

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SCORECARD WITH ARAB AND BLACK AFRICANS

During the fifteen months since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia sparked an almost unanimous and certainly unprecedented wave of blunt condemnation of the Soviet Union from most of Africa's independent leaders, the Soviet visage throughout Africa has markedly altered. Even though the Soviet position may be primarily governed by events which are beyond Moscow's control, wherever the Soviet position is particularly precarious, it has been mostly Moscow's own doing. The period has also been marked by growing African antipathy to "imported ideologies," to Sino-Soviet rivalries and polemics, and to Soviet disregard of "nationalism" and "sovereignty."

Especially in black Africa, together with the growth of a more pragmatic attitude toward relations with the Soviet Union, there has evolved a better comprehension of the risks incurred from a large Soviet presence and from Communist (particularly Soviet) involvement and meddling in internal matters. The Soviets have lost political prestige in much of black Africa as a result of some ruptured diplomatic relations, ousters of Soviet personnel, antagonisms brought on by continued Soviet support for Arab causes, or the tautening of some already strained relations because of Soviet intrusions into territorial waters. Particular concern has been voiced, in the wake of student disorders, about overly large Soviet missions.

The greatest Soviet gains have been scored by re-enforced ties with Arab states and by an increased presence in Nigeria. Soviet reactions to the most recent military coups (Libya, the Sudan, and Somalia) indicate that the USSR assesses them in the same light: as golden opportunities for pursuing her objectives in North Africa, the southern Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa. But there are limitations even on those factors favorable to the Soviets: frictions exist between Moscow and the Arab leadership, the government in Lagos can hardly be called pro-Soviet, and none of the new revolutionary council leaders has rushed into the Soviet orbit.

The following paragraphs score the political ups-and-downs of the Soviet Union in her African dealings over the past few months. Clearly each case is oversimplified, since little or no reference is made to internal political ramifications which in many instances had a direct bearing on the outcome. However, the aim is not to analyze the individual cases in detail, but rather to search out overall patterns which will indicate how Soviet-African relations are evolving. The only cases cited are those where in the past few months some notable or occasionally dramatic change has occurred to alter either the African view of the Soviet presence or the Soviet evaluation of a given African state in terms of Soviet geopolitical goals.

Algeria: the Soviet presence and influence have increased -- a real plus.

The December 1968 trade agreement committed the Soviet Union to import over the next seven years, three-fourths of Algeria's wine product and ten percent of her crude oil production. Since it was signed, Soviet "advisors" have increasingly worked their way into all sectors of Algerian social, industrial, and military life; they are outstandingly numerous in Algerian strategic industries, oil and mineral resources. They predominate in scientific-technical instruction.

A cultural exchange agreement and a protocol on the joint recognition of educational diplomas were signed in May 1969. The Algiers daily newspaper El Moudjahid reported 24 May that as a result of the agreements, the 100 Soviet teachers already in Algeria would be augmented by additional higher education teachers, particularly in the sciences, bring the total to 250, and that Russian language instruction would be extended in both universities and secondary schools.

The number of Soviet advisors in Algeria is most commonly estimated at 3,500. The "Arabization" of Algerian education appears to have been partly deflected by the need to communicate with these Soviet technicians and advisors; it has obliged the Algerians to complicate their educational system by introducing Russian language teaching down to the secondary level.

Frictions also crop up, however. While President Podgorny was visiting in Algiers in spring 1969, President Boumedienne publicly called, in Podgorny's presence, for the removal of "all forms of foreign presence from our Mediterranean Zone." When the outlawed Algerian Communist Party turned up in Moscow at the June 1969 International Communist Conference, Algeria's official paper, Revolution Africaine, accused Moscow of "an unfriendly gesture and of interfering in Algerian internal affairs."

Burundi: the Soviet presence cut -- a minus.

A 21 August 1969 newscast announced that President Micombero had officially requested the Soviet Union to reduce its "effective personnel" in Bujumbura from sixteen to eight. The surplus Soviet personnel were asked to be out of the country by 30 August.

Congo (Kinshasa): Communist curtailment -- a minus.

In the Congo, where officials have long been distrustful because of close contacts established by members of over-staffed Communist, and particularly Soviet, missions with students, trade unions, and Communist sympathizers, the June 1969 student disorders sparked strong government action. General Mobutu suspended Congo (K) diplomatic relations with Bulgaria on 20 August 1969 in what has been interpreted as a warning to all Communist diplomats to stay out of internal Congolese affairs. Recall that in June 1968 the Soviets were

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

again permitted to reopen their own embassy in Congo (K), but under stringent limitations. The Soviet ambassador's arrival in June 1968 marked the third time that the Congo and the USSR had established diplomatic relations. Twice previously the Soviets were expelled for having meddled in "internal Congolese affairs."

Ethiopia: Soviets expelled -- a minus.

Because of suspected Communist involvement in Ethiopian student disorders in March 1969, three Soviets and three Czechoslovak officials were declared personae non gratae on orders from the Emperor. Specific charges against the Soviets cited anti-government broadcasts by Radio Moscow, dissemination of Soviet propaganda publications in Addis Ababa, and extensive contacts with students in violation of a government edict.

Ghana: very strained relations -- a minus.

In October 1968 the Ghanaian navy seized two Soviet trawlers and their 50-man crews were placed under arrest on charges of violating territorial waters and suspicion of being engaged in subversive activities. The ships and crews were not released until March 1969, and then only after the USSR threatened Ghana militarily with gunboat diplomacy. The Soviets also applied economic pressures by threatening to default on the Soviet-Ghanaian trade agreement and canceling crude oil shipments.

Guinea: Soviet subversion revealed -- a minus.

Even in Guinea, long considered as the last holdout of the West African states who enjoyed "friendly and fraternal" relations with Moscow, the USSR's image got a black eye: It was learned that a Soviet embassy protocol officer had been secretly consorting with a Guinean accomplice of the 24 June, would-be assassin of President Sekou Touré. The Soviet protocol officer, arrested after a drunken brawl on 23 July 1969, reportedly openly confessed his intrigues to the Guinean police and implied that the Soviet ambassador was also involved.

In Guinea, the matter was hushed up; the story didn't make the international press for two months. President Touré took no other action than to dispatch a high-level diplomatic mission to Moscow in order to impress the USSR with the seriousness with which Guinea viewed the "incredible activities" of the Soviet embassy in Conakry. Reporting the event in the 21 September Nairobi Sunday Post, a columnist noted that such affairs were "a luxury that no foreign mission can afford if it wants to keep its influence."

Ivory Coast: relations ruptured -- a definite minus.

President Felix Houphouet-Boigny cited his suspicions of Soviet involvement in the Abidjani student disturbances of 19-20 May as his reason

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

for formally breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR later in the same month.

Kenya: Soviets expelled -- a minus.

The present regime has always taken a hard line with suspected meddlers and has expelled thirteen Soviets in the past three years. In April 1969 a Soviet embassy first secretary and the Pravda correspondent were sent packing because of their suspected involvement in subversive activities -- including the fomenting of troubles with students. In a later warning issued publicly to "certain foreign missions" Kenyan Vice President Daniel Arap Moi was quoted in the 6 August East Africa Standard as "deploring the use of Kenya as a battleground for propaganda," referring specifically to Sino-Soviet polemical exchanges.

Libya: the new look -- a plus.

Moscow recognized the Revolutionary Command Council almost immediately after the monarchy of King Idris was toppled on 1 September 1969. By 2 September, Radio Moscow was treating Libya with Soviet views on Libyan foreign policy, which also spelled out her own goals in Libya -- increasing her own influence while restricting or eliminating that of her adversaries. The broadcast, beamed to Libya in Arabic, stressed that "imperialism is the chief enemy of the Libyan people" and noted approvingly that "it is not by chance that the Council of the Libyan Revolution has stated that the activity of the Republic will be directed against imperialism and neo-colonialism.... Libyan public opinion considers the liquidation of foreign military bases as an important step toward ... independence and security.... Putting an end to plundering by Western ... oil monopolies fully conforms to the radical interests of the Libyan people."

The next few months will see the Soviets concentrating on nurturing Libya's "radical interests" and on assiduously developing a cordial working relationship with the Libyan government in command. Should Libya be induced to emulate Algeria and the UAR in her policies vis-à-vis the USSR, this trio which dominates the southern shore of the Mediterranean might well fulfill the Soviet aspiration to permanent anchorage rights for Soviet naval and merchant fleets in that sea.

On 19 September the press in Tripoli reported the arrival in Libya of Colonel Ivanov, special envoy of USSR Minister of Defense Zakharov, who came "to express congratulations on the revolution and to offer technical aid." At this writing, no acceptance of any Soviet "offer" has been announced.

Mali: fighting the socialist option -- a tenuous minus.

The coup of November 1968 ousted one of Moscow's favored clients when the army "seized power to put an end to the radicalization of Modibo Keita's

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Marxist regime." That a pro-Soviet Lenin Prize Winner -- the only African head of state who publicly praised the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- was evicted and replaced by a military junta did not seem to bother the USSR, at least not outwardly. Not only did Soviet media refrain from comment about the ouster, but less than a month after the coup Moscow was warmly welcoming Mali's foreign minister who was there on a goodwill mission.

The military junta presently governing Mali is divorcing itself from its legacy of "socialist option." But the move is being made only slowly: many bureaucrats who were Keita-regime holdovers and who continued to advocate the policies of the former regime were left in privileged positions. Mali's foreign trade deficit continues to soar and well over one-half of her imports from non-African countries still come from Communist sources. Contrasted with the past when, in 1966, Mali had an 82 percent deficit in the balance of her trade with the USSR, there has been some improvement.

Once Soviet (or Communist) inroads have been made, the residues of Soviet influence are extremely difficult to remove. It has not proved easy to try to cope with the economic sabotage practiced in the name of "socialism" by large numbers of officials in the state-run corporations that still operate in Mali.

Mali probably best typifies those states where, together with a deepening antipathy toward foreign ideology, there is also developing a more pragmatic view of how to get along with major foreign powers: Mali's finance minister admitted in a recent public statement that "if we are going to survive we need the Communist countries -- I must be pro-Communist when that seems the best thing to do." This sentiment is balanced by the governing junta's belief that they must also be pro-West when that seems best: in August 1969 Mali applied to participate in a Peace Corps program.

Mauritius: Communist inroads -- a plus.

Because of its strategic location in the Western Indian Ocean, Mauritius has received quite a bit of Soviet attention. Even before Mauritius, one of the world's smallest states, became independent in March 1968, Soviet merchant vessels and space-associated naval auxiliaries had been frequent callers at Port Louis and Soviet warships paid their first visit there in April 1969. A Mauritian-Soviet agreement signed in August 1969 by which the Soviets will provide Mauritius with modern fishing vessels, train Mauritians in deep-sea fishing techniques, and conduct local oceanographic surveys drew reservations from the Mauritian press on Soviet motives behind the agreement. The Mauritius Times on 29 August asked if the Soviet "aid" were not a "subtle way of gaining a foothold in our port?" The question may have been partly answered by a 27 October headline story in the Port Louis daily L'Express to the effect that Mauritius may shortly accord the USSR facilities for satellite tracking and communications.

Morocco: new inroads -- a tenuous plus (offset by a big minus).

In the past few months, while Morocco signed a partial association agree-

ment with the European Communities and continued to be on the receiving end of sizeable Western aid projects, political inroads were made by the Soviet Union. After a two-year struggle, AEROFLOT got transit rights from Rabat for its Moscow-Algiers-Havana run; King Hassan finally agreed to a Soviet naval visit to Casablanca and to the opening of a Soviet consulate there. A five-year trade agreement was signed with the USSR in July 1968 and during President Podgorny's March 1969 state visit the formalization of a joint Soviet-Moroccan friendship society was announced. While he was in Rabat, President Podgorny's March 1969 public statements stressed the people-to-people aspects of Soviet-Moroccan relations -- thus implying an effort to reach the Moroccan people over the head of the monarchy.

In September, the commercial gains made during the past few months were offset by a serious political loss. During 1968, King Hassan had permitted the legalization of a new Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS) headed by Ali Yata, long a Moscow favorite. In June the PLS was represented at the Moscow International Communist Conference where Ali Yata's public speeches gave clear proof that his PLS was merely an emanation of the Moroccan Communist Party, dissolved in 1960. Arrested and charged with reconstituting a legally dissolved party, Ali Yata was publicly tried and sentenced in late September to 10 years' imprisonment and his PLS officially disbanded.

Nigeria: the Soviet presence increased -- a plus.

Since 1967, when Moscow stepped in to help Lagos in its war against Biafra, the Soviets have achieved a sizeable presence in Nigeria. Official diplomatic representation, for example, doubled between July 1967 and April 1969. The November 1968 credit deal under which the Soviet Union agreed to build an iron and steel complex in Nigeria would be the largest aid commitment the Soviets had made to any African state south of the Sahara. Mineral resource surveys of the type the USSR will conduct in Nigeria involve upwards of 200 technicians over a several-month period. The Soviets might well hope to take over the full task of supplying arms, equipment, and trainees to Lagos, believing that their investment will garner enough gratitude and respect for Soviet help so that when the war is over, the increasingly strong Soviet position could pay off handsomely in terms of commercial and other benefits.

Meanwhile, Moscow's actions on other fronts appear far from designed to gain the "respect" of the powers-that-be in Lagos. On 5 March 1969 a Soviet naval flotilla, which included two guided missile destroyers and a submarine, turned up for a "surprise visit" in Lagos. The objective of the visit, according to an AFP release, was to establish in Lagos a staging post for Soviet naval and merchant fleets. The following month Pravda deplored the "far from brilliant condition of Nigeria's industry." The article, published 14 April, was a clear statement of Soviet support for those officials who were recommending that Nigeria adopt an economy based on "scientific socialism." The article, appearing just when Nigerians were beginning to discuss postwar economic and political development, was an obvious attempt to ensure that developments should evolve along lines acceptable to the Soviet Union.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Somalia: "socialist republic" -- a true plus.

The 21 October bloodless coup that ousted Prime Minister Egal's government was a joint army-police takeover that replaced parliament with a revolutionary council. The coup came within hours of the funeral of Somali's President Scermarche which had marked the end of a brief moratorium on politics, declared when Scermarche had been assassinated five days earlier. Reportedly, while Egal was maneuvering to elect a successor to Scermarche, the army, long outwardly discontent with Egal's foreign policy of detente with Ethiopia and Kenya, moved quickly, with police aid, to take control. The Scermarche (-Egal team) image had become tarnished by increasing charges of corruption and nepotism and the coup is viewed as being of purely nationalist inspiration. The council immediately proclaimed their takeover as designed to put an end to "widespread corruption" but in the same voice declared their intention "to support freedom fighters."

It is the latter declaration that must most elate the USSR. Somalia's Indian Ocean coastline partially accounts for the considerable Soviet investment in that country over the years. The Somali army is fully equipped by, trained by, and dependent on the USSR. Until the coup, the USSR had sustained a delicate balance by refusing to officially support Somalia's claims on Somali-inhabited lands in Kenya and Ethiopia and had appeared to favor Prime Minister Egal's detente efforts with both. Before the coup, all concerned chose to ignore the reality that it was the Soviet Union alone which supplied the weaponry that Somalia was accused of having distributed to rebellious dissidents in Ethiopia. Since the coup, no one has given the Soviets due credit for having supplied the arms and know-how that made the coup possible.

Sudan: "modern socialist" state -- a true plus.

The May 1969 military coup that overthrew Sudan's elected government gave that country a Revolutionary Council and cabinet composed predominantly either of members of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) or of self-proclaimed socialists -- while those who are neither, are at the least pro-Egyptian. The SCP, now represented at the top control echelons in Sudan, is known as the best organized political group in the country and is Africa's leading Communist Party. As long as the political coloration of the Revolutionary Council and cabinet remains unchanged, Moscow stands a good chance that the Communists can assume real control. And Moscow's main interest lies not in having another Communist nose to count at party round-up time, but in having guaranteed and permanent access to Sudan's Red Sea coastline.

To underline Sudan's shift away from dependence on the "imperialist" West, the government has promised to expand its military and economic aid and trade ties with Eastern Europe. Actually, aid and trade agreements with the USSR will simply continue a policy to which the overthrown government was already committed. What is new is that the Sudanese military, now primarily western equipped and trained, will be reorganized along Soviet lines. Sudan's precarious economic position, with insurmountable domestic and foreign debts and foreign exchange reserves at the lowest ever, leaves her dangerously vulnerable to the type of arms deal that several years ago put Egypt's cotton industry in pawn to the USSR.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Tanzania and Zambia: "pot-boiling" opportunities -- a potential plus.

To develop influence in Tanzania and Zambia is almost a must for any outside country that would want to try and influence the liberation groups to the south. The Soviets openly and officially declared their support for these liberation groups at the January 1969 Khartoum conference for solidarity with the freedom fighters of Portuguese and southern Africa. Freedom fighter groups operate out of both Tanzania and Zambia; leaders of both countries are dedicated to the liberation movement. Tanzania's President Nyerere especially has consistently declared that if the liberation of southern Africa cannot be achieved through peaceful change, it must come with a "minimum of violence." Although the Tanzanian military is almost wholly Communist-Chinese equipped, President Nyerere's tour last month of East Europe and the USSR may indicate a change in the wind, if for no other reason than to counteract Nyerere's probable fear of overdominance by the Chinese. As a result of recent border incidents that have further aggravated Zambian-Portuguese relations, Zambia wants an expanded military program and, for the moment at least, is looking to the USSR.

In Tanzania and Zambia, the feeling that western capitalist countries are prejudiced by both countries' national socialist goals has been fanned by Communist propaganda. The latest example also shows how favorably the Soviets view recent developments in both countries. In the 23 October 1969 Izvestiya, political commentator Vladimir Kudryavtsev hails the "social and economic changes in Tanzania and Zambia" as of importance for all Africa. Noting the strategic locations of both, Kudryavtsev concludes that "the success of the struggle of African peoples for liberation of the continent from racialists largely depends on the consolidation of national independence of these countries (Tanzania and Zambia)."

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

ASSOCIATED PRESS, Saigon
13 October 1969

VIETNAM ROUNDUP

by Robert D. Ohman

A record 35,000 enemy soldiers, political cadre and sympathizers have defected to the government side this year, a South Vietnamese spokesman said Monday. He said the defectors, listed as "ralliers" under the government's Chieu Hoi -- Open Arms -- Program, turned in more than 2,200 weapons. The only year approaching the 1969 figure was in 1967, when the government said 27,178 persons switched to its side during heavy fighting throughout South Vietnam.

The spokesman said that since February 18, 1963 when the government began its organized efforts to woo the enemy, 125,437 persons had rallied to the government. He said that the massive propaganda campaign has also had its effect on the thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers who have moved into the South. 897 defectors are listed as North Vietnamese.

The spokesman said that of the 125,437 persons who have rallied to date, 139 held the rank of lieutenant colonel or above or were military doctors, engineers or district commissioners. He added that the Chieu Hoi appeal has been most successful in winning over enemy troops. A total of 78,057 ralliers was reported from guerrilla or line units compared to 34,323 political cadre and 13,057 who had been allied with the Viet Cong in varying degrees.

The spokesman gave these annual figures for ralliers:

12,248	-	1963
5,417	-	1964
11,124	-	1965
20,242	-	1966
27,178	-	1967
18,171	-	1968
32,057	-	mid September 1969 since which time and additional 3,000 have rallied.

The GVN operates Chieu Hoi compounds throughout the country where ralliers are generally given two months of indoctrination and occasionally some vocational training. A limited number are now serving in provincial armed propaganda teams, 6,366 now serve with South Vietnamese or allied military units and 7,969 work for various government agencies.

MOSCOW RADIO (in Arabic)
1 October 1969

"A New Falsification by Imperialist Propaganda"

Despite the failure of the many attempts by imperialist propaganda to cast a shadow on Soviet-UAR relations and sow the seeds of doubt about the Soviet Union in the hearts of Arabs, we still encounter such absurd attempts every now and then. Western propaganda's base lie about the so-called purge of pro-Soviet elements in the UAR and nonexistent complications in Soviet-UAR relations has now completely collapsed. But it seems that even this has failed to teach a lesson to the persons paid to circulate false news and rumors.

Imperialist propaganda has embarked on weaving various imaginary fancies and extremely ridiculous rumors in connection with a so-called plot to snatch a Lebanese plane. Two Soviet citizens, one of whom is a diplomat, are supposed to have taken part. No doubt this well-contrived propaganda falsification is of an anti-Arab and anti-Soviet design. Reason cannot accept things which have been cooked up in the Western propaganda kitchen, and are but a continuation of the recent false campaign about the situation in the UAR, a campaign to which Arab public opinion provided the proper reply.

But the attempts of Western propaganda to propagate lies about the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens and, particularly, Soviet diplomats, have failed many times, and we must bear in mind that the motive behind those attempts has in many cases been the desire of imperialist circles to divert the attention of Arab public opinion from the realities of the interference by Western states in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Recently, the Lebanese press expressed indignation at the illegal activity of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon.

In one of its editorials the Beirut SAWT AL-URUBAH exposed the close relations between the U.S. charge d'affaires, Mak, and reactionary elements in the country who are trying to isolate Lebanon from the other Arab countries, which are struggling to consolidate their freedom and independence.

The same paper said: The Lebanese people fully realize the serious aims of Mak's activity, which is directed at splitting the ranks of Lebanese society and isolating Lebanon from its sister Arab countries in their common struggle against Israeli aggression.

The attempts by imperialist propaganda to drive a wedge in the constantly developing relations of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Arab countries are doomed, for Arabs are well aware of the treacherous aims of these attempts, and are also aware of the importance of friendly Soviet-Arab relations to our world.

MOSCOW RADIO (in Arabic)
2 October 1969

Imperialist and Zionist propaganda always uses any simple or trivial excuse-- even if completely unfounded--to channel a torrent of base fabrications, utter lies, and imaginary fancies to the Arabs in order to complicate relations among the Arabs and weaken the Arab front which is defending the cause of freedom, national independence, and progress. This anti-Arab propaganda exerts gigantic efforts, especially in circulating anti-Soviet fabrications and impudent provocative rumors.

This is quite understandable, since the continuous consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, based on mutual trust, leaves the Arab countries unaffected by various imperialist intrigues and provides the necessary circumstances for the independent national development of the Arab countries, a matter which does not please the imperialist. That is why the impudent imperialist attacks on friendly Soviet-Arab relations became boring a long time ago, and do not surprise anyone.

What is surprising is the extremely repulsive and impudent way these imperialist propaganda bodies, which have been entrusted with concocting fabrications against the Soviet Union, function. It seems that those in charge of this underestimate the mentality of the people to whom they are channelling these dirty propaganda lies. Imperialist propaganda operates according to the principle that some of this utterly fabricated propaganda may stick in the minds of some.

An example of this hateful and hideous propaganda is the provocative fuss being created by Western propaganda about Soviet diplomats in Lebanon. Everyone knows very well that this incident was totally concocted. Of interest, for instance, is the absurd and serious attempt to accuse the Soviets of trying to steal a Mirage aircraft from the Lebanese airport. Is it not absurd to speak about such things, when it is known that the Soviet Union, which has powerful supersonic aircraft and is exporting hundreds of splendid military and civilian aircraft to the Arab countries, is not in the least interested in foreign aircraft, particularly of old design. Is there anyone who does not understand that the Soviet Union has no practical or imaginary reason to disturb relations with Lebanon or with any other Arab country? How then, can anyone believe the false Western propaganda?

It is obvious, dear listeners, that the imperialist are engineering a propaganda move and that imperialist intelligence is preparing a provocation to disrupt Arab-Soviet relations. It is clear why only a few Arab papers have fallen into the trap; imperialist efforts to undermine friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries are futile and doomed.

Abd al-Hadi Alt-Nasif, member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union and a member of the UAR National Assembly, who is visiting the Soviet Union, has told Moscow Radio correspondent: There is no need to explain that all imperialist efforts to weaken the friendly ties between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, between the Soviet Union and the UAR in particular, are doomed, because cooperation and understanding between the Soviet Union and the UAR and between the Soviet Union and all Arab countries are stronger than ever, and facts show this every day. The attack by the imperialists and their agents on Soviet-Arab relations only gives rise to indignation and disgust among Arabs.

WASHINGTON POST
24 October 1969

CPYRGHT

Bolivia: All Dressed Up and No Place To Go

If it were not so inherently pathetic, Bolivia's seizure of the Gulf Oil Company holdings at Santa Cruz would be laughable, an opera bouffe to the cha cha cha. The regime, apparently forgetting for the moment that Bolivia is landlocked, is now confronted with an elementary truth, that it is no use having a bundle of oil if there is no way of getting rid of it. Specifically, the regime in La Paz reckoned on a takeover of Gulf's oil fields without comprehending that oil production was dependent on Gulf's marketing apparatus and tanker fleet. From Santa Cruz, the oil flows by pipeline to the Chilean port of Arica on the Pacific. There it is pumped into Gulf tankers headed for the United States, where about 75 per cent of it is sold. The refinery at Arica is now full, awaiting a Gulf tanker to arrive this week. Understandably mindful of its \$140 million investment, and angry at the prospect that the Bolivian action may set an unhealthy precedent, Gulf has diverted the tanker. Unless the Bolivians find some way to empty the bins at Arica, oil production will have to cease at Santa Cruz. So the Bolivians are at the moment all dressed up with no place to go.

The circumstances of the seizure tend to inspire sympathy for Gulf, a rare condition on a continent so outrageously exploited by American corporatism. By most accounts, Gulf has been a good citizen—ready and willing to negotiate terms with the Bolivians (it reportedly was prepared to up its royalty payment from 33 per cent to 50 per cent), and sensitive to the problems of Latin America's poorest, most chronically desperate nation. There is every evidence that General Ovando, in office by coup less than a month, has lost control of events and proceeded with expropriation not for any reason of economics or even national honor but as a quick, cheap, easy method of building popular support for his military government. It says something of Latin American attitudes now that the cheapest, quickest and easiest was to seize an American oil company. The government is apparently prepared

to pay some compensation, but all statements along those lines have been vague.

As might be expected, the population is all for it. This week the government staged an elaborate fiesta called "The Day Of National Dignity," replete with parades, demonstrations, and speeches denouncing Gulf as an "imperialistic octopus." Ovando, evidently a formidable phrasemaker, told the crowds that "we are at war and must join together in common cause against imperialism." At the same time, according to The Washington Post's John Goshko, emissaries of his regime were making quiet overtures to Gulf to turn on the faucets at Arica and continue, at least temporarily, the shipments. Negotiations are presumably proceeding and meanwhile the people of Bolivia can rest secure in the knowledge of a dragon slain in their midst.

These chickens will of course come home to roost, if not now then a year or five years from now when despite all the speeches and the demonstrations the country is as poor as it ever was. The Gulf seizure throws into serious question the ambitious venture (which was to be partly financed by Gulf) to build a natural gas pipeline from Bolivia to Argentina, a project of great value to the Bolivian economy. La Paz must calculate short-term popularity with long-term progress, and it may be that the one follows the other, that national pride will reflect itself in a higher GNP, that Ovando and his fellow army officers can operate the oilfields better, with more benefit to Bolivia, than Gulf. American investment in Latin America is a very mixed bag, and in too many places United States corporations have a stranglehold on the local economy. "Imperialism" is an entirely appropriate description of what we have wrought in Peru, for example. But conditions in Bolivia do not give much confidence that expropriation is the answer to the excruciatingly difficult economic problems she faces. The government ought to understand that the country is landlocked in more ways than one.

November 1969

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

November 14-16	Venice	6th Congress of (Communist) International Federation of Resistance Movements. The FIR conducts anti-West German propaganda in the name of anti-Nazism and extols WW II role of the Red Army and Communist undergrounds. This year's meeting coincides with 30th anniversary of first year of WW II, which was also period of Nazi-Soviet Pact.
November 17	Czechoslovakia	30th anniversary of closing down of all Czech institutions of higher learning by WW II Nazi occupation forces, following mass student demonstrations in Prague occasioned by death of a medical student Jan Opletal, killed during student protest against Nazi occupation. Nov. 17 is commemorated annually as International Student Day by the (Communist) International Union of Students which has its headquarters in Prague. Now, however, this Student Day ironically more likely recalls Jan Palach's self-immolation in Prague on January 16, 1969, protesting Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November 29	Albania	25th anniversary of seizure of power by Communist-led National Liberation Front, in wake of German withdrawal, 1944.
November 29- December 1	Vienna	Conference on European Security and Cooperation sponsored by (Communist) World Council of Peace.
December 1	USSR	35th anniversary of assassination of Sergey Kirov, a key Soviet leader, 1934, which Stalin used as pretext for launching the Great Purge.
December 7		20th anniversary of founding of International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in London, 1949, by unions leaving the World Federation of Trade

		Unions because WFTU had fallen into Communist hands.
December 11-13	Quito	Latin American Conference on Land Reform and Trade Union Rights sponsored by (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions.
December 15	Cairo	Bureau meeting of (Communist) International Association of Democratic Lawyers.

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

November 1969

HOW MUCH WILL EAST GERMANY'S ALLIES TAKE?

How East Germany reacts over the next few months to fresh initiatives which will emanate from West Germany's new team of Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel can either justify or invalidate East Germany's claim for international acceptance. Solely on the basis of past performance, invalidation would seem the most likely outcome. Among the decisive questions are: Just how much will East Germany risk in order to prolong the tension in Europe? and, For just how long will her East European allies condone the often headlong clash of their interests with those of East Germany's? There are, too, indications that Moscow's patience with the dictatorial Walter Ulbricht is again growing thin.

East-West German Relations

Up to autumn 1969, East Germany's posture toward Bonn had been pretty consistent. Diatribes against West German "revanchism and militarism" were as strident as they had been 20 years before and West German policies were particularly maligned whenever some mobility in East-West relations appeared in the offing. East Germany this year began to demand full recognition from West Germany "under international law" and Ulbricht's address opening the formalities of East Germany's 20th anniversary celebrations, while devoid of frothy polemics, included the full catalogue of his now-familiar demands. Meanwhile, circumstances surrounding the mid-September 1969 talks between East and West Germany on transportation and postal matters, which marked the first official contact between the two sides in several years, indicated that East Germany had come to the conference table only after considerable arm twisting by Moscow.

When word first got around about the Allied proposal to Moscow that its influence be used in getting East Germany to discuss inter-German transport, postal and communication issues, it evoked a heated response from East Germany to the effect that Pankow was not about to abandon its claims on Bonn. In a contrived mid-August interview, Foreign Minister Otto Winzer declared that Pankow was aware of Bonn's attempts to penetrate East Germany via "technical and organizational questions" and, addressing himself to Moscow, noted that Pankow was also "aware through whom" the penetration attempt was being made. However, by late August, Winzer was on his way to Moscow for a hastily arranged meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Then, almost simultaneously with the Soviets' response to the Allied démarche, came Pankow's agreement to hold the talks. Even though not too much was accomplished by the talks, the door was left open for future discussion (in late October) that could possibly resolve some issues of political as well as economic significance.

East Germany and the Communist Fraternity

Of late, East Germany has done little to ease relations with its fraternal East European partners. East Germany's special position within CEMA, Ulbricht's

insistence on playing broker between East Europe and Bonn while East Germany herself enjoys special benefits, and Ulbricht's penchant for lecturing his allies -- all are things that rankle. Moscow has occasionally been annoyed not only by East Germany's pursuit of purposes that do not always coincide with her own, but also by the emergence of special German national interests and a special German role within the Eastern European bloc.

Ulbricht openly opposes economic links with the West in favor of self-sufficiency among CEMA members: "In the bitter struggle between socialism and imperialism ... the community of socialist countries must solve all scientific and technological, defense, economic and other problems with their own forces and means." (Wirtschaft, East Berlin, 27 February 1969.) One West German expert, Peter Lutz, believes that East Germany under Ulbricht actually aims, not without some chance of success, at becoming the dominating force within CEMA: "For many years the East German planners have been constructing the economic system of their republic with an eye to the USSR and the CEMA market. They are not striving towards an independent national economy; on the contrary, closely integrated with the economy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the East bloc, they see the chance of becoming the dominating political force." (Osteuropäische Rundschau, Munich, March 1969, No. 8.)

In spite of a burgeoning "interzonal" trade with West Germany, which East Germany considers to be her special privilege, Ulbricht's posture toward east-west economic rapprochement has also been consistently rigid: "Those who aspire to travel between two worlds will end up sooner or later dependent on the world monopolies or on their banks." (Wirtschaft, op.cit.) In the past few months, official public speeches and articles appearing in German media have been ever more fervent in their condemnation of "perfidious bridgebuilding." Typical was the speech by Kurt Tiedke, head of East Germany's delegation to Rumania's Tenth Party Congress in August 1969 in which he tried to set up East Germany as the model of true Marxism-Leninism, pled for closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and warned against approaches toward "American and West German imperialism."

Little Support for East German Demands

In January 1967, when West Germany and Rumania exchanged ambassadors and East Germany simultaneously unleashed her anti-Rumanian propaganda war; official newspapers in both Prague and Budapest began to omit their previous editorial demands that Bonn should recognize the "sovereignty" of East Germany. The practice has caught on. During the most recent discussions of Polish-West German rapprochement, Poland has been equivocal about Bonn's recognition of the "existence" of East Germany as a prerequisite to actual negotiation.

In early September 1969, Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski did call for such recognition before a gathering of newsmen from both East and West Europe. At the same press conference, however, the head of the Foreign Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ferelek, enumerated the three conditions which could lead to "normalization" of West Germany's relations with the Bloc, in-

cluding the establishment of diplomatic relations:

- "all European countries" recognize frontiers as agreed to by the Potsdam conference;
- West Germany sign the nonproliferation treaty; and
- West Germany cease claiming to be the sole representative of all Germany.

None of the conditions calls for diplomatic recognition of the East German regime. Ferelek described the three conditions as being the "joint demands" of the socialist countries. If Ferelek was indeed speaking for the Bloc, his words could well indicate that Moscow is joining Warsaw in politically skirting Ulbricht's uncompromising demands.

Facing the Social Democrats

On 6 October when Soviet party chief Brezhnev joined party chief Ulbricht in East Berlin to honor East Germany on her 20th birthday, the salient points of their two speeches served to pinpoint the strains caused by their differences over West Germany. Brezhnev's speech did little to calm Ulbricht's nervousness over being left out in the cold as Moscow-Bonn relations begin to thaw. Brezhnev called the West German election results "a success for the democratic and anti-fascist forces in the Federal Republic" (while of course cautioning that reactionary forces would not vanish overnight) and said the USSR was ready to "respond accordingly" if West Germany developed a more "realistic" foreign policy. No doubt reflecting official dissatisfaction with Brezhnev's remarks, East German media failed to carry his early morning speech until late in the day after reporting most of the speeches made by other delegations.

Ulbricht, on the other hand, as previously mentioned ran through his now-familiar catalogue of demands from West Germany. However, compared with his speeches made earlier in the year, particularly at the April Central Committee Plenum, Ulbricht sounded just a bit less vitriolic. Instead of repeating his April demand that Bonn "recognize East Germany under international law," Ulbricht said on this occasion that there should be "treaties and arrangements valid under international law." (Perhaps a concession to make at least some of his demands more acceptable to Bonn?) Frequent references to East Germany's desire for "peaceful coexistence" were also atypical.

Certainly life would have been a lot less complicated for the hard-line factions in East Germany if the Christian Democrats had won a solid majority and if the "neo-Nazi" NPD had got at least a few seats in the Bundestag. Willy Brant's credentials as an anti-Nazi have taken some wind out of East German (and Soviet) insistence that it is the "revanchist" elements who run West Germany. How the East German regime reacts to the loss of this outworn theme, and as a chain reaction, how the rest of Eastern Europe reacts to East Germany, will show whether the tail wags the dog or vice versa.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 September 1969

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

East Germans irk fellow Reds

By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Berlin

East German Communists are showing a cocky pride on the 20th anniversary of their state which reportedly irritates and disturbs many Soviet and other Slavic Marxists.

East Germany, a well-placed German Communist declared, "has accomplished more under communism than any other country."

Including the Soviet Union? "Including the Soviet Union," he replied.

"The German Democratic Republic," he went on, "is living proof that communism can work in a highly industrialized country and particularly in Germany, where Marx and Engels came from."

He stressed the fact that East Germany was on a different plane, or level, of achievement than the Slavic nations of Eastern Europe.

"The fact that communism can work in Germany is more important to world communism than the fact that it works in a Slavic state."

Here, dressed up in Marxist trappings, was the age-old expression of German superiority over the peoples of Eastern Europe.

East Germany indeed has be-

come the most industrially advanced nation under Communist rule. But, according to informed sources, many Soviet and other Eastern European officials do not like to be reminded of this.

Many people in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Slavic lands overrun by the Nazis still harbor distrust of Germans, whether from East or West.

The East German Marxist to whom I spoke agreed readily that few, if any, Eastern European Communists would like to see Germany reunited, even under communism.

"We know," he said, "that there is no chance of getting a united Communist Germany. Therefore Germany will stay divided."

Did East German leaders fear that the Soviet Union, preoccupied with Communist China, might make a deal with West Germany to the detriment of East Germany?

No, he replied. He expressed quiet confidence that, for two reasons, the German Democratic Republic would survive.

1. The existence of a Communist East Germany gave the Soviets and Poles a secure buffer against the West.

2. The success of the German Communist experiment proved that Marx and Engels had been right in predicting that communism would work in an industrialized society.

