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December 1969

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(25 October - 21 November 1969)

I. All is Not Quiet on Moscow's Western Front

As Moscow reiterates the creed of democratic centralism and proletarian internationalism (i.e. control from the center, from the CPSU) with supporting quotes from the scriptures by Lenin, some western European Communist factions and rebellious individuals speak out in new, public forums -- in defiance of democratic centralism. Splits are threatened within several parties. Expulsions and resignations have given evidence of the serious strains triggered by (but not confined to) the festering problems of Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia.

Italy -- "We invite the rank-and-file Communists to effect a cultural revolution capable of even putting into question all the hitherto consolidated patrimony." With this challenge to the regular leadership of the Italian Communist Party a lively new magazine, Il Manifesto, began publication in June. "Heresy," screamed the old-line Communist periodical Rinascita. Whereupon the PCI's Central Committee began an investigation which may well lead to expulsion from the party for outspoken Rossana Rossanda and her Bolognese colleagues who publish the new monthly. By September their increasingly popular publication carried a tough anti-Soviet article which, according to L'Espresso of 12 October (attached), charged that "the political mistake committed by the Soviet leadership group in Czechoslovakia is so serious that 'there is no longer any possibility of counting on their self-correction; we are forced to count on their defeat and replacement by a new bloc of forces directed by the working class....'" Could disillusion speak any more plainly?

Evidently in fear of being accused of an excess of disciplinary democratic centralism of the old-fashioned Stalinist kind -- an accusation damaging to the assiduously cultivated image of an "open" party -- the PCI Central Committee has not yet expelled Rossanda and her colleagues. In the meantime Il Manifesto continues to print the unthinkable, such as a discussion of "our explicit request for a policy directed at overthrowing the Soviet leadership. There are quite a few PCI leaders who agree with us and consider the Soviet leaders a group of bandits."

On the other hand, there can be little consolation for Moscow in the "affirmation" by Luigi Longo, General Secretary of the PCI, of the party's fidelity to the Soviet Union. He chose the sacred anniversary of the October revolution (7 November) for his speech which included the assertion: "The PCI is not inspired by the regimes realized in the socialist countries but fights for an 'Italian path' to socialism in keeping especially with the conditions and possibilities of the Italian working classes and peasantry.... The party wants to create a socialist society endowed with democratic organizations, neither centralist nor bureaucratic: a society which must not become identified with one-party power" ... an unequivocal rejection of the Soviet model.

France -- While the Moscow-line French Communist Party backed away from its original condemnation of Soviet policy on Czechoslovakia, Communist heretic Paul Noirot continues to discuss the Czech scene in critical terms in his Politique Aujourd'hui. Less than a year old, this unorthodox French Communist periodical springs from the same roots as the Italian Il Manifesto. Both freely and critically discuss international Communist policy questions with which intellectuals have struggled more quietly for years. The editors have also discussed such items as the Chinese Cultural Revolution with a notable lack of polemics, which must be as disappointing to Moscow as it is to the PCF. Editors Noirot and Guy Perrimond were expelled from the PCF for their heresies within a few months of the magazine's appearance.

Austria -- On 29 October, the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party (KPOe) upheld the expulsion of its outspoken ideologist Ernst Fischer (see our November report) after a strong attempt by liberal forces to overturn the original Central Committee decision. Fischer, an outstanding critic of the Soviet Czech policy -- among other things -- originated the phrase "tank communism" (a reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia). The final Central Committee vote, 42-35, gave Moscow clear notice of the size of the opposition forces. At the same time it reflected an earlier comment by a liberal Central Committee member, Theodor Prager, on "a trend noticeable throughout the world Communist movement toward giving the extreme conservative elements in the Communist parties the upper hand." A further test of strength between the orthodox and the progressive factions, which threatens a party split, may occur during the Vienna provincial party congress late in November.

Coinciding with Fischer's expulsion was the appearance of a second issue of Wiener Tagebuch (see the November "Communist Scene"), which is the Austrian equivalent of Il Manifesto and Politique Aujourd'hui. Like its sister periodicals, it publishes frank and revealing appraisals of the Soviet role in the international movement. Coming as they do from long-time Communists, they are an embarrassment to the Soviet Union and therefore to the regular KPOe leadership, whose tenure depends on continuation of Soviet material support. (Attached, as a typical item, is "Report from Prague," sent anonymously from Czechoslovakia and published in Wiener Tagebuch.)

England -- The Czechoslovak crisis continues to agitate the British Communist Party, as it met in regular Congress in mid-November. The party had immediately denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and reiterated its condemnation at its current Congress -- but only after overcoming considerable pressure from supporters of the Soviet action. Narrowly avoiding a formal split, the Congress revealed the strength of the anti-Soviet opposition in the 295 to 118 vote in favor of denouncing the invasion (see attached New York Times account).

Switzerland -- Even the tiny Swiss party is shaken by dissent. Their complaint? The familiar one -- the party is too subservient to Soviet positions to suit many comrades. (See Le Monde, 9 October, attached.) A group of about 100 who have resigned or been expelled from the Swiss Labor Party (Communist) are now considering establishing a new revolutionary organization.

II. Mission to Moscow -- Czech Style

The Czechoslovak people learned on October 27th just what their top party and government leaders were bringing back from Moscow after eight days touring the Soviet Union and "negotiating" with Soviet leaders. The Czechoslovak officials brought back everything -- except what their economically troubled, occupied, unhappy country needs. The Czechoslovaks learned that the Soviet press had given the visit extraordinary coverage, that Soviet leaders unstintingly praised Party Secretary Husak and President Svoboda (Premier Cernik's presence was simply acknowledged), and that Husak and company had returned the compliments in full.

From the wordy Czech-Soviet communique the Czechs also learned that:

--Czechoslovakia will be increasingly dependent on the Soviet economy.

She desperately needs a hard currency loan to finance purchase of western equipment for building up her export capability. Such loans had been made to East Germany in 1953 and to Hungary in 1956 in similar circumstances, so that many Czechoslovaks were optimistic. Instead, the USSR proposed a 10% increase in their trade with Czechoslovakia -- a trade whose "unproductive weight is already crippling the Czechoslovak economy," according to one foreign observer. The Czechoslovaks are to be assisted in "purchasing certain goods which are at present in short supply in Czechoslovakia ... on foreign markets." This vague wording, which seems to promise much, most probably means that the Soviets will order on foreign markets whatever they want the Czechs to have. "The Czechoslovak side has noted," Czechoslovak citizens will be happy to learn, "that economic and scientific-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union ... creates ... long term, stable preconditions for an optimal development of the Czechoslovak national economy." (See Communique, attached, pages 3, 4, 7.)

--Czechoslovakia will be subject to increasing Soviet political control.

The Czechs are supposed to believe the political purges of recent months, culminating in demotion of the popular Alexander Dubcek, were performed for their own good. Such Soviet-approved moves will allegedly "... strengthen socialist social relations, improve socialist democracy, apply Marxist-Leninist principles in nationality policy...." (p.5). The Czechs also are supposed to be convinced of the equality and mutual respect between the two countries when they read of the "absolute unity of views ... on development of Czech-Soviet relations" (p.2). Or, put another way, "... there will be an intensification of cooperation and friendship between units of the Czechoslovak people's army and the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia." They will be assisted in developing this "unity of views" by agreeing to "... deepen cooperation between state organs and social organizations, and to develop friendly contacts among regions, towns and districts, among collectives of Czechoslovak and Soviet enterprises, agricultural cooperatives and institutions" (p.4).

--Czechoslovakia can expect increased censorship and cultural repression.

The party has already closed down the more independent newspapers and fired prominent communications chiefs. Now the Czechoslovaks have learned that "An especially important instrument of the party and of socialist power in this sharp class and ideological struggle is the mass media, whose duty is to fight consistently for the implementation of the party's line and to serve loyally the working people and the cause of socialism. Experience shows that the interests of socialism are seriously impeded by weak party direction of the mass media" (p.9).

--Czechoslovakia will continue to be occupied by Soviet troops.

"...the Czechoslovak people have been clearly convinced of the importance of safeguarding Czechoslovakia's western borders for the national existence and state sovereignty. In this sense the treaty on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia is of fundamental importance" (p.6).

For all these blessings, Czech leaders' praises flowed like vodka. For the Soviets, the crowning praise came from Husak: "The Czech delegation appreciates the action of the five fraternal socialist countries in the critical August days of 1968...."

* * *

Anti-Socialist Element

"...It is no accident that Husak before and after 1948 was raised on the shield of Slovak reactionaries nor that during the anti-state demonstration in Bratislava in the summer of 1948 the slogan was shouted: 'Long Live Husak!' Today it is clearly proven that the activity of Clementis and Husak was a matter of a conscious and organized criminal activity against socialism and against the unity of the Party and Republic. It is therefore necessary to unmask the anti-Soviet face of the Husak group, which consists of full-fledged enemies of the Soviet people and their socialist order...." (Citation from the "Report of the Investigation Commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the Case of Sling, Smermova, Clementis, Husak and Other Wreckers, Conspirators, and Bourgeois Nationalists.")

Concerning his being stamped as a bourgeois nationalist and as an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet element, Dr. Husak said repeatedly that he "had fallen into the clutches of a fearful machine." Today he has set in motion a machine which makes use of literally the same absurd accusations against Communists as those under which he was condemned 18 years ago!

[Wiener Tagebuch, No. 3/4, September-October 1969.]

L'ESPRESSO, Rome
12 October 1969.

**Gli eretici del "Manifesto" e la
commissione di censura del PCI**

**DISCUTIAMONE ACCANTO
AL ROGO**

CPYRGHT

ROMA. Il comunicato era breve, laconico, non occupava più di tre centimetri di spazio sulla prima pagina dell'"Unità" di sabato scorso, e soprattutto non vi si leggeva nulla di speciale. « La direzione », diceva, « ... ha deciso di convocare il comitato centrale del partito per lunedì 13 ottobre. Il punto centrale sarà svolto dal compagno Fernando Di Giulio: lotte delle masse lavoratrici, situazione economica e prospettive politiche ». Normalissima amministrazione, dunque. Eppure, per i lettori più esperti, per i più attenti esegeti dei testi ufficiali di via delle Botteghe Oscure, quel comunicato era a chiave: il fatto che la relazione del compagno Di Giulio vi venisse annunciata come "punto centrale" doveva necessariamente indicare che non sarebbe stata l'unico argomento all'ordine del giorno; e il fatto che vi sarebbero stati altri argomenti inominati, faceva automaticamente sospettare che uno di questi dovesse riguardare "Il Manifesto".

E' insomma da sabato 4 ottobre scorso che Rossana Rossanda, Lucio Magri, Aldo Natoli, Luigi Pintor, e tutti gli altri firmatari delle "eresie" ideologiche e politiche sistematicamente ospitate dal mensile della nuova sinistra del PCI, possono contare le ore che li separano dal giorno del Giudizio. La ipotesi che sia il comitato centrale di lunedì prossimo ad affrontare e risolvere il problema della loro attività editoriale è un'ipotesi del tutto realistica. Troppi chiarimenti sono ormai nell'aria: giovedì 2 ottobre, sotto la presidenza del segretario della federazione di Bologna, Galletti, s'è riunita a Roma

la quinta commissione del comitato centrale ("problemi dell'organizzazione della vita del partito"); giovedì 9 ottobre è in programma la seconda (nonché ultima) seduta della stessa commissione; e tutt'e due non hanno altro scopo se non la raccolta di materiale istruttorio sul caso "Manifesto", destinato appunto al comitato centrale per permettergli di formulare una sentenza. Ma quale sarà questa sentenza?

