to speak out against the campaign to rehabilitate Stalin's reputation in the Soviet Union.

Appeal Not Received

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., May 22—The dissidents' appeal reported from Moscow has not reached the United Nations, according to officials who handle human rights complaints.

Thousands of petitions or letters alleging violations of rights are received each year—14,000 in 1968—and accusations have been leveled against virtually every government. This is known to have included appeals from Soviet citizens, but sources here were unable to say whether they had come from inside the Soviet Union or had reached here by other routes.

The practice has been to acknowledge and file the petitions. This effectively buries

them unless the authors publicize them or a delegation chooses to raise them in an open meeting of the Human Rights Commission.

A new procedure, backed by the United States but opposed by the Soviet Union, would create machinery that would permit an investigation to be made when complaints revealed a consistent pattern of abuses. Such an inquiry would need the consent of the accused government.

55 Russians Ask U.N. For Probe Of 'Suppression'

CPYRGHT

Moscow, May 22 (AP)—An appeal circulating privately here contends that recent arrests of dissidents threaten a return to Stalinist terror and asks the United Nations to investigate "violation of basic civil rights" by Soviet authorities.

So far, the appeal has been signed by 55 Soviet citizens.

Its circulation coincided with a report from friends of Ilya Burmistrovich, a scientist, that he was sentenced yesterday to three years in a labor camp on a charge of spreading lies about the Soviet system by lending friends copies of critical writings of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. Those two satirists have been serving terms in labor camps for more than a year. Their trial in 1966 stirred up protests both here and abroad.

The appeal in circulation protests the arrest two weeks ago of the best known Soviet dissenter, former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigoryenko, and the arrest this week of a fellow dissident, Ilya Gabai, a poet and teacher.

"These recent arrests force us to think that Soviet punitive agencies have decided to suppress once and for all the activity of people who protest against arbitrariness in our country," the appeal said. "We feel that freedom to have and distribute independent convictions has finally been placed in jeopardy."

The signers said they were "deeply indignant over unceasing political persecutions in the Soviet Union, perceiving in them a return to Stalin's time when all our country was in the grip of terror."

The appeal listed recent trials involving intellectuals demanding free speech and "people seeking national equality and preservation of their national culture . . . Jews demanding the right to leave for Israel . . . and believers seeking religious liberty."

Addressing their petition to the U.N. Commission on Human

Rights, the signers said, "We appeal to the United Nations because we have received no answer to our protests and complaints which have been sent over a number of years to the highest state and judicial agencies of the Soviet Union."

Some Signers Listed

The 55 signers included the most active members of a small protest movement which has grown smaller as a result of continuing arrests and trials. Among the signers were:

1. Pyotr Yakir, 46, historian a veteran of 14 years in labor camps and son of a famed Red Army commander who was shot in Stalin's purges and later rehabilitated.

2. Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, 45, a poet and mathematician, son of the well-known poet, Sergei Yesenin, and a veteran of prisons and mental institutions which are used to imprison protesters.

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June 1969

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THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(19 April - 23 May 1969)

- I. Husak's First Month in Czechoslovakia
- II. On the Eve of the World Communist Conference
- III. Strange Bedmates in the Balkans
- IV. Briefly Noted:
 - A. Chinese Policy after the Ninth Congress
 - B. Soviets Meddle in Finnish Communist Affairs
 - C. Lenin Centennial

I. One Month of the New Husak Regime in Czechoslovakia

On 17 April, with the second Soviet intervention, Gustav Husak became Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) and thus top ruler in Czechoslovakia, taking orders from no one except the Soviets. His reign of something more than a month has been marked by definite steps toward Soviet-style "normalization" of the country's situation, which for the past year has been characterized by the Soviets as a "crisis" situation because it did not conform to the pattern of rule practiced in the Soviet Union and its other Satellites.

Husak has proceeded in several directions simultaneously in his effort to satisfy the Soviets. Prospects are that he may restore Czechoslovakia to passive Communist orthodoxy using little noticeable violent suppression or old-fashioned Stalinist methods, in fact much less than there was reason to fear at first. Among Husak's moves are the suspension of some of the more outspokenly liberal newspapers and magazines, including the Studentske Listy, Politika, (a major organ of the Central Committee of his own Communist Party), Listy, Reporter and others. Other publications that do not actively support the party line or are critical of the Soviet Union can expect to suffer a similar fate. On some newspapers, such as the CSCP daily, Rude Pravo, he has installed a new staff of editors he is sure will propagate his line. Some observers have noted that Husak is also substituting "reliable" Communists in place of liberals throughout the party and government hierarchy as an important measure to insure that his orders will be closely followed.

There have been sporadic unrest and occasional demonstrations by various elements of the population, as on May Day, on the eve of 6 May (anniversary of the entry of U.S. troops into Western Czechoslovakia during World War II), and again on official Liberation Day, 9 May. In each case, Husak has ordered swift measures to cope with the possibility of mass anti-Soviet, anti-regime demonstrations by having the police round up and arrest as many thousands of demonstrators as necessary. Thus far, even though an estimated 5,000 students and workers demonstrated at Plzen (Pilsen) on 5 May, none of the popular resentment has gotten out of control, as far as is known.

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Thus Husak has moved decisively to demonstrate to his Soviet masters that he intends to fulfill their explicit or unspoken requirements. He has supported all Soviet foreign policy initiatives, especially doing what he can to assure that Czechoslovakia will not become a bone of contention during the World Communist Conference. His most servile move was to make a speech in Moscow on May Day in which he all but accepted the Soviet version of the pre-invasion situation in Czechoslovakia, (i.e., that a counterrevolution was imminent), and therefore, in effect, seemed to agree that the Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion was justified. This, all previous CSCP leaders had refused to do. The Husak speech was promptly featured in Pravda, but this sensitive portion was omitted in the version published for the Czechoslovak public.

Seemingly as a reward for Husak's good behavior, the Soviets quietly suspended publication and distribution of their illegal Czech-language newspaper Zpravy, hated by the Czechs as a brazen symbol of Soviet rule. Husak may hope that the Soviets will further reward him by removing some Soviet troops from Czech soil or possibly by granting a hard currency loan, which the Czech economy sorely needs in order to buy modern western equipment and help make the Czechs competitive in world trade.

Some observers believe that the enigmatic Husak personality hides a strong will, a sense of independence, and a fierce sense of nationalism which make him not altogether to the Soviets' liking. But thus far, for all practical purposes, he has shown less independence than his predecessor Alexander Dubcek, despite extreme pressures kept to his commitment to preserve the important freedoms of speech, assembly and press.

II. At Issue On the Eve of the World Communist Conference

Czechoslovakia has been the main cause of the considerable disarray in the world Communist movement, and at the forefront of criticism of the Soviet Union has been the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI has been critical both of the military intervention and of the Soviet-inspired effort to snuff out the Dubcek-led experiment in a humanistic and progressive Communism. But, now that a native Czechoslovak is taking the lead in accomplishing Soviet objectives in Czechoslovakia, the PCI has less reason to point an accusing finger at the real culprit: the CPSU.

Nevertheless, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its justification in the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty gave added strength to pre-existing centrifugal forces that now threaten to throw more fragments of parties, if now whole CP's, out of the Soviet gravitational field. The period between the 23 May Preparatory Commission meeting and the end of the full-scale World Communist Conference, which starts 5 June, will witness a struggle between the centrifugal and centripetal forces in the movement. The Soviets will use every device their ingenuity can invent: pressure, persuasion, blackmail, bribery, to restore their centralized authority and control. If they do not succeed during this period in establishing some kind of international organization (as a latter-day variation of the Comintern or Cominform), they

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are certain to continue this effort after the conference. Centrifugal forces, foremost among them the PCI, but including also such parties as the Rumanian and the British, will oppose this Soviet aim and will try to gain acceptance of their principle of true autonomy for each party.

What sort of equilibrium between these two forces will emerge from the Conference may become evident from the wording of the document that is finally adopted by the 60-odd parties expected to attend. The critical portion will concern the relations between parties, i.e., between the CPSU on the one hand and individual parties on the other. Reportedly this section is causing serious difficulty for the drafters. If the Soviets succeed in their effort, the document should show strong emphasis on the unity of the movement and the "duty" and "responsibility" of fraternal parties to "proletarian internationalism" with a secondary role accorded the principles of autonomy and independence of parties. It might even include a statement suggesting or implying the desirability of some kind of formal international organization. If the independent-minded parties are able to persist in their views (their ultimate weapon being a refusal to sign the final document), it should be reflected in a corresponding dilution of the importance of unity, duties, and responsibilities, and a strengthening of the theme of party autonomy.

III. Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania, China --- Strange Bedmates

Ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Rumanians, Yugoslavs, and Albanians have feared that the Soviets would apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to their countries and move against them militarily. For those far removed geographically or psychologically from the danger of Soviet invasion, it is easy to dismiss such fears as far-fetched or even as being self-serving propaganda, but it should be remembered that it was just such "detached" observers who, before the Czech invasion, believed that the deviations represented by Czechoslovakia were not sufficient cause for the Soviets' taking such drastic action.

Recently, Soviet attitudes toward Albania raised these Balkan countries' apprehensions to a new level. The authoritative CPSU journal Kommunist (No. 5, 26 March 1969) claimed that the Chinese had established military bases in Albania with the intention of installing missiles there. The Albanians rejected these accusations (as did their long-time enemies, the Yugoslavs) but saw in them Soviet establishment of a pretext for military action against Albania. They were especially apprehensive inasmuch as they had formally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact in September 1968 without subsequent Soviet recognition or acknowledgment of this fact. (Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was one main reason for the Soviet invasion of Communist Hungary in 1956.)

The depth of Albanian concern is illustrated by the curious phenomenon of the Albanians' offering to make common cause with their archenemies, the Yugoslavs, in defense against a possible Soviet invasion. This position was made clear in an editorial 11 April in the main Albanian CP paper, Zeri i Popullit. The Yugoslavs, in turn, while suggesting that some Albanian views

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might be exaggerated, acknowledged that there was reason for concern since the Soviet accusation was false and therefore could quite logically be regarded as a trumped-up justification for military action. A military move against Albania would inevitably involve Yugoslavia, which has for months actively prepared its citizenry to resist Soviet invasion.

The Albanians at the same time asserted, less surprisingly, that their fate is also linked to that of Rumania. Rumania has long been aware that, because of their relative independence of, and often outright opposition to, the Soviets, they could be the next victim of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition to this common fear, the two countries are bound by their mutual sympathy for Communist China, though for different reasons and in different degree. The Rumanians have discreetly supported the Chinese ever since the latter challenged Soviet claims to dictate the international Communist line, because the Rumanians themselves aspired to just such independence. The Albanians in their dispute with the Soviets found a willing ally in the Chinese and have been as vituperatively anti-Soviet as the Chinese themselves.

The Chinese took until 7 May to register their view of the Albanian offer to make common cause with Yugoslavia and Rumania. China was able to acknowledge the logic of Albania's appeal to Rumania but unable to say a kind word about Yugoslavia, that archetype of revisionism. So the Chinese simply ignored the Yugoslav role.

This spectacle of tangled Communist international relations clearly has its ludicrous aspects, but two serious lessons of import emerge. There can be no doubt that the three deviating Communist countries -- Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia -- despite important dissimilarities, feel threatened by the Soviet Union as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And despite the incredulity with which many may view these fears, they simply cannot be ignored, any more than the prospect of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should have been underestimated before 21 August 1968.

Secondly, the mutually independent stance of all three countries vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is clear evidence of the potency of nationalism, even in the Communist world. This nationalism is one more proof of the falsity of the Communist myth, invented by Marx and enshrined by Lenin, that Communists as the vanguard of the working class regard "proletarian internationalism" as a greater principle than looking after the national interest (traditionally contemptuously referred to by the Communists as "bourgeois nationalism").

IV. Briefly Noted

A. Chinese CP Congress and National Policy

As the dust settles after the long Chinese Communist Party Congress (1 - 28 April), it is evident that it was inconclusive. The length of the congress, particularly the time it took to put together a new Central Committee, is one of many tenuous indications suggesting a hard fight took place, with

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tough bargaining and pulling and tugging between two factions in the party. On the one hand there are the moderates, pragmatists, who want to come to practical grips with economic and diplomatic realities and whose leader is generally thought to be Chou En-lai. On the other hand, there are the fanatic, purist revolutionaries, to whom the Cultural Revolution and Mao Tse-tung's ideology, bound in a little red book, are the ultimate reality and an end in themselves. The congress and its aftermath suggest that both factions continue to have influence on Mao and his heir, Lin Piao, who are the final arbiters over policy proposals put forth by each faction. It would appear that Mao sometimes decides in favor of one group and policy and then reverses himself under the persuasions of the opposing group, so that policies can veer wildly and change tack even from day to day. This factional struggle may explain why the Chinese proposal last November to resume the Warsaw talks with the U.S. (initiated by the moderates) was abruptly cancelled the following February (by the fanatics). Factionalism, presided over by an aging and capricious Mao, could also explain the simultaneous pursuit of contradictory courses, for example the current Chinese agreement to talk with the Soviets about navigation problems along common border rivers while renewed armed clashes go on.

B. Continued Soviet Intervention in Finnish CP Affairs

In early April Soviet Politburo member Arvid Pelshe tried to mediate the dispute between the dominant moderate faction of the Finnish Communist Party and the Stalinist faction, which walked out of the 15th Party Congress (3-6 April) with the intention of forming its own Communist party. On 21 April Alexey Belyakov, chief of the Scandinavian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, quietly slipped into Helsinki to continue the Soviet pressure to prevent either side from perpetrating an organizational split in the Party. Thus far, Belyakov has been successful in that he has persuaded the two factions to sit down together and try to find common ground. As of mid-May, the two factions have not reached agreement and are continuing talks, not very optimistically. Helsinki newspapers suggest that the Stalinists themselves may split into one group that favors rejoining the regular party as an opposition faction and another group which will go ahead and form a separate party.

C. Lenin Centennial

The 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth falls on 22 April 1970. One of the major items to be discussed at the World Communist Conference 5 June will be the celebration of this centennial, which promises to take on vast proportions. Lenin's 99th anniversary this year was marked by a dull, un-inspired address by CPSU Secretary Ivan Kapitonov. More interestingly, Pablo Neruda, well-known Latin American Communist, launched his own celebration in Santiago, Chile, with a flurry of newspaper features on various aspects of Lenin's life and work. He has promised to celebrate this god of the Communist world for the whole year.

Prague Under Husak

The month that has passed since Gustav Husak replaced Alexander Dubcek in the driver's seat in Prague has been a somber one for Czechoslovakia. The press has been purged, put under new leadership and tight censorship, and reduced almost to the level of the worst Novotny years. Mr. Husak and his associates have gone to great lengths to assert their loyalty to the Soviet Union, and to denounce the "right-wing" forces that were allegedly behind the trouble during the past year and a half. As a fitting climax to a grim month, last week's extensive series of price increases has administered a stiff dose of

austerity to a nation whose standard of living was hardly enviable to begin with.

Apart from the substantial success Mr. Husak has enjoyed in imposing normalization (Soviet style) upon his country, Czechoslovakia's will to resist has markedly deteriorated.

For the moment, evidently, the great mass of Czechoslovaks have bowed to the threat of Moscow's superior force. But the ideas and aspirations of the Prague spring in 1968 have not been forgotten, and their political power is in hibernation—not dead. The world knows now what the people of Czechoslovakia really want—democracy and genuine sovereignty—and the future will surely bring a new opportunity to pursue the goals now temporarily frustrated.

THE ECONOMIST

26 April 1969

Good cheer for hard-liners

FROM OUR EAST EUROPE CORRESPONDENT

Prague

Dr Gustav Husak, the new Czechoslovak party first secretary, is not interested in buying popularity. He has already embarked on a declared policy of appeasing and flattering the Russians as the essential prerequisite for the solution of all other outstanding problems. If anybody was in any doubt about this after his first policy statement to the central committee last week, these doubts must have been rapidly dispelled by the eruption of harsh promises to Moscow from Lubomir Strougal, the conservative Czech leader, and in the pages of *Rude Pravo*, all of which would have been music in the ears of Stalin. By way of further confirmation, Russian delegations of every conceivable shape and for every conceivable purpose have been arriving in Prague with the clockwork precision of the military airlift last August.

Politicians and the press have fallen back into the use of execrable jargon which, stripped down to essentials, carries the depressing message that many of the old orthodox hard-line communists, who have had a thin time of it since Novotny fell, are back in command and have not forgotten the indignities, real or imaginary, they suffered at the hands of the "revisionists." The point is best summed up by *Rude Pravo*: "the honest party members found it hard to tolerate that in the difficult days of post-January development they remained without aid from higher party bodies and left to the mercy of speculation and exposed to insults." The paper then speaks of the "sobering-up process" now under way.

The loss of Mr Dubcek and Mr Smrkovsky as effective symbols has been a heavy blow to the nation. As the sad-
Dubcek and Smrkovsky: tomorrow

Gernik, Svoboda and the rest." All over the country, wall slogans are being assiduously painted over in preparation for a new era. One hears whispered remarks: "Have you seen? The Dubcek sign is still on the radio building"; and stifled sniggers at newspaper cartoons of obscure and esoteric symbolism. A daring man boasts that he sat on his hands during the frenetic applause for Mr Strougal's "back to marxism-leninism" speech on Monday, in which he clearly endorsed the Brezhnev policy of limited sovereignty in the communist world.

Heavy-handed action against the press, radio and television is, of course, an essential preliminary to efficient house-cleaning. A few knights with shining typewriters will continue to fight a rearguard action, but an efficient, effectively implemented censorship is hard to by-pass. The other alternative, adopted by some of the formerly more strident voices, is to lie low and keep their powder dry until the wind drops.

Matters might, it is argued, have been worse, and one current occupation of intellectuals is to count up the positive aspects of life without Mr Dubcek. Dr Husak, many insist, may prove better able to negotiate with the Russians for an eventual withdrawal of troops. He has more drive, energy, greater physical stamina and powers of persuasion than his predecessor. There is also a tenuous hope that Dr Husak will keep a firm control of the ultra-conservatives who could put the clock right back to the 1950s. If this were the case, it is curious that he should have put up Mr Strougal—who was one of the Kremlin's four choices—to deliver a policy statement early this week. Or

that he... first trip to Moscow.

It was an astute move to make Karel Polacek, chairman of the trades union council, a full member of the presidium, thus taking the wind out of the sails of labour protest. The grand coalition between the trade unions and the students, carefully built up over the past six months, is now, in disarray, largely because of apathy, hesitation and a breakdown in communication. The students of Charles university in Prague somewhat lamely continued their sit-in strike in the knowledge that it would achieve nothing, beyond registering a protest. "We cannot shoot at Goliath, but we don't have to love him," as one of the students'

brave front has been reduced to a situation in which some workers debate whether to blow their factory whistles for ten minutes as a sign of solidarity with the students' strikes.

If Dr Husak can keep his fiercer bloodhounds in check and if he honours his promise of no personal arrests, the nation is prepared to give him a fair trial run. If he can assuage the wrath of the tougher men in the Kremlin and not play his "democratic centralism" too hard, he may get a solid popular backing. Until then, there are plenty of optimists dropping out of the party and even more pessimists taking out a little bit of judicious reinsurance by throwing in their lot with the conservative wing.

BALTIMORE SUN

7 May 1969

Czechs Busy Re-Electrifying Fences Along Their Border

CPYRGHT

By STUART B. SMITH
[Down Bureau of The Sun]

Bonn, May 6—The Czechoslovak border police are apparently preparing to turn on the Iron Curtain electricity again.

The Salzburger Nachrichten a responsible independent Austrian newspaper, reported this morning that Czechoslovak workmen have been installing new insulators on two long sections of frontier fences facing Austria.

Asked about the matter, Czechoslovak authorities said Soviet occupation officials had demanded the re-electrification as a part of the "normalization" process. The Czech officials begged the inquirers not to view the measure as an affront to Austria.

Escaper Shot In 1967

Czechoslovakia turned off the electricity on its frontier barrier some years ago but continued to patrol it zealously. In August 1967, Czechoslovak border police shot an East German escaper through the head after he had already reached Austrian soil. The killing incensed Vienna and prompted Prague to ban such shootings.

During last year's democratization movement, Czechoslovakia removed parts of the barriers along the Bavarian border, including an old, formerly electrified fence.

Since then Prague has repeatedly reassured the Warsaw powers that it is still stoutly guarding its frontiers to the West, pointing out that it has stopped innumerable Hungarians, Poles and East Germans trying to flee to Western countries.

During the last few weeks, Czechoslovak guards have been firing at escapers again, although no one is known to have been killed.

Observers here think it highly unlikely that the frontier police will again shoot to kill, no matter what their orders are. In recent months these guards have frequently expressed to Westerners their contempt for the Soviet occupiers and for the orders from Moscow.

Yesterday Rude Pravo, the official Czechoslovak Communist daily, complained about half-hearted attitudes and indifference throughout the country, noting that many party members are suddenly reluctant to carry out regulations.

Without specifically mentioning the nationwide enthusiasm and support the party had immediately before and after the occupation last August 20; the paper lamented that now some party members are drawing back "into non-committedness"

CPYRGHT

the opinions which at first sight are harmful to socialism."

Decisious Belittled

Other party members constantly belittle leadership decisions, the paper observed, asserting that this violates the spirit of the party statutes.

However, Prace, the Czechoslovak labor movement, daily, indirectly attacked the new policy of appeasing the Kremlin by recalling the anti-Nazi resistance movement a generation ago.

In an article commemorating the 24th anniversary of the Prague uprising against the crumpling forces of the German Reich.

Realism Denigrated

Prace recalled that the insurgents had to fight not only the "merciless occupiers" but also the "well known Czech realism."

"We now know," Prace continued, "that the exponents of Reason did not win, but that those who were called adventurers and madmen... went down in Czech history and in the history of the European struggle for freedom."

Prace's point was certainly not lost in those Czech readers familiar with the new party leadership's constant references to the current need for realistic attitudes toward the Soviet Union and its occupation forces.

Czech Police Arrest Protesters In Pilsen

Prague, May 6 (AP)—About 1,000 Czechoslovaks, some carrying American and British

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Police staged defiant demonstrations in Pilsen last night, 24 years after United States forces liberated the city from Nazi Germany.

Reports from the city in western Bohemia said nearly 400 police and two water cannons were needed to quell three separate demonstrations. Forty-five demonstrators were arrested and three policemen were injured, Czechoslovak informants said.

In Prague, the Communist party newspaper *Rude Pravo* blamed the disturbance on "criminal elements" fomenting "anti-state actions." Accounts

from Pilsen indicated that the participants were mostly students and workers venting their displeasure at the government's renewed pro-Soviet policies and its attempts to minimize the role of the Western Allies in World War II.

The turbulent evening began with an official ceremony marking the 1945 uprising against the Germans in the final days of the European war. Flags of the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States were raised at the memorial to the national resistance movement in Peace Square, and wreaths were laid.

Five persons who reportedly tried to participate in the ceremony carrying British and

American flags were detained and had their flags confiscated.

Elsewhere in the city, about 1,500 persons staged a demonstration at a busy crossing. Reports said they placed American flags and portraits of the late Tomas Masaryk, first president of Czechoslovakia, and the former Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, at the remains of a U.S. Army memorial. The memorial was dismantled during the Stalinist era.

Participants stoned police, and residents hurled flower pots at them from apartment house windows amid whistles and jeers, reports said. After some scuffling, officers cordoned off the area.

WASHINGTON POST
May 1969

1225 Arrests Reported By Czechs

PRAGUE, May 3 (UPI)—Police arrested 1225 persons in Moravia and Bohemia earlier this week in what was seen as a drive to round up possible trouble-makers.

The Czechoslovak news agency CTK said today that police booked 524 persons and detained 141 of them on criminal charges, "mostly violence and theft."

"Quantities of stolen goods were recovered, including 24 motor vehicles, 10 firearms, building materials and other goods," the report said.

Last Wednesday, Interior Minister Josef Groesser said officials in southern Moravia had uncovered "an illegal conspiratory organization" stealing weapons allegedly for use against Soviet occupation troops.

The plotters had "a political program and relations with military circles," Groesser said, adding that "in the near future it will be possible to start prosecution."

Groesser said weapons thefts had increased in the last four or five months.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 April 1969

10 Pro-Moscow Czechs Absolved of 'Treachery'

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, April 16—The Executive Committee of the ruling Communist party's Presidium today sought to rehabilitate in the eyes of the people a group of conservatives.

The group included men said to have been selected by Moscow to form a new government in Czechoslovakia at the time of the Soviet-led invasion by Warsaw Pact forces last August.

On the eve of a crucial session of the party's Central Committee, the eight-man Executive Committee said the "accusations of treachery and collaboration" leveled at the 10 conservatives were unfounded. It declared that the men had been slandered on the basis of unfounded information and fabrications.

Among those described as "honorable comrades" were Vasil Bilak, now a member of the Presidium; Drahomir Kolder, a member of the Central Committee, and Alois Indra, a secretary of the Central Committee.

Interpretations Vary

It was this group that many Czechoslovaks believe was picked by the Soviet Union to assume the leadership at the

time of the invasion. Since then, their names have been anathema to Czechoslovaks.

The decision by the Central Committee was interpreted variously by observers as either a prelude to the assumption of new powers by members of this pro-Moscow faction, or as part of an arrangement with the Soviet Union to save liberals facing possible demotion at the session opening tomorrow.

It also cleared the way for a similar statement from the full 187-member Central Committee.

It has been expected that the Central Committee will reassert tight ideological controls and perhaps determine the political fate of leading liberals. But the decision, evidently taken under Soviet pressure, came as a surprise to Czechoslovaks.

In its statement, the Executive Committee said it had decided to clear the men of the charges against them in the interests of party unity and in an effort "to consolidate conditions" in Czechoslovakia.

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ery and collaboration," it said, "were spread among the population in various ways without anyone setting proof or a factual and founded justification."

Besides Messrs. Bilak, Kolder and Indra, the Executive Committee named the following:

Frantisek Barbirek, ht. Slovak Minister of Trade; Jan Piller, a member of the Presidium; Emil Rigo; Oldrich Svestka, editor of the Communist party journal Tribuna; Milos Jakes, chairman of the party's Central Control and Auditing Commission; Jozef Ltnart, a former Premier; and Antonin Kapek. Both Mr. Lenart and Mr Kapek ae alternate members of the party's Presidium.

bers of the Central Committee.

"Among part of the public and in the party," the Executive Committee said, "there still exists a lack of confidence in the comrades accused of collaboration and treachery."

It noted that there has been an "organized and spontaneous condemnation" of the men and in the "lower party bodies many functionaries of the party and state were unjustly branded and in some cases were exposed to terror."

"The Executive Committee has discussed the state of affairs," it went on, "and regards it as its duty to state publicly that it has no factual proof on the basis of which accusations of alleged treachery of some sort of collaboration

could be confirmed."

"It was not correct that the party and civic honor of a number of honest comrades, devoted to the party, was allowed to be tarnished in such a fashion. It is important that in the future no accusation should be overlooked, that proof should be demanded from anyone who comes forward with an accusation and those who commit untruthful slanders should be dealt with according to the law.

"The basic criteria for judging the qualities of publicly active persons are socialist awareness, fidelity to socialist internationalism and the ability to apply the ideas of socialism responsibly in practice.

WASHINGTON POST
16 May 1969

Czechs Close Journals Which Pushed Reform

Los Angeles Times

PRAGUE, May 15—Two of the most prominent editorial voices of the Czechoslovak Communist reform movement, Reporter and Listy, were ordered closed today by the new conservative government.

The shutdowns are part of a sweeping purge of the press, and the interior and defense ministries are now in full swing as the conservatives tighten their control of the national life.

Listy and Reporter, journals of the writers' and journalists' unions respectively, had both been suspended twice for short periods for their outspoken articles since the Soviet-led invasion last August.

The government also suspended for three months the monthly Plamen, published by the Union of Czech Writers, the weekly Svet V Obrazech, published by the Czechoslovak Union of Journalists, and the monthly My 69, put out by the Children's and Youth Organizations.

Among the most significant developments of the press purge was the firing today of Ladislav Velensky, chief editor of Prace, the trade union journal.

Prace until recently had promoted the notion that organized labor was developing into an important political force independent of the ruling Communist Party.

There were also unconfirmed reports that Miroslav Jelinek, the editor of the youth newspaper Mlada Fronta, a paper that has frequently been severely attacked by the Moscow Press, may also be on his way out.

These moves are obviously the result of a series of intensive consultations between the government, the offices in charge of the newly imposed censorship and the Journalists Union. They were foreshadowed by harsh criticism of the press, radio and television from the Communist Party chief, Gustav Husak.

The Purge of progressives, who are officially labeled

"rightwing opportunists" and anti-Communist elements, was reported obliquely in the press yesterday in an announcement that the Communist Party organs of the Interior Ministry had elected "new leading Party bodies" in a secret ballot at a heretofore undisclosed meeting on May 12 and 13.

A statement issued by the Ministry said that the Communists there had sternly criticized the former Minister, Josef Pavel, a progressive, for the "destructive results" of his activity while he held the office for a short period at the height of the reforms last year.

Pavel was the first, to be fired at the Kremlin's insistence after the Soviet invasion. He had in fact implemented the reformist program for dismantling the police state. In doing so, he fired many of the old-time secret police officials and was said to have ousted the large number of Soviet agents posing as advisers.

The Soviet agents are back, and the new statement by the Communists in the Ministry indicates that the old-timers have also returned to their posts while the progressives are being sent out to "useful labor" in factories, collective farms and elsewhere.

It is apparent that there had been a lengthy power struggle inside the Ministry that was finally brought to a close when Husak came to power last month and ordered the restoration of stringent central controls.

The Ministry statement said the new majority of Communists (the newly restored conservatives) had condemned the "expression of anti-Soviet nationalism and chauvinism" that had been heard among members of the Ministry and were still to be heard, although their voices were "dying out."

A tough-line member of the Party Presidium, Lubomir Strougal, who was Interior Minister during the former Stalinist dictatorship and is now the chief of the Party bureau in the Czech part of the Federal republic, predicted at a policy meeting of Interior Ministry conservatives Tuesday that there would be "political, organizational and particularly cadre measures" in the press and elsewhere throughout the government.

The phrase "cadre measures" is the Communist euphemism for personnel changes, or in this case a purge of those opposed to the Party's moves to restore strict central controls.

Similar measures are reported by authoritative sources to be under way among top officials in the armed forces and Ministry of Defense, where progressives are being weeded out or prematurely pensioned off.

PCI REFUSES TO JOIN CPSU ANTI-MAO CRUSADE

[Article by Antonio Gambino: "Why the Italian CP Refuses to Join the Soviet Anti-Mao Crusade";

The 67 delegations participating in the Preparatory Commission of the world conference of communist parties left Moscow in the middle of last week, after 10 days of meetings and debates. But their long stay in the Soviet capital did not contribute to solving all the problems and smoothing over all the contrasts and disagreements. The only result was that of fixing, with a new postponement, the definitive date of the conference -- next 5 June. There are, instead, serious misgivings as to whether the conference will be held. Nor are there any assurances with respect to the date of its conclusion.

Throughout the 10 days of the Preparatory Commission's work, the Soviets insisted that the next world communist conference "manifest a strong unitary position." Repeating the slogan launched by Brezhnev himself -- "what unites us is greater than what divides us" -- they asked the "fraternal parties" to set aside marginal divergencies and to emphasize, through their talks and the approval of a broad concluding document, the solidarity of the communist and anti-imperialist front. The inevitable corollary of this position was the condemnation of all those like China which, for reasons of sectarianism or nationalism, aim instead at destroying a united front.

In the Preparatory Commission the Soviet Union was able to win over to its position an overwhelming majority of almost two-thirds. Many of the parties assuming Moscow's positions were, however, (like those from South America) small clandestine groups with a few hundred members and without genuine contact with their countries of origin. What Suslov and Ponomarev then had to obtain was the acquiescence of the West European parties, which without doubt constitute one of the principal poles of world communism. And it was in this area that their action encountered an obstacle that was more difficult than was envisioned.

In theory the alignment of the West European communist parties had weakened in past weeks: the French had in fact published a document on the Sino-Russian clashes, and in this document they accepted fully the Soviet theses. By this gesture the French CP heads were completing their parabola with virtual complete agreement with the Kremlin. However, this volte-face did not prevent the other European [sic] parties from confirming their rejection of CPSU requests. The opposition group was made up of the communist parties of Italy, England, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and Rumania. And it was up to the PCI, by virtue of its tradition and organizational strength, to speak with Suslov and Ponomarev in the strongest words and to pronounce the nos in the most decisive way.

The thesis supported by the Italian Communists was that, in discussing the next world conference, it was essential to separate in a clear-cut way the debate from the final document. As to the debate, it was indispensable that it be broad and public, with its themes limitless. The PCI insisted, in fact, that the international press be invited to the meeting hall and participate in the discussions. In the event that this request was unacceptable, it made known that it reserved the right to inform, after each session, the world's journalists in a way that would clearly delineate the various positions. The CPSU leaders spoke of the dangers of such a procedure. The Preparatory Conference was concluded without reaching a compromise on this point.

Even more specific was the contrast that developed over the problem of the concluding document: the PCI in fact contested the Soviet position on this matter. The CPSU leaders, the Italian Communists say, have a strange idea about the unity of the communist and worker movement. For them, who obviously have not gotten beyond the old conception of the Comintern and Cominform, this unity must certainly have a disciplinary character and assumes as an inevitable corollary the establishment of an organized structure with a single guiding center, to whose orders it is essential to adapt without discussion. The consequence of this view is the excommunication of all those who do not agree, with the result of splitting still further the anti-imperialist front. Our conception, the PCI leaders add, differs completely. In the current historical situation, the only way to maintain the unity of the international worker movement is that of renouncing not only any pretext of a single guiding center, but also that of an ideological and strategic view shared by everybody. What is essential, instead, is to reach agreement in the struggle for some common objectives. Only in this way is it possible to prevent the repeated splits (between China and the USSR, between the USSR and Rumania, etc.), avoid catastrophic initiatives like the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and strengthen, not weaken, the march toward the affirmation of socialist ideals.

The contrast between these two profoundly diverging positions was manifested during the 10 days of the Preparatory Commission's work, in the discussion on the type of document that the June conference must approve. The Soviets want a very broad final communique that tackles all the principal ideological questions, fixes for each question the "correct" position for every communist party, and then binds all the party to respect them without uncertainty and with discipline. Whoever rejects this will be automatically outside the communist movement and must then be publicly condemned as a right or left deviationist. Conversely, the Italians say they are ready to sign only a brief and concise document that fixes for the immediate future some concrete objectives of common action, in which they would participate on a basis of the absolute parity of all the communist and worker parties, including those that decide, the underlying cause notwithstanding, not to participate in the Moscow conference. Because the Soviets submitted to the Preparatory

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Commission a document drawn up along the lines of their desiderata, the PCI representatives said that if it was not drastically changed before June the Italian Communist delegation to the world conference in Moscow would reserve the right of not voting for it and of submitting some amendments directed at expressing its diverse orientation.

It is difficult to see how, within the next 2 months, these two positions can be reconciled. For the CPSU leaders, the essential goal of the Moscow conference is today (and has always been) that of consolidating its control over the Communist movement, imposing upon it a strict discipline and cutting away all that component which refuses to allow itself to be fitted within Moscow's framework. What concerns Moscow in fact is the "internal" contestation of Mao and Castro. Once China and Cuba are officially excommunicated, Moscow will be free to define their regimes as "adventurist" and "parafascist" and can thus try to reduce their capacity to penetrate propagandistically other sectors of the worker movement. The Italian Communists are aware both that such a policy is antihistorical and that its implementation would result in ever increasing splits in the worker movement and reduce to a minimum the PCI's freedom to maneuver.