Apart from Czechoslovakia and East Germany, communism has taken root only in relatively underdeveloped countries, with a peasant base. Czechs and Slovaks—as industrious and skilled as the Germans—have refused to make communism viable in their land.

The East German Communist, in rattling off his nation's successes, did not mention that substantial trade with West Germany, on privileged terms, had done much for East Germany.

Had the diplomatic recognition of East Germany by Cambodia and five Arab states been expensive? "At least two countries," the German replied, "Cambodia and the Sudan, asked nothing. Some of the others were promised more aid."

He shrugged. "Unfortunately we cannot compete with the West Germans in giving economic aid."

He did not know when the next "wave" of recognition would come—whether next year or in five years. But he was certain it would come.

India now was the prime target of East Germany. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had sent the congratulations of her government to East German chief of state Walter Ulbricht on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of East Germany.

This constituted "political recognition," the East German Communist asserted. In principle, he asserted, Mrs. Gandhi would like to open diplomatic relations, but could not afford to lose massive West German technical and economic assistance.

Black Africa was a second area where East Germany was working assiduously to cultivate relations. The Communist predicted that, when African recognition came, several African states would send ambassadors to East Berlin in a "wave," as the Arabs had done.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 September 1969

CPYRGHT

East and West Germany sit down to intergovernmental talks

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

For the first time in 20 years, East and West Germany have settled down to talks on an intergovernmental level.

Talks between the economy ministers of the two states planned for August, 1968, were called off because of the Czechoslovak crisis. Now the topic is transportation between the two Germanys.

According to the East Germans, all aspects of transportation are to be covered: railroads, inland shipping, and road building. After the talks got under way on Sept. 16 in East Berlin, the West Germans disclosed that inland shipping and the completion of the autobahn (motor road) between Bad Hersfeld, West Germany, and Eisenach in East Germany were the first points on the agenda.

This first step toward easing tension is the outcome of East Germany's more conciliatory stance toward West Berlin. It followed Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's speech before the Supreme Soviet of July 10.

According to Mr. Gromyko's new formula, West Berlin was "a special political unit." It no longer was called "separate and independent," a third Germany so to say.

New departure

This new definition may sound like hair-splitting to Americans. But for Communists, sticklers for terminology, this was a new departure and it was understood as such in Bonn and in East European capitals.

By referring to West Berlin as a "special political unit" Mr. Gromyko enunciated a view long held by West German jurists.

According to Bonn, West Berlin is linked to West Germany in many ways—economically, culturally, and in some respects administratively. But it is not formally part of the Federal Republic. West Berliners do not have to serve in the West German Army and do not elect deputies to the Bundestag.

Mr. Gromyko's formula originally seems to have shocked the East Germans. On the one hand, they want improved relations with Bonn—their biggest trading partner in the West. On the other hand, they fear any rapprochement would induce other Warsaw Pact countries to follow the Romanian example and improve their relations with the Federal Republic—possibly at the expense

of trade with East Germany

Conditions for understanding

But under some pressure from the Soviets, Poland, and other bloc countries, East Germany now has opted for somewhat improved relations with West Germany.

The new departure came at a memorial meeting Aug. 16 in the former Nazi concentration camp of Buchenwald when Deputy Premier and Politburo member Alfred Neumann also referred to West Berlin as a special political unit.

In every other respect Mr. Neumann reiterated East Germany's previous conditions for a lasting understanding with Bonn—recognition of all borders, including that between the two German states; renunciation by West Germany of its claim to represent all of Germany and to the possession of nuclear weapons of any kind; recognition of East Germany as a separate state, etc.

Only Mr. Neumann's definition of the status of West Berlin was new, and an indication of a somewhat softer stand.

Fast response

Neues Deutschland, East Germany's leading party daily, went so far as to write: "We must find a way which would guarantee peaceful coexistence between the Federal Republic and East Germany."

The letter which East Germany's Transport Minister addressed Sept. 11 to his counterpart in the Federal Republic, proposing negotiations between the two German states, was an attempt to find such a way in an important, but politically neutral domain. The fast response of the West Germans and their acceptance of negotiations in the capital of the East Germany is a heartening development.

Apart from the political significance of the talks, there also is an economic angle. Inland shipping between East and West Europe developed considerably in recent years.

In addition to East and West German motor barges, each year about 300 Polish vessels ply the canals and rivers of Central Europe between the Vistula and the Rhine. They call at such ports as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Basel with average loads of several hundred tons and represent a significant traffic remunerative for both Germanys.

9 October 1969

AN EXERCISE FOR TWO

East Germany has been celebrating its twentieth anniversary with an outward show of great confidence. Economically the confidence is justified. Since 1961, when the Berlin wall cut off the main escape route, the people have largely settled down to make the best of their situation, and industry and agriculture have developed fast. Politically the regime is not yet fully accepted either at home or abroad, and it shows every symptom of being aware of this failure. The limits on speech, writing and travel remain as tight as ever, and the demands for international recognition as strident.

The prospect of a new government in west Germany now puts the regime in a dilemma, and the way it reacts will be important for the immediate future of east-west relations in Europe. As in the other communist capitals, there are groups in east Berlin which would probably have been happier if the Christian Democrats had won a solid majority, and the right wing National Democrats a substantial representation in the Bundestag.

This would have confirmed the main line of communist propaganda, which hammers away at the alleged revival of nazism in west Germany.

It would have made for a simpler political life. It would have strengthened those people who believe that the power of the communist parties in eastern Europe survives better in relative isolation from the west and bolstered by fears of west German aggression.

There are, however, other groups who are less frightened and who mean what they say about wanting relaxation and greater contact with the west. Until a few years ago these groups received very little encouragement from west Germany, which itself showed scant interest in relaxation. When eventually, with much agonizing, Bonn started to explore the possibility of a new relationship with east Europe it was sharply told that it was trying to divide the camp and that it must first recognize east Germany and the Polish frontiers and renounce nuclear weapons. The Social Democrats were attacked as scarcely different from the Christian Democrats, and the National Democrats were said to represent resurgent nazism.

If the Social Democrats now try new approaches to eastern Europe there will have to be some new thinking among Herr Ulbricht and his allies about what they really want.

If they continue to insist on full diplomatic recognition for east Germany before anything else it will show that the more negative group has gained the upper hand, for no diplomacy that insists on unconditional surrender can be taken seriously. If they show a willingness to talk, to understand the position of west Germany, and to make concessions in return for concessions from Bonn, it will show that some real progress is possible. Bonn, after all, cannot be expected to make substantial diplomatic offerings to east Berlin unless it receives reasonable indications that there is real willingness on the other side for a saner and more open relationship.

So far the signs in the east are ambiguous but faintly encouraging. Mr. Brezhnev, speaking in east Berlin on October 6, made the usual remarks about neo-nazism in west Germany, and warned against overestimating the successes of democratic forces in the election, but he did add that he would be willing to respond to a more "realistic trend" in Bonn. Herr Ulbricht, however, merely repeated his familiar demands. As soon as the new government is settled in Bonn, it will be up to both parts of Germany, not just one, to see whether a new start can be made.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

14 October 1969

CPYRGHT

East Germany with 20 years' perspective

CPYRGHT

By Harry B. Ellis

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Berlin

TWO SCENES IN ONE CITY ON A SUNNY AFTERNOON, October, 1969:

The place — East Berlin. It is celebrating, with the presence of top world Communist leaders, the 20th anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic.

The vast concourse of Karl Marx Allee, closed to traffic, seethed with the kaleidoscopic movement of thousands of restless, young people — boys dressed in bright blue anaraks, girls in jackets of orange.

They were among 100,000 members of East Germany's Free Democratic Youth (FDJ) movement who had gathered in the capital for the celebrations.

All was carnival on Karl Marx Allee. Ice cream, sausages, and lemonade in plastic cups. Singing and waving of banners. Knots of young people grew quickly to large clusters, when rock bands along the avenue burst

into sound.

That was Scene 1.

Scene 2 unfolded about a mile away. Shining new buildings are fewer. Weed-grown ruins of World War II lie untended. A tall gray wall topped with lengths of rolling pipe slices through Berlin.

Barriers to escape

At Friedrichstrasse the wall is cut by Checkpoint Charlie, where foreigners may pass from West to East Berlin—and back again.

Between the Allied exit on the Western side and the final visa barracks to the East there stretches a no-man's-land. It is laced with heavy zigzag barriers of concrete, painted red and white.

In the past some desperate East Berliners have aimed their cars at Checkpoint Charlie and tried to hurtle through to the West. So up went the zigzag barriers, designed to stop a heavy truck.

That sunny afternoon, while Karl Marx Allee exploded with sound and color, Checkpoint Charlie was a magnet for hundreds of East German youth.

They, too, wore jackets of blue or orange, with FDJ emblazoned on the sleeves. But their faces, as they gathered in small groups on the Friedrichstrasse, did not smile.

They stared down the street, lined with tired buildings of dingy gray and brown, toward Checkpoint Charlie and, beyond, to the rooftops of West Berlin.

Perhaps curiosity drew them, perhaps a longing—or perhaps only unfounded rumors that the Beatles would play from the roof of the tall Alex Springer publishing house, built near the wall in West Berlin.

Whatever the reasons that tugged young people close to the wall, East German authorities took no chances. Ordinarily East Berliners are allowed to walk up to the barriers at Checkpoint Charlie and peer across. But not this day.

East Berlin police roved the street, keeping the "happy smiling youth of the German Democratic Republic"—as the official signs and slogans had depicted all week long—a full block away from the wall.

To emphasize the point, an armored car with a soldier in its turret and a long-barreled machine gun exposed, stood at Checkpoint Charlie, visible to the young people.

As afternoon drew toward night, the crowds grew so thick that police reinforcements were called in. Youth jeered, police charged, arrests were made. Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of other young participants ran down side streets and melted into celebrating crowds.

What images would these young people carry back to their homes in Erfurt, Weimar, Magdeburg, or Rostock? What stories about their afternoon at the wall would they mutter to comrades back home?

Another scene unfolded during East Germany's long anniversary celebrations.

A giant military parade, complete with tanks, rockets, and airborne troops, passed a reviewing stand in the vast Marx-Engels Platz, dominated by East Germany's handsome new Foreign Ministry building.

Rockets are rockets, troops are troops—every country, East and West, has them. But the language of the commentator, describing the parade to East German television viewers, struck the observer.

Tangible achievements

These "class-conscious" troops, the commentator declared, were "filled with hate" against their imperialist enemies, those who would threaten East Germany's frontiers. Several times he used the word "hate" to describe how East German soldiers were supposed to regard their enemies in the West.

Thousands of West Berliners and West Germans, the commentator went on, would be watching this parade on their own TV sets. They should ponder the implications of this military might, backed up as it was by the full panoply of the Soviet Union's power.

It must be a sorrow to many East Germans themselves that their record of achievement over the past 20 years should be flawed by negativism—by talk of hate and by the specter of the wall.

For 17 million East Germans have accomplished much in the past two decades. Starting from ruin and rubble, they have fashioned the highest standard of living in the Communist world.

Industrially, East Germany is more sophisticated than any other Communist land. A flow of machines, chemicals, optical and other scientific equipment—vital to development plans east of the Iron Curtain—streams from East Germany to its Communist allies.

East Germany sells entire factories to underdeveloped lands, complete from machinery on the plant floor to typewriters in the office and carpets and curtains in the executive suite.

For years East Berlin was dreary, by comparison with West Berlin. The Communist part of the city still has a long way to go. Perceptibly East Berlin is edging up to West Berlin in gloss and appearance. But East German city planners lack the vast subsidies available to West Berlin from Bonn.

East Berlin's brand-new TV tower—tallest structure in either part of Berlin, second highest edifice in all Europe—looks down upon a developing complex of hotels, office buildings, and malls that will make Alexander Platz one of the most attractive city centers in Europe, East or West.

East Germany has surpassed West Germany in revising the traditional German educational system to seek out and develop talent from the working class.

Restaurants are good. Food, except for tropical products, is plentiful. Clothing is adequate and getting better. Home appliances can be bought. East Germans with enough cash now can buy color TV.

Cars are scarce and will be for many years. Servicing of home appliances and of automobiles remains a problem. Housing is short and most East German city dwellers still live in shabby tenements.

East Germans, in short, have their legitimate gripes, but they can—and do—take pride in what their hands and minds have achieved.

Poles grumble

"And without foreign help," chimed in an East Berliner during the celebration week. He was not quite right.

Through its interzonal trade with West Germany, approaching \$1 billion a year in value, East Germany gets high-quality equipment to supply critical sectors of its economy. "East Germany has its own Marshall

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Plans, the Poles are known to grumble.

The continued existence of East Germany is just as important to Moscow as in earlier years. It provides a bulwark against the percolation of liberal ideas from Western Europe. It is a buffer between Poland and the West.

The stationing of 20 Soviet Army divisions in East Germany gives Soviet power a pincer arm toward South-Central Europe, where some Communist regimes are less stable than that fashioned by Walter Ulbricht in East Berlin.

Mr. Ulbricht is 76 years old. Sooner or later power must pass from him to two designated successors—Erich Honecker to control Socialist Unity Party affairs, and Premier Willi Stoph to run the government.

Some friction is evident between the two men and their respective apparatuses. But a smooth succession is in the interests of both Mr. Honecker and Mr. Stoph, and Western observers foresee no serious rocking of the boat when Mr. Ulbricht loosens his grip on the reins of power.

The German Democratic Republic is here to stay. This fact is accepted, tacitly if not publicly, by the chancelleries of the West.

Within the past year East Germany has been recog-

nized by six non-Communist powers—Cambodia and five Arab states. Other governments are likely to send ambassadors to East Berlin, particularly if a West German government headed by Willy Brandt concedes the concept of two Germanys to the outside world.

East German officials show evident concern at the current probings toward better relations with West Germany by Wladyslaw Gomulka's Polish regime and, more importantly, by the Kremlin.

Nation-state concept

But leaders insist privately that the importance of a stable Communist regime in East Germany precludes any Soviet deal with Bonn that might spur false hopes among East German intellectuals and youth and hence create unrest.

The bulk of East Germany's 17 million people appear to accept—some enthusiastically, many more resignedly—the concept of nation-state advanced by Mr. Ulbricht and his party followers.

But acceptance does not imply free choice. Evidently East Germany's rulers doubt they have won the active loyalty of most of the people they rule.

Otherwise, why ring Checkpoint Charlie with police when young East Germans are invited to East Berlin?

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

20 October 1969

CPYRGHT

Poland's look westward mars celebrations for East Germans

CPYRGHT

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Berlin

Walter Ulbricht may not have been wholly satisfied with the outcome of the 20th anniversary celebrations of East Germany.

The sun shone throughout the festive days, his Army rolled impressively across the Mark-Engels Platz, and leaders of world communism visited East Berlin to pay Mr. Ulbricht homage.

But two of the most important visitors—Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Union and Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland—did not say exactly what Mr. Ulbricht might have liked to hear.

Mr. Gomulka, in his speech Oct. 6 in the festooned Seelenbinder-halle in East Berlin, praised Polish-East German economic cooperation—but implied that it was insufficient to meet Polish needs.

Even as Mr. Gomulka spoke, emissaries of his government were preparing to open trade talks in Bonn with West German officials.

Background traced

Background to this development was Poland's decision—despite East German resistance—to seek expanded West German credits, with which to purchase capital goods for Warsaw's 1970-75 economic plan.

This decision had followed the failure of Mr. Gomulka's government to obtain sufficient credits and capital goods from Poland's Communist allies in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).

The fact that Bonn had not recognized the validity of Mr. Ulbricht's East German regime did not keep Poland from exploring wider cooperation with West Germany.

Perhaps even more unsettling to Mr. Ulbricht was the Oct. 6 speech in East Berlin by Mr. Brezhnev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Brezhnev, commenting on West Germany's parliamentary elections, hailed the defeat of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) as "a clear-cut success for democratic forces in the federal republic."

The Soviet Union was prepared to "react accordingly" to a "change toward realism in the politics" of West Germany, the Krem-

lin chief continued.

Mr. Brezhnev's remarks, coupled with earlier Soviet initiatives toward Willy Brandt, implied Moscow's readiness to open exploratory talks with a West German government led by Mr. Brandt.

Diplomats in Bonn detected no softening of the Soviet position on fundamentals. But the tone of Mr. Brezhnev's speech was considered strikingly mild, delivered as it was in Mr. Ulbricht's presence at festivities honoring East Germany.

Mr. Ulbricht's own speech was notably sharper. The veteran East German leader cataloged familiar demands on Bonn, including international law.

Mr. Ulbricht also made new stipulations, including the dissolution of the NPD and the rooting out of "neo-Nazis" from the "federal and state" apparatus of the federal republic.

Presumably the security of East Germany does not trouble Mr. Ulbricht, or Erich Honecker and Willy Stoph, the two men likely to take over top leadership of East Germany from the 76-year-old Mr. Ulbricht.

Warning stressed

Mr. Brezhnev stressed that the "full might of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community" would "destroy" any Western assault against East Germany.

What troubles East German leaders is more subtle—an apparent fear that closer West German relations with Poland and the Soviet Union, even in limited economic and cultural fields, might weaken East Germany's own leverage in Eastern Europe.

Within Comecon and the Warsaw Pact Mr. Ulbricht long has fought to prevent Communist states from extending their relations with the federal republic.

Where Romania was concerned, he failed. But Mr. Ulbricht—backed up by Mr. Gomulka of Poland — succeeded in preventing Hungary and Bulgaria from following Romania's example and opening diplomatic relations with Bonn.

Ally deserted?

For his polemics Mr. Ulbricht earned resentment from many Hungarian and to a lesser extent Bulgarian Communist officials eager to modernize their nations' economies through West German help.

Now Mr. Gomulka appears to have deserted his East Berlin ally, at least to the extent of seeking a broader slice of the West German trade pie for Poland.

Informed sources argue that, with some asperity, Polish officials have noted that East Germany had a "Marshall plan" of its own—through interzonal trade with West Germany.

None of these undercurrents may have been apparent to ordinary East Germans, applauding as Soviet-built limousines whisked Communist leaders through the streets of East Berlin.

But East German officials, seated in the huge Seelenbinder-halle Oct. 6, no doubt were conscious of the nuanced differences uttered by Messrs. Ulbricht, Brezhnev, and Gomulka.

CPYRGHT

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, Vol. 2, No. 2.
(University of Southern California)
April 1969

CPYRGHT

The Special Case of East Germany

by Peter Bender

(Excerpts)

EXACTLY what is the "German question"? Most Germans take the easy way out and connect it with the division of their country. For more thoughtful people it is linked with the prospects of a viable liberal democracy in Germany: a topic which has been bandied about for over a hundred years already. Foreign observers tend rather to take the view that the very existence of seventy-five million Germans, all equally proficient in the manufacture of high-class industrial goods and political difficulties, presents a problem in itself.

Nevertheless, everyone agrees that there is a "German question," and that it is one for the East as much as for the West. "Our German problem is how to get rid of the conservatives in East Berlin," said a man recently come from a country allied to the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic

(D.D.R.). Similar *cris de coeur* were heard in the West, particularly until the end of 1966, with reference to Bonn. Parallels may indeed be drawn between the position and behavior of the East Germans in the one camp and the West Germans in the other. Both are Germans, both have to bear the burden of their past, and both experience similar reactions to their strengths and weaknesses: astonishment at, and envy of, their efficiency, exasperation at their self-righteousness, and stupefaction at their overinsistence on principles. . . .

All the same, however clear the parallels between Bonn and East Berlin may be, over the last two years or so a difference in their behavior—albeit only a quantitative one as yet—has become apparent. Whereas Bonn's special role within the West is declining, East Berlin's special role within the East has been maintained and, indeed, enhanced in a number of ways. Both developments go hand in hand. As long as there was an equal balance of fear, there was an equal amount of competition to master it. In the meantime, the West German politicians have grown more self-assured in their dealings with the East, and are more prepared to sacrifice principle in the name of politics. From a defensive position (fostered by the cold war), the Federal Republic has gone over to a political offensive assisted by the international détente. This posed a serious problem for the D.D.R. regime: to choose whether to drop its guard and follow Bonn along the path of political relaxation, or to stand its ground. East Berlin chose the latter course, in the belief that it could not afford to do otherwise.

East Germany's Role in the Bloc

The special role which East Germany thus assumed (or rather was forced to assume) within the Eastern bloc may be explained, at least partly, by historical events. The D.D.R. was not founded until the autumn of 1949, by which time all the other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence were "people's democracies" striving to attain socialism. East Germany had a "democratic," not a "popular democratic" constitution, and the "construction of socialism" was not proclaimed there until the summer of 1952. While all the other members of the Eastern bloc were allied and safeguarded by mutual assistance pacts made with each other and with the Soviet Union, the D.D.R. was denied treaty cover until the middle fifties; its existence was guaranteed solely by the presence of Soviet troops. This gave more than enough protection against a military offensive from the West (which was in any case improbable), but in the political sense it was quite inadequate. What is more, until early 1955 the Soviet Union itself continually cast doubt over the future of the East German state by suggesting reunification

through free elections on condition that the West agreed to the neutrality of a reunified Germany. Anyone who doubts the seriousness of the Soviet offer to liquidate the D.D.R. (and many people did doubt it, probably mistakenly) should remember that it severely hampered the consolidation of the D.D.R., and kept the thin skin of "regime supporters" in permanent irritation. It may be that, as young cadres of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) were to point out later on, they had by that time got used to the idea of carrying on the struggle for socialism from the opposition benches.

It was not until the Federal Republic had joined NATO in early 1955 that the D.D.R. had the chance to enjoy the protection of a formal treaty. In May of the same year, East Berlin was one of the founding members of the Warsaw Pact, although it was not until January 1956 (did the unsuccessful summit meeting and conference of foreign ministers in Geneva have anything to do with it?) that the armed forces of the D.D.R. were officially designated "people's army" and embodied in the Eastern alliance. Compulsory military service, which had long been the rule in all the other member states, was not introduced until 1962. But 1955 was the crucial turning point: in September the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, and a few days later defined its relationship with the D.D.R. in an agreement "based on equal rights, mutual regard for sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs." From then on, the principle of the two states lay at the root of Soviet policy toward Germany, the touchy subject of reunification was at least formally left in the competent hands of the East German regime, and the D.D.R. appeared to be politically ensured.

But the D.D.R. did not as yet enjoy absolute equality of rights with the other members of the bloc, nor their full solidarity. Therefore, in order to secure Bonn's cooperation, the Polish foreign minister, Rapacki, put forward an idea for the negotiation of his disarmament plan which would have spared the Federal regime direct contact with its East German counterpart.¹ Where top-priority interests are at stake, as in the case of the nuclear test-ban and nonproliferation treaties, the Soviet Union is still prepared even now to agree to methods which, while not discriminating against East Berlin, are clearly tuned to Western discriminative reservations. An invigorating shot in the arm for D.D.R. prestige—and at the same time enhanced political insurance—stemmed from the agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1964 specifying "friendship, mutual aid and cooperation."

In relation to Moscow the D.D.R. was thus formally elevated to the same status as the other Warsaw Pact members, which

¹Polish memorandum dated 14 February 1958.

had been closely linked since the forties as a result of similar agreements with the Soviet Union and each other. Yet no other country in the Eastern bloc followed the Soviet example by signing a reciprocal aid agreement with East Berlin. It was only in early 1967, when West Germany's policy toward the East threatened, albeit involuntarily, to plunge the D.D.R. into isolation, that the East German regime achieved full formal inclusion in the bloc: in the same year it signed friendship and aid agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and then with Hungary and Bulgaria. For the first time East Berlin was able to enjoy the backing of its allies on the question of recognition, an asset which Bonn had taken for granted since joining NATO. To counteract the "Hallstein doctrine" the D.D.R., helped by Poland and the Soviet Union, introduced the "Ulbricht doctrine," according to which no member of the Warsaw Pact could establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic unless the Federal Republic had first recognized the legal existence of the D.D.R.

The continued existence of such relics of World War II also underlies East Germany's peculiar military role in the Warsaw Pact. It does share the burden of quartering Soviet troops with Hungary and, to a limited extent, Poland and (more recently) Czechoslovakia, but the numbers involved (about twenty divisions, compared with four, two, and seven or so in the other cases) are enough to show that East Germany is a special case. It is the Soviet stronghold in central Europe from which any vassals who, like the Czechs and Slovaks in 1968, start to think for themselves a bit too freely, may speedily be brought to heel.

The large number of Soviet troops in the D.D.R. must be set against the small number of East German troops.² Except for the Hungarian army, which, as the only member of the camp to have fought against the U.S.S.R. as late as 1945, has been kept well pruned ever since, the D.D.R. maintains the weakest armed forces within the Warsaw Pact, not only per capita but also absolutely. Even Bulgaria, with only half the population of the D.D.R., has more soldiers at its disposal.

This picture alters considerably, however, when one considers not only the regular fighting forces, but also the paramilitary forces (excluding the workers' militia). Even then, the D.D.R., according to the absolute figures, is only in fourth place, but when its low capability (namely, the small number of men of the right age for military service) is taken into account, it moves into first place. If East Berlin's military expenditure is also taken into consideration, its contribution is at least as great as its

²The following statements are based on figures in *The Military Balance 1968-1969* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies).

allies', though it is distributed differently. The D.D.R. is probably the only country in the world in which the security and border troops are stronger than the regular army. Indeed, its paramilitary strength, compared with the collective strength of its regular armed forces (army, navy and air force), comes to about three-quarters of the total. In Hungary and Rumania, on the other hand, the figure is between a third and a quarter, while in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria it ranges from a seventh to, at most, a fifth. The D.D.R. has accordingly also the largest workers' militia.

The reason for the size of the D.D.R.'s border police lies in their duties: they have to keep watch over the Eastern bloc's longest border with the "hostile" West (the border with the Federal Republic and around West Berlin), and control the traffic which passes by land and water between West Germany and West Berlin. Of course, all this vigilance and control are directed less against invasion from outside than against escape from inside. Thus the structure of East Germany's armed forces points a general political truth: within the Eastern alliance the D.D.R. has the greatest need for internal security, and therefore of all the states in the alliance, it can (and may?) do the least about its own external security.

East Germany's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the D.D.R. is determined by the same factors as its domestic policy. The D.D.R. has its own existence to thank for the support it receives from its allies; for Poland and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia, a communist government in East Germany represents a substantial element of their security; for the other states in the Eastern alliance, the division of the previously all too powerful German potential is probably something of a relief. In addition, there is the natural solidarity of communist leaders, who know that the overthrow of any one of them threatens all the others.

The respect which East Germany has won in its own camp is due to a great extent (as with West Germany and Japan in their spheres) to its economic strength.³ After Czechoslovakia it is the most highly industrialized country in Comecon. "The higher the degree of manufacturing [in Comecon]," writes one specialist in the economy of the Eastern bloc, "the more significant does the industrial strength of the D.D.R. become. . . . If the comparison [with the other members of Comecon] is based not simply on the gross amount produced, but on the production per capita . . . , the D.D.R. often jumps from second into first place."

³The following statements and quotations on the economy of the D.D.R. are from "Braucht der Osten die DDR?," by Eberhard Schulz and Hans Dieter Schulz, in the series of publications by the Research Institute of the German Society for the Study of Foreign Policy (Opladen: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1968).

East Germany's production potential is important for its Eastern business colleagues on two counts. With the exception of Bulgaria, the D.D.R. carries on more of its foreign trade within Comecon than any of its other members; in absolute terms, it has the second largest export trade (after the Soviet Union) of all the Comecon countries. But what matters here is not merely the quantity but the quality. Hans Dieter Schulz, the above-quoted expert on the economy of the D.D.R., writes: "By trading with the D.D.R., the Comecon countries can frequently get machines and other industrial equipment of 'Western' quality in exchange for such products of their own as are only purchased by the industrial nations of the West in small quantities or not at all. This gain in quality must make part of their foreign trade with the 'Golden West' of Comecon seem as interesting for the East European countries as trade with the real West." The economic interest of the Comecon countries in the D.D.R. may, as Schulz implies, diminish as their own degree of industrialization and, above all, their all-around level of productivity approximate those of the D.D.R. However, no such major change is likely here for the next decade or two.

The economic advantages which East Berlin offers its allies, and which it seeks to enlarge by a special extension of its Comecon trade, are nevertheless offset by awesome political encumbrances. The East German party leadership is the most rigorous opponent, within its camp, of "revisionism," "nationalism" and closer cooperation with the West; after the Soviet Union it is easily the most consistent crusader for the unity and solidarity of the bloc. What the SED cannot tolerate at home it feels called upon to oppose in other socialist countries, and far more energetically than were it a development in the Federal Republic. After all, whatever comes from the West can be stigmatized as "class enemy" and "imperialist" and suppressed accordingly. In contrast, anything that takes place on allied ground bears the label "socialist." It contains—whether it is the stressing of national peculiarities and interests, philosophical or literary unorthodoxies, political reforms or even mere practical relaxations—what is today probably the only relevant danger for the East Berlin regime: whenever and wherever the SED leadership has to fight or expect serious opposition, the danger comes from forces that want to alter, not abolish, socialism.

Therefore, the foreign policy of the D.D.R. was and is—in accordance with Leninist principles as well as East Berlin's own interests—the logical extension of its domestic policy. When the liberalization policy was introduced in Poland in October 1956, East Berlin's relations with Warsaw deteriorated to a degree which at that time was still quite unusual between socialist countries: they only improved as Polish domestic policy became more conservative and both sides realized that *raison d'état*.

recommended a close alliance.⁴ Thus the more resolutely Rumania steered a nationalist course, the more strained became its relations with the D.D.R.; East Berlin party circles had been referring to "the gypsies" long before Rumania and the Federal Republic established diplomatic relations in early 1967. The D.D.R. leadership took the most stringent measures to prevent this one instance from becoming a precedent. With the help of the Soviet Union it imposed the so-called Ulbricht doctrine, stopping Hungary and Bulgaria from following Rumania's example (which had been their intention), and threw suspicion on Novotny's Prague so that it would grant Bonn no facilities other than a trade mission.

There has been much speculation about the part played by Ulbricht in Czechoslovak affairs during the spring and summer of 1968. Little light is shed on the matter by his visit to Karlovy Vary shortly after the Cierna compromise and shortly before the invasion. Before setting out for his meeting with Dubcek, Ulbricht had once again expounded his policy toward West Germany, at a session of the People's Chamber, and although he remained inflexible on matters of principle, his tone appeared more conciliatory than hitherto. His proposal that the economic ministers of both German states should meet to confer caused a minor sensation. The most likely explanation of his action is probably this: after Cierna and Bratislava, Ulbricht regarded it necessary, and possible, to come to some arrangement with the Czech reformers; in order to gain as much influence as possible over their policy toward Bonn, and to coordinate the attitudes of East Germany and Prague as best he could, he had to show a certain flexibility himself. Therefore, he offered the West German government negotiations in a sphere in which he had least to lose and most to gain.

But this attempt at coming to some sort of arrangement throws little light on Ulbricht's behavior before and afterwards. What seems fairly certain is that the military "solution" was anything but attractive to the SED leaders; they had reaction in East Germany to consider, and it was highly embarrassing for Germans to be marching into Czechoslovakia for the second time. In spite of this, they felt this course of action was necessary: indeed, they were more convinced of this plan than either the Hungarians or the Bulgarians (who are outside the danger zone), and probably more so than the Poles or even perhaps the Russians.

⁴Ulbricht made a point of using the word *Staatsräson* when he attended the Polish Party Day in Warsaw in November 1968. (*Neues Deutschland*, 13 November 1968.)

This is not to say, though, that East Berlin had a vital influence on the Soviet decision to occupy Czechoslovakia, although it may be assumed that the Politburo in Moscow was very mindful of East Germany in making that decision. In the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, very great value tends to be attached to the role of the D.D.R., and here opinion about facts is perhaps as important as the facts themselves: the fact that in Eastern Europe, and indeed in "political and diplomatic circles," Ulbricht has to take most of the blame, only goes to show the D.D.R.'s relationship with its allies.

This relationship becomes difficult, and at times almost unbearable, not only because of mutual resentment and animosity, but above all because of a headlong clash of interests. Any country in Eastern Europe that wants to carry out reforms and cooperate with the West—and that means every member of the alliance except Poland—must heed East Berlin as well as Moscow.

The D.D.R. regards the utmost caution as vital where reforms are concerned, and is the only country in the Warsaw Pact with a stake in the prolongation of tension in Europe. This results in a series of demands such as no other state imposes on its allies: they are obliged not to normalize their relationship, politically or even diplomatically, with the Federal Republic, which is after all one of their most important trading partners; they must not sign any agreements with Bonn which include West Berlin; and finally, they are to have no more contact with the Federal Republic than the D.D.R. does, since the D.D.R. naturally regards the flourishing trade between East and West Germany as its own special privilege. Whenever East and West Germans quarrel about flags, emblems and national anthems (and they are both very fond of doing so), when a wall is to be built to isolate East Berlin or the West German President is to be elected in West Berlin, the D.D.R.'s allies have to put on an air of solidarity, even though they are for the most part completely indifferent to the whole thing and no doubt often suspect that the SED is more interested in prolonging tension than in the particular point at issue. But even if it is a question of consequences rather than motives, the fact remains that the East Europeans find their own interests jeopardized by the bickering between the two Germanies. . . .

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

November 1969

LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION VS. DEVELOPMENT

For the past forty years the rate of population growth in Latin America has been higher than that of any other major region of the world. Should the present annual growth rate of 3.0 per cent continue, the total population would rise from the 250 million of mid-1968 to approximately 355 million in 1980 and to 645 million at the end of the century. Although the death rate has sharply declined because of improvements in sanitation and in medical care, especially for mothers and infants, there has not been a subsequent general decline in the birth rate in Latin America because of traditional social, cultural and religious precepts. Parallel to this is a steadily rising rate of illegitimacy and also of illegal abortions.

Such explosive growth of the population only perpetuates poverty and restricts opportunities for individual advancement, because for both society and individual families a large part of any growth in income must go to sustain the increased number of people rather than to improve the living standards of the existing members. Over the long term, this makes it especially difficult to generate the savings and investment needed for economic expansion. Population growth also swells the ranks of the under-employed or unemployed, since there is not enough productive employment for the huge numbers which enter the labor market each year.

The problem is especially acute in urban areas, where the population growth is often more than five per cent a year, the result of not only high birth rates, but migration from the countryside. In 1960 there were nine metropolitan areas with a million or more residents; by 1970 the number will probably be 18, and by 1980, 26. Already the shortage of decent jobs, housing, schools and other vital facilities is becoming increasingly severe.

In most countries at present there has not yet been undue population pressure on the usable land, because of the existence of unused lands. This has meant that Latin Americans have only just begun to realize that high birth rates drain capital resources which are at best limited in most of these countries. In fact, there has been a widely-held notion among Latin Americans that a problem exists only where there is high-density population, as in India, and that contrary to limiting population growth, their countries need more people. However, continued rapid growth of the population creates enough pressure on resources so that available unused or underused land cannot be properly developed. This in turn generates continued migration from rural to urban areas, and builds up the potentially violent pressures coming from concentrated urban masses which have neither the opportunity nor the means to improve their conditions. The Communists and other extremists of Latin America are bound to make every effort both to take advantage of such situations, as well as to aggravate the difficulties of coping with the basic problems caused by overpopulation since economic and social turmoil best serves their political interests.

In the view of the Inter-American Development Bank, "The Latin American labor force grows at a much faster annual rate than new jobs in non-agricultural activities, and overcrowding of the big cities by rural migrants is getting worse."

AMERICA LATINA: POBLACION CONTRA DESARROLLO

En los últimos cuarenta años la tasa de crecimiento de población de la América Latina ha sobrepasado la de cualquier otra región del mundo. Si se mantiene la actual tasa de 3.0 por ciento anual, la población total, que sumaba 250 millones de habitantes a mediados de 1968, aumentará a 355 millones para 1980 y a 645 millones a finales de este siglo. Aunque la tasa de mortalidad de Latinoamérica ha disminuído enormemente gracias a las mejoras en sanidad y servicios médicos, principalmente en el campo de la maternidad y la medicina infantil, no se ha registrado una correspondiente disminución en la tasa de natalidad a causa del apego a preceptos religiosos y costumbres tradicionales. Al mismo tiempo se registra un creciente aumento en el número de hijos ilegítimos y en el de abortos ilegales.

Tal crecimiento de la población sirve sólo para perpetuar la pobreza y restringir las oportunidades individuales, pues tanto para la sociedad como para la familia cualquier incremento en los ingresos tiene que destinarse al sostenimiento de un número mayor de individuos en vez de emplearse en mejorar el nivel de vida de los actuales miembros. Como consecuencia se hace bastante difícil generar a largo plazo los ahorros e inversiones necesarios para la expansión económica. El crecimiento de la población produce también un aumento en el número de desempleados y subempleados, dado que no hay suficiente empleo productivo como para absorber a la enorme cantidad de individuos que ingresan al mercado de trabajo cada año.

El problema se agudiza en las zonas urbanas donde el crecimiento de la población excede con frecuencia el cinco por ciento anual, debido no sólo a una tasa de natalidad bastante alta sino también al movimiento migratorio del campo a la ciudad. En 1960 había nueve zonas metropolitanas que contaban al menos con un millón de habitantes; en 1970 habrá dieciocho y en 1980, veintiséis. Por otra parte se vuelve cada vez más severa la escasez de buenos trabajos, viviendas, escuelas y otras comodidades vitales.