E' veramente difficile rispondere. Tutta la storia, breve eppure rumorosa, di questo mensile è stata preceduta e accompagnata dall'incertezza sul suo avvenire e quello dei suoi autori. All'inizio dell'estate, quando "Il Manifesto" è ancora in fase di preparazione, non c'è dirigente comunista che non ne scongiuri decisamente la uscita. Per qualcuno, legato all'idea d'un partito autoritario e monolitico, la sola ipotesi d'un giornale non ufficiale è scandalosa; per qualcun altro è soprattutto il momento che è sbagliato; e questo sia sul piano interno,

ca di Bufalini, si afferma solennemente l'esistenza d'un « problema di compatibilità di scelta tra il proseguire la iniziativa del "Manifesto" e i principi su cui si reggono la vita del partito e la milizia comunista ». A questo punto il destino dei promotori della rivista sembra ormai segnato: il problema viene affidato alla quinta commissione del comitato centrale; la relazione Natta esce dal ristretto ambito dei dirigenti e viene pubblicata sul settimanale del partito.

TUTTAVIA, proprio nello stesso momento, inizia una fase che si può chiamare interlocutoria. Se lo sbocco verso una soluzione disciplinare appare inevitabile è anche evidente che vi si vuole arrivare lentamente, quasi in punta di piedi, con la consapevolezza dei costi politici d'un provvedimento d'espulsione (sia verso l'interno, per quello che riguarda le possibili reazioni di molti militanti, soprattutto di base, che non considerano affatto infondate alcune delle tesi critiche esposte sulle pagine della rivista; sia verso l'esterno, per quel che riguarda il grado di credibilità del PCI nel momento in cui si parla d'una futura unità organica di tutte le sinistre), e con la segreta speranza d'un ravvedimento in extremis che permetta di mettere una pietra sull'intero caso. Si tratta d'una speranza

molto fragile. La tendenza ad accelerare la soluzione del problema in senso radicale (impersonata dalla destra Amendola-Pajetta, oltre che dalla vecchia guardia staliniana) prevale sulla tendenza a rinviare (impersonata dal gruppo Berlinguer-Ingro) nello stesso momento in cui alla fine di settembre appare nelle edicole il quarto numero del "Manifesto", dove l'aumento delle pagine (e del prezzo) coincide con l'aumento della produzione eretica.

« Quale senso avrebbe l'ingresso del PCI nell'area di sistematicamente ospitate dal mensile della nuova sinistra del PCI, possono contare le ore che li separano dal giorno del Giudizio. La ipotesi che sia il comitato centrale di lunedì prossimo ad affrontare e risolvere il problema della loro attività editoriale è un'ipotesi del tutto realistica. Troppi chiarimenti sono ormai nell'aria: giovedì 2 ottobre, sotto la presidenza del segretario della federazione di Bologna, Galletti, s'è riunita a Roma la quinta commissione del comitato centrale ("problemi dell'organizzazione della vita del partito"); giovedì 9 ottobre è in programma la seconda (nonché ultima) seduta della stessa commissione; e tutt'e due non hanno altro scopo se non la raccolta di materiale istruttorio sul caso "Manifesto", destinato appunto al comitato centrale per permettergli di formulare una sentenza. Ma

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MA sono argomentazioni senza seguito per quel drappello di esponenti comunisti (tra cui Aldo Natoli, Luigi Pintor, Massimo Caprara, Lucio Magri) che appunto al congresso di Bologna si sono sentiti abbandonati da Ingrao e hanno finito per unirsi alla Rossanda di cui condividevano l'atteggiamento critico nei confronti della nuova linea centrista del partito. Firma-

to da Rossana Rossanda o Lucio Magri come direttori, il primo numero del "Manifesto" esce dunque verso la fine di giugno; se ne tirano 55 mila copie; se ne vendono 40 mila. Noi, scrivono in sostanza Magri e i suoi collaboratori, pensiamo che ci sia bisogno d'aria nuova, « invitiamo la base comunista a una rivoluzione culturale capace di mettere in discussione anche il patrimonio fin qui consolidato ».

Il primo a reagire è Paolo Bufalini su "Rinascita", con un violento articolo in cui le tesi del "Manifesto" vengono bollate di eresia e i loro propugnatori accusati di "volontà frazionistica"; cioè imputati d'un delitto che nel codice del partito comunista italiano prevede come pena l'espulsione. Qualche settimana dopo, verso la fine di luglio, c'è un durissimo intervento di Alessandro Natta in cui, riprendendo e sviluppando l'interpretazione criti-

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« Quale senso avrebbe l'ingresso del PCI nell'area di governo », si chiede ad esempio Aldo Natoli in uno scritto che prende spunto dai due famosi articoli di Giorgio Amendola sull'"Unità", « se non quello della degradazione e della sconfitta storica? ». E mentre poche pagine prima in un editoriale intitolato "Praga è sola" si può leggere che l'errore politico

commesso dai gruppi dirigenti sovietici in Cecoslovacchia è così grave che « non è più possibile puntare su una loro autocorrezione: si è costretti a puntare sulla loro sconfitta e la loro sostituzione da parte di un nuovo blocco di forze dirette dalla classe operaia... », poi che pagine più avanti c'è un lungo saggio critico (di Lucio Magri e Filippo Maone) sull'organizzazione comunista in cui si ridiscutono il concetto stesso di partito, i criteri di gestione, i rapporti con le masse, la selezione dei dirigenti, la scelta della linea, e così via.

« E' questo che ha dato soprattutto fastidio alle Botteghe Oscure », dice oggi Lucio Magri; « il discorso sul partito (o almeno il modo come l'abbiamo posto) e, subito dopo, la nostra richiesta esplicita d'una politica che tenda a rovesciare il gruppo dirigente sovietico. Certo non sono pochi anche tra i leader del PCI quelli che sono d'accordo con noi e considerano i dirigenti sovietici un gruppo di banditi. Ma l'affermarlo ad alta voce gli crea dei gravissimi imbarazzi diplomatici; senza contare che l'idea che si può essere antisovietici da sinistra, e non da posizioni socialdemocratiche, è ancora lontana dal poter essere compresa ».

CARLO GREGORETTI

L'ESPRESSO, Rome
12 October 1969

Let's Talk About the Funeral Pyre

The communique was brief, laconic and hardly occupied more than 3 centimeters of space on last Saturday's issue of l'Unità.

But, above all, it contained nothing special: "The Directorate," it read, "has decided to convene the party CC on Monday, 13 October. The main subject will be discussed by Comrade Fernando Di Giulio: the working masses' struggle, economic situation, and political outlook." Yet, for the more experienced readers, for the more attentive exegetes of official documents issued from Central Committee headquarters, this communique was like a

key. The fact that Comrade Di Giulio's report was announced as the "central theme" necessarily showed that it would not be the only subject on the agenda of the day. And the fact that there were other, unannounced subjects immediately made one suspect that Il Manifesto was to be one of these subjects.

At any rate, since the Saturday of 4 October Rossana Rossanda, Lucio Magri, Aldo Natoli, Luigi Pintor, and all the other signatories to the ideological and political heresies found in the monthly of the PCI's new left have been counting the hours that separate them from judgement day. The hypothesis that it will be next Monday's CC meeting to tackle and solve the problem of their editorial activity is most realistic. Attesting to this are extraordinarily clear signs: Thursday, 2 October, a meeting of the CC's censorship commission, chaired by the secretary of the Bologna Federation, Galletti, was held in Rome (to discuss "Problems of the Organizational Life of the Party"). Thursday, 9 October, the second (as well as the last) session of this commission is scheduled. And both sessions have no other purpose than to collect material pertinent to Il Manifesto case and prepare it for the CC, so that it can fix the sentence. What will this sentence be?

This is a difficult question to answer. The entire history, short but noisy, of this monthly was preceded by and accompanied with uncertainty relative to its future and that of its authors. At the beginning of summer, when Il Manifesto was still in the preparatory phase, there was not a communist leader who did not decisively counsel against its publication. For those tied to the idea of an authoritarian and monolithic party, the very hypothesis of a non-official newspaper is scandalous. For others, only the timing of its publication is wrong -- from both the domestic and the international points of view. In the former case the broad debate at the 12th PCI Congress made some members glimpse the premises for a new disposition of party forces in Italian political life, while in the latter case the polemics between the PCI and the Soviet leadership are becoming ever-increasingly open.

This is the evidence in the appealless case against that group of communists (including Aldo Natoli, Luigi Pintor, Massimo Caprara, Lucio Magri) who felt themselves abandoned by Ingrao at the Bologna Congress and wound up joining Rossanda, with whom they shared a critical attitude toward the party's centrist line. Signed by Rossana Rossanda and Lucio Magri in their capacities as directors, the first issue of Il Manifesto came out toward the end of June; 40,000 of the 55,000 published copies were sold. We think, Magri and his collaborators wrote in substance, that new ventilation is required in the party: "we invite the

rank-and-file communists to effect a cultural revolution capable of even putting into question all the hitherto consolidated patrimony."

The first to react was Paolo Bufalini. In a violent article in Rinascita (Rebirth), he labeled the monthly's theses as heresies and accused their proponents of "splitist activity"; i.e., they were accused of an offence whose penalty in the PCI's criminal code entails expulsion from the party. Several weeks later, toward the end of July, Alessandro Natta delivered a hard-line report in which he, emphasizing and developing Bufalini's critical interpretation, solemnly affirmed the existence of a "compatibility problem between the initiative made by Il Manifesto and the principles governing party life and the membership." At this point it seemed that the fate of the monthly's promoters had finally been sealed. The case was turned over to the CC's censorship commission. Natta's report, which had been delivered to a limited group -- the leadership -- was then published in the party's weekly.

Nevertheless, at the same time a new phase was initiated, a phase that can be called interlocutory. While a disciplinary solution seems inevitable, it also seems evident that the leadership wants to effect this solution slowly, almost at a snail's pace, for it is fully aware of the political costs of expulsion (both on the intraparty level, where there could be reactions by many activists, primarily rank-and-file members who in fact do not consider unsubstantiated some theses presented on the monthly's pages; and on the interparty level, where the PCI could create a credibility gap precisely when there is talk about an organic unity of all leftist forces). The leadership is also proceeding slowly because it harbors the secret hope of having the heretics repent in extremis, thereby enabling the whole case to be closed. This is a very fragile hope. The trend to accelerate the solution of the problem in a radical sense (sought by the Amendola and Pajetta right wing, as well as the old Stalinist guard) is prevailing over the trend to postpone a solution (sought by the Berlinguer and Ingrao group) at the time (at the end of September) of the appearance of the fourth issue of Il Manifesto at the newstands, where the increase in the number of pages (and the price) coincides with the increase in the output of heresies.

"Would the PCI's participation in government have any other significance than that of degradation and historical defeat?" So wrote, for example, Aldo Natali in an article that takes its point of departure from 2 famous Amendola articles in L'Unita. An editorial entitled "Prague Is Alone" in the same issue states that the political mistake committed by the Soviet leadership group in Czechoslovakia is so serious

that "there is no longer any possibility of counting on their self-correction: we are forced to count on their defeat and replacement by a new bloc of forces directed by the working class..." Subsequently, there is a critical article (by Lucio Magri and Filippo Maone) on communist organization. Discussed here are the very conception of the party, leadership criteria, ties with the masses, the selection of leaders and the party line, etc.