Gradually, as the date for the Moscow trip comes closer, it is certain that the pressures on Longo and Berlinguer to renounce this position will become more intense and direct. Will the PCI be able to maintain its current firm position? It is not easy to answer this question.

At the Botteghe Oscure (PCI Central Committee Headquarters) there are perplexities and uncertainties. On the one hand, in fact, the battles along the Amur and the Ussuri and the ever increasing indiscriminate insults of Mao (accused by last Saturday's Pravda of being, inter alia, in the pay of imperialism since infancy) have disturbed broad sectors of the communist base, shaken the pro-Soviet sentiments of many who in August had approved the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and thus strengthened the hand of those who advocate the necessity of continuing without change the attitude of firmness toward Moscow. On the other side of the scales, there are the reasons of those who see the PCI's insertion in the majority as a short-term operation. Precisely when the Washington-Moscow dialogue has become more intense and productive, the advocates of this position ask, would it not be absurd for the Italian Communists to break publicly with the Soviet Union? Would not such a gesture, though a step toward autonomy, be interpreted as a dangerous opening toward pro-Chinese and opposition movements?

The ideological, international, and domestic political situations will thus be considered by the PCI leaders in the next few weeks, when they fix definitively the position to advocate in Moscow on 5 June and make one of the more important decisions of the party in its 50 years of life.

Perché il PCI rifiuta di partecipare

alla crociata sovietica contro Mao

L'USSURI BAGNA L'EUROPA

ROMA. Le 67 delegazioni che partecipano alla commissione preparatoria della conferenza mondiale dei partiti comunisti hanno lasciato Mosca alla metà della scorsa settimana dopo dieci giorni di riunioni e dibattiti; ma la loro lunga permanenza nella capitale sovietica non è servita a risolvere tutti i problemi e ad appianare tutti i motivi di contrasto e di dissenso. L'unico risultato è stato quello di fissare, con un nuovo rinvio, la data definitiva dell'incontro: il 5 giugno prossimo. Rimangono invece gravi incertezze sul suo svolgimento e sulla sua conclusione.

Per tutti i dieci giorni dei lavori della commissione preparatoria i sovietici hanno insistito perché la prossima conferenza mondiale comunista acquisti il carattere d'una

"forte manifestazione unitaria". Ripetendo lo slogan lanciato dallo stesso Breznev: «ciò che ci unisce è più di ciò che ci divide», essi hanno chiesto ai "partiti fratelli" di mettere da parte i motivi marginali di divergenza e di sottolineare, con i loro discorsi e con l'approvazione di un ampio documento finale, la saldezza del fronte comunista e antimperialista. Corollario inevitabile di questa impostazione era la condanna di tutti coloro che, come la Cina, per ragioni di settarismo o di nazionalismo, mirano invece alla distruzione del fronte unitario.

Su questa sua impostazione l'Unione Sovietica raccoglieva, nella commissione preparatoria, una maggioranza schiacciante, di quasi due terzi. Molti dei partiti schierati sulle posizioni di Mosca erano tuttavia (come nel caso di quelli sudamericani) dei piccoli gruppi clandestini, con poche centinaia di iscritti e privi di un vero contatto col loro paese di origine. Ciò che Suslov e Ponomarev dovevano ottenere era quindi l'assenso dei partiti dell'Europa occidentale, che costituiscono indubbiamente uno dei poli principali del comunismo mondiale. Ed è qui che la loro azione s'è scontrata contro un ostacolo più duro del previsto.

In teoria lo schieramento dei partiti comunisti dell'Europa occidentale si era, nelle settimane scorse, indebolito. Invece si erano infatti pubblicati un documento sugli scontri russo-cinesi,

in cui accettavano in pieno le tesi sovietiche. Con questo gesto i capi del PCF completavano la loro parabola con un allineamento quasi totale al Cremlino. Questo voltafaccia non ha tuttavia impedito ad altri partiti europei di confermare il loro rifiuto alle richieste del PCUS. Il gruppo degli oppositori era formato dal partito comunista italiano e da quelli inglese, belga, svizzero, spagnolo e rumeno. Ed è toccato al PCI, in virtù della sua tradizione e della sua forza organizzativa, il compito di dire a Suslov e a Ponomarev le parole più ferme e i no più decisi.

La tesi sostenuta a Mosca dai comunisti italiani è stata che, nel discutere la prossima conferenza mondiale, bisognava separare nettamente il dibattito dal documento finale. Per quanto riguardava il dibattito era indispensabile che esso fosse ampio, senza limitazioni di temi, e pubblico. Il PCI insiste infatti perché la stampa internazionale venga ammessa nella sala delle riunioni e possa assistere ai discorsi. Nel caso che questa richiesta non venga accolta, ha già fatto sapere che si riserva il diritto di informare dopo ogni seduta i giornalisti di tutto il mondo, in modo che le singole posizioni appaiano chiaramente delineate. I dirigenti del PCUS hanno fatto presente i pericoli d'una simile procedura. La conferenza preparatoria si è conclusa senza che un compromesso

ANCORA più preciso è stato il contrasto che si è sviluppato sul problema del documento finale; il PCI contesta infatti, su questo tema, l'intera impostazione dei sovietici. I dirigenti del PCUS dicono i comunisti italiani, hanno una strana idea dell'unità del movimento comunista e operaio. Per loro, che evidentemente non hanno ancora superato la vecchia concezione del Comintern e del Cominform, questa unità deve avere fatalmente un carattere disciplinare e presupporre, come corollario inevitabile, la creazione d'una struttura organizzativa con un unico centro direttivo al cui ordini bisogna adeguarsi senza discussione. Conseguenza di questa visione è la scomunica di tutti coloro che non sono d'accordo, con il risultato di spaccare in più parti il fronte antimperialista. La nostra concezione, aggiungono i dirigenti del PCI, è del tutto diversa. Nelle circostanze storiche attuali, l'unico modo di conservare l'unità del movimento operaio internazionale è quello di rinunciare non solo ad ogni pretesa d'un unico centro direttivo, ma anche a quella di una visione ideologica e strategica condivisa da tutti, limitandosi invece a trovare un accordo nella lotta per taluni obiettivi comuni. Solo in questo modo si possono impedire le spaccature a ripetizione (tra Cina e Urss, tra Urss e Romania, ecc.), evitare iniziative catastrofiche come l'invasione della Cecoslovacchia e rafforzare, anziché indebolire, la marcia verso l'affermazione degli ideali socialisti.

Il contrasto tra queste due impostazioni profondamente divergenti si è manifestato, durante i dieci giorni dei lavori della commissione preparatoria, nella discussione sul tipo di documento che la conferenza del giugno prossimo dovrà approvare. I sovietici desiderano un comunicato finale molto ampio, che affronti tutte le principali questioni ideologiche, stabilisca, su ciascuna, la posizione "corretta", da parte di ogni partito comunista, e obblighi poi tutti a rispettarla, senza incertezze e con disciplina: chi si rifiuterà di farlo si troverà automaticamente fuori dal movimento comunista e dovrà essere quindi pubblicamente condannato come deviazionista, di destra o di sinistra. Gli italiani, al contrario, hanno detto di essere pronti a sottoscrivere solo un documento breve e conciso, che fissi, per il prossimo futuro, alcuni obiettivi concreti di azione comune, alla quale siano chiamati a contribuire su una base di assoluta parità tutti i partiti comunisti e operai, anche quelli che non hanno ancora deciso di non partecipare alla conferenza di Mosca. Poiché i sovietici hanno sottoposto alla

commissione preparatoria il testo d'un documento redatto secondo i loro desideri, i rappresentanti del PCI hanno detto che se esso, prima di giugno, non sarà stato profondamente modificato, la delegazione comunista italiana alla conferenza mondiale di Mosca si riserverà il diritto di non votarlo o di presentare su taluni punti emendamenti diretti ad esprimere il suo diverso orientamento.

E DIFFICILE immaginare in che modo, nei prossimi due mesi, queste due impostazioni possano essere conciliate. Per i dirigenti del PCUS lo scopo essenziale della conferenza di Mosca è oggi (ed è stato sempre) quello di consolidare il proprio controllo sul movimento comunista, imponendogli una stretta disciplina e tagliando via tutta quella parte che rifiuta di farsi inquadrare. Ciò che preoccupa Mosca, infatti, è la contestazione "internazionale" di Mao e di Castro. Una volta che Cina e Cuba fossero state ufficialmente scomunicate, Mosca sarebbe libera di definire i loro regimi "avventuristici" e "parafascisti" e potrebbe in tal modo cercare di ridurre la loro capacità di penetrazione propagandistica in altri settori del movimento operaio. I comunisti italiani si rendono conto che tale politica è non soltanto antistorica ma che il suo prevalere porterebbe a sempre nuove scissioni nel movimento operaio, e rischierebbe di ridurre al minimo la libertà di manovra del PCI.

A mano a mano che si avvicinerà la data del viaggio a Mosca è tuttavia certo che le pressioni su Longo e Berlinguer perché rinuncino a tale atteggiamento si faranno più intense e dirette. Riuscirà il PCI a conservare la sua

attuale posizione di fermezza? È una domanda a cui non è facile rispondere.

Alle Botteghe Oscure non mancano le perplessità e le incertezze. Da un lato, infatti, le battaglie lungo l'Amur e l'Ussuri, gli insulti sempre più indiscriminati nei confronti di Mao (accusato tra l'altro, dalla "Pravda" di sabato scorso, di essere stato fin dall'infanzia al soldo dell'imperialismo) hanno turbato larghi settori della base comunista, scosso i sentimenti filosovietici anche di molti che nell'agosto scorso avevano approvato l'intervento in Cecoslovacchia, e quindi rafforzato la mano di chi sostiene la necessità di mantenere immutato l'atteggiamento di fermezza nei confronti di Mosca. Sull'altro piatto della bilancia vi sono però i ragionamenti del gruppo che vede l'inserimento del PCI nella maggioranza come un'operazione a breve scadenza. Proprio nel momento in cui il dialogo tra Washington e Mosca si sta facendo sempre più intenso e produttivo, chiedono gli esponenti di questa tendenza, non sarebbe assurdo che i comunisti italiani rompessero pubblicamente con l'Unione Sovietica? Un simile gesto, anziché un passo verso l'autonomia, non verrebbe interpretato come una pericolosa apertura verso i movimenti floccinosi e contestatari?

Valutazioni ideologiche e internazionali e considerazioni di politica interna saranno quindi davanti ai dirigenti del PCI nel momento in cui, nelle prossime settimane, fissando definitivamente l'atteggiamento da tenere a Mosca il 5 giugno, prenderanno una delle decisioni più importanti nei cinquant'anni della vita del loro partito.

ANTONIO GAMBINO

ALBANIA PROMISES AID TO YUGOSLAVIA

Also Offers Rumania Help
Against Soviet Pressure

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

Zeri i Popullit, the Albanian Communist party newspaper, Rumania Albanian support in resisting Soviet pressure and any military aggression.

In a long editorial, recently distributed by the Albanian press agency, the paper was particularly strong in its promise of support for neighboring Yugoslavia, despite the long history of tension and ideological conflict between the Belgrade and the Tirana regimes.

Albania, the editorial said, "will support without any hesitation the resistance of the peoples of Yugoslavia toward aggression." It continued:

"If it has been easy going so far [for the Soviet Union], a further adventurous step—an attack on Yugoslavia and Albania—not only would cost the Soviet revisionists dearly but would certainly be the prelude of a great world war, because neither Yugoslavia nor Albania are fresh figs that would easily go down the throats of the Grechkos and Yakubovskys. They are hard bones that would break their throats into pieces."

There are some indications that this gesture toward Yugoslavia was made by the Albanians with Chinese Communist approval. A relatively high Yugoslav trade official visited Peking recently and negotiated an agreement for increased Chinese-Yugoslav trade.

As regards Rumania, Zeri i Popullit said: "The Soviet revisionists want to occupy Rumania, but not in the Czechoslovak form. They want this [occupation] to take place with the approval of the Rumanians, under the regular framework of the Warsaw Treaty."

The newspaper said that Albania's people and Labor [Communist] party "powerfully back the just resistance of the Rumanian fraternal people and of the working class against the aggressive aims of the Soviet chauvinists and their followers and against any blackmail or provocation, overt or covert, which the chiefs of the Soviet Union would use."

Romanian Paper Rejects Brezhnev Intervention Policy

By STUART S. SMITH
[Bonn Bureau of The Sun]

Bonn, April 24—An authoritative Romanian journal today repudiated the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of the limited sovereignty of the individual "socialist commonwealth" states.

The bluntly worded attack on the theses which the Kremlin has repeatedly used to justify last summer's march into Czechoslovakia is one of the most forthright denunciations of Soviet policy ever made in Bucharest. As such, it can be interpreted as an open challenge to Moscow's claim to lead the world Communist movement.

The rebuke appeared in the latest issue of *Lumea*, the foreign affairs weekly published by the Romanian Journalists Union under Foreign Office supervision.

"Degrades Socialism"

The theory of "limited sovereignty," *Lumea* asserted, does not belong in Marxist ideology "because it is foreign to it and degrades socialism." Moreover, *Lumea* wrote, the doctrine is "erroneous, harmful and dangerous."

Such a "completely unscientific theory" gives the false impression that the Communist countries amount to "a formless community" in which the individual countries have lost their character — "a sort of superstate."

The article, which was given additional emphasis by being quoted by *Agerpress*, the official Romanian news agency, said too that it is "strange" to demand respect for the sovereignty of

the Communist bloc without applying the same standard to the individual members.

System As A Whole

One hears support for the principles of non-interference but this refers, "only to the Socialist system as a whole" as if it did "not apply to the relations between the Socialist states within the Socialist bloc," the journal commented.

At the fifth Polish Communist party conference last November 12, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, declared that "when internal and external forces inimical to socialism seek to influence the development of a Socialist country with the aim of restoring the capitalist system, when the threat to socialism in this country becomes a threat to the security of the entire Socialist community, then this ceases to be a national problem. It becomes a general problem which must be the concern of all Socialist countries."

Direct Threat?

Since then Mr. Brezhnev's remarks have been reiterated many times and expanded to include the U.S.S.R.'s Far Eastern frontiers. As a result, both Romania and Yugoslavia feel directly threatened.

Just a few days ago President Tito visited the Yugoslav city of Subotica, less than 10 miles from the Hungarian border (and, therefore, the Warsaw Pact frontier), and launched a firm warning in Moscow's direction.

Soviet Troops Patrol Bulgaria, Albania Says

CPYRGHT Statement Also Finds Military Designs On Romania

By STUART S. SMITH
[Bonn Bureau of The Sun]

Bonn, April 22 — The Soviet Union has stationed permanent occupation troops in Bulgaria and has serious military designs on Romania, an official Albanian statement said today.

Western officials said they had little information on the subject, but the tone of the Albanian charges indicates that Albania is seriously disturbed over potential aggression in the Balkans from the Kremlin.

Because Bulgaria said two weeks ago that the Warsaw Pact forces would invade any nation which copies the Czechoslovak democratization experiment, the Albanian accusations have been given at least some consideration.

A Decisive Role

A lengthy statement in *Zeri i Popullit*, the official Albanian Communist party paper, took note of the fact that Soviet military leaders now seem to play a decisive role in forming Kremlin policy, the article charged them with trying to overrun the entire Balkan Peninsula.

"For a long time," *Zeri i Popullit* asserted, "the Soviet chiefs, in an open and scandalous way, have been prowling around Romania like wild beasts. Pressures are now overt.

"However," the paper continued, Moscow's "militarist adventurous policy" has met the "determined resistance" of the Romanian people, "who are courageously opposing the intervention attempts. . . ."

The Kremlin leaders, *Zeri i Popullit* stated, have "militarily occupied Bulgaria. This is an accomplished fact due to the betrayal of the Zhivkov clique." Todor Zhivkov is both the Bulgarian premier and the Communist party leader.

"This occupation has been carried out without noise. They want to do the same in Romania, but to achieve this aim they must have the Romanian leadership which does not obey them.

They are seeking to get a hold on it through flatteries, coups, plots and threats of all kinds."

The Albanian paper did not say how many or what kind of Soviet troops it thinks are stationed in Bulgaria.

If the report is true, it represents another Soviet blow against sovereignty of the individual Warsaw Pact members.

Rumors Of Troops

Soviet troops have not been garrisoned in Bulgaria for many years. Following the Czechoslovak invasion, in which Bulgaria participated, there have been rumors of Soviet troops being massed in Bulgaria along Romania's southern frontier.

Last September 21 Albania protested against the alleged presence of Soviet troops there. Four days later, the Bulgarian news agency denied the charges. Bulgaria and Albania expelled each other's diplomatic representatives last July.

Soviet troops in Bulgaria would be hard to identify except by experts. Bulgarian Army uniforms look exactly like Russian uniforms. Bulgarian military equipment comes from the U.S.S.R.

What is more, in an unusual law passed in 1950, the Bulgarian National Assembly gave Soviet citizens living in Bulgaria a special status, providing them with the same legal standing and privileges as the 8,300,000 Bulgarian citizens are entitled to, including the right to hold any Bulgarian public office.

Earlier this month, Ivan Bashev, the Bulgarian foreign minister, gave Western newsmen an interview in which he warned that "should developments like those in Czechoslovakia take place in another country of the Warsaw Pact, the organization would react in the same way. Such joint action is also possible should the border incidents between the Soviet Union and China lead to being a danger for the Socialist camp."

Alarm was voiced in foreign offices throughout the Balkans and, a few days later, the Bulgarian government stated that Mr. Bashev's remarks had been distorted.

That Romania took Mr. Bashev's

and the denial less seriously was indicated in the way the Romanian papers reported the incident. Agerpres, the Romanian news agency, called attention to the denial, but also to all of Mr. Bashev's threatening statement, as reported by Western news agencies.

Resistance Called Just

Zeri i Popullit said that even though Albania and Romania have ideological differences, the Albanian party and people "powerfully support the just resistance of the Romanian fraternal people" against any Soviet "blackmail or provocation, overt or covert, with which the chiefs of the Soviet Union might use to subvert Romania. Whatever may happen we will always be on the side of the Romanian people."

The Albanian paper said basically the same thing about the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. The subject has become especially topical as there are a number of observers in Belgrade who think the powerful Russian fleet in the Mediterranean might have just as much interest in the Adriatic Sea and the Dalmatian coast as it does in the Middle East.

"The Kremlin chiefs," *Zeri i Popullit* commented, "are well aware" that an attack on Yugoslavia "would meet with the fierce and heroic resistance of the Yugoslav peoples, who, during their whole history, have fought for freedom and independence and against foreign invaders."

Russian aggression "would be disastrous" for the U.S.S.R. "from every viewpoint," the paper asserted.

Prelude To War

Such an invasion "would certainly be the prelude of a great world war because neither Yugoslavia nor Albania are fresh figs which would slide easily down the throats of Grechkos and Yakubovskys."

The references were to Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Soviet defense minister, and Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, the Warsaw Pact commander in chief, both of whom have assumed a dominant role in Kremlin policy-making, Communist observers

CPYRIGHT

Mao, Lin and the Maomen

The great man and his chosen heir naturally came out on top again at China's ninth party congress—but there was quite a bit of a dust-up in the lower ranks of the communist hierarchy

Almost everything about China's ninth party congress was predictably Maoist. Lin Piao's political report, 24,000 words long, which was published on Monday, was a catalogue of familiar Maoist themes, from the need for ceaseless class struggle at home to strong support for revolution abroad. The new party constitution, essentially the same as earlier draft versions, was a Maoist prescription for an anti-bureaucratic bureaucracy. And the new party leadership, selected last week, was similarly dominated by Mao and his men. But which men they would be was anything but predictable.

The publication of the membership roster for Peking's new central committee ended the mystery about the prolongation of the congress to 24 days. Nine of these days were evidently occupied by a complex and controversial election process. Instead of the expected routine translation of the 176-man congress presidium into the central committee, the new central committee emerged as a greatly enlarged body of 170 full members and 109 alternates which did not even include 36 members of the presidium. And the most startling thing about the new central committee was that for the first time in Chinese communist history it was presented, not according to rank, but, except for Mao and Lin, in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order. Both the increased size and the unhierarchical order suggest that the selection of the committee was marked by serious disputes which could be resolved in no other way. But the unprecedented omission of ranks may also be a Maoist innovation to promote a "democratic" party style. This explanation gained credibility on Monday when the central committee, in its first plenary session, elected a new politburo. And, lo and behold, the politburo was in non-rank order.

The politburo also confounded China-watchers by departing considerably from what, for almost a year, had looked like an established leadership. Four provincial representatives were added to the group, three military commanders from Nanking, Shenyang and Anhwei, plus the little-known deputy chairman of the Honan revolutionary committee who had not even made it on to the presidium. Among the leaders who were booted downstairs were the foreign minister, Chen Yi, two economic planners and three top-ranking soldiers.

The results of the considerable changes in the politburo and the central committee are to strengthen the clasped hands of Mao and his constitutionally designated successor, Lin Piao. The surprisingly small standing committee of the politburo surrounds the pragmatic prime minister, Chou En-lai, with the cultural revolutionary inner core of Mao, Lin, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. (What was it that made Mao stop short of including his wife?) In the full politburo, nine out of 25 are full-blooded cultural revolutionaries and nine of the ten military members can be considered political comrades of Mao and Lin.

The central committee membership in itself does not look overwhelmingly Maoist. Some 40 per cent are military and about a quarter are old cadres. Assuming that the 40-odd unknowns are most likely to be revolutionary types, the Maoists would constitute up to one-third. But given the unwieldy size of the committee, its membership is not likely to make much difference. The politburo will be stronger than ever and the politburo is a secure Maoist instrument.

What will the Maoists use their enhanced power to do? Lin Piao's political report did not make this clear, except, of course, for continuing to saturate the Chinese people with Mao Tsetung thought (Mao's name is now denuded of its hyphen, apparently to make it an equal partner in the triumvirate, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought). "The wide dissemination of Mao Tsetung thought," said Lin, was "the most significant achievement of the great proletarian cultural revolution."

If the full flush of the cultural revolution is now over—and the congress does signify an end of some sort—the struggles which it stirred up are not. Lin juggles the same contradictory instructions that the Maoists have been issuing for over two years: class struggle must continue; the proletariat must criticize the bourgeoisie and fight anti-Maoists on the left and the right; the ranks must be purified and the party must keep on "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh." But at the same time Maoists must carry out a conciliatory policy towards their enemies, particularly old cadres and intellectuals, most of whom can be re-educated. But again, "we must for ever remember this lesson: whoever opposes chairman Mao, whoever opposes Mao Tsetung thought, at any time and under any circumstances, shall be condemned and punished by the whole party and the whole nation." And what if the class enemies stir up trouble again? "Just arouse the masses and strike them down again." In other words, strike up another cultural revolution.

Lin's is not a dove-like statement. But apart from its revolutionary rhetoric, it provides few concrete guidelines to policy. On economics, Lin sounds a moderate note, asserting that revolution should not replace production though it must command it. And while he uses the slogan "new leaps forward," he does not imply a crash programme on the 1958 model. Curiously, Lin spares hardly a word for what would logically seem to have deserved a central place in the speech: the reconstruction of the party. He makes no attempt to resolve the crucial questions of whether the party will constitute an apparatus distinct from the revolutionary committees and whether an effort will be made to overcome military dominance at the local level.

On foreign affairs, Lin employs similar revolutionary language and balances similar contradictions between the need to struggle and a willingness to coexist peacefully. He is much more bitter in his attacks on the apostate Russians than on the Americans. But in his one discussion of specific policy he reveals that the Chinese have already had some

exchanges with the Russians about their border problems—started by a Kosygin telephone call to Peking—and are considering a Soviet proposal for what are described as consultations.

In all its massive text, the Lin Piao report says little that is new and settles none of the basic problems raised by the cultural revolution. As a statement of general principle, it is in the Maoist style, for Mao does not choose to concern himself with detail. A more programmatic policy document may be produced by a national people's congress which is rumoured to be in the works. But with the leadership stripped of most of its administrators and planners, there may be nothing but moral imperatives issuing out of Peking for some time to come.

BALTIMORE SUN
4 May 1969

Mao joins the Red pantheon, but his revolution isn't over

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By PETER J. KUMPA

Mr. Kumpa is chief of The Sun's Hong Kong Bureau.

Hong Kong.

IN the early, conspiratorial days of communism, party congresses were held so that opposing factions could slug it out and decide the next stage of the revolution. In recent years, ruling parties have staged elaborate congresses to give mechanical approval to major decisions already reached by a small inner circle of career bureaucrats and theoreticians.

The ninth national congress of the Chinese Communist party apparently had elements of the old and the new.

Because of the time involved (24 days); the rumor-proof secrecy (no one discovered in which building meetings were held) and the visible preparations, which seemed to have anticipated a shorter meeting, it is reasonable to conclude that there was disagreement. The untidy state of the party just before the congress virtually guaranteed conflict.

As the congress publicly produced exactly what was expected of it, it could be described as staged. There was more planning evident, however, in the noisy celebrations of hundreds of millions of Chinese this past week in the sweaty, hysterical spectacle that ancient land produces.

Mao exalted

The hoarse throats and the hypnotic, chanting slogans that marked the "victory" of the congress were largely saluting the one man who still dominates China with his will and personality. He is Mao Tse-tung, at 75 the deified father-figure of the country.

Mr. Mao was continued as the leader, the party chairman. Better still, the congress elevated him officially to the same exalted philosophical rank as Marx and Lenin, a promotion that the Chinese can take pride in, and the rest of the Communist ruling parties (except the Albanians) can reject.

The congress gave China a new faith. It was not called "Maoism," which would be too simple and undignified. Rather it was called "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse tung thought." And it confirmed Lin Piao, the quiet military strategist with the heavy eyebrows, the most faithful conduit of Chairman Mao's ideas, as his successor.

More of the same

Disposed of was a potential issue, the illegality of the Maoist takeover of the party during the cultural revolution. The congress legitimized the new rulers.

For the future, the congress promised China more of what it has had during the past several years. The cultural revolution was "victorious" but not yet ended. Massive campaigns of ideological education were going to be dosed out as cures for all the country's ills.

This was all that was produced in three sober, largely sterile communiques, the new and somewhat vague constitution and finally the list of 279 names that comprised a new central committee.

Egalitarian dream

The congress was, of course, much more than that. With gale winds of change blowing through China, it appeared to be one of the last, great scenes in the second revolution of Mao Tse-tung. Nearly 20 years before, Chairman Mao had proclaimed the People's Republic of China, the fruit of a guerrilla revolution.

and civil war, for which he could thank hated foreign invaders and a softened and corroded Nationalist opposition. Though Chairman Mao led it, that was a revolution from below, relying on the masses of millions of poor or disaffected Chinese.

A complex man, Chairman Mao has simple but utopian goals. Not only has he worked to restore China to its ancient greatness, but he was also driven by the dream of an egalitarian China, free from the hated exploitation of the past—a land where the worker and peasant would be as cultured as the intellectual who would also do manual labor.

Hatred had driven Chairman Mao to despise mandarins of any persuasion. He considered them a bureaucracy out of touch with the people, snooty intellectuals quoting classics, seeking special pay and special privileges.

Stumbled on "great leap"

Success in guerrilla war, in mass education and in propaganda techniques had convinced Chairman Mao that he could "remold the majority into new men." He believed that subjective will could be turned into objective force. With something like 500,000,000 backward, superstitious peasants living barely above subsistence in a tired land, China profited by a Mao preaching the impossible.

Chairman Mao's techniques worked until the "great leap forward" when his enthusiasm for instant communism plunged China into economic despair. Near famine was averted by the bureaucrats who turned to pragmatic, rational policies to pull China slowly back together. Chairman Mao never admitted his error but fought back to wipe out exactly what he feared would ruin his purist dreams.

Peasants were thriving with their private plots, private pigs and private markets. Workers were getting incentive pay rather than laboring for the ideological glory. The party was full of experts and managers, drifting from Chairman Mao's idealized contact with the masses. Chairman Mao never saw nor wanted to see that China was progressing, just as he never cared to see Russian progress. All he could see was his egalitarian vision being destroyed by his old comrades in arms.

Party defeated

By 1962, he was striking back. What the outside world saw as a conflict between ideologues and pragmatists was the beginning of Chairman Mao's second revolution. By 1966, Chairman Mao alone carefully ripped off the head of the party he had built and slashed at its innards, using Red Guard students and his mass techniques of rebellion.

The giant party of 18,000,000 members that controlled every aspect of Chinese life fought back, but in the end it fell defeated. Down went most of its leaders, Liu Shao-chi and others, denounced as traitors. History was rewritten to show they had opposed Chairman Mao for years, when all they had done in fact was to jolly him along.

Chairman Mao had to call in Lin Piao and the army to maintain order. The military is still there, on farm and in factory, to put down resisting "class enemies." The chairman had to entice back cadres, who finally restored some semblance of administration through the "three-way" revolutionary committees, along with the military and some of the revolutionaries. But it took two long years.

Rebuilt in Mao's fashion

The process was to toughen "millions" of Chairman Mao's "heirs of the revolution." The price was a setback in industry, a loss of three years of education for the country's youth and the planting of savage rivalries deep in China's fabric. It cost Chairman Mao whatever faith the intellectuals had in him.

Still the more difficult task was the rebuilding of the party, for nothing else has been able to run China's 700,000,000 people. The rebuilding has to be done from the top. The congress was the beginning of that process, but it is being done in Chairman Mao's way. This will not be easy, for the congress showed it could agree on honoring its old leader but nothing else.

It said nothing about education, agriculture, health or industry. For its Politburo, it could not even agree on a pecking order below Chairman Mao and Mr. Lin. Prescribing more and more Mao-study, it seemed as if the 75-year-old leader had decided to start all over again to convince the country of the righteousness of his ways.

Time, it seems, has caught up with a figure as heroic as Chairman Mao has been for his China. His ideas are essentially rooted in the past. He talks of modernization, but he opposes just what China needs: the experts to run a modern economy. Chairman Mao's ideal of politically loyal workers who think and intellectuals who work just is not good enough. Undoubtedly, Chairman Mao was told this behind the closed doors of the ninth congress. From what was said publicly, he is not convinced.

Communist China therefore faces an uncertain unstable future. Chairman Mao's heirs today are a group of unknown, inexperienced, unsophisticated military men. And it is too late to have a third Maoist revolution.

MAO HEIR FACING POLITICAL WOES

Open Opposition To Lin Found At Red Parley

By PETER J. KUMPA

[Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun]

Hong Kong, April 26—Marshal Lin Piao, China's defense minister and officially designated heir to the Communist party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, appears to be in political trouble.

Though the just-ended Ninth National Communist Party Congress was the peak of achievement of a long military and political career, it also was the scene of reported open opposition to Mr. Lin.

Position Raised 3 Years Ago

A new party constitution was adopted expressly naming Marshal Lin as Chairman Mao's successor. The move was only confirmation of the Lin elevation, for he had been raised to No. 2 in the Communist hierarchy nearly 3 years ago with the fall of former President Liu Shao-chi.

Diplomatic sources in Peking, however, reported rumors of strenuous disagreement with the constitutional provision. According to these reports, the debate was one reason for the length of the congress: 24 days in close secrecy.

Poor Health Record

Delegates were said to be questioning why Marshal Lin had to be named in the constitution, a step never taken before.

They were said to have asked what would happen to the succession problem if Marshal Lin died before Mr. Mao. Though Marshal Lin is 13 years junior to Chairman Mao, he has a record of poor health, probably arising out of old war wounds that required years of hospitalization in the Soviet Union.

Never confirmed is Marshal Lin's reputed tubercular condition. Whatever his ailment, it is true that he has had to take long rest periods.

Pictures from the congress also show a thin and tired looking Marshal Lin standing besides a rather robust chairman.

WASHINGTON
13 May 1969

Marshal Lin made the major political report to the congress and, unlike previous such reports, it was gone over and revised. The thin communiqués said delegates "discussed again and again the political report made by Vice-Chairman Lin Piao, paragraph by paragraph and sentence by sentence."

Corrections Unprecedented

Then, said the communique, "delegates have made many good proposals for additions to and revisions of the report."

Within Communist China, political heroes do not have their speeches corrected. In this case, the changes probably were more significant, for Marshal Lin was speaking as the party's vice chairman, and its eventual leader, while setting forth its "fighting tasks" for the future.

Before the Lin report was adopted, the top hierarchy of the party spoke out in its favor. These include Premier Chou En-lai, two old Maoist advisers, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, and the chief of the general staff, Huang Yung-shen. Their party ranks are Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 10.

Radical Left Silent

Whether deliberately or not, the radical leftists at the top of the party's leadership, Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), who ranks sixth, and Chang Chun-Chaio, No. 7, Yao Wen-Yuan, No. 8, and Hsieh Fu-chih, No. 9, did not speak out for the Lin report.

Perhaps they were not called upon to back the political report.

But some China observers here see this as an ominous sign of a developing feud between Chiang Ching, noted for her grudges, and Marshal Lin. True or not, the extreme left at the congress did go on record backing the report.

Even after the report was adopted by the congress, the communique said the secretariat was entrusted with making "modifications in wording" before it was published.

China Agrees To Soviet River Talks

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, May 12—Peking has agreed to meet with the Soviet Union next month to discuss navigational problems along their common boundary rivers, the scene of recurrent clashes between Chinese and Russian troops within recent months.

Until now, however, the Chinese have not responded to two Soviet notes recommending extensive negotiations to settle the actual border dispute between the Communists' neighbors and former allies.

This suggests to analysts here that Peking has chosen to attend the navigation meeting as a way of sounding out the Russians before entering into talks on the more substantive frontier issues.

At the same time, these analysts submit, the fact that the Chinese have decided to meet with the Russians at all after their bloody clashes and bitter recriminations may reflect Peking's desire to prevent the border fracas from degenerating into a full-scale conflict.

In a telegram sent to Moscow yesterday, Peking accepted a Russian proposal to resume regular meetings of the Sino-Soviet Joint Commission for Navigation on the Border Rivers, which last met in 1967.

The Soviet proposal, sent to Peking on April 20, called for new talks on navigation on the Amur, Ussuri, Argun and Angacha rivers as well as Lake Khanka.

The Peking telegram, the text of which was transmitted here tonight by the New China News Agency, suggested that the forthcoming meeting be held in the Soviet city of Khabarovsk at a date to be fixed in mid-June. The message referred to Khabarovsk as Poil, its old Chinese name.

Slender Charged

Signed by the chief Chinese representative on the joint commission, Chen Fa-ping, the Peking telegram charged the Russians with "slander" for having accused Peking of declining to attend a meeting last year.

The message expressed "doubt" about the extent of Soviet sincerity in convening the forthcoming meeting, but added:

"Nevertheless, proceeding from its consistent stand of safeguarding normal navigation . . . on the boundary rivers, the Chinese side has still decided to send its delegation to this meeting."

Meanwhile, the Chinese have yet to answer the Russian notes proposing that talks on the demarcation of the Sino-Soviet border, broken off in 1964, be resumed. These notes were issued on March 20 and April 11.

The first appeal for negotiations, which was widely publicized, was contained in a 3000-word Soviet statement handed to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow.

Though calm in tone, the statement blamed the Chinese for the failure of the 1964 talks and rejected all their claims to disputed border areas. Consequently, observers considered it less an effort to promote talks than an attempt to win public opinion.