En la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos no se ha producido todavía ninguna presión excesiva de la población sobre la tierra arable debido a la existencia de grandes extensiones de tierra sin cultivar. Esto significa que los latinoamericanos todavía no se han dado cuenta de que una alta tasa de natalidad se traga los bienes capitales que en la mayoría de esos países existen sólo en forma limitada. Es más, que es noción bien extendida en Latinoamérica pensar que sólo existen problemas en


-2-

las regiones donde la población es muy densa, como por ejemplo en la India; luego entonces piensan que se necesita un aumento, no una disminución, de la población en los países latinoamericanos. Sin embargo, este crecimiento continuo y rápido de la población crea la suficiente presión en los recursos económicos como para hacer imposible la debida utilización de las tierras sin cultivar y de las subutilizadas. A su vez esto produce un continuo movimiento migratorio de las zonas rurales a las urbanas, constituyéndose entonces un potencial de presiones sociales violentas por parte de las grandes masas urbanas que no tienen ni la oportunidad ni los medios de mejorar sus condiciones de vida. Es seguro que los comunistas y otros elementos extremistas de Latinoamérica harán todos los esfuerzos posibles para aprovecharse de esa situación y tratar de agravar los problemas causados por la superpoblación, con el objeto de crear la inestabilidad social y económica que mejor sirve a sus intereses políticos.

Según el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, "El crecimiento anual de la fuerza de trabajo en America Latina excede el número de ocupaciones que se crean cada año fuera del sector agrícola, y se hace cada vez más grave el hacinamiento producido en las grandes ciudades por la migración de elementos rurales. Sin embargo en la mayoría de los países la mejor tierra de zonas agrícolas ya establecidas sigue estando bastante subutilizada; esa tierra podría ser fuente de empleo y de ingresos para numerosos campesinos."

from AID DATA BOOK
(recent issue)

LATIN AMERICA Population Growth in 19 Republics



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 April 1969

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Growth picture clouded

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

population growth rates for the different countries."

the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay) showing rates varying between 4 and 5 percent.

The report makes no further analysis of the overall population question. Yet this year's annual IADB survey, which has become something of a major yearbook of economic statistics for the hemisphere, does devote considerable attention to population growth in its reporting of individual countries which make up the bulk of the book.

"The significance of the preceding figures," the IADB report comments, "can better be appreciated when compared with those for the industrial countries, whose potential for continued growth is fed by much larger capital and technological resources than can be mustered by the developing nations."

Population growth rates of 3 percent or more are recorded for 14 of the 20 IADB member nations surveyed in the report. Only Argentina with an annual population increase of 1.6 percent, Bolivia at 1.4 percent, Chile at 2.5 percent, Haiti at 2 percent, Trinidad and Tobago at 2.8 percent, and Uruguay at 1.3 percent are under the 3 percent rate.

The industrialized nations, it says, registered an annual growth rate of 5.1 percent in the same period.

Problems pinpointed

Taken against the population increase, the overall economic growth would be considerably less than the 5 to 5.5 percent increase noted in the report.

Yet despite the effort to show progressive trends in Latin America, the IADB survey pinpoints a number of critical problems—in addition to the factor of population.

Among these:

Upward trends seen

At the same time, IADB officials do point to what they regard as significant upward trends in Latin America's economic picture. The report, for example, cites "important economic conditions in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia" as one of the principal factors accounting for the improved overall picture. The majority of the other countries also showed relatively high development rates.

• "A persistent lag in the rate of expansion of the agricultural sector." For the period between 1960 and 1967, the yearly expansion of farm output for the region "barely exceeded 4 percent." Yet industrial expansion ran at the rate of 6 percent per year and in 1968 reached 8 percent.

• The overall growth rate in industry "has gradually weakened during the past few years." The reason: relatively fewer prospects for import substitution in most countries. The answer lies in an expansion of markets including the development of Latin America's economic integration.

• But that integration has not advanced much. "Despite the statements and affirmations contained in the Declaration of Punta del Este in April 1967, the region as a whole has been slow to adopt the measures required to ensure effective establishment of a Latin American Common Market, except for efforts to form the Andean Group."

In addition, the IADB reports notes that during the 1960's, 12 countries in Latin America (the Central American nations, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad, and Tobago, and Venezuela) maintained annual economic growth rates of 5 percent or more, with four others (Chile, Colombia,

Although noting substantial improvement in Latin America's growth rate during 1968, the annual economic survey of the Inter-American Development Bank suggests that this improvement must be measured against a host of negative factors present throughout the hemisphere.

In fact, the IADB report which is released today emphasizes a number of persistent problems facing most Latin American nations. Among these are the population spiral, a lag in agriculture, some slow-downs in industrial expansion, and an inability of the Latin nations to band together in regional economic cooperation. But the bank report does begin on a note of progress.

The IADB survey, entitled "Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America," says that "according to currently available preliminary data," the region's gross domestic product registered an increase of 5 to 5.5 percent during the past year. This increase, it adds, "indicates further regional progress toward achievement of the targets set by the Alliance for Progress."

Population growth noted

Furthermore, the bank comments, that taken against the 4.5 percent annual growth rate for the 1961-67 period and the corresponding 4.3 percent figure for 1966 and 1967, the 1968 tally "is all the more significant."

But the bank's survey quickly notes that "although generally satisfactory from an overall standpoint, economic development trends in the region may be viewed as less favorable when expressed in the light of the

CPYRGHT

New York Times
CPYRGHT 6 MAR 1969
**Aid Agency Reports
Birth Rate Offsets
Latin Alliance Gains**
By FELIX BELAIR Jr.
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 15—

The Agency for International Development reported to Congress today that the goals of the Alliance for Progress with Latin-American countries were neither realistic nor attainable until the people of the region

took steps to control population growth.

In a report to a House "watchdog" committee, the Agency said that although there had been substantial progress toward economic, political and social objectives of the Alliance since its inception in 1961, such gains had been "largely canceled out" in per-capita terms because of "staggeringly high" birth rates.

The United States provided \$9.2-billion in the Alliance

last June 30, with \$4.1-billion of it coming from the aid agency. Other assistance was provided through the Peace Corps, the Food and Peace programs, the Export-Import Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Total United States economic aid since 1949 to the Latin-American countries has been about \$13.2-billion. Project loans and technical assistance grants from 1949 through 1960 totaled \$3.9-billion.

One of the chief goals of the Declaration of Punta del Este,

named for the meeting in 1961 at which the Alliance was created, was an annual increase of 2.5 percent in the combined gross national product of the 18 member nations. All citizens and social groups were to share in this economic advance through high income and living standards.

In the first seven years of the Alliance, the combined gross national product of member countries actually showed an average annual increase of 4.5 percent. But on a per-capita basis, this was an increase of only 1.5 percent, because in those countries were among the world's

highest, the reason is that the breaking up of large land holdings immediately brings "a confrontation with an element of the power structure well represented in national government."

"It is evident that Latin-American nations, with population increasing at some of the fastest rates in the world, must attain total growth rates of 5.5 per cent and more—higher than the United States average of 5.1 per cent for the same seven-year period—to attain the Alliance goals of 2.5 per cent per capital," the agency's report said.

The agency noted that population control, "because of its political volatility," was not mentioned among the goals of the Alliance. It said that "while there are growing signs of growing recognition of the population issue throughout the hemisphere, there are few countries in which the issue is yet being squarely met." The report added:

"Until these problems are better recognized and addressed in most of the hemisphere countries, the question of attaining a satisfactory level of development remains uncertain."

The report came in response to a demand from the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information that the agency reassess Alliance goals in the light of the last seven years' experience.

The report said at the outset that realization of Alliance goals was not possible in the 10 years originally contemplated. It said "the framers of the charter erected a goal structure which anticipated too much too soon and in recognition of this, the time frame of

beyond 1971." The House subcommittee noted in a report last August that United States administrators of the Alliance had extended the time period to 18 years, or three six-year periods. The first was described as an organization and mobilization phase, the second as one of social and political development and the third as one of integration of the market economies of member countries.

The subcommittee chairman, Representative John E. Moss, Democrat of California, said he welcomed the agency's report as "an honest evaluation of performance toward Alliance objectives and of the need to restate its goals."

"Unquestionably real progress has been made toward these goals," said Mr. Moss, "but I feel that Congress and the people are weary of financing programs that fall short of stated goals. I want to be able to say for once that our objectives have been achieved, but this requires their restatement in more realistic terms."

The agency's report said that "despite the initial unrealistic 10-year time frame, the goal structure still affords an attainable set of priority guideposts for development of the hemisphere." It added that "the development progress and momentum generated under the alliance justify promise for the future and merit continued United States support."

On the other hand, the report made it clear that if the Alliance's goals were to be attained even in the extended 18-

sub must be made a matter of priority concern by all major governments.

School Attendance Cited

Illustrative of the impact of birth rates on other Alliance goals, the report said:

"The number of school-age children not in school tends to grow at the very moment when new schools are being built at a record rate. Substantially increased food production and remarkably expanded educational facilities barely keep pace with population increase."

The report made the following points regarding progress toward other Alliance goals:

¶Taxation: Although tax collections have increased by 80 per cent since 1961 for all Latin America, there is need for more effective enforcement.

¶Public Health: There has been "dramatic progress" in this area but much remains to be done. The target of providing potable water to 70 per cent of the urban populations will be achieved by 1971. New or improved water supplies already have been provided for 43 million city dwellers, or 69 per cent of the total, but only 19 million out of a rural population of 128 million have been so benefited.

Deaths from communicable diseases have been reduced markedly since 1961, but still are 10 times the rate for North America.

¶Agrarian reform: The member nations with some exceptions, such as Mexico, Venezuela and Chile, have not yet effectively "tackled this major

¶Monetary and Fiscal Stability: Most countries have managed to keep a reasonable degree of price stability despite increased public expenditures. Nine countries had inflation of less than 3 per cent annually. In three others, price increases amounted to about 6 per cent a year. But stabilization is still "precarious" in Brazil, Chile and Columbia.

¶Income Distribution: The only indicators available show little change from 1960. A study showed remarkably similar income structures, with the top 10 per cent of the population receiving 40 per cent of the income in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The bottom 40 per cent of the population received 10 to 14 per cent of total income in those countries.

¶Education: Enrollment of school-age children in primary schools increased by about 50 per cent between 1960 and 1967, or from 24 million to 36 million. But there were 27 million children not enrolled in primary schools in 1967—740,000 more than in 1960.

With an expansion by 1979 of primary education facilities sufficient to give all school-age children six years of schooling before their 15th birthday, the adult illiteracy rate would be reduced to about 37 per cent, or some three-fifths of the 1964 rate, which was 62.1 per cent

WASHINGTON POST
23 March 1969

A Non-Catastrophic View

Economic Calamity for Latin America

Can Be Averted, Prebisch Says

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By Richard Halloran
Washington Post Staff Writer

Dr. Haul Prebisch, Latin America's best-known economist, leaned back in his chair and said emphatically: "No, no, no, not at all."

He waved his hand to reject the prediction of prominent British author and philosopher C. P. Snow that the advanced nations would be in a "state of seige" by the frustrated, famine-stricken underdeveloped nations within 20 years.

Prebisch, who is identified throughout the world as a leading spokesman for the underdeveloped countries, said, "I don't see it from a catastrophic or

catastrophic point of view. Disaster is quite avoidable provided we recognize the complexity, the seriousness, and the urgency of the problem."

Snow has magnified the problem all out of proportion," Prebisch continued. "People like that have introduced an element of confusion and unnecessary pessimism. They have exaggerated the degree of resources needed to stimulate development."

Snow gave his gloomy forecast last fall at Westminster College, in Fulton, Mo., in the same forum that the late Winston Churchill made his famous "Iron Curtain" speech 20 years ago. He now urged the advanced nations to embark immediately on a coordinated

development program to avert worldwide calamity. He recommended that they allocate up to 20 per cent of their gross national products to economic aid for the next 10 to 15 years.

Prebisch Gives Target

"That's ridiculous," Prebisch said. "The target I'd like to see is one per cent of GNP every year." Few nations come close to that level today. Prebisch further advocated "convergent measures from internal and external sources to thrust underdeveloped countries into self-sustained economic programs."

Prebisch has come to Washington, where he expects to spend half his

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

time, to be a member of the Inter-American Development Bank and other inter-American and international institutions concerned with Latin American development. Specifically, he will guide a study of financial resources available to Latin America.

He plans to spend the other half of his time mainly as head of the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning in Chile and occasionally as special adviser to U.N. Secretary General U Thant on global strategy for economic development.

Prebisch, an Argentine, served as head of his nation's central bank until he fell out with President Juan Peron. He moved on to become Executive Secretary of the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) from 1948 to 1963, then was head of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) until a few weeks ago.

The career of Prebisch has not been without controversy.

His critics contend that he puts too much emphasis on economic planning and not enough on practical application, that he is too much a blue-sky thinker and is an indifferent administrator, that his ideas are socialistic and anti-American.

His defenders, however, verge on the passionate in their praise. They argue that he is an earthshaker in his ideas, that he is an innovator in a classical sense, that his broad prescriptions for economic development on a continental or hemispheric, or global scale provide an essential framework for implementation.

Prebisch is intense and persuasive in conversation but is an emotionally-controlled Latin American. He is articulate in English, which he speaks with a slight Spanish accent, but is more expressive with his hands. He punctuates his discussion by jabbing the air with a forefinger, rapping the desk with his knuckles, or sweeping his hands in wide circular motions.

Prebisch sat in his simply-appointed office at the IDB the other day explaining why Latin America, a potentially rich region, has not made more economic progress and what needs to be done.

He said that the planning in the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy's grand strategy for Latin American economic development, and all the other plans had provided an incentive but had not been translated into practical measures.

"Planning can't just be superimposed and machinery set up," Prebisch maintained. "Economic progress takes a change in attitude and discipline to give continuity and support to development."

"The responsibility is fundamentally that of the Latin American countries themselves," he said. "But the problem of attitudes there is that governments tend to solve problems day-to-day and ignore programs that take years to emerge."

"It is indispensable to have a deep transformation in the economic and social structure," he said. The question is: Can the transformation come in an orderly and non-violent way or will it be by violence? If Latin America

continues to drift, the accumulation of violence will break out someday."

Cites Mexico's Growth

Prebisch pointed to Mexico, which he said has had a "very satisfactory rate of growth—6 or 7 percent a year, sometimes a little more. Why? Because Mexico had a deep social revolution, a breaking up of the old economic and social structure and a period of violent upheaval."

"All of the dynamic elements of youth cannot be absorbed by the present economic and social system," he said. "These are the frustrated people and the next 20 years will be difficult from their point of view."

Prebisch contended, however, that violence is not necessary for change. Prebisch continues to advocate overall planning. "You can't take one factor and isolate it and say this is the solution." He said that problems of agricultural production, land reform, the formation of an entrepreneurial class, industrial development, capital investment into infrastructure, and population control all must be pursued at the same time.

But, Prebisch argued, "the best internal policies are bound to fail if there is not a simultaneous policy of international cooperation. The increase in the rate of investment has to be supported by a transfer of international resources."

The lag in Latin American economic development, Prebisch maintained, is due to a combination of internal and external factors. It will take a combination of internal and external forces, he said, to overcome it.

WASHINGTON POST
3 April 1969

Growth of Cities Seen Peril to Latin America

By A. D. Horne
Washington Post Staff Writer

Economic growth in Latin America speeded up last year, but the region's cities are growing too fast for its food production and for "its capacity to provide efficient employment," the Inter-American Development Bank reported yesterday.

In the eighth annual report of its Social Progress Trust Fund, established in 1961 to finance social development projects in 20 Latin American countries, the Bank estimated a regional growth rate of 5 to 5.5 per cent in 1968. Assuming the region's population growth continues at the same rate, this would bring per capita GNP (gross national product) gain close to the Alliance for Progress target of 2.5 per cent.

But the Bank's report warned that "the rapid rate of urbanization . . . may lead to serious problems." Cities of 20,000 or more grew from 25 per cent of the region's population in 1950 to nearly 33 per cent in 1960, and are expected to contain more than 60 per cent of the population by 1980, the Bank reported.

One U.S. official, in Congressional testimony last month, estimated that while Latin America's population is doubling itself every 20 years, the labor force grows at a

doubling every 10 years. Much of this growth, the Bank said, is in migration from rural areas so depressed that despite "the risk of not finding adequate employment in the city, . . . little is lost by abandoning the farm."

The Bank warned that "virtual stagnation of yields per person" has held down farm productivity "far below the level . . . required to support a vigorous and sustained development of the urban sector."

Progress in land reform has been "disappointing," the Bank declared, and "some of the best land" remains "very much under-utilized" while "the labor force grows at a

new jobs in non-agricultural activities." "Despite the impressive development trends in Latin American industry over the decade, the over-all growth rate of the (manufacturing) sector has gradually weakened during the past few years," the Bank warned.

And, while urban growth in the advanced countries has been accompanied by rapid expansion of manufacturing jobs, the Bank found it disturbing that in Latin America a larger share of new jobs has gone into less productive "service activities."

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

NEW YORK TIMES 2 May 1969 **McNamara Appeals For Population Curb In Notre Dame Talk**

By JOHN D. MORRIS
Special to The New York Times

SOUTH BEND, Ind., May 1

Robert S. McNamara, addressing a predominantly Roman Catholic audience, appealed today for a "humane but massive" reduction in the world rate of population growth.

The former Secretary of Defense, now president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, received an honorary doctor of laws degree from the University of Notre Dame at a solemn academic convocation in the university's athletic and convocation center.

A Presbyterian, he acknowledged that "it may seem strange that I should speak at a center of Catholic thought on this awkward issue."

"I have chosen to discuss the problem," he explained, "because my responsibilities as president of the World Bank compel me to be candid about the blunt facts affecting the prospects for global develop-

ment. Mr. McNamara said that current birth rates throughout the emerging world were "seriously crippling economic development efforts."

Diversion of Savings

"The reason," he said, "is that these governments must divert an inordinately high proportion of their limited national savings away from productive investment simply in order to maintain the current low level of existence."

He said that new capital that cannot be invested in "other desperately needed sectors" of the economy must be diverted to food, clothing, housing, medical care and at least minimal educational services for "mounting waves" of children in underdeveloped countries.

"A treadmill economy tends to emerge in which the total national effort will exhaust itself in running faster and faster merely to stand still," he contended.

He called this a "cruel and self-perpetuating dilemma" of governments of underdeveloped countries as "their plans for progress evaporate into massive efforts merely to maintain the status quo."

Mr. McNamara also deplored "the tragic truth" of high abortion rates, particularly in Latin America.

"The conclusion is clear, I think," he said, without mentioning that the Catholic Church

resistance to birth control programs of the Latin-American and Philippine governments.

"Where the public authorities will not assist parents to avoid unwanted births," he said, "the parents will often take matters into their own hands — at whatever cost to conscience and health."

A Right of Parents

Mr. McNamara emphasized his belief that it was right for parents themselves to decide the size of their own families. It would be an "intolerable invasion" of a family's rights for a government to use coercive measures, he said.

"But," he maintained, "the notion that family planning programs are sinister, coercive plots to force poor people into something they do not want is absurd. The pervasive prevalence of voluntary illegal abortion should be enough to dispel that fiction."

Mr. McNamara disavowed any desire to reduce the population of any country. Instead, he advocated the reduction of population growth rates to a level that would allow a significant increase in per capita income.

He said there was barely sufficient time to avert "wholesale famine," but he expressed confidence that "application of the new technology will dramatically expand the rate of agricultural growth and will buy two decades of time—admittedly the barest minimum of

to cope with the population explosion, and reduce it to manageable proportions."

Without referring directly to the Catholic Church's opposition to artificial contraception Mr. McNamara mentioned "certain precise and painful moral dilemmas."

He predicted that the population problem would be solved "one way or the other."

"Are we to solve it by famine?" he asked. "Are we to solve it by riot, by insurrection, by the violence that desperately starving men can be driven to? Are we to solve it by wars of expansion and aggression? Or are we to solve it rationally and humanely in accord with man's dignity?"

"Providence, I think, has placed you and me—all of us—at that fulcrum point in history where a rational, responsible, moral solution to the population problem must be found. You and I, all of us, share the responsibility—a responsibility to find and apply that solution."

The Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame, thanked the speaker for "thoughtful, serious, moderate" advice.

"You have advanced a real problem assuming that we take it seriously, and we do," he said.

Mr. McNamara spoke at the dedication of the Hayes-Healy Center for studies in graduate business education.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 May 1969

U.N. Unit Sets 6% Growth Rate As Goal for Developing Lands

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., May 3

—An economic growth rate of 6 per cent a year for developing countries has been proposed by a major United Nations economic committee as the goal of international development efforts during the nineteen-seventies. The developing countries now average 4 per cent annual growth.

The 55-country preparatory committee for the second United Nations Development Decade, completed its first working session this week. It agreed tentatively to raise the growth target for developing countries from the 5 per cent annual goal used during the first Development Decade, which began in 1961.

Of the 86 United Nations members that are considered developing countries, only 27 have been able to maintain the annual economic growth rate of 5 per cent. Only 9 have reached the proposed rate of 6 per cent.

Committee discussions made it clear that most countries' development will be almost stagnant because of population increases that cancel increases in production of goods and services.

More Aid Needed

The inability of countries with per capita income of \$100 to \$250 a year to use domestic savings for rapid development

means that the new growth target will necessitate increased aid. During the first Development Decade, the goals called for the wealthier countries to provide aid equal to 1 per cent of their gross national product.

The committee also unanimously adopted a list of "key areas for international cooperation" to promote development.

Among the areas listed were these:

International trade, including a "scheme for preferences" to be granted to exports of developing countries.

Transfers of both foreign and private investment and agreement to protect developing countries from fluctuations

in commodity prices.

Human development, including education, housing, health, nutrition and population policy.

Diversification of production, including land reform to promote agriculture and the expansion of export-oriented industries.

The committee will continue its work in Geneva in July and report to the General Assembly here this fall. An international development strategy will be announced early next year.

The reluctance of the wealthier countries to guarantee aid and trade advantages from the developing countries during this decade.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Seabed Proposals

GENEVA.—Britain told the Disarmament Conference that listening devices fixed to the ocean floor must not be outlawed in any treaty limiting uses of the seabed, informed sources said.

Commenting on a draft treaty submitted by Russia, British Delegate Ivor Porter said any treaty which barred submarines from resting on the sea bottom also would be unacceptable.

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1969

Malthus Revisited

Were he alive now, Parson Malthus would have found much that was familiar in Robert S. McNamara's eloquent plea at Notre Dame for a sharp cutback in birth rates in the underdeveloped countries. Many of those nations are "treadmill economies" forced to divert already inadequate capital resources to the care of "mounting waves" of children whose immediate needs leave little left over for raising abysmally low standards of consumption and health. The choice, as Mr. McNamara correctly stated it, is between reducing birth rates humanely or letting the cruel forces of famine and war or other violence solve the population problem in their usual grim fashion.

The bleak statistics of the population crisis ahead are simple enough. If recent trends continue, humanity's numbers will double in the next thirty years—from about 3.5 billion now to 7 billion at the turn of the century—and reach 14 billion by 2035. Of the prospective increase between now and the year 2000, 85 per cent or more could be accounted for by larger numbers in the underdeveloped nations. If this arithmetic is the pattern of the future, then chaos and suffering on an almost unimaginable scale are certain.

Mr. McNamara may be too optimistic, if anything. He sees the current rapid advance of agricultural productivity as sufficient to buy two decades during which the world will have time to take measures needed to prevent catastrophe. But the increasing hundreds of millions in the underdeveloped areas want more than merely enough food to fill their bellies. Understandably they want a standard of living that will approach more closely the standard taken for granted in the developed countries. But this re-

quires precisely the capital that is being eaten up by the ceaseless flood of new-born life.

* * *

Strong as the case is for a systematic effort to reduce birth rates, the difficulties are formidable. There are great shortages of the funds and manpower needed to mount the required educational campaigns and to provide mechanical, pharmaceutical and other means of birth control. Even more fundamental is the resistance in many areas to the idea of reducing births. That resistance arises partly from religious taboos, partly from deeply grained cultural patterns grounded in the now obsolete wisdom of a past age, and partly from fears spread by demagogues that Western talk of birth control is really inspired by the desire to commit genocide and "demographic imperialism."

Mr. McNamara's campaign for population control should apply to all nations, the developed as well as the underdeveloped. Food is not the limiting factor in the former; but already important questions are being raised about how much this small planet's air, water and land can absorb in the way of automobile fumes, insecticides and other poisons, radioactive wastes and the other effluvia given off massively in modern industrial societies. The more people and the higher the standard of living they enjoy, the greater the volume of damage to the world environment as a whole. More, and more effective, measures of birth control are as essential in the have as in the have-not nations, and only their broad acceptance throughout the world during the next generation will prevent a convulsion that will make all questions of population control academic because then there won't be enough population left to control.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 July 1969

CPYRGHT

Population Growth Will Strain Latin America's Development

BY IRVING S. BENGELSDORF, Ph.D.
Times Science Writer

If the Rio Grande is considered to be the dividing line between North America and Latin America, then there now are more people living south of the river than to the north.

North America, with 225 million people—203 million in the United States and 22 million in Canada—has 44.9% of the 501 million people who live in the two Americas, and 55.1% of the inhabitants of the two Americas live in Latin America, with its 276 million people—in Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.

But human populations are not static; they are dynamic and growing. And the population of Latin America is growing almost three times as fast as is the population of North America. Thus, it is projected that by 1980 the population of the two Americas will be 640 million people—with 264 million (41%) in North America and 376 million (59%) in Latin America.

If this population growth difference continues, then by the year 2000, it is estimated there will be twice as many people south of the Rio Grande as north of the river.

Of the 276 million people that now live in Latin America, slightly more than half live in two countries—Brazil and Mexico. Brazil, with 90.6 million people, now has an annual population growth rate of 2.8% (for every 1,000 Brazilians there are 38 babies born and 10 people die). At this rate, Brazil's population will double in about 25 years. Brazil is

expected to have 124 million people by 1980.

Mexico, with 49 million people, now has an annual population growth rate of 3.4% (for every 1,000 Mexicans there are 43 babies born and 9 people die). At this rate, Mexico's population will double in about 21 years. Mexico is expected to have 71.4 million people by 1980.

More people need more food, water, shelter, clothing, jobs, education, electricity, transportation, etc. And it is precisely those nations with the highest population growth rates that now are having difficulty providing minimum goods and services to the population they already have, let alone be able to take care of the needs of exploding populations that will double in about 20-25 years.

And so, at East Setauket, Long Island, N.Y., on Saturday and Sunday, June 28 and 29, the Population Reference Bureau of Washington and the Tinker Foundation cosponsored the Third Dialog on Population Problems in Latin America. In attendance were publishers and editors of North American and Latin American newspapers. The Tinker Foundation was created in 1959 by the late Dr. Edward L. Tinker "to promote better understanding among the peoples of the world with a particular concern for the peoples of the Americas."

★

One of the four featured speakers at the meeting was Dr. Victor L. Urquidi, president of the College of Mexico, an outstanding graduate

and post-graduate school in Mexico City devoted to in-depth studies in the social sciences and humanities.

Dr. Urquidi emphasized that population problems in Latin America were due to the continued maintenance of a traditional high birth rate in the face of a non-traditional falling death rate. Thus, in the 30-year period 1930-1960, the death rate in Mexico of children one year and younger was reduced by 50%; the death rate of Mexican children in the age group 1-14 years was reduced by 75%; and the death rate of young Mexican adults in the age group 15-30 years was reduced by 60%.

Thus, both Mexico and Brazil now have about 45% of their populations under the age of 15. This is precisely that part of the population that must be supported by the rest of the population. And it also is that part of the population that will be of highest fertility in the near future.

★

Not only are Latin American populations increasing rapidly, but the added numbers of people are moving into already overcrowded cities in search of employment. Dr. Urquidi estimates that unemployment runs about 10-12%, and perhaps 25%, of the labor force as Latin American cities are incapable of absorbing the ever-growing number of people looking for work.

Under such continuing population pressures, Dr. Urquidi felt that future economic development of Latin America, indeed, did not look very promising.

7 October 1969

Brazil and population

Recent statements from Brazil show the need for patience and persuasion in the world's fight against overpopulation. Word from Brasilia is that (a) the government does not intend to lend any encouragement to birth control efforts despite that country's astronomical birthrate and widespread poverty, and (b) United States efforts to promote such control are designed to keep Brazil weak.

Patience is required because at so many points population control runs into outmoded but still active social, cultural, and religious taboos. Persuasion is required for Brazil's own present and future good, to say nothing about the world's good as a whole.

Frankly, we do not believe that Brazil, or any other land under the sun, will long hold out against the need and desirability of keeping population growth under control. In the first place, there is too much evidence of the harm done by reckless reproduction for any government to pretend ignorance of the facts. In the second, the last few years have seen land after land,

in which birth control was once anathema; swing over to government-sponsored efforts to control growth.

The real question is whether governments and peoples can succeed in time in bringing population expansion under control. In India, for example, the government is now committed to such control, yet there has been no appreciable slowing down in population growth, reckoned at about 12,000,000 yearly. The same is true in, say, Egypt and certain Latin-American countries.

Mere governmental determination to limit births is not enough. Yet this is the indispensable first step in most of the countries with overhigh rates. Thus the official Brazilian attitude, were it irreversible, could eventually turn out to be tragic. But too many other Latin-American countries have come to see the need for putting some rein on indiscriminate population growth for anyone to doubt that Brazil will eventually come to do the same out of sheer good sense and necessity.

WASHINGTON POST
22 October 1969

CPYRGHT

"A Moment in Human Destiny"

INTERNATIONAL development policy in the last 20 years has been dominated by the ending of the colonial era, with the launching on the world of a great armada of new nations sailing out boldly on the exhilarating but sometimes treacherous seas of independence; and at a time when the winds of a cold war were blowing.

The desire to preserve, in the new circumstances, old links and friendships, as well as

The accompanying is a partial text of a speech by Lester B. Pearson, former Canadian Prime Minister, at a development conference in Racine, Wis., last week. Mr. Pearson headed an international commission which recently urged the virtual doubling of foreign aid.

to keep out new and potentially hostile political influences, played a large, though by now a declining, part in the adoption of development strategies and the distribution of development aid by the older and richer countries. There were also two other more permanent factors underlying the policies of the participating states.

One was—and is—the realization that the headstart in industrialization and the early breakthrough to technology and science enjoyed by the so-called donor states gave them an extraordinary and preponderant control of the world's wealth-creating resources. In the late '50s, the people of our planet began to become aware of a "north-south" dimension, with 80 per cent of the wealth, the income and the resources of the world, and only 20 per cent of its people, to be found above the Tropic of Cancer. The gap between the two worlds of north and south, made by this concentration of wealth in a few countries, continues and increases. If present trends continue in the '70s our planet will be even more lopsided.

Moreover, this imbalance persists and increases in a world whose sense of unity is receiving in other respects a new stimulus. Will see the experience of space as hu-

manity's chief insight of the '60s. Gradually entering the world's consciousness like a silent and rising tide within the human imagination are those pictures taken from interstellar space, where our bright planet, Earth, full of life and light, hangs small, single and alone in the cold void . . .

LOPSIDED and unified, divided in resources and opportunities, but united by knowledge and communications, the world of the '60s takes into the next decade these old divisions and disproportions, but also new challenges and opportunities.

The drama of this moment in time lies in the fact that on the one hand we now have the knowledge and incentive to work towards a world community which recognizes the inescapability of interdependence; while, on the other, we do little enough to reflect that awareness in the social and economic policies of our separate sovereign states. So we must strengthen and improve international cooperation in many fields; including efforts to remove the shocking disparities of welfare and living standards between the two worlds of the rich and the poor. With these disparities there can be peace in the future . . .

WE ARE in an era of swift and often violent change. Doubts and fears and vast dissatisfactions surge up all round the developing world as the masses move from field to city and men struggle to achieve sense and mastery in their new way of life. Cities grow at twice, at even four times, the rate of population increase. The rural exodus has become a new "wandering of the peoples," surpassing 19th century movements in size and differing in that barriers and restrictions prevent the rural migrants from crossing seas and frontiers and finding new empty continents. The people now have to move, very largely, within the limits of their own countries.

Our development decades of the 19th century, for instance, saw vast transatlantic migrations, new lands opening up, fantastic breakthroughs in productivity and in communications. But in some ways the sequence of events is now much less favorable to continued development than it was a century ago. The dilemmas of today are rooted in much more stubborn obstructions and require far more aggressive, sustained and determined action to break through and launch the poorer countries into effective modernization and growth.

Population growth outpaces anything known in the 19th century and far exceeds the ability of developing communities to feed and employ the new multitudes. The population of the poorer countries—now nearly 2½ billions—will double in the next 30 years. In the 1950s and through most of the 1960s, food supplies in the developing world have lagged behind this

fantastic thrust of population growth. Developing nations again and again have had to use precious foreign exchange for the import of food, while the increase in exports necessary to pay for this food from their own resources has been held back, in part by local policy it is true, but also by the fact that it is made hard for newcomers to compete internationally in the field of trade against the established giants of Europe, Japan and the United States . . .

The seventies offer

us crisis, no doubt, but also vast opportunities for creative action. The first is the possibility of a complete reversal of fortune on the agricultural front. We are already seeing the consequences of this tremendous breakthrough to new productivity in the shape of rising grain productivity in large parts of Asia, and I suggest that if this technological change is rightly handled it can begin to reverse the fatalities of obstruction and stagnation through every aspect of developmental change.

INSOFAR as the new opportunities are seized by small farmers, backed by extension services and cooperatives, we shall create a more stable farm population. Under conditions of intensive agriculture, the land can for a time absorb more labor. We shall therefore slow down the exodus to urban life. A lively farming class will be a market for expanding industries and will feed the cities, releasing foreign exchange for technical and capital imports and for intermediate goods. At the same time, rising expectations, based on prosperous farming and expanding employment, will help to create the environment in which parents will seek responsibly to stabilize family size. Thus the spirals may begin to go into reverse and push society towards greater wealth and hope.

WE ARE at a moment in human destiny when the door can swing open to new opportunities and new hopes for the submerged 2 billion. The gates of the future are not closed. They are ajar. They will respond to a determined push . . .

Will we do it? Here I confess I hesitate between light and shadow. Light comes from our opportunities, our capacity for such a fantastic coordinated effort as a moon landing, from the moral urgency of the young, from their underlying demand for human unity. The dark comes from our record of fear and hate, our nationalist pre-occupations, our huge armaments which we feel must be maintained, our poisons and pollutions, the casual destructiveness of much of our technology; also from the record of declining public commitment to worldwide development and a trend of governments to look increasingly inwards, not outwards; and neglect the planetary environment they all help to create . . .

'A sea of famine' by the century's end

By C. P. SNOW

Lord Snow is a British scientist, novelist and former high-ranking government official who has written extensively on the interrelationships between his various interests. This article is excerpted from two lectures he delivered last week at Westminster College, Fulton, Mo.

IN many places and for many purposes, including some of the fundamental human purposes, there are already too many people in the world. Within a generation, there will be far too many. Within two or three generations—unless we show more sense, good will and foresight than men have ever shown—there will be tragically too many.

Everyone knows the brute facts. At the time of the first English settlements in America, there were something like a half billion human beings alive. When people still living were born, that figure, the population of the planet, was around one billion. It is now, in 1968, well over three billion. By 2000 A.D. it will be over six billion, and may be nearer seven billion.

Doubling the world population in 30 years. That is something new in history. On a small scale, countries like the United Kingdom, as they became industrialized, had rapid increases in population. The United Kingdom doubled its population between 1800 and 1850, and again between 1850 and 1900. We were relatively rich, and had the wheat fields of America to obtain food from. There has never been anything comparable on a world scale.

No problem for rich nations

It is not so much that more babies are being born: the point is, we are so much better at keeping people alive. Medicine has gone round the world, the poor world as well as the rich, quicker than anything else. Not only has infant mortality been reduced everywhere (remember, our great-grandparents, even the privileged in the most privileged countries, took the death of children as an inevitable fact of existence) but the length of life is also increasing everywhere. That is a triumph, and any decent human being rejoices in it. But it is presenting

us with a situation in some ways graver than we have known before, and one that we may not be able to control.

In the rich countries, food has ceased to be a problem. Industrialized agriculture has had its spectacular successes in the United States and Canada. If we wanted, we could grow more food. All over the northern hemisphere, population is rising relatively slowly: too fast for many amenities, but not fast enough to cause us the most brutal concerns.

Unfortunately, there are nearly twice as many people in the poor countries as in the rich. Further, there will—nothing can stop it—be an extra billion people added to the world population in the next ten years. Of those, rather more than three-quarters will be added to the poor.

The gap between the rich and poor countries is growing. Take the average daily income in a large slice of the poor countries. It is something like 35 cents a day. The average daily income in the United States is about \$8 a day—200 times greater. In 10 years it is likely to be 300 times greater.

Yes, those statements are cliches all right. Some of them are dreadful cliches: and I am using dreadful in its first meaning, that is, full of dread. The most dreadful of all—again, men of sober judgments have been saying it for years—is that many millions of people in the poor countries are going to starve to death before our eyes—or, to complete the domestic picture, we shall see them doing so upon our television sets.