"This is what, above all, has bothered Central Committee headquarters," Luigi Magri says today. "This is the discussion on the party (or at least the way we discussed it) and, immediately after, our explicit request for a policy directed at overthrowing the Soviet leadership group. There is no denying that there are quite a few PCI leaders who agree with us and consider the Soviet leaders a group of bandits. But to affirm this out loud would create the most serious diplomatic embarrassments. Moreover, the acceptance of the idea of criticizing the Soviets from leftist and not social-democratic positions is still remote."

il manifesto

Praga è sola

Dopo un anno di occupazione militare la situazione cecoslovacca non lascia più margine a compromessi e impone nuove scelte al movimento operaio occidentale.

Il PCI e il governo

Una nota di *Aldo Natoli* sulla proposta di partecipazione comunista all'area governativa, e un articolo di *Valentino Parlato* sulle prospettive economiche.

Partito e classe

Conversazione con *J. P. Sartre* sul rapporto tra spontaneità e coscienza, con una introduzione di *Rossana Rossanda*.
Uno scritto di *Luigi Pintor* sul « partito nuovo ». Materiali per una discussione sull'organizzazione comunista.

I movimenti di lotta

Articoli di *Pino Ferraris* sulla lotta alla Fiat e di *Claudio Lombardi* sui tecnici e i contratti. Corrispondenza dall'Italsider.

Il satellite della Luna

Marcello Cini riprende il dibattito sulla gara spaziale, frutto dell'uso capitalistico della scienza e specchio di una civiltà deforme.

IL MANIFESTO, Rome
4 September 1969

Un anno dopo

PRAGA E' SOLA

CPYRGHT

La Cecoslovacchia non suscita più vera emozione. Qualche grosso titolo nei quotidiani e le sonanti dichiarazioni dei *leaders* non bastano a nascondere l'accettazione dello stato di fatto. Ognuno tira l'acqua al suo mulino, cercando di trarre il maggior vantaggio o il minor danno possibile da quanto succede a Praga, senza sentirsi obbligato a pensare o ad agire.

Vale per tutte le forze politiche, compresa la sinistra. Da anni esse condividono l'ipotesi di una graduale ma effettiva evoluzione in senso « democratico » della società sovietica e degli altri socialismi europei, sotto la pressione dello sviluppo produttivo e per opera dei gruppi dirigenti. Nessuno si attende grandi rotture, in un senso o nell'altro. E' una convinzione che risale al 1956. La denuncia dello stalinismo, fu interpretata dai comunisti come la prova migliore che il sistema socialista era in grado di riformarsi da sé, dai socialdemocratici come l'inizio di un riavvicinamento fra i due sistemi, del comune orizzonte « del socialismo e della libertà ». I successi dell'URSS negli anni immediatamente seguenti al XX Congresso sostennero le immutate certezze dei primi e spinsero i secondi a preferire la prospettiva dell'accordo a quella del « roll-back ».

Da allora molta acqua è passata sotto i ponti: le difficoltà crescenti del movimento antimperialista, la rottura tra Cina e Unione Sovietica, la crisi del riformismo in Occidente, le difficoltà economiche e i riflussi autoritari nel campo socialista europeo. Si cominciò a pensare che il processo di sviluppo di queste società sarebbe stato meno rapido e lineare di quanto nel 1956 si era sperato. Togliatti, che meno di ogni altro si era abbandonato all'euforia del XX Congresso, fu il primo a riconoscere la possibilità di arretramenti e lacerazioni, ma sempre nel quadro di una linea di tendenza positiva. La formula della « unità nella diversità » fu dedotta da questa convinzione. Alla quale il « nuovo corso » cecoslovacco portò, nel 1968, un innegabile conforto. E vero che esso costituiva una nuova drammatica denuncia del passato, ormai a dodici anni dal XX Congresso e dunque gettava

un'ombra di dubbio sui progressi nel frattempo compiuti. Ed è vero che esso esprimeva forze contraddittorie, spinte centrifughe e dunque poteva comportare il pericolo di un cedimento all'Occidente. Ma si trattava, ancora una volta, di un rinnovamento promosso dai comunisti, diretto dal loro gruppo dirigente. Pareva quindi testimoniare, che in quel partito e in quel paese, nonostante gli errori, esisteva una ricchezza di uomini e idee tale da garantire una continua correzione del processo di rinnovamento. E infatti, nel giro di pochi mesi, la partecipazione operaia e popolare stava sostituendo all'egemonia tecnocratica e terzaforzista degli esordi del « nuovo corso » una ispirazione diversa e ben più ricca.

L'intervento militare dell'agosto 1968 fu un brusco risveglio. Non solo per la gravità dell'errore di cui il gruppo dirigente sovietico si rivelava capace, non solo per la conferma dei vincoli che l'equilibrio fra le grandi potenze impone alle forze progressive, non solo perché tradiva il peso ancora determinante degli schemi passati; ma soprattutto perché era prova di una debolezza interna così grave dei paesi del Patto di Varsavia, da spingere i gruppi dirigenti a pagare qualsiasi prezzo pur di tagliar corto con l'esperimento cecoslovacco. Si sperò, in quei giorni, che affiorasse ai vertici dell'URSS una discussione, una divisione che permettesse di intravedere un ricambio. Questo segno non venne. Restavano la fidejussione, la misura, il carattere « socialista » della resistenza di Praga: vi si poté vedere ancora, nei primi mesi dopo l'occupazione, l'espressione di una potenzialità politica, di una maturità sociale che il partito o una parte di esso avrebbe ancora potuto, a un certo punto, raccogliere; l'esistenza insomma di una linea, per il momento perdente ma che, allentata la pressione sovietica, avrebbe potuto prendere la rivincita. Quando i comunisti italiani condannarono l'intervento sovietico senza aprire un fronte di discussione radicale con gli orientamenti dell'attuale gruppo dirigente dell'URSS e dei paesi del Patto di Varsavia, puntavano ancora, con qualche ragione, su questa carta residua.

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Fine del « nuovo corso »

Il 1969 obbliga ormai ad una riconsiderazione. Ciò che colpisce negli avvenimenti cecoslovacchi dopo aprile è la definitiva liquidazione delle forze che avevano dato vita al « nuovo corso ». Se continua una resistenza nelle masse, essa appare, però, priva di una espressione o prospettiva politica. Deludendo il calcolo dei realisti, Gustav Husak si è rivelato la più irrealistica delle soluzioni: dietro di lui non c'è che il vuoto, egli non rappresenta che la copertura d'una ripresa delle forze burocratiche. I leaders del nuovo corso restano, nella migliore delle ipotesi, dei simboli; non più esponenti di una forza o di una linea. La resistenza di base, disperata quanto tenace, obbliga ai tempi lunghi, alla espressione negativa, come passività e sabotaggio, può finir col perdere il suo carattere socialista. Che si può ragionevolmente attendere dal domani, se non che sia più grave dell'oggi?

Non si tratta di passare da un acritico ottimismo ad un pessimismo catastrofico. Ma le forze che si vogliono rivoluzionarie in Occidente sono costrette a fare i conti con la realtà, a determinarsi di fronte a quel che avviene nei paesi socialisti europei, a indicare quale via d'uscita sembra loro auspicabile. I gruppi capitalisti e imperialisti hanno dal canto loro compiuto la propria scelta: non tirare la corda, tentar di inserirsi con prudenza nella crisi in atto, puntare sulla secessione romena più che sulla resistenza cecoslovacca, senza perdere di vista il punto fondamentale, cioè l'accordo con l'attuale gruppo dirigente sovietico. Non si prefiggono più di rovesciare i regimi socialisti, ma di condizionarli e spingerli a condividere una politica di stabilizzazione mondiale.

Ma le forze di sinistra? I comunisti? Nessuno meglio di noi, che per cinquant'anni abbiamo visto, giustamente, nell'URSS la garanzia della rivoluzione mondiale, può valutare la gravità del vuoto derivante da una crisi crescente del campo socialista europeo. E proprio nella misura in cui rifiutiamo lo schema semplicistico, che vede compiuta in URSS una restaurazione capitalistica, siamo tenuti a chiarire su quali ipotesi puntiamo, a quali forze ci riferiamo nel momento in cui diviene evidente che gli attuali equilibri politici e sociali non sono in grado di garantire a quei paesi una evoluzione positiva.

Due alternative

Un punto sembra assodato: l'inconsistenza dell'alter-

nativa tecnocratica, con la sua propaggine dell'opposizione intellettuale. Sono, queste, forze troppo deboli, troppo legate ai propri privilegi, troppo subalterne alla ideologia capitalista per dirigere un blocco di forze progressive. Cercano, e talvolta trovano, l'adesione della massa sul terreno d'una spinta ai consumi, ma sono destinate a rompere con essa sull'organizzazione del lavoro e della democrazia. E a questo punto, a rianodare un compromesso con la burocrazia, a sua volta instabile, in una spirale che vede l'elemento autoritario intrecciarsi sempre più strettamente all'ideologia produttivistica. Non è una logica analoga, d'altronde, che in occidente ha portato al fallimento delle illusioni riformiste?

Una opposta alternativa si era abbozzata proprio nell'esperienza cecoslovacca: quella fondata sugli operai e l'ala progressiva, radicale degli intellettuali. Di qui era venuto quell'esplosione di una partecipazione e di una maturità delle masse, una loro naturale ostilità al privilegio, una inattesa capacità di rielaborazione ideale e di autorganizzazione. Se mai al « nuovo corso » fosse stato dato di procedere, sarebbe riaffiorata al suo interno una dialettica avanzata di classe; quella esplosione di democrazia, di bisogno di potere, di riflessione su se stessi e sui propri fini non sarebbe stata riconducibile nel quadro angusto di un socialismo tecnocratico. Essa esigeva un tipo diverso di sviluppo, in cui partecipazione e uguaglianza fossero la molla del progresso tecnico-produttivo. Questo era l'elemento comune che al di là di evidenti difformità derivate dalla totalmente diversa condizione storica, poteva unire la primavera di Praga con i principi della rivoluzione culturale in Cina: due modi di resistenza, due forme di contestazione — certo parziali, ma straordinariamente ricche — rivolte contro la stabilizzazione degli equilibri mondiali, contro i privilegi sociali e politici, fondate sulla mobilitazione e l'iniziativa di massa. Ma non bisogna fare le cose più semplici di quanto non siano; scambiare una potenzialità con una realtà. L'alternativa di cui parliamo, nelle società socialiste europee è tutt'altro che a portata di mano. Non solo perché soffocata, ma perché le sue radici oggettive sono ancora deboli, debole l'impalcatura teorica di cui può disporre, assente un punto di riferimento internazionale. La classe operaia di questi paesi esprime, ad esempio, una collocazione ancora contraddittoria: pressata da bisogni elementari e consapevole della possibilità di soddisfarli, essa resta profondamente sensibile alle suggestioni di un migliore tenore di vita; né intende, giustamente, rinunciare alle conquiste strapate sul terreno della piena occupazione e della orga-