In his report to the opening session of the Communist Party Congress in Peking on April 1, Marshal Lin Piao, the Chinese Defense Minister and Mao Tse-tung's designated successor, disclosed that Soviet Premier Kosygin had tried to discuss the border problem by telephone on March 21.

Kosygin Rebuffed

Lin Piao went on to reveal that Peking rebuffed Kosygin, telling Moscow that telephone communication was "unsuitable." As a result, Lin said, Moscow issued its March 20 statement, to which "our government is considering its reply."

According to the Chinese, the 1964 attempt to resolve the border dispute broke down when the Soviet delegates at

the conference in Peking refused to acknowledge that large areas of China had been appropriated by Imperial Russia in the 19th century under "unequal treaties."

After that, tensions along the border built up, finally exploding in March when Chinese and Russian frontier guards clashed in two major skirmishes on an island in the Ussuri River. About 50 Soviet troops and an unknown number of Chinese were killed.

Against this background of conflict, it seems dubious that the Chinese and Soviet representatives scheduled to attend the navigation meeting in Khabarovsk will be able to conciliate their differences easily.

1951 Shipping Treaty

If it is held, the meeting will be the 15th session of the Sino-Soviet commission since the group was created under a 1951 treaty designed to regulate shipping along the boundary rivers.

In 1958, the Chinese and Soviet governments signed a new agreement aimed at simplifying the rules governing merchant shipping on the rivers and lakes. Among its other provisions, this agreement guaranteed the exchange of port facilities by the two signatories.

After their dispute with Moscow had worsened in 1966, the Chinese instigated a fresh set of rules intended, according to Peking, to "protect the sovereignty" of China. These rules virtually scrapped any efforts at joint navigation rights, and subjected Soviet and other foreign vessels to harsh restrictions.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
11 May 1969

SOVIET AND CHINA ARE SAID TO CLASH

Fighting on Central Asian Border Is Reported

MOSCOW, May 10 (UPI)—Well informed sources said today that Soviet and Chinese troops clashed in "serious border incidents" in Central Asia several times this week.

They said these incidents occurred on the border separating Soviet Kazakhstan and China's Sinkiang region. Both sides suffered casualties, these sources said.

There was no official confirmation of the incidents. The Soviet Union is conducting military maneuvers along the Siberian and Far Eastern stretches of its border with China.

At least 50 Russian troops were killed in border incidents on the Ussuri River in the Far East on March 2 and March 15.

Sources said the border in Central Asia has been "very tense" for several weeks.

There were persistent reports that the border situation between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan has been tense since the early stages of the Chinese-Soviet dispute.

Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, recently disclosed that more than 200 persons were killed when they tried to cross from China to the Soviet Union in May, 1962.

First Ship This Year

MOSCOW, May 10 (Reuters)—a Soviet ship has started up the Ussuri River on a voyage that will take it near the scene of border clashes between China and the Soviet Union in March.

A Moscow radio correspondent in Khabarovsk reported that the ship had set out from there on the first voyage of the year up the border river.

The ship is heading for Iman, the nearest large town to the scene of the clashes.

The River was frozen and covered with snow at the time of the border battles in March. It was reported clear of ice at the end of April.

The latest account from the area, reported in the newspaper *Sovietskaya Rossiya* on May 1, said the Chinese had stopped sporadic shelling and were contenting themselves with shouting insults through bullhorns.

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HELSINKI SANOMAT, Helsinki

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RUSSIAN GUESTS FROM MOSCOW

RUSSIAN MEDIATION IN THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY QUARREL

CPYRGHT

The communist party of the Soviet Union is mediating the internal disputes of the Finnish Communist Party. Aleksey Belyakov, the chief of the Scandinavian section of the CPSU, has been leading the negotiations with representatives of the different camps of the FCP since last Monday. He has recommended to chairman Aarne Saarinen, former Secretary General Ville Pessi, and one of the opposition leaders, Taisto Sinisalo - who have visited the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki - the arranging of an extraordinary FCP party congress. The Extraordinary congress would renew the central committee of the FCP in such a way that the internal opposition would abandon its plans to found a new communist party, he has suggested. Belyakov, who landed in Helsinki on Monday unnoticed, is accompanied by Pravda's writer Stefan Smirnov - signature "Observer" - and by World Peace Council Secretary Nikolay Voshinin.

Aarne Saarinen was immediately called to the Soviet Embassy, where the CPSU representatives are staying, and where he heard the greetings of the CPSU leadership. The previously presented demand of the CPSU, that a split of the opposition's plans to found a new communist party but also the demands of the supporters of the party's present policy for a party purge were condemned.

As far as is known, the big district organization meeting of next weekend arranged by those who walked out of the 15th Party Congress of the FCP was merely touched on at the meeting; the CPSU representative did not demand a cancellation of the meeting.

Ville Pessi, formerly Secretary General and presently secretary for International Affairs of the FCP, arrived at the Soviet Embassy on Tuesday at noon-time. The CPSU representatives announced that they trust him in a mediating role. It was noted in the discussions that the internal situation in the FCP has led to a blind alley. One can get out of this dilemma only by the friendly assistance of fraternal parties and by the different FCP camps desire for reconciliation. Belyakov, who before and during the FCP congress tried to bring the FCP's ranks into order, suggested as a possibility that the central committee call together an extraordinary party congress.

A compromise proposal, according to which opposition representatives would also be elected to the central committee, would be prepared and accepted by the party's membership before the extraordinary congress.

According to the FCP's by-laws, an extraordinary congress can be convoked in two weeks. The delegates of the ordinary congress would be delegates to the extraordinary congress too; in this case, it would be the same delegates as those who were at the 15th party congress during Easter holidays.

One obstacle, however, is the fact that the FCP's by-laws prescribe that the central committee is elected by a regular party congress. Party organization technicians, however, have discovered a way around this: The by-laws say nothing about long the mandate of the central committee is. The by-laws say that "the mandate of the central committee lasts until a new central committee's members could be persuaded to abandon their seats voluntarily - or by force - then these seats could be filled by representatives of the Stalinist opposition. Another possibility would be to change the party's

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by-laws by a two-thirds majority and then to elect a new leadership. This procedure would, however, take three months.

Sinisalo is planned as the leader of a new party

Some members of the FCP leadership and certain opposition circles are, however, doubtful about holding an extraordinary party congress. It is assumed that the majority is sharply against compromise proposals. The communists, on the other hand, are waiting for the results of the Stalinist meeting. The Stalinist group which meets on Saturday in Helsinki and on Sunday in Uusimaa might even decide to found a new communist party. Strong groups in the FCP's district organizations of Turku, Uusimaa, Kymenlaakso, south Karelia, Lahti, and Kuopio are leaning in this direction. Smaller groups have been gathered to support this effort from other district organizations as well; the pensioners in particular have been a welcome power reserve for the FCP opposition in the struggle for power.

However, it is surmised within the FCP that the opposition will not, at least at this stage, found a new party. It is assumed that the opposition will stake everything on one card: All or nothing.

The opposition has prepared a "Shadow" program. Adoption of this program would probably lead to the dismissal of some of the opposition leaders from their posts. In such a case, it would be easier to explain the founding of a new party to the membership and the fraternal parties.

The opposition group also contains some extreme elements who are of the opinion that the founding of a new communist party cannot be avoided. It has even been planned in some district organizations that Taisto Sinisalo would become the chairman of the new party. Among the names suggested for the new party are "Finnish communist workers' party" or "Finnish workers' communist party."

The Opposition Rejected a Proposal on Reconciliation

About 2,000 communists from all over the country have been mobilized for the meeting of the opposition on Sunday. Bus-loads of people will come from districts which are loyal to the party leadership. E.G. a bus-load of pensioners from northern Finland will come to Helsinki to approve the resolutions of the opposition meeting and to become acquainted with Helsinki at the same time.

Only dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists have received an invitation to the opposition's meeting. Access to the meeting for persons who support the party's line has been sharply refused.

Negotiations about a reconciliation between the different camps of the FCP are being held today. Representatives of the party leadership and the opposition are meeting in Helsinki. They will deal with a conciliatory proposal presented by the official party leadership; the proposal has been rejected by the opposition. The opposition is expected to present its own demands today.

Yllätysvieraita Moskovasta Kuumaa sovittelua Skp:n riidassa

Neuvostoliiton kommunistinen puolue sovittelee Suomen kommunistisen puolueen sisäisiä riitoja. Nkp:n Skandinavian osaston päällikkö Aleksei Beljakov on johtanut Skp:n eri leirien edustajien kanssa käytyjä neuvotteluja viime maanantaista lähtien.

Hän on suositellut Neuvostoliiton Helsingin suurlähetystössä käyneille puheenjohtaja Aarne Saarille, entiselle pääsihteerille Ville Pessille ja opposition johtoryhmään kuuluvalla Taisto Sinisalolle, että Skp:n on syytä järjestää ylimääräinen edustajakokous.

Ylimääräinen edustajakokous uudistaisi Skp:n keskuskomiteaa siten, että puolueen sisäinen oppositio luopuisi hankkeestaan perustaa uusi kommunistipuolue, hän on esittänyt.

Vaiivhkaa maanantaina Helsinkiin laskautuneen Beljakovin mukana saapui myös Pravdan toimittaja Stefan Smirnov, nimimerkki Tarkkaailija, sekä maailman rauhaneuvoston sihteeri Nikolai Voshinine.

Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystössä asuvien Nkp:n edustajien luo kutsuttiin heti Aarne Saarinen, joka saapui kuulumaan Nkp:n johdon terveiset.

Näissä terveisissä korostettiin Nkp:n aikaisemmiinkin esittämää vaatimusta, että Skp:n hajaannus on estettävä. Tuomion saivat sekä oppositio hankkeet uuden kommunistipuolueen perustamisesta että puolueen nykylinjaa kannattavien vaatimukset laajoista puolueen sisäisistä puhdistuksista.

Skp:n 15. edustajakokouksesta poistuneiden piirijärjestöjen lauantaina alkavaa suurkokousta sivuttiin tietävästi vain ohimennen; Nkp:n edustajat eivät vaatineet kokouksen peruuttamista.

Tiistaina puolenpäivän aikaan saapui Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystöön Skp:n entinen pääsihteeri, nykyisin Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystössä toimiva Pessi, joka ilmoitti saavansa Nkp:n edustajat ilmoittavat luottavansa.

Keskusteluissa todettiin, että Skp:n sisäinen tilanne on ajautunut umpikujaan, josta pääseminen on mahdollista vain veljespuolueiden myötävaikutuksella ja Skp:n eri leirien sovinnonhalulla.

Beljakov, joka yritti jo ennen Skp:n edustajakokousta ja sen aikana saada Skp:n rivejä järjestykseen, esitti varteottelevana näkökohtana, että keskuskomitea kutsuisi koolle ylimääräisen edustajakokouksen.

Sitä ennen valmisteltaisiin ja hyväksytettäisiin puolueen kentällä kompromissiesitys, jonka mukaan uuteen keskuskomiteaan valittaisiin myös Skp:n opposition edustajia.

Skp:n sääntöjen mukaan ylimääräinen edustajakokous voidaan kutsua koolle kahdessa viikossa. Edustajiksi tulevat varsinaisen puoluekokouksen edustajat; tässä tapauksessa samat edustajat, jotka olivat 15. puoluekokouksessa pääsihteerinä.

Eräs kompastuskivi on kuitenkin se, että Skp:n sääntöjen mukaan keskuskomitean valinta kuuluu varsinaiselle edustajakokoukselle. Kommunististen järjestötekniikoiden piirissä on kuitenkin keksitty sopiva sääntöjen kiertämisskeino: säännöissä ei puhuta mitään siitä, kuinka pitkä on keskuskomitean toimialka.

"Keskuskomitean toimialka kestää siihen saakka kunnes uusi keskuskomitea on valittu", säännöissä sanotaan. Jos osa nykyisen keskuskomitean jäsenistä saataisiin vapaaehtoisesti — tai pakolla — luopumaan paikastaan, voitaisiin ylimääräisessä edustajakokouksessa täyttää nämä paikat stalinistisen opposition edustajilla.

Toinen mahdollisuus olisi, että puolueen sääntöjä muutettaisiin kahdenkolmasosan äänenemmistöllä ja sen jälkeen valittaisiin uusi johto. Tämä menettely voisi kuitenkin aikaa kolme kuukautta.

Sinisaloa kaavailtu uuden puolueen johtoon

Skp:n johtoportaan ja määrättyä oppositiopiirissä puhuttuun Sinisaloon liittymään määräisen edustajakokouksen pitämiseen. Enemmistön arvellaan

olevan jyrkästi kompromissiesityksiä vastaan.

Toisaalta kommunistit odottelivat stalinistien järjestämän kokouksen tuloksia. Lauantaina Helsinkiin ja sunnuntaina Uudellemaalle kokoontuva stalinistileiri saattaa jopa päättää uuden kommunistipuolueen perustamisesta.

Tälle kannalle kallistuvat voimakkaat ryhmät Skp:n Turun, Uudenmaan, Kymenlaakson, Etelä-Karjalan, Lahden ja Kuopion piirijärjestöissä. Pienempiä ryhmiä on kerätty tukemaan tätä hanketta myös muista piirijärjestöistä; erityisesti eläkeläiset ovat olleet Skp:n oppositiolle kiitollista voimareserviä valtataistelussa.

Skp:n piirissä onnellistellaan kuitenkin, että oppositio ei ainakaan tässä vaiheessa perusta uutta puoluetta. Opposition arvellaan panevan kaiken yhden kortin varaan — kaikki tai ei mitään.

Oppositio on valmistellut varjo-ohjelman, jonka hyväksyminen saattaisi johtaa eräiden opposition johtomiesten erottamiseen tehtävistä. Tässä vaiheessa uuden puolueen perustaminen olisi helpommin selitettävissä jäsenjoukolle ja veljespuolueille.

Oppositio leirissä on myös niin jyrkkää ainekseen, että uuden kommunistipuolueen perustamista ei niiden mielestä voida välttää. Onpa eräissä piirijärjestöissä kaavailtu jo uuden puolueen puheenjohtajaksi Taisto Sinisalo. Puolueen nimeksi on ehdotettu mm. Suomen kommunistinen työväenpuolue ja Suomen työväen kommunistinen puolue.

Oppositio hylkäsi sovintoesityksen

Oppositioleirin kokoukseen on mobilisoitu sunnuntaiksi noin 2.000 kommunistia ympäri maata. Linja-autolasteittain saapuu väkeä myös puoluejohdon kannalla olevista piirijärjestöistä. Mm. Pohjois-Suomesta pääsee autolastillinen vanhuksia hyväksymään oppositiokokouksen perheet ja tutustumaan samalla Helsinkiin.

Oppositiokokoukseen ovat saaneet pääsylipun vain neunkokouksen saaneet. Oppositioleiri on kuitenkin tukeville on eväty jyrkästi päässyt kokoukseen.

CPYRGHT

Positions in Opposition Districts

The information that some of the districts in which the Opposition is in control have softened their position and are ready to negotiate comes as a surprise if we recall the demand made in the Opposition congress that it be recognized as a faction and that negotiations be held with a 95-member committee of its own choosing. Thus it now seems that the Opposition is not, after all, standing "as solid as granite" as it vowed as late as a couple weeks ago. Thus it seems to be a matter of the regular party leadership, which was stymied on party regulations, winning the opening round on the procedural matter.

If certain Opposition districts have in fact softened their position, it means the strengthening of the "third line" on the example of the Tampere District. The decisive, behind-the-scenes factor in this kind of change is the negative attitude of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concerning the establishment of a second Finnish Communist party.

Nevertheless, it is not a matter of the whole Opposition going tame. One sign of this is the fact that the Opposition is establishing parallel organizations in districts that are under the control of the regular party leadership. This means that the Opposition itself is breaking up into two parts: "a third line," whose idea is to stay within the regular party, and the "irreconcilables" who are driving toward the establishment of their own party. Or else the party is sitting on two stools: in opening the door to reconciliation just a crack, they are not closing the door that leads to a party split.

In undertaking to negotiate district by district, the Opposition stays within the bounds of party regulations and in that way saves its face before the CPSU. At the same time, it saves its face in its own eyes in that negotiators in the districts can at the same time be members of the aforementioned negotiating committee of the Opposition as a whole. If no agreement is reached in the negotiations, the Opposition can still claim to have followed party regulations, but at the same time it will have a ready-made party organization.

Oppositopiirien asenne

Tiedot ainakin eräiden Skp:n oppositiopiirien pehmenneistä asenteista ja neuvotteluvalmiudesta ovat yllättäviä, jos palauteaan mieleen opposition suurkouksen vaatimus sen tunnustamisesta ryhmäkunnaksi ja neuvottelujen käymisestä sen asettaman 95-jäsenisen neuvottelukunnan kanssa. Nyt näyttää siltä, ettei oppositio seisokaan "jyrkkänä kuin graniitti" ainakaan tässä suhteessa, kuten sen taholta vielä pari viikkoa sitten vannottiin. Paremminkin on kysymys puoluesääntöihin tukeutuneen puoluejohdon alkuerävoitosta menettelytapakysymyksessä.

Jos eräät oppositiopiirit ovat todella lieventäneet asenteitaan, merkitsee se Tampereen piirin esimerkin mukaisen "kolmannen linjan" vahvistumista niissä. Tällaisen muutoksen taustatekijänä on ratkaisevalta osalta pidettävä Neuvostoliiton kommunistisen puolueen kielteistä kantaa toisen suomalaisen kommunistisen puolueen perustamista kohtaan.

Kyseessä ei kuitenkaan ole koko opposition kesyyntyminen. Siihen viittaa jo opposition toimesta harjoitettava rinnakkaisorganisaatioiden perustaminen puoluejohdon hallussa oleviin piireihin. Tämä merkitsee sitä, että oppositio on

lohkeamassa kahteen osaan, puolueen sisällä pysymiseen tähtäävään "kolmanteen linjaan" ja oman puolueen perustamiseen pyrkiviin "leppymättömiin". Tai sitten oppositio istuu kahdella tuolilla: raotettaessa sovinnon ovea ei puoluehajaannuksen ovea suljeta. Ryhtyessään neuvottelemaan piireittäin oppositio pysyy puoluesääntöjen puitteissa ja siinä mielessä säilyttää kasvonsa Nkp:n edessä. Lisäksi se saattaa säilyttää kasvonsa myös omissa silmissään, sillä piirien neuvottelijat voivat olla myös em. opposition neuvottelukunnan jäseniä. Jos neuvotteluissa ei päästä sovintoon, oppositio on näin kuitenkin neuvottelun puolueen sääntöjä ja

UNDIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY

1. May 1969 can be entered on political calendars as the month during which East Germany's Walter Ulbricht thought the pendulum was swinging his way. Official diplomatic recognition granted East Germany by three non-Communist governments -- Iraq, Cambodia and the Sudan -- has given Ulbricht the entrée he thinks he needs to gain broad acceptance of the concept of "GDR sovereignty" in time to celebrate his regime's 20th anniversary in October of this year.

2. Our aim is to get our assets and mass media tapped into a concerted propaganda effort to clarify for Third World audiences, and to remind Third World leaders about, the oft-repeated but apparently forgotten fact-of-life concerning Germany and the underlying reason why the pendulum does not swing in Ulbricht's favor: "East Germany" is a temporary, artificial structure whose survival depends mainly on the continuing presence of 20 Soviet Army divisions and, further, that diplomatic recognition of this government does entail a choice between East and West. Third World leaders, even the more radical ones, might well be reluctant to undertake action that would antagonize Bonn, which in both short and long-range terms offers greater economic advantages than does Pankow.

3. To accomplish our aim, the following themes are among many which could be embellished in terms of local conditions. Support material from which to draw is found in the attached unclassified backgrounder and sampling of current newspaper clips.

a. Iraqi, Cambodian and Sudanese diplomatic accords with East Germany represent acts based on emotion, not logic, and were payoffs for services rendered. They were also clearly the result of heavy Soviet pressures.

b. Ulbricht gratuitously buttressed the case for non-recognition by his ostentatious May Day military parades and boast of "20 years of socialist military policy."

c. The paucity of what East Germany can offer the Third World in terms of trade and aid, particularly in comparison with what West Germany offers, should not be ignored.

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

June 1969

UNDIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY

As a May Day remembrance for 1969, Walter Ulbricht's East German regime was rewarded with a long sought-after prize: cognizance by some non-Communist states of the German Democratic Republic's official existence. Plans to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany were announced on 30 April by the Government of Iraq and, eight days later, by the Government of Cambodia. At his first press conference held after the 25 May military coup which brought him to power, Sudan's new Premier Awadallah announced his government's intention to emulate Iraq.

Ulbricht has long been convinced that just one non-Communist commitment would start a chain reaction throughout the Arab, African, and Asian worlds inspiring country after country to scramble onto a bandwagon labeled "GDR sovereignty." The East German regime already is recognized in all but name by many Third World countries through reciprocal trade missions or full-blown consulates. Now it is Ulbricht's ambition that these relationships be dignified by the highest sounding title in time for the East German 20th anniversary celebrations in October 1969 and presumably he believes that recognition thrice in a month will give his scheme the impetus it badly needs. Stepped up efforts to gain official status throughout the Third World can be expected within the next few weeks despite two great stumbling blocks, one military and the other economic, both of which portend a miscarriage of Ulbricht's ambition.

May Day Remembrances

The Iraqi, Cambodian, and Sudanese diplomatic acceptances of East Germany are matters of vested interest -- born not out of respect for "GDR sovereignty" but out of need to pay for past and probably promised future East German support on ticklish national or international issues. Of at least equal importance is the intense pressure the Soviet Union has exerted on these countries on behalf of East Germany, the leverage for which comes from years of intense cultivation and considerable economic and military aid programs. Iraq, for instance, received advanced-type Soviet MIG fighters well before Egypt. Moscow certainly has a very active interest in securing legitimization outside of the Communist Bloc for the "state" it created in East Germany.

East German backing for almost every Arab cause sometimes exceeds even Moscow's pro-Arab endorsements -- particularly with regard to the Palestinian Arabs. The Iraqis specifically cited East German "support for the Palestinian peoples' just struggle to liberate their usurped homelands" as a reason for bestowing diplomatic recognition. On 23 April the East German Foreign Ministry issued a statement supporting Iraq in

its border dispute with Iran (over Shatt-al-Arab), something the USSR has failed to do, and described Iran's actions as "imperialist provocations." Iraqi gratitude was reflected in Radio Baghdad's statement that East Germany's "noble attitude toward our national issues" was just another reason for extending recognition.

Cambodia's diplomatic obeisance is another sign of extreme national sensitivity about the lack of world acknowledgment of Cambodian borders. Statements issued in both Pankow and Phnom Penh suggest that the new diplomatic ties are a belated reward to East Germany for her long-standing recognition of the border delineations most acceptable to Cambodia.

On 5 May, Sheikh Ali Abdel Rahman, Sudan's leftist Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier, held a press conference at which he said he had recommended to the Sudanese Cabinet that Sudan follow in Iraq's footsteps in recognizing the German Democratic Republic because it was a "friendly country with honorable attitudes toward Arab causes." At that time, the suggestion was interpreted as designed to counteract a movement in the Sudanese Constituent Assembly to reestablish relations with West Germany and the U.S.A. However, the 25 May military coup which overthrew President Ismail el Azhari also thrust radicalism into a much more powerful position in Sudan. The new Prime Minister Babiker Awadalla held his first press conference two days later and announced that his government's first act of foreign policy would be to recognize East Germany because of "the East Berlin regime's opposition to Israel."

A May Day Blunder

While Moscow and all the other members of the Warsaw Pact this year eschewed their annual spring show of military prowess, Walter Ulbricht celebrated the day with loud and enthusiastic saber-rattling throughout East Germany. Speeches by military leaders and four parades featuring missiles, tanks, and heavy artillery marked May Day in East Berlin as dedicated to "20 years of socialist military policy." This is the facet of Walter Ulbricht that must be understood by anyone toying with the acceptance of "GDR sovereignty": he remains the ever-ready hangman and executor for the Warsaw Pact, for the Brezhnev Doctrine -- the true "Stalinist" of Central Europe.

May Day 1969 in East Berlin rekindled memories of 21 August 1968 when Ulbricht's troops, mercenaries of the Soviet Union, were among those forces that moved into and occupied the sovereign state of Czechoslovakia. Warsaw Pact utilization of German troops, permitting them to march into a neighboring country, above all one previously occupied by Nazi Germany, was a flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agreement. Even the USSR, in August 1968, soon saw the grave error of sanctioning GDR military presence in occupied Czechoslovakia: all the wind went out of Soviet propaganda which was trying to portray the West Germans as the "aggressors plotting invasion."

Perhaps Ulbricht relies on man's short-lived memory of painful incidents to help him over this "military" stumbling block of his own making?

The False Image

The economic stumbling block, also of Ulbricht's personal making since it is the system he imposes which causes the troubles, is equally insurmountable. Facts belie the image of an attractive trading partner which Ulbricht promotes throughout the Third World. However anxious East Germany may be to win political support, the fact remains that this regime has little to offer in economic terms to the Third World, particularly in comparison with West Germany. Jeune Afrique (Paris, 31 March - 6 April 1969) gives details of exports from Western countries to the Near East during 1967, showing that after the United States and Britain, West Germany was the third leading supplier of these countries, with almost twice as much, by value, as Italy and more than twice as much as France.

West Germany was the second largest exporter to Iraq and also to the UAR (the value was U.S. \$54,800,000) despite the break in diplomatic relations with West Germany by both countries in 1965. By contrast, the East German-UAR trade protocol for 1969, which represents an increase of 25 percent over 1968, allows for a total volume of exchanges of only about U.S. \$8,500,000.

Le Moniteur Africain (Dakar, 3 April 1969) describes the recent growth of West German trade with African countries. Statistics given indicate the African continent as a whole has a very healthy balance of trade with West Germany -- a positive factor for Africa. Overall, 7.52 percent of West German imports come from Africa and that continent in turn absorbs 4.62 percent of West German exports.

East Germans, Alone in Soviet Bloc, Display Arms

Special to The New York Times

BERLIN, May 1—Communists and Socialists of all shades marked May Day in this divided city today with four parades, including a military show of power in East Berlin.

East Germany was the only Soviet-bloc country this year to parade its forces to underline its military strength. A speaker at the parade on Marx-Engels-Platz in East Berlin noted that East Germany had conducted "20 years of socialist military policy."

The three Western allied commandants condemned the display as a violation of the city's four-power status and held the Soviet Union responsible for permitting East German military personnel to take part in the May Day celebrations.

"The militaristic nature of the celebration was accentu-

ated by the equipment on display, which included missiles, tanks and artillery pieces," the commandants charged.

The 30-minute parade was led by cadets from military academies who marched past a grandstand to salute Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader; Marshal Pyotr K. Koshevoi, the commander of Soviet forces in East Germany, and other dignitaries.

Appeal by the Mayor

Across the wall on West Berlin's Square of the Republic, Mayor Klaus Schütz called on the Soviet Union and East Germany to enter into an earnest dialogue with the West about the city's future.

"Let us get away from the cramped immobility of the past and strive for peaceful co-existence," he said.

He spoke to a crowd of

30,000 as two rival parades wound their way through streets. One of them was staged by West Berlin's Communists, the other by the city's revolutionary youth groups, including Trotskyites, anarchists, Maoists, syndicalists, self-styled "Bolsheviks" and so-called "Spartacists."

Cold and gusty winds kept most West Berliners at home.

The police, out in force, said the only incident occurred when youths hurled stones to smash windows in the central courthouse on their march from the Tiergarten district to the workers' borough of Wedding.

The radicals—university and high school students as well as a sprinkling of young workers—announced plans to set up a "revolutionary organization" to operate under the name of "Union of Socialist Workers and Students."

LE MONDE

10 May 1969

Allemagne de l'Ouest

La reconnaissance de Berlin-Est par le Cambodge pose le problème de la validité de la « doctrine Hallstein »

(De notre correspondant particulier.)

Bonn, 9 mai. — A la différence de l'Irak, dont la décision de reconnaître la République démocratique allemande avait été annoncée à la fin de la semaine dernière, le cas du Cambodge, qui a pris une décision identique, pose à Bonn une question de principe.

L'Irak, en effet, n'entretenait plus de relations diplomatiques avec la République fédérale depuis la crise engendrée en 1965 par la décision du gouvernement Erhard de reconnaître l'Etat d'Israël. La fameuse « doctrine Hallstein », qui posait en principe, depuis 1955, l'impossibilité pour Bonn d'entretenir des relations diplomatiques avec un Etat ayant un ambassadeur à Berlin-Est, n'était donc pas en cause.

La question se pose, en revanche, pour le Cambodge, où la République fédérale entretient une ambassade depuis le 15 novembre 1967 et où un nouvel ambassadeur, M. Jürgen Eick, ancien porte-parole adjoint de M. Willy Brandt, venait précisément de rejoindre son poste le 1^{er} avril dernier.

Faut-il appliquer la « doctrine Hallstein » à ce cas, comme on l'avait

fait en 1957 avec la Yougoslavie et en 1963 avec Cuba? Depuis, la « doctrine » a subi une première entorse, puisque Bonn, après l'arrivée au pouvoir du gouvernement de grande coalition Kiesinger-Brandt, a admis la possibilité d'avoir des ambassades dans des pays de démocratie populaire où Berlin-Est était déjà représenté. Ce fut le cas, par exemple, pour la Roumanie, avec laquelle des relations diplomatiques ont été nouées en janvier 1967. Dans la foulée, Bonn reprit en 1968 ses relations avec Belgrade.

Renoncer à rompre avec Phnom-Penh serait porter un nouveau coup à la « doctrine Hallstein » et inciterait de nombreux pays d'Afrique et d'Asie à suivre l'exemple du prince Sihanouk.

Cependant, M. Strauss, président de l'aile bavaroise de l'union chrétienne-démocrate, n'a pas hésité, jeudi, à Bonn, au cours d'une réception, à prendre position contre la rupture avec le Cambodge. Une telle rupture serait une folie, assurait M. Strauss à qui voulait l'entendre, en suggérant d'appliquer la « doctrine » de façon « différenciée ». Il fit même allusion à la possibilité de relations économiques.

THE ECONOMIST

10 May 1969

Iraq and Germany

First to take the plunge

FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

Although Bonn had been half expecting the Iraqis to recognise east Germany it was none the less painful. When Herr Otto Winzer, the east German foreign minister, arrived in Baghdad on Tuesday to sign on the dotted line, Bonn knew for certain it had lost an important diplomatic battle in the Middle East, if not a campaign.

The first sign of Iraqi readiness to ignore Bonn's susceptibilities came in February, when the Baath party conference approved a resolution recommending full recognition of east Germany. Then on April 30th Radio Baghdad announced that the revolutionary council had decided Iraq should practise normal relations with east Berlin "in recognition of east Germany's support of the Arab nation in its struggle against Zionism and imperialism." Thus Iraq has become not only the first Arab state to recognise Herr Ulbricht's regime but also the first non-communist one.

Sniffing an air of spreading rot, Bonn is reviewing its meagre stock of counter-arguments. It is also looking for a more effective way of dealing with Baghdad's fait accompli. The

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...Haltst...
diplomatic excommunication to diplomatic communicants with Ulbricht—cannot even be invoked since Bonn has had no normal relations with Baghdad since 1965. West Germany has not given any capital help to Iraq, and only comparatively little and easily dispensable technical aid. What can be done in such circumstances? So far Bonn has confined its cudgeon to tut-tutting.

Reports that the Sudanese foreign minister is advising his government to follow Iraq's example suggest that other Arab states may be about to have the courage of their national convictions. Most of them have forgone diplomatic relations with Bonn since Dr Adenauer's secret commitment to deliver arms and equipment to Israel became known in 1965. But all have hitherto shrunk from recognizing east Germany for fear of losing west German economic help. It is supposed in Bonn that Moscow may even be discouraging Egypt and Syria from yielding to Herr Ulbricht's blandishments for the time being on the ground that it would cost so much money.

CPYRGHT
3 May 1969

Iraq Link To East Germany Strongly Assailed By Bonn

By BRIGITTE FALBE
[Bonn Bureau of The Sun]

Bonn, May 2—The Kiesinger administration views Iraq's announced intention to recognize the Ulbricht regime as an "unfriendly act," a West German spokesman declared here today.

The decision is a blow to Bonn's efforts to normalize its relations with the Arab nations and is directed against the interest of the entire German nation, Conrad Ahlers, the deputy government press secretary said at a news conference.

Mr. Ahlers charged that Baghdad's step in effect removes Iraq from the bloc of the non-aligned countries and puts it into the Communist camp.

Otto Winzer, the East German foreign minister, in a message today to Abdul Karim el-Sheikhly, his Iraqi counterpart, expressed his "deep satisfaction" over the decision.

The decision Wednesday followed Mr. Sheikhly's visit to East Berlin and Moscow about a month ago.

Diplomatic observers believe

Iraq's decision will not necessarily unleash a "recognition avalanche" although it is considered a "test case."

West German's means of political retaliation are limited. Under the old Hallstein Doctrine it threatened it would break off diplomatic relations with any non-Communist state recognizing East Germany. However, the Arab League states themselves broke off these contacts in May, 1965, over Bonn's recognition of Israel.

Trade Partner

Since then, only Jordan has reopened diplomatic relations with Bonn. However, this was in February, 1967, before the Arab-Israeli war in which West Germany morally supported Israel.

West Germany is Iraq's second most important trade partner after Great Britain. The mutual exchange of goods is twice as large as Iraq's trade with the Eastern European countries, according to official statistics.

CPYRGHT
2 May 1969
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

East Germany receives 'gift' from Iraq

By Harry B. Ellis

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

Iraq has handed Walter Ulbricht a splendid May Day present, by announcing full diplomatic recognition of his Communist East German regime.

Iraq thus becomes the first non-Communist state to recognize the (East) German Democratic Republic.

West Germany can be expected to use its best diplomatic efforts to persuade other Arab governments not to follow Baghdad's example.

But Bonn's position is weak. Nine Arab states, including the "big four" — Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria—have no diplomatic relations with the (West German) Federal Republic.

Ten Arab governments broke ties with Bonn in 1965, when the latter recognized Israel. Jordan

CPYRGHT

Leadership at loggerheads

Since 1965 East Germany has plied Egypt with credits and aid in an effort to capitalize on Arab anger with Bonn to win diplomatic recognition from Cairo.

But President Nasser, possibly with an eye on future economic help from Bonn, never went further than to acknowledge the existence of two German states. This included respect for East Germany's existing frontiers.

East German strategists worked on the theory that, if President Nasser sent an ambassador to East Berlin, other Arab governments would follow suit.

Now the breakthrough has come from Iraq, whose revolutionary leadership is at loggerheads with the Syrian and Egyptian Governments.

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to be swayed from his cautious policy by Baghdad's action. Syrian authorities are held to be less predictable.

In addition to Egypt, East German diplomats have concentrated in recent years on wooing Syria, Algeria, and India. In all cases East Berlin has failed to win recognition.

East Berlin rebuked

East Germany has consulates general in 10 non-Communist states, all in the so-called third world. Arab states included are Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and South Yemen.

East Germany boasts two consulates general in Egypt — in Alexandria and Cairo.

East Berlin was rebuked by the Nasser government for claiming that its "mission" in Cairo enjoyed diplomatic status.

Apart from the above, East Germany has permanent trade offices in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Lebanon, plus several non-Arab nations.