How soon? How many deaths? Can they be prevented? Can they be minimized?

Those are the most important questions in our world today. Much more important than all the things which fret us in Western societies, student power, racial conflicts, the disaffection of the young. Though I believe there is an invisible connection between our local problems and the catastrophic world one.

To answer those questions we have to rely to an extent upon judgment, which is really informed guessing. Most of the expert demographers and the agronomists take the most pessimistic view.

But I want to stress that neither the

extent of this catastrophe, nor the time it will happen, nor whether it will go on indefinitely or be controlled, can be precisely calculated. There are too many unknowns. One of the unknowns, or half-knowns, gives a glimmer of partial hope. I shall deal with that shortly. The only contribution I can make is to give my own judgment, for what it is worth. It is worth only as much or as little as anyone else's who can read the evidence. I am neither a demographer nor an agronomist. And there are different stresses of opinion among those who know most, and some areas of disagreement.

Scientists seek time

It is common ground that, in large parts of the poor world, in sections of Asia, Africa, Latin America, the collision between rising population and available food is very near. The demographers say that there is no method of curtailing population growth within ten years. With great good fortune, and world effort, a little might just conceivably be done in 20 or 30 years. They call on the agronomists to pull something out of the bag to give the demographers enough time.

The agronomists—or a large proportion of them—make exactly the same demand, in reverse. Can the demographers reduce the human increase soon enough to give them—the people working on tropical agriculture—enough time?

Most informed opinion believes that neither step is going to happen in time: that is, the collision is going to take place. At best, this will mean local famines to begin with. At worst, the local famines will spread into a sea of hunger. The usual date predicted for the beginning of the local famines is 1975 to 1980.

The only rational ground for putting this date further into the future is the hope of increasing food production. In fact, this is the chief area of disagreement between responsible men. Here, as it happens, there is the glimmer, the ray of hope, that I mentioned. In the midst of the bleak prospect, there is one genuine piece—though in the long term it must not be overestimated—of good news.

In the 1967-1968 season, the wheat harvest in India was 17,000,000 metric tons.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

in 1961-1962, which had better weather, the harvest was 12,000,000 metric tons. Very nearly the same increase, and the same kind of record harvest, has been grown in Pakistan. For the moment, the fear of hunger has been beaten back from the subcontinent.

This is a success story, carefully planned, and the result of many years work. A great deal of the credit, and it is pleasant to say it here in the middle of the United States, goes to two great private foundations, the Rockefeller and the Ford.

Progress with rice

Dwarf wheat strains have been developed which have a high degree of resistance to tropical conditions. That took getting on for twenty years. In 1962 the Indians decided their best chance was to import those wheat strains. Their own research workers have introduced other genetic characteristics into them. The Pakistanis did precisely the same two

years later, and produced their own Mexipak strain.

Something of the same nature, again supported by the two foundations, is happening to rice. There is an International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, which started in 1962 and has been producing a high yielding and disease-resisting strain of rice. The most promising one, called IR8, has already been exported to Asia and South America. With any luck, more hunger will be pushed back for a while.

Well, this is good news. In making one's judgment of the future, it is a factor. We mustn't lose our heads, one way or the other. The limits to food production, even when as deeply planned, as this, seem to be quite sharp. The population increase has no such limits. The collision is still on.

The guess I should now make—as I said, this is no more useful than that of anyone else who reads the evidence—is that large-scale famine will not happen as early as 1975 or 1980. There will

probably (it is a bitter thing to say) be serious local famines, in, for instance, Latin America and parts of Africa. The major catastrophe will happen before the end of the century. We shall, in the rich countries, be surrounded by a sea of famine, involving hundreds of millions of human beings, unless three tremendous social tasks are by then in operation. Not just one alone, but all three. They are:

1. A concerted effort by the rich countries to produce food, money and technical assistance for the poor.
2. An effort by the poor countries themselves, on the lines of India and Pakistan, to revolutionize their food production.

3. An effort by the poor countries—with all the assistance that can be provided under the first point—to reduce or stop their population increase; with a corresponding reduction in the population increase in the rich countries also.

Those are the three conditions, all necessary, if we are to avoid social despair.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 April 1969

CPYRGHT

TOPICAL COMMENT: NUMBER ONE PROBLEM

Overpopulation and World Starvation

David Kaplan is assistant professor of economics at Santa Monica City College.

BY DAVID KAPLAN

According to the best scholarly estimates, it took thousands of years to reach a world population of 250 million by AD 1. By 1650 world population doubled to 500 million. Another doubling took place by 1850, when world population reached one billion. Then, 80 years later in 1930, population doubled again to two billion people. By 1975, 45 years later, if present trends continue, population will have doubled to four billion people.

At our present rate of growth, we can look forward to 14 billion people in 2035 and 28 billion by 2070. Why has there been such an acceleration of growth in world population? The answers are easy.

Medical advances have eradicated the dreaded plagues of the past centuries and conquered other serious diseases by devising processes which make our food and drinking water clean. In addition, modern sanitation has sharply reduced the incidence of diseases such as malaria.

In short, we have instituted various forms of death control.

No longer, and happily so, is world population going to be decreased by any of the ancient pandemics. While we should applaud these medical advances which have saved so many lives all over the world, we also must observe that historically it was high death rates that accounted for the slower rates of population increase.

Economies Are Hit Hard

The eradication of high death rates while high birth rates continue has led to an increase in the rate of world population growth which in many cases has had pernicious economic effects, particularly on the underdeveloped nations.

If one were to describe these economies generally, one would see a pattern of poverty, capital shortages, low agricultural productivity, and unequal distribution of income. One would

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

also... located in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Perversely, these areas have the highest rates of population growth, which act as a serious drag on economic growth. More people mean more mouths to feed. This cuts down the amount of product that can be saved. With low savings rates, little capital is available to modernize agriculture and industry—a modernization these economies desperately need if they are going to increase their production of food and other products.

What little production is obtained, say in agriculture, must be immediately consumed. These economies thus have very low savings rates, and these translate into low rates of capital formation. One of the basic prerequisites for economic growth for these economies—increasing levels of capital accumulation—is being seriously impeded by rapidly increasing populations.

Latin America in Trouble

Latin America clearly reflects how population increases have all but eradicated economic growth. Latin America has had a 4.7% increase in gross national product annually. However, when you include population growth of 3% yearly, the per capita growth rate actually comes down to 1.7% annually.

In 1900 Latin America had a population of 63 million. It now has a population of 268 million. This population, if the present rates of increase continue, will double in 23 years. By the end of the century, Latin America will have 650 million people. It will be growing then at a rate of 100 million people every 5 years. Obviously, with geometric population increases of this magnitude, Latin America will be very fortunate if it is able to record *any* per capita growth in the final 30 years of this century.

All of these areas which have rapidly increasing populations have extremely low annual per capita incomes: under \$400 for Latin America and under \$150 for Africa and Asia. (Those incomes look especially low when compared to North America's annual per capita income of well over \$3,500.) Yet, Africa and Asia have rates of population increase which will result in a doubling of both their populations by the year 2000.

Latin America, Africa, and Asia have approximately 2.6 billion people now. If present rates of population increase continue, these areas will have approximately 5.3 billion by the end of the century.

The ominous consequences of this spiraling population growth are clear.

First, there will be a continued exacerbation of the gross inequalities in the shares of world income going to the underdeveloped countries and to the developed nations. Economist Barbara Ward, in her book *The Lopsided World*, states that 80% of the world output is now going to only 20% of the world's population. This inequality will become even more pronounced if the underdeveloped nations continue to experience rapid population growth.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

However, India's annual population growth is about 2.5%. Thus, her per capita increase in income is only about 1% yearly or, in dollar terms, about 75 cents. The U.S. per capita increase in income is about 3% yearly or, in dollar terms, about \$120.

For the near future, at the very least, we are going to have wider disparities in the shares of income between the "have" and the "have not" nations. Rapid population growth can only accelerate these disparities.

Second, the famines that the people of various nations are experiencing now will be dwarfed by even more massive and prolonged famines in the 1970's. William and Paul Paddock, writing in *Famine—1975!* have said that the people are already born who will be the future victims of the race between food and population growth—a race which, according to the authors, already has been lost.

Furthermore, population pressures have already compelled the poorer countries to become importers of basic foodstuffs where, in the recent past, they were exporting these commodities.

Thus, Tadd Fisher writes that before World War II, Africa, Asia, and Latin America exported 11 million tons of grain yearly. By 1961, they were importing 25 million tons yearly. In addition, and even more ominously, she reports that Latin America's population increased 11.5% between 1959 and 1964, but food production increased only 6.5%. Thus, we see more evidential support for the accuracy of the predictions of more pervasive famines in the 1970's.

Third, the low incomes and prevalence of hunger in the poorer countries can only mean a continuance of political instabilities. It is the underdeveloped nations that are most often wracked by military coups, civil wars, and violent revolutions. Future uncontrolled population growth can only increase these instabilities.

Fourth, overpopulation means increased pollution. In the United States we are caught between two very malevolent forces: a population that will grow from roughly 200 million today to 300 million in the next 35 years; and an increase by 1980 in our urban population to 175 million people. The results of these two forces are already discernible. A growing population consumes more energy, drives more cars, and produces more waste products. All this will result in our air and water becoming even more contaminated than they are now.

Massive Commitment Needed

It is easy to come to the conclusion that some drastic measures must be taken immediately. It is imperative first of all that we have a massive increase in resources committed to the overpopulation problem. Special care should be taken with the underdeveloped

It should be made abundantly clear to these

vations that excessive population growth is one of the central reasons for their lack of economic development. Family planning programs should be initiated where the country does not have a program, and the program should be strengthened and extended where we find one already initiated. Further, more research should be done to discover the most effective methods of family planning. We must realize, however, that even effective voluntary systems of family planning may not be a total answer to the problem. We are at a point in time when serious consideration may have to be given to mandatory governmental programs for population control.

It is obvious from the evidence that it is already too late for many people now living. We must be concerned, however, that the millions who are going to starve to death in the 1970's should not be followed by many more millions, yet unborn, in the 1980's.

Queries for Opponents

Those who argue against contraception and family planning on the basis of their fundamental immorality must be prepared to answer the following questions:

Is it moral to bring a child into a world

where he will suffer daily the ravages of hunger, where the poverty is so abject and the life of that child so desperate that an early death is hoped for as a way to end his seemingly interminable suffering?

Is it moral to add to the two-thirds of the world's population, approximately 2.5 billion people, who are living in a dehumanizing poverty?

Is it moral to markedly increase the pollution of our air and water?

No one, of course, would claim that increasing the levels of poverty and starvation, pollution and filth, pain and suffering is moral; yet, if we tacitly assent to the present rates of world population growth, we are then implicitly consenting to this claim. *That* is the immorality, not the advocacy of birth control and family planning.

In the time it took you to read this article the population of the world increased by approximately 750 people. Each day the world adds 190,000 more humans, each year approximately 70 million. Given the present food-population ratio, millions of these are doomed to early tragic deaths. If we do not act now, countless millions more, yet unborn, will face the same fate.

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

November 1969

THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT

Origins of the Islamic Summit

The idea of holding a conference of the Muslim heads of state and of creating an Islamic Bloc is not a new one; it has been under discussion and consideration for a number of years, particularly since 1960. Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have strongly supported the idea, but its most persistent and active advocate has been King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. In fact, since 1965 in particular, the convocation of a Muslim summit and the gathering of the various Muslim states into a cohesive bloc has been one of the principal objectives of Saudi government policy and diplomatic activity. King Faysal's interest in this concept stems from his deep religious faith; from his official position as the defender of Muslim holy places, not only in Saudi Arabia but throughout the world, especially Jerusalem and its holy Muslim shrines; and from his sincere and well-founded conviction that close association with the other Muslim nations and frequent Muslim gatherings at various official and non-official levels would greatly help the Arab causes.

Because of the violent opposition of the radical Arab states, especially the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq, neither a Muslim summit nor an Islamic Bloc materialized. Imbued with almost xenophobic nationalism and socialist concepts generally opposed to religion, these states insisted that only Arab nationalism and socialism can help the Arabs and attacked Muslim solidarity as a reactionary movement.

Al-Aqsa Fire

The catalyst which galvanized the Muslim world into united action was the fire which destroyed part of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969. The compound which contains al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock that adjoins it is called al-Haram al-Sharif (The Sacred Grounds) and is regarded as the third holiest shrine of Islam after al-Ka'bah in Mecca and the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. According to Muslim tradition, the prophet Mohammad journeyed to heaven from al-Haram al-Sharif. For this reason the city of Jerusalem is regarded by Muslims the world over as the third most holy city after Mecca and Medina.

The fire at al-Aqsa Mosque was started by a young Australian -- Michael Dennis William Rohan, a Christian fanatic with an apparently unbalanced mind. However, almost all the Arab states accused Israel of direct responsibility for the fire, of secretly instigating it.

That very day, 21 August, King Husayn of Jordan sent an urgent appeal to all Arab and Muslim heads of states in which he called for a Muslim summit meeting: "I have therefore turned to you on this gloomy day to wake your consciences and to urge you to meet immediately to shoulder your responsibilities to God and your people. I also appeal to my brothers, the leaders

of all the Muslims, and urge them and their people to participate -- immediately and effectively -- in the work to save their Jerusalem...."

Most of the Muslim states responded affirmatively to King Husayn's appeal including Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. Of special interest in this connection, however, were the replies of King Faysal of Saudi Arabia and President Nasser of the U.A.R.

On 23 August King Faysal appealed to all "Moslem leaders and their people throughout the world to come forward armed with faith, ... to liberate Islamic holy places in dear Jerusalem." At the same time, he sent a message to King Husayn in which he said, "I support Your Majesty's desire for an Islamic summit conference since most Islamic countries have hastened to support us in a just cause. Islamic support is the foundation of this cause...."

In a letter to his war minister, General Muhammad Fawzi, President Nasser proclaimed that only a successful war with Israel can guarantee Arab rights and the salvation of Muslim holy places in Palestine. On August 27 Nasser sent King Husayn a message in which he endorsed both an Arab summit and an Islamic summit provided the latter be preceded by a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Muslim states, and provided that both the foreign ministers' meeting and the Summit Conference be held in Saudi Arabia. He also sent a message to King Faysal to the same effect. Thus, with Nasser's blessing, one of the major hurdles to the holding of an Islamic summit was surmounted.

There has been considerable speculation as to why Nasser would approve such a conference after he had opposed it for years. Some speculate that Nasser believed that an Islamic summit could never take place. If the conference failed to materialize, the idea of Islamic solidarity would have been dealt a death blow. On the other hand, if it took place and succeeded, he could claim part of the credit by his endorsement of it. It has also been reported that Nasser hoped that through an Islamic summit, moderate states such as Morocco, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan might be able to influence the West to put pressure on Israel. It is ironic that after attacking the leaders of these states for years, especially Iran, as imperialist stooges, Nasser should now turn to them for assistance. This also shows that by his continued enmity towards the West, President Nasser has lost a great deal of his political maneuverability and has become almost a captive of his own foreign policy.

At any rate, an emergency meeting of the Arab foreign ministers was held in Cairo on 25-26 August to consider the al-Aqsa crisis. The conference, which was attended by representatives from all the Arab states, issued a final statement in which it endorsed the holding of an Islamic summit and entrusted Morocco and Saudi Arabia with the task of making the

necessary arrangements for its convocation.

The Preparatory Meeting

At the initiative of Morocco and Saudi Arabia, intensive consultations took place among the various Muslim states. These resulted in the formation of a preparatory committee composed of the representative of seven Muslim states: Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Somalia.

The committee met at Rabat, Morocco on 8-9 September and agreed that a conference of the Muslim heads of states would be held at Rabat from 22 to 24 September 1969 "to discuss the question of al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy City of Jerusalem."

Attendance at the Conference

Morocco, being the host country, issued the invitations to the conference. No official list of the invitees has ever been published, but informed sources believe that about 32 nations were invited.

Ultimately, twenty-five nations accepted the invitations and attended the conference: Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Yemen.

Nine states -- Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Somalia -- were represented by their respective heads of state, while several other countries were represented by prime ministers or vice-presidents.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was accorded an "Observer" status.

Indian Representation

The major issue which marred the rather smooth proceedings of the conference was the question of Indian participation. Although India has a minority of over sixty million Muslims, it was not originally invited. On 23 September, however, the conference invited India to send an "official government delegation on behalf of the Muslim minority of India." The following day, 24 September, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan declared that if the Indian delegation were seated the Pakistani delegation would boycott the conference on the grounds the representatives of Indian Muslims should have been invited instead of an official Indian Government delegation.

The presence of an Indian delegation in Rabat and Pakistani opposition

to it created an embarrassing impasse. Moreover, Morocco, Jordan, Iran and Turkey declared that they, too, would boycott the conference if the Pakistani delegation was not completely satisfied. Ultimately, after stormy debates, it was decided that in the interest of Muslim unity the invitation to the Indians should be withdrawn and India was so informed.

Regardless of the merits of the respective Pakistani and Indian positions, the barring of the Indian delegation from attending the conference was an embarrassing and humiliating experience for India. India has always cultivated the radical Arab states and supported the Arab extremist positions in the Palestine conflict. However, in its hour of need, many of its radical Arab friends failed to come to its assistance entirely, while the efforts of other friends proved fruitless. As might be expected, the moderate Arab states which had been neglected by India sided with Pakistan.

In retaliation for its humiliation at Rabat, India subsequently withdrew its top diplomatic representatives from both Morocco and Jordan, while several Indian political figures have called upon their government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

Absence of Iraq and Syria

Although all the Arab states had endorsed the holding of an Islamic summit in the unanimous statement of the Arab foreign ministers, both Syria and Iraq not only refused to attend but attacked the conference bitterly. It is to be noted that both countries are ruled by the Ba'th Party. The Ba'th is socialist and many aspects of its philosophy are identical with communist doctrine. Although it is not openly opposed to religion, it frowns on it. This is probably the real reason why both countries refused to attend a religious Muslim gathering.

Moreover, when it became certain that the conference would be held, President Nasser of the UAR tried his best to torpedo the meeting. He proposed that the conference should be postponed indefinitely and that, in any case, it be preceded by a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Muslim states. When this attempt failed, President Nasser conveniently developed severe influenza -- believed by almost everyone to have been "diplomatic illness" -- and failed to show up. Instead, he sent a delegation headed by Anwar al-Sadat, chairman of the national assembly.

As a general rule, all the Arab radical states were and are still opposed to an Islamic summit meeting. Even those which did attend the conference, such as the UAR, Sudan, South Yemen, and Yemen, played essentially negative and disruptive roles, and contributed virtually nothing to the success of the gathering.

It is probably no coincidence that the leaders of all these states are very closely tied to the Soviet Union -- politically, economically,

militarily and ideologically -- and are generally opposed to religion. The Soviet Union, aside from its well-known hostility to religion, has attacked most vehemently the idea of Muslim solidarity and the convening of an Islamic summit.

Declaration of the Conference

The conference lasted from 22 to 25 September (instead of ending on 24 September, as was originally planned). A declaration was issued which included the following principal points:

1. It expressed the "deepest grief" of 600 million Muslims over the al-Aqsa fire. It stated that all the participant governments in the conference reject any solution to the Palestine problem which does not include the return of Jerusalem to its pre-June 1967 status. It asked Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States "to take into consideration the profound attachment of the Islamic faithful to the city of Jerusalem and the solemn resolution of their governments to struggle for its liberation."

2. It demanded "the quick withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the territories they occupied following the June 1967 war...."

3. It declared the full support of the participants "to the Palestinian people for the establishment of their deprived rights in their struggle for national liberation."

4. It was agreed that the foreign ministers of the Muslim states would meet during March 1970 in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, to discuss the creation of a permanent secretariat and the execution of the summit resolutions, pending the liberation of Jerusalem.

Achievements of the Conference

In many respects the Islamic summit conference was a resounding success. In large measure its success was due to the positive leadership and active, constructive participation of King Hassan of Morocco, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, King Husayn of Jordan, the Shah of Iran, and President Boumedienne of Algeria. It was the moderation of these leaders, their ability to present reasonable proposals and to smooth over problems, that was mainly responsible not only for the success of the conference but also the gains made for the Arab cause.

In contrast some of the Arab delegations such as those of Libya, the Sudan, and the United Arab Republic acted mainly as a disruptive influence by their extremism and unreasonable demands, which were unacceptable to the conference at large. In fact, by their actions they harmed the Arab cause, as they tended to antagonize and alienate some non-Arab delegations.

The achievements of the conference are many: In the first place, it was the first time in history that such a Muslim conference has ever been held. As King Hassan of Morocco said, the fact the conference took place at all is in itself a "miracle of God." It is not an easy matter to gather together the leaders of twenty-five nations representing some 300 million Muslims scattered throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Second, the summit was a gathering of Muslim representatives and not an Arab conference. The fact that such a high level meeting could be convened in the extremely brief time of less than two weeks demonstrated in a spectacular manner that Muslims throughout the world do have a common bond, that Islamic solidarity is not a myth.

Third, through the influence and moral suasion of Kings Hassan, Faysal and Husayn and President Boumedienne, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was accorded "observer" status and allowed to air its view. This was the first time that PLO has ever been given international recognition outside strictly Arab gatherings. Moreover, through the influence of these same leaders, the agenda of the conference was expanded from the limited consideration of al-Aqsa fire and the status of Jerusalem into the wider field of the entire Palestine conflict.

Fourth, by rejecting the extremist demands of some of the Arab delegations and following a moderate course, the conference was able to adopt a final declaration acceptable to all participants.

Finally, the conference established a precedent for high level Muslim gatherings and formalized Muslim cooperation. Indeed, it represents a beginning rather than an end; as a result a Muslim Bloc is apparently now in the making. In the final declaration, the participants pledged to cooperate with each other for the welfare of the Muslim community, and it was agreed that the Muslim foreign ministers would meet in Jiddah in March 1970 to establish a permanent secretariat and to consider the implementation of the conference resolutions.

The meeting also had several positive byproducts:

Until recently Morocco claimed Mauritania as part of its territory. Nevertheless, President Daddah of Mauritania was invited and did attend the Rabat conference. Through the mediation of President Boumedienne, King Hassan had a long meeting with President Daddah during which they apparently resolved many of their differences. It seems that Morocco has given up its claim to Mauritania and is about to recognize that country.

Relations between Algeria and Morocco have been cool for a number of years. Boumedienne's attendance at the conference and his moderate attitude, along with the considerate position of King Hassan as the host, seem to have helped break the ice.

And finally, it has been reported that unofficial positive contacts took place between the Saudi and Yemeni delegations. If this is true, it may pave the way to more fruitful discussions at higher levels and to normalizing the relations between these two countries which have been at odds with each other since the overthrow of the monarchy in Yemen in 1962.

Cooling off

Arabs dampen fuse of 'holy war' threat

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Beirut, Lebanon

The Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Cairo this week has dampened the burning fuse of religious feeling over the El Aksah mosque fire in Jerusalem.

Fourteen Arab states have, in effect, filed the matter away for future attention by asking King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan II of Morocco to call a conference of all Islamic nations to consider Israel's control of holy places in Jerusalem.

The foreign ministers agreed to defer the question of holding an Arab summit conference, at least until a meeting of the Arab League Defense Council in Cairo during the first week of November. This would probably postpone an Arab summit until early next year.

The foreign ministers also reaffirmed full support of the Palestine commandos, who on Aug. 26 mounted a number of rocket attacks on Israel, including one on a Jewish suburb of Jerusalem.

A communiqué issued after the Aug. 25-26 meeting in Cairo added that the commandos should be given "freedom of action" and that the "resistance capacity" of Palestinians in Israeli occupied territories must be reinforced.

Cairo commentaries after the meeting suggested, in fact, that the ministers agreed to concentrate the main Arab military effort in mounting guerrilla operations, at least until regular Arab armies can implement mobilization plans.

The foreign ministers' meeting had been called, in haste and in anger, during the initial furor caused by the mosque fire Aug. 21. It considered several basic alternatives.

President Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan wanted an early Arab summit. King Faisal preferred a wider meeting of Islamic states, perhaps including as many as 30, on Jerusalem.

The Palestinians, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), demanded "immediate mobilization of the military and economic resources of the Arabs for a war of liberation."

The final majority decision in favor of an Islamic meeting, which would include pro-Western countries and those having relations with Israel, like Turkey and Iran, is considered here a relative victory for moderation, despite the "holy war" phraseology of Saudi and other commentaries.

Surprising some observers, President Nasser threw his own support to the Islamic concept. This was in total contrast to his past opposition to such an idea, first raised by King Faisal and his advisers in 1965 as a move to combat Mr. Nasser's influence in the Arab world.

[Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has sent a memorandum on the burning of the El Aksah mosque to governments throughout the world, Reuters reported.

[The memorandum outlined Israel's view of developments before and after the fire. It did not call for any action.

[Earlier Mr. Eban denounced Arab propaganda condemning Israel for the mosque fire as "criminal" and "medieval incitement to wars of religion."]

Nasser attitude studied

Some students of the Egyptian President's career believe that, despite his discouragement with continued United States support to Israel, he still believes the key to a reasonable Middle East solution lies in some future change of heart in Washington.

President Nasser, it is thought, believes that the opinions of countries like Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia, emerging from an Islamic conference, might influence Washington on the Jerusalem question more than Arab propaganda could ever do.

Simultaneously, in the November Arab Defense Council meeting and in bilateral talks between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, the countries directly confronting Israel, military plans can be made without waiting for a meeting of Arab chiefs of state.

Newsmen in Cairo obtained some extracts of U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad's report to the conference. They disclose the depth of Egyptian bitterness and disillusion over what is seen a Nixon administration's failure to modify pro-Israel positions of the Johnson era.

Mr. Riyad reviewed the futile Arab diplomatic efforts to persuade Washington to avoid arms deliveries to Israel, especially Phantom jet fighter bombers, while Israel held captured Arab territory.

Proposal criticized.

He added a detailed account of recent U.S. proposals for a settlement, which, he said, "place the burden of obligations on the Arabs."

Mr. Riyad concluded that only force remained as a means of getting Israel to give up its Arab territorial conquests, the French news agency said.

Meanwhile, in Beirut, Lebanese reaction to the Aug. 26 UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel for its air raid on Lebanese villages Aug. 11 and "other grave violations of the cease-fire" was generally that of satisfaction.

The independent daily newspaper Al Nahar found this satisfaction in the resolution's mention of the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese armistice agreement. The Beirut government says it recognizes only this arrangement and not the 1967 cease-fire decisions since it was not an active belligerent in 1967.

Threats discussed

Jajib Sadaka, director general of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, summoned the United States, French, and Soviet chargés d'affaires in Beirut. Official sources said he discussed new Israeli threats of reprisals against south Lebanon following fresh guerrilla attacks inside Israel near the Lebanese border.

In Israel, commandos of the Al Fatah organization fired Katyusha rockets into the Katamoun area of western Jerusalem in the first such attack since the June, 1967,

war. Israel said there was neither damage nor casualties.

Israeli Air Force planes struck the Ghor Safi area of Jordan, south of the Dead Sea, after guerrilla attacks in that area.

Baghdad Radio broadcast an Iraqi military communiqué announcing that Iraqi forces shelled the Israeli settlement of Kfar Rupin, in the northern Jordan Valley, after Israeli positions had fired on them.

Other artillery exchanges occurred in the Jordan Valley near Beisan and on the Suez Canal front in Egypt.

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES

25 September 1969

DISSENTION GRIPS ISLAMIC MEETING

Pakistan Leader Refuses to

Sit With the Indians

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times

RABAT, Morocco, Sept. 24—

The conference of the leaders of Islamic nations neared its conclusion tonight amid confusion as President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan of Pakistan refused to sit with the Indian delegate and the resolutions committee sought to reconcile Turkish and Iranian reservations with activist demands that all Moslems back the Arabs against Israel.

President Yahya remained in his villa at the edge of town all day refusing to answer the telephone or attend the conference. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran visited him but could not persuade him to attend the parley.

The Indian Minister of Industry, Fehrudin al-Ali Ahmed,

who arrived at 3 P.M. with a delegation of four Moslems and four Hindus, never got to the conference hall. He went directly to a villa.

Hussein Backs Pakistanis

The Indian Ambassador, Guorbachan Singh, who had arrived at the conference hall at 9:30 A.M. with an Indian flag under his arm, was asked to remain in the lobby.

The Jordanian King also refused to attend the conference tonight in sympathy with the Pakistanis and the Shah was also reported to be siding with them.

The question was whether the conference yesterday had invited the participation of representatives of India's Moslem community, as the Pakistanis contended, or of an Indian Government delegation, as the Indian Government evidently understood.

The Pakistanis said that the conference decision had been to request the Government of India to send a delegation of representative Moslems to the conference. They objected both to the Indian Ambassador as a Hindu and to the composition

of the delegation that arrived from New Delhi. The Indians, on the other hand, maintained that the invitation had read merely "to send a delegation."

The official conference spokesman, foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki, of Morocco said last night that the conference had decided to invite an Indian delegation "at the official government level."

Banquet Canceled

Meanwhile, a banquet for the delegates announced by King Hassan II of Morocco, had to be canceled, while Kings and Presidents and ministerial delegates milled around the lobbies of the Rabat Hilton hotel in frantic frustration.

Thus, the most important non-Arab delegations which the Islamic conference had brought together were in dispute with their Arab hosts at the end of a meeting intended to end tonight with declarations of unity.

The dissention with Turkey and Iran arose from an agenda drafted yesterday by a committee of eight. Although labeled agenda, it was in fact a summary of the discussions and speeches that had already taken

place and was intended as a guide for the final resolutions.

The Turkish delegate, Iksan Caglyangil, told the conference that the agenda went far beyond the subject that Turkey had been invited to discuss, namely the Aksa Mosque fire in Jerusalem.

The agenda not only broadened the scope of the conference to include the whole Palestine problem, but included a phrase asserting "full support by the Islamic nation of the Palestinian people in their struggle for national liberation."

"We could not go along with that," a member of the Turkish delegation said. "We don't want to be involved in the Palestinian war."

No vote was taken on the agenda, however. It was adopted by tacit consent.

A resolution proposed yesterday by Libya asking all Moslem countries to break relations with Israel was quietly withdrawn to avoid additional dissention.

The participants in the conference who have relations with Israel are Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Chad, Turkey and Iran.

NEW YORK TIMES

26 September 1969

BIG 4 ACTION URGED BY ISLAMIC PARLEY

Delegates in Rabat Demand Speedy Israeli Pullback

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
Special to The New York Times

RABAT, Morocco, Sept. 25—

The conference of the leaders of Islamic nations called on the major powers tonight to intensify their efforts to obtain the "speedy withdrawal" of Israel from occupied Arab territory.

In particular, the conference asked France, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States to "take into account the deep attachment of the followers of Islam to Jerusalem." It demanded restoration of the status prevailing there prior to the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, when Israel annexed the Arab sector of the divided city.

The conference of 25 Moslem nations, both Arab and non-Arab, had been called following the fire five weeks ago at the Mosque of Al Aksa in Jeru-

salem, the third holiest shrine of Islam.

Resolution Reiterated

The final declaration today reiterated in slightly stronger language the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of Nov. 22, 1967, which called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as well as the right of all nations in the Middle East to secure and recognized boundaries.

There were, however, some additions, including these:

¶ The declaration asserted "full support for the Palestinian people for restitution of their usurped rights and their struggle for national liberation."

¶ It asserted the will of the Moslem countries to work for implementation of the United Nations resolution.

¶ It called for a meeting of Moslem foreign ministers at Jidda, Saudi Arabia, next March to organize a permanent Islamic secretariat.

At the final session, at the request of King Hassan II of Morocco, the delegates also heard a statement by the Palestine Liberation Organization observer, Khaled Abu al-Kadib.

The conclusions of the conference went far toward satisfying demands of Arab militants. Yet they did not adopt

Sudan for military and economic support of the Palestinians or the proposal made by Lybia that all Moslem states break diplomatic relations with Israel.

Nor did the final resolutions repeat President Gamal Abdel Nasser's assertion in his message to the conference that the mosque fire was a "premeditated act by Israel." The conference merely held Israel responsible as the occupying power.

A spokesman for the Turkish delegation explained that the chief delegate had told his colleagues that his country interpreted the conclusions of the conference as entirely within the limits of the United Nations resolution.

The same view was taken by Iran and by some of the African countries represented here that have diplomatic relations with Israel, including Senegal, Chad, Niger, Mali and Guinea.

This was the formula by which the differences were bridged between the activist demands of the Arab countries, and the other Moslem delegates who did not wish to be involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

King Hassan, presiding at the final session on a dais beneath

a medallion inscribed "Islamic Summit" in Arabic and in English, pointed to what may have been the main achievement of this conference—the fact that it took place at all. He called it "a miracle of God."

No representative of India was in the hall. The Foreign Minister of Morocco, Ahmed Laraki, acting as spokesman for the conference, said earlier in the afternoon that India had not been excluded from the conference but was merely "not physically present" after her representatives had received "advice" not to attend today's session.

India Is Indignant

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Sept. 25—The Indian Government reacted indignantly today to the "exclusion" of its delegation from the Islamic conference at Rabat.

An official spokesman cautioned that the Arab countries would be the "losers" if they allowed themselves "to be exploited and coerced by Pakistan," which had opposed the seating of the Indians.

As the Government was trying to conceal its humiliation in a show of indignation, other prominent leaders expressed criticism of the Government's conduct in the affair.

NEW YORK TIMES

28 September 1969

HASSAN CRITICIZES ARAB EXTREMISTS

Moroccan King Says Some Guerrilla Actions Do Not Advance Moslem Cause

By The Associated Press

RABAT, Morocco, Sept. 27—

King Hassan II of Morocco last night assailed the position of extremists among the anti-Israeli guerrilla forces as "wild and harebrained," adding that those Arabs did not serve "the Palestinian cause, the Arab cause or the Moslem cause."

In a news conference reviewing the pan-Islamic meeting this week that he had cosponsored, the King said that Morocco supported only those anti-Israeli elements "who fight at the front openly, who fight at the United Nations, who fight to convince states of their cause and their right."

He criticized the Arab guer-

rillas who blew up the part of the trans-Arabian pipeline that crosses Israeli-occupied territory and said that Saudi Arabia had lost millions of dollars because of that action.

The monarch showed surprise when he was told that Vice President Anwar el-Sadat of the United Arab Republic had been quoted by the Cairo radio as saying that the conference had achieved poor results and that its final resolution did not express solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization or mention the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territory.

The King retorted the conference's resolution demanding the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab land. "We must expect false interpretations, a war of nerves, polemics," he added.

Israeli Officials Relax

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Sept. 27—Israeli officials who could watch the Islamic conference in Rabat

this week only from a distance relaxed today over what they considered were the inconclusive results of the meeting.

The gathering was seen here as an effort by the Arab countries to broaden their support in the struggle against Israel. The results, in the Israeli view, was to dramatize the lack of unity not only in the Moslem world but among the Arab states leading the struggle.

Some Israeli officials thought that the meeting was not entirely without benefit to Israeli's enemies. For one thing, they said, it provided a new forum for anti-Israel sentiment.

For another, it established a precedent for drawing countries such as Turkey, Iran and even Tunisia, normally on the edge of the Arab-Israeli dispute, into the fray.

Evidence of Flaw Seen

But the conference offered new evidence of what Israeli observers have long believed to be a basic flaw of the Arabs in the confrontation—their inability to match action to words.

One of the Rabat participants was reported to have stated that the hope was to mobilize support in the Moslem world similar to the international backing given to the Israelis by Zionist organizations.

A third of those invited failed to attend, including two of the countries directly involved in the middle East war, Syria and Iraq. The United Arab Republic sent what was generally regarded as a token delegation.

Although the meeting was called in response to what its sponsors said was concern for Islamic shrines following the fire last month in the Aksa Mosque in the Israeli-controlled Old City of Jerusalem, the fire was not mentioned in the final resolution.

The resolution seemed to go hardly beyond similar documents approved by the United Nations.

Yahya Acclaims Conference

Special to The New York Times

KARACHI, Pakistan, Sept. 27—President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan said today on his return from the Rabat conference that it had "sown the seeds of unity and solidarity of the Moslem world."

India jolted on Arab policy

By Ernest Weatherall
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi

The Indian Government's pro-Arab policy may be seriously challenged as a result of the snub New Delhi's delegation received at the Islamic conference in Rabat.

The leader of the anti-Muslim Jana Sangh Party, Balraj Madok, said that the government should declare secular India a "Hindu state" and that the ruling Congress Party give up its "anti-Indian policies" and pursue a "foreign and domestic policy consistent with the interests of the people and the majority community."

The Jana Sangh has also insisted that the three Palestine Arab commandos, now on a month's tour of India, be sent home.

The delegation members of the Palestine Liberation Organization are sponsored by the leftist Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity. They have been given a warm official welcome in New Delhi, and hailed by the leftist press as "great patriots in the struggle for freedom."

Even the right-wing newspapers have been giving the pretty miniskirted Arab girl and her two male companions a good deal of publicity.

According to the leader of the commandos, Mohamed Abu Mizar, "We have come to meet as many people as possible and tell them what we are fighting for and why."

The Al Fatah commandos are also picking up contributions in India to help their cause, while hundreds of their coreligionists are being killed in communal

Support for Arabs mixed

The reason the Al Fatah commandos have been given official Government of India approval is because New Delhi has been backing the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel.