nizzazione del lavoro. Sul piano politico, diffida della fraseologia rivoluzionaria, dall'egualitarismo demagogico che troppe volte sono serviti a coprire il privilegio e il sopruso. Pensare che da essa possa nascere quasi spontaneamente, e in condizioni di clandestinità effettiva, un nuovo discorso rivoluzionario, come è avvenuto nella rivoluzione culturale cinese, è un assurdo. Manca un « pensiero di Mao » non solo perché manca chi dall'alto promuova un tanto radicale processo di rottura, ma perché mancano le condizioni di una analoga proposta politica. Per fare un esempio, lo schema, caro a tanti estremisti di casa nostra, che identifica libertà di espressione e restaurazione del capitalismo (quasi che il socialismo senza censura e senza processi diventasse d'un rosso più sbiadito) basta a liquidare ogni possibilità di discorso con le forze rivoluzionarie di un paese come la Cecoslovacchia. E così gli schemi di un anticonsumismo semplificato o di egualitarismo ascetico. Il vero problema di queste società, ormai a un certo grado di sviluppo, è lo stesso su cui dobbiamo misurarci noi in Occidente: un discorso radicale sull'uguaglianza, la democrazia diretta, il superamento dell'individualismo e del lavoro alienato, la critica alla scienza e alla tecnica borghesi, ma in forme adeguate a società ormai articolate, complesse, ricche di individualità; in grado di impiegare nel processo di emancipazione dell'uomo tutto il patrimonio di conoscenze e di capacità accumulato in secoli di sviluppo. Il problema è lo stesso: difficile per noi, ancora più difficile per i paesi dell'Est europeo. Ma una volta che ci sia chiaro che l'attesa d'uno spontaneo, e pur lento, maturare di una alternativa positiva all'interno del campo socialista è destinata a naufragare come sono naufragate le speranze di una evoluzione affidata ai gruppi dirigenti usciti dal XX Congresso, o al crescere dell'opposizione tecnocratica; una volta persuasi che, affidate al loro corso naturale, le cose non possono che peggiorare, il proletariato europeo non può più esimersi dalla responsabilità di aiutare esplicitamente la formazione di una alternativa di sinistra, rivoluzionaria, all'interno del campo socialista, prima che quanto vi resta di opposizione degeneri in una linea di destra. Già è una lotta contro il tempo: le accoglienze fatte a Nixon in Romania dovrebbero suonare ormai come un campanello d'allarme. È una responsabilità d'altra parte che tocca al proletariato occidentale, perché è il solo, forse, in condizioni di elaborare e di realizzare un modello di socialismo in cui si compongano le antinomie contro cui obbligatoriamente finiscono con lo scontrarsi le forze rivoluzionarie degli altri settori del mondo. La nostra solidarietà contro l'intervento militare appare, quindi, non più che una premessa, e non a caso suona sempre più

formale, ripetitiva, meno convinta. Tanto più che quando la solidarietà non è più rivolta al partito comunista di un paese invaso ma a masse che protestano in piazza contro le forze di occupazione e contro il loro stesso governo, essa cambia di natura, deve poggiare su di un terreno più solido, oppure, nella pratica, si stempera. Da solidarietà diventa « preoccupazione », da « preoccupazione » può diventare « neutralità ». Si tratta di misurare l'internazionalismo su un terreno molto più avanzato e difficile.

Per la resistenza

Il primo punto è l'assunzione di una presa di posizione netta di fronte alle scelte politiche dei gruppi dirigenti dell'URSS e degli altri paesi socialisti europei. Non è più possibile puntare su una loro autocorrezione; si è costretti a puntare sulla loro sconfitta e la loro sostituzione, per iniziativa e da parte di un nuovo blocco di forze sociali diretto dalla classe operaia, un rilancio socialista che investa le strutture politiche e sia capace di esprimere realmente le potenzialità immense uscite dalla Rivoluzione d'Ottobre. I cauti condizionamenti dall'esterno, le critiche generiche che non individuano esplicitamente obiettivi, responsabilità, gruppi dirigenti, non rappresentano ormai che segmenti di un « realismo » sempre più somigliante all'omertà, che avalla gli stati di fatto e scoraggia sul nascere ogni forza di opposizione. Finché la resistenza cecoslovacca si troverà di fronte — nel campo internazionale — all'alternativa fra le simpatie degli anti-comunisti e le prudenziali realistiche coperture all'attuale gruppo dirigente, non le resterà che l'isolamento e il ripiegamento su se stessa.

Ma anche questo è un punto preliminare. Il proletariato occidentale ha un solo modo per diventare un punto di riferimento mondiale, un momento di internazionalismo attivo ed efficace: quello di portare avanti la sua rivoluzione; essere in grado di proporre un modello di socialismo diverso, perché lo sta realizzando. Il discorso sulla Cecoslovacchia ci riporta così all'Italia. Con una nuova consapevolezza, e cioè che se la crisi oggi aperta in Occidente si dovesse ancora una volta chiudere con una sconfitta o un nulla di fatto, dovremmo scontare un arretramento grave su tutto il fronte rivoluzionario internazionale. Vi è una perfetta coerenza fra chi perdona la politica di Breznev e chi sollecita da noi una linea di compromesso. Se in Occidente i comunisti si inseriscono non c'è da attendersi che un congelamento conservatore nelle società socialiste. Sarebbe l'internazionalizzazione della rinuncia.

II. MANIFESTO, Rome
4 September 1969
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Prague Is Alone

Czechoslovakia no longer excites true feelings. An occasional big headline in the daily newspapers and ringing declarations of leaders can't hide the acceptance of the status quo. Everyone seeks his own benefit by trying to gain the greatest advantage or the least damage from what happens at Prague without feeling obliged to think or act.

This is true of all political forces, including the left. For years, they have shared the hypothesis of a gradual but effective evolution of Soviet society and other European socialisms in a "democratic" direction under the pressure of productive development and through the efforts of leadership groups. No one expects important ruptures, one way or the other. This conviction goes back to 1956. The denunciation of Stalinism was interpreted by the communists as the best proof that the socialist system could reform itself; by the socialdemocrats as the beginning of a rapprochement between the two systems; as a common horizon "of socialism and freedom." The USSR successes in the years immediately after the 20th Congress sustained the unchanged convictions of the former and led the latter to prefer the prospect of an agreement to that of a "roll-back."

Much water has passed under the bridge since then: the increasing difficulties in the anti-imperialist movement, the break between China and the Soviet Union, the reformist crisis in the West, the economic difficulties and authoritarian flare-ups in the European socialist camp. Some began to think that the process of development in these societies would be slower and less linear than had been hoped in 1956. Togliatti, who was less enthusiastic than anyone else about the 20th Congress, was the first to recognize the possibility of retreat and damage, but always within the framework of a line based on a positive tendency. The "unity in diversity" formula was deduced from that conviction. And in 1968, the Czechoslovak "new course" gave it undeniable comfort. It is true that it constituted a new dramatic denunciation of the past 12 years after the 12th Congress and therefore threw a shadow of doubt over the progress made in the meantime. And it is true that it expressed contradictory forces, centrifugal thrusts, and therefore could carry with it the danger of yielding to the West. But, once again, it was a matter of a renewal promoted by the communists directed by their leadership group. It seemed therefore to be evident that in that party and in that country, despite errors, there existed a wealth of men and ideas such as to guarantee a continuous correction of the process of renewal. And in fact, within a few months, the participation of the workers and the people was replacing the technocratic and third force hegemony with the beginning of the "new course," an inspiration which was quite different and far richer.

The military intervention of August 1968 was a rude awakening. This was so not only because of the seriousness of the error the Soviet leadership group showed itself capable of; not only because of the confirmation of the hold which the power balance among great powers imposes on progress-

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forces; not only because it betrayed the still-determining weight of past plans; but also because it was proof of such a serious internal weakness among the Warsaw Pact nations that it led leadership groups to pay any price to cut short the Czechoslovak experiment. In those days, it was hoped that at the USSR summit there would develop a discussion, a division, that would permit the possibility of a change. No sign ever came.

What remained was the pride, the extent, the "socialist" character, of the Prague resistance; there still could be seen, after the first months of the occupation, the expression of a political potential, of a social maturity which the party, or a part of it, could still at a certain point have counted upon; the existence, that is, of a line which temporarily was on the losing side but which could have won out if Soviet pressure had been relieved. When Italian communists condemned the Soviet intervention without opening a front of radical discussion concerning the orientation of the present leadership group of the USSR and of the Warsaw Pact nations, they still, with some reason, counted on this remaining card.

The End of the "New Course"

The year 1969 forces a reassessment upon us. What is striking in the Czechoslovak events after April is the definitive liquidation of the forces which had given life to the "new course." However, if a resistance of the masses continues, it appears to lack expression or a political future. Disappointing the calculations of the realists, Gustav Husak showed himself to be the least realistic of solutions: behind him there is nothing but a void. He does not represent anything but a surreptitious resumption of bureaucratic forces. The leaders of the new course remain, under the best of circumstances, symbols; no longer are they exponents of power or of a line. A resistance at the base, as desperate as it is tenacious, imposes long term considerations; negative expression (such as passive resistance and sabotage) could end up by losing its socialist character. What can we reasonably expect tomorrow except that it will be more serious than today?

It is not a matter of passing from a position of non-critical optimism to catastrophic pessimism. But the forces which can be expected to be revolutionary in the West are forced to reckon with reality, to develop in terms of what happens in the European socialist countries, to indicate what outlet they can hope for. The capitalist and imperialist groups have made their own choice: not to keep a tight rein; to try to intervene prudently in the crisis; to count on the Romanian secession rather than on Czechoslovak resistance without losing sight of the fundamental point, that is, agreement with the present Soviet leadership group. They no longer count upon overturning the socialist regimes, but to condition them and channel them into sharing a policy of world stability.

But what about the leftist forces? The Communists? No one better than we, who for 50 years and with good reason have considered the USSR the guarantee of world revolution, can assess the seriousness of the void emerging from a growing crisis in the European socialist camp. And it is precisely to the extent that we reject the simplistic view, which considers that the USSR has completed a process of capitalist restoration, that we are obliged to clarify our hypotheses -- what forces we count upon when it has become evident that present political and social balances are not able to guarantee those nations a positive evolution.

Two Alternatives

One point seems settled: the inconsistency of the technocratic alternative and its offspring in the intellectual opposition. These forces are too weak, too closely tied to their own privileges, too submissive to capitalist ideology to direct a bloc of progressive forces. They seek, and sometimes find, support among the masses on the terrain of a thrust in terms of consumer economics, but they are destined to break with it on the level of labor and democracy. And at this point, it seeks to make a compromise with bureaucracy -- which in turn is unstable -- in a spiral which sees the authoritarian element become increasingly tied to the ideology of productivity. In the final analysis, is it not analogous to the logic which led to the failure of reformist solutions in the West?

An opposite alternative had been proposed in the Czechoslovak experience itself: that based on the workers and the progressive, radical wing of the intellectuals. From this came the explosion of participation and mass maturity, a natural hostility to privilege, and an unexpected capacity for redevelopment of ideas and for self-organization. If the "new course" had been given the possibility of developing, there would have grown within it an advanced class dialectic; that explosion of democracy, of need for power, of self-examination and of its particular aims, could not have been channeled once again into the painful framework of technocratic socialism. It demanded a different type of development in which participation and equality were the springs for technical-productive progress. This was the common element, which, beyond evident deformities deriving from the totally different historical condition, could unite the Prague spring with the principles of the cultural revolution in China: two kinds of resistance, two forms of contestation -- certainly partial but extraordinarily promising -- aimed against the stabilization of world balances of power, against political and social privilege, and founded on mass mobilization and initiative. But we must not make things simpler than they are; exchange possibilities with reality. The alternative of which we speak in the European socialist societies is far from being immediately accessible. Not only because it is suffocated, but because its objective roots are still weak, because of its theoretical shoring which lacks a point of international reference. The working class of these nations expresses, for example, a position which is still contradictory: pressed by elementary needs and aware of the possibility of satisfying them, it continues to be profoundly sensitive to suggestions concerning a better way of life; not does it intend, correctly, to give up the gains made on the terrain of full employment and labor organization. On the political plane, it does not trust revolutionary phraseology and demagogic egalitarianism which too often have served to mask privilege and exploitation. To believe that from it can spring, almost spontaneously and in effective conditions of secrecy, a new revolutionary dialogue as happened in the Chinese cultural revolution, is absurd. A "Mao's Thought" is lacking not only because there is no person who promotes such a radical process of rupture from above, but because the conditions for such a political possibility are lacking. For example, the plan, which is geared to many extremists in our country, that identifies freedom of expression and restoration of capitalism (almost as though socialism without censorship and without trials could become a more faded red) is sufficient to

wipe out any possibility of dialogue with the revolutionary forces of a nation such as Czechoslovakia. And the same holds true for projects involving a simplified anti-consumerism, or ascetic egalitarianism. The true problem of these societies, which have reached a certain stage of development, is the same as that which we in the West must use as a yardstick: a radical dialogue concerning equality, direct democracy, overcoming individualism and alienated labor, criticism of bourgeois science and technology. But this must be done in ways which are adequate to societies that are articulated, complex, rich in individuality, and able to employ in the process of man's emancipation all the patrimony of knowledge and ability accumulated in centuries of development. The problem is the same; it is difficult for us, still more difficult for the east European nations.