Before, during, and since the 1967 war, East Germany has been unreservedly on the Arab side in the conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

East Germany also has refused to pay compensation to Jewish victims of Nazi persecution, on the grounds that the Federal Republic, not East Germany, was the heir of Hitler's Third Reich.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 May 1969

Sudan glances toward East Berlin

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Cairo

After Iraq, Sudan may become the second Arab—and non-Communist—government to recognize Communist East Germany.

Sheikh Ali Abdel Rahman, the Sudanese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, recommended this step to the Sudanese Cabinet, the news agency Mena reported from Khartoum.

East Germany is a "friendly country which has honorable attitudes toward Arab causes" Sheikh Ali said in a memorandum to President Ismail el Azhari's government, Mena said.

On April 30 Iraq became the first non-Communist regime to give full diplomatic recognition to the East Berlin regime. East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer flew to Baghdad May 6 to arrange details.

Soviet-bloc diplomats here hope the rest of the Arab world will soon follow Iraq's example.

Cultural relations

Walter Ulbricht's regime carefully did its staff work for his successful breakthrough in the Arab world. Cultural relations have been a main element.

Last January and February Paul Scholz, president of the (East) German-Arab Friendship Society, visited Iraq, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic. He inaugurated "friendship" societies or "friendship" weeks in all three.

His tour paralleled a series of visits by Foreign Minister Winzer. Mr. Winzer's stop-over here in January ended with the opening of an East German consulate in Alexandria.

East Germany has tried unsuccessfully to win full recognition from the U.A.R. since Mr. Ulbricht visited this country in May, 1965. East German diplomatic pressure also has aimed at the more limited objective of persuading President Nasser's government not to resume relations with Bonn.

Sequence sketched

Cairo broke relations with Bonn in May, 1965, when Bonn formally recognized Israel. After Egypt, Mr. Winzer visited Syria. In Damascus he chaired a conference at the East German consulate of heads of East German missions to 11 Arab and several other Afro-Asian states.

This reminded observers of a similar meeting of Cuban ambassadors in Damascus in July, 1968, when Cuba was expanding its relations with "Socialist" Arab states.

A detailed East German-Syrian communiqué followed Mr. Winzer's talks with President Nouredine al-Attasi's government. It indicated that one aim of his visit had been to repair damage suffered by East German prestige in the August, 1968, Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Both sides affirmed the need to respect existing frontiers of the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] and pointed out that any threat to the GDR or any other socialist country in Europe represented a danger to world peace.

Meanwhile, Iraq sought to overcome embarrassment caused by Moscow's lack of sympathy for Baghdad's warfare against Kurdish nationalist partisans of Mullar.

Last Feb. 2 the Baghdad Kurdish newspaper al Nour reported that Jalal Talabani, an anti-Barbani leftist Kurdish leader, had called for Iraqi recognition of East Germany.

The next move in this careful East German-Arab courtship was a trip by Iraqi Foreign Minister Abdul Karim al Shaykhly to Moscow and East Berlin March 20 to 31.

Paper suggests recognition

When he returned to Baghdad, the newspaper Al Hurriyah April 3 suggested recognition in appreciation of "East Germany's support for the Arabs." This was the reason Baghdad Radio gave when it announced recognition April 30.

Despite many East German trade missions to Arab capitals and a demand for some products such as machine tools and cameras, East Germany's trade in the Arab world has lagged far behind that of Bonn.

In 1967, West Germany was third only to the United States and Britain as a leading supplier to the Middle East area as a whole. West Germany was the second-largest exporter to Iraq and also to the U.A.R., despite the 1965 break in relations between Bonn and all Arab states except Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 December 1968

East Germans Draft Doctrine of 'Liberation'

BY JOE ALEX MORRIS
Times Staff Writer

BONN—This is a time for doctrines.

First there was the "Brezhnev doctrine," the Soviet Union's elaborate theory justifying its armed intervention in Czechoslovakia last August. It is named for Soviet Communist Party boss Leonid I. Brezhnev, and roughly says that the Soviet Union has a right to intervene anywhere in the "socialist commonwealth" to protect the holy cause of Marxism.

As Sir Isaac Newton said, for every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction. Therefore, it was not long before the "liberation doctrine" emerged from the cloisters of NATO headquarters outside Brussels.

The Rusk doctrine, named for secretary of state Dean Rusk, of course, is not quite so forthright and clear-cut as the Brezhnev doctrine. It apparently extends the NATO protective umbrella to certain nations in Central Europe and the Middle East. This is staunchly denied by U.S. officials who, at the same time agree, however, that it puts Moscow on notice against further applications of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Ulbricht Next

To Brezhnev and the Rusk must now be added the Ulbricht doctrine. Although it hasn't yet been named for the East German Party boss Walter Ulbricht, the new East German philosophizing clearly outstrips both the Moscow and NATO attempts for sheer ingenuity and tortured thinking.

It has emerged slowly, in several parts. First came the "military doctrine of the German Democratic Republic."

This is somewhat difficult to follow, but thanks to the Communist Party newspaper Neues Deutschland, we have this chain of thinking:

—A war between East and West Germany should not be regarded as a war between brothers but a "war to defend socialist progress."

—Such a war would quickly develop into a rocket and atomic weapons war which would end with the "final destruction of West German imperialism."

—With this laudable goal in mind, such a war would in fact be a "war of liberation."

It is possible to pick some holes in this argument, notably concerning the state of East Germany after the 7,200 American atomic warheads stored in Europe are presumably used in retaliation. But these apparently did not concern the ideologists of East Ber-

lin. Not that the development of the new doctrine stopped with the atomic liberation of the "enslaved" West German folk. Next on the line was Bernhard Fraefrath, an East Berlin "people's judge."

Fraefrath developed a supplementary theory to justify the launching of a forceful action against what the East Germans like to call the West German revenge seekers. He maintained that the "anti-fascist" Clauses 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter allowed partners in regional security pacts to use force against West Germany without the authorization of the Security Council.

Carrying on deeper into new uncharted zones of political philosophy, People's Judge Fraefrath said this applied "not only in cases of armed aggression (by West Germany), but also in cases of a resumption of the policies of aggression."

The judge specifically referred to the East German-Russian pact of 1967. Since Communist propaganda is daily larded with references to the aggressive West German government, the conditions for such an intervention are presumably already there.

To add fat to the fire, an East German party functionary named Hermann Axen came up with a new theory of what constitutes a sovereign state. Only a Communist state can truly be considered sovereign, he maintained.

The caterwauling out of East Berlin might seem somewhat unrealistic to the outside world. But not to many West Germans who have to live with chronic Berlin crises and this summer went through a real security scare during the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The general reaction here was to see Moscow's hand behind the recent East German philosophi-

cal antics. This fits in with the general West German assumption that East Germany is only a tail to be wagged by the Soviet dog.

To West Germans, this makes the situation all the more serious because it shows that the Russians are really behind it all. And since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the West Germans and many other people are not at all sure of the potential limits of Soviet expansionism.

"Theoretically, the East bloc is now ready for an attack against the federal republic," was a typical editorial comment.

Such dire warnings are not taken too seriously by Western diplomatic circles here, nor indeed by many West Germans. But there has been open anxiety for some weeks now that another Berlin crisis may be just around the corner.

An expected crisis failed to develop last month, despite sharp protests from the East Germans when the Christian Democratic Party held its annual party meeting in West Berlin. But speculation has been renewed by an article in the East

German foreign policy magazine which came out last week.

This article repeated East German claims that there were no longer any official agreements controlling access to West Berlin, and that it was only the "extraordinary kindness" of East German authorities which permitted traffic to continue to flow.

The article said such traffic must be guided by the people's rights, which forbade traffic through the corridors to West Berlin for "aggressive purpo-

ses." Among these purposes, according to the article, are included "provocative sessions" of the West German parliament.

Berlin remains the touchstone of East-West relations in Central Europe, and it is toward the divided city rather than the curious new East German doctrine of a war of liberation that attention remains fixed. The new doctrine, unlike the Brezhnev or Rusk doctrines, appears headed for a short life before returning to the obscure sources from which it sprang.

LE MONITEUR AFRICAINE, Dakar

3 April 1969

1968 WEST GERMAN-AFRICAN TRADE INCREASED

An American observer recently declared: "The Germans have come to Africa. They are now playing a much more important role and they are exercising a much greater influence in Africa than at the time of the Kaiser!"

Indeed, the Germans are not only coming as travelling salesmen and instructors for the armies of the young African states. They have also come as investors and as lenders. They are carrying out more than 400 projects in Africa, including plants, ports, and highway networks. They can also be found in the universities. One can hear them on the radio waves, the "German Wave," which broadcasts about 17.5 hours of miscellaneous programs, in various languages, to Africa, each week, in other words, much more than the Voice of America.

It must be admitted that people in Africa generally, and quite justifiably, moreover, consider the Germans to be quite efficient in business, that their merchandise is of good quality and that their investments are quite important.

In Nigeria, the Germans are threatening to outstrip the British in investments. Over the past 4 years, they have completed about 30 projects in that country and their investment there is equivalent to 35 billion CFA [African Financial Community].

In Liberia, where the Americans were almost at home, even before World War II, the "Salzgitter" West German steel mills have obtained a license covering all mining prospecting. Experts from this cartel are already working with the government in Monrovia as industry and mining advisers.

Bonn has thus selected foreign trade as the principal instrument for its penetration of Africa. By aid to the developing countries, the West Germans primarily mean exporting their private capital.

If we glance at the foreign trade statistics, we see first of all that Africa, by and large, is not of primary importance to West Germany and that there are places in the interior of Africa where German commercial interests are primarily concentrated, according to all available evidence.

Overall, 7.52 percent of German imports come from Africa and that continent in turn absorbs 4.62 percent of German imports whereas Europe gets 61-73.2 percent and America 24-13 percent. The balance of trade with West Germany is thus very positive for Africa. Germany buys from its commercial partners in the tropical countries and especially Libya much more in terms of products than it sells to them (right now, Libya supplies almost 40 percent of Germany's petroleum imports).

In Millions DM	Imports		Exports	
	1964	1968	1964	1968
Libya	990	2,365.3	112.8	225.5
South Africa	506.5	982.5	905.8	1,418.4
Nigeria	367	192	217.8	266.1
Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi	365.5	449.5	55.1	59.6
Algeria	265.7	556.6	47.3	182
Morocco	235.7	160	126.9	170.9
Liberia	192.6	283.1	137.5	39.1
Ivory Coast	166.3	267.1	38.7	85
Ghana	162.9	131.5	105.1	107.3
Congo-Kinshasa	148.1	185.7	96.0	120.9
Kenya and Uganda	137.3	118.3	104.7	146.5
UAR	135	109.3	436.0	264

The above table, covering the 12 regions of Africa, where we find the principal West German suppliers, shows the development of German foreign trade between 1964 and 1968. The next table draws a parallel between 1967 and 1968 for each African country. Here, we discover among other things, that the total trade volume, which was 9.4 billion DM in 1967, went up to 10.8 billion DM in 1968, in other words, an increase of 14.9 percent.

In Millions DM	Imports		Exports	
	1968	1967	1968	1967
Canary Islands	37,931	33,900	112,770	129,740
Morocco	159,960	172,437	170,932	175,186
Algeria	556,648	515,341	182,040	77,270
Tunisia	88,672	78,732	77,642	77,548
Libya	2,365,302	1,402,070	225,457	156,482
UAR	109,258	115,087	264,000	219,792
Sudan	179,772	140,909	54,494	61,015
Mauritania	60,392	67,601	5,686	4,608
Mali	2,079	574	4,276	3,013
Upper Volta	380	8	7,340	3,339
Niger	485	24	6,347	6,649
Chad	5,923	1,973	5,538	7,281
Senegal	21,454	17,290	41,920	37,442
Gambia	6,631	20	2,376	1,890
Portuguese Guinea	8,405	8,723	2,873	2,299
Guinea	18,607	20,551	11,870	21,485
Sia	59,614	79,217	17,385	14,704

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Liberia	283,072	293,081	39,098	77,910
Ivory Coast	287,136	211,152	84,996	61,391
Ghana	131,432	103,462	107,292	100,286
Togo	28,737	19,384	12,186	16,556
Dahomey	11,527	8,386	7,999	7,767
Nigeria	191,996	376,362	266,121	244,148
Cameroun	114,005	91,042	55,953	46,206
Central African Republic	2,414	1,873	10,202	13,133
Equatorial Guinea	450	687	5,742	4,121
Gabon	66,836	75,868	19,464	13,059
Congo-Brazzaville	78,773	59,206	30,596	31,389
Congo-Kinshasa	185,688	145,495	120,937	78,560
Rwanda	3,435	2,976	6,004	4,139
Burundi	2,259	2,976	9,646	5,863
Angola	90,976	61,448	126,462	156,753
Ethiopia	37,831	24,853	73,533	79,049
French Territory of Afars and Issas	59	175	3,455	2,834
Somalia	656	421	12,231	10,020
Kenya	71,232	83,812	105,172	118,180
Uganda	47,033	63,656	41,294	42,023
Tanzania	68,610	58,003	48,258	47,233
Mozambique	37,044	40,172	71,717	62,163
Madagascar	18,943	13,210	40,420	27,859
Comores	564	(322)
Reunion	14,575	(1,776	7,204	8,137)
Zambia	396,351	257,752	67,410	61,484
Rhodesia	53,202	63,903	52,660	50,395
Malawi	13,369	7,140	6,922	7,216
South Africa	982,482	1,045,154	1,418,318	1,251,361
Total				

Trade between West Germany and Ivory Coast has been increasing regularly for the past several years, in terms favorable to the latter. Germany exports primarily automotive vehicles, synthetic fabrics and cotton, as well as chemical and electrical industry products to Ivory Coast while it imports primarily logs and lumber or de-barked wood, cocoa and canned pineapples. According to the detailed 1967 figures, automotive vehicles accounted for one-third of the German exports, in other words, 1.1 billion CFA; fabrics accounted for 531 millions and electrical and chemical industry products made up 451 millions. Ivory Coast wood exports amount to 6.5 billion CFA and cocoa bean exports account for 5 billions. Compared to 1966, these figures reveal one fact that is very positive for Ivory Coast: the surplus in its balance of trade increased from 7.9 billion CFA in 1966 to 9.2 billion in 1967.

The total volume of trade between Senegal and West Germany has increased quite noticeably. Between 1965 and 1966, Senegal exports to West Germany increased by 15 percent and from 1966 until 1968 this tendency has been further accentuated; likewise, Senegalese sales increased from 17,290,000 DM to 21,454,000 DM (an increase of 24 percent). It must however be pointed out that German merchandise imports have also gone up, reaching a figure of 41,920,000 DM in 1968, although Senegal's balance of trade with West Germany shows a deficit, with coverage amounting only to 51 percent.

West German imports primarily consist of phosphates. West Germany purchased about 33 percent of Senegal's phosphate output. Next come peanut cakes and miscellaneous peanut by-products used for animal fodder; the export volume here already amounts to a counter value of 30 million CFA per year.

The increase in Senegalese exports to West Germany has reduced the dis-equilibrium in the balance of trade since German imports to Senegal increased in lesser proportions; during fiscal year 1967, the Senegalese trade balance coverage rate with respect to Germany did not exceed 46 percent.

It is interesting to note that certain Senegalese exports going to West Germany are handled in an indirect fashion, since they are routed through third countries, especially France, where these raw materials are processed.

The German firm of Kathmann, which does about 40 million DM worth of business, selling poultry, eggs, and special fodder for poultry, has assumed majority participation in the Presh Farm Company which is responsible for the technical and commercial management of a large, industry-scale poultry farm in Togo. This project is being carried out with the support of the Joint Development Fund for Africa and the German Development Company. A similar project is under study in Ghana with the participation of the same German firm.

We must point out the considerable jump in German imports from Togo which increased from 19,384,000 DM in 1967 to 28,737,000 DM in 1968 (up 48 percent), whereas exports from West Germany decreased about 26 percent, dropping from 16,556,000 DM in 1967 to 12,186,000 DM in 1968. It is thus evident that the balance of trade between the two countries is for the time being extremely favorable to Togo.

West Germany is Cameroun's second-ranking supplier, after France, and occupies fourth place in the import of Cameroun products which include above all cocoa, wood, and coffee. To these figures we must also add those concerning major imports of Cameroun products which Germany obtains through French and Dutch buyers.

In conclusion we find that German businessmen so far have been interested primarily in English-speaking countries, that is, countries in East Africa, as well as Nigeria and Ghana, in other words, some of the more populated and richer, countries which are traditionally more open to investments and foreign trade because they were in a more privileged position than the other African states.

There is a process of evolution which is about to start here. It seems to be a natural consequence of the association of the French-speaking countries with the European Common Market. To a minor extent this may also be due to the disappointments in the nationalization of German property in Tanzania and by the events in Nigeria.

One of the manifestations of German vitality in the field of trade is illustrated precisely by the sixth "Partners in Progress" import exposition which was held in the buildings of the West Berlin Fair-Exposition from 26 September until 6 October 1968, with the participation of 56 developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Thus Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Senegal, Niger, and Togo -- as far as Africa is concerned -- were in a position for a leisurely examination of the possibilities of increasing their traditional raw materials exports to West Germany.

The value of such events is quite obvious in the sense that they enable the seller to define the real nature of his partners' needs much better and, in certain cases, to determine much better in advance what the development of the market might be in the future. To some extent, this is an immediate advantage resulting from commercial contacts during these fairs and exhibits.

In the specific case of Germany, such contacts with African producers also make it possible to strengthen business links; these contacts always prove profitable, sooner or later, both in terms of sales and in terms of imports; these contacts definitely promote the development of the German presence in Africa; this is something both the Bonn Government and private investors obviously desire.

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June 1969

SOUTH VIETNAM -- DEALING FROM STRENGTH

When Nguyen Van Thieu was elected to the Presidency in September 1967, it was to a din of critic's scoffing and Hanoi's accusations about rigged elections, a military dictatorship being legalized and South Vietnam's citizens going to the polls at bayonet point (this, despite observations to the contrary by an enormous international press corps on the scene). With the perspective that two years offer, it is not only possible to say that no valid challenge to the legality of the elections has arisen; it is also possible to say that the men and women who were elected at that time (the president, the vice president and 60 members of the Upper House) have, for the most part, performed responsibly and in some cases effectively.

President Thieu himself has provided a good example of political nimbleness and steadily developing qualities of responsible leadership. He has successfully consolidated his presidential power, has become increasingly sure-footed in Saigon's fluctuating political scene and has contributed measurably to the consolidation of the constitutional processes and the division of responsibilities inherent in self-government. He has won the confidence of his peers -- not simply the military men who already respected him, but political professionals, many of whom had been active long before the new president came into the picture.

Thieu's skills as a leader and a politician are helping to weld his government into a rallying point for non-Communist political elements in Vietnam. This is due, in part at least, to Thieu's willingness to share his power with uncommitted political figures such as the highly esteemed Prime Minister Tran Van Huong. The government has the nation's major political force, the army, solidly behind it and its general popularity and power seem to be on the upcurve. These factors have had an effect on the government's international image, which is primarily reflected in the context of the Paris peace talks, where the government's domestic strength has given its delegation in Paris added strength and some degree of luster and flexibility.

If one wished to cite concrete evidence of the government's domestic strength and its tie-in with the Paris talks, the elections of March this year would be a fairly dramatic example. On four successive Sundays in March, three million voters (representing almost 90% of those eligible) in the villages and hamlets went to the polls and elected more than 4,600 village council members and 3,100 hamlet chiefs and deputies. In Paris and other areas of the world the voter turnout was viewed as a major achievement of the Saigon government which not only proved it could once again carry out wartime elections in the face of Viet Cong threats and violence, but also cast doubt on the National Liberation Front's claim to be the only real representative of the South Vietnamese people. The open nature of the village and hamlet elections conducted by the Saigon government under the scrutiny of hundreds of foreign newsmen provides an interesting contrast

with the unwitnessed and unsubstantiated elections the Viet Cong claimed to have held sometime this past winter to establish "People's Liberation Councils" in the villages and hamlets.

Following the village and hamlet elections, and undoubtedly influenced by the strong popular support their outcome demonstrated for the Saigon government, President Thieu decided to acknowledge the Viet Cong as a fact of life it was no longer necessary to wish away. At a 25 March news conference the President announced that the Saigon government is ready to integrate members of the NLF into the political life of South Vietnam as part of an over-all peace settlement. In answer to reporters' questions, Thieu opened the possibility that members of the NLF might be encouraged to form a party in South Vietnam and participate in future elections.

On 7 April, in a speech to the South Vietnamese National Assembly, President Thieu proposed a Six Point Peace Plan with the aim of putting an immediate end to the war. One of the points covered by the President included a welcome to "those now fighting against the South who decide to renounce violence ... and abide by the democratic processes" and who will, as a result, "enjoy full political rights and assume the same obligations as other lawful citizens."

On 21 April a top level government group led by President Thieu and Prime Minister Tran Van Huong traveled to Vung Tau for the graduation of village and hamlet officials from a six-week government administration school. These first graduates of a series of six training courses, are expected to instruct more than 16,000 local officials in improving and revitalizing local administration. President Thieu reminded the graduates of the need to nurture self-government at every level and stressed the responsibility of hamlet and village officials in bringing this about. The President discussed the problems of corruption, land reform and improvement of the present Vietnam economy. He also spoke of the government's plans for postwar development, indicating that the government is programming the current wartime economy to develop as logically as possible into the projected postwar picture.

In another speech, on the 26th of April, President Thieu noted that in March 1969 the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program (the governmental effort to encourage enemy desertions) had received its 100,000th "rallier." He contended that the continuing success of this program, which brings in North Vietnamese regulars as well as Viet Cong guerrillas and political cadre, is an indication that government efforts toward national reconciliation are producing results. Observers are inclined to agree with this contention, particularly when many of the so-called ralliers are willing to undergo a period of rehabilitation and then enter into some constructive form of service such as hospital work for the South Vietnamese people. The increasing success of the Chieu Hoi program may be an indication that the Viet Cong is losing the hold it had on its followers as it weakens politically and militarily, it may also indicate that the government is

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offering sufficiently appealing alternatives to Communism to attract a greater number of adherents.

On the 8th of May the NLF proposed a 10-point solution to the problem of war in Vietnam. Despite the fact that the points were based on the same proposals that the NLF and Hanoi have made on dozens of previous occasions, Saigon did not reject them outright as it might have been inclined to do a year ago. Rather, the Saigon government suggested -- in a carefully drafted and unusually conciliatory communique -- that "talks on three of the ten points can take place immediately in the framework of the present talks in Paris," or in secret talks as previously proposed by Saigon. The free world press praised Saigon's conciliatory response as a genuine effort to move the peace talks forward.

The relatively high standards of leadership exemplified by the Saigon government are remarkable for a country at war and for one so newly emerging into nationhood. Certainly the increasing flexibility of the government is showing in its dealings with the NLF and Hanoi and its growing sense of identification with present and postwar domestic needs of the South Vietnamese people are a testimonial to its leaders and their nascent maturity. The question of whether they can actually create and carry out badly needed domestic reforms and also negotiate a peace which can lead to some form of effective self-government for South Vietnam are questions that only the future can answer.

The village and hamlet elections in South Vietnam

by BARRY BROWN

WASHINGTON.— Although the guns are blazing again in South Vietnam, it is important to note that the even more decisive political struggle also continues. The South Vietnamese government recently registered another important achievement in this area by completing a new series of village and hamlet elections on each of the last four Sundays, beginning March 2.

The voting, in which nearly one million men and women have taken part, installed village councils and hamlet chiefs to serve for the next three years. Despite Viet Cong threats and acts of terrorism intended to disrupt the proceedings, from 80 to 95 per cent of those eligible in the various communities have cast their ballots. This brings the number of villages in which such elections have been held during the past two years to more than 1,000 and the number of hamlets to some 4,500.

The program began in 1967 followed not long afterwards by a new constitution and the election of a popularly-based national government under it. The two movements toward establishment of a strong central authority in Saigon, on the one hand, and toward decentralized local self-government, on the other - have been precisely complementary.

In order to understand this, it is helpful to recall the old Vietnamese proverb: «The emperor's law stops at the village gate.» Although this

was perhaps never literally true, and it could scarcely be considered compatible with the current effort to build a modern nation in the midst of a war, 85 does suggest how ancient and deep-rooted the idea of local autonomy has been.

For centuries, village councils and hamlet chiefs chosen by the people did have full responsibility for justice, security and fiscal affairs in their communities. The Vietnamese Emperors, and the French during the colonial period, customarily acted in the villages - notably in such matters as tax collections - through the councils and local leaders. The elimination of that system in 1956 by President Ngo Dinh Diem was largely responsible for the alienation of his popular support.

Initially, it may be supposed that Diem thought it necessary to substitute village councils appointed from Saigon for those chosen locally in order to tighten his grip on the countryside and strengthen the war effort. But by eroding the traditional defense of the peasantry against the central authority and the abuses that have been so commonly associated with it in Vietnamese society, he opened the way to despotism and his own downfall. The new constitutional regime has therefore, wisely concluded that a return to the tradition of local self-government must be an indispensable part of the effort to erect an effective and responsive national government.

Nearly 8,000 hamlet chiefs elected

SAIGON (VP) — Gen. Tran Thien Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister for Pacification and Construction concurrently Minister of Interior, Tuesday afternoon held a press conference at the Interior Ministry to announce the results of the village and hamlet official elections in the last month.

The Deputy Prime Minister said the government is concentrating all its efforts to the control and execution of the national sovereignty throughout the country in the Pacification and Construction project for 1969.

In order to attain the above objective, he added, the country needs an effective administrative machinery elected by the people themselves to take care of the national interests. Therefore, the establishment of village and hamlet authorities and election of village people's councils and hamlet executive committees were considered one among the eight essential objectives of the Pacification and Construction Program, he said.

Deputy Prime Minister Khiem stressed the failure of the Communists through the first stage elections of village people councils, hamlet chiefs and deputy chiefs.

Speaking next, Mr. Mr. Le

Van De, Interior Ministry's Studies Director, reported on the results of the village and hamlet elections in the past month.

He said that before February 1969, the number of villages having elected councils amounted to 1,104 not counting 589 villages councils elected in the first phase of 1969. At present, 1,693 villages have completed their elections with a total of 7,857 hamlet chiefs and deputy chiefs.

Through the four election phases in March 1969, 4,598 persons were elected out of 8,015 candidates.

Meantime 615,483 persons went to the polls or 89 per cent of the eligible voters.

As for the election of hamlet and deputy hamlet chiefs, 3,145 people were elected from 7,133 candidates. The number voters going to the polls reached 937,825 or 88.1 per cent.

Mr. De also made known that by the end of this year, elections will be held in the remaining 130 villages and 889 hamlets.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that in the future, the central government will have a special status for village officials according to which, they will be assigned to command Popular Force, and Revolutionary Development cadres as well as entitled to use special funds.

VIETNAM GUARDIAN
29 March 1969

Thieu's readiness to talk is "good will escalation"

SAIGON (VNG).— A government spokesman said Friday President Nguyen van Thieu's statement to the foreign press earlier this week in which he stated this government is ready to hold secret talks with the National Liberation Front, has been misinterpreted by certain elements of the Vietnamese language press.

These reports interpreted the President's statement as a change of policy.

This is an inaccurate conclusion, the spokesman said.

He said that a careful reading of the President's previous and most recent statements would reveal that there has been no change in positions.

«We still do not recognize the NLF as a legal entity, nor will we accept any coalition with the communists», the spokesman said. «We will not accept the communist Party in South Vietnam.»

«The object of the President's statement», he said, was to «escalate the good

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, March 25—President Thieu declared today that South Vietnam was ready to engage in private peace talks with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. He set no preconditions.

South Vietnam's willingness to bargain in secret has been conveyed to the Communists but neither Hanoi nor the NLF has thus far responded, Thieu said.

"The first private meeting has not been scheduled yet, but we are working on it," he added.

Asked whether Saigon still insisted that the Communists meet certain conditions before the beginning of private talks, the 45-year-old chief executive suggested they need not.

"In the private talks, anyone could raise any question, and we might consider any problem that arises. Private talks will help in some way to bring fruitful results and solve what we cannot solve in the official talks," Thieu said.

In an obviously expansive mood, Thieu answered questions posed by a score of foreign journalists invited to Independence Palace by the President's office. Sipping a Scotch and soda, Thieu spoke in English without notes. He read no prepared statement.

Saigon's refusal to recognize and deal with the NLF, its rival for eventual political control of South Vietnam, has been a major sticking point in efforts to end the war. The current talks in Paris were delayed by Saigon's insistence that the NLF not be treated as an equal in the procedural arrangements. Hanoi and the NLF, likewise, do not recognize the Thieu government as the legitimate government of South Vietnam.

South Vietnam's original position was that it would talk only with Hanoi and the original Communist position was that the NLF would talk only with the United States.

On Jan. 27, Vice President Ky had said in Paris that South Vietnam was prepared for "private talks with the other side if they are willing," but that the time was not ripe for such contacts to begin. Today, Thieu was far more specific.

He said he expected the talks to take place. He described Paris as the most "practical" location. He said that Ky "very possibly" would negotiate for Saigon. And he raised the possibility of two-party or three-party talks — between South Vietnam and the NLF, or representatives of Hanoi and the NLF in combination.

"In the private talks," Thieu said, "we do not consider any longer two sides, four sides, four men or the number of delegations."

Thieu declined to identify which diplomats conveyed Saigon's willingness to negotiate secretly to the Communists, nor did he say where such overtures were made. "But they understand well we are ready," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES

27 March 1969

THIEU SAID TO OPEN AN ELECTION ROLE FOR N.L.F. MEMBERS

Reported Ready to Integrate

Them Into Political Life as

Part of Vietnam Accord

SAIGON STUDYING PLANS

President Expected to Take

Leadership of an Enlarged

Pro-Government Party

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 26 — President Nguyen Van Thieu is reliably reported to be ready to integrate members of the National Liberation Front into the political life of South Vietnam as part of an over-all peace settlement.

The President is known to have discussed with his advisers in recent weeks possible ways in which members of the N.L.F. might be permitted to compete in elections as members of an opposition.

In anticipation of a future political struggle against the Front, Mr. Thieu is also planning to assume personal control of an expanded Government party.

During April, according to sources close to Mr. Thieu, the President will accept the personal leadership of an enlarged version of the Peoples Alliance for Social Revolution, a pro-Government political organization formed last year.

Convention Expected

An extraordinary convention of the alliance is expected to be held in Saigon during the month to select Mr. Thieu as chairman of its presidium. Additional South Vietnamese political factions are also expected to be accepted into the alliance in an effort to broaden the base of the Government.

Mr. Thieu's closest advisers have been urging him for several months to take a personal initiative in creating a political organization that could compete with the Front.

They—and Mr. Thieu—are working on the assumption that some form of political participation by the Front in South Vietnam will be part of a peace settlement negotiated in Paris.

Cites 6 Conditions To End War

By Nguyen Duy Lieu

President Nguyen Van Thieu said Monday he will «volunteer» to lead what he called a political association» and set forth six «basic» conditions «to end the war in this part of the world.»

In a one-hour address before a joint session of the National Assembly, President Thieu said that since his suggestions for strong political parties have not been heeded, he felt it his duty to do the job himself.

He said his political group will represent «the ruling tendency, «calling on those who share his views and responsibility to join and help «save the nation.»

Thieu did not elaborate on his party and when it would be organized formally, mentioning only that it would be a tightly knit organization, and a large-scale group.

«My only ambition,» he said, «is to help our country overcome present difficulties and to do whatever is possible to prevent its loss to the Communists.»

He called on those who disagree with him on the «procedures and methods» (of forming such a party) to set up their own party which would then be called «an opposition party»

«Of course the same nationalist ideology must prevail in any such opposition party,» Thieu said, emphasizing that like any political setup worthy of such a name «our parties must have clear-sight leadership well-knit organization, disciplined and responsible operations.»

Thieu said «all of our actions must be guided by democratic principles,» adding that he had always adopted such principles.

He also requested the National Assembly to endorse «as soon as possible» the two decrees on the political parties and the press code so that the promotion of political activity and press responsibility at the political level of the Republic could be implemented effectively.

Six Points

President Thieu said in his constant quest for «a constructive solution» to the war, the following six points constitute a «reasonable and solid basis [for the restoration of peace in Vietnam:

(1) Communist aggression should end. In this case Communist North Vietnam should give up all its attempts to take over the Republic of Vietnam through force. It should stop violating the Demilitarized Zone and the RVN frontiers, and end its wanton shellings on the innocent people in the South.

(2) Communist North Vietnamese troops and their auxiliary forces and cadres must completely withdraw from the South. As the military and subversive forces of Communist North Vietnam pull out, infiltration ceases and the level of violence thus subsides, the RVN will ask its allies to remove their forces, «in accordance with the Manila joint-communique of seven allied nations in October 1966.

(3) the neighboring countries of the RVN must not be violated and used by communist North Vietnam as bases and staging areas for aggression against the RVN. Communist North Vietnam troops and cadres who have illegally infiltrated and stationed themselves in Laos and Cambodia should withdraw from these countries. Communist North Vietnam military installations in these countries must be dismantled.

(4) As the RVN adopts a «national reconciliation policy, those who now are fighting against the South, but decide to renounce violence and respect the laws of the Republic faithfully abide by the democratic processes, will be welcome as «full» members of the national community. They will enjoy full political rights and assume the same obligations as other lawful citizens.

(5) The reunification of the two Vietnams will be decided by free choice of the entire people of Vietnam through democratic processes.

Thieu said that to create an atmosphere conducive to national reunification after peace is restored, economic and cultural exchanges between the North and South of Vietnam and other countries in the Region «can be actively explored, altogether with other intermediary measures of peaceful coexistence. This, he added, must be carried out so that, pending reunification, the two Vietnams can participate

more fully and more constructively in the various undertakings of the international community.

6) An effective international control system and reliable international guarantees against the resumption of Red aggression must be sought.

Thieu stressed that when violations are committed and aggression are renewed, there must be an effective response from a reliable system of international

guarantees. Without such measures, he added, any peace agreement will be only a sham device used by the Communists to weaken our system of defense, and not a basis for long lasting peace and stability for this part of the world.

Senate judicial Committee Chairman Pham Nam Sach said the «peace six-point stand» of President Thieu «well proves the position of the strong willing to seek peace and their readiness to talk with the enemy.»

Sen. Hoang Xuan Tuu, First Deputy Chairman of the

Senate, said President Thieu's six-point plan does not go against «our sovereignty and national integrity.» He said there were two new points in the President's speech—the enemy must respect the territorial integrity of both Laos and Cambodia, and the reunification of the two Vietnams by «democratic means.»

Thieu also spoke of the 1969 government program which he said emphasized on pacification and development.

«I can affirm that by the end of this year government will control 100 per cent population in the Republic,» the President said.

He said he was thinking mainly of improving the lot of the peasants in remote areas who have been stricken by «misery, disease illiteracy» for decades. «These people must be given our full support and affection.» He pledged he would do his best to make «each peasant a small landowner» by this year.

The President's address was interrupted by repeated applause by the audience which included government officials, the diplomatic corps, and Lower House Speaker Nguyen Ba Luong and Senate Chairman Nguyen Van Huyen.

THE VIETNAM GUARDIAN
23 April 1969

EIGHT WHO CAME TO SERVE

SAIGON (VNG) — Eight men who were once pledged to further the cause of communism have set out on the road of service to the people.

All eight are medical technicians and will serve as aides and «medics» in clinics and hospitals in Saigon and the provinces.

The former Viet Cong turned themselves in to the government under the Chieu Hoi program and, after undergoing a period of retraining, have volunteered to serve as medical assistants.