But the government's decision to cast its lot with that of the Soviet Union by supporting the Arabs in the June, 1967, war has not been a popular move, especially with Hindu chauvinistic political parties such as the Jana Sangh.

Many feel that India should have maintained the nonaligned policy of Pandit Nehru and remained aloof from taking sides.

By taking the part of the Arabs, New Delhi also lost a lot of its liberal friends in Washington, including Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R) of New York and Rep. Emanuel Celler (D) of New York. Former President Johnson was reported as being furious with India's decision, and his relations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi chilled after the June, 1967, Middle East war.

Muslims apprehensive

India's pro-Muslim policy in the Middle East has nettled the Jana Sangh. Some have placed blame for the increasing Hindu-Muslim communal riots on the party and its militant wing, the RSS, has often been compared to Hitler's brown shirts during the early days of Naziism. "Organized gangs" have been blamed for the riots at Ahmedabad and other areas in Gujarat.

But no newspaper has blamed the Jana Sangh for the communal riots in which a thousand persons are feared to have perished. One paper mentioned that Jana Sangh leader Madok was in Ahmedabad a few days before the riots along with the chief of the RSS, M. S. Golwalkar. Readers were allowed to draw their own conclusions.

The growing power of the Jana Sangh and its militant paramilitary wing are feared by the Muslims in India, as the Jews in Germany feared Hitler's brown shirts.

LE MONDE, Paris
1 October 1969

INDIAN "WITHDRAWAL" FROM RABAT CONFERENCE

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Fifty million Moslems but no mosque

From our correspondent
ERIC ROULEAU

Heads of Islamic states meeting in Rabat last week adopted a relatively mild attitude towards Israel. The conference produced a resolution which was, in effect, identical to the November 22, 1967, resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling upon Israel to evacuate all the territory occupied in the Six Days War.

The same circumspection was shown in the conference's handling of the El Aqsa Mosque fire. Blame for the fire was not directly laid at the door of the Israeli government. The Rabat resolution merely noted that the fire was a consequence of Israeli occupation of Jerusalem.

Delegates also carefully avoided any reference to "aggression" on the part of Israel and there was no trace of anti-Zionism in the final declaration.

The only untoward incident at the conference involved the expulsion of the Indian delegate, sitting as the representative of the subcontinent's 50 million Moslems.

RABAT... The final hours of the Islamic summit meeting were disrupted by a fierce clash which led to India's exclusion from the conference table just twenty-four hours after being admitted.

The crisis struck on the evening of Tuesday, September 23. Delegates were congratulating themselves on having navigated the conference through choppy waters. The agenda had been adopted unanimously, and the Palestinian guerrillas had said they were satisfied with the compromise that allowed them to attend proceedings as observers.

It was in this euphoric mood that the Moroccan foreign min-

India had been officially invited to attend. Immediately, the Indian ambassador to Morocco took a chair at the horseshoe table in the Hilton Hotel, not far from the headquarters of Pakistani President Mohammed Yahya Khan.

The Pakistani delegation had opposed India's presence but had later given ground, to everyone's satisfaction, stating it would back any decisions emerging from the summit talks.

The first signs of trouble appeared Wednesday morning, when it only remained for heads of state to meet at 11 o'clock to examine draft resolutions, and

muniqué was already circulating among journalists. A Rabat daily, in fact, published the draft in a special edition appearing early Wednesday afternoon.

First storm warnings

Mysteriously, the plenary session was put back from half-hour to half-hour. Towards 12.30 p.m. the heads of state began arriving at the Hilton, only to leave an hour later without resuming their talks. The proceedings were to last late into the night of Wednesday-Thursday, rich in incidents.

The conflict raged behind closed doors at first, but its causes quickly became known: Pakistan was refusing to return to the conference if India was not excluded immediately. Some countries such as Iran, Turkey and Jordan were siding with General Yahya Khan while others like Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Libya and South Yemen were lining up behind India.

In the lobby of the Hilton Hotel, where some 400 journalists and photographers were anxiously awaiting the outcome of the

dispute, envoys from the two camps were busy stating their case.

Some said it was scandalous to expel the Indian delegation when everyone had agreed to its admission. After all, India had a Moslem population of 50 million, putting it third on the list of countries where Islam is practised, after Indonesia and Pakistan. In any case, the Arab cause needed the support of this Asian giant.

The Indian ambassador, a tall, splendid figure of a man with a fierce moustache and thick beard, nervously stalked back and forth. The Pakistanis pointed an indignant finger at him, telling journalists: "That gentleman represents a country where 1,000 Moslems have just been massacred." (This was a reference to the bloody clashes between Moslems and Hindus at Ahmedabad recently). General Yahya Khan, they added, had never accepted that the "Hindu" government in New Delhi be represented at the conference. In his view, only a "people's delegation" from the Moslem community in India could be admitted as observers.

Invitation to Israel?

Meanwhile, several heads of state drove out to General Yahya Khan's house in the residential district of Souissi to ask him to reconsider his stand. To this persuasion he invariably replied: "If the criterion of participation in the conference is a large Moslem minority, why not invite the Soviet Union, China or Albania, not to say Israel? From the way it treats our brothers, India is to Pakistan what Israel is to the Arabs."

A deadlock had been reached, and the position of Morocco's King Hassan II was particularly awkward. To ask his Indian guests to return home ran counter to the most elementary rules of Arab hospitality, and it could also have political consequences.

All talk of compromise failed with General Yahya Khan, and at 11 p.m. ushers were seen removing the Indian ambassador, politely but firmly, from the waiting room outside the conference hall to the hotel's lobby.

The Moroccan foreign minister,

Ahmed Laraki, soon turned up to inform journalists—irrelevantly, it seemed—that King Hassan had decided to name Morocco's principal mosques after the nations taking part in the conference.

India's name was missing from the list he cited. Had it been decided to exclude the Indian delegation?

"No, but in view of the existing tensions we have decided to advise the Indian representatives to abstain from attending meetings," he said. Just as diplomatic was the first-page announcement in the daily newspaper *L'Opinion*, on Thursday: "The Indo-Pakistani tension ended with the voluntary withdrawal of India."

The "magnanimous" gesture allowed the other delegates (including General Yahya Khan and King Hussein) to hasten to the Royal Palace for a night of feasting and entertainment at King Hassan's invitation.

A Moroccan leader's wry comment on the "happy ending" was: "The bomb that nearly wrecked our conference turned out in the end, for you journalists, to be nothing but a Roman candle."

NEW YORK TIMES
15 October 1969

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

India Recalls Aides in 2 Arab Countries

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Oct. 14—India

announced tonight the recall of her senior envoys from Morocco and Jordan in retaliation for her exclusion from the recent conference of Islamic nations in Rabat.

The decision to withdraw India's Ambassador to Morocco, Gurbachan Singh, and her charge d'affairs in Jordan, I. S. Chadha, was announced by a Foreign Ministry spokesman at a news conference.

Mr. Chadha is the only official of diplomatic rank in the Indian Embassy in Amman, so with his recall, one mission will virtually cease functioning. There are two Indian diplomats in the Rabat Embassy, in addition to Ambassador Singh.

"This decision was taken," the Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "as a result of the treatment meted out to our delegation at Rabat, which was led by a very senior Cabinet minister and had gone there

at the unanimous invitation of the conference."

The Moroccan and Jordanian Ambassadors to India were summoned to the Foreign Ministry before the news conference and were told of the decision.

The spokesman said that the action did not mean a break in diplomatic relations. Asked if he thought Morocco and Jordan would withdraw their Ambassadors from India, he said: "It is we who are expressing disappointment and displeasure."

"There is no change in policy," he added, alluding to India's pro-Arab policy in the Middle East.

India was not originally invited to the Rabat conference of 25 Islamic nations, which was called last month to protest the fire in the Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest shrine of Islam.

But the New Delhi Government asked for an invitation on the ground that although its 530 million people were predominantly Hindu, its 60 million Moslems represented

the world's third largest Islamic community, after Pakistan's 100 million Moslems and Indonesia's 90 million.

India finally received an invitation to the Rabat conference and sent a delegation of four Moslems and four Hindus. The presence of the Hindus angered President Mohammed Agha Yahya Khan of Pakistan and other Moslem leaders. Finally, the Indian delegation was physically blocked from entering the conference hall.

The foreign ministry spokesman, asked why India had acted only against Morocco and Jordan and not against Pakistan or any of the other countries that had supported Pakistan on the issue, said:

"From Pakistan we did not expect anything better and there was no action needed. Morocco was the host country. The lack of courtesy happened on its soil and the Moroccan Foreign Minister was discourteous to our Ambassador. In the case of Jordan, it was the only country which actively supported India's exclusion."

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(27 September - 24 October 1969)

I. PCI Accuses Soviets of Continued Interference in Czechoslovakia

"... in judging the most recent developments of the Czechoslovak situation and the measures adopted, one cannot ignore the burden of the particular conditions which were created in that country after August 1968, precisely as regards the questions of autonomy and sovereignty."

So reads a portion of a formal pronouncement of the Politburo of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on 30 September disapproving the results of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Plenum held 25-26 September, which marked the demotion of Dubcek and set off a large-scale purge of the Party. The pronouncement, couched in typically obscure Communist language, was justified on the grounds that the purge ("measures regarding the composition of leading party and state organs") is more than a domestic matter, and affects the world movement adversely. It reiterates the established position of the PCI, which approved the Dubcek experiment and condemned the Soviet intervention in August 1968 as a violation of Czech "autonomy and sovereignty." The excerpt cited was made in this context. Despite its careful, cryptic phraseology, one can only conclude that the PCI by this statement is partially absolving the Czech leadership of the responsibility for the purge and holding the Soviet Union primarily responsible, since it suggests that the recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the "measures adopted" (i.e., the purge) took place under the "particular conditions ... after August 1968" (i.e., under Soviet occupation) when Czechoslovak "autonomy and sovereignty" have at best been questionable.

II. French Communist Criticizes Deteriorating Czech Situation

Louis Aragon, French Communist intellectual and Central Committee member, used the pages of his literary weekly Les Lettres Françaises (8 October) to denounce the growing oppression and reversion to Stalinism in Czechoslovakia. He published a directive issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party requiring university administrative and faculty heads to denounce staff and students who might be of doubtful ideological purity, as attested by their attitude toward the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and subsequent events. He lamented that this odious Stalinist practice of "systematic informing" is pervading the whole of Czechoslovak society. (The directive and Aragon's comments are attached.) All French newspapers immediately commented on this remarkable event and speculated on its effect on the French Communist Party. Only L'Humanité, the party daily, kept silent on the matter, as did PCF Secretary General Waldeck Rochet in a major speech to the Central Committee on 14 October in which he did criticize another PCF intellectual maverick, Roger Garaudy.

III. Free World Communist Disaffection Spreads

Apart from these immediate developments, the disastrous Soviet "solution" of the Czech crisis of 1968 has been a catalyst fostering critical examination by free world Communists of the more fundamental differences separating their concept of proper international Communist relations from the compulsively Russocentric concept of the Soviets. The expulsion of Austrian Communist "elder statesman" Ernst Fischer from the party in October aptly symbolizes the growing alienation between thinking Communists in the free world and the automatons in the leadership of their parties who, aping the example of the CPSU "mediocracy," are gradually succeeding in paralyzing whatever dynamic is left in Marxism-Leninism. The political isolation of most free world CP's (and of governing CP's for that matter) is testimony to the stagnancy of modern Communism. Realization of this truth has led some parties to try to break out of the stranglehold of Soviet-style orthodoxy. Three recent instances illustrate this spreading disaffection. On 10 September the Australian Communist Party leadership denounced the Soviets as well as the Chinese for damaging the cause of socialism by their "unthinkable war." French Politburo member Roger Garaudy renewed his attack on the Soviet system in an interview granted in Yugoslavia during his visit there last summer. And in the Austrian Communist Party, the persistent efforts of Ernst Fischer and his progressive colleagues to open the party to free, uncensored discussion of domestic and international Communist problems finally led the orthodox leadership, in despair, to expel him, with ominous consequences for the future of the party.

a. The Australian Communist Party (CPA)

The National Executive of the Australian Communist Party devoted a complete page of its weekly newspaper, Tribune (10 September), to denouncing the shocking spectacle of the two leading socialist States engaged in border skirmishes that threaten to escalate into a full-scale war -- "The Unthinkable War," as the statement was entitled. Citing the damage to the cause of socialism, and (with unconscious candor) reflecting on the danger that it "would destroy what remains of unity in the world communist movement," the statement claimed that "neither side is acting in this situation as a socialist country should, and both are pursuing aims going much beyond the issue of the border." The CPA clearly perceives that the chief illegitimate aim being pursued by both China and the Soviet Union is the "striving of both for hegemony or leadership over the world revolutionary movement." The CPA answer to this is blunt and unequivocal:

"We reject the claims of each to being the sole interpreters and custodians of marxism and socialism, the identification by each of the interest of socialism in general with their national interests and aims, and the attempts to assume a position of hegemony over others."

The statement represents one of the few instances of a Communist party publicly setting down for the record what countless thousands of other Communists have thought and said privately.

b. PCF Politburo Member Roger Garaudy

Long at odds with his conservative colleagues in the French Communist Party for expressing unorthodox views and for being outspokenly critical of the Soviet Union, Roger Garaudy again shocked the Communist world by forthright criticism of the world socialist system centered on Moscow. In his interview, which was published in the Yugoslav Communist theoretical journal Komunist, he started by asserting flatly that the socialist movement is now in a state of crisis, manifested not only by the Sino-Soviet dispute but also by the conduct of the World Communist Conference (WCC) last June. He attributes the crisis to the Soviet "refusal to recognize variety in the models of socialism." (In an aside, he reminds his Yugoslav hosts that Yugoslavia was the first to be "excommunicated" some 20 years ago as a result of this persistent refusal.)

"Socialist thought is in a state of stagnation." This fact is evident to Garaudy from examination of the basic document issued by the WCC and intended as a beacon to guide the Communist faithful for the foreseeable future. In its analysis of the situation in the "capitalist" camp (but also in the socialist camp), the document leaves the "impression of a sclerosis of socialist thought."

Commenting on the first anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he asserts: "I was astounded by the fact that all difficulties are attributed to an imperialistic conspiracy.... When an attempt is made to subsume everything that happened in Czechoslovakia under the action of a handful of counter-revolutionary elements inspired by foreign imperialism, it seems to me that essential problems are being concealed."

Ridiculing the Soviet fear of ideological subversion, he muses: "... it is difficult for me to understand why the Soviet Union is so afraid and examines suitcases so that no Chinese pamphlets or other elements of ideological subversion will be carried over the border."

Garaudy might well have added that not only Chinese pamphlets worry the Soviets, but also American, French, English -- in brief, all non-Soviet or non-orthodox ideas, even the ideas of their own intellectuals, who languish in labor camps for their ideological beliefs.

Secretary General Waldeck Rochet, in his speech at the Central Committee Plenum of 14 October, chastised Garaudy for his misbehavior, accusing him of "trying to exploit events in Czechoslovakia to encourage anti-Sovietism and opportunistic trends." It seems highly likely that Garaudy will be purged from the Politburo at the next party congress.

The full text of Garaudy's interview is attached, as is an excerpt from his recent book, Pour un Modèle Français du Socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism). This excerpt elaborates in greater detail the stagnation of ideology in the Soviet Union under the rigidity of Soviet bureaucracy and the disastrous consequences of the Soviet insistence on a "sole model" of socialism.

c. Expulsion of Ernst Fischer

Ernst Fischer, 70 years old, is a veteran member of the Austrian Communist movement. He joined the KPOe in Prague in exile in 1934. The war years he spent in Moscow broadcasting propaganda to Austria. He was Secretary of Education in the Austrian Provisional Government of 1945 and later became a member of parliament. Since 1959, he has devoted himself largely to writing and has for many years been acknowledged as the leading ideologist of the Party. He was swift to condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia and has ever since been at the forefront of continuous criticism of the Soviet Union by the more progressive wing of the KPOe. He was expelled from the Central Committee at the January 1969 Party Congress and now has been expelled from the Party altogether. The divisions in the KPOe have now been made deeper as many Central Committee members protested Fischer's expulsion. There is now more reason than ever to believe that the expulsion will lead to an organizational split in the party, which, in any case, is no major factor in Austrian politics.

What seems to have precipitated the move is the fact that the orthodox leadership has been unable to prevent the continued criticism of the Soviet Union by Fischer and his fellow intellectuals, among whom is numbered Politburo member Franz Marek. (Fischer and Marek recently collaborated on a book Was Lenin Wirklich Sagte (What Lenin Really Said), which so angered the Soviets that they felt compelled to denounce it in the international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, also known as World Marxist Review.) The main vehicle for intellectual and cultural exchange for Austrian Communists was a periodical called Tagebuch (Diary). Because its pages were so subversive in the eyes of the orthodox leadership, its financial support was withdrawn this past summer, but Fischer, Marek and their colleagues promptly launched another periodical Wiener Tagebuch (Vienna Diary). The first issue contained the text of several speeches in honor of Fischer's 70th birthday, which once again aired all the ideological differences agitating thinking Communists in their battle against the entrenched apparatchiks, loyal to Moscow, who are in command of the party. This struggle and these arguments transcend the problems of the KPOe inasmuch as they can be taken as representative of the preoccupations of a large proportion of the world's thoughtful Communists, few of whom have the opportunity or dare to express themselves as the Austrians have. Attached is an article by Franz Marek in which he focuses, as Roger Garaudy did, on the inability of the World Communist Conference to cope with the intellectual crisis of Communism.

(Some of the more important passages in the attachments have been underlined; Aragon provided his own underlining.)

PCI Politburo Communique on Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee decisions. L'Unità, 30 September 1969

The decisions recently adopted by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, revising former decisions and judgments, and the measures regarding the composition of leading party and state organs have again raised problems which go beyond the domestic events of Czechoslovakia and affect the entire democratic and workers movement of our country and have aroused regret and concern among all Italian communists.

We greeted the decisions of January 1968 and the policy which derived from them as a necessary correction of errors committed by the former leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and as the beginning of a positive renovation and development of a socialist society on the basis of more open and democratic relations between the party, the working class, and the popular masses. Without concealing or underestimating the risks deriving from the complexity of such a process of renovation and from the international situation in which it was taking place, and even from the presence of forces hostile to socialism, we considered not only that it was up to Czechoslovak Communists to face these perils but also, that they should have both the means and the opportunities of carrying out such an action independently and in the framework of loyalty to socialism, to the principles of internationalist solidarity, and to the existing alliances with the socialist countries.

It is by proceeding from these considerations that we expressed our opposition to the intervention of the five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia. We did this both for political reasons and for reasons of principle, concerning the respect for correct relations between communist parties and between socialist states on the basis of the autonomy and sovereignty of every party and of every state; positions, which have been confirmed many times in the documents of the international and workers movement and also by leading bodies of the USSR and of other socialist countries.

No one is more convinced than we, in conformity with these positions, of the necessity of allowing the Czechoslovak Communists to resolve their problems independently and responsibly. We do not view this simply as a question of formal legitimacy; there is no doubt, however, that in judging the most recent developments of the Czechoslovak situation and on the measures adopted, one cannot ignore the burden of the particular conditions which were created in that country after August 1968, precisely as regards the questions of autonomy and sovereignty.

These opinions on facts and these positions of principle which have been fully expressed more than once by our party and confirmed once again on the occasion of the first anniversary of 21 August must be reaffirmed once again. These are the positions of a party which intends to conduct the battle for socialism in Italy on the basis of its own autonomous conception and determination under the political and historical conditions of our own country, adhering firmly to the principle and pledge of internationalist solidarity. We would

the difficulties of this painful and tormented period, thus fully responding to the aspirations and socialist, democratic, and national ideals of their people.

PCI Politburo. Rome 29 September 1969

CPYRGHT

L'Unità
30 September
1969

COMUNICATO DELL'UFFICIO POLITICO DEL PCI

I comunisti italiani e le decisioni del C. C. del Partito comunista cecoslovacco

Le decisioni prese in questi giorni dal Comitato centrale del Partito comunista cecoslovacco di revisione di precedenti giudizi e deliberazioni, e i provvedimenti relativi alla composizione degli organi dirigenti del partito e dello Stato, hanno riproposto problemi che al di là delle vicende interne della Cecoslovacchia toccano il movimento democratico e operaio del nostro paese, e hanno suscitato rammarico e preoccupazione in tutti i comunisti italiani.

Noi avevamo salutato le decisioni del gennaio '68 e la politica che ne derivò come una necessaria correzione degli errori compiuti dalla precedente direzione del Partito comunista cecoslovacco, e come l'avvio di un positivo rinnovamento e sviluppo della società socialista sulla base di rapporti più aperti e democratici tra il partito, la classe operaia e le masse popolari. Senza nascondere o sottovalutare i rischi derivanti dalla complessità di questo processo di rinnovamento e della situazione internazionale in cui esso avveniva, ed anche dalla presenza di forze ostili al socialismo, noi ritenemmo non solo che spettasse

il compito di fronteggiare questi pericoli, ma anche che essi avessero le possibilità e i mezzi di svolgere questa azione in modo autonomo e nel quadro della fedeltà al socialismo, ai principi della solidarietà internazionale, alle alleanze esistenti con i paesi socialisti.

E' partendo da queste considerazioni che noi abbiamo espresso il nostro dissenso sull'intervento in Cecoslovacchia dei cinque paesi del patto di Varsavia. E questo sia per ragioni politiche che di principio relative al rispetto dei corretti rapporti tra i partiti comunisti e tra gli Stati socialisti sulla base della autonomia e della sovranità di ogni partito e di ogni Stato; posizioni che sono state più volte affermate nei documenti del movimento operaio e comunista internazionale e dagli organi dirigenti dell'URSS e degli altri paesi socialisti.

Nessuno più di noi, in conformità a queste posizioni, è persuaso che occorre lasciare che i comunisti cecoslovacchi risolvano in piena autonomia e responsabilità i loro problemi. Non si tratta per noi di una questione di legittimità formale, ma è certo che il giu-

luppi della situazione cecoslovacca e sui provvedimenti che sono stati adottati non può prescindere dal peso che su di essi hanno avuto le condizioni particolari che proprio sotto il profilo dell'autonomia e della sovranità si sono create in quel paese dopo l'agosto del 1968.

Questi giudizi di fatto e queste posizioni di principio, che sono stati più volte e ampiamente illustrati da parte nostra, e ribaditi ancora in occasione dell'anniversario del 21 agosto, debbono essere riaffermati anche in questo momento. Sono queste le posizioni di un partito che vuole condurre avanti la battaglia per il socialismo in Italia sulla base della propria autonomia concezione e determinazione nelle condizioni storiche e politiche del nostro paese, e mantenendo ben fermo il principio e l'impegno della solidarietà internazionalista. Ai comunisti cecoslovacchi vogliamo esprimere il nostro augurio di superare le difficoltà di questo periodo doloroso e travagliato, per rispondere pienamente alle aspirazioni e agli ideali socialisti, democratici, nazionali del loro paese.

L'Ufficio Politico
Roma 29 settembre 1969

ON A QUESTIONNAIRE

It is not our practice to republish herein what can be read elsewhere nor, more generally, to resort to the same sources of information as the popular press. But once is not a habit: we are reproducing a text with which the readers of Figaro have been able to become acquainted. It is a circular addressed by the Minister of Public Education of the Czechoslovak Republic to all those under his jurisdiction. Of two possibilities, one is that this text, which follows, is a forgery, in which case why wait to denounce it as such? or, unfortunately, it is authentic, and in this case it does not seem that French people can accept it without saying something. All the more so since, apparently, it is only another version, destined for the university world, of directives sent to all state employees and even to the factories. The installation in a socialist country of systematic informing as a national duty accompanies, we know, the official denunciation of what the entire country thought, felt and defended from August 1968 to the present. And particularly the ratification of what may now only be called the "entry" of troops of the Warsaw Pact on the Czechoslovakian territory.

I belong to a party which at the time publicly disapproved this "entry," and did so for reasons which are not tactical. Since that time, not only have we never retracted that condemnation of an act which endangers the future of socialism throughout the world, but we -- meaning the men responsible for our policy -- have reaffirmed it each time that that has appeared necessary to us. Nothing permits it to be said that we have changed our point of view, and it is more than likely that we will never retract what we said in August 1968, with all the authority of the elected organs of the party.

That is why I permit myself to say here -- before an act which in my eyes is worse than the military operations of August 1968 and which, in any case, could never have happened without the prior occurrence of those operations, of which it is the logical sequel -- that the document reproduced here, even if it is sanctioned by an apparently national authority (which we could call something else), engages first of all those who are responsible for it or are the executors of it in a course we were not alone in disapproving, and delivers a possibly mortal blow to proletarian internationalism, to the confidence of people in socialism, and to the rallying of the democratic forces in France, which is already gravely compromised.

What I have written above is a very small part of what I think. As for the remainder, I prefer to leave to the readers of this journal themselves to judge whether I am right or not on the basis of the documentary evidence itself.

LETTRES FRANÇAISES, Paris
8-14 October 1969

CPYRGHT

Il n'est ici de notre pratique ni de republier ce qu'on a pu lire ailleurs ni, plus généralement, de nous en remettre aux sources d'information de la presse d'opinion. Une fois n'est pas coutume : nous reproduisons un texte qu'ont pu connaître les lecteurs du *Piquaro*. Il s'agit d'une circulaire adressée par le ministre de l'Instruction publique de la République tchécoslovaque à tous ses ressortissants. De deux choses l'une, ce texte dont on prendra connaissance est un faux, et en ce cas qu'attend-on pour le dénoncer comme tel ? ou malheureusement, c'est un fait, et en ce cas il ne semble pas que des Français puissent l'accepter sans rien dire. D'autant que, paraît-il, il ne s'agit que d'une mouture, destinée au domaine universitaire, de directives transmises à tous les fonctionnaires et même aux usines. L'instauration dans un pays socialiste de la délation systématique comme devoir national accompagne, on le sait, la dénonciation officielle de ce que le pays tout entier a pensé, senti et défendu d'août 1968 à nos jours. Et particulièrement l'entérinement de ce qu'on n'a le droit d'appeler que « l'entrée » des troupes du Pacte de Varsovie sur le territoire tchécoslovaque.

J'appartiens à un parti qui a désapprouvé publiquement en son temps cette « entrée », et cela pour des raisons qui ne sont pas de tactique. Depuis cette époque, non seulement nous ne sommes jamais revenus sur cette condamnation d'un acte qui met en danger l'avenir du socialisme dans le monde entier, mais nous l'avons, j'entends des hommes responsables de notre politique, réaffirmée chaque fois que cela nous a paru nécessaire. Rien ne permet de dire que nous ayons changé de point de vue, et il est plus qu'in vraisemblable que nous revenions *jamais* sur ce que nous avons dit en août 1968, avec toute l'autorité des organes élus du parti.

C'est pourquoi je me permets ici de dire, devant un acte à mes yeux *pis* que les opérations militaires d'août 68, et lequel, en tout cas, n'aurait jamais pu se produire sans le préalable de ces opérations, dont il est la poursuite logique, que le document ici reproduit, même s'il est couvert par une autorité en apparence nationale (que nous pourrions appeler autrement), engage plus avant ceux qui en sont les responsables ou les fidèles exécutants dans la voie que nous n'avons pas été seuls à désapprouver, et porte un coup qui peut être mortel à l'internationalisme prolétarien, à la confiance des peuples dans le socialisme, et au rassemblement en France des forces démocratiques déjà gravement compromis.

Ce que j'écris là est bien peu de ce que je pense. Mais je préfère laisser, pour le restant, aux lecteurs mêmes de ce journal le soin d'en juger si j'ai tort ou non sur les pièces mêmes du procès.

Aragon

LES LETTRES FRANÇAISES, Paris
8-14 October 1969

National Ministry of Education, Prague, 16 September 1969

To all Rectors of Higher Czech Schools.

To all Deans of Faculties.

I order you to submit to me between now and 12 October 1969 at the latest a written report including a survey and an evaluation of the opinions, the statements and wrongful acts, especially of a right-opportunist, antisocialist or anti-Soviet orientation, which were manifested during the years 1968 and 1969 in the organs of the school and the faculties, in the public statements of the various teachers, in the organs of the student movement and in the public declarations of the various students. The report should include in particular the following information:

(1) The participation of academic officials and members of the scientific council, or of the faculty, in the various political pressure activities, in the resolutions, manifestations of solidarity with the actions of the students, etc. Attach the texts and the date of these declarations, indicate at the same time if these wrongful resolutions have been annulled and if you would be inclined to propose their annulment and on what date. If the officials have personally participated in these actions, request from each a written personal evaluation of their activity and a declaration of their attitude in regard to the present policy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the National Front, the federal and national government. Attach this personal evaluation to the report;

(2) What professors and teachers of your school, or of your faculty, appeared in the press, as a result of their public actions, by their activities within the K.A.N. (Club of the Committed Non-Party Members) or in the various clubs and organizations, etc., as initiators and organizers of signature collection campaigns, of displays of opposition by teachers and students against the policy of the CSCP and National Front, as participants in campaigns against the faithful partisans of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism, etc.

Give their birth date, their functions and a brief description of the acts. Discuss it with them and ask for their written statement. Attach it to the report.

(3) Who were the workers in the school or faculty, during the course of 1968 and 1969, who were molested or were discriminated against for the simple reason that they respected in a consistent manner the attitude of the party, that they respected its internationalist program, and that they did not let themselves be intimidated by psychological terror by the antisocialist forces and the forces of the right. Mention their birth date, their functions, the type of discriminatory measures (attacks in the press, radio, tracts, by signature campaigns, release from their functions, departure from the faculty, forced retirement, effects of the terror on their health, etc.);

(4) The evaluation of the comportment of all the holders of the professional chairs of the social sciences (Marxism-Leninism), mentioning if the person involved has actively respected during the years 1968 and 1969 the attitude of the party in a consistent manner, if he respected its internationalist program, if he did not let himself be broken by the attack of the antisocialist and rightist forces. If it involves a worker who in the past has shown hesitations, but was capable of freeing himself of the errors and faults of the past period and is today sincerely convinced of the correctness of the policy of the party and is determined to apply it and to win over to it the students and the other teachers.

If it involves a partisan and a propagator of rightist opportunism in addition to Zionism, a participant in anti-Soviet and anti-party acts, a participant in the campaigns against the faithful partisans of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism, etc., demand from each holder of such a chair a written reply to these questions, a written evaluation of his conduct and of the activity of the entire professorial chair. Attach it to the report.

(5) The list of all the officials of the dissolved Union of Students of Bohemia and Moravia, of the student parliament, of the municipal Center, and of the other organizations and clubs of students in 1968 and 1969 in your faculty or higher school. Give their date of birth, their domicile (college), their faculty, class in school, their grades, and a short personal description.

Mention separately the list of students who, by their declarations in the mass media, in meetings, or by any other activity, worked as initiators and organizers of interventions of the opposition against the policy of the CSCP, of the National Front, of the federal and national governments, who have participated in the campaigns against the faithful partisans of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, who participated in antisocialist and anti-Soviet demonstrations, etc. In addition to the dates, present a brief note on their wrongdoings.

Mention next what sums the school, or faculty, has spent to contribute to the expenses of the student organizations during the course of the year 1968 and of the first half of the year 1969, if and how the mimeograph machines or the publications offices of the school were utilized for the publication of tracts, appeals and declarations. Present, at the same time, samples of these publications.

I hope that your reports and your evaluations will be precise and complete, based on just principles and effectuated according to irreproachable criteria. Your reports can contribute in a substantial manner to an exact analysis of the situation in the higher schools, to the amelioration of the job of political education and to the acceleration of the process of consolidation.

The rector of the school will attach to the reports of the deans his appraisal, if different, and his additions. Ascertain, if appropriate, what worker has refused to add his personal written statement. I recommend that the statements and the evaluations be discussed with the respective organs of the CSCP.

I call the attention of academic officials of the schools and of the faculties to the fact that the National Ministry of Education is carrying out at the same time its own detailed analysis of the situation in the different higher schools according to the documentation which is at its disposal. The conclusions will be compared with your evaluation and any contradictions will be judged and discussed with you.

CPYRIGHT

Professor MUDR.

JAROMIR HRBEK DR SC.

CPYRIGHT

Lettres françaises, Paris 8-14 October 1969

Ministère de l'Éducation nationale,
Prague, le 16 septembre 1969.

A tous les Recteurs des écoles supérieures tchèques.

A tous les Doyens des Facultés.

Je vous intime l'ordre de me présenter d'ici le 12 octobre 1969 au plus tard, un rapport écrit comprenant un aperçu et une évaluation des opinions, des déclarations et des actes injustes surtout d'orientation opportuniste de droite, antisocialistes et antisoviétiques qui se sont manifestés au cours de l'année 1968 et 1969 dans les organes de l'école et des facultés, dans les déclarations publiques des divers enseignants, dans les organes du mouvement des étudiants et dans les déclarations publiques des divers étudiants. Le rapport doit notamment comprendre les informations suivantes :

1) La participation des fonctionnaires académiques et du conseil scientifique de l'école, éventuellement de la faculté, aux diverses actions de pression, aux résolutions, déclarations, aux manifestations de solidarité avec les actions des étudiants, etc. Joignez les textes et la date de ces déclarations, faites savoir en même temps si ces résolutions injustes ont été annulées et si vous seriez disposé à proposer leur annulation et à quelle date. Si les fonctionnaires ont participé personnellement à ces actions, demandez à chacun une évaluation personnelle écrite de leur activité et une déclaration de leur attitude à l'égard de la politique actuelle du P.C.T., du Front national, du gouvernement fédéral et national. Joignez cette évaluation personnelle au rapport :

2) Quels professeurs et enseignants de votre école, éventuellement de votre faculté, se sont manifestés dans la presse, par leurs interventions publiques, par leurs activités au sein du K.A.N. (Club des sans-parti engagés ou dans les divers clubs et organisations, etc.) en tant qu'initiateurs et organisateurs des campagnes de signatures de pression ; des interventions d'opposition des instituteurs et des étudiants contre la politique du P.C.T. et du Front national, comme participants des campagnes contre les partisans fidèles du marxisme-léninisme et de l'internationalisme prolétarien, etc.

Mentionnez leur date de naissance, leurs fonctions et une description brève des actes. Discutez-en avec eux et demandez leur une déclaration écrite. Joignez-la au rapport ;

3) Quels étaient les travailleurs de l'école, éventuellement de la faculté, au cours des années 1968 et 1969 qui ont été molestés ou l'objet de discriminations par le simple fait qu'ils respectaient de manière conséquente l'attitude du parti, qu'ils respectaient son programme internationaliste et qu'ils ne se sont pas laissés intimider par la terreur psychique des forces antisocialistes et des forces de droite. Mentionnez leur date de naissance, leurs fonctions, le genre de mesures discriminatoires (attaques dans la presse, radio, tracts, par les campagnes de signatures, libération de leurs fonctions, départ de la faculté, mise à la retraite, séquestration de la terreur sur leur santé, etc.) ;

4) L'évaluation du comportement de tous les membres des chaînes des sciences sociales (marxisme-léninisme) en mentionnant si la personne intéressée a activement respecté pendant les années 1968 et 1969 l'attitude du parti de manière conséquente, si elle a respecté son programme internationaliste, si elle ne s'est pas laissé briser par l'attaque des forces antisocialistes et de droite. S'il s'agit d'un travailleur qui dans le passé a manifesté

des hésitations, mais était capable de se libérer des erreurs et des fautes de la période écoulée et est aujourd'hui sincèrement convaincu de la justesse de la politique du parti, et se trouve décidé à l'appliquer et à y gagner les étudiants et les autres enseignants.

S'il s'agit d'un partisan et d'un propagateur de l'opportunisme de droite en plus du sionisme, d'un participant aux actions antisoviétiques et antiparti, d'un participant aux campagnes contre les partisans fidèles du marxisme-léninisme et de l'internationalisme prolétarien, etc. ; exigez de chaque membre de la chaire une réponse écrite à ces questions, une évaluation par écrit de sa conduite et de l'activité de toute la chaire. Joignez au rapport.

5) La liste de tous les fonctionnaires de l'Union des Étudiants de Bohême et Moravie dissoute, du parlement des étudiants, du Centre municipal et des autres organisations et clubs des étudiants en 1968 et 1969 dans votre faculté ou école supérieure. Mentionnez leur date de naissance, leur domicile (collège), leur faculté, l'année d'étude, les résultats de ces études et une brève caractéristique.

Mentionnez séparément la liste des étudiants qui, par leurs déclarations dans les moyens d'information de masse, dans les réunions ou par toute autre activité travaillaient comme initiateurs et organisateurs des interventions de l'opposition contre la politique du P.C.T., du Front national, des gouvernements fédéraux et nationaux, qui ont participé aux campagnes contre les fidèles partisans du marxisme-léninisme et de l'internationalisme socialiste, qui ont participé aux démonstrations antisocialistes et antisoviétiques, etc. En dehors des dates, présentez une brève information sur leur fausse activité.

Mentionnez ensuite quelles sommes l'école éventuellement la faculté, ont déboursées pour contribuer aux frais des organisations des étudiants au cours de l'année 1968 et de la première moitié de l'année 1969, si et comment on utilisait des machines à ronéotyper, éventuellement les centres d'édition de l'école pour la publication des tracts, des appels et des déclarations. Présentez en même temps des exemplaires de ces publications.