But once it is clear to us that the expectation of a spontaneous, even if slow, maturation of a positive alternative within the socialist camp is destined to fail (as the hopes of an evolution placed in the hands of the leadership groups which emerged from the 20th Congress, or the growth of a technocratic socialism failed); once we are persuaded that when things are left to their natural course they cannot fail to worsen, the European proletariat cannot deny itself the responsibility of expressly aiding the formation of a leftist, revolutionary alternative within the socialist camp, before what is left of the opposition degenerates into a rightist line. It is already a race against time: the reception extended to Nixon in Romania should sound an alarm. On the other hand it is a responsibility which falls on the western proletariat because it is the only one, perhaps, which is able to develop and realize a socialist model in which there can be a reconciliation of the self-contradictions against which the revolutionary forces of other sectors of the world necessarily founder. Our solidarity against the military intervention appears therefore, as nothing more than a premise, and it is not by chance that it seems increasingly formal, repetitive, less convincing. So much so that when solidarity is no longer directed toward the communist party of an invaded nation, but to the masses which protest in the squares against the occupation force and against their own government, its nature changes. It must be based on a more solid terrain, otherwise in practice it loses its strength. From solidarity it becomes "preoccupation," from "preoccupation" it can become "neutrality." It is a question of measuring internationalism on a much more advanced and difficult terrain.

For the Resistance

The first point is the assumption of a clear position regarding political choices of the USSR leadership groups and those of the leaders of the other European socialist nations. It is no longer possible to count upon their self-correction; one is obliged to count upon their defeat and their substitution by and through the initiative of a new bloc of social forces directed by the working class, a socialist rebirth which would attack political structures and be able to really express the immense potential which emerged from the October Revolution. The cautious considerations from abroad, the general criticisms which do not explicitly state objectives, responsibilities, leadership, no longer represent anything but the segments of a "realism" which increasingly resembles a conspiracy of silence, which justifies status quo positions and discourages

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any opposition force as soon as it is born. So long as the Czechoslovak resistance is faced by -- in the international field -- the alternative between the sympathies of the anticommunists and the prudent, "realistic" camouflages of the present leaders, there will be nothing left for it but isolation and introversion.

But even this is a preliminary point. The western proletariat has only one way to become a world point of reference, a phase of active and effective internationalism: that of carrying forward its own revolution; to be able to propose a different socialist model because it is developing it. The debate concerning Czechoslovakia thus takes us to Italy. With a new awareness, and that is, that if the crisis which has opened today in the west should once more end with a defeat or a stalemate, we would have to suffer the consequences of a serious reverse on the international revolutionary front. There is a perfect coherence between those who forgive the Brezhnev policies and those in our country who urge a line of compromise. If in the west the communists join the governments in power, we can expect nothing but a conservative freeze in socialist societies. It would be the internationalization of renunciation.

Appeal to Brother Parties

The 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party addresses the communist and workers' parties of all nations with this urgent appeal:

The principle of sovereignty and national independence represents the fundamental premise of any specific road to socialism. But the blind act of some groups of bureaucratized leaders, who substitute theoretical argumentation in debate on the conception of socialism with the brute force of cannons and tanks, tramples underfoot all the basic principles of Marxism and internationalism. The hegemonic and great-power tendencies, barely hidden behind concern over the internal Czechoslovak situation and the struggle against the ghosts invented by the counterrevolution threaten to compromise Marxism and socialism for an entire historical period. Therefore, in publicly condemning the brutal and cynical military intervention before the judgment of the working class and the labor masses whose interests you represent, you will be acting in your most direct interests in addition to our interests. Promote our just cause and express your opinion energetically to the leaders of those parties, who in regard to the military intervention, try to halt the rebirth of socialism in Czechoslovakia and to restore the rule of Stalinism.

In this situation we invite you all to refuse to attend the Conference of Communist and Working Parties scheduled to be held this autumn in Moscow, and to consider whether, by continuing the policy already begun, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of other parties of interventionist nations should be included for the future among the Marxist revolutionary parties.

* * *

This appeal was approved by the 14th (Clandestine) Extraordinary Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was not made public in order to avoid compromising the position of the Czechoslovak leaders while they were being led to the "negotiating" table at Moscow.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
3/4 September-October 1969

BERICHT AUS PRAG

Husak und die Folgen

CPYRGHT

Es geht längst nicht mehr darum, ob man für oder gegen die Intervention vom 21. August 1968 ist. Heute lautet die Frage anders: können wir uns mit den Folgen abfinden? Nach den Ereignissen der Augusttage 1969 kann niemand mehr behaupten, die im April durch massiven sowjetischen Druck eingesetzte Parteiführung unter D. Gustav Husak wolle das Land zur progressiven Nachjännerentwicklung des Vorjahres zurückführen. Kann etwas diese aufreizende Unwahrheit stärker widerlegen als die Tatsache, daß nahezu alle Initiatoren und Autoren des Aktionsprogramms der KPTsch entweder ihrer Funktionen enthoben und aus der Partei ausgestoßen sind oder daß Ausschlußverfahren gegen sie laufen?

Gustav Husak hat im April, als er Alexander Dubcek ablöste, eine echte Konsolidierung versprochen. Durch „energische politische Aufklärung“, verbunden mit einer Säuberung der Partei von „antisozialistischen Elementen“ sollte die politische Krise überwunden werden.

Kaum ein halbes Jahr später zeigt sich, daß sein Regime die Krise noch verschärft, die Kommunistische Partei von der Arbeiterklasse isoliert und das Land an eine ökonomische und allgemeine Katastrophe herangeführt hat. Über die Arbeiterklasse hinaus nehmen weite Kreise der Bevölkerung und vor allem die Jugend eine Haltung passiver Resistenz ein und setzen in verschiedenen spezifisch traditionell tschechoslowakischen Formen Akte, die ihrer Ablehnung des Führungswechsels und der Umwandlung des souveränen sozialistischen Staates in ein Protektorat der UdSSR Ausdruck geben. Das ist die Realität der CSSR von 1969.

Während offiziell von einer Normalisierung und dem Sieg der Politik Gustav Husaks gesprochen wird, schätzt man in Wirklichkeit die Situation viel nüchterner ein. Die Prager Kreisleitung der Partei stellte in einer vor der Öffentlichkeit geheim gehaltenen internen Einschätzung wörtlich fest: „Die Beschlüsse des Z.K. und der Kreis- und Stadtleitung finden kein entsprechendes Echo in den Grundorganisationen, die sie – in ihrer Mehrheit – passiv zur Kenntnis nehmen, ohne für ihre Realisierung zu sorgen. Viele Organisationen auf den Sektoren der Wissenschaft, Technik, Forschung, des Schulwesens, aber auch in den Betrieben haben die Beschlüsse des Maiplenums entweder überhaupt nicht angenommen, oder mit Vorbehalt, die nur ihre Mißbilligung der heutigen Linie der Partei oder ihrer Führung zum Ausdruck bringen. In den Stellungnahmen der Betriebsorganisationen herrschen weiterhin emotionelle, nationalistische und anarchistische Tendenzen vor. Besonders schwach erweist sich die Führung der Partei aber in ihrem Verhältnis zur Gewerkschaft und zur Jugend“.

Innerhalb der Partei macht man kein Hehl aus dieser Lage. So schätzte der Sekretär für die böhmischen Länder, Lubomir Strougal, in einer Sitzung des Präsidiums der Partei anfangs September die Zahl der Mitglieder, die den Beschluß des April- und Maiplenums zustimmen, auf 300.000 (von 1,5 Millionen) und vertrat die Ansicht, daß sich die Partei mindestens von 500.000 Mitgliedern, die „unter dem Einfluß antisozialistischer und revisionistischer Kräfte stehen“ über kurz oder lang wird trennen müssen, um umgestört an der Gewinnung der anderen Mitglieder arbeiten zu können. Er gab deren Zahl mit 700.000 an, räumte jedoch ein, daß heute nur 18 Prozent den statutarisch für sie vorgesehenen Beitrag leisten, während 82 Prozent nur den Minimalbeitrag abliefern, um vorläufig die Mitgliedschaft aufrechtzuerhalten. 80 Prozent der Grundorganisationen halten laut Strougal nach wie vor die Parteibeschlüsse gegen den Einmarsch – eben jene Beschlüsse, die heute von der Parteiführung widerrufen werden – für richtig.

Charakteristisch für den Prozeß der Desintegration und Isolierung der Parteispitze ist die Demission von drei Vierteln der Leitungsmitglieder der Betriebsorganisation der Skoda-Werke von Pilsen und von 13 der insgesamt 16 Betriebsräte. Es werden, ebenso wie in zahlreichen ähnlichen Fällen, keine Neuwahlen zugelassen. Die zurückgetretenen Betriebsräte werden durch Kandidaten der vorigen Wahl ersetzt, die die geringste Stimmenzahl erhalten haben. Solche Praktiken führen zu den grotesksten Situationen, etwa daß – laut „Večerna Praha“ – Mitgliedern der korporativ zurückgetretenen Bezirksleitung von Prag VI., die aus der Partei austraten, erklärt wurde, es werde zuerst ein Parteiverfahren gegen sie eingeleitet, bevor ihr Austritt zur Kenntnis genommen wird.

Es würde den Rahmen dieses Reports sprengen, wollte man eine Gesamtübersicht über den Stand der Säuberung der Partei und der Staatsorgane geben. Sie hat auch in den wissenschaftlichen Institutionen bereits eingesetzt: mit dem Ausschluß der bekannten Professoren Machovec, Černý und Luboš Kohout von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Karls-Universität, mit dem Ausschluß zahlreicher Professoren von der Militärakademie und mit Verboten und Konfiskationen von Zeitschriften der Sozialistischen Akademie, „Dejní a Současnost“ (Geschichte und Gegenwart) und „Mezinárodní Politika“ (Internationale Politik).

Innerhalb dieser allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen Krise treten scharf die Versorgungsschwierigkeiten und das stetige Absinken der Arbeitsproduktivität in allen Zweigen der Wirtschaft hervor. Die allgemeine Arbeitsunlust hat ihre psychologische Wurzel darin, daß man einfach nicht daran denkt, sich mit der sowjetischen Beset-

zung abzufinden. Die offizielle Presse gibt zwischen den Zeilen diesen Zustand zu: sie polemisiert gegen die in allen Betrieben kursierenden Losungen „Wozu für die Russen arbeiten?“, „Je ärger desto besser“ (Pruboj, Nordböhmen); oder sie schreibt offen, daß viele Arbeiter zwar „den Streikaufrufen für den 21. August nicht gefolgt sind, aber nur so getan haben, als würden sie arbeiten“ (Rude Pravo). Das Ausnahmegesetz, das bereits dazu benützt wurde, gegen 2.400 Personen Gerichtsverfahren einzuleiten, hat lediglich dazu beigetragen, solche Stimmungen zu verstärken.