They were given a formal sendoff Monday morning at the Chieu Hoi Center in Thi Nghe by Deputy Information and Chieu Hoi Minister Lt. Col. Bui Quang Hien.

In his address to the men, Col. Hien noted their rehabilitation into service for the people who are defending the country against communism is another example of the accomplishment of the government's Open Arms policy that seeks to build rather than tear down.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 May 1969

SAIGON RECEPTIVE ON N.L.F. PROPOSAL

Ready for Talks on Aspects of 3 of 10 Points in Latest Terms for Peace

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 9—The Government announced tonight that it was ready to begin discussions immediately on aspects of at least 3 of the 10 points included in the Vietcong's new peace proposal.

In an unusually conciliatory statement issued by the Foreign Ministry in reply to the negotiating program proposed by the Vietcong in Paris yesterday, the Government said it was ready to begin talks, either in private or in the plenary sessions, on the following points:

«The exchange of prisoners of war.

«The re-establishment of a demilitarized situation in the six-mile wide buffer zone straddling the border of North and South Vietnam.

«The application of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

Response Believed Positive

The 400-word statement also observed that private talks between the two sides «could create a favorable atmosphere for discussions of other substantive problems.»

NEW YORK TIMES

15 May 1969

Main Vietcong and U.S. Points

Following, in summary form, are the major proposals offered at the Paris peace talks on May 8 by Tran Buu Kiem, the Vietcong's chief delegate, and in Washington last night by President Nixon. United States officials said the President's proposals were formulated last March and did not constitute a direct reply to the Vietcong program.

Vietcong's 10 Points

1. Vietnamese independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are to be respected, as provided by the 1954 Geneva agreements.

2. The United States must unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and liquidate its bases in Vietnam.

3. The question of Vietnamese military forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved "by the Vietnamese parties among themselves."

4. The South Vietnamese shall settle their affairs without foreign interference. A regime for South Vietnam shall be formed through "free and democratic general elections." A constituent assembly will be formed, a constitution worked out and a coalition government installed "reflecting national concord and the broad union of all social strata."

5. Between the restoration of peace and the holding of an election, a provisional government will be set up to include all parties in South Vietnam "that stand for peace, independence and neutrality." This regime will supervise the American withdrawal and conduct the general election.

6. South Vietnam will adopt a policy of "peace and neutrality" and will establish diplomatic and economic relations with all countries, including the United States.

7. The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved "step by step, by peaceful means, through discussions and agreement between the two zones, without foreign interference." Pending reunification, North and South Vietnam shall establish normal relations.

8. North and South Vietnam shall join no military alliances and permit no foreign bases or forces on their soil.

9. "The parties" will negotiate the release of prisoners of war. The United States "must bear full responsibility" for losses and devastation in North and South Vietnam.

10. "The parties shall reach agreement" on international supervision of the United States and allied withdrawal from Vietnam.

United States Position

As soon as agreement could be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all United States, allied, and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining United States, allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

The remaining United States and allied forces would move to complete their withdrawals as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised ceasefires.

As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

Arrangements would be made for the earliest possible release of prisoners of war on both sides.

All parties would agree to observe the Geneva accords of 1954 regarding Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos accords of 1962.

Thieu Strong, But Many Doubts Remain

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, May 14—

"No one in the South can compete with Ho Chi Minh," commented Nguyen Xuan Oanh, a former deputy prime minister. "He has been struggling for his ideology for more than 50 years. The Communists in Vietnam have more than 20 years' experience in political organization."

An outsider who ventures to pass judgment on the politics of Vietnam must play the role of a visitor to Rome who does not know the Roman customs. There is no history of democratic anti-Communist political activity in South Vietnam.

With that in mind, it is possible to review the points made by both optimists and pessimists. First the optimists:

Since he took office in late 1967, Thieu has made remarkable progress. He has neutralized the generals, the hawks who used to support Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and many of the doves—especially the militant Buddhists.

He has won the respect (though not, in all cases, the enthusiasm) of most traditional political leaders. And he has made Vietnam's new American-style constitution work better than even American officials had hoped.

All other leaders of South Vietnam since the fall of Diem had to keep a constant eye over their shoulders, but Thieu does not. There are no obvious alternatives to his rule. The important South Vietnamese generals are all his allies or politically impotent. Ky has lost his influence in the government and inside the armed forces. The excesses of the Buddhists have discredited them.

There has not even been a serious rumor of a coup in Saigon for seven months. That is a record for the post-Diem period.

Perhaps more important, Thieu has shown a willingness to share his power, even with people whose allegiance he might not trust completely. His appointment of Tran Van Huong as prime minister is cited as proof of this. Huong outpolled Thieu in the 1967 presidential elections in the Saigon area.

Recently Thieu has gone even further, offering to lead a new anti-Communist political front composed of most of the powerful traditional parties. This new group could be the basis for a realistic political struggle.

Moreover, the political parties are showing new signs of effectiveness in the countryside. They seem to realize that the time has come to bury their differences and prepare for the crucial struggle with the Communists. And the politicians reached this decision on their own. Political organization is the one major program in Vietnam that does not have American advisers.

The pessimists accept most and sometimes all of the optimists' arguments, but discount them. And they make their own arguments:

The Thieu government is still essentially a military regime. When the people in the countryside meet a representative of the government, they invariably met a soldier—their province or district chief. The military is traditionally and currently unpopular in much of the country, and Thieu cannot make soldiers popular in the near future.

Thieu's efforts to achieve a functional new political alliance are interpreted by the people as an effort to establish a government political party. "Government sponsorship has always been the kiss of death for political organizations in Vietnam," is the way one American put it.

During the past 15 years a barrier has grown up between urban Vietnamese and their peasant compatriots. The peasants long ago decided that the central government neither understood, nor sympathized with their problems, and Thieu has had no effect on this prejudice. People in the countryside still equate the central government with corruption and inefficiency.

Thieu is torn between irreconcilable extremes. He must appear conciliatory and forthcoming to please American and world opinion, but he must seem firm and resolute to satisfy his own people. Already Thieu has reversed himself dramatically on several key issues—especially by agreeing to negotiate with the NLF. As a result, people, feel he has abandoned his principles under pressure from the Americans.

Even if the President does seem to be making some progress, "progress" in Vietnam is a fragile thing. "All allegiances to the government are transitory," one American expert said. "The government could make one mistake and ruin everything." Vietnamese politicians have learned to hedge their bets. Experience has persuaded them of the merits of circumspection.

The optimists and the pessimists seem to be separated by a sense of time. The pessimists don't think there is enough time for Thieu to overcome the historic disadvantages that work against him. The optimists say that, with luck and six to 12 months, Thieu could prevail.

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(REUTERS), Saigon
13 May 1969

A SPECIAL SOUTH VIETNAMESE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITTEE HAS INVESTIGATED 269 ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION AMONG GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SINCE IT WAS ESTABLISHED BY PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG IN JUNE, 1968, THE PREMIER'S OFFICE REPORTED TODAY.

OF THESE, 113 ALLEGATIONS WERE SUBSTANTIATED AND 120 WERE STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION. ANONYMOUS DENUNCIATIONS BY PRIVATE CITIZENS LED TO 70 OF THE CASES, THE REPORT SAID.

THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE RESULTED IN THE TRANSFER OF 20 SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THE FIRING OF 30 CIVIL SERVANTS AND LEGAL ACTION AGAINST 78 OFFICIALS, INCLUDING 13 MILITARY OFFICERS, IT SAID.

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Excerpts from Press of Highlights Covered in President Thieu's 21 April Speech to Class of Village and Hamlet Officials Graduating from Government-Sponsored Course in Local Administration:

"Some time after I was entrusted by the people with the responsibility of leading the country, I said that the problem of reforming the local administration is a task I am determined to accomplish because I think that to defeat communist aggression, our strong nation is not composed only of a President, a National Assembly and a government in Saigon. To fight communism, the people must know why they fight. They must be led in the anti-communist struggle. I cannot lead 17 million people alone. I invite 12,000 Village People's Councils, 1,200 Village Administrative Committees and 12,000 Hamlet Administrative Committees to help me and the government in this task of leading the people. I say this to demonstrate that leadership must be shared by me with all of you. I will also share my responsibility toward our nation with all of you."

Thieu went on to announce that "village governments will be strengthened with additional personnel and funds and village chiefs will be given additional authority; each village with an elected village council will receive 1.5 million piasters for local improvement projects as determined by local officials . . . most important, village chiefs will henceforth be given command authority over Popular Force, Revolutionary Development and People's Self Defense personnel stationed in their villages." The President emphasized that "with this new authority and these additional resources, local officials will be held strictly responsible for providing good government for the people . . . the authority to make decisions (is) in accordance with the village and hamlet people's aspirations. In each village, the people express their desires in a democratic way: they wish to build a school and not to dig a well; to build a classroom and not a market, or to build a road."

Later in his speech (which was given without notes) Thieu talked about self-reliance: "What does self-reliance mean? It means to endeavor to insure that our people and nation become increasingly mature in every respect -- administratively, politically, militarily and economically. Our nation is poor and small and has been subjected to 100 years of colonial rule and to 20 years of war. Our nation is like someone who has been afflicted with a chronic disease for hundreds of years. Now we must take fortifying medicine. When we have been reinvigorated and have recovered from our illness and regained our strength, we will resume our work and will again become an athlete. At present we are subjected to aggression. We extend our hands to solicit aid from people, accepting aid from any giver, provided that which is given does not encroach upon our political interests, our lives, and our right to independence and freedom. During and after the war, even a great country like France and a great power like Germany extended their hands, receiving aid from everyone. As a result, they have now again become powerful nations. After the war, Japan was poor; many of its people had been annihilated. It, too, extended its hands to receive every kind of aid, including that of the country which had fought against Japan -- the United States. Today, Japan has become a great power in Asia, the second or third greatest power in the world. Thus, let people not say that when

the President talks about self-reliance, he is anti-American. No. As you, the people in the villages and hamlets may know, we are still extensively dependent upon others. Our army's salaries are still financed by U.S. AID funds. The pills of medicine you gentlemen take are given by Germany. The tractors you are using have been given by Japan, Canada and France. Weapons and ammunition are also given by others."

Thieu continued in similar vein: "Self-reliance means that by relying upon the assistance of everyone our nation matures, we develop a strong army, a strong administration and a sound economy. The free world, especially the American people, have promised to help us develop our armed forces and our economy and consolidate our administrative system and our political system . . . they have given us weapons and we must hold these weapons and shoot . . . they have given us tractors and we must go to our rice fields and plow. We must not ask them to plow for us, nor expect that we will have rice no matter what we do after their departure."

Thieu promised that "I will carry out a program of giving land to poor people, making peasants land owners, and adjusting the status of those living in other areas, such as those areas with no rice fields, the high plateaus and plantation areas. All lands expropriated from the French but still held by the GVN will be distributed. Our objective is to make everyone who plows a ricefield become its true owner with legal ownership papers, thus enabling him to exploit his own plot of land and to use the money to feed and care for his family, to build its future, to send his children to school, to build his house, to buy medicines, and to improve his living conditions."

In conclusion President Thieu told the village and hamlet officials that "we will succeed largely because you will do your tasks well . . . success does not depend just on me or on those others sitting here with me -- the Chairman of the Upper and Lower Houses, the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice, Senators and high officials present here -- but on you."

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June 1969

FORCED LABOR CAMPS STILL EXIST IN THE USSR

--"I would like to see this testimony of mine, about the camps and prisons for political prisoners, become known to humanists and progressive people of other countries, to those who work for the defense of political prisoners of Greece, Portugal, South Africa and Spain. In the struggle against anti-Humanism let them ask their Soviet colleagues, 'What have you done in your own country about the hunger of political prisoners...?'"

Anatoly Marchenko, Soviet political prisoner from 1960 to 1966, in a letter concerning his forthcoming book.

--"We demand immediate and unconditional recognition by the authorities of freedom of assembly, freedom of press and an amnesty for all 'political' prisoners and dissenters. Until this is done, all words about tolerance, about religious liberty, will remain a miserable game and an indecent lie. Until freedom of assembly, of speech and of the press is declared, there will not disappear the shameful Russian inquisition which persecutes the profession of unofficial faith, unofficial opinions, unofficial doctrines."

V.I. Lenin, "The Autocracy is Tottering" (March 1, 1903), Sochineniya (Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1946), vol. VI, p. 314.

--"We demand that the police be deprived of the power to imprison anyone without trial. The officials must be severely punished for arbitrarily arresting anyone. To prevent them from violating the law, the officials must be chosen by the people, and everyone must have the right to sue any official before a court without first having to ask for permission."

V.I. Lenin, "To the Rural Poor" (1903), Selected Works (International Publishers, New York, 1943), vol II, p. 279.

--"Our enemies are resorting to the grossest falsifications and deception. Take, for instance, the hullabaloo they raise in connection with their charge that the Soviet Union has what they call forced labor."

G.M. Malenkov, Pravda, 10 March 1950.

--"At present we have no people detained in prisons for political motives ... In the Soviet Union there are now no cases of persons being made to stand trial for political crimes. That is unquestionably a great achievement. It

speaks of an unprecedented unity of political convictions of all our people, of their cohesion around the Communist Party and the Soviet rule."

N.S. Khrushchev, Speech
at 21st Congress of the
CPSU, 27 January 1959.

For more than ten years Soviet leaders have guarded their silence on the subject of forced labor camps (for which the Soviets use the euphemistic term "corrective labor colony"). With the advent of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in 1964, Soviet censors made concentration camps a taboo subject, according to refugee writer Mikhail Dyomin. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that, even though older Soviet citizens know about Stalin's camps because their relatives, friends and colleagues were sent there to endure or die (12 million perished, according to Robert Conquest) and even though Soviet youth have heard countless poems and ballads and have read a little about Stalin's camps, there is little evidence to indicate that the Soviet public as a whole is aware of the full extent of the camp system which exists in the USSR today. Indeed, Anatoly Marchenko, the above-cited former political prisoner, angrily contends that Soviet citizens do not care about present-day camps or cannot learn about them because Soviet newspapers falsely report that "all is well." Curiously, foreigners have access to far more information on concentration camps in the USSR than do Soviet citizens. This information gap will be considerably increased in the near future when Marchenko's book, My Testimony is published in the West.

As an indication of the nature and extent of information concerning concentration camps in the USSR which is available in the free world, the following notes have been compiled from the references cited below and from the attached documents.

Locations

The attached map locates and names 56 forced labor camps in the USSR, only a part of the total. It notes the numbers and kinds of prisoners as well as the kind of labor performed. The map is based on 1963 and 1964 information and was published in April 1968 by the "Free Trade Union News." According to Marchenko, Dyomin and others, additional concentration camps are located in the Kolyma River basin and around Magadan in northeastern Siberia. Many of the concentration camps are divided into sub-camps, so that political prisoners are kept separate from petty and major criminal offenders.

Political Prisoners

Political prisoners have always constituted an appreciable percentage of the total inmates of the labor camps. While the overwhelming majority of them are unknown to the free world, over the years many well-known figures have been imprisoned for political reasons. Currently, the most famous political prisoners in the USSR are the writers Andrey Sinyavsky and

Yuli Daniel, who were sentenced in February 1966 to respective terms of 7 and 5 years of rigorous punishment. They were convicted of producing anti-Soviet propaganda, a charge which they disputed. In October 1968 Daniel's wife Larisa, the grandson of former Foreign Minister Litvinov, and three other persons who joined them in protesting against Soviet policies in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 were convicted of disturbing public order by obstructing pedestrian traffic on the empty vastness of Moscow's Red Square. Larisa Daniel and Litvinov were exiled to remote areas of the USSR for 5 and 4 years, respectively; Mrs. Daniel, a linguist, is doing heavy labor in a lumber mill at Taishe even though she is reported to be in frail health, and Litvinov, a physicist, is at a mine near Chita where he is working as an electrician. Of the others, one was exiled for three years and prison terms of three and 2½ years were given to the other two.

Other well-known political prisoners are Yuri Galanskov and Alexander Ginzburg, dissident young intellectuals whose trials in January 1968, though closed to the public, were widely discussed in the free world press. In February 1969 Irina Belgorodskaya, a step-sister of Mrs. Daniel, was sentenced to a year in a labor camp for "spreading concoctions about the Soviet state"; she denied that some petitions which had been found in her purse were either false or defamatory. In May 1969 Ilya Burmistrovich, a mathematician, was sentenced to three years in prison; when arrested he had in his possession carbon copies of books by Sinyavsky and Daniel.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Ukrainian journalist who was sentenced in November 1967 for slandering the Soviet system, compiled a list of 16 Ukrainians sentenced in the latter part of 1966. The list emphasized the fact that political prisoners are essentially professional people. On it are university instructors, graduate students, scientific research workers, an art critic and an engineer. Confirming the impression given by Chornovil, Marchenko says that political prisoners are usually engineers, men of letters, artists, scientific workers, and other professionals.

The charges made against political prisoners are frequently just as flimsy as "obstructing traffic" on Red Square. Chornovil mentions that the accusations against an Ukrainian named Ozerny were that he refused to attend "political training," that he "misused" the works of the Ukrainian poet Schevchenko, and that he mentioned to friends the names of several articles including some that had been written by foreigners. What with the KGB's unrestricted searches of people's homes, their confiscation of notebooks and manuscripts, their repeated interrogations of suspects, it is easy to understand how almost anybody who is the object of the KGB's interest could be accused of some sort of crime. Moreover, rigged, closed trials ensure that "offenders" have little chance of avoiding being convicted.

Numbers of Political Prisoners

Marchenko states that even Yuli Daniel thought that besides himself and Sinyavsky there could not have been more than a dozen political prisoners in all of the USSR. However, Daniel learned that at Ruzayevske prison alone

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

there are thousands of political prisoners. Marchenko believes that there are tens of thousands of political prisoners, and others estimate the total as "thousands of thousands." Robert Conquest cites unofficial conversations with Soviets who estimate that there are a million camp inmates, of whom not more than about 10% are political offenders. This, as Conquest points out, is still more than the number in the Nazi camps before the outbreak of World War II.

Conditions in the Camps

Marchenko pictures contemporary conditions as being in some respects better than in Stalin's time, and in some respects worse. His detailed description of some of the horrors of these camps is attached.

In brief, Soviet prison authorities use several main techniques for controlling their political prisoners. The strongest force, according to Marchenko, is hunger. Normal daily rations equal 2,400 calories, the minimum for a child 7 to 11 years old. For failure to meet his work quota the prisoner's ration can be reduced to 1,300 calories. The authorities can also assign prisoners to more strenuous jobs. Daniel was given jobs handling coal, clearly too heavy work for a man still suffering the effects of his World War II shoulder wound. Prisoners are sometimes given jobs injurious to their health. Daniel, for instance, was assigned to a machine shop where the shrill noise soon deafened him. Alternatively, the authorities can curtail privileges. A prisoner can lose his right to spend five rubles a month (of his own earnings) at the commissary for "breaking the rules." Most galling of all, probably, is the authorities' threat to take away the privilege of receiving visitors, a privilege which is usually granted only after a prisoner has served half his term.

The substance of the contemporary situation of political prisoners is well summed up, once again by Marchenko, in these words:

"I do not know whether in the 1960's there exists anywhere in the world, except in our country, such status for political prisoners, legalized lawlessness, legalized hunger, and legalized forced labor. I am convinced of one thing, that these conditions are possible in our country only because nobody knows about them except the organizers and the executors. If the society knew about them, how would we protest about the position of political prisoners in other countries? So far only our political prisoners, reading these protests in the newspaper, can judge the amazing double standard of the situation, the extreme contradiction between propaganda for export and practice at home."

References

- a. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, The Macmillan Company, London, 1969.
- b. Vyacheslav Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1968. (This petition to legal and security officials of the Ukrainian SSR is published in full on pp. 2-73, and abridged in "Problems of Communism" (USIA, Washington, D.C.), July-August 1968.)
- c. Letter from Valentyn Moroz, 15 April 1967, to Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, abridged in "Problems of Communism" (USIA, Washington, D.C.), July-August 1968.
- d. Daily Mail (London), 2 April 1969. (Layout of Potma forced labor camp).
- e. New York Times Magazine, 13 April 1969. (Why Mikhail Dyomin, a successful Soviet writer, defected).
- f. Various newspaper articles on trials and sentencing of dissident Soviet intellectuals and the reported treatment of those already imprisoned, e.g., New York Times, 18 February 1969.

Attachments

- a. "Forced Labor Remains on the Map in the Soviet Union," "Free Trade Union News" (publication of AFL-CIO), April 1968.
- b. Petition of Anatoly Marchenko, dated 2 April 1968, to health, legal and academic officials and writers of the USSR, and to the UN Committee on Human Rights, calling for a struggle to improve the conditions of political prisoners in the USSR; translated from "Posev" ("Sowing"), Frankfurt-on-Main, June 1968.
- c. "USSR Concentration Camps Today," by Anatoly Marchenko, in "Corrispondenza Socialista," Rome, October 1968.
- d. "The Slow Torture of Larissa Daniel", from Sunday Times, London, 25 May 1969.

April 1968

FORCED LABOR REMAINS ON THE MAP IN THE SOVIET UNION

At the close of World War II, the AFL Free Trade Union Committee prepared a map showing the location of slave labor camps in the Soviet Union. This map was part of the massive evidence which was presented to the UN and which led the United Nations to make a thorough-going survey and to condemn the USSR for this utterly inhuman practice.


After the 20th congress of the CPSU and Khrushchev's denunciation of some of Stalin's murderous crimes against the Soviet peoples, the Kremlin began to reduce the number of forced labor camps, largely because they were uneconomical and some of the inmates who were technically skilled were badly needed in speeding the development of Soviet economy, particularly in arms production.

Within recent years there has set in a trend towards reversion to Stalinist practices—persecution of intellectuals, minority nationals, and dissident workers.

As a result of the arrival at the camps of new "criminals" sentenced in accordance with the decree concerning "Increased Liability for Hooliganism," dated July 26, 1966, the number of prisoners in the various camps has been increasing.

In order to implement most effectively the provisions of the decree, a central so-called "United-Republican" (Federal) Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order was also established on July 26, 1966. Prior to that date each republic had its own Ministry.

We herewith publish a new map of the Soviet Union indicating the location of 56 of the better known forced labor camps and the approximate number of their inmates. This map shows only a partial list of the Soviet Union's forced labor camps, which are a flagrant and callous violation of the UN Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO Convention on forced labor.



- 1. Lumbovka. Main camp.
- 2 and 3. Lumbovka Transient Camps (sub camps). Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Germans and Russians. Total about 8,000 including women and children. Mining of precious metals, airplane and road construction. Work in various trades.
- 4. Lumbovka Transient Camp. Camp closed in the fall of 1963 as the result of an epidemic.
- 5. Saborovo (*). Poles, Russians, a few Germans. Total approximately 5,000. Mining of precious metals. Construction of houses, road maintenance.
- 6. Vukhodnoi. Poles and Latvians—total about 3,000. There are also women. Airpost maintenance, servicing of camps.
- 7. Noska (*). Camp in an uninhabited region. No information.
- 8. Viermiensk Vorkuta (*).
- 9. Izma.
- 10. Shchugor (*).
- 11. Ushta.

Combined information about these camps: Poles and Germans—total about 6,000. Railroad construction, drilling of oil wells. Conditions extremely bad, high mortality rate. The prisoners call these camps "samovarnye" camps or "tchastucki." (Translator's note: these terms are meant to convey the idea of short duration.)

- 12. Berezniki. Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Germans. Overall figure not known. There are also women. Heavy industry, machine manufacturing.
 - 13. Suchobezvodnoye. Poles, Russians, majority Germans, some Hungarians—total about 2,000. Heavy industry and chemical industry. Clearing of forests.
 - 14. Ufa. Poles were removed from this group of camps in 1958—destination not known. Hungarians, Ukrainians, Russians and a small number of Alsatians were left behind. Total about 5,000. Iron ore mining.
 - 15, 16, 17. Camps on the Central Asian (Kirghiz) steppes. Hungarians, Germans, Kalmuks and Russians. Total about 3,000. Poles not confirmed. Drilling of oil wells and maintenance of railroad tracks.
 - 18. I Lebmorskaia (*).
 - 19. II Lebmorskaia (*).
 - 20. III Lebmorskaia (*).
- In these three camps: Poles, Hungarians, Germans and a small group of Finns—about 3,000 in each camp. There are also women and children. Construction of factories, airfields, railroads and roads. Drilling for oil. Digging canals.
- 21. Caucasian wasteland. Poles, Czechs and Jews—total about 4,000. Stone quarries and airports.
 - 22. Naviersk (*). Camp for military personnel. Nationalities not known. About 5,000 prisoners. They presumably work in stone quarries, on road construction and oil drilling.
 - 23. Tbilisi (Tiflis). Small number of Poles. Hungarians, Germans, Kalmuks and Russians. Total about 2,500. There are also women. Power plants and airfields.
 - 24. Voronesh. Poles, Germans, many Turkmen grouped in several camps. Coal mining.

* (Note: Camp, the existence of which has been confirmed, but it is not certain that the official correct one today. All information furnished above spans the years 1963 and 1964. The changes since then have not been significant.)

- 25. Daria 4. 42. Daria 1. Stanogorsk region. Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Romanians and a few Germans. There are also women. Total about 1,500. Factories and roads.
- 26. Kaluga. Poles, Balts and Russians. Total about 1,000. Road construction. Regulating rivers, (flood control).
- 27. Yaroslav. Not many Poles—mainly former soldiers of the underground army (AK). In addition, Hungarians and Germans. Total about 2,800. Metallurgical factories. Canals.
- 28. Kadluga (*). Camp for Soviet officers. They are engaged in lumbering.
- 29. Kamenek Podolsk. Poles, Hungarians and Ukrainians. Total approximately 1,500. Airfield and road construction.
- 30. Pervomaisk. Poles—small number, Hungarians and Russians. In 1960 there were about 3,000. Factories and cement plant.
- 31. Krivoi Rog (Crooked Horn). Poles, Lithuanians, Hungarians and Germans. Also women. Total about 2,400. Cellulose factory and road construction.
- 32. Tebolsk. Poles, Czechs and Hungarians. Also women. About 20 camps with 500 prisoners each. Construction of railroads and roads. Digging tunnels.
- 33. Anurmin (*). Poles not confirmed, Estonians, Finns and Russians. Total approximately 6,000. Different types of work: airfields, house construction, tunnels.
- 34. Kurgam (*). Poles, Estonians and Russians. Total about 5,000. Road construction and other work.
- 35. Uka. Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Germans and Russians. Predominantly women. Total about 6,000. Drilling tunnels in the mountains and railroad construction.
- 36. Ivashka. Nationalities and occupations as for 35 above. There are Poles in this camp. There are about 10,000 prisoners in this camp.
- 37, 38, 39, 40. Details concerning these camps not known. These four camps, as well as Nos. 35 and 36 above, are under the central administration for Kamchatka. Numerous prisoners sent to these four camps never return from there. The authorities explain that after having served their sentences, the prisoners remain as settlers. In prison jargon, these camps are called "paradise within paradise."
- 41. Daria 4. 42. Daria 1. These two camps are transient camps. Small number of Poles. Majority are German, Kirghiz and Russian. Total about 14,500. They work on canals and airfields.
- 43. Kara Kum. Camp for military. Also small group of Hungarians and Germans from the German Democratic Republic. The prisoners are digging canals.
- 44. Karabash. Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Bulgarians. Total about 3,500. Factories and road construction.
- 45. Alma Ata. No information.
- 46. Tiyupa (*). No information.
- 47, 48, 49. Transient camps. Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and numerous Ukrainians. Total in these three camps about 16,000 persons. Lumbering, airfields, factories, railroads, roads.
- 50. Ulan Ude. Since 1958 only Russians. Approximately 3,500. Mining of precious metals, lumbering, railroads.

51. Bogoshi (*). 52. Name of camp unknown. 53. Komsomolsk. 54. Gandala (*). 55. Vangar (*). These five camps are under one central administration. No available information regarding nationality and number of prisoners. There are rumors that there are many Hungarians and Germans, and a lesser number of Poles. Coal mining, coke ovens, electric power plant, railroads, roads, house construction.

56. Voloshchovka (*). This is a distribution center: Poles, Russians, Germans; transient camp consists of 5,000 Bulgarians. Total approximately 18,000. Coal mining, heavy industry, lumbering, construction of roads, railroads, airfields.

POSEV, Frankfurt-on-Main
June 1968

To:

G. A. Miterer, Chairman of the Red Cross of USSR

B. V. Petrovsky, Minister of Health

A. A. Pokrovsky, Director of the Institute of Nutrition AMN

Alesky, Patriarch of All Russia

M. V. Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

V. D. Timakov, President of the Academy of Medicine of the USSR

Chikvadze, Director of the Institute of Government and Law

J. G. Petrovsky, Rector of the Moscow State University

K. Fedin, First Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Union of Writers of USSR

Zimyanin, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Union of Journalists of USSR

K. Simonov

R. Gamzatov

R. Rozhdestvensky

E. Evtushenko

(Copy to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights)

(Copy to the United Nations International Conference on Human Rights)

Five months ago I finished the Book Moi Pokazaniya (My Testimony), a work about six years (1960-66) spent in the Vladimir Prison for Political Prisoners. In the introduction of the book I said: "...present Soviet camps for political prisoners are as terrible as those of Stalin's time. In some respects better, but in some respects worse. It is necessary that we all know about it: those who want to know the truth, but instead get false, "all-is well" newspaper accounts, which put to sleep the public conscience; and those who do not want to know the truth, who close their eyes and shut their ears so that sometime later they are able to justify their action by saying, "Oh God, and we did not know....." If they have at least some measure of civic conscience and true love of their country, they will come forward to her defense as true sons of Russia always have.

I would like to see this testimony of mine, about the camps and prisons for political prisoners, become known to humanists and progressive people of other countries; those who work for the defense of political prisoners of Greece, Portugal, South Africa and Spain. In the struggle against anti-humanism let them ask their Soviet colleagues, "What have you done in your own country about the hunger of political prisoners...?"

I did everything I could for my book to bring it to the attention of the public. However, to this date there is no response to it at all (except for the conversations between me and the KGB [The Committee for State Security] worker about my "antisocial activities"). The conditions in the camps remain the same. Consequently, I am now forced to turn to certain people; those whose social position places them above responsibility for the condition of our society and for the level of its humanism and lawfulness.

You must know the following:

In the camps and prisons of our country there are thousands of political prisoners. The majority of them were convicted by closed courts. Frankly speaking, there never were any open courts (besides the proceedings of war criminals). In all cases the fundamental principle of legal procedure, the open court, was violated. This way the society did not and cannot check the rule of law or the scope of political repressions.

The position of the political prisoners is completely identical to that of the criminals, and in some respect considerably worse. For the political prisoner the lightest sentence is a hard labor camp. For a criminal there is a general law, even more lenient. Criminals can be

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freed after serving two-thirds or one-half of their sentence while political prisoners must serve their sentence in full, "from the beginning to the end." Thus, the political prisoners are on the same level as the most dangerous criminals. There is no legal and lawful difference.

Political prisoners as a rule are people who prior to their arrests worked at jobs beneficial to society: engineers, workers, men of letters, artists, and scientific workers. In corrective camps they are subjected to forced labor. In addition, the camp administration takes advantage of their labor as a form of punishment. The weak are forced to do hard physical work. Professional people are forced to do unskilled physical labor. When quotas are not fulfilled it is considered as breaking of the rules and the prisoner is subject to various administrative punishments ranging from loss of visiting privileges to lock-up or solitary confinement.

The strongest coercion force used is hunger. The general nutrition norms are so low that a prisoner constantly feels hunger. The daily ration contains 2,400 calories (daily minimum for a child from 7 to 11 years of age), and a grown man doing physical work has to subsist on it from day to day, sometimes for as long as 15-25 years! On the whole the dark bread represents the biggest share of these calories (700 gr. daily). Fresh vegetables, butter and many other necessary products, which the prisoners never see, are forbidden even in the camp commissary (as sugar, for instance).

Let me immediately point out that the prisoners pay for both the camp food and clothes from the earnings they get for their work (50 o/o of which is immediately deducted for the upkeep of the camp: for the barracks, equipment, fences, towers, etc.). Only five rubles a month may be spent in the camp commissary (which includes tobacco as well) from the money that remains after the deductions. Even this privilege to spend 17 copecks a day the prisoner can lose for "breaking the rules." For instance, the prisoner Rendel, a historian (sentenced ten years for participation in an illegal Marxist circle), lost his commissary privileges for two months because he brought supper to a sick friend in the barracks. The prisoner Sinyavsky, a writer, lost his commissary privileges for talking to his friend, the writer Daniel, when the latter was in the camp prison.

A prisoner can be placed on a strict ration of 1,300 calories (daily minimum for a child of 1-3 years of age) for the so-called breaking of camp rules, which includes failure to complete the working quota. In another instance, at the end of summer in 1967 the writer Daniel and engineer Ronkin (serving seven years for illegal Marxist activity) were placed on such a punitive ration.

Those placed on strict ration are "not entitled" to food packages from relatives; the authorities may permit them only as encouragement for good behavior (for repentance, for denunciation and for cooperation with the authorities). Even then, not sooner than after serving half time, and not more often than four times a year, and no more than five kilos!

Thus, the camp administration has a powerful means of physical coercion over the political prisoners. The results produced by this whole system are emaciation and vitamin deficiency.

Due to undernourishment some prisoners are reduced to killing and eating crows, and dogs if lucky. In the fall of 1967 one prisoner from the second section of Dubrovlaga camp, while in the hospital zone, found an opportunity to get some potatoes, overate and died (potatoes were raw).

In the Vladimir Prison and in other special camps, where a good number of political prisoners are held, the hunger is even more severe. In comparison to the continuous undernourishment other "forms of influence" seem quite harmless. However, to mention at least some of them: loss of visitation privileges with family, shaving of heads, loss of the right to wear one's own clothes (including warm winter clothes), eliminating hobbies, and right to exercise of religious rites.

Complaints and petitions of prisoners to the District Prosecutor, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the CCCPSU somehow always find their way back to the camp administration. Higher organs send them on to MOOP [Ministry for Preservation of Public Order] and GUMZ [Main Administration of Prisons], from there through other channels they sooner or later reach the hands of those about whom the prisoners complained. Naturally the result of the complaints is always the same: camp administration answers, "facts not confirmed," "punishment justified," and the situation of those who complained becomes intolerable. Sometimes they are even transferred to prisons or placed in solitary confinement for a breaking of the rules. Therefore, the training officers quite often maliciously tell the complaining prisoners, "Why don't you complain about us, complain, write it, it is your right." Others, who are a little more open-hearted say: "And why do you protest, you know very well that the Administration will always find grounds for punishing a prisoner. You just make it worse for yourselves, you should conform..."

Clearly, "The Position of Camps and Prisons," approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1961, gives the prison administration unlimited practical right to apply measures of physical and moral discipline. According to the "directive" applied to political prisoners no food packages can be received, revoking of commissary privileges, introduction of the hunger norm, cutting visitation, cell confinement, handcuffs and solitary confinement, all this is legalized. These measures are close to the heart of the camp administration, inasmuch as among the "camp trainers" there are quite a few workers from the Stalin labor camps, people who are accustomed to unlimited authority (that is, subscribing to the practices used in that period).

Prisoners without citizens' rights are led to terrible and fatal forms of protest: hunger strikes, self-injury, and suicide. In broad daylight some go to the prohibited areas, to the wire and are shot there by the guards for "trying to escape."