J'espère que vos rapports et vos évaluations seront exactes et complets, fondés sur des principes justes et effectués selon des critères irréprochables. Vos rapports peuvent contribuer de manière considérable à une analyse exacte de la situation dans les écoles supérieures, à l'amélioration du travail éducatif politique et à l'accélération du processus de consolidation.

Le recteur de l'école joindra aux rapports des doyens son appréciation éventuellement différente et ses compléments. Informez-vous éventuellement quel travailleur a refusé d'ajouter sa déclaration personnelle écrite. Je recommande que les exposés et les évaluations soient discutés avec les organes respectifs du P.C.T.

Attirez l'attention des fonctionnaires académiques des écoles et des facultés sur le fait que le ministère de l'Éducation nationale effectue en même temps sa propre analyse détaillée de la situation dans les différentes écoles supérieures selon la documentation qui est à sa disposition. Les conclusions seront confrontées avec votre exposé et votre évaluation et les contradictions éventuelles seront jugées et discutées avec vous.

PROFESSOR MUDR.

JAROMIR HRBEK DR SC.

STATEMENT FROM A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE,
COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTRALIA, SYDNEY, AUGUST 28-29.

THE UNTHINK- ABLE WAR

SOCIALISTS, progressives, humanitarians and people of the most diverse views cannot but be alarmed over the growing conflict on the borders of the USSR and Chinese People's Republic.

Serious as that border conflict is in itself, with casualties on both sides, it is also abundantly clear that it has its origin in other, deeper issues dividing and generating antagonisms between the two countries and the Communist Parties leading them.

Although we cannot predict what course events will take, it is evident that the possibility of extension or enlargement of the conflict to a state of war cannot be ruled out. And so far-reaching, so incalculable are the consequences of such a development that every voice must be raised and every influence brought to bear to avert it.

A war resulting from the present situation would do irreparable damage to the cause of socialism, one of the cardinal principles of which is that socialism will abolish wars, the basic source of which has always been held to lie in capitalism and exploiting society generally.

Disastrous

It would destroy what remains of unity in the world communist movement.

It would provide imperialism, especially the United States, with unparalleled opportunities for manoeuvre for achievement of its aims of domination, exploitation and oppression throughout the world.

It would stimulate growth of antagonisms between "East" and "West", between "haves" and "have-nots", between "white" and "colored" and so contains the seeds of still wider conflict which would leave no people untouched.

Its ultimate outcome could not be foreseen and its course would be likely to negate even the most careful calculations for limitation.

In the light of such possible disastrous consequences no claims or counter-claims on territory or delineation of borders can at all justify courting extension of the

present conflict whether by deliberation or miscalculation.

Borders

In practically every area and continent there are territories and borders which, as a result of historical development, are potentially or actually in dispute.

In most cases, including the present dispute between China and the Soviet Union, there are many treaties, including unequal ones, documents and records of negotiations (much of which may not be publicly disclosed), accusations and counter-accusations, and it is usually impossible for the outside observer to pronounce conclusively on the rights and wrongs of every case or incident, or to weigh up exactly the degree of responsibility to be apportioned to this side or that.

And in this case, with so many conflicting claims, with tempers as they are and with so much at stake, to try and fix precisely degrees of responsibility would be a particularly fruitless pastime.

Negotiation

Marx, Engels, Lenin and other leaders of socialism always held that socialist na-

tions, particularly in relations among themselves, not being prompted by motives of territorial aggrandisement, or acquisition of sources of raw materials, population, spheres of influence or possession of strategic bases, would be able to, and would seek to, settle territorial and border problems bequeathed by history through negotiation and on the basis of the wishes of the people in the areas in question.

But instead, both China and the Soviet Union seem to be responding in the accustomed manner of "great powers" and even to be deliberately using the conflict as a means to foster "national unity", inflaming narrow nationalistic feelings among their populations, which history shows have often been a source of war, and which in this case are harnessed to the pursuit of the larger objectives of governments and leaders.

Hegemony

In our view neither side is acting in this situation as a socialist country should, and both are pursuing aims going much beyond the issue of the border.

The sources of these larger issues go back far into history and are connected with

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

national character historically developed.

In more recent times these historical factors have become fused with radically different views of what socialism is and how it is to be achieved and built, of the further course of the development of the socialist revolution throughout the world, and with the striving of both for hegemony or leadership over the world revolutionary movement.

In line with this, the attitudes adopted on concrete questions of foreign policy and relations with various countries often seem to depart from a position of principle and be based on expediency. In this connection some diplomatic activities undertaken by both sides seem to lose sight of the fact that the main enemy of all socialist states is imperialism and not each other.

It is not necessary to question the strength of the conviction with which each side holds to its position, or to reject everything in their experiences and policies, in order to dissociate oneself, as we do, from such standpoints and aims which we regard as a massive departure from basic socialist principles.

Interests

We reject the claims of each to being the sole interpreters and custodians of marxism and socialism, the identification by each of the interests of socialism in general with their national interests and aims, and the attempts to assume a position of hegemony over others.

Another disturbing fact which reveals some of the dangers in the present situation is the increasing insistence of each side that the

other can no longer be regarded as a socialist country.

Rational

In our view this is not just a misstatement of fact, but constitutes an ideological preparation for continued or extended conflict, because the people of the two countries have regarded war between socialist countries as impossible, but not war among capitalist countries, or between capitalist and socialist countries.

Although holding that both countries differ greatly in internal practices and external policies from the socialism we envisage for Australia (even after making full allowance for the greatly differing conditions and difficult problems), both are socialist.

We believe both are capable, on the basis of collect-

ive ownership of the main means of production and the revolutionary sentiments and traditions of the people, of correction of faults and of further great social and human advances, though much time may be needed for this.

Distressing as the border conflict is at present, the alternative of a pre-emptive strike, or any method of seeking to terminate it by escalation of military force, is far worse and should be rejected, even if this means that the existing unsatisfactory situation continues for some time.

Time is needed to permit negotiation and mediation, whether by other socialist countries, communist parties or others. This, in our view, must be attempted and persisted in for as long as necessary to achieve a detente and the rational discussion in the light of socialist principles of all issues involved.

KOMUNIST, Belgrade
September 1969

"The Richest Political and
Human Experience of Our Time"

Interview of Roger Garaudy by Vukoje Bulatovic

Roger Garaudy, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France, has spent several weeks in Yugoslavia. During his stay Garaudy had talks with a large number of sociopolitical functionaries, scientists and representatives of self-managing bodies. He was also received by Mijalko Todorovic, member of the Executive Bureau of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. At the end of his stay, which gave him the opportunity to become familiar with the Yugoslav self-managing system in greater detail, Comrade Garaudy gave the following interview at the request of our editor Vukoje Bulatovic.

Question: What are your principal observations concerning the status of the workers' movement and socialism in the world today?

Answer: The socialist movement in the world is now in a state of crisis. This is manifested not only in the true split dividing our Soviet and Chinese comrades, but was also manifested at the Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow: the agreement at the Conference (which in any case was partial) became realizable only because of the elimination of the basic problems -- by the elimination of the Chinese problem, the Czechoslovak problem, by the elimination of the central problem of different roads by which each country, in accordance with its own social structures and national traditions, may travel toward socialism. As I see it, this crisis does not arise out of variety, which, on the contrary, would be a sign of the health

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8
and richness of the movement, but it arises out of the refusal to accept the
variety in the models of socialism. This situation is not new, you Yugoslavs
are very familiar with something of this, since in 1948 the first excommuni-
cation in the movement took place, with all the adverse consequences of the
failure to understand the desire of a people to move toward socialism along
its own roads, consequences which were adverse not only because of the iso-
lation and boycott of Yugoslavia, but adverse for the movement as a whole.

Stagnation or Dynamism of Marxist Thought

Question: What is the distinguishing feature of socialist thought at the present time, dynamism or stagnation?

Answer: If we judge by the document adopted at the Conference in Mos-
cow, we would apparently have to say that socialist thought is in a state of
stagnation. First of all, because of the analysis or, to put it better, the
absence of analysis of the situation in the capitalist countries. The sharp-
ening of the contradictions in the capitalist world is evoked in this docu-
ment in an almost ritual manner. There is no question but that the contra-
dictions in capitalism are becoming sharper, but the contradictions which are
becoming sharper there are not those from the 19th century. These are new
contradictions. And the stagnation of thought is precisely that these new
contradictions are not being analyzed, particularly those that are manifest
in the United States and the entire capitalist world as a consequence of the
new scientific and technical revolution, with the changes which they are
causing in the structure of the working class, in the relations between pro-
duction and the market, in the growing role of science in the development of
the productive forces, and therefore in the new role of entire categories of
educated people, particularly engineers, technicians, and scientific research-
ers who are becoming a direct productive force and a component part of the
working class. If, then, we are thinking of the analysis of the situation
contained in the Moscow document, which was so superficial, we might get the
impression of a sclerosis of socialist thought.

The same stagnation is manifested in the analysis of the socialist
world: just as the new contradictions which are appearing for the first time
in the capitalist world are not acknowledged, so, unfortunately, we find in
this document a tendency to deny the contradictions within the socialist camp
and within each socialist country. And it is this that resulted in the
elimination of the fundamental problems, the problem which is posed because
of the behavior of the Chinese communists, in the elimination of such essen-
tial problems as that posed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by its
"January course" up until August 1968, that is, by the attempt of one commu-
nist party to create a model of socialism which would meet the requirements
of the scientific and technical revolution in a developed country. Never-
theless, I do not wish to stop at this pessimistic evaluation, since even
though certain forms of socialist thought may appear to be in stagnation,
it appears to me more significant in the present epoch that the revolution-
ary forces in the world are much larger than they ever were in the past. At
the same time, it is significant that just a few years ago most of the revo-
lutionary forces in the world were polarized around the communist and work-
ers' parties, while today the revolutionary movement is "by-passing" the
communist parties in large regions of the world. This is the case with a
large number of countries in Latin America and in Africa, where the national

liberation movements and movements with socialist inspiration are operating though Marxist parties do not exist. In Asia the problems are taking on a particularly aggravated form not only because of the voluntaristic attitudes of the Communist Party of China, but also because of the almost complete eradication of the Communist Party of Indonesia and the splintering of the other parties, particularly in Japan and India. But the vitality of the movement is manifested in the unexampled struggle of the Vietnamese communists against the most powerful imperialism in the world. Therefore, in spite of the elements of sclerosis which we have cited, I have entirely preserved my faith in the future of socialism, since new and ever greater forces for the construction of socialism are establishing themselves, even when they are frequently operating outside the traditional communist parties, since this introduces elements of competition and will perhaps drive a certain number of parties to go beyond the present stagnation of Marxist thought, which can only weaken communist parties vis-à-vis the growing revolutionary movement.

Question: In the light of the recent events which have shaken the socialist world, do you think we can say that greater efforts are being invested in the struggle against the effects of imperialistic subversion than in the search for solutions to existing problems within the socialist world and the system itself, a search which in turn would make socialism still more attractive to the masses?

Answer: This is indeed one important aspect of the matter. In the announcements which were made public both in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia a few days ago on the occasion of the anniversary of the intervention in August 1968, I was astounded by the fact that all the difficulties are attributed to an imperialistic conspiracy. I am of course far from the idea of denying the existence of counterrevolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia or the existence of external factors which are attempting to create difficulties, not to help socialism, but to destroy it. I think there is no question of this. But when an attempt is made to subsume everything that happened in Czechoslovakia under the action of a handful of counterrevolutionary elements inspired by foreign imperialism, it seems to me that the essential problems are being concealed. In the last few days, for example, the fundamental thing is not that a few dozen or a few hundred young people or perhaps foreign elements have created difficulties in the center of Prague. If we try to explain everything as if we were dealing with a few rowdy persons who want to destroy order, then we are behaving like Nixon, who, when he sent Rockefeller to Latin America, attributed the demonstrations that occurred along the route of his emissary to a handful of students who supposedly were being moved from capital to capital in order to protest against Rockefeller. It is not impossible that small groups of students did move from capital to capital, but the essence of the problem lies in the enormous protest of the entire continent of South America against Yankee imperialism. We might almost say the same thing of the May events last year in France. There is no doubt that certain elements came from outside: small groups of students who came from Milan; several students from Berlin, such as Cohn-Bendit, might have come and attempted to give a special make-up to the demonstrations. I don't deny this by any means. But if we leave it at that, we completely overlook the enormous one line omitted in the original -- translator's note/ who manifested their determination not to be integrated into a system which would forbid them to discuss the goals and values and

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

meaning of life. The big problem lies here. It is true that handfuls of persons wish to provoke disorder to appear on the surface of the movement. But if we leave it at that, we will never resolve the real problems. When today they speak in certain socialist countries only of ideological subversion, I wonder what sort of theoretical foundations can support such an idea. This simply means taking the defensive. I remember a wonderful interview which Lenin gave to an American newspaperman in 1919. "If you like, we can make an agreement. We will allow all the propaganda of the capitalist countries to be introduced into the Soviet Union provided that we have reciprocity," Lenin said at that time. In a time when things were not simple, Lenin was completely on the offense, and the capitalist world was frightened of an exchange of that sort. Now, 50 years after the October Revolution, it is difficult for me to understand why the Soviet Union is so afraid and examines suitcases so that no Chinese pamphlets or some sort of elements of ideological subversion will be carried over the border. If the problems are posed in this way, then we are incapable of solving them.

This reminds me of a period in our country when the capitalist and the bourgeois press looked for the "secret person pulling the strings" whenever there was a strike in France. They said that Moscow was causing all those disorders. This means that they did not see a great and authentic workers' movement which was striking for its own reasons, and they searched for "ideological subversion." I can quite understand when the bourgeoisie does this, but I admit a very poor understanding when this is done by Marxists who ought to attempt to comprehend the large and essential internal contradictions which are manifested in every country, instead of attributing them to the subversive action of handfuls of international rowdies.

The Strength and Weakness of the French Opposition

Question: What can you say about the present political situation in France?

Answer: I cannot provide a very deep analysis, I have neither the time nor the space here. Nevertheless, it seems to me significant that the opposition in France should be simultaneously in the majority and yet weak. Let us cite a few examples. In May of last year the largest strikes and the largest student movement in France's entire history occurred. The broadest strata of the people participated in this movement: workers, engineers, technicians, functionaries, peasants, millions of men and women. Elections were held only 2 months later, and after such a powerful movement directed against the regime, the party in power, the party of General de Gaulle, achieved a great election victory. A similar phenomenon occurred a year later. In the course of an unforgettable referendum, a majority stood out against General de Gaulle, and he was forced to withdraw. A month later, the presidential elections were called, and the candidate of the Gaullists was elected by a substantial majority. In my opinion, we ought to draw certain lessons from this situation: every time an opposition is in the majority but at the same time is only able to be negative, it is incapable of building.

We also find a similar phenomenon within the opposition itself. At the time of the May events, the Communist Party played a significant role in the strikes, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was undoubtedly the decisive element; at the time of the elections, the Communist Party, as dis-

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

it found itself isolated within that opposition. In the same way, at the time of the presidential elections, when all the opposition parties practically disintegrated, the Communist Party and its candidate, Jacques Duclos, who certainly conducted an excellent election campaign, achieved success. But the day after this success, it found itself alone in that opposition, which was extremely divided. This is the paradox. The opposition forces which are in the majority are powerless in the country, and within that opposition the largest force, the Communist Party of France, is unable to rally its forces. It seems to me that the moment has come for a profound analysis of these new conditions of French political life, an analysis of the new class relations which have arisen in France, and which, as I see it, call for the elaboration of a new political strategy, a new revolutionary strategy which would make it possible for the Communist Party of France to again become the ferment for rallying the opposition. I do not wish here to go into an elaboration of the various aspects of this initiative. What seems to me essential is the need for an essential re-examination and analysis both of class relations in France and also of the strategy for unity of the opposition and, I would also say, of the very conception of a revolutionary party in a highly developed country. Viewed from this standpoint, the attempt of our Czechoslovak comrades, their effort to create a policy and strategy adapted to a highly developed country, can serve us as a great lesson. In the case of the Communist Party of Italy, for example, the clear reminder which Luigi Longo expressed last week is extremely significant: "We feel solidarity with the Czechoslovak 'January course.'"

Lessons of Universal Importance

Likewise, the example of Yugoslav self-management, which demonstrates how socialism can be built by placing the working class in the position of an historical subject without the role of that working class being usurped by one party, without the class being replaced by that party, without the party being replaced by the apparatus, without the apparatus being replaced by the leading group, this, in my opinion, is a lesson of universal significance. So, this is why I have now been trying to study these problems on the spot. I have been fortunate to encounter great understanding in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which has helped me to better understand what this experience means, an experience that went so unrecognized after the tragic error of 1948 and the slander, silence or lack of recognition which the communist parties evinced toward this experience.

Question: More than a year has passed from the great social upheavals in France which are called the May events. What has remained as permanent experience, what are the prospects for the development of the movement and the opportunities for a better understanding of the new problems posed by social development?

Answer: If we should remain on the surface of things, it would appear that we are confronted with a disappointing situation. After such a powerful movement such as the one consisting of the working class and the students in May last year, we must say that the two successive defeats of the majority opposition called into question everything that had been achieved. So that everything that was achieved for the working class by the agreement at Grenelle -- just like everything that was achieved by the initial reforms of education -- which to a certain extent reflected, although contradictorily,

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

the demands of the students /sic/ Nevertheless, a problem which will be difficult to squirm out of has been placed on the agenda. What seems to me significant during the worker strike in May of last year, along with the material demand for a rise in wages along with the quantitative demands, is that a new demand began to appear in the broad strata of the working class and also among the engineers and personnel in general -- the demand for participation in management. The demand for participation in working out the decisions on which the fate of all depends. This is a new stage in the gaining of consciousness, a new stage in the struggle against the capitalist system. What was manifested in June, both among the workers and also among the students, was the consciousness that every political and economic system is obsolete in which one man or a few people decide in the name of all others.

From this standpoint, the experience of Yugoslav self-management, even with all the difficulties which the achievement of self-management has encountered in a country which started off from a position of great backwardness, must force us to reflect. Self-management might be even more suitable to an economically and technically highly developed country such as France. A study of what you have achieved since 1948 constitutes a very great lesson for us: the prospects for development and an understanding of the new problems which society is posing must proceed from the need for every worker, whether his work is mental or physical, to become a subject of history. We must go beyond not only alienation in capitalist society, but also the new alienations which may arise in the centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian conception of socialism.

Integration Gives a New Structure to Society

Question: During your stay in Yugoslavia you had conversations and an exchange of opinion on various political and other topics arising out of the life of our country. What impressions did you bring away from these talks?

Answer: I encountered so much understanding in those I talked with, my Yugoslav friends who received me, that I still cannot make an over-all judgment. I gathered very rich material and a certain time will be needed for me to put order in my ideas concerning this experience. But what has already struck me is the unjust way in which this system has been evaluated for so long. Attempts have frequently been made in France to discredit it, with the following interpretation in particular: this is a resurrection of Proudhonism, an individualistic and anarchistic conception whose goal is the atomization of society. What has impressed me in the talks I have had is the realization that if self-management was applied at first in a critical and polemical manner so as to break up the centralistic, authoritarian and bureaucratic conception which prevailed for a certain time, between 1945 and 1948, when the Soviet model was being copied, now Yugoslavia is in a new stage in which self-management is no longer defined only as opposition to the centralistic conception, as a negation of the hierarchical, bureaucratic and authoritarian, but is defined in a positive way, that is, as the full participation of man in the decisions on which his fate depends from the economic, political and cultural standpoints. I am impressed by the fact that there was much insistence on the role of integration in the various discussions in which I took part. We are dealing with a movement whose goal is not the atomization of society, but, on the contrary, the structuring of society in a new way. Something else that struck me is that integration is not a re-

turn to the unitary and centralistic conception. I have the impression that during the replacement of a cybernetic model for the former mechanical model, i.e., for the centralized and authoritarian concept in which everything comes from top down through directives originating from a single center, an alternative system is being set up which would give society a new structure through integration. Not hierarchies, that is, which originate from one center, but self-regulation of several interdependent centers, which provides what I just called the cybernetic model, rather than the mechanical model for regulation of social processes. In the coming weeks, after I return to France, it is precisely this I will work on, since it seems to me that it is infinitely pregnant with the future and full of lessons for the orientation which, in my opinion, we must give to our revolutionary struggle and our Marxist thought in France if we wish to struggle against disagreements and the dissatisfaction caused by the centralized and authoritarian conception of socialism. We must say clearly that the socialism which we wish to build in France is not the centralized, authoritarian and bureaucratic system. We will have difficulties, because a dual tradition exists in France: in our national tradition the idea of revolution has always been associated with centralization. This was the Jacobin conception, and then the conception of Blanqui, and we must say that when Marxism made its way into France (Jules Guesde), it came in a dogmatic, authoritarian and centralistic form. Perhaps this is why Stalinism was able to become entrenched in France so easily. But then there is another tradition: the tradition of Proudhonism, the individualistic tradition which would lead us to anarchoid or even anarchical conceptions. The problem is to find our way between these two conceptions. It is a question of our answering a great and essential aspiration of our time, without losing anything of our national past. If I were to sum up my impressions of Yugoslavia in a word, it seems to me, and this is not the smallest paradox, that this experience has been achieved in a country which started from extreme backwardness, and that the form of human relations characteristic of self-management is precisely that which best corresponds to present-day demands of the scientific and technical revolution. Self-management is not an attribute of underdevelopment. The new scientific and technical revolution is creating new forms of professional skill in which general culture plays an enormous role; it is calling for decentralization of initiative, so that for the first time in history the demands of technical and economic development coincide with the demands of democracy and human development. In meeting these demands, self-management is perhaps the richest political and human experience of our time, that experience which is richest in lessons for the entire revolutionary movement in the world.

KOMUNIST, Belgrade
4 September 1969

Najbogatije političko i ljudsko iskustvo našeg vremena

Rože Garodi, član Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta komunističke partije Francuske, boravio je poslednjih nekoliko godina u Jugoslaviji. To komi svog boravka Garodi je imao razgovore sa većim brojem društveno-političkih funkcionera, naučnih radnika i predstavnika samoupravnih tela. Primio ga je

i Mijalko Todorović, član Izvršnog biroa Predsedništva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije.

Na kraju svog boravka, koji mu je poslužio za bliže upoznavanje jugoslovenskog samoupravnog sistema, drug Garodi je, na molbu našeg urednika Vukoja Bulatovića, dao sledeći intervju:

Koja su vaša osnovna zapažanja o stanju radničkog pokreta i socijalizma danas u svetu?

SOCIJALISTIČKI pokret u svetu nalazi se u stanju krize. To se manifestuje ne samo kroz pravi raskol koji suprotstavlja naše sovjetske i kineske drugove, nego se manifestovalo takođe i na Konferenciji komunističkih partija u Moskvi: sporazum na Konferenciji (parcijalan uostalom) mogao se ostvariti samo eliminisanjem osnovnih problema — eliminisanjem kineskog problema, čehoslovačkog problema, eliminisanjem centralnog problema različitih puteva kojima svaka zemlja, u skladu sa sopstvenim društvenim strukturama i nacionalnim tradicijama, može ići ka socijalizmu. Po mom shvatanju, ta kriza ne proizilazi iz raznolikosti, što bi naprotiv bio znak zdravlja i bogatstva pokreta, već proističe iz odbijanja da se prizna raznolikost modela socijalizma. Ovo stanje nije novo, vama Jugoslovenima nešto od toga dobro je poznato, jer se 1948. godine dogodila prva ekskomunikacija u pokretu, sa svim negativnim posledicama nerazumevanja volje jednog naroda da krene ka socijalizmu sopstvenim putevima, posledicama koje su bile negativne ne samo po izobovaru, bojkotovanu Jugoslaviju, nego za pokret u celini.

Stagnacija ili dinamizam marksističke misli

Šta oblikuje savremenu socijalističku misao — dinamičnost ili stagnacija?

AKO SE ocenjujemo po dokumentu usvojenom na Konferenciji u Moskvi, izgleda mi da bismo morali reći da je socijalistička misao u stanju stagnacije. Pre svega zbog analize ili, bolje rečeno, odsustva analize situacije u kapitalističkim zemljama. U pomenutom dokumentu evocira se na skoro ritualan način, zaoštavanje kontradikcija u kapitalističkom svetu. Neosporno, u kapitalizmu se kontradikcije zaoštavaju, ali kontradikcije koje se tamo zaoštavaju nisu one iz XIX veka. To su nove kontradikcije. A stagnacija misli i jeste u tome što se ne analiziraju te nove kontradikcije, posebno one koje se javljaju u Sjedinjenim Državama i čitavom kapitalističkom svetu kao posledica nove naučne i tehničke revolucije, sa promenama koje izazivaju u strukturi radničke klase, u odnosima proizvodnje i tržišta, rastućoj ulozi nauke u razvoju proizvodnih snaga i, otuda, novoj ulozi čitavih kategorija intelektualaca, posebno inženjera, tehničara, naučnih istraživača koji poslažu neposredna proizvodna snaga i sastavni deo radničke klase. Ako, dakle, imamo u vidu tu tako površnu analizu situacije u moskovskom dokumentu, mogao bi se steći utisak o sklerozi socijalističke misli.

Ista stagnacija javlja se u analizi socijalističkog sveta: kao što se ne priznaju nove kontradikcije koje se po prvi put javljaju u kapitalističkom svetu, tako, nažalost, u ovom dokumentu konstatujemo tendenciju negiranja suprotnosti unutar socijalističkog lagersa i unutar svake socijalističke zemlje. To je ono što je uostalom i dovelo do elimi-

nisanja fundamentalnih problema: problema koji se postavlja zbog držanja kineskih komunista, od eliminisanja tako suštinskih problema kao što je onaj što ga je postavila Komunistička partija Čehoslovačke »ja nuarskim kursom« do avgusta 1968. godine, odnosno pokušajem jedne komunističke partije da ostvari model socijalizma koji bi odgovarao zahtevima naučne i tehničke revolucije u jednoj razvijenoj zemlji. Ipak, ne bih hteo da ostanem pri ovoj pesimističkoj oceni jer uprkos tome što izvesni oblici socijalističke misli mogu izgledati stagnirajući, izgleda mi značajnije u sadašnjoj epoci, da su revolucionarne snage u svetu mnogo veće nego što su ikada ranije bile. Značajno je, s druge strane, da je još samo pre nekoliko godina većina revolucionarnih snaga u svetu bila polarizovana oko komunističkih i radničkih partija, a danas u velikim regionima sveta revolucionarni pokret »mimoilazi« komunističke partije. Takav je slučaj sa velikim brojem zemalja Latinske Amerike, u Africi gde nacionalno-oslobodilački pokreti i pokreti socijalističke inspiracije deluju bez postojanja marksističkih partija. U Aziji, problemi dobijaju posebno zaoštren oblik, ne samo zbog voluntarističkih stavova Komunističke partije Kine, nego i zbog skoro potpunog istrebljenja Komunističke partije Indonezije i pocepanosti drugih partija, naročito u Japanu i Indiji. Ali vitalnost pokreta manifestuje se kroz besprimernu borbu vijetnamskih komunista protiv najmoćnijeg imperijalizma u svetu. Zato, uprkos elementima skleroze koje smo naveli sačuvao sam u potpunosti veru

u budućnost socijalizam jer se čini rmišu nove sve veće potrebe za izgradnju socijalizma, čak i kada one deluju, često, izvan tradicionalnih komunističkih partija, jer to u nosi elemente konkurencije i možda će paterati izvestan broj partija da prevaziđu sadašnju stagnaciju marksističke misli, koja može samo da oslabi komunističke partije pred rastućim revolucionarnim pokretom.

U svetlu nedavnih događaja koji su potresli socijalistički svet može li se konstatovati, po Vašem mišljenju, da se ulazu veći naponi u borbu protiv efekata imperijalističke diverzije, nego što se traže rešenja postojećih problema unutar socijalistikog sveta i samog sistema, što bi sa svoje strane učinilo socijalizam još privlačnijim za mase?

TO JE USTVARI jedan značajan aspekt stvari. U saopštenjima koja su objavljena kako u Sovjetskom Savezu tako i u Čehoslovačkoj ovih dana povodom godišnjice intervencije, avgusta 1968, bio sam frapiran činjenicom što se sve teškoće pripisuju imperijalističkoj zavci. Razume se, daleko sam od pomisli da negiram postojanje kontrarevolucionarnih elemenata u Čehoslovačkoj, postojanje spoljnih faktora koji pokušavaju da stvore teškoće, ne da pomognu socijalizmu, već da ga sruše. To mi se čini izvjesnim. Ali kada se sve što se odigralo u Čehoslovačkoj pokušava podvesti pod akciju šačice kontrarevolucionarnih elemenata, inspirisane inostranim imperijalizmom, čini mi se da se prikrivaju suštinski problemi. Ovih poslednjih dana, na primer, osnovna stvar nije u tome što je nekoliko desetina ili nekoliko stotina mladih ljudi ili možda inostranih elemenata stvaralo teškoće u centru Praga. Ako se pokušava sve objasniti tako kao da je reč o nekoliko izgrednika koji hoće da narušavaju red, onda se ponaša slično Niksonu koji, šaljući Rockefellera u Latinsku Ameriku, pripisuje demonstracije do kojih je došlo prilikom prolaska njegovog izaslanika šačici studenata koji su se navodno prebacivali iz prestonice u prestonicu da bi prote stvovali protiv Rockelera. Nije isključeno da su se grupice studenata prebacivale iz prestonice u prestonicu, ali suština problema je u ogromnom protestu čitavog južno-američkog kontinenta protiv jenkijevskog imperijalizma. Moglo bi se skoro isto reći za događaje maja meseca prošle godine u Francuskoj. Nema sumnje da su neki elementi došli sa strane: grupice studenata su došle iz Milana; nekoliko studenata iz Berlina, kao što je Kon-Bendit, moglo je doći i pokušati da da posebno obeležje demonstracijama. To ne negiram ni na koji način. Ali ako se drži samo

toga potpuno se minovlazi osnovan koji su imali stovili, ali da se ne integrišu u jedan sistem koji bi im zabranio da diskutuju o ciljevima, vrednostima i smislu života. U tome je veliki problem. Da se šačice izazivača nereda javljaju na površini pokreta — to je tačno. Ali ako se ostane samo na tome, neće se nikada razrešiti stvarni problemi. Kada se danas, u izvjesnim socijalističkim zemljama, govori samo o ideološkoj subverziji, pitam se na kakvim teorijskim osnovama može počivati jedan takav pojam. To prosto znači nalaziti se u defanzivi. Priscćam se onog diynog intervjua što ga je Lenjin dao jednom američkom novinaru 1919. godine. »Ako vi želite, možemo sklopiti ugovor. Dozvolice-mo da se u Sovjetski Savez unosi sva propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja, pod uslovom da imamo reciprocitet«, rekao je tada Lenjin. U vreme kada stvari nisu bile jednostavne, Lenjin je bio u punoj ofanzivi, a kapitalistički svet je bio preplašen od jedne takve razmene. Sada mi je teško da shvatim da se, pedeset godina posle Oktobarske revolucije, može do te mere biti zaplašen i kontrolisati kofere da ne bi bila proneta kakva kineska brošura ili ne znam kakav elemenat ideološke diverzije. Ako se problemi postavljaju na taj način onda smo nesposobni da ih rešimo.

To me podseća na jedan period u našoj zemlji kada su kapitalisti i građanska štampa, prilikom svakog štrajka u Francuskoj tražili »tajnog šefa orkestra«. Govorili su da je Moskva izazivala sve te nevide. To znači da nisu videli jedan velik i autentičan radnički pokret koji je ustajao na štrajkove iz sopstvenih razloga, a oni su tragali za ideološkom subverzijom«. Mogu sasvim da shvatim kada to čini buržoazija, ali priznajem da veoma loše razumem kada to čine marksisti koji bi trebalo da pokušaju da shvate velike i suštinske unutrašnje kontradikcije koje se javljaju u svakoj zemlji, umesto da ih pripisuju subverzivnom delovanju šačica međunarodnih izgrednika.

Snaga i nemoć francuske opozicije

Sta možete reći o sadašnjoj političkoj situaciji u Francuskoj?

NE MOGU DATI dublju analizu, nemam ovde ni vremena ni prostora. Ipak, izgleda mi značajnim, to što je opozicija u Francuskoj istovremeno i u većini i nemoćna. Navedimo nekoliko primera. Maja meseca prošle godine došlo je u Francuskoj do najvećih štrajkova i najvećeg studentskog pokreta u čitavoj njenoj istoriji. Najširi narodni slojevi učestvovali su u tom pokretu: radnici, inženjeri, tehničari, fun

kcioneri, seljaci, milioni ljudi i žena. Sve to se dogodilo tek posle toga ocrčani su izbori, posle jednog tako snažnog pokreta usmerenog protiv režima, partija na vlasti, partija generala De Gola, postigla je veliku izbornu pobedu. Godinu dana kasnije, došlo je do sličnog fenomena. U toku jednog nezaboravnog referenduma, izdvaja se većina protiv generala De Gola i on je prinuđen da se povuče. Mesec dana kasnije zakazani su predsednički izbori i kandidat dogolista izabran je značajnom većinom. Po mom mišljenju, iz takve situacije trebalo bi izvući neke pouke: svaki put opozicija je u većini a istovremeno može samo da negira, nemoćna je da gradi.

Sličan fenomen nalazimo i unutar same opozicije. U vreme majskih događaja, komunistička partija odigrala je značajnu ulogu u štrajkovima, Generalna konfederacija rada (CGT) bila je nesumnjivo odlučujući elemenat; za vreme izbora, komunistička partija, za razliku od svih drugih levih partija, postigla je uspeh, ali se našla izolovana unutar te opozicije. Na isti način, u vreme predsedničkih izbora, kada su se sve opozicione partije praktično raspale, komunistička partija i njen kandidat, Zak Diklo, koji je uostalom vodio odličnu izbornu kampanju, postiže uspeh. Ali sutradan posle tog uspeha našla se sama u toj, do kraja podeljenoj opoziciji. To je paradoks. Snage opozicije koje su u većini, nemoćne su u zemlji, a unutar te opozicije najveća snaga, KPF, ne uspeva da okupi njene snage. Izgleda mi da je došao trenutak za duboku analizu ovih novih uslova francuskog političkog života, analizu novih klasnih odnosa koji su nastali u Francuskoj, i koji zahtevaju, po mom shvatanju, razradu nove političke strategije, nove revolucionarne strategije koja će omogućiti Komunističkoj partiji Francuske da po novo postane ferment okupljanja opozicije. Ne želim ovde da ulazim u razradu različitih aspekata ove inicijative. Ono što mi izgleda bitnim, jeste neophodnost ponovnog suštinskog razmatranja i analize kako klasnih odnosa u Francuskoj, tako i strategije jedinstva opozicije i, rekao bih takođe, same koncepcije revolucionarne partije u jednoj visoko razvijenoj zemlji. Sa tog stano- višta gledano, pokušaj naših čehoslovačkih drugova, od januara do avgusta 1968, njihov napor da kreiraju politiku i strategiju prilagođenu visokorazvijenoj zemlji, može nam poslužiti kao velika pouka. Za komunističku partiju Italije, na primer, izvanredno je značajno što je Luidi Longo jasno podsetio tokom prošle nedelje: »Mi smo solidarni sa čehoslovačkim »januarskim kursom.«

Pouke od univerzalnog značaja

Isto tako, primer jugoslovenskog samoupravljanja, koji pokazuje ka

Ko se socijalizam može graditi stavljajući radničku klasu u položaj istorijskog subjekta, a da uloga te radničke klase ne bude konfiskovana od strane jedne partije, da ta partija ne zameni klasu, da aparat ne zameni partiju, da rukovodna grupa ne zameni aparat, to po mom mišljenju, predstavlja pouku univerzalnog značaja. Zato sam uostalom ovih dana tražio da izučavam na licu mesta ove probleme. Imao sam sreću što sam naišao na veliko razumevanje u Savezu komunističke Jugoslavije, koji mi je pomogao da bolje shvatim šta znači to iskustvo tako nepriznato posle tragične greške iz 1948. godine i kleveta, čušanja ili nepriznanja koje su komunističke partije pokazale prema tom iskustvu.

Prošlo je više od godinu dana od velikih takozvanih majskih društvenih previranja u Francuskoj. Šta je ostalo kao trajno iskustvo, kakve su perspektive razvoja pokreta i mogućnosti boljeg razumevanja novih problema koje postavlja društveni razvitak?

AKO BISMO SE zadržali na površini stvari, izgledalo bi kao da se nalazimo pred situacijom koja razočarava. Posle jednog tako snažnog pokreta, kao što je bio onaj u maju prošle godine među radničkom klasom i studentima, treba reći da su dva uzastopna poraza većinske opozicije dovela u pitanje sve što je bilo postignuto. Tako da je sve ono što je bilo postignuto za radničku klasu sporazumima u Grenelu — kao i ono što je bilo postignuto početnim reformama obrazovanja — koji su odražavali u izvesnoj meri, iako kontradiktorno, zahteve studenata. Ipak, postavljen je na dnevni red problem koji će biti teško izvršiti. Ono što mi se čini značajnim u vreme radničkih štrajkova maja meseca prošle godine pored materijalnih zahteva za povećanje plata, pored kvantitativnih revandikacija, počeo je da se javlja jedan nov zahtev, kako u širokim slojevima radničke klase, tako kod inženjera i kadrova uopšte — zahtev za učešćem u upravljanju. Zahtev za učešćem u razradi odluka od kojih zavisi sudbina svih. To je nova etapa u sticanju svesti, nova etapa u borbi protiv kapitalističkog uređenja. Ono što se javilo juna meseca, kako među radnicima, tako i među studentima, jeste svest o prevaženosti svakog političkog i ekonomskog sistema u kojem jedan čovek ili nekoliko ljudi odlučuje u ime svih ostalih.