Zu all dem kommen die Reibungen innerhalb der Führungsspitze hinzu, es geht dabei unter anderem um die Frage, welchen Umfang und welches Tempo die weiteren Säuberungen und Einschränkungen der Rechte und Freiheiten, die noch aus der Nach-Jänner-Periode erhalten blieben, annehmen sollen. Vorläufig handelt es sich um die Entfernung einer größeren Anzahl aus dem Z.K. Das Schicksal Smrkovskys ist bereits entschieden, ob auch Dubceks Kopf fällt, ist zur Zeit noch offen; seine totale Entfernung aus dem politischen Leben wird wohl weniger spektakulär vor sich gehen. Damit steht aber ohnedies fest, daß außer Gustav Husak und Černík nahezu alle wichtigen Männer des Prager Frühlings der Ausschlußmaschinerie zum Opfer gefallen sind.

Die Husak-Politik hat jedoch nicht nur das Vertrauen der Massen zur Partei (in jüngster Zeit auch in zunehmendem Maße in der Slowakei) systematisch zerstört, sie hat als Resultat auch die Verstärkung antikommunistischer Stimmungen und die heute tatsächlich vor sich gehende Herausbildung antikommunistischer Gruppierungen zu verzeichnen. Mit dieser Gefahr, die es vor der sowjetischen Intervention nur in sehr geringem Maße gegeben hat, muß man heute ernsthaft rechnen. Je länger dieses Regime aufrechterhalten wird, desto größer wird sie.

Kann man sich eine Lösung aller dieser Widersprüche in der gegebenen Situation vorstellen? Kaum. Niemand hier hegt große Hoffnungen. Und eine Hoffnung hat sich als falsch erwiesen: die Solidarität der Kommunistischen Weltbewegung ist ausgeblieben. Auf die Frage ausländischer Kommunisten, was man von ihnen erwartet, weiß man bei uns nur eine Antwort: daß sie die schlichte Wahrheit über unsere Verhältnisse sagen und schreiben sollen; über die Tatsache, daß wir in einem sowjetischen Protektorat leben und daß, was seit dem 21. August 1968 geschah und weiter geschieht, dem Internationalismus und dem Selbstbestimmungsrecht der CSSR widerspricht.

Prag, den 11. September 1969

WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
3/4 September/October 1969

REPORT FROM PRAGUE

CPYRGHT

Husak and the Consequences

The issue has long ceased to be whether one is for or against the intervention of 21 August 1968. Today the question is different: can we come to terms with the consequences? After the events of the 1969 August days, no one could say anymore that the party leadership, placed in office under D. Gustav Husak due to massive Soviet pressure, wants to lead the country back to the progressive post-January development of last year. Is there anything that can more strongly refute this provocative untruth than the fact that almost all of the initiators and authors of the Czechoslovak CP action program have either been relieved of their office and have been expelled from the party or that expulsion proceedings are underway against them?

When he took Alexander Dubcek's place in April, Gustav Husak promised a genuine consolidation. The political crisis was to be overcome through "energetic political enlightenment," combined with a purge of "antisocialist elements" from the party.

Barely half a year later it turned out that his regime had isolated the CP from the working class even more and that it had led the country to an economic and a general disaster. Above and beyond the working class, broad population circles and especially the younger generation are adopting an attitude of passive resistance and are taking action -- in various, specifically Czechoslovak forms -- expressing their rejection of the leadership change and the conversion of the sovereign socialist state into a protectorate of the USSR. That is the situation such as it really prevails in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1969.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

Officially, there is talk of normalization and a victory of Gustav Husak's policy; but in reality, the situation estimate is much more sober. The Prague Kreis directorate of the party made the following statement in an internal situation estimate which was kept secret from the public:

"the resolutions of the Central Committee and of the Kreis and city directorate are not correspondingly echoed in the base organizations which, in their majority, passively take cognizance of these resolutions without seeing to their implementation. Many organizations in the sectors of science, technology, research, and the education system, but also in the enterprises, have either not accepted the resolutions of the May Plenum at all or they have accepted them with reservations which only express their disapproval of the present line of the party or its leadership... The comments by the enterprise organizations continue to be heavily overshadowed by emotional, nationalistic, and anarchistic tendencies. But the party leadership is proving to be particularly weak in terms of its relationship with the labor unions and the younger generation..."

This is no secret inside the party. For instance, Lubomir Strougal, secretary for the Bohemian states -- addressing a session of the presidium of the party early in September -- estimated the number of members who approved the resolution of the April and May plenum at 300,000 (out of 1.5 million) and expressed the view that the party would sooner or later have to part company with at least 500,000 members who "are under the influence of antisocialist and revisionist forces," in order to be able to work undisturbed on the recruiting of other members. He gave a figure of 700,000 for these other members but allowed that today only 18 percent are paying the dues prescribed for in the statutes, while 82 percent are turning in only the minimum contribution in order to maintain their membership on a temporary basis; 80 percent of the base organizations, according to Strougal, still believe that the party's resolutions against the invasion -- even those resolutions which the party leadership is revoking today -- are correct.

The process of disintegration and isolation of the party summit is characterized by the resignation of three-quarters of the directorate members of the enterprise organization of the Skoda Works in Pilsen and of 13 out of the total 16 enterprise council members. As in numerous cases, no new elections are allowed. The enterprise council members who resigned are being replaced by candidates who ran during the prior elections and who received the smallest number of votes. Such practices lead to the most grotesque situations, such as the situation in which -- according to Vecerna Praha -- members of the Bezirk directorate of Prague VI [6th district], who resigned from the party in a body and who also dropped their party membership, were informed that party proceedings would be instituted against them, before their resignation could be acknowledged.

It is not the purpose of this report to present an overall survey as to the status of the purge in the party and the government agencies. This purge has already started also in the scientific institutions: with the expulsion of the well-known professors Machovec, Cerny, and Lubos Kohout from the Department of Philosophy of Charles University; with the expulsion of numerous professors from the military academy and with bans

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on and confiscations of periodicals of the socialist academy, Dejeni a Soucasnost (History and Present) and Mezinarodni Politika (International Policy).

Supply difficulties and the constant drop in labor productivity in all branches of the economy stand out heavily within this general social crisis. The general dislike for work has its psychological root in the fact that no one has the slightest intention of simply and quietly accepting the Soviet occupation. The government press admits this situation, if we read between the lines: It argues forcefully against the slogans which are widespread in all enterprises, such as "why work for the Russians?" "The worse the better" (Prubo!, Northern Bohemia); or it openly writes that many workers to be sure "did not follow the 21 August strike call but only did as if they were working on that day" (Rude Pravo). The state of emergency law, which has already been used to institute legal proceedings against 2,400 persons, merely helped bolster such moods.

In addition to all this there is the friction within the top leadership; this, among other things, involves the question as to what scope and what tempo the further purges and restrictions of rights and freedoms, which are still left from the post-January period, are to assume. For the time being, this involves the removal of a larger number of people from the Central Committee. Smrkovsky's fate has already been decided; whether Dubcek's head is also to roll, that is a question which is as yet unanswered; his total removal from political life will probably take place in a less spectacular fashion. But this means that there is one thing that is certain now: except for Gustav Husak and Cernik, almost all important men of the Prague Spring have fallen victim to the expulsion machinery.

Husak's policy however has not only systematically destroyed the confidence of the masses in the party (and most recently also to an increasing extent in Slovakia); it has also further strengthened the anticommunist mood and the present development of anticommunist groupings which are today indeed shaping up. One must today seriously reckon with this threat which existed only to a very small extent prior to Soviet intervention. The longer this regime is maintained, the greater will this threat become.

Can one visualize a resolution of all of these contradictions in the present situation? Hardly. No one here has any great hope. And there is one hope which proved to be false: the solidarity of the International Communist Movement failed to materialize. In response to the questions on foreign communism and what is expected of them, there is only one answer forthcoming at our end so far: they should say and write the simple truth about our conditions; about the fact that we live in a Soviet protectorate and that everything that happened since 21 August 1968 and continues to happen is in contradiction to internationalism and the selfdetermination right of Czechoslovakia.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 November 1969

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SOVIET IS SCORED BY BRITAIN'S REDS

Party at Congress Assails
Czechoslovak Invasion

Rejecting strong pressures to support the Soviet Union, the delegates voted 295 to 118 to endorse the denunciation issued by the party's Executive Committee shortly after the invasion in August, 1968. The committee had declared that the intervention was unjustified and "a gross violation of the democratic rights of the Czechoslovak Communists.

countries for "the fraternal assistance" given to Czechoslovakia on the day of the invasion.

No Vote on Amendments

In an effort to avoid an open split, party leaders decided to allow no votes on amendments, but only on the question of whether the delegates backed the committee's statement of condemnation.

International Department, who said, "We can never accept the right of any party or socialist state to intervene in the affairs of another in this way."

A supporter of the invasion, R. Palme Dutt, charged that the party leadership had erred and he urged the delegates to "wipe out this stain from our record."

After losing 2,000 members since the invasion, the British party now stands at about 31,000. Its postwar peak was about 45,000, but many members resigned after a party congress in 1957 endorsed the use of Soviet tanks to crush the Hungarian uprising the year before.

Special to The New York Times
LONDON, Nov. 16 — The British Communist party, holding its first congress since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, agreed today to denounce the action as a "tragic error."

Many British Communists urged that the congress, which is held every two years, override the party leaders and applaud the invasion. One amendment, proposed today, urged the party to give its fullest support to the Warsaw Pact

For four hours this afternoon, at the meeting in Camden Town Hall in London, the party debated the invasion as if it had happened yesterday. The tone for the opponents of the invasion was set by Jack Woddis, head of the party's In-

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LE MONDE, Paris
9 October 1969

CPYRGHT

Scission au sein du Parti du travail (communiste)

(De notre corresp. particulier.)

Berne. — Les divergences qui existaient depuis quelque temps déjà entre certains éléments gauchistes et la direction du parti suisse du travail (communiste) viennent d'éclater au grand jour. Le mois dernier, le quotidien communiste *Voix ouvrière* avait fait état, pour la première fois, d'une « crise interne » provoquée au sein de la section vaudoise du parti « par l'activité fractionnelle d'un groupe agitant des théories trotskystes ».

Un congrès extraordinaire des militants du canton de Vaud, auquel assistait M. Jean Vincent, secrétaire général du parti du travail et député au Parlement helvétique, avait décidé l'expulsion des cinq principaux animateurs de cette tendance, dont un conseiller communal de Lausanne. Il y a une semaine, l'un des deux députés communistes au Parlement du canton de Zurich était à son tour exclu pour des raisons analogues. Il était en même temps relevé de toutes ses fonctions, y compris celles de rédac-

teur de l'organe en langue allemande du parti. Cette exclusion a entraîné la dissolution à Zurich d'une section de la Jeunesse du parti ainsi que la démission de l'un des principaux théoriciens communistes de Suisse allemande, M. Konrad Farner, déjà écarté l'année dernière du comité central.

Une centaine de militants récemment exclus ou démissionnaires se sont réunis dimanche dernier à Zurich pour consacrer la rupture définitive avec le parti du travail. Ils ont décidé de coor-

donner leur action avec d'autres organisations en vue de constituer, à long terme, une nouvelle organisation révolutionnaire en Suisse. Les éléments dissidents du parti du travail reprochent à celui-ci de faire passer les intérêts électoraux avant toute autre considération et de s'aligner trop inconditionnellement sur les positions soviétiques. Les communistes suisses sont représentés par cinq députés au Parlement de la Confédération, qui compte deux cents membres.