I do not know whether in the 1960's there exists anywhere in the world, except in our country, such status for political prisoners, legalized lawlessness, legalized hunger, and legalized forced labor. I am convinced of one thing, that these conditions are possible in our country only because nobody knows about them except the organizers and the executors. If the society knew about them, how could we protest about the position of political prisoners in other countries? So far only our political prisoners, reading these protests in the newspapers, can judge the amazing double standard of the situation, extreme brutality of the guards, and the report and practice at home.

while the responsibility of others is limited by their social position. But I am turning to you as my countrymen: we are all equally responsible before our country, before its youth, and to its future. It is sufficient that the generation of the 1930's and 40's allowed crimes to be perpetuated in the name of the people. We cannot, we must not again show the same indifference which at that time made the whole nation participants in the bloody crimes.

I exhort you to:

Demand open investigation of prisoners' conditions.

Demand wide publicity on the document, "Position of Camps and Prisons"; and seek introduction of special laws for custody of political prisoners.

Demand publications of norms on the nourishment of political prisoners.

Demand immediate elimination of the "rehabilitation" work of Stalin's concentration camp personnel and cadres, who at the present time show cruelty and inhumanity towards prisoners. Demand public judgement against them.

Our civic duty, the duty of our human conscience, is to stop crimes against humanity. After all the crime does not begin with the smoke from the chimneys of crematoriums and the ships to Magadan full of political prisoners. Crime begins with public indifference.

A. Marchenko
27 Novinskaya Street
Aleksandrov, Vladimir Prvince

April 2, 1968

USSR CONCENTRATION CAMPS TODAY

by Anatoly Marchenko

(The Italian transliteration of Marchenko's name is Martchenko)

The text of which we give some excerpts below is circulating secretly in Moscow and is entitled: "On the USSR Concentration Camps." It is the proven testimony of an ex-prisoner, Anatol Martchenko, and concerns a barbarous and brutal reality, which has already had numerous and well-known descriptions, from the memoirs of "The Campesino" to those by Solzhenitsyn. However, Martchenko's memoirs are particularly interesting because they dispel a myth which Soviet propaganda and its little local [Italian] servants have striven for at least ten years to promote; and that is that the horrors of the forced labor camps following the lightning catharsis of the 20th and 22nd Congress of the CPSU are only unpleasant memories of the past which were forever wiped out by the revival of the so-called "socialist legality" and by the verbal repudiation of Stalinist methods. The concentration and forced labor camps described by Martchenko are not in fact those of the pre-Khrushchev years, but those of today, of the sixties. They are those where, among others, Sinyanskiy and Daniel are suffering and to which are being sent Litvinov and Daniel's wife and thousands of other unknown victims of the very de-Stalinized "Soviet democracy." Martchenko spent six years in these camps from 1960 to 1966 for ridiculous reasons, which he describes in the text (a quarrel with persons deported to Kazakhstan during Stalin's time because they tried to leave the country secretly). And now he is running a serious risk of returning since he was once more arrested on August 26 this year [1968] under a sentence of eight years of imprisonment following a brief trial for another "serious crime:" He went to Moscow even though the police refused to give him a permit to visit the capital. It seems that in addition Martchenko is supposed to have even "dared" to show his support of the Czechoslovaks during the crucial days of August. Martchenko is not an intellectual and much less a writer. He is a 31-year-old worker, who in recent months before his arrest, worked as a stevedore. His memoirs do not have the literary value of Solzhenitsyn's stories, but it is precisely because of this that they are perhaps more interesting: because it is a genuine and brutal document, regarding the present which unmasks the new, cynical deceptions of a clique which stubbornly retains its despotic power and which -- falsely and shamefully -- claims it has rejected Stalinism.

My name is Anatol Martchenko. I was born in 1937 at Barobinsk (Siberia). My father worked all his life on the railroad. My mother was a charwoman at the station. Both were illiterate. I went to school for eight years then I left to take a job as head of a group of workers at the hydro-electric plant. I also worked in the mines and did geological prospecting. The last place where I worked was in Karaganda, in Kazakhstan. There I was arrested for the first time in 1960 following a quarrel with a group, deported from the Caucasus. On my release I decided to escape abroad. I saw no other possibility and I left with a young friend, a certain Budrovskiy. We wanted to cross to Iran but on 29 October 1960 they caught us at barely 40 meters from the border. On March 3 the following year I was arrested again. I am now 29 years old.

When I boarded the deportees' train at the Ashkhabad station, I had the idea that my trip was to be a true Odyssey destined to last for three months and which by stages, from one prison to another, would have led me to the remote camps of Mordovia. The prison-stage at Alma Ata differs from that at Tashkent in terms of the number of bed bugs which infest it: there are so many that the walls have a reddish color. At the Novosibirsk prison-stage there are rats. They run around and climb over the prisoners who sleep on the floor...

At the end of May 1961 we sighted the camps of Mordovia. I was assigned to camp No. 10 and from there soon transferred to the "special camp" which, in a certain sense, is the prison of the prisoners. Those who have committed some infraction of the common camp's internal rules are sent there: either they refused to work, tried to escape, were unable to perform the prescribed quota of work or resisted a guard. In effect it is very easy to be accused of "banditism" and of "rowdyism," in the camp. It is enough to preserve a minimum sense of human dignity. In practice, they include all those who are disliked by the camp's authorities because they showed a certain independence, or were sarcastic, or more simply, because they became popular among the other prisoners.

The men sentenced to a "special schedule" sometimes lived for years in fearfully inhuman conditions. Attempts were made to break them through hunger, through cold. Rarely could they communicate with each other because there were always two or three paid spies in every cell. Suicides are frequent in the special camps. One day, three prisoners decided to end their lives. They took some lumber from the carpentry shop where they worked, and built a sort of ladder, which they set against the prison wall in view of a guard. The soldier yelled "Get down! Be careful or I will fire!" One of the prisoners replied, "You will do us a favor!" and he continued to climb toward the top of the wall. He was cut down by a burst of fire. The second prisoner took his place and he also was cut down. Then the third one followed and fell at the base of the wall on the bodies of his companions in prison and in suicide.

The guards who kill an escapee are given special leave as a reward, but it must be said that the guards are frequently ashamed of the work they are made to do. One day in autumn 1963 a soldier killed an escapee in the prohibited zone and was rewarded with leave, but he left the camp with injuries: his own companions had taught him a lesson during the night. The soldiers do not write home about their hateful work. And sometimes, through the bars, they confess what they think of the camps: "In a year I will have finished my duty, and I will send this stinking work to hell!"

"Yes, but in the meanwhile you will shoot me if they order you to."

"What else can I do? I don't want to be sent to the camp in your place."

Thus, they accept the situation even while they complain to the prisoners.

It is another story as far as the career guards are concerned. They are venal. They will do anything to ingratiate themselves with their superiors and anticipate their desires. The unlimited powers they enjoy in their relationships with the prisoners corrupts them. Through them, a vast traffic is carried out in the camps, and they become rich at the expense of the prisoners.

After three months in the special camp, I was sent to the Vladimir prison. There the rules were as follows: from reveille at 6 AM until lights-out at 10 PM, it was forbidden to lie down under pain of one or two weeks of solitary confinement. It was permitted to sit down, to walk, to stand up sleeping, but lying down on one's own cot was prohibited. It was even prohibited to stand at the window under pain of solitary confinement. What can one do under these conditions for 16 hours a day? Read or write. It is permitted to have two books every 10 days and to buy copybooks of 12 pages each at the store. However, each copybook had to last 15 days and the guard censored everything that was written. These are the daily rations of the Vladimir prisoners: 500 grams of black bread; 15 grams of sugar; a cup of soup in the morning with warm water and some anchovies which often were spoiled. At dinner, 100 to 150 grams of mashed potatoes so liquid that it formed a transparent layer on the bottom of the messkit. These were the normal rations. The "strict" diet consists instead of only 400 grams of bread, no sugar and a little broth at noontime and in the evening. Every morning, long before reveille, no one is asleep, everyone waits for the distribution of bread. As soon as the guard calls the roll and distributes the rations, some devour everything immediately. Others put the bread away but after a short while they can't stand it anymore and begin to take a piece, they put it on their tongue and keep it in their mouths as long as possible as though it were candy. Understandably, most of the quarrels take place because of food, if it can be called food.

To protest, to rebel, to write letters -- all this is useless. The administration is already well aware of what is being complained of.

Here is an eloquent example. In cell No. 79, in front of mine, there was a very good, likeable prisoner called Stepan. He had been a professor of geography in a city in the Ukraine. He had been sentenced to 25 years and had already served 14. One day, as usual, the prosecutor entered the cell and asked: "Does anyone have any complaints?" Then, suddenly he saw Stepan and was dumbfounded: "You...are still a prisoner?" Stepan replied quietly, "As you see." After an embarrassed silence, the district attorney left the cell. Stepan and the district attorney knew each other well: they had shared the same cell in the same prison for two years. Then, in 1965, the district attorney had been rehabilitated and had been reassigned to his job. Stepan, instead, remained in prison. Therefore, why tell the prosecutor what is wrong? He already knows anything you can tell him.

This thick wall of silence, this sense of total rejection is the hardest thing to bear. And this is why every so often, as I have said, some commit suicide. And this is why others cover their faces with painful and provocative tattoos. And finally, this is why others atrociously mutilate themselves. This is what I saw with my own eyes in the spring of 1963 in the Vladimir prison.

Serge K. had touched the bottom of desperation. He decided to mutilate himself in a spectacular way. He made a hook with a small piece of wire. With the cotton from a pair of socks he wove a long line. Then he found two nails and with these he prepared his "coup." First of all he drove one of the two nails into the door, hammering quietly with his mess kit to avoid attracting

the guard's attention. Then he tied the line to the nail. At the other end of the line he tied the hook. We, his cell companions, watched him silently: it is unwise to get mixed up in this kind of affair. Then Serge went to the table in the center of the cell, he undressed completely, sat on one of the benches and...swallowed his hook.

We were dumbfounded: from that moment, if the guard had opened the door he would have lifted Serge like a fish from a pond, but for Serge, this still was not enough. He realized that if someone had pulled the line he would not have been able to avoid following the pull: despite himself, he would have walked to the door and it would have thus been possible to cut the line through the half-opened door. To be certain he would not yield, this is what Serge did: he took the other nail and nailed his testicles to the bench where he was seated. This time he hammered the nail loudly. He no longer cared about making noise. Soon the guard ran and looked through the peephole to see what was happening in the cell. At first he understood only one thing: that a prisoner had a nail and was hammering it. Naturally, his first reaction was to take it away from him and he began to turn the key in the lock. At this point, Serge, in a sharp voice told him to think it over before he opened the door and then he calmly explained the situation. If the guard opened the door he would tear out Serge's stomach.

Soon there was a crowd of guards around the door who took turns looking through the peephole and yelling to Serge to cut the line. When they saw he did not obey, they ordered us to do it. But we remained seated on our cots, motionless. However, mealtime came. From the corridor could be heard the tinkling of pots and mess tins. One of us could no longer bear it and he cut the line. The guards erupted into the cell and surrounded Serge: but what could they do? Serge remained nailed to the bench, naked as a worm. Finally, they made us collect our belongings and they transferred us into another cell. I never learned what happened to Serge after that bewildering day.

Undoubtedly he was sent to the prison infirmary which was already full of those who had practiced self-mutilation. There, there are people who swallowed all sorts of things: spoons, toothbrushes, wire. People who plucked their eyes out and filled the sockets with ground glass. People who inhaled powdered sugar until they developed pulmonary lesions. People who sewed buttons onto their flesh. The infirmary surgeon spends most of his time operating on stomachs. Another of his tasks is to remove tattoos. Things may have changed now, but when I was there in 1961-1963 the operation was very primitive: the piece of tattooed skin was cut off, then the two lips of the wound were pulled together and sewn. I remember a prisoner who was operated on three times for that reason. The first time they took a piece of skin from his forehead, where he had tattooed the now-classic inscription, "Slave of Khrushchev." As soon as the wound was healed, they had to operate on him again to remove another inscription: "Slave of the USSR," and finally they operated a third time because he had again tattooed on his forehead the inscription: "Slave of the CPSU." After this last operation the skin on his forehead became so tight that the poor devil could no longer close his eyes. For this reason he was nicknamed: the "watchman."

One day it was announced by radio that the American pilot Powers had been pardoned because of his sincere repentance and because of his good conduct. We were very interested in this news since Powers was our "neighbor." He also was interned at Vladimir. Furthermore, we knew that he had a double

with him, a Lett, and they occasionally took walks in the attiguous courtyard. The announcement that Powers had been freed caused many comments; so, Powers had not even served one quarter of his sentence and he had been immediately pardoned. He had flown over the USSR in a plane, a paid capitalist spy: and he had been freed. In the same years, "criminals" such as Pavel Ivanovich (a clergyman) and Adrey Novodzhinskiy (who voluntarily returned to the USSR after having left the country) were sentenced to life.

In autumn 1964 the directors of camp No. 2 (and, I believe, all the directors of all the camps in Mordovia and the rest of the USSR) were faced by a big problem: Nikita Khrushchev had been overthrown and the order had been given to cancel every trace of the cult of his personality. Early in the morning one of the prisoners, a painter and decorator by profession, was led toward the camp. All the directors were there, even those of the political police. The order given him was simple: cancel from all the walls and all the partitions of the camp the name and the picture of Khrushchev.

However, when it was time to open the library, one of the directors suddenly remembered that the walls were covered with pictures of Khrushchev, with inscriptions praising him, and press clippings which spoke of him. Something had to be done and quick. Some of the more venal prisoners were called to the main office. They were human derelicts capable of anything. Director Svechikov placed a package of tea in front of the first who entered. Tea will buy anything in the camp. "Go to the reading room and wipe out every trace of Khrushchev and this tea will be yours," [the director said]. The prisoner replied with a vulgar obscenity. He was immediately sent to solitary confinement, but while they were dragging him away he continued to scream: "Pigs! You kissed Khrushchev's backside for years and years and now you want me to remove his pictures! I am here for seven years because of him! Bunch of Fascists! Carrion! If your Khrushchev has become dirt, you should liberate me, and instead, you send me to solitary confinement!"

In fact, it was natural and understandable that the fall of Khrushchev would have caused the prisoners to think as follows: "I was condemned for having criticized Khrushchev; now, therefore, they will free me." Thus in one of the Mordovian camps everyone gathered at a meeting place with their personal effects and they went toward the guardposts. "Halt! What do you want?" the guardpost officer asked. "They condemned us for having criticized Khrushchev, and now it is recognized we were right. Therefore, open the door: we are free." However, they were unceremoniously sent back to the barracks.

In order to calm the prisoners, the camp administration nevertheless held a meeting of the anti-Khrushchev prisoners in the office of the political police. "Write to the Supreme Soviet Presidium and ask for a pardon. You will certainly be freed." Even that caused surprise. Why a pardon? Logically, immediate rehabilitation should have been granted. Many wrote, but as far as I was concerned, I never heard tell of a single case of rehabilitation. Regarding pardon, there was only one among the many hundreds of Khrushchev's victims in my camp.

Freedom of expression for writers was a theme which interested many of us. In February 1966, the trial of the writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel was discussed in all the Moldau camps. At the beginning we were all convinced that those two were provocateurs, cowards who would have cried, who would have repented, who would have confessed that they sold out for dollars. We expected

the usual farce-trial where each plays the role assigned to him, even the accused, in the most docile way. But the first reports arrived: the accused did not admit they were guilty; they did not repent; they did not beg for clemency. They argued their right for freedom of expression with the court. It is the first time the political police do not hold a planned trial against men who already were destroyed. Sinyavskiy was sentenced to seven years and Daniel to five but we have the impression that whatever the sentence, the political police had suffered a bitter defeat. Now, the entire world would know that in the USSR were political prisoners, contrary to Khrushchev's lying assertions.

One day, returning from work, I heard Petr Ilich Izotov yelling to me: "They brought him here!"

"Who?"

"The writer! They put him in your group." While I was changing, I saw a man arrive who was about 35 to 40 years old, in a woolly jacket, boots and a leather hat. Under his open coat he wore a large pullover. He looked a little lost. He was Yuliy Daniel, the writer. We shook hands. Other prisoners in the group came close. Others ran from the nearby barracks to see Daniel: a celebrity! While we asked him questions about the trial, Captain Ussov came toward us. Without stopping, he said: "A new man? He will have to leave his pullover and hat in the store house. Personal clothing is absolutely prohibited."

Daniel asked us about conditions in the camp, and we tried to raise his spirits, as we did with all the new arrivals. But he spoke more about Andrey Sinyavskiy than about himself. "He is," he said, "a writer the like of which there are only a couple at most in Russia." He was very restless and worried about his friend. How would it be in his camp? Might he not be given work too heavy for him? Daniel told us about his trip, and he confessed that he did not believe that camps like ours existed. "I said to myself: this kind of thing was wiped out about 10 years ago. Certainly, I had heard talk about a certain Jew from Kiev who was arrested on a charge of Zionism. But I told myself that between him, me, Sinyavskiy, and others there could not have been more than a dozen in the whole country, and they therefore would have sent me to a prison for common crimes. And then, at the Ruzaievske prison, I learned that there alone there are thousands of political internees. They really deceived us, didn't they?"

Daniel was put to work the day after his arrival and as usual, the wardens assigned him to very hard work. We knew that his right arm was affected by an injury. How could he, with the limited use of his right arm, pick up sticks or shovel coal? This was what the warden counted on: Daniel would not have been able to work and would have been forced to ask for less arduous work. Then they would have forced him to write in the camp newspaper and to speak on the radio, and they would have made him librarian...in short, they would have forced him to express the repentance which he refused to do at the trial. But Daniel was ready to suffer anything rather than surrender.

There was additional merit in this attitude because he was also hated by many prisoners. In fact, it must not be believed that everyone understood the deep meaning of the Daniel case. For some he was merely an intellectual with lily white hands, a privileged person...They said, "let him suffer like us, we know those pen pushers! They are all hirelings who live comfortably, with full bellies, describing the marvelous life in the USSR and in our camps. Did those two make a mistake? Good: let them also pay for the others!"

If the prisoners detest the writers, it is because too often they read in magazines, in newspapers or in books their essays and stories on the "redemption of prisoners through work." Only Solzhenitsyn dared tell the truth in "A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." And still he did not tell everything! Others said, "in any case Daniel will always make out well. He will soon find a comfortable place. The Jews always know how to get along everywhere." We already knew from newspaper accounts that Daniel was a Jew; and it was not the least of our bitterness to see the persistence of the worst kind of anti-Semitism even in those camps where the regime was as merciless with Jews as it was with the others.

Nevertheless, Daniel succeeded through his personality in changing the attitude of those who were hostile toward him: and this from the first days. Common criminals like Foutman and even Vorkhuta began to respect him. He worked without complaining even though his strength was nothing compared with that of giants such as, for example, Kolya Yusupov. Soon he suffered severe pains in the shoulder where he had another injury. But he always refused to ask for lighter work. Then, all the prisoners made an effort to help him and to lighten his task. After having unloaded their quota of coal, even the "tough" ones like Foutman, Yusupov and Valeri went to help Daniel. All of our group was called to the office of the political police. "Who is helping Daniel?"

"Everyone."

"Why? Why can't he do his own work? Does he need servants?"

A sharp-tongued prisoner said, "Just a minute! What does your moral code say? Brotherly help: man is the friend of man. Has that code been suddenly changed?"

Caught off balance, the political police transferred Daniel from our group to the workshop. Formally they pretended to have done him a favor, to have taken into account the injury to his arm, but in reality it was something else: in the workshop, the noise was such that even a healthy person could not stand it. Now, Daniel had ear trouble, and the camp warden knew it well. The result was that having entered the camp with incipient deafness, Daniel was now almost completely deaf. I myself -- who had perfect hearing -- left the camp considerably deaf.

Two months before my release, they called me to the warden's office for a "talk." I found the camp commandant in the office, the head of my group Ussov, and an official of the political police. They told me, "Martchenko, you will be released shortly. You understand clearly that now you will have to behave and think like normal people. Freedom is not like life in the camp, where everyone anarchically expresses his own opinion about everything."

"But perhaps, even outside, normal people no longer think today as they did at one time. We live in new times and the communists are fighting among themselves."

"That's enough of your lies, Martchenko. The communists are a united mass."

"So! What about the Chinese? And the Albanians? And the Titoists? Do you see the pro-Chinese and orthodox communists in foreign parties?"

"Take care, Martchenko. With ideas like those it will not be long before you wind up here again."

"There is no doubt about that: anyone who does not agree with you is a candidate for the lager. But tell me one thing: in other countries there is a legal opposition which often includes communist parties. When the leaders of those parties, after having attended any kind of a congress at Moscow, return to their country, their governments do not try them for high treason. Yet, they officially plan to change the regime of their country. And I instead, a simple worker, who is not a member of any party, have been locked up for 6 years in this bedlam. And now you promise me that you will lock me up again: I would like you to explain to me how that can happen." They shook their heads sadly: for them, I was only an object of surprise and annoyance, an incomprehensible and lost being: a dangerous individual.

Daniel was among those who remained with me almost until the moment of my departure. He gave me a book, one of those he had lent me and which I had read avidly. On the inside front page he has written the following verses:

This comic fate
Wasn't too bad!
Here you became deaf.
Here you grew.
Be proud of your strange fate:
You are always better than those
Who have eyes and do not see.

At the exit, a police agent took the book and the dedication. He ordered a subordinate: "Tear out that page and put it in the record."

The slow torture of Larissa Daniel

I HAVE profound regrets about some of the Russians we left behind. I am not thinking of the official Russians—the type of policemen, or camouflaged policemen, who were responsible for my expulsion—but of a dozen, or perhaps two dozen very fine Russians who, I know, represent hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of thinking, fine people in that country who must live and labour under this dreadful system.

I am thinking in particular of Larissa Daniel, wife of the imprisoned Soviet writer Yuli Daniel, who is having her health ruined while in exile in Siberia by being forced to haul heavy pieces of timber. All requests for her to be allowed lighter work have been refused.

Yuli Daniel has been in the Potma concentration camp, on the Volga, since 1966 himself in very bad health. His wife, Larissa, along with half a dozen others, demonstrated on August 25 against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which she thought was a dishonour to the best in Russia as well as an act of imperialist aggression.

Tried last autumn and sentenced to exile in Siberia, she arrived on December 31 at a little settlement called Chuna, about 150 miles west of Bratsk, where the great hydroelectric power station is located. They had nowhere for her to stay for the first two nights, so they put her in the unheated MVD prison. The temperature at the time was 50 degrees below zero Centigrade. She had, of course, been in prison of one sort or another before, notably in Moscow's infamous Lefortovo prison.

Then they found her a job. In theory, someone sentenced to exile should be able to do any sort of work for which he or she is qualified. The only restriction is on movement. But the job they gave her was hauling lumber from the outdoors into a wood processing factory—pieces of timber six, seven or eight feet long, which were wet and therefore twice as heavy as if they were logs for your fireplace.

She was a frail woman to begin with. Yet this hard labour went on from January to April and she has been losing still more weight. She has had severe

trouble which had bothered her earlier, and local doctors told her: "You cannot go on with this work. It will kill you." She went to the local police headquarters informed them of this, and asked for other work.

For example, having seen a notice in the window of the post office saying that a position of postman was vacant, she asked whether she could have the job of delivering the mail round the small settlement of 1,500 people. The mail sacks would be heavy, but she thought that it would be only twice a day and therefore somewhat easier than the timber yard. Alternatively, she asked for a job inside the factory, concerned with making up window frames. This is also not quite women's work in the Western world, although in the Soviet Union it certainly is, but at least it had the virtue of being indoors, where there was heating.

They turned down both requests.

This is a woman of 38, a graduate in philosophical sciences, with reasonable knowledge of four languages—English, French, Polish and Czech. Yet her request to do work with translations was also turned down.

Friends who have seen her in the last two months were shocked at her appearance and weakness. Finally, at the end of April, she could take it no longer. The doctors had warned her that she would die if she continued the work allotted to her. So she stopped it.

There is a Soviet law, which could conceivably be applied to her, under which anybody who does not work, or refuses to work, is guilty of parasitism or hooliganism. So the authorities could if they wished—though I doubt if they will—apply even more stringent penalties: that is, take her from a so-called civilised exile to a forced labour camp.

Her friends, who came to Moscow after having seen her, went to the Central Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MVD, and reminded them that this woman did speak four languages and certainly read them well. They asked whether, for the sake of her own dignity and her own life—she refuses to be taken to the hard labour— it would be possible for translation work to be sent out to her from Moscow.

The MVD took an ambiguous position. They said: "If you can find publishing houses in Moscow which are willing to sign a contract with her, then we would make no formal objection." But, of course, her friends discovered, after trying for a month, that no publishing house in Moscow dares even consider concluding any kind of agreement with a political prisoner.

After Larissa Daniel, I think of young Alex Ginsburg, who was the chief defendant at the writers' trial in January, 1968. His "offence" was that he had compiled a record of the secret trial of Yuri Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky, which found its way abroad. Ginsburg was also sent to the Potma camp, with other distinguished political prisoners. Before his trial, he had been held in jail for nearly a year.

Shortly before his arrest, he had become engaged to, and was living with, a woman who to all intents and purposes except legal registration was his wife. Ever since he has been at Potma, he has been trying unsuccessfully to get this marriage registered legally. They have refused to do it.

The reason it is particularly important to Ginsburg is not that she could come and live with him at the concentration camp, but simply that she would be allowed to visit him once a month; that is provided by law. The authorities have steadfastly refused, and I was told only a day or two ago that, since May 16, he has been on a hunger strike, saying that he would rather die, if need be, if he cannot get his common law marriage formally registered.

There is no actual rule which forbids a political prisoner to marry. It is just that the authorities choose to treat his request in that way. As for my personal experiences as a Western correspondent, I must say that the attitude of the authorities to us all is one of hostility to a greater or lesser degree.

Western newspapers are unavailable in Moscow. There was a brief spell when a few dozen newspapers were placed in tourists' hotels, available only to obvious foreigners, purchasable only in hard currency. That was the rapid end with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even certain Communist publications—the

French ones, Italian and British, for a while, and the Czechoslovak ones, of course, not to mention the Rumanian and Yugoslav—were withdrawn.

The official Soviet Press does not let a day go by without some attacks on the Western Press in general, some papers in particular, and quite frequently on particular correspondents. In my two years in Russia, I was attacked half a dozen times, the first three or four months after my arrival, the last one just a week before my expulsion.

These attacks can be very vicious. I recall in particular the case of my friend and colleague Henry Kamm, of the New York Times. He was attacked in the Soviet Press in the following words: "Mr Kamm, of German origin"—German is a curse word in the Soviet Union—"with an American passport in his pocket, was busy distributing anti-Soviet propaganda in the streets of Prague."

The part about anti-Soviet propaganda is a complete invention. As to the German origins and the American passport, Henry Kamm was born in Breslau, of a Jewish family, and spent eight years under the Hitler regime.

He and his mother managed to get out to the United States in April, 1941, only 10 days before the Gestapo began sending the Jews of Breslau to the death camps. He acquired American citizenship a bit earlier than usual by fighting in the U.S. Army.

A friend of mine pointed out that Henry Kamm was fleeing the Gestapo and dedicating his services to fighting it, as a very young man, at a time when the editors of Pravda were still praising the Nazi-Soviet Pact—two months before the German invasion of Russia.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry, which is supposedly in charge of foreign correspondents, does absolutely nothing to give anyone any information on what Soviet policy really is—the sort of thing one expects in almost any country. Yet, in the last five or six years, there has developed the practice of *selling* news. The Novosti Press Agency was set up. I don't want to be too harsh on publishers, editors and others, but the television networks were the first to cave in, and the news magazines followed. The result now is that those correspondents who manage to get 40 minutes with the deputy minister for the textile industry, let us say, will be paying \$50 in hard currency to the Novosti Press Agency for the dubious privilege of doing so.

The other day, many people saw photographs of the new TU 144 supersonic airliner in the newspapers. The TV networks, American, British, French, West German and others, each paid \$500 just for the privilege of photographing this plane.

For correspondents inside the Soviet Union, however, working conditions have deteriorated steadily since the January, 1968, writers' trial.

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June 1969

WORLD PEACE ASSEMBLY

The World Council of Peace (WCP), now headquartered in Helsinki, Finland, will hold a World Peace Assembly (WPA) in East Berlin from 21 through 24 June 1969. In fact, the WPA is the eighth Congress of the WCP and comes in the twentieth anniversary year of the WCP's foundation. For tactical reasons the WCP makes an elaborate effort to portray the WPA as a meeting of "many different peace organizations" which have "divergent political views" on international problems. The WCP emphasizes in Circular Letter, No. 9, dated 28 February, that the WPA is not a meeting called by one single organization or one single movement to which the others are invited as delegates and observers; rather it is an assembly that is placed under the joint auspices of these organizations.

The WCP is the only non-functional Soviet-controlled international front organization -- unless the "fight for peace" were to be interpreted as a functional specialty. It has traditionally been more successful in winning non-Communist support than other Communist front organizations, having attracted from the beginning a number of neutralists, pacifists, internationalists, left-wing socialists, etc. Throughout its history the WCP has defended the policies of the Soviet Union and attacked those of the non-Communist family of nations, particularly those of the U.S. as the leader of the West.

Preliminary WPA meetings have been held and an organizing committee with its own permanent secretariat has been working in East Berlin since early April to handle preparations. Claiming that the main purpose of the WPA is to bring the pressure of world public opinion to bear on the lessening of tension and the prevention of any aggravation which could lead to "a world conflagration," publicity issued by the WPA organizers also says "public opinion can contribute in helping to turn the tide against the cold wars and the hot wars and against preparations for them, against the violence of colonialism and racialism, and in favor of peace and liberty."

The WPA expects 900 delegates to attend. Each participant must be sent officially by an organization which accepts the WCP or WPA principles and goals, but certain important personalities are also invited to attend as guests of honor. Among the twenty international organizations represented at the preparatory meeting in Berlin in February there were, in addition to the hard core fronts, a number of neutralist, pacifist or fellow traveling groups, such as: the World Movement of Esperantists for Peace, the Young World Federalists and, as observers, the American Friend's Service Committee, Amnesty International, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The WPA will begin and end with plenary

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June 1969

sessions, in between there will be $2\frac{1}{2}$ days of discussions in five main committees and half a day of specialized meetings (youth and students, women, trade unionists, parliamentarians, peasants, representatives of religious organizations and movements, etc.).

The main agenda points for the Assembly's consideration, discussion and action are:

- a. War in Vietnam
- b. European Security [a WCP euphemism for anti-NATO activities]
- c. Near East Situation
- d. Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, and National Independence
- e. Disarmament

Vietnam will undoubtedly be the main issue at the Assembly. In March, the WCP had issued an appeal which stated: "The Paris four-party talks on Vietnam are making no progress at all In the present situation it is the successive defeats which have been inflicted by the Vietnamese people which will lead the American government to accept the principle of withdrawing its troops and those of its satellites from Vietnam. Isolating still further the American aggression is contributing to bringing the negotiators in Paris to consider that their attitudes can no longer be dictated from a position of strength."

On all other agenda points, the WPA will also not deviate from the Soviet position. Overall, the focus of activity in the front organizations has moved increasingly from Europe to the Middle East and Africa, while having constantly put a sharp focus on Vietnam. Repercussions of the invasion of Czechoslovakia are now minimal in the fronts; they are not expected to really affect the plans and proceedings of the WPA.

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June 1969

THE ARAB COMMANDOS: A DILEMMA FOR THE SOVIET UNION

The Fedayeen Threat

The recent political crisis in Lebanon has again focused world attention on the fedayeen or Arab commando forces and their growing political significance in the Middle East. Lebanese Premier Rashid Karame resigned and formed a caretaker government following riots in support of the fedayeen's using Lebanon as a base for Arab guerrilla operations against Israel. The uneasy agreement which was finally reached between the government and Yasir Arafat, leader of Al Fatah--now the dominant element in the Palestine Liberation Organization and the largest Palestinian commando organization in the Middle East--allows the fedayeen to undertake training, propaganda and fund raising activities within Lebanon, but bans any guerrilla action against Israel for fear that it would bring on Israeli retaliation.

The agreement is not expected to last since it falls far short of Arafat's demands for absolute freedom of action by the commandos, and because survival of the fedayeen as a vital and dynamic organization requires continuing action. Lebanese officials are evidently concerned since they have called for an Arab League summit meeting to review the political threat of the fedayeen throughout the Middle East.

The threat is two-fold, for not only have the fedayeen proved they are capable of bringing down even a moderate Arab government, but their continued guerrilla action against Israel, with the fanatical aim of destroying it, only diminishes the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Had it not been for these commandos, the Middle East would have been less unsettled over the past two years. Israel's major retaliations, including its attack on the Beirut airport in late December 1968, have been made in response to Arab guerrilla provocations, except for the Egyptian commando action at the Suez Canal. In turn, these provocations were made over the opposition of most Arab governments. In fact, the fedayeen are fast becoming a greater potential threat to these governments than to the State of Israel.

The Fedayeen and the Arab Governments

Since the June 1967 war, a number of fedayeen organizations, most of them newly created, have emerged as the spearhead of Arab resistance to Israel, while at the same time providing a sense of national identity and pride for over two million Palestinian Arabs throughout the Middle East. Al Fatah, or the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, is by far the largest and most effective of the numerous Arab commando organizations, having an estimated 4,000 members, or about half of the 8,000 or more estimated fedayeen militants believed to have been trained and now active. It was founded in 1956. Its leader, Yasir Arafat, is a

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Jerusalem-born Palestinian refugee who has become a popular hero with growing political influence throughout the Arab world.

The other major groups are the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), which was established after the June 1967 war as a fedayeen subsidiary of the Palestine Liberation Organization's Popular Liberation Army; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the product of the 1967 merger of several small Arab terrorist groups; and Al-Saiqa, created in late 1967 when several Syrian terrorist groups joined forces. The last-named group is supported and controlled by the left-wing Baathists. It was probably members of this group who infiltrated into southern Lebanon earlier this year and considerably augmented the Al Fatah forces camped there. Most of the fedayeen are based in Jordan, in the area east of the Jordan River and north of the Dead Sea.

Arab popular support for the fedayeen is so intense that all the Arab governments give them verbal support, and most feel obliged to provide assistance, although voluntary contributions from Palestinians and automatic deductions from salaries of Palestinians employed in the Arabian Peninsula states have provided the bulk of financial support for the commando movement. Besides financial assistance, the governments have furnished other types of support. Syria, Algeria and Iraq have reportedly not only supplied arms, but have also assisted in training activities and have even given the guerrillas access to regular military installations. Soviet arms to the fedayeen have been channelled through Syria, Algeria and Egypt. Although there are no exact figures, the fedayeen obviously receive substantial support in the total value of funds, arms and other goods and facilities provided them.

At the same time these groups present a grave challenge to the basic sovereignty of their benefactors and they have succeeded in putting several Arab governments on the psychological defensive. For example, although Palestinians total only about ten per cent of the Lebanese population, they have obviously gained widespread support, and further disturbances could wreck not only the Christian-Moslem balance of power that is vital to the functioning of any Lebanese government, but also Beirut's policy of avoiding confrontation with Israel. Jordan's King Hussein is equally threatened. Palestinians make up almost half the population of Jordan and Hussein has managed to co-exist with them by giving the fedayeen operating room inside the country. This has obliged King Hussein to maintain his army in a state of virtual wartime readiness, not only for any confrontation, accidental or otherwise, which the fedayeen might provoke with his regime, but also to demonstrate that he has the military strength to counter any Israeli action provoked by the fedayeen. In Egypt, the much publicized attacks of the Egyptian commando units across the Suez Canal are believed to be an effort by President Nasser to counter the Palestinian challenge to his leadership. Iraq followed the earlier Syrian example of organizing its own guerrilla group in order

to exercise some control and to curtail the domestic threat of the Palestinian group. Even King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, known as a principal financial backer of the fedayeen, has shown interest in forming a rival commando force of his own. Algeria appears to be the strongest supporter of the fedayeen cause, but she is at a sufficiently safe distance from which to encourage their guerrilla action.