Sa tog stanovišta, iskustvo jugoslovenskog samoupravljanja, čak i sa svim teškoćama na koje je mogla naići realizacija samoupravljanja u jednoj zemlji koja je pošla iz velike zaostalosti, mora nas na-

terati na razmišljanje. Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji još nije odgovaralo jednoj ekonomski i tehnički visokorazvijenoj zemlji kao što je Francuska. Studiranje onoga što ste vi ostvarili posle 1948. godine, predstavlja za nas veoma veliku pouku: perspektive razvoja i razumevanje novih problema koje društvo postavlja mora polaziti od potrebe da svaki trudbenik, fizički ili intelektualni, postane subjekt istorije. Prevazići ne samo otuđenje u kapitalističkom društvu, nego i nova otuđenja koja bi se mogla javiti u centralizovanoj, birokratskoj i autoritarnoj koncepciji socijalizma.

Integracija daje novu strukturu društvu

Za vreme vašeg boravka u Jugoslaviji imali ste razgovore i razmeću mišljenja o različitim političkim i drugim temama iz života naše zemlje. Kakve utiske nosite iz tih razgovora?

NAIŠAO SAM na toliko razumevanje kod svojih sagovornika, mojih jugoslovenskih prijatelja, koji su me primili, da još ne mogu dati sud o celini. Prikupio sam veoma bogat materijal i biće potrebno izvesno vreme da bih sudio ideje o ovom iskustvu. Ali ono što me već sada frapiralo jeste nepravilan način na koji je tako dugo ocenjivano ovo uređenje. U Francuskoj su se često činili pokušaji da ga se diskredituje, naročito uz tumačenje: to je vaskrsavanje prudonizma, individualistička, anarhistička koncepcija, koja ima za cilj atomiziranje društva. Ono što me je impresioniralo u razgovorima što sam ih imao, jeste saznanje da, ako je u prvo vreme samoupravljanje i bilo primenjeno na jedan kritički, polemički način, da bi se razbila centralistička, autoritarna, birokratska koncepcija koja je vladala izvesno vreme, između 1945. i 1948. kada je kopiran sovjetski model, sada se Jugoslavija nalazi na jednoj novoj etapi kada sa samoupravljanje nije više definisano samo kao suprotnost centralističkoj koncepciji, kao negacija hijerarhijskog, birokratskog, autoritarnog, nego se definiše na pozitivan način, tojest kao puno učešće čoveka u odlukama od kojih zavisi njegova sudbina na ekonomskom, političkom i kulturnom planu. Impresioniran sam činjenicom da se mnogo insistira, u različitim diskusijama u kojima sam uzeo učešća, na ulozi integracije. Radi se o jednom pokretu čiji cilj nije atomizacija društva, već naprotiv strukturisanje društva na nov način. I što me takođe frapiralo, integracija nije vraćanje na unitarističku i centralističku koncepciju. Imam utisak da je u toku za-

gradnja modela kibernetičkim modelom, odnosno jednog centralizovanog, autoritarnog koncepta u kojem sve dolazi odozgo, preko direktiva koje dolaze iz jednog jedinstvenog centra, suprotstavljajući se sistem koji, putem integracije, daje novu strukturu društvu. Dakle, ne hijerarhije koje polaze od jednog centra, već samoregulisanje više međuzavisnih centara, što daje ono što sam maločas nazvao kibernetičkim, a ne mehaničkim modelom regulisanja društvenih procesa. Upravo eu tokom sledećih nedelja, po povratku u zemlju, raditi na tome, jer mi to izgleda beskraino bogato budućnošću i punim pouka za orijentaciju koju bismo, po mom mišljenju, mogli dati našoj revolucionarnoj borbi i našoj marksističkoj misli u Francuskoj, ako hoćemo da se borimo protiv nesporazuma i protiv nezadovoljstva što ga izaziva centralizovana i autoritarna koncepcija socijalizma. Treba jasno da kažemo — socijalizam koji želimo da izgradimo u Francuskoj — to nije centralizovani, autoritarni i birokratski sistem. Imaćemo teškoća jer u Francuskoj postoji dvostruka tradicija: ideja o revoluciji je u našoj nacionalnoj tradiciji bila uvek vezana za centralizaciju. Bila je to jakobinska koncepcija, a zatim koncepcija Blankija, i treba reći da, kada je marksizam prodro u Francusku (Zil God), došao je u dogmatskoj, autoritarnoj i centralističkoj formi. Možda je zato staljinizam i mogao tako lako da se ukorenji kod nas. A zatim ima i jedna druga tradicija: tradicija pridonizma, individualistička, koja bi nas dovela do anarhičnih ili čak anarhičnih koncepcija. Problem je u tome da nađemo naš put između te dve koncepcije. Radi se o tome da odgovorimo jednoj velikoj i suštinskoj aspiraciji našeg vremena, a da ništa ne izgubimo od naše nacionalne prošlosti. Ako bih htio jednom reći da rezimiram impresije iz Jugoslavije, izgleda mi, a to nije najmanji paradoks, da je ovo iskustvo ostvareno u jednoj zemlji koja je pošla od krajnje zaostalosti, a da je upravo oblik ljudskih odnosa koji karakteriše samoupravljanje ovaj koji najbolje odgovara sadašnjim zahtevima naučne i tehničke revolucije. Samoupravljanje nije atribut nerazvijenosti. Nova naučna i tehnička revolucija stvara nove oblike profesionalne kvalifikacije u kojima opšta kultura igra ogromnu ulogu; ona traži decentralizaciju inicijativa, tako da po prvi put u istoriji, zahtevi tehničkog i privrednog razvika koincidiraju sa zahtevima demokracije i razvika čoveka. Odgovorajući tim zahtevima, samoupravljanje je možda najbogatije političko i ljudsko iskustvo našeg vremena, najbogatije poukama za celi revolucionarni pokret u svetu.

Excerpts from: Pour un modèle français du Socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism) by Roger Garaudy, Gallimard, 1968.

The year he died, Lenin wrote: "Our worst internal enemy is the bureaucrat, the Communist who occupies a responsible post in the Soviet institutions."

The reasons for Lenin's concern and for his struggle against bureaucracy derive from a fundamental preoccupation: bureaucracy, as Marx had already emphasized in his "critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," is a concentrated form of the alienated relationship between the individual and the general interest and cannot disappear completely until all contradiction has been eliminated between the individual and the general interest. That is why it is characteristic of all class regimes based on domination and exploitation by the majority: it gives this domination and this exploitation an anonymous face....

The reappearance of bureaucracy after the socialist revolution means a return to the relationship of exteriority between the worker and his state, a new alienation which tends to make of the worker once again the object and not the subject of history. Socialism begins when the state has become, not the formal and exterior state of the old bourgeois regime, but that in which every worker participates in the direction of the economy and of the state itself. If this direct participation is restricted, to say nothing of blocked, by a bureaucratic system, there is a threat to the very principle of socialism, which involves not just the direction of the economy and the state for the workers, but also by them. (pp. 122-123)

We have already seen by what convergence of historical conditions, after the death of Lenin, bureaucratic deformation began with a double violation of the principles of socialist democracy, first in the state: the substitution of the dictatorship of the Party for that of the proletariat; then in the Party: the substitution, for the dictatorship of the Party, of that of its chief, centralism hyper-trophying without limits at the expense of democracy.

This bureaucratic distortion cannot be reduced to the "cult of the personality," for although Stalin's personality did play a role, it was not the essential one. To pretend that everything can be explained by the personal quirks of Stalin is to bagatellize the essential and thus not be prepared, in analogous historical circumstances, against the return of such deformations. (p. 131)

But after the death of Lenin, bureaucratic deformation became a permanent characteristic of the Soviet regime. With Stalin, but also with his successors.

From the point of view of theory, this was manifested in a dogmatic degeneration of Marxism transformed into an ideology of justification.

To take up only the essential political aspects of this theoretical deformation, we must remember that "theory" served constantly to falsify the objective analysis of reality to make people believe that they had attained stages of social development which in fact they were far from having reached.

Thus, for example, Stalin put forward the thesis that Communism could be constructed even while the state (because of capitalist encirclement) still existed, this to support the claim announced at the XVIIIth Congress in 1939 that socialism had been completely achieved in the USSR and that they were moving toward Communism. On the eve of the XIXth Congress, in 1952, Stalin acknowledged, with reason, the existence of market relations under the socialist regime, in his "Economic Problems of Socialism," but nevertheless reiterated the thesis that Communism lay just over the horizon of history. A few years later, N.S. Khrushchev hastily warmed up the "theory" of the state of the entire people, a concept which is impossible in a Marxist perspective, the historical reality of which is refuted by the situation in the USSR, where the people as a whole are kept in absolute ignorance of events and where the base organizations of the Party play only the role of executing directives from above and have no part in the elaboration of policy or the fundamental options of the leadership.

The Stalinist thesis, based on purely economic criteria, that socialism had been achieved and that they were beginning to build Communism, was taken up again at the XXIIIrd Congress. But, without restricting oneself to a purely mechanistic definition of socialism, strictly economic: the suppression of private ownership of the means of production, it is evident that, at the level of the superstructures (of the state, of socialist democracy, or of cultural creativity, for example) there still does not exist more than embryonic socialism.

This theoretical deformation, this dogmatism and this schematism devoid of reality, make up the foundation for deformations in practice and, especially, of bureaucracy, a characteristic of the Soviet state which still falls under Lenin's condemnation: it is a state for the workers, but not by the workers.

The consequences and recurrences of Stalinism, due to a Party leadership which tried to turn too quickly the page of the XXth Congress, have manifested themselves openly many times: there were, in the past few years, the esthetic and theoretical gesticulations of Khrushchev, the theses of Ilichev on religion, the conditions of Khrushchev's removal, the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial and its aftermath, the honors accorded to the anti-semitic Kishko, whose works have since been officially disavowed in 1964, after a protest by Maurice Thorez.

But by far the gravest manifestation of theoretical and political degeneration on the part of the leadership of the CPSU was the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was not an "error" or a "madness," but the necessary consequence of a systematic conception: from the moment when the Soviet leaders were dogmatically imprisoned in the Stalinist schema identifying socialism with the sole model historically realized in the Soviet Union, they were led to consider as a menace to socialism any initiative to adapt the forms of building socialism to the conditions, for example, in a country already highly industrialized before the revolution. This is how they judged the attempt by the Czechoslovak Communist Party and its chief, Dubcek, to create a socialist democracy. (pp. 147-149)

EXCERPTS from:
 Pour un modèle français du Socialisme
 (For a French Model of Socialism)
 by Roger Garaudy

CPYRGHT

122 Formes actuelles du socialisme	Le modèle soviétique	123 Le modèle soviétique 13
<p>commencerait par tenter d'organiser sur une grande échelle la production et la répartition pour les paysans, puis que, n'étant pas venu à bout de cette tâche en raison des conditions culturelles, il ferait participer le capitalisme à son œuvre. On n'a jamais prévu tout cela, mais c'est néanmoins un fait incontestable¹.</p> <p>Désormais, et jusqu'à sa mort, la préoccupation centrale de Lénine c'est d'empêcher qu'au niveau de l'État se crée une nouvelle bureaucratie, soit héritée de l'ancienne par le retour des commis de l'ancien régime, soit engendrée par le régime nouveau : en ce dernier cas la déformation bureaucratique c'est la substitution de la dictature de l'appareil du Parti à la dictature du prolétariat. Le Parti, instrument de la dictature du prolétariat, devient alors une fin en soi.</p> <p>Lénine écrit, en février 1921, à l'un des dirigeants du parti d'État : « Le plus grand danger c'est de bureaucratiser à l'extrême le plan d'économie nationale. C'est un danger énorme². »</p> <p>L'année même de sa mort Lénine écrira encore : « Notre pire ennemi intérieur, c'est le bureaucrate, le communiste qui occupe dans les institutions soviétiques un poste responsable³. »</p> <p>Les raisons de cette angoisse de Lénine et de sa lutte contre la bureaucratie découlent de sa préoccupation fondamentale : la bureaucratie, Marx l'avait soulignée déjà dans sa <i>Critique de la philosophie de l'État de Hegel</i>, est une forme concentrée du rapport aliéné entre l'intérêt particulier et l'intérêt général et ne pourra complètement disparaître que lorsque aura disparu toute contradiction entre l'intérêt particulier et l'intérêt général. C'est pourquoi elle est caractéristique de tout régime de classe, fondé sur l'exploitation et la domination du plus grand nombre : elle donne à cette domination et à cette exploitation un visage anonyme.</p> <p>1. Lénine, t. XXXV, p. 489 (Lettre à Krijijanovski). 2. Lénine, t. XXXIII, p. 228. 3. Marx, <i>Œuvres philosophiques</i>, Éd. Costes, t. IV, p. 102.</p>	<p>« L'esprit général de la bureaucratie, ajoutait Marx, c'est le secret... l'obéissance passive, la foi en l'autorité, le mécanisme d'une activité formelle fixe¹. »</p> <p>« Elle est forcée de donner le formel pour le contenu et le contenu pour le formel. »</p> <p>Dans ce formalisme d'État « le bureaucrate ne voit dans le monde des hommes qu'un objet de son activité². »</p> <p>La réapparition de la bureaucratie, après la révolution socialiste, signifie donc un retour au rapport d'extériorité entre le travailleur et son État, une nouvelle aliénation qui tend à faire du travailleur une fois de plus un objet et non un sujet de l'histoire. Le socialisme commence lorsque l'État est devenu non pas l'État formel et extérieur de l'ancien régime bourgeois, mais celui dans lequel chaque travailleur participe à la gestion de l'économie et de l'État lui-même. Si cette participation directe est freinée, voire refoulée par un système bureaucratique, on risque de mettre en cause le principe même du socialisme qui n'implique pas seulement la gestion de l'économie et de l'État pour les travailleurs, mais aussi par eux.</p> <p>Lénine, en mars 1919, au VIII^e Congrès du P. C. (b.) R. rappelle que le vieil appareil bureaucratique d'oppression a été brisé, mais que les bureaucrates tsaristes se sont peu à peu infiltrés dans les institutions soviétiques. Mais, au-delà de cette difficulté momentanée, l'on n'en finira avec le bureaucratisme « que si toute la population participe à la gestion du pays ». Or le bas niveau culturel du pays a conduit à une situation où l'appareil du Parti est devenu l'appareil bureaucratifié de l'État : « Les soviets qui, d'après leur programme, sont des organes de gouvernement par les travailleurs, sont en réalité des organes de gouvernement pour les travailleurs, exercé par la couche avancée du prolétariat et non par les masses laborieuses³. »</p>	<p>réalisé pour la première fois en Union soviétique. Les aspects négatifs ne sauraient pour autant nous échapper.</p> <p>« Nous avons vu déjà par quelle convergence de conditions historiques, après la mort de Lénine, la déformation bureaucratique a commencé par une double violation des principes de la démocratie socialiste, d'abord dans l'État : la substitution de la dictature du Parti à celle du prolétariat, puis dans le Parti : la substitution à la dictature du Parti, de celle de son chef, le centralisme s'hypertrophiant sans mesure aux dépens de la démocratie.</p> <p>Cette distorsion bureaucratique ne peut se réduire au « culte de la personnalité », car la personnalité de Staline y a certes joué un rôle, mais nullement essentiel. Pré-tendre tout expliquer par les travers personnels de Staline serait escamoter l'essentiel et, par conséquent, n'être pas prémuni, dans des circonstances historiques analogues, contre le retour de semblables déformations.</p> <p>Une autre erreur consisterait à considérer que cette déformation bureaucratique et la personnalisation du pouvoir qui en est la conséquence découlent nécessairement du principe même du socialisme. Ce serait d'abord une erreur historique car, du vivant de Lénine, les conditions historiques qui ont conduit à une bureaucratisation existaient déjà, et même à un degré supérieur, mais cette tendance à la bureaucratisation (qui menace toute organisation étatique) a été combattue comme « l'ennemi intérieur principal » dans la construction de l'État socialiste, et elle n'a pas conduit à un « culte de la personnalité », la discussion interne et collective demeurant jusqu'au bout la loi du Parti. Dire que la déformation bureaucratique et le « culte de la personnalité » découlent de l'essence même du socialisme, ce serait en outre fausser la notion même du socialisme. L'hypertrophie bureaucratique est la caractéristique d'un régime qui tend à consolider et à éterniser la domination d'une classe sur une autre (c'est</p>

En tous les domaines, la révolution d'Octobre a ainsi ouvert les voies nouvelles pour échapper à la logique des systèmes anciens et créer un homme nouveau.

Mais après la mort de Lénine la déformation bureaucratique devint un trait permanent du régime soviétique. Avec Staline, mais aussi avec ses successeurs.

Du point de vue théorique, cela se manifesta par une dégénérescence dogmatique du marxisme transformé en idéologie de justification.

Pour ne retenir que les aspects politiques essentiels de cette déformation théorique, il est nécessaire de rappeler que la « théorie » servit constamment à fausser l'analyse objective de la réalité pour faire croire que l'on avait franchi des étapes du développement social qu'en fait l'on était loin d'avoir atteintes. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que Staline avança la thèse selon laquelle le communisme pouvait être construit même lorsque l'État (à cause de l'entourage capitaliste) subsistait encore, ceci pour étayer la prétention, proclamée au XVIII^e Congrès, en 1939, selon laquelle le socialisme était en U. R. S. S. complètement réalisé et que l'on allait vers le communisme. A la veille du XIX^e Congrès, en 1954, Staline, dans ses *Problèmes économiques du socialisme*, reconnaissant, avec juste raison, l'existence de relations marchandes en régime socialiste, reprenait néanmoins la thèse selon laquelle le communisme était au proche horizon de l'histoire. Quelques années plus tard, N. S. Khrouchtchev échafaudait à la hâte la « théorie » de *L'État du peuple tout entier*, dont le concept est impossible dans une perspective marxiste et dont la réalité historique est démentie par la situation de l'U. R. S. S. où le peuple, dans son ensemble, est tenu dans l'ignorance absolue des événements et où les organisations de base du Parti n'ont qu'un rôle d'exécution des directives d'en haut et aucune part à l'élaboration de la politique et des options fondamentales de la direction.

La thèse stalinienne selon laquelle, sur des critères

purement économiques, l'on proclamait que le socialisme était en U. R. S. S. achevé, et que l'on abordait la construction du communisme, était reprise au XXIII^e Congrès. Or, à moins de s'en tenir à une définition mécaniste du socialisme, strictement économique : la suppression de la propriété privée des moyens de production, il est évident qu'au niveau des superstructures (de l'État et de la démocratie socialiste ou de la création culturelle par exemple) n'existent encore que des embryons de socialisme.

Cette déformation théorique, ce dogmatisme et ce schématisme décollés de la réalité, constituent le fondement des déformations pratiques, et, notamment, de la bureaucratie, caractéristique de l'État soviétique et qui tombe toujours sous le coup de la condamnation de Lénine : c'est un État pour les travailleurs, mais ne fonctionnant pas par les travailleurs.

Les séquelles et les rechutes du stalinisme, dues à une direction du Parti qui a voulu tourner trop vite la page du XX^e Congrès, se sont exprimées à l'extérieur à maintes reprises : ce furent, au cours des dernières années, les gesticulations esthétiques et théoriques de Khrouchtchev, les thèses d'Ilitchev sur la religion, les conditions de l'éviction de Khrouchtchev, le procès Siniasvski-Daniel et ses rebondissements, la distinction honorifique accordée à l'antisémite Kichko dont les ouvrages avaient pourtant été officiellement désavoués, en 1964, après la protestation de Maurice Thorez.

Mais la manifestation de loin la plus grave de la dégénérescence théorique et politique de la direction du Parti communiste de l'U. R. S. S. fut l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie, qui n'était pas une « erreur » ou une « folie », mais la conséquence nécessaire d'une conception systématique : à partir du moment où les dirigeants soviétiques étaient dogmatiquement enfermés dans le schéma stalinien identifiant le socialisme avec le seul modèle historiquement réalisé en Union soviétique, ils étaient amenés à considérer comme une

menace pour le socialisme toute tentative d'adapter les formes de construction du socialisme aux conditions, par exemple, d'un pays déjà hautement industrialisé avant la révolution. C'est ainsi qu'ils ont jugé notamment l'entreprise du Parti communiste tchécoslovaque et de son chef Dubček, de créer une démocratie socialiste.

Pour justifier cette vue schématique, au mépris de toute analyse marxiste des rapports de force réels, les dangers de la révolution et de la contre-révolution ont été démesurément grossis. En fait, c'est l'occupation militaire qui a effectivement servi la réaction et la contre-révolution en Tchécoslovaquie et dans le monde entier.

Pour masquer la violation flagrante des principes léninistes régissant les rapports entre partis communistes, principes rappelés par la Déclaration des 81 Partis en 1960 : « Tous les partis sont égaux en droits... Aucun parti ne peut prétendre imposer son point de vue à d'autres... il ne peut y avoir d'ingérence, d'immixtion ou d'intervention dans les affaires intérieures d'un parti frère... respect de la libre détermination de chaque parti », il a fallu mentir en prétendant que l'appel à l'intervention était lancé par les dirigeants du Parti ou du gouvernement tchécoslovaques.

La fermeté du peuple tchécoslovaque, de son Parti communiste, de ses dirigeants, et d'Alexandre Dubček, fort de son droit et de l'unanimité nationale, a montré l'impuissance de la force et imposé le respect de la souveraineté du pays.

Ce qu'Alexandre Dubček appelait la « renaissance du socialisme » à Prague, a été pour tous les communistes un grand exemple, capable de donner à l'idéal du communisme son plein rayonnement.

Il y a là un mouvement irréversible et l'entreprise tchécoslovaque, bien que dangereusement compromise et exposée par l'intervention militaire, a montré à tous les peuples le beau visage humain du socialisme.

Le grand peuple soviétique, qui a ouvert, sous la

WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
July-August, 1969

ON THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN COMMUNISM

Continuation of the lecture on the Moscow Conference
by Franz Marek

I believe that this Conference, no matter how one judges its significance, will be of no help in the intellectual crisis in which the Communist movement now finds itself, an intellectual crisis which exists also in countries where the Communists have enjoyed electoral success; an intellectual crisis, let us say it right out, whose epicenter is the Soviet Union.

The search for knowledge and the probing of conscience which we went through after the 20th party congress didn't go beyond the outer crust of appearances. And when Rosa Luxemburg wrote in her June tract of 1915: "What is now at stake is the whole last 45 years in the development of the modern workers' movement. What we are experiencing is the ultimate critique, the sum total of our work for almost a half century." These same words are applicable to the present, 45 years after Lenin's death. Indeed, 21 August 1968 in its significance for European communists is not far behind the significance of August 1914 for European social democracy. I say: for European communists. Marxism, Antonio Gramsci once said, is the sum total of west European history. Its pre-history lies in the Renaissance, in the Period of Enlightenment, in the French Revolution, in the English classical economy, in German philosophy. Its scientific discoveries are also important in lands outside of the continent, the cradle of the modern workers' movement. And the system of concepts which Marxism had developed is useful also for continents where this pre-history of Marxism is lacking. But it would be wrong to deny that Marxism has taken much of its stamp from the world of ideas of this pre-history, that today in continents where this pre-history is lacking, many concepts like democracy, humanism, must take on a different meaning. And that it is therefore a task of Marxists to free themselves in this day and age of that Eurocentrism which measures all problems of other continents by the European measuring stick --- which must be adopted inevitably in these countries as a form of intellectual help in their development. It is logical that these countries have developed their own models of revolution, and it is also logical that they develop their own models of socialism.

Our problematic, the problematic of the West European workers' movement --- a problematic which cannot be disposed of by a mere majority decision --- it seems clear to us is that in our search for knowledge and in our probing of conscience in 1956 we didn't go far enough. Characteristic of our superficiality was the fact that in exposing the deformations of the Stalin era we left out of consideration completely the decisive fact that in our time the great idea of producer democracy was completely forgotten and lost sight of. The idea of Soviets, which seemed so appealing at the time, the

idea that people have a claim on the function of control in the (of work), where they after all spend the largest part of their precious life, where they expend most of their energies -- this idea has been completely lost so that all that is left of the idea of Soviets is the name itself. Even in the Constitution of 1936, the Stalin constitution, they are no longer representative bodies, on the local level with certain possibilities in the social and economic sectors, but on the higher levels empty shells which do not even remind us of the idea of producer democracy. We became aware of this only as we had to come to grips with a significant current trend which, in the German language area, has found all to inadequate expression in the concept of co-determination. A trait which, as we know, has even worked its way into the sanctified kingdom of the press, as the discussions in Stern prove, and as for example is proved by the fact that today the editors of the conservative Paris Figaro are in the second week of their strike in their demand for independence of the paper's owners. Truly, too much is asked of us Communists when in such times as these we are required to acknowledge that censorship is the key distinguishing feature of Socialism.

Where, then, is the essence of the deformation, which becomes clearer and clearer even if we have to study it without the help of the one party that has all the necessary materials and evidence. The essence of the deformation consists in the fact that the decisive power was concentrated more and more in the party leadership, in a small clique which was replaced and renewed from within itself, that the movement has lost control over the leadership and the leadership has taken under its control what one still calls a movement; that the formula of the leading role of the party now means the role of the party leadership, while the formula of the leading role of the working class (as we see from the experience of recent weeks in Czechoslovakia) serves only to justify the witch hunt against difficult intellectuals. What has been lost is the regulative function of criticism, of correction, the regulative function of a timely dismissal of a leadership which has proven itself incapable, what has been lost is every possibility for discussing political alternatives. That's what the decisive deformation is and that's what we have to speak openly about.

Concerning West European party concepts it is often said, and with justice, that the Soviet model of socialism is not an obligatory one for the West European parties, that on the basis of other assumptions, other historical conditions, and also on the basis of a change in power relationships (to which the Soviet Union has made the essential contribution) new models are possible. But at the risk of provoking protest, I say: that is correct --- but in all honesty it is necessary to add: this model of party and state leadership is in fact no socialist model at all for any country, not even for the Soviet Union!

Another often used formula is that there is a contradiction between the base and the superstructure. The socialist inner structure is the basis, but the superstructure does not yet correspond to the base. This picture at first glance seems to correspond to the formulation of Marx that when the base (whose juridical expression is property relations) changes, sooner or

later the superstructure also changes. But it seems to me on longer reflection it is not Marx who gives us this picture, but the simplifications of Stalin, who in his work on "Linguistics" said that the capitalistic superstructure corresponds to the private ownership of the means of production and the socialist superstructure corresponds to the socialization of the means of production.

People like to hold on to this picture because it accompanies the hope that in the final analysis the socialist inner structure will prevail against the superstructure, which is not yet socialist or not completely socialist. I am not convinced that this picture is right. I consider it entirely possible that on the basis of socialized means of production an arbitrary power of disposition arises, a superstructure which corresponds to this base and despite that, is not socialistic. I do not believe that this is in conflict with Marxism. And therefore, I do not share the hopes of many comrades -- among them Georg Lukacs -- who represent the view that planned economic reform will guarantee the achievement of socialist democracy. I am not convinced of that. Rather I fear that economic reform will have no decisive results so long as the political structure is not changed, so long as the forms of producer democracy and self-administration do not generate a truly great interest on the part of the workers for these reforms, an interest without which there can be no substantial increase in productivity.

We should not be misunderstood (though we undoubtedly will be): This is not a question of our setting ourselves apart from the Soviet Union as provincials. It is a question of seeing the Soviet Union in its reality and in true historical perspective. The reality and the historical perspective are represented by the October revolution, which we will always regard as the most significant event of the 20th century, the attempt to build the first society without the falsifying, corrupting, and destructive element of capital. The historical perspective and reality of the Soviet Union are her role in the Second World War against Hitler Fascism, in which she bore the main burden. The historical perspective and reality in the Soviet Union are represented by the revolution in education, which made many superlative achievements in many fields of science in a country where 60% of the population was illiterate. A revolution in education which would be even greater if there were freedom in the field of social and intellectual research. A revolution in education which is simply amazing above all in Central Asia, in the central Asian republics and as Le Monde wrote this week, whose achievements in such republics as Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan are without parallel in history. And we reject many arbitrary formulations which overlook the fact that it is Soviet rockets which are shooting down American planes in Viet Nam and that Cuba could not withstand the American blockade without Soviet economic and military aid.

It belongs to the reality and historical perspective of the Soviet Union also that this system of guidance and leadership is no guarantee that socialist alternatives will be adopted. And when the young Marx once said that the so-called Christian nations are not necessarily a state expression of Christianity, it is equally true that where the means of production were socialized, a state expression of concepts which we normally associate to socialism need not follow unconditionally. Lenin said explicitly that socialism is not reducible to its economy, but that a new and higher form

of democratic state must arise. I am not sure whether this Lenin citation will be heard among the well worn Lenin citations of this so-called Lenin year.

I am convinced that such assertions are hard not only for me to say but that they are very hard for many to listen to. Indeed, it almost seems that as one says these things, the question can be posed whether all the struggles of the past have not been senseless, a question which I consider false. I am fully convinced that there was a period when solidarity with the first socialist experiment, to the point of complete identification with it, was the hallmark of every revolutionary socialist. There was no alternative. But that period is over. Over not only because there are 14 countries with differences and different national components. In the world in which we live, in the developed capitalist countries, the realization of the socialist will is possible only through its longing for the maximum dignity of man, maximum of personal happiness, for the maximum of information, for a maximum also of guarantees and control functions against the opinion factories which manipulate us. When Russell once characterized the development of science by saying that we always know more and more about less and less and when we approach the point where we will know everything about nothing, then we will be living in time where man is degraded to being a punch card; similarly we can say: more and more people have less and less to say, and it is approaching the point where almost everyone will have nothing whatsoever to say about anything. And in such times socialism must respond to its calling and add new achievements to democracy over and above those already existing, by exclusion of the capitalist element.

Czechoslovakia was the great chance to demonstrate the superiority of socialism in this field --- let us call it "democracy". This chance was thrown away when for every one of the famous 2000 words, 3 tanks and 300 men intervened. There is a conclusion to be drawn from this: the dedication to the socialistic idea and also active support in behalf of the socialist idea can no longer depend on a hypothetical model for whose realization we will be kept waiting for God knows how long.. If we don't see this and speak out about it, we will slip into that smug atmosphere of falsity which at one time we described as the essential characteristic of social democracy.

Is it a coincidence that insofar as socialist experiments are attractive to young people, it is the experiments in Cuba and China, often idolized and idealized, that are attractive, because a certain egalitarianism and feeling for justice there appeal to the young people without a complete loss of content of the socialist idea.

One more thing is involved. We are living, I believe --- that we can say --- in a time of intellectual crises which cut across many parties, across many movements, many communities, and for which the word of Karl Marx is apparently valid, i.e. that times of revolutionary turmoil are times in which this turmoil is mirrored in very contradictory forms of consciousness. Perhaps they are additions to those "intellectual forms" Antonio Gramsci felt to be the prerequisite of change in the order of life. But what unites all these variously thinking people, rebellious students, defecting Jesuits, protesting Communists, is (among many other things) certainly the fact they have had enough of sweet lies and prefer bitter truths.

A politician of the 19th century once said that problems which are not seen and not solved are horrible for people and governments. The same is true for movements and parties. And what is common to movements and parties alike is that they consider as specially harmful and dangerous precisely those people who struggle with these problems and even look for a solution for them. Thus, there are varying common demoninators in the different movements and parties.

CPYRGHT

FRANZ MAREK

Zur geistigen Krise im Kommunismus

FORTSETZUNG DES REFERATS ZUR MOSKAUER KONFERENZ *

Ich glaube, daß diese Konferenz, man mag ihre Bedeutung beurteilen wie man will, keine Hilfe in der geistigen Krise sein wird, in der sich die Kommunistische Bewegung befindet, eine geistige Krise, die auch in jenen Ländern besteht, wo die Kommunisten Wahlerfolge haben; eine geistige Krise, sprechen wir es offen aus, deren Epizentrum in der Sowjetunion liegt.

Die Wissens- und Gewissensforschung, die wir nach dem 20. Parteitag durchgeführt haben, ist nicht über die Rinde der Erscheinungen gegangen. Und wenn Rosa Luxemburg in ihrer Junius-Broschüre 1915 geschrieben hat: „Was jetzt in Frage steht, ist der ganze letzte 45jährige Abschnitt in der Entwicklung der modernen Arbeiterbewegung, was wir erleben, ist die Kritik, der Strich und die Summa unter die Positionen unserer Arbeit seit bald einem halben Jahrhundert“, — so gelten diese Worte auch 45 Jahre nach Lenins Tod, zumal der 21. August 1968 in seiner Bedeutung für die europäischen Kommunisten nicht weit zurücksteht hinter der Bedeutung des August 1914 für die europäische Sozialdemokratie. Ich sage, für die europäischen Kommunisten. Der Marxismus, hat einmal Antonio Gramsci gesagt, ist eine Summa der westeuropäischen Geistesgeschichte. Seine Vorgeschichte liegt in der Renaissance, in der Aufklärung, in der französischen Revolution, in der englischen klassischen Ökonomie, in der deutschen Philosophie. Seine wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse sind auch bedeutend in Ländern, die außerhalb des Kontinents liegen, in dem die Wiege der modernen Arbeiterbewegung stand. Und der Begriffsapparat, den der Marxismus entwickelt hat, ist nützlich auch für Kontinente, wo diese Vorgeschichte des Marxismus fehlt. Aber es wäre doch unrichtig, zu leugnen, daß der Marxismus von der Vorstellungswelt dieser Vorgeschichte mitgeprägt worden ist, daß heute in Kontinenten, wo diese Vorgeschichte fehlt, manche Begriffe, wie Demokratismus, Humanismus, eine andere Bedeutung annehmen müssen. Und daß es daher eine Aufgabe der Marxisten auch ist, sich in unserer Zeit von jenem Eurozentrismus zu lösen, der alle Probleme auch anderer Kontinente an europäischen Maßstäben mißt, was unvermeidbar in diesen Ländern als eine präpotente Form der geistigen Entwicklungshilfe empfunden werden muß. Es ist logisch, daß diese Länder eigene Revolutionsmodelle entwickelt haben und es ist auch logisch, daß sie eigene Sozialismusmodelle entwickeln.

In unserer Problematik, in der Problematik der westeuropäischen Arbeiterbewegung — in einer Problematik, die nicht durch Mehrheitsbeschlüsse zu erledigen ist — scheint uns klar, daß wir in der Wissens- und Gewissensforschung 1956 nicht weit genug gegangen sind. Kennzeichnend für unsere Oberflächlichkeit war es doch, daß wir bei der Darstellung der Deformationen der Stalinzeit die entscheidende Tatsache außer Acht gelassen haben, daß in dieser Zeit ja auch der große Gedanke der Produzentendemokratie verloren gegangen ist. Dieser Gedanke, der uns aus dem Begriff der Sowjets seinerzeit angelacht hat, der einfache Gedanke, daß die Menschen dort, wo sie den Großteil ihres bewußten Lebens verbringen, wo sie ihre meisten Energien verausgaben, auch Kontrollfunktionen beanspruchen, ist verloren gegangen, so daß von den Sowjets doch nur der Name geblieben ist. Selbst in der Verfassung von 1936, in der Stalinischen Verfassung, sind sie nicht mehr als Repräsentativkörper

schaffen, im lokalen Maßstab mit gewissen Möglichkeiten in sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Belangen; im zentralen Maßstab jedoch leere Hülsen, die an den Gedanken der Produzentendemokratie überhaupt nicht mehr erinnern können. Uns ist das doch erst bewußt geworden, als wir uns mit dieser bedeutsamen Tendenz der Gegenwart auseinandersetzen mußten, die im deutschen Sprachgebiet nur sehr unzulänglich im Begriff der Mitbestimmung Ausdruck findet. Ein Zug, der bekanntlich sich sogar in das geheiligte Königreich des Pressewesens eingeschlichen hat, wie die Diskussionen im „Stern“ beweisen, und wie z. B. die Tatsache beweist, daß heute die Redakteure des konservativen Pariser „Figaro“ schon die zweite Woche streiken, weil sie ihre Unabhängigkeit vom Besitzer verlangen. Wahrlich, wir Kommunisten sind überfordert, wenn man in solch einer Zeit von uns verlangt, die Zensur als unabdingbares Geschlechtsmerkmal des Sozialismus anzuerkennen.