J.-O. F.

LE MONDE, Paris
9 October 1969

CPYRGHT DISSIDENT FACTION BREAKS WITH SWISS LABOR PARTY

Bern. The disagreements which have existed for some time now between certain leftist members and the leadership of the Swiss Labor Party (communist) have just exploded on the surface. Last month, the communist daily *Voix ouvrière*, commented for the first time on an "internal crisis," created within the Vaud section of the party "by the factionist activity of a group promoting Trotskyite theories."

A special congress of the members in the canton of Vaud attended by Mr. Jean Vincent, secretary general of the Labor Party and Swiss parliament deputy, voted to expel the five key

activists in this movement, including a Lausanne municipal councillor. A week ago, one of the two communist parliamentary deputies from the canton of Zurich was in turn expelled for similar reasons. He was simultaneously relieved of all his duties, including his responsibilities as editor of the German language organ of the party. This expulsion brought about the dissolution of a section of the party youth organization in Zurich, as well as the resignation of one of the leading communist theoreticians in German Switzerland, Mr. Konrad Farner, who had been removed from the Central Committee last year.

About one hundred members who were recently expelled or who resigned met last Sunday in Zurich to decide upon a definitive break with the Labor Party. They voted to coordinate their activities with other organizations with a view to establishing, in the long range, a new revolutionary organization in Switzerland. The Labor Party dissidents charge that it has given priority to electoral interests above all other considerations and that it is too subserviently pledged to the Soviet positions. The Swiss communists are represented by five deputies in the parliament of the confederation, which has 200 members.

RUDE PRAVO, Prague
29 October 1969

(Original translation follows)

JOINT CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

CPYRGHT

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Soviet Government, a Czechoslovak Communist Party and state delegation was in the Soviet Union from Oct 20 to Oct 28, 1969, on an official friendly visit. The delegation consisted of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Gustav Husak, head of the delegation; member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Ludvik Svoboda; member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and Premier of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Oldrich Cernik; member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Lubomir Strougal; member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Vasil Bilak; member of the Communist Party Central Committee Presidium and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Stefan Sadvsky; member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade Frantisek Hamouz; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Marko; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of National Defense Colonel-General Martin Dzur; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Czechoslovak Ambassador to the Soviet Union Vladimir Koucky.

The Czechoslovak comrades made trips to Volgograd and Kiev, visited a number of industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, and scientific, cultural and educational institutions. Everywhere

they met with warm reception and fraternal hospitality. The Soviet people extended a cordial welcome to the Czechoslovak party and state delegation, expressed warm feelings of friendship for the Czechoslovak people, and wished successes to the Czechoslovak working people in the construction of socialism.

The leading officials of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Gustav Husak, member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Ludvik Svoboda, member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and Premier Oldrich Cernik, and other Czechoslovak comrades, together with Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A.N. Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, A.A. Grechko, minister of defence, and other Soviet official personalities visited the Cosmodrome where they were shown various kinds of space and military equipment, and witnessed the launching of rockets.

During its stay in Moscow, the party and state delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had talks with a party and state delegation of the Soviet Union, whose members were: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, head of the delegation; member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgorny; member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin; member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee A.P. Kirilenko; Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee K.F. Katushev; member of the Communist Party Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Commission N.K. Baybakov; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers M.A. Lesechko; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Trade N.S. Patolichev; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia S.V. Chervonenko. "The talks were held in an atmosphere of comradeship and brotherhood, and in a spirit of mutual trust and respect, sincerity and cordiality."

The talks have confirmed absolute unity of views on the further ways of all-round development of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are fraternal countries linked together by relationship of historical development, the same social system, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the same aims and interests in the fight for peace and social progress, for communist future of their nations. The Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship was sealed by blood shed together on battlefields. It is developing on the basis of ideas of the Great October, illustrious traditions of the common revolutionary fight against capitalism, anti-fascist war of liberation and creative constructive work in the building of socialism and communism. It has survived grave tests and proved its indomitable viability.

The Czechoslovak-Soviet relations are firmly based on confidence, mutual comradely help and support, active internationalist solidarity equality of rights, independence, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect of the sovereignty, inseparably linked with common concern for the further strengthening of socialism. The fraternal relationship represents one of the most useful values for both parties and for the nations of both countries, and is an important factor in their common work and common fight.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

Questions of the development of socialist economy and economic cooperation of both countries had a prominent place in the talks. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union try to make use, to the full degree, of all objective advantages provided by the planned management of the economy, linking central management and a broad initiative of enterprises and working collectives. They attach great importance to a consistent carrying out of measures aimed at improving the structure of the economy, the system of planning, management, and economic methods. An extensive exchange of experience obtained from the practical application of the economic policies of fraternal countries contributes towards increasing the effectiveness of the economic management.

The economic and scientific-technical cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is beneficial for the development of the national economy, helps with the solving of the most important tasks in the building of socialism and communism, and serves vital interests of the nations of both countries. In comparison with 1960, the present volume of the mutual exchange of goods has (?grown) 1.8 times greater. Of this, mutual supplies of machinery and equipment have increased 2.3 times.

Concrete questions relating to the coordination of national economy plans for the period up to 1975 reviewed.

Complying with the wish of the Czechoslovak side, the Soviet Union will increase, over the volume envisaged earlier, its supplies of crude oil, pig iron, cotton and several other important raw materials for Czechoslovak industry, as well as of the equipment which Czechoslovakia urgently needs. Preconditions are being created for the further, substantial growth of trade in the next 5-year period, on the (?basis) of mutual advantageousness.

The Soviet side has agreed that it will make additional supplies in 1970 of durable goods, and will assist Czechoslovakia in purchasing certain kinds of goods which are at present in short supply in Czechoslovakia on foreign markets.

"The two sides state that in the present conditions, specialization and cooperation are acquiring greater and greater importance in the mutual economic relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, first of all, in machine-building, power industry, chemistry, electronics as well as in the production of consumer goods. This promotes a creation of favourable conditions for progressive changes in the pattern of the national economy, a development of process of socialist economic integration both between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and as within the framework of the socialist community."]

An agreement has been reached on the development of cooperation in the sphere of nuclear power engineering. The Soviet Union will provide Czechoslovakia with scientific and technical aid, and supply necessary equipment for the construction of large-capacity atomic power plants in Czechoslovakia.

The sides have agreed that they will develop--on a long-term basis--broad cooperation in the production of equipment for atomic power stations and in the production of computers. The help of the Soviet Union in the construction of the metro (underground rapid transit system) in Prague will be substantially increased, which will speed up the construction. Possibilities of close cooperation in the development of production of lorries in Czechoslovakia will be jointly reviewed.

An important result of broader economic cooperation will be fuller and more effective use of engineering production capacities in Czechoslovakia by Soviet orders for supplies of machinery and equipment.

In order to ensure rational utilization of the scientific-technological base and the scientific cadres of both countries, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will concentrate their efforts, according to plans, on joint solving of certain scientific and technical problems of considerable interest for the national economy.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

The Czechoslovak side has noted that the economic and scientific-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union, which is permanently the biggest and reliable economic partner of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, creates to a decisive degree long term, stable preconditions for an optimal development of the Czechoslovak national economy.

In the present stage, both sides regard it as the most important task of their cooperation to help speed up the introduction of the results of the scientific-technical revolution in all branches of the national economy, to increase the effectiveness of social production, and on this basis also the standard of living of the working people.

Necessary for achieving a higher standard of the economic and scientific-technical cooperation is continuous care of party and state organs for extension and improvement of planning activities, including mutual consultations on economic policies and coordination of national economy plans. The participants in the talks have come to the conclusion that the work of planning, economic and foreign trade organizations of both countries, and of the inter-governmental Czechoslovak-Soviet commission for economic and scientific-technical cooperation must be orientated towards ensuring the further fast development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation and socialist economic integration of fraternal countries.

The (two) sides have agreed to further extend and deepen cooperation between state organs and social organizations, and to develop friendly contacts among regions, towns and districts, among collectives of Czechoslovak and Soviet enterprises, agricultural cooperatives and institutions. The important positive role was appreciated which was and is being played by the Union of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship and the Society of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship for the strengthening and development of fraternal relations between the nations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the USSR.

Both sides ascribe great importance to the strengthening of friendship and close cooperation of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries. In accord with this, there will be intensification of cooperation and friendships between units of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Both sides will promote further development of cooperation and broaden contacts in the spheres of science, culture, the arts, education, film, the press, radio and television, in health service, sports and tourism. The expansion of direct contacts between Czechoslovak and Soviet working people is an important factor for the further strengthening of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and the education of the masses in the spirit of internationalism.

Proceeding from historical experience, the Czechoslovak side stressed that the strengthening of the friendship with the Soviet Union is an inseparable part of the socialist patriotism of the nations of Czechoslovakia. The party and state delegations of both countries declare that Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are unswervingly determined to strengthen their fraternal alliance, and to contribute in all possible ways towards the cohesion of the whole socialist community and to a growth of its strength and power.

During the talks, information was exchanged on questions of party and state life in both countries.

The Soviet leading representatives spoke about the efforts of the nations of the Soviet Union, aimed at implementing the nearest and perspective plans of communist construction, at ensuring economic prosperity, and advancement in science and culture. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is devoting in its work great attention to the education of the working people in the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist ideology which enriches the intellectual world of man, and gives the builders of a new society inexhaustible strength.

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Czechoslovak leading representatives informed in Soviet delegation how the line is being implemented which was worked out at plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April, May, and September this year, and whose aim is to strengthen the leading role of the party, to bring to the end the struggle against rightist opportunism, to strengthen socialist social relations, to improve socialist democracy, to apply Marxist-Leninist principles in nationality policy, to remove difficulties in the economy and to achieve higher standard of living of the people. This line is an expression of the struggle for a victory of Marxist-Leninist principles, and for surmounting the deformations and mistakes of the past development. It is aimed at developing positive aspects of the resolutions adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in January 1968.

The Soviet delegation expressed full understanding and support for this political line of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Both sides are of the same view that the lesson from the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969 are proof of continuous attempts of imperialism to obstruct socialist community, to weaken relations between its individual links, and to drive a wedge into the socialist system.

The lessons drawn from the Czechoslovak events reveal the strategy and tactics of the enemies of socialism, their attempts to make use of the difficulties and certain unresolved urgent problems in order to undermine the leading role of the Communist Party and to shake the foundations of socialist society.

The activity of the antisocialist and counterrevolutionary forces is all the more dangerous, the deeper the expressions of revisionism in theory and of opportunism in political practice.

The Czechoslovak comrades stressed that in consequence of the activities of rightist-opportunist forces in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, various petit bourgeois and anarchist tendencies grew in the political and economic life of the country.

An energetic fight was organized neither against these tendencies nor against the antisocialist counterrevolutionary forces which were making an active use of the situation which had arisen. By the joining of the rightist-opportunist, revisionist stream and the internal antisocialist forces which had striven, with the support of the imperialist reaction, to disintegrate the Communist Party and the socialist state, to destroy the class alliance of Czechoslovakia with the socialist countries, a real danger had arisen of a power-political reversal, and a direct threat to the socialist social system in Czechoslovakia. All this seriously harmed the interests of the nations of Czechoslovakia, its socialist allies and the cause of socialism all over the world.