Soviet and Chinese Interest

The fedayeen pose a dilemma to the Soviet Union, which has therefore reacted to them with some ambivalence. While it is doubtful that they (unlike the fedayeen) want the whole Arab world converted into one huge guerrilla camp dedicated to reckless, perpetual struggle with Israel. They do not support the fedayeen goal of destroying the State of Israel, but they are obliged to acknowledge the fedayeen as a legitimate resistance movement within the occupied areas. Likewise, although the USSR is uneasy about accepting the unpredictable, highly volatile guerrillas as the potential leaders of the revolutionary Arab forces, the Soviet role as the great power champion of the Arab cause compels the Kremlin to give them some verbal support. This ambivalence has been reflected in articles which have appeared in recent Soviet publications. Soviet criticism of fedayeen methods and aims is reflected in the statement of the Jordanian Communist Party on the fedayeen which first appeared in the World Marxist Review in late 1968 and is analyzed in the attached article from Est et Ouest. It is likewise evident in the attached article from the 15 April issue of the newspaper Soviet Russia, an official organ of the RSFSR Party Federation. Yet on the following day, Trud, the Soviet trade union newspaper, published a flattering photo of six Arab guerrillas together with an editorial statement praising the "creation of a united command to coordinate the activities of the four largest Palestine partisan groups." A lengthy editorial in the Soviet magazine Kommunist (No. 5, 26 March 1969) was critical of the commandos. Entitled "The Mao Tse-tung Group's Policy in the International Arena," it stated:

"The Maoist policy of stirring up conflicts and encouraging extremists and nationalist circles in the 'third world' is distinctly evident in the Arab countries, where the Maoist group is trying to increase its influence on the Palestine organizations which are opposing a political settlement of the Near East conflict. Several centers are operating in the CPR for political training of insurgents from developing countries, training them not so much for anticolonialist struggle as for the realization of Peking's special aims in the 'third world'."

The Palestinian guerrillas returned the criticism in a statement on the Soviet role in the UN peace talks. It was issued by the executive com-

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mittee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and broadcast to the Arab world in early April (see attachment).

Notwithstanding such exchanges, the Soviets have an obviously growing interest in the fedayeen, with indications they may become more actively involved with them, if only in an attempt to bring them under some semblance of control and more compliant political leadership, and to counter possibly increased Chinese involvement with the guerrillas. Although Al Fatah has carefully avoided involvement in international issues and has taken stands only on matters relating to the Palestine issue, the Chinese have given it assistance in past years. Some of its members have doubtless been training missions to the Middle East. It is also known that the Chinese have provided the fedayeen, Fatah included, with small arms and munitions. Recently the Chinese broadcast a strongly worded rebuttal to the Soviet Russia article on the fedayeen, even accusing the Soviets of betraying the Arab commandos (see attachment).

THE FIGHTING FEDAYEEN

The Middle East is in a more dangerous state than at any time since the Six-Day War. Tension in Israel and among Arab Governments is near breaking-point. For this, the Palestine guerrillas are largely responsible. GAVIN YOUNG, who has been meeting their leaders, reports on their ideas, their methods and their fears.

AMMAN, 17 May

IN A SIDE-STREET of Saigon a year or two ago, there used to be a black market where it was convincingly said that you could buy anything from a pistol to a bazooka mounted on a jeep. It probably hasn't quite reached that stage here yet. But to judge from the number of slung carbines openly displayed and the bulges under people's coats, you might soon expect to find a mislaid tommy-gun like a forgotten umbrella in the back of your taxi.

But for all that the area is more than ever a vast self-service arms dump, the coming year is not going to be easy for those rising new Arab heroes, the Palestinian commandos or fedayeen. Continuing war is what they want and thrive on. But even if they get it, as seems likely, internal ideological divisions add a new dimension to their problems. While they fight the Israelis, they have to prepare simultaneously for a greater threat — peace. Planning for violent counter-action against Arab regimes that may try to enforce a settlement, or for self-transformation into a non-violent but dynamic political entity, has become a major preoccupation. It is clear from the evasions of their spokesmen that it has not been effectively resolved.

The commando organisations face something of a crisis. Most revolutionary movements pass through such a stage. Other things apart, it is a result of extraordinarily swift growth. In less than two years the fedayeen have achieved a membership and a startling popularity of immeasurable proportions. They are the heroes not only of the Palestinians, but militant Arabs from Cairo to Baghdad and Beirut to Aden.

The fedayeen phenomenon is, in effect, like an iceberg. If the visible one-third represents the men with camouflage uniforms

the submerged two-thirds are those students, workers, professional men and women who idolise the fighters. Their appeal is political as well as military. Fedayeen posters screaming, 'Resistance, plaster Middle Eastern walls. The Arab equivalents of Sinatra and the Beatles sing of love and the fedayeen. El Fatah, the largest organisation, has its postage stamps. Girls knit pullovers, recruits pour in, many of them educated men.

Idealists

Satisfactory though this all sounds for the militants, it hides important questions. Can the fedayeen live up to the heady expectations of their supporters? Can they maintain their impetus?

The fedayeen face criticism. They are expected to be ideal by Arab idealists. Their military claims are often exaggerated: that every Arab now suspects. Arab newspaper readers have learned to lay off for wind when they see the fedayeen press releases.

Again, the rapid expansion of El Fatah especially has led to organisational problems. The top leaders are few and the rank-and-file (Abd Ammar), the

most senior among them, seems concerned with a welter of non-operational detail, from high-level political talks with, say, President Nasser of Egypt, to the quality of his men's boots. A short, rather pudgy man, he nips nimbly about the Arab world, cheekily greeting smartly suited Heads of State in his black-and-white-check Arab headdress, roll-neck sweater and military windcheater.

El Fatah is the 'mother' of the other three groups now militarily united into the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command. These are: the Palestine Liberation Organisation; the extreme-Left Democratic Popular Front of Nayef Hawatmeh; and the Syrian-backed Baathist group, As Saiqa.

These retain an ideological life of their own and often need slapping down. Neurotic in inverse ratio to their size, they shoot out their differences now and again in the streets of Amman like rival protection mobs in old Chicago. This endangers the live-and-let-live arrangement that Abu Ammar has been at pains to strike with King Hussein.

On another level, intelligent Palestinians consider that the young recruits from the universities and professions are not necessarily given the opportunity to inject their newer, valuable ideas and technical skills into an established movement that they think is slow to adapt itself to a quicker pace.

El Fatah, until recently a military movement, perhaps finds it hard to realise that it is outgrowing its military boots: or rather, that its increasingly dual nature requires a pair of sensible town shoes in the cupboard, too.

Proper organisation and system are not always evident. 'I go into PLO political offices in some Arab capitals,' says one of the movement's intellectual mainstays, 'and find people sitting at empty desks, drinking tea. When I ask them why they are not getting on with the hundred and one things that need organising, they smile and reply with an Arab proverb about the dangers of undue haste. Well, I don't know if a war can be fought on proverbs.'

Certainly in other offices work gets done: but it is doubtful if much long-range planning is in the works. When I asked a seemingly important man from Fatah what the long-term effects could be of the possibility—however remote—that several thousand refugee families would be re-absorbed into parts of former Palestine in Israel, the answer was a simple emotional dismissal of such an idea. Such a consideration would deflect Fatah from its essential aim—an Arab-Jewish State almost at once, and by force.

Yet such political hypotheses should be considered—among many others—in a situation made more complex by, for example, entrenched Israeli psychological attitudes today. This spokesman's emotion seemed to display his inability to perceive them.

There seems to be little serious study of psycho-political trends inside Israel, as there now is in, say, Egypt. Both among the present generation of fedayeen and among the more elderly leaders of Israel, there seems to be a depressing number of *idées fixes*, when it comes to real political evolution of the Palestine problem. Yet, finally, as in the Vietnam situation, any solution will be a political and social one of great complexity.

Of course, the fedayeen have necessary priorities. 'Military operations must come first,' a Fatah man insists, quite rightly from his point of view. As long as the present semi-war situation goes on, fedayeen leaders agree on that.

Dr George Habash, leader of the Popular Front, which refuses the Fatah umbrella to preserve its Arab nationalist, socialist identity, told me in Amman this week: 'What are the achievements of the commandos so far? First, we have robbed Israel of its political victory after the Six-Day War. Second, the commandos have made Israelis stop and think; they have created a deep psychological problem in Israel. And they keep Israel at least partially mobilised and that costs them a lot of money.'

Christian

Habash is a calm, strong-faced 44-year-old Christian graduate of the American University of Beirut, who has been dodging authority for about 10 years, mostly in Jordan. His underground organisation attacked the El Al aircraft at Athens and Zurich. It was also responsible for the bomb in the Jerusalem supermarket and the two bombs outside the British Consulate there in February—to tell them what we think of their tank sales to Israel.' He says his movement is healthily independent, unlike El Fatah, of all Arab governments. He proclaims the necessity for greater active and passive resistance on the occupied West Bank and in Gaza, where he says his organisation, established before the June War, still holds together despite the waves of Israeli arrests. 'You can only rely,' he says, 'on 20 years of continuous warfare. Palestinians are the spearhead, but we will need other Arabs too.' I had the impression that he is not contemplating any more bomb attacks on El Al, even though he advised me to fly on some other airline.

Habash men have had sharp and violent clashes with supporters of his breakaway colleague, Nayef Hawatmeh, another Christian Palestinian, who comes from a poor family and professes revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. To find him in Amman I was driven at night to three different rendezvous, all stuffed with armed men, before I found him in a small villa, chain-smoking and flicking ash into an ashtray made of an Israeli mortar bomb.

Not surprisingly, he too advocated increased resistance on the West Bank. 'When there are 50,000 people in jail there,' he says, 'we will know our resistance is a success.' He claimed his group had killed an Arab spy in Nablus recently. His organisation is small. 'But we appeal to the youth who reject the more traditionalist movements like El Fatah.'

Hawatmeh has been to Hungary and the Soviet Union, but not to China. He takes a poor view of Arab Communist parties which, he says, are 'reformist' and not 'revolutionary.' He disapproves of attacks on civil airlines ('They might kill non-Israelis unconnected with the struggle') but he is not averse to bombs inside Israel. He speaks hesitating English, wears a corduroy coat, open-necked shirt and sneakers and, like Habash, has a certain charm.

Is he planning revolution against Arab governments? 'We rely on the Arab masses to do that,' he says with discreet vagueness. 'Now we cannot go beyond the struggle with Israel.' What about the Soviet Union's cold shoulder to the Palestinian militants? 'Russia is too involved with the Americans for the moment—that may change if things get hotter. China and Asian Communist countries take a good diplomatic stand. We have had some training from the Chinese.' But not much more, I gathered. His activists, he says, are all Palestinians up to now. Other movements have apparently employed some Frenchmen and perhaps other nationalities.

As Saiqa, a small organisation that recruits Palestinian Baathists, also claims independence from all governments, but it is clearly dependent for arms and money on Damascus. It is under the military wing of El Fatah and the PLO. Because the Syrian Government has a uniquely predictable whim of its own, Saiqa gives both these organisations anxious moments. The present troubles in Lebanon, for example, are being blamed on Saiqa by the Lebanese military authorities. There have been bloody clashes in south Lebanon. Abu Moussa, a suave Saiqa official, told me in Amman this week that accusations by the Lebanese of the infiltration of thousands of Saiqa men from Syria could not be true because Saiqa is only about 260 strong.

As the largest and most respected organisation, El Fatah faces considerable potential problems. Peace would bring them in a flood. Fatah's finances seem secure today from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. If peace came, Kuwait, though intensely pro-fedayeen with its large and wealthy Palestinian community, might stand firm. Saudi Arabia is a different matter.

King's tears

King Faisal, commando officials in Mecca report, has genuine tears in his eyes when he speaks of lost Islamic Jerusalem. But if East Jerusalem comes back to the Arabs in a peace package-deal, perhaps both the tears and the cash to the fedayeen will dry up together.

Arab governments have already reneged, with a variety of unconvincing excuses, on their undertakings to finance the PLO.

Again, the Russians mistrust Fatah's non-Communist character. In case of peace, Fatah

will be in conflict with King Hussein, and even President Nasser has been urging moderation on Fatah in its present dealings with the Lebanese. One can see why Fatah men are touchy. They feel hedged in by possible conspiracies against them—from the Americans, the Israelis, Arab governments, even perhaps the Russians.

At this stage they have no desire, they say, and no reason to try to topple King Hussein, even if they thought they could do it without plunging Jordan into a bloodbath and chaos. Their preoccupation is with organization and Israel. The danger of a showdown with Hussein lies only in an accidental spark by uncontrolled groups. Yet Fatah strength is considerable. Its military activities, exaggeration aside, are an undoubted strain on the Israelis. The recent temporary occupation of an Israeli health resort in the heavily defended Jordan Valley was an unpleasant reminder of their strike ability. They represent a psychological burden that will almost certainly grow with time and as Arab armies build up in their rear. Israeli air strikes against fedayeen 'camps,' which the Israelis once claimed, are illusory because camps as such do not exist. Air strikes are said to keep them 'on the move,' but they are seldom stationary in any case.

But the commandos may have to depend on other strengths as

well as military ones. Ideological splits certainly weaken them, as anything short of total unity must. But the roots of the fedayeen organisations go deep into the Arab psyche. The fight against Israel is one thing. But the movements are by now widely identified with social and political reform. They have inspired a new political consciousness among a restless and cynical youth. Naturally they pray that Israel will not change its policies, opt for a peace and force a confrontation between Arabs. But if the crisis of peace comes, the fedayeen will have that popular element of their struggle to fall back on. Are they predicting peace? 'There will be no peace settlement before the Israeli elections,' Abu Ammar said last week, examining a captured Israeli sub-machine gun he now carries. 'After that—maybe.'

Campuses

Meanwhile, the posters in the refugee camps say: 'Our problem will not be solved in the Security Council but in the recruiting office.' Armed El Fatah men patrol the camps at night. The collection boxes go successfully round student campuses and cafes. The rear windows of taxis and cars of comfortable middle-aged couples sport El Fatah stickers among the decorative dolls. How successfully and how soon the fedayeen will solve their

organisational problems, achieve effective long-range military planning, co-ordinate their politics, it is too early to say. Even now, it is probably too late for the Israelis really to disrupt them even by a massive ground attack which would draw in at least one regular Arab army and simply inflame an already desperate Arab mood.

On the other hand, some of their Arab admirers doubt if El Fatah and the rest will be able, single-handed, to force that almost unimaginable change in Israeli feeling required to bring about the Arab-Jewish State they crave. Could 10 or 20 years of regular and irregular daily incursion and bombardment and explosions in market-places and factories achieve it? Can Arab militancy be maintained for another two decades, although, of course, it has survived that long already?

These are unanswerable questions. Yet today the fedayeen movement is growing on two fronts: as probably an irradicable element in the Arab dream, and—as the ever-increasing frequency of Israeli retaliation shows more clearly than anything else—a real and aggressive component of the Israeli nightmare. Abu Ammar says: 'When we started all this in 1965 people thought we were crazy. Even after 1967 people still tended to think we were not serious. Who thinks that now?'

WASHINGTON POST
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Reds Act To Warn Arabs

Czechs to Cut Arms; Envoys Cite War Peril

By Kenneth Ames
Special to The Washington Post

PRAGUE, April 21 — Czechoslovakia has filed diplomatic protests with the governments of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, warning them against precipitating a full-scale Middle East war, it was learned from authoritative sources here today.

The warning was made last Friday by Czechoslovak ambassadors in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad on instructions from Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Marko. It is understood that this diplomatic action was closely coordinated with the Soviet authorities and upon instructions from Moscow. The protests were delivered verbally.

Czechoslovakia is one of the major suppliers of arms and military equipment to the Arab countries. Deliveries continue under existing contracts but it is reliably learned that no new contracts will be completed and deliveries will be scaled down sharply. There has been considerable unease in the past over these arms shipments.

of Moscow, since much of the equipment remains unpaid for.

Czechoslovakia was placed in the vanguard of this surprising diplomatic action as fears grew in the Communist world that continued provocation of Israel could easily flare into another major war.

Soviet authorities have indicated to Prague that they are concerned that a sharp deterioration of the Middle East situation could affect their chances of a continued dialogue and agreement on arms reduction with the United States.

Washington Reaction

In Washington there was this reaction to the reported move by Czechoslovakia:

U.S. officials said they had received no word about such a step by Prague, either at the Middle East talks by Big Four representatives to the United Nations or elsewhere.

Soviet Union had shown some increased concern about the Middle East by means of a recent Moscow press criticism of excesses by Arab guerrillas. In a comment earlier this month, a Soviet newspaper criticized terrorist methods of the Arab El Fatah guerrilla organization and called its pledge to destroy Israel unrealistic.

The newspaper, Soviet Russia, a publication of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, expressed "mixed feelings of sympathy" for El Fatah and "some doubts about their methods of struggle."

The paper added that, "The liquidation of the State of Israel is not realistic."

Otherwise, officials here said, there has been no indication of increased Soviet anxiety.

They further noted that Czechoslovak arms shipments to Syria and Iraq have been small in contrast to the substantial quantities to Egypt.

Moscow gets tough with Palestinians

from GAVIN YOUNG and IRENE BEESON

BEIRUT, 19 April

INSTANCES of Soviet concern over the rise of the Palestinian commando organisations and the popular support that El Fatah, in particular, exerts over Arab public opinion, are increasingly noticeable as the Big Four discussions proceed in New York. It is of immense significance for the political future of the Middle East.

Though in theory the Soviet Union is widely regarded in the Third World as an automatic supporter of struggles for national liberation—and the Palestinian commandos see their movement as such a struggle—that support has not been forthcoming for the Palestinians. On the contrary, a Soviet newspaper recently criticised El Fatah as 'unrealistic,' saying that the largest of the Palestinian organisations should help to seek a peaceful solution. It called it 'Neo-Trotskyist.'

The Palestinians have answered back. Earlier this month the Palestinian Liberation Organisation issued a statement that said: 'Our national duty compels us to put on record that the Soviet Union persists in ignoring the rights of Palestinians, in their land, their right to liberate Palestine, to go back and to decide the future of their country.'

All sorts

In Israel it is often believed that the Palestinian movement is extreme left-wing, if not dominated by Communists. But a recent secret meeting between a senior Soviet diplomat and several top Palestinian commando leaders shows that not only is this not the case, but that the Russians are keenly aware that it is not. The meeting, hitherto unreported, took place in a commando office in an Arab capital. The Palestinians asked the Russian diplomat, politely, why they were not getting support from the Soviet Union. The Russian countered by asking their aims. 'Purely and simply to liberate our country and return home,' they replied.

'What we want to know,' the Russian apparently said, 'is what will your politics be after the liberation of your country? Do you expect us to help you when you have, for example, Muslim Brotherhood men in your movement?'

The Palestinians emphasised that they had all sorts of political trends in their movement. Ideological con-

lict is one thing the Palestinian leaders are trying to freeze in the interests of a greater aim—that of fighting without dissipating their strength on internal squabbles.

'If you also have Communists, are they free,' the Soviet diplomat then demanded, 'to discuss Communism inside the organisation?' He was told that they could not do this when on active duty, but that in off-duty hours anyone could discuss any political subject and that political literature was at their disposal, including Communist literature.

Friend in need

As the Russian continued to press the Palestinians for reasonable assurances that the future State they envisaged would be orientated towards Soviet Communism, the Palestinians, to his evident disappointment, reiterated their view that they expected to have a democratic State. It was likely, they said, to be socialist, as it was in the nature of most liberation movements to be socialist. But if the majority voted for a Muslim Brotherhood State or one based on any other ideology, that would be their right.

The Russian then asked why the Palestinian organisations were taking arms and money from 'reactionary' States like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and also from China. The Palestinians replied: 'If you are drowning in a river and want a hand, do you care whose hand it is? But, remember, you are grateful to the owner of the hand.'

The diplomat went on to discuss Soviet aid to Egypt: 'We have been working there, arming them, training them—look where it has got us. We have achieved no political benefit. The people don't like us. After all this time, Egypt is not even a truly Socialist country.'

This week a senior Palestinian commando organiser confirmed to us that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which represents the major commando groups, rejects all peace plans so far, including the Soviet plan. He used strong words: 'The Soviet Union has become the slave of the Israeli *fait accompli*. It supported the 1947 partition plan; now it supports the 1967 partition plan.' He relented a little to add: 'You have to bear in mind that Russia does not want to be forced into a confrontation with the United States, any more than she did over Cuba.'

1/15 February 1969

JORDANIAN CP POLICY DESIGNED TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN

The situation in the Middle East is still very much cause for concern. Not only does the outlook for general negotiations, the only possible way to put an end to tensions there, look very dim indeed; with every passing day, we can see less and less respect for the fragile cease-fire line laid down along the Jordan at the end of the six-day war. Fedayeen guerrilla activities and commando raids are instantly followed by retaliatory strikes by Israeli forces, forging a chain of mounting violence that is turning this part of the world into a veritable powder-keg.

If we want to get an objective idea of a problem whose complexities are obvious, it is important to overlook none of its components. Hence it is not off the point to inquire into the attitude of the local communists these days, particularly those in Jordan, toward the fedayeen movement. The October-November issue of the Nouvelle Revue Internationale, official organ of world communism, carries a lengthy article on communist tactics in Jordan ("Jordanie: La tactique des communistes") by one Fahmi Salfiti, apparently one of the leaders of the Jordanian CP.

This text is a sort of analysis of the "extraordinary program" the Jordanian communists have set up, probably toward the end of last summer. Incidentally, the Jordanian CP is still officially outlawed, but the authorities seem to be allowing it more leeway lately, and its secretary general, Fuad Nassar, was allowed to return to Amman without any trouble. (On communists in Jordan, see Est et Ouest n° 402 and 405.)

This "extraordinary program" is the follow-up to the "provisional program" the Jordanian CP defined in July 1967, and it embodies several of the main themes of that program.

"In defining our present tasks," writes Fahmi Salfiti, "the communist party program hopes to encourage formation of a nation-wide bloc embracing all the classes and social groups that have suffered by reason of [Israeli] aggression, to combat the tendency already apparent in certain quarters to turn toward American imperialism, and to create suitable conditions for their participation in a broad front of struggle against the occupying forces."

The "National Front" Tactic

This "extraordinary program" consists of two parts. In the first part, the Jordanian communists once again go back to the idea of forming a united front, upon the foundations that have existed ever since the spring of 1968, shortly after the Karamé affair, when the "national front" was founded. That group is now headed by former prime minister Suleiman Nabulsi, and embraces the parties and organizations that have been outlawed in Jordan, including the Jordanian CP.

The second part of the "extraordinary program" lays down party position on the fedayeen movement and what the Jordanian communists call "leanings toward adventure." It is certainly the most interesting part of the text, as we shall see shortly.

As for the "national Front" tactic, the communists believe the front should be broadened still further: "Refraining from accentuating economic and social problems," the Salfiti essay says, "the program stresses the need for forming a national unity government, open to representatives of the upper bourgeoisie and the big landowners, if they are ready to fight against the occupation. It invites a peaceful settlement, and denounces the leanings toward adventure that have emerged since the defeat..."

Not only are the Jordanian communists ready to join with the spokesmen for the "upper bourgeoisie" in a "government of national unity;" they also say they are pillars of the throne.

"We feel that it is in the king's interest to retain his throne and his power over both banks of the Jordan, while the United States and Israel do their best to snatch away part of his kingdom and keep control over the occupied territories. But we do not forget that the king fears the development of a mass movement that would endanger his throne. And so our party takes a stand at once against the left extremists who call for overthrowing the régime, and against the factions that would surrender or seek a reconciliation on the grounds that everything that has happened is for the best."

Well aware that should the Hashemite monarchy fall, anarchy might well take its place in Jordan, the communists prefer to deal with a weakened régime which tolerates their presence for the time being, rather than deal tomorrow with its successors, either from the army or from the fedayeen, who might have a less tolerant attitude toward the communists.

Communist Activities in East Jordan

The communists are using the "national front" cover for their activities in East Jordan, the part of the country which is not occupied by the Israelis.

"The Front's activity for the moment is fairly limited, despite all our party's efforts and its eagerness to find and make use of ever-new patterns of leadership. But the potential influence of the national Front over the country's political life is far broader than its actual activities, in that it is made up of parties, labor unions, and individuals whose prestige and influence among the masses are great, and which bring very strong pressure to bear upon the government. The Committee to Free Jerusalem, for example, includes various elements belonging to the national Front, particularly some influential ministers, one of whom is the minister for foreign affairs. Our party is a member of this committee, and has its representative on the executive board. The committee is in contact with various international democratic organizations. It has invited the Organization for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Association for Arab-Soviet Cooperation, the International Democratic Federation of Trades Unions, the International Democratic Federation

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of Women, and the National Front in Vietnam to send representatives to a demonstration it is organizing in Amman in collaboration with the national Front. We may add that the establishment of contact with our brother communist parties, the international democratic organizations, and the social organizations in the socialist countries is an eminently positive factor, which will help change the position of political and social quarters in our country, and bear witness to a growing understanding of the need for our struggle to maintain organic ties with the various detachments of the revolutionary movement."

There is a considerable degree of competence in this kind of behavior by the Jordanian communists. Knowing how vital it is to call the world's attention to Jordan, the communists, through satellite organizations of the USSR and making full use of the national Front channel, are working to create a groundswell of sympathy throughout the world even as they work to push the movement to the left, both in Jordan and abroad.

It is obviously for such reasons that the communists are working busily inside the Jordan Federation of Labor Unions and got it into close relations with the WFTU, that they have created a "Union of Jordanian Women" in which they say communists "play a leading rôle," and that they are behind the establishment of a "Soviet-Arab Friendship Association" whose emergence in Amman would have been unthinkable only a year or two ago. The Jordanian CP newspaper, Al Taquaddum, is growing in circulation although it is still more or less a clandestine operation.

The Jordanian CP in the Occupied Territories

According to Fahmi Salfati, the Jordanian CP is equally active in occupied Jordan, which is the area in which it used to have its greatest strength. There were sizeable communist cells in Naplouse, in Hebron, and in Bethlehem before the six-day war, drawing most of their recruits from among the Palestinians. Despite the Israeli occupation, the CP seems to be continuing its activity there, although it is not on the same level as that of the fedayeen.

"We particularly want to point out," writes Fahmi Salfati, "that our party has managed to stay united in the occupied and unoccupied regions of the country. On the west bank of the Jordan, it publishes an underground paper, Al Watan (The Fatherland), the only Arabic newspaper published over there. We are delighted to report that its press-runs have been stepped up sharply of late, and that in the last six months our membership has doubled in the occupied regions, where our party is the biggest organized force."

As soon as the war was over, the Jordanian CP moved to "gather together all the forces opposing the occupation, to set up national committees on which, besides our own, there would be representatives of political parties such as the Baath, the Arab nationalists (though their influence is limited), mayors, spokesmen for professional groups, doctors, etc., as well as the labor

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unions. This is the case in certain labor unions that had been dissolved by the Jordanian government before the aggression, and in setting up women's organizations. Committees were set up in several cities and in the big towns in the occupied regions; they chose representatives who form the supreme coordinating committee, whose rôle is to direct and guide the mass struggle against occupation.

"National orientation committees organized strikes, boycotts against the occupation forces, and a campaign to improve living conditions for workers on the west bank. They managed the strike and the mass demonstrations of 5 June in the cities of the occupied territories."

While admitting that communists "are taking an active part in the military training being given the inhabitants" of the border regions of the unoccupied portion of Jordan, Fahmi Salfati emphasizes the fact that the Jordanian CP is outspokenly opposed to what he calls petty-bourgeois "adventurism."

"The wisest policy," he writes, "as carefully weighed by our party, is a far cry from the adventurism peculiar to the petty bourgeoisie; it is designed to enable it to keep its cadres intact after the occupation. It is in large measure this policy we have to thank for the high level of [political] awareness among the masses today. The party successfully resisted pressures brought to bear upon it by certain forces which wanted to involve it in a fight far which favorable conditions were lacking. It plays an exceptional rôle in the occupied regions of Jordan where our successes or failures would unquestionably have major repercussions on the future of our party and the communist movement in all the Arab countries."

And in fact it is a very subtle tactical approach that the Jordanian CP has chosen. While opposing the occupation, it rejects "adventurist" methods, putting its money on the future and concentrating on getting ready for the day after the peace settlement. It is possible that the Jordanian CP has not enough executives to control the movement, or rather the organizations of the fedayeen. But it is just as possible that Moscow, and consequently the Jordanian CP, which has always fallen obediently into line behind the Soviet view, feels that the fedayeen are actually being "manipulated" by Arab "conservative forces," and that their policies in no way coincide with the goals the USSR has set itself in the Near East.

The Jordanian CP and the Fedayeen

This, at all odds, is what emerges from the second half of the Jordanian CP's "extraordinary program." After some stress on the point that the radio and the press, "even outside the Arab countries," pay very special attention to the "partisan organizations," and that they "enjoy the sympathy of the deepest strata of the population as well as the governments of the Arab countries," Fahmi Salfati goes on to say:

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We must not forget that the political makeup of these organizations, some of which are under the influence of adventurist and extremist elements, is extremely disparate. Some of their leaders, particularly those of Al Fatah, come from the reactionary cliques that form the Moslem Brotherhood, and still show its influence. Most of the members of these organizations are not Jordanian nationals. The hard core consists of Palestinians, and this is why they are limited in their capacities, and why they set themselves unachievable goals. This, of course, constitutes a danger to the Jordanian national movement and to the communist party itself."

Fahmi Salfati next admits that there are "influential patriots" among the leaders of the fedayeen organizations, and that the CP "has made contact with them...seeking to convince them that their country needs their political talents, and that they should join with the other patriotic forces in the national Front..." Until now, however, "there has been no answering echo to this appeal." As a consequence, the Jordanian communists, according to Fahmi Salfati, base their attitude toward the fedayeen "on the following facts:

"1. Present conditions in Jordan and the other Arab countries are not ripe for this kind of action, either in the occupied territories or elsewhere.

"2. These organizations are based outside the occupied territories, and consequently their operations are not basically different from those of regular army commandos.

"3. The action of the fedayeen is altogether different in nature from the armed struggle of the masses in the occupied regions. Supporting the fedayeen organizations means supporting a political program whose objectives are NOT FEASIBLE and with which we do not agree. Their methods in the struggle do not fit in with the objective conditions, and give evidence of extremist leanings. Those who do support them are digging a ditch between the resistance on one side and the Jordanian-Arab reality and the anti-imperialist movement in the rest of the world on the other. What is more, they will have nothing to do with mass action or political activity; at the moment, they are opposed to the very existence of political parties.

"4. Progressive Arab countries like Egypt and Syria are aware of the real balance of power in this part of the world, and of the dangerous consequences that can stem from enemy provocations. Therefore they will not tolerate this kind of activity in areas close to the cease-fire line. The support Egypt and Syria have given to these organizations can be explained on the basis of tactical considerations, the desire to win the sympathy of the masses, and perhaps a wish to hide certain shortcomings they are not quite ready to set straight. But the support so generously lavished on the fedayeen by countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with Saudi princes and leading Kuwaiti figures spon-

soring fund drives, like the encouragement showered on Al Fatah by the Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-8 between some Al Fatah leaders and these countries, and show us just why they favor the activities of organizations of this kind. For our part, we think that these countries are doing this to make their people forget about the ties that bind them to imperialism, and to limit their participation in the common Arab effort, thus pushing Jordan into extremism and providing the enemy with a pretext for acts of aggression playing into the hands of American imperialism.

"5. In most cases, the activity of these organizations is to be deplored. While they do some damage to the enemy and thus win kudos for themselves, they are also responsible for the many victims killed and injured in their operations and for the expulsion of the Arab population from particularly fertile lands.

"It is not that we repudiate armed struggle per se; but we allow it only when it is justified by the extent of the struggle in the occupied territories and by the determination of the masses to strike back at the aggressor.

"Even when conditions are ripe for the armed struggle in the occupied territories, these organizations can take only a limited part in the real resistance, by reason both of their character and of the utopian nature of their programs, and also because they cannot penetrate the occupied regions and therefore have no bases there. Even though a few elements manage to penetrate these areas, they are unable to blend in with the local population and remain foreigners.

"When we say all this, we are not trying in any way to take issue with the fedayeen organizations. All we want to do is to provide an accurate picture of them. We are not unmindful of the fact that patriotism motivates most of their members, who have given proof of the greatest courage. But neither do we want to close our eyes to their shortcomings. We are in contact with the leaders of these organizations. We are doing our best to get them to think, so that they can fight successfully."

Now there is a very forthright condemnation of fedayeen action from the Jordanian communists. And in fact, if you analyze this text correctly (and its importance is obvious, particularly in relation to Soviet policy in the Near East), you see that the communists, as of now, have no confidence whatever in the chances for fedayeen success, and that their guerrilla activities are a marked hindrance to the Jordanian CP's plans for mass action, particularly on the west bank of the Jordan. We also see that conditions are by no means ripe for turning this corner of the world into "another Vietnam." On the contrary, they may well end in a situation of anarchy, by which the communists are not at all sure they can profit. It is highly likely that the Jordanian communists are hoping primarily that they will be able to exploit the situation born of the six-day war to develop their influence on both banks of the Jordan. Whatever the outcome of possible negotiations, they want to be there on both sides as a force to be reckoned with. From this political angle, the activities of the fedayeen cannot do anything but complicate the situation and hamper them in working toward that end.

Les communistes jordaniens et les fedayines

La situation reste très préoccupante au Proche-Orient. Non seulement les perspectives d'une négociation générale, seule issue sérieuse pour mettre fin à la tension, paraissent encore fort éloignées, mais l'on constate chaque jour que le fragile cesse-le-feu instauré après la « guerre des six jours » le long du Jourdain est de moins en moins respecté. Aux activités de guérilla et de subversion des fedayines succèdent des raids de représailles des forces israéliennes, suscitant ainsi un enchaînement de violences qui transforment cette région du monde en une véritable poudrière.

Pour pouvoir se faire une idée objective d'un problème dont la complexité est évidente, il appartient de ne pas en négliger les divers éléments. C'est ainsi qu'il n'est pas sans intérêt de connaître quelle est aujourd'hui l'attitude des communistes locaux, notamment ceux de Jordanie, en face du mouvement des fedayines. Dans sa livraison d'octobre-novembre 1968, la *Nouvelle Revue Internationale*, qui est l'organe officiel du communisme mondial, publie sous le titre « Jordanie — La tactique des communistes », une longue étude d'un certain Fahmi Salfiti, vraisemblablement un responsable du P.C. jordanien.

Ce texte constitue une sorte d'analyse du « programme extraordinaire » que les communistes jordaniens ont établi probablement à la fin de l'été dernier. Rappelons, pour mémoire, que le P.C. de Jordanie est toujours interdit mais que son activité semble aujourd'hui plus tolérée qu'auparavant et que son secrétaire général, Fuad Nassar, a pu regagner Amman sans que le gouvernement s'y oppose (1).