Worin besteht denn das Wesen der Deformation, die immer deutlicher wird, wenn wir sie auch ohne Hilfe jener Partei studieren mußten, die über die notwendigen Materialien verfügt. Das Wesen der Deformation besteht darin, daß die Entscheidungsgewalt immer mehr in der Parteiführung konzentriert wurde. In einer kleinen Garnitur, die sich nur aus sich selbst ergänzt und erneuert, daß die Bewegung die Kontrolle über die Führung verloren hat und die Führung das, was man noch Bewegung nennt, unter Kontrolle bekommen hat; daß die Formel von der führenden Rolle der Partei ja nur mehr die Rolle der Parteiführung umschreibt, während die Formel von der führenden Rolle der Arbeiterklasse, so lehrt die Erfahrung der letzten Wochen in der CSSR, dazu dient, die Hetze gegen unbequeme Intellektuelle zu rechtfertigen. Was verloren gegangen ist, ist jedes Regulativ der Kritik, der Korrektur, jedes Regulativ einer rechtzeitigen Ablöse einer Führung, die sich als unfähig erwiesen hat, jede Möglichkeit der Diskussion politischer Alternativen. Darin besteht die entscheidende Deformation und darüber muß man offen sprechen.

In Konzepten westeuropäischer Parteien wird mit Recht oft gesagt, daß das sowjetische Modell des Sozialismus kein obligatorisches Modell für die westeuropäischen Parteien ist, daß auf Grundlage anderer Voraussetzungen, anderer geschichtlicher Bedingungen und auch auf Grundlage der Veränderung der Kräfteverhältnisse, für die die Sowjetunion das Wesentliche beigetragen hat, eben neue Modelle möglich sind. Aber in der Gefahr, Proteste auszulösen, sage ich: das ist richtig — aufrichtig ist, wenn man hinzufügt: Dieses Modell der Partei- und Staatsführung ist überhaupt kein sozialistisches Modell, für kein Land, auch nicht für die Sowjetunion.

Eine andere, oft gebrauchte Formel ist die, daß man sagt, es gibt einen Widerspruch zwischen der Basis und dem Überbau. Die sozialistische Eigenstruktur ist die Basis, der Überbau aber entspricht noch nicht der Basis. Das Bild ist bestechend und scheint auf den ersten Blick der Formel von Marx zu entsprechen, daß, wenn die Basis, deren juridischer Ausdruck die Eigentumsverhältnisse sind, sich verändert, früher oder später der Überbau sich auch verändert. Aber mir scheint, wenn man länger darüber nachdenkt, sieht man, daß das Bild, son-

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

dem die Vereinfachung von Stalin, der in seiner Arbeit über „Sprachwissenschaften“ gesagt hat, dem privaten Eigentum an Produktionsmitteln entspricht der kapitalistische Oberbau und der Sozialisierung der Produktionsmittel entspricht der sozialistische Oberbau.

Man bleibt oft gern bei dem Bild hängen, weil ja die Hoffung mitschwingt, daß sich letzten Endes die sozialistische Eigenstruktur gegenüber dem Oberbau, der noch nicht sozialistisch ist, oder noch nicht ganz sozialistisch ist, durchsetzen wird. Ich bin nicht überzeugt, ob dieses Bild richtig ist. Ich halte es für durchaus möglich, daß auf Grundlage sozialisierter Produktionsmittel auch eine Verfügungsgewalt entsteht, ein Oberbau, der dieser Basis entspricht und trotzdem nicht sozialistisch ist. Mir erscheint das gar nicht im Widerspruch zum Marxismus. Und ich teile daher nicht die Hoffnungen vieler Genossen — zu ihnen gehört auch Georg Lukacs —, die die Auffassung vertreten, daß die geplanten Wirtschaftsreformen den Durchbruch der sozialistischen Demokratie garantieren werden. Ich bin nicht davon überzeugt. Ich befürchte eher, daß die Wirtschaftsreformen keine entscheidenden Erfolge haben werden, solange die politischen Strukturen nicht geändert werden, solange nicht Formen der Produzentendemokratie und der Selbstverwaltung wirklich ein großes Interesse der Arbeiterschaft an diesen Reformen erzeugen, ein Interesse, ohne das es ja auch keine beachtliche Steigerung der Produktivität geben kann.

Man mißverstehe uns hier nicht, aber man wird natürlich mißverstanden werden: es geht uns nicht um eine provinzielle Distanzierung von der Sowjetunion. Es geht uns darum, daß man die Sowjetunion in ihrer Realität und in ihrer Historizität sieht. Die Realität und die Historizität, das ist die Oktoberrevolution, die wir nach wie vor für das bedeutendste Ereignis des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts halten, der Versuch der ersten Gesellschaft ohne das verfälschende, korrumpierende und zersetzende Element des Kapitals. Die Historizität und Realität der Sowjetunion, das ist ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg gegen den Hitlerfaschismus, in dem sie die Hauptlast getragen hat. Die Historizität und Realität der Sowjetunion, das ist eine Bildungsrevolution, die in einem Land, wo 60% der Bevölkerung Analphabeten waren, auf manchen Gebieten der Wissenschaft Spitzenleistungen vollbringen konnte, eine Bildungsrevolution, die noch größer wäre, wenn es auf dem Gebiete der Geistes- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften Forschungsfreiheit gäbe; eine Bildungsrevolution, die vor allem in Mittelasien, in den mittelasiatischen Republiken stupend ist und daß, wie „Le Monde“ diese Woche schrieb, was in solchen Republiken, wie in Usbekistan, Tadschikistan, Turkmenistan vor sich gegangen ist, ohnegleichen in der Geschichte ist. Und wir lehnen auch manche summarische Formulierungen ab, die über die Tatsache hinwegsehen, daß es sowjetische Raketen sind, die die amerikanischen Flugzeuge in Vietnam herunterschließen, und daß Kuba ohne sowjetische Wirtschafts- und Waffenhilfe kaum der amerikanischen Blockade standhalten könnte. Die Ideologie, die zur Institution geworden ist, hat Verpflichtungen, nicht nur auf terminologischem Gebiet.

Aber zur Historizität und zur Realität der Sowjetunion gehört es auch, daß dieses Leitungs- und Führungssystem keine Garantie für sozialistische Optionen ist. Und wenn der junge Marx einmal gesagt hat, daß die sogenannten christlichen Staaten nicht unbedingt ein staatlicher Ausdruck des Christentums sind, so gilt es auch, daß dort, wo die Produktionsmittel sozialisiert wurden, nicht unbedingt ein staatlicher Ausdruck jener Vorstellungen erfolgen mußte, die wir mit dem Begriff Sozialismus verbinden. Lenin hat ausdrücklich gesagt, daß der Sozialismus sich nicht auf die Ökonomie reduziert, sondern auch eine neue und höhere Form des demokratischen Staates erfordert. Ich bin nicht sicher, ob dieses Lenin-Zitat zu den strapazierten Lenin-Zitaten des sogenannten Lenin-Jahres gehören wird.

Ich bin überzeugt, daß solche Feststellungen nicht nur mir schwer über die

Ohren. Ja, es scheint ja so, daß, wenn man das ausspricht, die Frage gestellt werden kann, ob nicht alle Kämpfe der Vergangenheit sinnlos geworden sind, eine Fragestellung, die ich für falsch halte. Ich bin nach wie vor davon überzeugt, daß es eine Periode gab, wo die Solidarität mit dem ersten sozialistischen Experiment bis zur Identifizierung das Merkmal jedes revolutionären Sozialisten war. Es gab keine andere Alternative. Aber diese Periode ist abgeschlossen. Und nicht nur deshalb abgeschlossen, weil es vierzehn Staaten gibt, mit Differenzen und differenten nationalen Komponenten. In der Welt, in der wir leben, in den entwickelten kapitalistischen Ländern, ist der Durchbruch des sozialistischen Willens nur möglich aus der Sehnsucht nach einem Maximum an Menschenwürde, nach einem Maximum an persönlichem Glück, nach einem Maximum an Information, nach einem Maximum auch von Garantien und Kontrollfunktionen gegen jene Meinungsfabriken, die uns manipulieren. Wenn Russell einmal die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft so gekennzeichnet hat, daß er gesagt hat, wir wissen immer mehr über immer weniger, und es naht der Zeitpunkt, wo wir alles über nichts wissen werden, so leben wir in einer Zeit, wo der Mensch zur Kombination einer Lochkarte degradiert wird, so daß man sagen kann: Immer mehr Leute haben immer weniger zu reden, und es naht der Zeitpunkt, wo fast alle nichts zu reden haben werden. Und in einer solchen Zeit muß der Sozialismus in sich die Verheißung tragen, daß er zu den bereits bestehenden demokratischen Errungenschaften neue hinzufügt, durch Ausschaltung des kapitalistischen Elements.

Die CSSR war die große Chance, die Überlegenheit des Sozialismus auf diesem Gebiet — nehmen wir den Arbeitstitel „Demokratie“ — zu beweisen. Diese Chance ist verschüttet worden, als für jedes der berechtigten 2.000 Worte je drei Panzer und 300 Mann intervenierten. Daraus ergibt sich die Schlußfolgerung, daß der Einsatz für die sozialistische Idee und auch die Werbung für die sozialistische Idee nicht mehr abhängig gemacht werden können von einem Anschauungsunterricht, der auf sich warten läßt, wer weiß, wie lange. Wir schlittern unvermeidlich in jene Atmosphäre der blöden Verlogenheit hinein, die wir seinerzeit als Wesensmerkmal des Sozialdemokratismus bezeichnet haben, wenn wir dies nicht sehen und nicht auch offen aussprechen.

Ist es denn so ein Zufall, daß soweit überhaupt sozialistische Experimente auf junge Menschen attraktiv wirken, es die Experimente Kubas und Chinas sind, oft idyllisiert und idealisiert, weil ein gewisser Egalitarismus das Gerechtigkeitsempfinden junger Menschen anspricht, ohne das die sozialistische Idee ja ihren ganzen Inhalt verliert.

Dazu kommt noch etwas anderes. Wir leben, ich glaube, das kann man sagen, in einer Zeit geistiger Krisen, die quer durch viele Parteien geht, durch viele Bewegungen, viele Gemeinschaften, und für die wahrscheinlich das Wort von Karl Marx gilt, daß Zeiten der Umwälzung Zeiten sind, in denen sich diese Umwälzung in sehr widerspruchsvollen Bewußtseinsformen spiegelt. Vielleicht sind es Ansätze zu jener reforma intellektuale, die Antonio Gramsci als die Voraussetzung der Veränderung der Lebensordnung empfunden hat. Was aber alle diese umdenkenden Menschen einigt, rebellierende Studenten, demissionierende Jesuiten, protestierende Kommunisten, ist neben vielem anderen auch die Tatsache, daß sie die süßen Lügen satt haben und bittere Wahrheiten vorziehen.

Ein Politiker des 19. Jahrhunderts hat einmal gesagt, daß Probleme, die nicht gesehen werden und die nicht gelöst werden, grausam sind für Völker und Regierungen. Das gilt auch für Bewegungen und Parteien. Und was Bewegungen und Parteien auch gemeinsam haben, ist das, daß sie gerade jene Menschen, die um diese Probleme ringen und sogar eine Lösung versuchen, als besonders schädlich und gefährlich empfinden. Es gibt eben unterschiedliche Gemeinsamkeiten in den verschiedenen Bewegungen und Parteien.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

Siend 79 Mail/Juni 1969

TRIPS TO THE WEST CURBED BY PRAGUE

Visits by Individuals Banned — Only Organized Groups and Officials to Get Visas

By United Press International

PRAGUE, Oct. 9—Czechoslovakia announced tonight a ban on trips by individual citizens to Western countries.

The move appeared to have a twofold purpose: to stop the flow of refugees to the West in the aftermath of the Soviet-led invasion and to halt the drain of hard currency.

As many as 90,000 Czechoslovaks may have left the country since the Soviet intervention in August, 1968, according to statistics from Western countries. Official figures from the Prague Government place the figure at less than 40,000.

It appeared that the main motive behind the travel restrictions might have been economic. When Czechoslovaks go to Western nations, the state

must provide them with hard currency so that they can pay for travel, hotels and meals. Few Western banks accept Czechoslovak crowns.

The announcement was made by the Prague television, which said that "extraordinary measures" provided for the following restriction:

Czechoslovak citizens are forbidden to travel to the West except as members of groups organized by Cedok, the national tourist agency.

Permission for Czechoslovaks to live abroad after the end of the year has been canceled.

All commercial visas held by businessmen are canceled effective Dec. 1.

The broadcast said the government would deny visas for travel to countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia. This would end all tourist travel to West Germany.

It said no visa would be granted to anyone when "there is danger they will remain broad," a phrase broad enough to justify denial of almost any visa.

Currency Problem Cited

Col. Jan Majer, the State Secretary in the Interior Ministry said at a news conference that "foreign currency limita-

tions" prompted the measures as well as "a number of negative phenomena appearing in tourism."

The Prague television quoted Colonel Majer as having said 50,000 Czechoslovak citizens were living abroad, 40 per cent of them illegally, while about 100,000 others held exit permits but had not made use of them.

"This is why the Government decided to cancel exit visas valid for visits as of today," a commentator said.

Even before the announcement, diplomats said, passport and visa control offices at Prague airport told airlines with flights to Western countries that Czechoslovaks traveling either as tourists or on unofficial business were not to be taken aboard.

Many Taken by Surprise

PRAGUE, Oct. 9 (AP) — Czechoslovakia's ban on private travel to the West went into effect last midnight and caught hundreds of travelers at airports and frontier crossings.

Relatively free travel to the West had been one of the last freedoms remaining after the Soviet-led invasion.

Airline and travel officials were informed early today that all exit permits in private passports had been declared invalid, effective immediately.

A sign at police headquarters proclaimed that the passport and exit permit office was

closed for the day. Small knots of despairing travelers, some with their suitcases, gathered outside.

At Prague Airport, all Czechoslovak passengers were removed from all flights to the West, except for those in possession of official passports for official business.

Many Taken From Train

A number of passengers had been aboard their plane, Sabena Flight 786 for Brussels, when it loaded yesterday on schedule. The flight was postponed until today because of fog. Private Czechoslovak travelers were left behind when it took off.

The night express from Prague to Zurich and Paris was almost empty when it reached West Germany. Czechoslovak frontier guards removed their countrymen from the train before it crossed the border about 4 A.M., Bavarian officials in Munich reported.

Twenty Czechoslovaks were taken off the regular bus between Brno and Vienna this morning, the driver reported. The Austrian Railways said a special train of Czechoslovak vacationers apparently had been canceled.

The Austrian Interior Ministry in Vienna said the new rules halted nearly all Austria-bound border traffic except state-organized groups, official business trips and travel of diplomats and foreigners.

Prisoners of Prague

It is impossible to believe that it was primarily a shortage of foreign currency that caused the Prague Government to ban all private trips to the West on the part of Czechoslovak citizens. Purely economic considerations could hardly explain the callous and brutal way in which Czechs and Slovaks en route to Western countries were suddenly removed from trains and buses last week before they could cross the frontier.

The primary motive was undoubtedly political. The prohibition on private travel to the West fits snugly into the pattern of re-Sovietization that Gustav Husak

has followed since he succeeded Alexander Dubcek

last spring. In effect the move makes the people of Czechoslovakia prisoners again, much as they were during the worst period of the Novotny era. The aim is not only to prevent defection to the West, but also to reduce as drastically as possible the contact Czechoslovaks may have with Western people and Western ideas.

Husak has not yet begun to build a "Berlin wall" along his frontier with the free world, but it must now be assumed that he will take stringent measures to capture or kill any of his subjects trying to flee to West Germany or Austria. It is a grim prospect.

CPYRIGHT

The Daily Telegraph, Saturday, October 4, 1969

Liberal ministers ousted as Dubcek purge continues

By DAVID FLOYD, Communist Affairs Correspondent

THE purge of liberal politicians was continued in Czechoslovakia yesterday with the removal of 20 reformist members of the Slovak Communist party, including four members of the Presidium. A similar purge of the Cech and Czechoslovak party leadership has already been carried out.

Mr Stefan Sadovsky remains First Secretary of the Slovak Communist party and Mr Peter Colotka remains Prime Minister of Slovakia.

Four Ministers mainly concerned with economic affairs were dismissed from the Slovak government.

Attacks on Mr Alexander Dubcek, the former leader of the Czechoslovak party, continued yesterday.

The principal party newspaper, *Rude Pravo*, carried the campaign so far as to charge that Mr Dubcek had in effect invited the Russian troops to invade the country in 1968.

"Events took charge"

In August, 1968, the paper

said "the leadership was not in control of events, but events were in control of the leaders."

The leadership under Mr Dubcek was not united and "had no repressive means at its disposal."

The newspaper continued: "Was it then traitors who invited in the troops of the Warsaw Pact? No. They were invited by the total disruption of the political system in our country."

They were invited by the opportunism and political impotence of the so-called Dubcek leadership."

Marshal Grechko, Russian Defence Minister, arrived in Prague yesterday to attend the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Czechoslovak army.

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
20 OCTOBER 1969

UNREST REPORTED IN CZECH UNIONS

Workers Said to Have Set
Unauthorized Meetings

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Oct. 19—Reports from Czechoslovak industrial workers indicate that the Communist Government's threat to abolish the five-day work week and the current purges of progressives have led to renewed tension among labor.

Workers' grievances are understood to

be scheduled in factories in Prague, Pilsen, Ostrava, Brno and other cities in Bohemia and Moravia tomorrow.

The revival of labor unrest appears to represent an inauspicious send-off for the Communist party chief, Dr. Gustav Husak, and other top party and Government representatives who are scheduled to fly to Moscow tomorrow on a long-delayed official visit.

The Czechoslovak delegation is expected to press Kremlin leaders for increased Soviet economic assistance. Both Mr. Husak and Federal Premier Oldrich Cernik have lately depicted the plight of their country's economy as grave.

Meanwhile, according to private information available here, the text of an unpublished speech by Alexander Dubcek, the demoted former party leader, has begun to circulate clandestinely.

Speech Was Not Reported

In the address, delivered at the plenary meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee in Prague Sept. 25-26, Mr. Dubcek spoke in his own defense before being "recalled" from the ruling 11-man party Presidium and the chairmanship of the National Assembly.

The Prague Government merely listed Mr. Dubcek as a participant in the plenary meetings debate, without divulging his name. It was reported that he refused to en-

gage in "self-criticism."

In the version of his speech current in Prague Mr. Dubcek is quoted as having rejected charges that Czechoslovakia was threatened with "counter-revolution," as having denied that he had any inkling that Moscow was about to order the invasion of the country in August, 1968, and as having accused Mr. Husak of slandering and muzzling him and other progressives, who during the Dubcek era favored a liberalization of Government policies and control.

Unauthorized Meetings

Reliable informants said today that mimeographed and typewritten accounts of what Mr. Dubcek was reported to say at a Central Committee meeting were going

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

from hand to hand in many industrial plants and that they might be discussed in some of tomorrow's meetings.

It was understood that worker committees were organizing the factory meetings without authorization from local Communist party organs or central trade union officials but with the support or connivance, of factory trade union leaders.

The labor ferment is said to be the strongest in the 900,000-member Metal Workers Union, the largest of the

country's about 60 trade unions. Several chapters of the union, including some in machine shops on Prague's outskirts, were said to be agitating for work stoppages to protest the purge of the union's chairman, Vlastimil Toman.

Mr. Toman, a Progressive who has great prestige among union members and workers at large, was permitted to "resign," while other like-minded labor leaders were bluntly removed from their posts amid denunciations by Government

and party spokesmen of "anti-socialist" and "right-wing opportunist" tendencies in trade unions.

Workers Warned on Output

The labor unrest is regarded as a reason for the build-up of police and army forces that Premier Cernik announced last week. The Premier explained that the Government's "power bodies" were being reinforced because of threats from external and internal enemies.

During the last few days, Dr. Husak and Mr. Cernik have

repeatedly urged their countrymen to work harder and have deplored the slackness in many industrial plants and other enterprises. The Government and party leaders have so far abstained from publicly linking the low working morale to political discontent and opposition.

However, they have warned that work on Saturdays, gradually abolished since 1962, would be reintroduced by the beginning of 1970 unless productivity rose sharply before then.

BALTIMORE SUN
17 October 1969

CPYRIGHT

Czech Assembly Thanks Invaders

Prague, Oct. 16 (AP)—The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, under the new hard-line regime, thanked the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies tonight for invading the country in August, 1968.

Joint Session

Parliament, at the time of the invasion, was riding a liberal tide led by Alexander Dubcek. It demanded withdrawal of the invading troops, said the intervention was against international law and praised the popular resistance to it.

Today's action came in a joint session of the two-house body, which adopted a resolution saying it "appreciated the selfless internationalist assistance of the five fraternal Socialist countries,

granted to our peoples in the critical days of August, 1968, in order to defeat counter-revolution . . .

The Soviet allies were Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria.

To accomplish the about-face seven lower-house members who disagree with current pro-Soviet policies or are abroad were expelled and four new hard-liners were elected under a law passed yesterday giving Parliament power to change its makeup without elections.

The new "no-elections" law provides for the extension until the end of 1971 of terms of office of legislators and other officials originally elected in 1964 to four-year terms.

Not Publicized Then

sed, it was not made public that it also gave parliament the right to purge and replace its own membership.

Premier Oldrich Cernik talked today of a new turning point in relations with Moscow, one year after he signed the military treaty legalizing the presence of Soviet troops in this country.

Mr. Cernik told Parliament he is convinced that the forthcoming state visit of Czechoslovak leaders to the Soviet Union "will be a new turning point in the history of traditional Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship."

Prague's Communist party and government delegation is expected to leave Monday for a

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
17 October 1969

CERNIK PLANNING TO BOLSTER POLICE

Says Prague Won't Allow Attacks on Party's Role

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Oct. 16—Premier Oldrich Cernik of Czechoslovakia announced today in a stern speech to the newly purged Federal Assembly in Prague that the Communist regime intended to reinforce its "power bodies" — the police and the army.

"We shall not allow attacks against the leading position of

the Communist party," the Premier said. He pledged the country would strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union and called for new purges, tighter economic planning and stricter working discipline.

The Premier conceded that some foodstuffs and other consumer goods were scarce, observing that such shortages make "the consolidation of our political situation much more difficult." He promised efforts by the Government to improve supplies and housing.

The Premier blamed last year's liberalization under Alexander Dubcek, the former Communist party leader, for many of the present difficulties. Mr. Cernik, a Moravian with a reputation for flexibility, last year was considered one of Mr. Dubcek's staunchest supporters. He has headed the Government since April. Lately, Mr. Cernik has turned

At the time the law was pas-

against Mr. Dubcek, and has strongly backed the pro-Soviet conservative policies of Dr. Gustav Husak, the present party chief.

Unaffected by Purge

Mr. Cernik remained unaffected when the party Central Committee purged and shuffled the Communist hierarchy and state machinery late last month. He was entrusted with forming a new federal Government and in doing so he replaced many ministers, especially those in charge of economic departments. Today Mr. Cernik presented his new Cabinet to the Communist-dominated legislature in a meeting at Hradiany Castle.

Contrary to custom, President Ludvik Svoboda failed to attend the session. The official explanation was that the 73-year-old head of state was ill. He is expected to return to the capital. President Svo-

boda is known to be fatigued and saddened by the latest developments.

Mr. Dubcek who was formally replaced yesterday as chairman of the Federal Assembly, was also absent, as were other progressive members who were removed from parliamentary committee posts.

In an obvious attempt to allay widespread fears that the police-state terror of the nineteen-fifties might return, Mr. Cernik promised that the Government would "insist on the strict observance of socialist legality in the work of the armed security services."

Cernik to Go to Moscow

PRAGUE, Oct. 16 (UPI) — Premier Cernik announced today that he would lead a delegation of Czechoslovak leaders to Moscow in the next few days.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

26 OCTOBER 1969
**Prague Will Review
 Rehabilitation Cases
 Of Liberal Regime**

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Oct. 25 — Czecho-

slovakia indicated today that she was re-examining the recent proceedings that sought to correct injustices and illegalities of the Stalinist era and rehabilitate their victims.

The party newspaper Rude Pravo said it was necessary to distinguish between those who

had been innocently punished and others "who were justly hit by the fist of working-class justice."

The newspaper asserted that the rehabilitation courts, set up on the basis of last year's liberal reforms, had cleared persons who had actually deserved their punishment in earlier political trials.

"Even people who committed criminal acts deliberately and evidently in an attempt to harm the socialist system or even to contribute actively to its subversion have been rehabilitated," Rude Pravo said. The newspaper cited the cases of three defendants, including a woman, who were

given prison sentences in 1950 on espionage charges, of another group "that had founded an antistate organization," and of four men who knew that a fifth was "preparing the murder of a policeman," all of whom had lately been rehabilitated.

The party newspaper also denounced the Prague city prosecutor's office for indiscriminately accepting citizens' claims to apartments from which they had previously been ejected. For the most part they were "members of the bourgeoisie who were moved out of Prague after February, 1948," the date of the Communist takeover, Rude pravo said.

The newspaper said there was no reason why "memorials should be built" to persons who had been justly punished, and why they should be given "warrants for undeserved well-being."

This was an allusion to the liberal rehabilitation law of Aug. 1, 1968, providing for cash indemnities to victims of miscarriages of justice of the Stalinist era, which lingered on in Czechoslovakia longer than in other Soviet-bloc countries.

Rude pravo said rehabilitation proceedings had so far cost the equivalent of \$70-million and might cost nearly five times as much if they were allowed to go on unchecked.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
 12 October 1969

**Czechs Seen Returning
 to Old Days of Fear**

**Clamp on Travel to West Signals Tougher
 Repressions, Prague Communist Believes**

BY OSGOOD CARUTHERS
 Times Staff Writer

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

VIENNA—Now we are back to square one," said the sad-eyed intellectual from Prague. "The fear is growing in my country now that there will be tougher and tougher repressions, that currency devaluation will wipe out our savings and that the petty police informers will take the place of real justice once again."

The man, in his mid-30s, was one of the last citizens of that unhappy land to get out before the regime cracked down on travel to the West last week.

Though he is in Vienna on a legitimate visa, his family is still in Czechoslovakia. He naturally did not want his name revealed. He has been a member of the Communist Party most of his adult life. But he was widely noted in intellectual circles at home as an enthusiastic supporter of the "Prague Spring" reforms of last year.

Speaking with great sadness of his fears about the future of his country, he said he found little confidence and hardly any comfort in the reported assurances by the nation's Communist chief Gustav Husak that there would not be a return to the grim Stalinist terror that prevailed under the former dictatorship of Antonin Novotny before he was ousted by the reformists in January, 1968.

Assurances Published

Husak's assurances were reported Saturday as the party newspaper Rude Pravo got around to publishing the text of the speech he made at the close of last month's crucial Central Committee meeting which brought about the final downgrading of former party chief and reform leader Alexander Dubcek.

Observers believe that the party leadership apparently believed it neces-

sary at this time to reproduce Husak's assurances—more than two weeks after they were made—to take some of the sting out of the latest repressive measures against travel to the West.

The leadership also found it necessary to try to scotch rumors sweeping Prague and other major cities of Czechoslovakia that a currency reform with the attendant issuance of new money to replace the old would suddenly wipe out individual savings.

What the man from Prague meant by being "back to square one" was that there was, with the ending of the last bit of freedom to travel, a return of the constantly nagging fear which marked the daily lives of that country's people under the old Novotny dictatorship. There was fear of being informed upon — sometimes falsely — by a neigh-

bor, a fellow worker, a friend or even a member of the family; fear of further economic hardship in the long cold winter approaching; fear of being unable to hold onto a good job without abjectly toeing the party line.

It is obvious from the text of Husak's speech, parts of which were distributed abroad by the official Czechoslovak news agency, that such fears had seriously divided the membership of the party's ruling Central Committee during that September meeting behind closed doors.

Thus Husak appears to emerge as the moderate between the old hard-line Stalinist orthodoxy and the Dubcek reformers whom he accuses of having been too weak and indecisive in their leadership of the party and the nation.

By his own defensive

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8

words at one stage of the speech it is clear that some hard-liners had severely criticized Husak himself for vacillating from support of Dubcek when he was head of the party to opposition when he lost his job.

It is apparent from Hu-

sak's speech that Dubcek, speaking in his own defense in the Central Committee, expressed the fears for the future in much the same terms as had the Czechoslovak talking in Vienna. Dubcek's defense of himself, in which he apparently refused to recant, has not been pub-

Husak said Dubcek's fears of a return to the purges of the 1950s were unfounded. He said the purge now going on in all levels of the Communist Party and the government "must be an honest one, not a revenge-seeking affair."

"There used to be times when criticism of a man meant that behind the door two others were waiting to take him away," Husak declared. "We shall not return to these times never again. And therefore no one need be afraid of that."

CPYRIGHT NEW YORK TIMES
21 October 1969

CPYRIGHT

Czechoslovak Leaders Warmly Welcomed in Moscow

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, Oct. 20—The

Soviet Union today gave an enthusiastic welcome to a Czechoslovak delegation including Dr. Gustav Husak, the party leader, and President Ludvik Svoboda, who arrived for a nine-day official visit, nearly 14 months after Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. Virtually every Kremlin leader was at flag-draped Vnukovo Airport to demonstrate approval of the conservative policies being followed by Dr. Husak, who last April replaced Alexander Dubcek, the liberal leader. It was assumed that the visitors would make an appropriate statement during the visit justifying the invasion and the continued garrisoning of about 80,000 Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. In return, the Soviet Union is expected to sign an economic aid agreement to help its ally out of an economic crisis. President Nikolai V. Podgorny, in a welcoming speech at a Kremlin banquet tonight, praised the "great positive change" that has taken place in Czechoslovakia in recent months as Dr. Husak has cracked down on the supporters and policies of Mr. Dubcek.

"New horizons" are opening up for the two countries, Mr. Podgorny said, according to Tass, the Soviet press agency. During negotiations during the

visit, "we are to consider major questions of no little importance for relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia," he said.

President Svoboda, who together with Premier Oldrich Cernik has remained in office throughout the hectic 14-month period since the invasion, also gave his endorsement to the changeover in Czechoslovak policy.

According to Tass, the Czechoslovak President said anti-socialist and right-wing forces "had demoralized society and the party for a long time and weakened efforts aimed at implementation of a principled Leninist policy."

"But at the April plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party, we succeeded in reaching a turning point," he said.

Discussing the current visit, Mr. Svoboda said the Czechoslovak leaders "have come to you now to seek your advice and agree on how to develop our mutual cooperation in the future."

No Mention of Invasion

The invasion was not mentioned in Tass excerpts from the two speeches.

A full day of negotiations is scheduled for tomorrow, primarily, it is believed, to settle last-minute details of the agreements and communiqués to be released. The Czechoslovak delegation then leaves Moscow on Wednesday for a tour of several Soviet cities before returning Monday.

On Wednesday the seven Soviet astronauts from the three-craft Soyuz mission will arrive in Moscow for the traditional hero's welcome.

Today was reserved primarily for the symbolic signs of fri-

endship that Soviet leaders like to display for their close allies or for those they wish the world to believe are close allies.

The major newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, carried biographies of both Dr. Husak and President Svoboda on their front pages under their pictures. Radio stations broadcast the news of their arrival, and thousands of workers were let off from work to be bussed to the parade route from the airport.

At the airport Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader; Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and President Pogorny embraced and kissed the visitors as they disembarked from their plane, which had been escorted over the field by seven MIG fighter planes.

A 21-gun salute boomed for President Svoboda, and the leaders then rode in limousines along Lenin Prospekt to a guest house in the Lenin Hills, overlooking the Moscow River.

Along the motorcade route, both Soviet and Czechoslovak flags waved, and signs in Russian, Czech and Slovak proclaimed the unity and friendship of the peoples.

The Czechoslovak delegation includes Lubomir Strougal, head of the Czech branch of the party; Vasil Bilak, a national party secretary; Stefan Sadovsky, Slovak party leader; Frantisek Hamouz, a Deputy Premier; Jan Marko, Foreign Minister, and Lieut. Gen. Martin Dzur, the Defense Minister.

Ironically, the last time President Svoboda received a welcome at Moscow airport was shortly after the invasion when he came here to talk with Soviet leaders under some duress.

Dr. Husak, then head of the Slovak party, was a member of the delegation in which Mr.

CPYRIGHT

Dubcek and Mr. Cernik were allowed to participate only after President Svoboda had insisted. They had been arrested by the Soviet authorities during the invasion.

From that first meeting with Soviet leaders, the legal justification for the stationing of Soviet troops evolved.

Referring to those talks 14 months ago, Mr. Svoboda said tonight, "We agreed upon correct and wise decisions on a number of questions in the complicated situation that then developed in our country and our relations."

Soviet Loan Is Aim

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Oct. 20—A substantial loan in rubles is reported to be the main objective of a Czechoslovak party and Government mission that began a nine-day visit to the Soviet Union today.

East European diplomats said the Czechoslovak leadership was seeking credits of up to the equivalent of \$500-million in Soviet currency, to be spent in the area of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance the East European economic community.

The sources said the prestige of Dr. Gustav Husak, the party chief, might suffer if he returned from the visit without firm Soviet pledges to help tide Czechoslovakia over her present economic difficulties.

The diplomats stressed that the very fact that Dr. Husak was making his first formal visit since he became party head six months ago was a personal success, showing that he had attained the Kremlin's recognition and trust.

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

Czech Hard-Line Leaders Get Brezhnev Endorsement

By Anthony Astrachan

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Oct. 27—Soviet

Communist Party Leader Brezhnev gave a full endorsement today to the Czechoslovak regime of Gustav Husak and its purge of those who tried to give communism "a human face" last year.

Talks with Czechoslovak leaders, who are completing an eight-day visit to the Soviet Union, produced "full identity of views on all questions of principle," Brezhnev told a rally of party stalwarts in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

He added that the Soviet Union regards the September plenary meeting of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as "one of the most important stages in the history" of the party. That plenum removed Alexander Dubcek and other 1968 reformists from their remnants of power and set the stage for purging lower levels of the party.

New Agreement

Brezhnev said the plenum

had given "an emphatic no to those who are still trying to hamper the healthy consolidation of the party and society along socialist, Marxist-Leninist lines."

The Soviet Leader mentioned economic cooperation and increased trade but gave no details of an expected aid package. This may be announced Tuesday after the visitors return to Prague, though Brezhnev said a new agreement would be signed only next May, the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Nazis.

Husak's embrace of the Soviets appeared even more complete than Brezhnev's endorsement of the Prague regime: "The friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union are the main condition of our national and state existence," the Czechoslovak party leader told the rally.

He promised that his party

would rid its ranks of "right-wing opportunists," maintain its dominance of society (the reformists had allowed the idea of more than one party to be mentioned) and stick to "allegiance and friendship" with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Czechs Learn a Lesson

Husak said the Czechoslovaks had learned a lesson from the overthrow of Stalinist strongman Antonin Novotny in January, 1968; not to underestimate the harm that can be done by "opportunist and petty-bourgeois illusions, by anarchist and nationalist trends" and by the "strivings of imperialism to erode socialist states from within."

Apart from questions dealing directly with Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev made a tour d'horizon of foreign policy topics in his speech.

His mentions of Vietnam, the Middle East and European security seemed routine. Some observers were intrigued, however, by the way he moved from Czechoslovakia to China.

Brezhnev said the Czechoslovak crisis raised a question about "the internationalist responsibility of Communists for the destinies of socialism," which he called the most important Communist lesson of the events in Czechoslovakia. This was an assertion of the Brezhnev doctrine, which states that the sovereignty of socialist countries is limited by the right of the Soviet Union (or theoretically other brother states) to intervene if those countries stray too far from the path.

He then moved immediately to the question of China, saying that the Soviet Union thinks talks are "the only way to solve arguable questions between the two countries." He did not say what questions might not be arguable, nor did he elaborate on the connection between the "internationalist responsibility of Communists" as demonstrated in Czechoslovakia and the hope of the Kremlin "that the positive realistic approach will reign" at the Sino-Soviet talks now under way in Peking.

CPYRIGHT

NEW YORK TIMES

29 October 1969

PRAGUE'S LEADERS BACK FROM SOVIET

Bring Promises of Greater
Economic Assistance

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Oct. 28—Czechoslovakia's Communist party chief, Dr. Gustav Husak, and other party and Government

leaders returned today from Moscow with Soviet promises of increased economic help.

However, Czechoslovak hopes for at least a token reduction in the 80,000 occupation troops were disappointed.

Instead, a statement issued tonight in Prague announced efforts to "deepened the joint activity and friendship between the Czechoslovak army and Soviet army forces stationed here on a temporary basis."

The apparent prospect of even tighter Soviet control of the Czechoslovak armed forces deepened the gloom pervading today's observance of Czechoslovakia's national holiday—the 51st anniversary of the

country's emergence as an independent republic at the end of World War I.

Informants in Prague, Bratislava and other Czechoslovak cities reported that people had stayed mostly indoors throughout the chilly day. Police patrols were reinforced last night.

Slogans Painted on Walls

The letters FSN had been freshly chalked on many walls. They are interpreted as the initials of the Czech words for federalization, freedom and neutrality, believed to be a slogan that underground opposition groups coined for the independence anniversary.

Tonight's 4,000 word coun-

manique announced that a new treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual aid would be signed in Prague next May, marking the 25th anniversary of Czechoslovakia's liberation from German occupation. The Soviet leaders will attend the signing ceremony, the communist declared.

Rephrasing what Dr. Husak said at a Moscow rally yesterday, the statement affirmed that "the Czechoslovak delegation appreciates the action of the five fraternal socialist countries in the critical days of 1968 as an act of international solidarity that helped avert antisocialist counter-revolutionary forces."

CPYRIGHT