Ce « programme extraordinaire » du P.C.J. fait suite au programme provisoire défini en juillet 1967, dont il reprend d'ailleurs un certain nombre de lignes directrices. « En définissant les tâches actuelles, écrit Fahmi Salfiti, le programme du Parti communiste se propose de faciliter la formation d'un bloc national rassemblant les classes et les groupes sociaux qui ont eu à pâtir de l'agression, de combattre la propension, qui se manifeste dans certains secteurs, à se tourner vers l'impérialisme américain, de créer les conditions pour leur participation à un large front de lutte contre l'occupant ».

TACTIQUE DU « FRONT NATIONAL »

Ce « programme extraordinaire » se divise, en fait, en deux parties. Dans la première, les communistes jordaniens reprennent, une fois de plus, l'idée de la formation d'un front uni dont les bases existent d'ailleurs depuis

la constitution, au printemps 1968, peu après l'affaire de Karamé, du « Front national » que préside l'ancien premier ministre Suleiman Nabulsi et qui regroupe les partis et les organisations interdits en Jordanie, parmi lesquels le P.C.J.

La seconde partie du « programme extraordinaire » est une prise de position à l'égard du mouvement des fedayines et envers ce que les communistes jordaniens appellent « les tendances à l'aventure ». C'est certainement l'aspect le plus intéressant de ce texte, comme nous le verrons plus loin.

En ce qui concerne la tactique du « Front national », celle-ci, aux yeux des communistes, doit être encore élargie : « S'abstenant de mettre l'accent sur les problèmes économiques et sociaux, lit-on dans l'étude de Fahmi Salfiti, le programme souligne la nécessité de former un gouvernement d'union nationale, ouvert aux représentants de la haute bourgeoisie et de la grande propriété foncière, s'ils luttent contre l'occupation. Il convie à un règlement pacifique et condamne les tendances à l'aventure qui sont apparues après la défaite... ».

Non seulement les communistes jordaniens sont prêts à s'associer avec les tenants de « la haute bourgeoisie » dans un « gouvernement d'union nationale », ceci par tactique, bien entendu, mais ils s'affirment également comme des soutiens du trône : « Nous estimons, en effet, qu'il est de l'intérêt du roi de conserver son trône et de maintenir son pouvoir sur les deux rives du Jourdain, alors que les Etats-Unis et Israël s'efforcent de lui arracher une partie de son royaume, de garder le contrôle des territoires occupés. Mais nous n'oublions pas pour autant que le roi redoute un développement du mouvement de masse qui mettrait son trône en péril. Aussi notre parti s'élève-t-il à la fois contre les extrémistes de gauche, qui appellent à renverser le régime, et contre les courants capitulaires et conciliateurs, dont les partisans déclarent que tout ce qui s'est passé est pour le mieux ».

N'ignorant pas qu'en cas de chute de la monarchie hachémite, l'anarchie risque de s'installer en Jordanie, les communistes préfèrent avoir affaire à un régime affaibli qui, aujourd'hui, tolère leur existence, plutôt que de se trouver demain en présence de successeurs, issus soit des rangs de l'armée soit des fedayines, qui risqueraient d'avoir à l'égard des communistes une attitude moins tolérante.

ACTIVITÉS DES COMMUNISTES EN JORDANIE ORIENTALE

C'est toujours par le truchement du « Front national » que les communistes mènent leur action en Jordanie orientale,

c'est-à-dire dans la partie qui n'est pas occupée par les Israéliens.

« L'activité du Front reste, pour le moment, assez limitée, malgré tous les efforts de notre parti, son désir de trouver et d'utiliser des formes toujours nouvelles de direction. Mais les possibilités qu'a le Front national d'influer sur la vie politique du pays sont beaucoup plus vastes que son activité pratique, car il se compose de partis, de syndicats, de personnalités dont le prestige et l'ascendant sont grands parmi les masses et qui exercent une forte pression sur le pouvoir. Ainsi, le Comité pour la libération de Jérusalem rassemble différents éléments qui font partie du Front national, en particulier des ministres influents, dont le ministre des Affaires étrangères. Notre parti est membre de ce comité et il a son représentant au bureau exécutif. Le Comité s'est mis en rapport avec différentes organisations démocratiques internationales. Il a invité l'Organisation de solidarité des pays d'Asie et d'Afrique, l'Association des amitiés soviéto-arabes, le Conseil mondial de la paix, la Fédération syndicale mondiale, la Fédération démocratique internationale des femmes et le Front national de libération du Sud-Vietnam à envoyer leurs représentants à la manifestation qu'il organise à Amman en collaboration avec le Front national. Nous pouvons dire que l'établissement de contacts avec les partis communistes frères, les organisations démocratiques internationales et les organisations sociales des pays socialistes est un facteur éminemment positif, qui contribue à modifier la position des milieux politiques et sociaux de notre pays et témoigne d'une compréhension croissante de la nécessité, pour notre lutte, d'une liaison organique avec les différents détachements du mouvement révolutionnaire ».

Cette manière d'agir des communistes jordaniens ne manque pas d'habileté. Sachant combien il est nécessaire d'attirer sur la Jordanie l'attention de l'opinion internationale, les communistes, par le truchement des organisations satellites de l'U.R.S.S. et tout en utilisant le canal du « Front national », s'emploient à créer un courant de sympathie dans le monde entier, en ne négligeant pas de « gauchir » ce mouvement tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de la Jordanie.

C'est évidemment pour des raisons semblables que les communistes déploient une activité très grande dans la Fédération des syndicats ouvriers de Jordanie, qu'ils ont mise en relation étroite avec la F.S.M., qu'ils ont créé une « Union des femmes jordaniennes » où, disent-ils, « les communistes jouent un rôle dirigeant », et qu'ils sont à la base de la création d'une « Association des amitiés soviéto-jordaniennes » dont l'apparition à Amman eut été impensable voici un ou deux ans. L'organe du P.C.J. « Al Taquaddum » connaît aujourd'hui une diffusion plus large même si elle demeure encore plus ou moins clandestine.

LE P.C. JORDANIEN DANS LES TERRITOIRES OCCUPÉS

Selon Fahmi Salfati, le P.C.J. poursuit également son action en Cisjordanie occupée, c'est-à-dire dans la région où, j. dis, il avait le plus d'audience. A Naplouse, à Hébron, à Bethléem, partout existaient avant la « guerre des six jours » d'importantes cellules communistes dont le recrutement se faisait surtout parmi les Palestiniens. En dépit de l'occupation israélienne, le P.C.J. semble y poursuivre son action mais qui ne se situe pas sur le même plan que celle des fedayines.

« Nous tenons à souligner, écrit Fahmi Salfati, que notre parti a su préserver son unité dans les régions occupées et non occupées du pays. Sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain (Cisjordanie), il édite dans la clandestinité le journal « Al-Watan » (La Patrie), seul journal arabe qui paraisse là-bas. Nous avons la joie de constater que ces derniers temps son tirage s'est fortement accru et que depuis six mois le nombre de nos adhérents a doublé dans les régions occupées où notre parti constitue la principale force organisée. »

Dès la fin du conflit, le P.C.J. aurait pris l'initiative de « rassembler les forces qui combattent l'occupation, de créer des comités nationaux où sont représentées, à nos côtés, des forces politiques telles que les baassistes, les nationalistes arabes (dont l'influence est d'ailleurs limitée), des maires, des représentants de groupements professionnels, de médecins, etc., ainsi que des syndicats ouvriers. Il a joué un rôle essentiel dans le rétablissement de certains syndicats dissous par le gouvernement jordanien avant l'agression et dans la mise sur pied d'organisations féminines. Des comités ont été constitués dans plusieurs villes et dans les gros bourgs des régions occupées; ils ont désigné des représentants qui forment le Comité suprême de coordination, dont le rôle est d'orienter et de diriger la lutte des masses contre l'occupation. »

« Les comités d'orientation nationale ont organisé des grèves, le boycottage de l'occupation et une campagne pour l'amélioration des conditions de vie des travailleurs de la rive occidentale; ils ont dirigé la grève et les manifestations de masse du 5 juin dernier dans les villes du territoire occupé... »

Tout en reconnaissant que les communistes « prennent une part active à l'entraînement militaire donné aux habitants » des régions frontalières mais dans la partie non occupée de la Jordanie, Fahmi Salfati insiste sur le fait que le P.C.J. est nettement hostile à ce qu'il appelle « l'aventurisme » petit bourgeois : « La politique sage, note-t-il, mûrement pesée de notre parti, très éloignée de l'aventurisme propre à la petite bourgeoisie, doit lui permettre de préserver ses cadres après l'occupation. C'est à elle que l'on doit, pour une bonne part, le niveau de conscience élevé qui est aujourd'hui celui des masses. Le Parti

de la part de certaines forces qui voulaient l'entraîner dans un combat pour lequel les conditions favorables faisaient défaut. Il joue un rôle exceptionnel dans les régions occupées de la Jordanie où nos succès ou nos échecs auront, sans conteste, d'importantes répercussions sur l'avenir de notre parti et le mouvement communiste dans tous les pays arabes. »

C'est, en fait, une tactique très subtile qu'a choisie le P.C. jordanien. Tout en s'opposant à l'occupation, il rejette les méthodes « aventuristes », spéculant surtout sur l'avenir et voulant, en quelque sorte, être prêt pour la période qui succédera au rétablissement de la paix. On peut penser que le P.C.J. ne dispose pas suffisamment d'effectifs pour contrôler le mouvement ou plus exactement les organisations de fedayines. Mais d'un autre côté, il est possible aussi que Moscou, et par conséquent le P.C.J. qui a toujours été indélétement aligné sur les thèses soviétiques, estime que les fedayines sont, en fait, « manipulés » par des « forces conservatrices » arabes et que leur politique ne correspond nullement aux objectifs que s'est fixés l'U.R.S.S. au Proche-Orient.

LE P.C.J. ET LES FEDAYINES

C'est en tout cas, ce qui ressort de la deuxième partie du « programme extraordinaire » du P.C. jordanien. Après avoir souligné que la radio et la presse « même en dehors des pays arabes », accordent une attention toute particulière aux « organisations de partisans » (fedayines) et que celles-ci bénéficient de « la sympathie des couches le plus profondes de la population, ainsi que des gouvernements des pays arabes », Fahmi Salfati écrit ce qui suit :

« Nous ne devons pas oublier que la composition politique de ces organisations, dont une partie se trouve sous l'influence d'éléments aventuristes et extrémistes, est des plus disparates. Certains dirigeants, en particulier d' « Al-Fatah », sont sortis de ce groupement réactionnaire que forment les « Frères Musulmans », mais en subissent encore l'influence. La plupart des membres de ces organisations ne sont pas Jordaniens. Le noyau de ces dernières est constitué par des Palestiniens, et c'est pourquoi elles sont limitées dans leurs possibilités et s'assignent des objectifs irréalisables. D'où un danger pour le mouvement national jordanien et le Parti communiste lui-même ».

Fahmi Salfati reconnaît ensuite qu'il existe parmi les dirigeants de ces organisations de fedayines des « patriotes influents », avec lesquels le P.C.J. « est entré en contact... » pour les convaincre de la nécessité de prendre part à la vie politique du pays et, comme les autres forces patriotiques, d'adhérer au Front national... Mais jusqu'à présent, cet « appel est resté sans écho ». Par conséquent, l'attitude des communistes jordaniens à l'égard des fedayines est fondée, selon Fahmi Salfati, sur « les faits suivants » :

« 1) Les organisations « fedayines », en Jordanie et dans les autres pays arabes, ne sont pas mûres pour des actions de ce genre, tant dans les territoires occupés qu'en dehors de ceux-ci.

« 2) Ces organisations ont leurs bases en dehors des territoires occupés et, par suite, leurs opérations ne diffèrent pas d'ordinaire des actions de commandos des armées régulières.

« 3) L'action des fedayines revêt un caractère très différent de la lutte armée que livre la population des régions occupées. Soutenir les organisations de fedayines, c'est soutenir un programme politique dont les objectifs sont IRREALISABLES et avec lesquels nous ne sommes pas d'accord. Leurs méthodes de lutte ne correspondent pas aux conditions objectives et témoignent de tendances extrémistes. Leurs partisans creusent un fossé entre la résistance, d'une part, les réalités jordaniennes et arabes et le mouvement anti-impérialiste dans le reste du monde, d'autre part. Qui plus est, ils prétendent ignorer l'action de masse et l'activité politique, ils sont hostiles à l'existence de partis politiques à l'heure actuelle.

« 4) Les pays arabes progressistes, tels l'Égypte et la Syrie, se rendent compte du rapport des forces réel dans cette partie du monde et des dangereuses conséquences que peuvent avoir les provocations de l'ennemi. Aussi ne tolèrent-ils pas des actions de ce genre dans les régions voisines du cessez-le-feu. L'appui accordé par la Syrie et l'Égypte à ces organisations s'explique par des considérations tactiques, par le désir de gagner la sympathie des masses, et, peut-être de dissimuler certains défauts auxquels elles ne désirent pas remédier entièrement. Mais le soutien apporté aux fedayines par des pays comme l'Arabie Saoudite et le Koweït, les collectes de fonds patronnées par des princes saoudites et d'importantes personnalités du Koweït, les encouragements prodigués à l'organisation « Al-Fatah », notamment par la radio saoudite, attestent l'existence de liens entre certains dirigeants d' « Al-Fatah » et ces pays, nous font comprendre pourquoi ceux-ci favorisent les activités d'organisations de ce genre. Nous pensons, quant à nous, que ces pays veulent de la sorte faire oublier à l'opinion les liens qui les attachent à l'impérialisme, limiter leur participation à l'effort commun de tous les Arabes et pousser la Jordanie dans la voie de l'extrémisme, fournissant ainsi à l'ennemi de nouveaux arguments pour justifier les actes d'agression qui font le jeu de l'impérialisme américain.

« 5) Dans la majorité des cas, l'activité de ces organisations est à blâmer. Car, si elles causent un certain préjudice à l'ennemi et se font ainsi de la réclame, elles sont aussi responsables des nombreuses victimes qu'entraînent leurs opérations, de l'expulsion des populations arabes de régions particulièrement fertiles.

« Non que nous répudions la lutte armée, mais nous ne l'admettons que lorsqu'elle est justifiée par l'ampleur qu'a prise la lutte dans les territoires occupés et par la volonté des masses de riposter à l'agresseur.

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« Même lorsque les conditions sont acquises pour la lutte armée dans les territoires occupés, ces organisations ne peuvent prendre qu'une part limitée à la résistance effective, en raison tant de leur caractère que de l'utopisme de leurs programmes, et aussi parce que les fedayines ne peuvent pénétrer dans les régions occupées et n'y ont pas leurs bases. Même si certains éléments parviennent à s'y introduire, ils sont incapables de se fondre dans la population locale, ils restent des étrangers ».

« Ce disant, nous ne voulons nullement nous en prendre aux organisations de fedayines ; nous désirons seulement donner d'elles une image véridique. Nous n'oublions pas que le patriotisme anime la plupart de leurs membres, qui font preuve du plus grand courage. Nous ne voulons pas non plus fermer les yeux sur leurs défauts. Nous sommes en contact avec les dirigeants de ces organisations. Nous nous efforçons de les amener à réfléchir pour qu'ils puissent mener la lutte avec succès ».

Voilà qui constitue une très nette condamnation de l'action des fedayines par les com-

munistes jordaniens. En fait, si l'on analyse avec attention, il est évident notamment en ce qui concerne la politique soviétique au Proche-Orient, on constate que les communistes n'ont aujourd'hui aucune confiance dans les possibilités de succès des fedayines, que leurs activités de guérilla gênent sensiblement l'action de masse entreprise par le P.C.J. notamment en Cisjordanie et que les conditions ne paraissent nullement réunies pour faire de cette région du monde « un nouveau Vietnam », mais risquent de déterminer, au contraire, une situation anarchisante dont les communistes ne sont nullement assurés de pouvoir tirer profit. Il est probable que les communistes jordaniens souhaitent avant tout pouvoir exploiter la situation née de la « guerre des six jours » pour développer leur influence sur les deux rives du Jourdain. Quelle que soit l'issue d'une éventuelle négociation, ils veulent être présents ici et là, et constituer une force politique avec laquelle il faudra compter. A cet égard, les activités des fedayines ne peuvent, à leurs yeux, que compliquer la situation et les gêner.

NICOLAS LANG.

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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ARAB STATES SEARCH FOR A JUST MIDEAST PEACE

Moscow SOVIET RUSSIA 15 Apr 69 p 3 L

[Article by NOVOSTI political observer Georgiy Dadyants: "Peace or War in the Near East?"]

[Text] The road to Damascus passes through mountains--Lebanon and anti-Lebanon. As soon as you cross the frontier not only the landscape changes--grim rocky desert takes the place of the Mediterranean subtropics. Across the entire (Masnaa) [as transliterated] frontier post is the sign "This is the Bath Frontier."

At the frontier we were immediately besieged by likeable children--boys and girls in khaki uniform. They were collecting donations for the "Fedayeen" solidarity week being held throughout the country.

Until recently extreme opinions and extreme views have been disseminated in Syria regarding the solution of the Near East problems. Whereas in Cairo and Beirut a military solution is considered as only one of the alternatives for solving the question in the event of the Israelis wrecking the opportunities for a political settlement, and the Palestinian refugee problem is viewed as a factor which must be taken into consideration in seeking a settlement of the crisis, in Damascus they are completely oriented toward a military solution, and the Palestinian problem is viewed as the most acute one, without whose resolution peace in the Near East cannot be guaranteed.

When I asked one of our Syrian friends what was the idea behind the nonrecognition by Syrian political circles of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, he said:

The point is that this resolution regards Israel's recent aggression as the main tragedy, forgetting that the fundamental tragedy is the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Making peace with Israel without solving the main problem--this would mean capitulation and betrayal of the Arab cause.

But if there is a peace, we should not be asked to give up our land.
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such time as conditions for peace are created.

The slogan "neither peace nor war" worried me. I had to remind my interlocutor of Trotsky's position at the time of the Brest peace negotiations. Our theoretical argument produced no results. We did not reach a common viewpoint on methods of solving the Palestinian problem either.

What is a just peace?, I asked.

The return of the refugees to Israel and the return to them of all their violated rights. A popular democratic Palestinian state.

Would not the evacuation of Israeli troops from the territories they seized in June 1967 make the solution of the Palestinian problem in the future easier? I asked again.

The evacuation of troops, my interlocutor replied, will only delay the solution of the problem for a long time. This compromise with imperialism is not to our advantage.

What is the meaning behind our Syrian friends' formulation of the question in this way? It is said that the domestic considerations that determine the Bath Party's policy have not occupied last place in this matter. But a leftist "revolutionary" phrase, as historical experience shows, is seldom a real help in policy. It is obvious, for example, that the slogan "neither peace nor war" is playing into the hands of Israel, alone, which also, incidentally--it is true, not "from the left" but "from the right"--does not want to acknowledge the resolution of 22 November 1967.

It is comforting that a recent extraordinary conference of the Bath Party, confirming the old position regarding the methods solving the Near East crisis, at the same time expressed its willingness to demonstrate a more flexible approach to the problem of a political settlement, and in particular stressed the necessity of closer coordination of action with other Arab countries for the speediest liquidation of the consequences of the aggression.

Naturally in Damascus I wanted to meet the leaders of one of the main Palestinian resistance organizations, about which so much has been said recently in the West--the celebrated Al-Fatah.

We circled the Kurdish quarter for a long time in the car, then we drove around the modern streets of new Damascus. I was taken up a dark staircase to the second floor. Two young men were waiting in a small room. Above a simple office desk hangs the black, white, red, and green Palestinian flag. Beneath one of the numerous placards that are stuck to the walls is the inscription: "All rifles must be aimed at the enemy's chest."

I cannot give the names of the Fatah leaders with whom I conversed, nor even the pseudonyms I learned when I made their acquaintance. Therefore I shall call my interlocutors Ahmad and Kamal.

When I asked him to talk about Fatah Ahmad began: "First of all, a short historical digression. In 1948 the Arab people of Palestine were subjected to Zionist aggression. The Zionist enemy drove these people from their land. We are the representatives of the exiled people."

Ahmad stopped for a minute, exchanging glances with Kamal: The exiled people have waited and are waiting for a just solution of the Palestine question as envisaged in the 1947 UN resolutions. But the Zionist enemy rejected the UN decisions. In time the United Nations itself forgot about its decisions and, instead of the Palestine problem, raised the so-called problem of the refugees. It began to work on it as one would the problem of people who have nothing to eat and nowhere to sleep. But that

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is the wrong approach to the present situation. They have received medical aid and provisions, but they haven't the slightest desire to accept it--they have their own land which can grow corn Thus the exiled people have become convinced with the passage of time that the efforts of the world public cannot lead to the establishment of true justice. It is natural that they should strive to resurrect justice with their own forces.

What is Fatah?, Ahmad asked again as it were. It is an organization for the liberation of Palestine, or rather one of the organizations. Its special feature is that it sees the user of force as the only way out of the situation that has been created, that is, to speak to the invader in the same language that imperialism uses with us. The movement's aim is the liberation of Palestine from Zionist Nazism, that is, revolution to a victorious conclusion. By the liberation of the people of Palestine we mean primarily the recognition of that people from the Arabs and the Jews on an equal basis.

Why do I emphasize this? Because world imperialism is trying to convince public opinion that we are against the Jews. This is a lie. As a people and as a movement we are part of a world revolutionary process which is fighting against the forces of imperialism and reaction, and we consider Zionism as such a movement. We are sure that progressive and fighting peoples cannot avoid understanding and sharing the aims of our struggle, which amounts to putting an end to one of imperialism's strongholds in the world.

I asked what one should understand by the words "putting an end to one of imperialism's strongholds?" Does it mean that Fatah aims to destroy the state of Israel?

Ahmad answered: In principle we do not recognize Israel, inasmuch as the state arose on the land of an exiled people. We are struggling to destroy this government's state, behind which Zionism hides. We reckon that as a result of this struggle a new Palestinian state must be created which would represent the whole of the Palestinian people. By what methods are we struggling? Killing is not our "hobby," contrary to what several Western countries like to imagine....

Kamal interrupted: "I would like to emphasize that we are not against the Jews as a people. We have lived together with Jews, we have lived with them for a long time. We cannot be anti-Semites since we are ourselves Semites. But there is a difference between the Jewish people and Zionism...."

Does Fatah have some sort of social program? What are the ultimate aims of its struggle?

Ahmad noted in answering: The nature of this revolution differs in a fundamental way from any liberation movement in the world, since we are not struggling on our own land. A variety of people are taking part in Fatah, as was the case during the resistance in France, and now in Vietnam. Now we find ourselves not at the stage of ideological struggle, but at the stage of the liberation of a motherland that has been wrenched from us. When we return to our motherland we shall be able to look more deeply into the social problems and determine the aims of the further struggle.

Ahmad added: Naturally when we have returned to our motherland we shall be neither feudal lords nor capitalists. What shall we be? He smiled. You must draw your own conclusions. I left the Al-Fatah leaders with mixed feelings of deep sympathy for the Palestinian resistance movement and several doubts with regard to their methods of struggle.

Of course, nobody can deny the Palestinian refugees the right to armed resistance against the invaders. Therefore there are no grounds for Israel's attempts to represent this struggle as "illegitimate," and respond to it with "reprisals" against individual Arab countries or repression against the populations of occupied regions. But can one see the use of force, and the method of armed struggle, as the liberation struggle's only method in the specific historical conditions?

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...the aims of Arafat and several other organizations, which consist of the liquidation of the state of Israel and the creating of a "democratic Palestinian state," do not appear practicable. One doubts whether it is possible now to turn back the clock and recreate a united Palestinian people out of Jews and Arabs.

The liberation struggle on land occupied by Israel engenders the deep sympathy of the entire progressive public. It is more of a pity that some of its leaders, who have set themselves political aims, do not take into account the present situation in the Arab East, and also the balance of forces in the world arena.

Damascus, that beautiful bright city that looks as if it had been carved out of the mountains, was the last stage of my 2-weeks journey through the Arab countries.

I was not in Jordan, but Jordan's acceptance of the conditions of a political settlement leave nobody in any doubt. The position of Saudi Arabia remains a riddle for many people. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are the richest countries in the Arab East. It is well known that they generously support the Palestinian resistance organizations. But the aims of this support are not quite clear. Is it a question of demonstrating Arab solidarity or the aspiration to protract the conflict and complicate the situation in order to strike at the progressive regimes? One has to base one's opinions on those of other people, because Soviet journalists rarely have occasion to visit Saudi Arabia and to know its rulers' position at first hand....

What conclusions may be drawn from the talks in the Near East?

The situation in this area continues to remain very tense and events are developing quickly. It seems to me that these events have now reached a critical point--either matters will move toward a political settlement or toward a further dangerous increase in tension, fraught with a new military explosion.

It is quite clear that the Arab countries are not now considering the liquidation of Israel as a state and are ready to adopt some kind of formula for coexisting with Israel provided it gives up the occupied territories and further territorial seizures. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories is the main prerequisite and condition for any political settlement.

Insofar as Israel refuses to acknowledge the resolution of 22 November, which is acknowledged and generally accepted by the main Arab countries, a political solution can only be found as a result of pressure on Israel by world public opinion and also by the four powers which are permanent members of the Security Council. On the other hand no actions by the four powers having the aim of exerting pressure on the Arab countries to force them to agree to Israeli conditions are possible.

Similarly, taking into account the realistic positions of such Arab countries as the UAR, Jordan, and Lebanon, there are still possibilities for averting a new war and achieving a political solution to the crisis. With this, Israel can obtain the maximum political concessions, which will essentially mean its "de facto" recognition by the Arab world and which will offer it guaranteed borders and also freedom of navigation in Near East waters. But tomorrow it will be more difficult to solve these questions. The more Israel persists and haggles, the more powerful those moods, which are usually called "extremist," will grow in the Arab countries.

There is no need to repeat the importance that would attach to solutions of the Near East problems jointly worked out by the four powers--the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The consultations between the four powers, which have started within the framework of the United Nations, generate hope among all people of good will. The Israeli Government alone is taking a negative attitude

toward these consultations and making various maneuvers aimed at preventing a rapprochement in the positions of the four powers. Thus, the aggressive provocative policy of Israeli extremist circles continues to remain the main obstacle in the path of a settlement.

Will there be peace or war in the Near East? Yesterday it was still not possible to give a reply to this direct question. But today it is necessary to try to find an answer to it at the conference table to prevent the guns from speaking out again.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
11 April 1969

Statement on Big Four

Cairo Voice of Fatah in Arabic to the Arab World 1830 GMT 10 Apr 69 M

[Political Statement issued by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization]

[Text] Representatives of the big four powers are continuing their meetings in New York. They will discuss the so-called Middle East crisis to adopt a common international attitude to solve the crisis. That solution will be made in light of the 22 November 1967 UN Security Council resolution, on the basis of the Soviet interpretation--supported in principle by France and expressed in the Soviet plan--and on the basis of the U.S. interpretation--supported in principle by Britain and expressed in the American working paper.

If the big four powers are to reach agreement, it is expected that each side will try to bring its plan or working paper closer to a meeting point that evidently will entail more concessions in favor of the Zionist entity. They will do so amid a put-on, misleading Zionist opposition inspired by the policy of imposing more concessions on the Arabs in favor of Zionism.

The big four powers, which dominate the United Nations, reached a common ground in their international relations in 1947. In that year, they assailed the Palestinian Arab people's right to their entire homeland--Palestine--and to self-determination and decided to divide Palestine and impose the Zionist entity on most of the Palestinian Arab territory.

The big four powers are meeting again after 20 years to seek an agreement that would bring harm and injustice to Palestinian Arabs. We are not surprised by the attitude of the imperialist powers, particularly the United States and Britain. They have always been on the side of world Zionism because of their ties, expansionist exploitive interests, and enmity to the Arabs.

But we are surprised by the attitude of the USSR. While we fully appreciate the Soviet aid to many Arab states, it is our national duty to record that the USSR has been maintaining an incorrect attitude toward the Palestine question and disregarding the Palestinian people's right to all of Palestine and their sacred right to liberate their homeland, return to it, and decide their own fate in it.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which leads the Palestine Liberation Movement, speaks on behalf of the Palestine people, and represents the Palestinians, wishes to declare that the question of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians alone and neither the big powers nor anybody else has the right to decide on this question. The Palestine question is based on the Palestinian people's absolute right to their entire homeland--Palestine--to liberate it and return to it, to end and eliminate the Zionist presence in it, and to establish a free democratic Palestine state throughout Palestine.

the Zionist presence in Palestine, as represented by the state of Israel, is based on aggression, usurpation, and the eviction of the Palestine people. It is an imperialist colonial presence. Therefore, this Zionist presence has no right to continue in Palestine. The Palestinian people wish to declare to the big powers and others that they reject and resist any solution to the Palestine question that entails the preservation of the Zionist presence in Palestine.

The Palestinian people reaffirm their rejection of the Security Council resolution, the Soviet plan, the U.S. working paper, and every solution or plan entailing the preservation of the political entity of the state of Israel. The Palestinian reject, with the same firmness, the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of the Palestine soil. The Palestinian people are firmly determined to continue the armed struggle and to develop and escalate it to liberate their homeland--Palestine--and to establish a free democratic state in Palestine.

All Palestine belongs to its people and to the entire Arab nation. It is an inseparable part of the Arab homeland--indeed, it is in its heart. The unity and freedom of the Arab nation will never materialize until Palestine is liberated and the Zionist presence eliminated. The Palestinian people have been fighting imperialism and Zionism for the last 50 years. They will never surrender and will never keep quiet about any act of surrender. The protection of Palestine from all forms of plotting lies with the Palestinian people and all the Arab masses.

[signed] The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, 10 April 1969.

COMMUNIST CHINA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
16 May 1969

Soviet Betrayal

Peking NCNA International Service in English 0220 GMT 16 May 69 B

[Text] Peking, May fifteenth (HSINHUA correspondent)--The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has again brazenly vilified, abused and attacked the Palestinian people's armed struggle by setting its propaganda machine in motion recently. This has further exposed the ugly features of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism which is anxious to make a bigger counter-revolutionary deal with U.S. imperialism on the Middle East in betrayal of the Palestinian people's liberation cause.

A most shameless masterpiece in this respect is a signed article published in the paper "SOVIET RUSSIA" on last April 15. From beginning to end, the article makes no mention of the Palestinian people's right to return to their homeland and their just cause of liberation. On the contrary, like a harridan hurling abuses in the street, the article openly reviles by name "Fatah" (the Palestine National Liberation Movement) which is carrying on the armed struggle. It questioned "Fatah" barefacedly: Can armed struggle be regarded as the only way in waging liberation struggle? Putting on the air of a social-imperialist boss, the article alleges that the "political aim" of "Fatah and certain other organizations" to realize national liberation by defeating Israel, the U.S. imperialist tool of aggression, through armed struggle is "not taking into account the present condition of the Arab East" and is therefore "not realistic" and "all the more regrettable."

In the eyes of the Soviet revisionist renegades, the 2 million Palestinian people who have been driven out of their homeland for 20 years should suffer aggression forever and have no right at all to fight for national liberation, they should submit themselves to the tender mercies of Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism and have no right to take up arms to fight the enemy.

Since the Palestinian people have stood against the revisionist line of the Soviet revisionists and waged an armed struggle, they have become a thorn in the flesh of the Soviet revisionists who revile their action as "not realistic" and "regrettable." In the eyes of the Soviet revisionists, the Palestinian people should act according to the revisionist line of the Soviet revisionists and submissively accept the "status quo" of U.S. imperialism, committing aggression against the Arab people by making use of Israeli Zionism, but should not destroy "the status quo in the Arab East," even less so to defeat Israel, the U.S. imperialist tool of aggression, by force.

This is outrageous to the extreme. What is more disgusting is the fact that "SOVIET RUSSIA" viciously vilifies the Palestinian people who are persisting in armed struggle as taking "Trotsky's stand." The paper even madly questions the leader of "Fatah": How is the following remark to be interpreted: The Palestinian people want to "eliminate one of the imperialist strongholds"? This is a brazen act of provocation against the Palestinian people's liberation struggle on the part of the Soviet revisionists by posing this question through the paper "SOVIET RUSSIA." This has fully revealed that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism and U.S. imperialism are birds of a feather, both being the protectors of Israeli Zionism.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has all along harboured a deep hatred against the armed struggle of the Palestinian people. As early as last December, it instructed the paper "PRAVDA" to slander, without mentioning names, the Palestinian guerrilla fighters as "extremists" and attacked their taking up arms to fight as "ill-considered actions which have objectively damaged the just cause of the Arab peoples."

This time, soon after the opening of the sinister "four-power meeting," it hurriedly allowed the paper "SOVIET RUSSIA" to revile by name the guerrilla units which are composed of the heroic sons and daughters of the Palestinian people. It shows clearly how frenziedly Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is trying to strangle the armed struggle of the Palestinian people. On the day after the publication of this vicious article in the "SOVIET RUSSIA," D.P.A. reported from Moscow that "signs were growing here today that Moscow is set on an early political decision in the Middle East" and that the aims of "Fatah are regarded more and more by Moscow as a drag on a speeded up political solution, and have been criticized".

It may be recalled that after the Soviet revisionists put forth the notorious "five-point plan" for a "political solution" of the Middle East question last December, former U.S. President Lyndon Johnson in a reply to the Soviet revisionists on January 15 this year, said: "The U.S. views, as a matter of top priority, the undertaking of the Soviet Union and the United States and other countries to use their influence to stop the grave increase of Arab terrorist operations (should read: The Palestinian people's armed struggle--NCNA editor) in the area."

Soviet revisionism acted without delay in accordance with the desire of U.S. imperialism. After this, the Soviet revisionists went all out to step up their sinister activities "to stop" the development of the Palestinian people's armed struggle. On the one hand, they tried hard through diplomatic channels to peddle the filthy "political solution" to the Arab countries. On the other hand, they played up, through "non-official activities," "peaceful solution" as the "only correct path to follow."

Head of the Soviet revisionist trade union Shelepin went to Cairo in person and unexpectedly attended the fourth conference of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions which opened on January 29 this year. He exerted "influence" inside and outside the conference and asserted more than once that "the fulfillment of the Security Council resolution" "is the realistic road to political settlement in the Middle East." He opposed the Palestinian people's guerrilla war.

However, the "influence" of the Soviet revisionists is getting less and less effective. Just as the Arab saying goes: No matter how the dog barks, the caravan continues to advance. The Palestinian people are not taken in by the Soviet revisionists "political solution" fraud. "Fatah" and other Palestinian nationalist organizations issued many

statements opposing all so-called "political solutions," categorically rejecting the Soviet revisionist "five-point plan" and strongly denouncing the Soviet revisionists "for ignoring the Palestinian people's sacred rights to liberate and return to their homeland." They pledged to carry on their armed struggle firmly and fight for the victory of the cause of national liberation.

At present, the Palestinian people's perseverance in armed struggle and resolute opposition to "political solutions" have become the biggest obstacle to the attempt to Soviet revisionism to make counter-revolutionary deals over the Middle East question in collusion with U.S. imperialism. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique, while contriving a Munich plot in the Middle East together with U.S. imperialism at the "four-power meeting," has come out openly to abuse the Palestinian people's armed struggle.

However, the heroic Palestinian people are not to be cowed. Soviet revisionism's curses can only evoke the indignation of the Palestinian people and make them draw a clearer line of demarcation between them and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. These curses can only stimulate them to rely on themselves, strive more vigorously, unite as one and carry the armed struggle to the end. Like U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism has done every evil in the Middle East and the broad masses of the Palestinian people and Arab people will not let them off easily.

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