In accord with the conclusions of the September plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and with the decisions of the highest Czechoslovak legislative and government organs, the Czechoslovak delegation appreciates the action of the five fraternal socialist countries in the critical August days of 1968 as an act of internationalist solidarity which helped block the way to antisocialist, counterrevolutionary forces.

The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have identical class concept of the sovereignty of a socialist state as an expression of the power of the working class and all working people.

Both delegations proceed from the principle that the class concept of sovereignty includes both the inalienable right of every socialist state and of every communist

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party to determine the forms and methods of socialist construction, as well as the prime duty to protect the power of the working class and all working people, and their revolutionary socialist achievements. In this sense, every communist party accounts for its activity to the people of its country, and bears internationalist responsibility towards the countries of the socialist community and the international communist and workers movement.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union regard, in absolute accord with the Bratislava Declaration, the protection, support, and strengthening of socialist achievements which had been won by heroic efforts and selfless work of the people of every country, as common internationalist duty of all fraternal countries. They express firm determination to oppose--together with all fraternal countries--the counterrevolutionary designs of imperialism and all the other reactionary forces, in the interest of peaceful, creative work of nations.

On the basis of historical experience from the fight against the German imperialism and fascism, the Czechoslovak people have been clearly convinced of the importance of the safeguarding of Czechoslovakia's western borders for the national existence and state sovereignty. The nations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are aware that these borders are also an advanced western outpost of the whole socialist community, and that their strength is one of the key factors for the preservation of peace and security in Europe. In this sense, the treaty on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia is of fundamental importance.

The party and state delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic declared that it considers all-round cooperation and close alliance of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the fight against the common enemy--imperialism--to be a guarantee of the genuine sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, to be a guarantee of its national security and socialist development.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union pursue in international questions a coordinated line, whose purpose is to ensure favourable conditions for the building of socialism and communism, fight for peace and freedom of nations, against the aggressive policy of imperialism.

Both sides consider it to be their greatest duty to help strengthen the cohesion of the countries of the socialist community, and contribute to the deepening and improving their cooperation both on multilateral and on bilateral basis. In future, they will continue to devote undiminished attention to the stepping up of the defence ability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which ties the main aggressive forces of imperialism and which has at his disposal all means necessary for waging a resolute fight against any designs of imperialist aggressors.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will consistently implement the resolutions of the 23d extraordinary session of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, aimed at developing further the socialist integration as an objective necessity for economic advancement and for increasing the effectiveness of social production in both countries and in the whole socialist community.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of USSR are striving to achieve unity of the countries of the world socialist system on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, and condemn any activity aimed at causing a split among the socialist countries, or at creating mistrust in their mutual relations. The weakening of the contacts and cooperation between the socialist countries plays into the hand of imperialism.

Against the aggressive doctrine of imperialism, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, have formulated a constructive peace program

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which is based on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different international questions through negotiations, at the solving of the problems of disarmament by stages, and at the development of a broad cooperation on the basis of equal rights.

The delegations affirmed their determination to continue their support to the just struggle of the Vietnamese people against the continuing aggression of the United States and for freedom and right to independence life. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are convinced that the bravery and heroism of the Vietnamese patriots and a broad international support of their fight will lead to a deeper international isolation of the aggressors, and will force them to halt the imperialist intervention against the Vietnamese people.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union express solidarity with the fight of the Arab nations against Israeli aggression, supported by the imperialist circles of Europe and America. They insist on the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories of the Arab countries, on a just settlement of the conflict in the Near and Middle East on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will grant all-round support to the fight of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for national liberation, political and economic independence, and to develop with them mutually beneficial contacts and grant them aid.

In their peaceful policy, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider the ensurance of European security to be of great importance. The extensive social and political changes in the past 20 years-- the victory of socialism in many European countries and their unification in the socialist community, the establishment of the first German state of workers and farmers--all that decisively strengthened the forces of peace and democracy in Europe.

At the same time, however, factors which complicate international relations and increase tension continue to affect Europe. A serious danger is the activity of the aggressive NATO--a support to all reactionary forces on the European continent and the center of international complications. NATO fulfills the role of a collective instrument of the anti-communist policy of imperialism.

The dangerous tension in Europe is created by the attitude of reactionary forces, especially of the neo-Nazi forces in West Germany, which bet on the revision of the result of the Second World War.

The criterion of the sincerity of the declared peaceful intentions of the West German Government policy and the essential prerequisite for ensuring permanent peace in Europe can be a realistic attitude of the new German Government towards such just demands as the recognition of the permanency of the present European borders, international recognition of the socialist German state--the German Democratic Republic, a giving up the West German claims to act "on behalf of all Germans," designs against the independent political units--West Berlin, and demands of nuclear weapons, and an unconditional recognition of the invalidity of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning by the West German Government.

Permanent peace in Europe can be ensured by creating a system of collective security.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will actively assist in preparing and realizing an all-European conference, suggested in the Budapest Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member-states. The two countries believe that realistic conditions now exist for holding this conference. The positive response of the absolute majority of European states to the convening of an all-European conference increases the hopes of nations for the strengthening of peace.

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union highly value in this connection the initiative of the Finnish Government, which assists the preparations and convening of a conference of all European states.

The two sides have voiced their firm conviction that a consistent peaceful policy of the socialist countries and active efforts of the nations of the whole world are able to strengthen international security and to remove the danger of war.

That the long-term experience in the fights and victory of the international workers class and experience gained in many difficult tests prove that socialism as a social system can win and be strengthened only under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party. Only a party armed with a scientific Marxist-Leninist concept of the road of social development is able to set a clear programme of the fight for communist ideals, to organize and unite the working people to realize them. To influence social development purposefully and systematically, to protect and develop the achievements of the socialist revolution.

The strength of the communist parties rests in their inseparable link with the working people, the revolutionary workers class, in their loyalty to their internationalist duties and in the creative implementation of the laws of scientific communism.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have a common concept of the roads and methods of the construction of socialism and communism.

The nations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and of other fraternal countries are constructing a new society, while being guided by the general laws of the development of socialism, which were discovered and formulated by the founders of scientific communism and further developed [in]--the programme documents of the international communist movement and the Marxist-Leninist parties.

The communist parties are enriching international experience of the construction of socialism by implementing these laws in the concrete conditions of their countries, in keeping with their progressive national traditions, specific national characteristics and the level of their social and economic development.

The Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider as one of their most important tasks to improve the ideological standard of communists, to form the communist world opinion, internationalist consciousness and the socialist patriotic feeling of all society members. The strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the defence and strengthening of socialist democracy are going on in a hard and sharp fight against anti-socialist opinions and conceptions, against bourgeois nationalism, rightist and "leftist" opportunism and revisionism in the communist movement.

In the present situation, when the enemies of communism are ever more resorting to ideological subversive activity against the communist parties and socialist countries, the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider it necessary to intensify ideological education and to face decisively all expressions of anticommunism.

An especially important instrument of the party and the socialist power in this sharp classical and ideological fight are the mass media of information, whose duty is to fight consistently for the implementation of the party's line, to serve loyally the working people and cause of socialism.

Experience shows that the interests of socialism are seriously impeded by a weak party directing of the mass media of information.

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The Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union declare their solidarity with the workers movement in the capitalist countries, they support the fight of the working people against nationalist and social oppression.

In keeping with the evaluations and conclusions of the international conference of communist and workers parties held in Moscow in June 1969, the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider it their duty to strengthen the fighting solidarity of communists of the whole world and to fight for the strengthening of the world anti-imperialist front. The strengthening of ideological cohesion and action unity of the communist parties on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism are considered by the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union to be the most important task, on the fulfillment of which depend all further successes in the fight for peace, democracy and socialism.

The Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider it important to develop party contacts at all levels: between the central committees of the parties, between regional, city and district committees, primary organizations, press bodies and ideological institutions. Close contacts between the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are the fundamental pillar of confidence and friendship in mutual relations between the two countries.

On the eve of the centenary of the birth of the great genius of proletarian revolution, V. I. Lenin, the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union voice their unswerving loyalty to his legacy and determination to implement consistently in their activity and in mutual contacts the Leninist principles of internationalism, to lead the nations of their countries to the victory of communism.

Maintaining loyalty to the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation, signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on December 12, 1943 in the period of the common fight against fascism and prolonged in November 1963, the two delegations unanimously decided, in the interest of further strengthening the friendship and fraternity of their nations, to sign on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Hitler occupiers a new treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, corresponding to the higher level of Czechoslovak-Soviet fraternal relations achieved in the postwar period.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak President and Czechoslovak Government, the party and state delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic conveyed to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR an invitation for a delegation of the Soviet Union to officially visit Czechoslovakia. The invitation was accepted with thanks.

The party and government delegations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union voice their deep satisfaction with the talks and absolute unity in opinions and standpoints of the parties evident during the meeting.

The extension of bilateral and multilateral political, military, economic and cultural cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union helps to strengthen the forces of world socialism and to make it more attractive.

The unity of the socialist countries serves the cause of the communist movement, freedom of nations peace, socialism and progress.

The communique is signed on behalf of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by Dr

Gustav Husak, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; Ludvik Svoboda, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; and Oldrich Cernik, premier of the Czechoslovak Federal Government.

On behalf of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the communique is signed by Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Nikolay Podgorny, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; and Aleksey Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Moscow, 27 October 1969.

CPYRGHT

RUDE PRAVO
29 October 1969

Společné čs.-sovětské prohlášení

CPYRGHT

Na pozvání ÚV KSSS, presidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR a sovětské vlády byla od 20. do 28. října 1969 v Sovětském svazu na oficiální přátelské návštěvě československá stranická a státní delegace v tomto složení: první tajemník ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa Gustav Husak, vedoucí delegace, člen předse-
dnictva ÚV KSČ a prezident Československé socialistické republiky Ludvík Svoboda, člen předse-
dnictva ÚV KSČ a předseda vlády Československé socialistické republiky Oldřich Černík, člen předse-
dnictva ÚV KSČ a tajemník ÚV KSČ Lubomír Štrougal, člen předse-
dnictva ÚV KSČ a první tajemník ÚV KS Sloveńska Štefan Sádovský, člen ÚV KSČ, místopředseda vlády ČSSR a ministr zahraničního obchodu ČSSR František Homouz, člen ÚV KSČ a ministr zahraničních věcí ČSSR Jozef Marko, člen ÚV KSČ a ministr národní obrany ČSSR generálplukovník Martin Dzúr, člen ÚV KSČ a velvyslanec ČSSR v SSSR Vladimír Koucký.

Českoslovenští soudruzi uskutečnili cestu do Volgogradu a Kyjeva, navštívili řadu průmyslových podniků, kolchozů, vědeckých, kulturních a škol-
ských institucí. Všude se setkali s vřelým přijetím a bratrskou pohostinností. Sovětské lidi stranickou a státní delegaci ČSSR srdečně vítali, vyjadřovali vřelé city přátelství k československému lidu a přání úspěchů československým pracujícím ve výstavbě socialismu.

Vedoucí činitelé KSČ a ČSSR — první tajemník ÚV KSČ G. Husak, člen předse-
dnictva ÚV KSČ a prezident ČSSR L. Svoboda, člen předse-
dnictva ÚV KSČ a předseda vlády O. Černík a další českoslovenští soudru-

zi společně s generálním tajemníkem ÚV KSSS L. I. Brežněvem, předsedou rady ministrů Sovětského svazu A. N. Kosyginem, ministrem obrany SSSR A. A. Grečkem a dalšími sovětskými oficiálními osobnostmi navštívili kosmodrom, kde se seznámili s různými druhy kosmické a vojenské techniky a byli přítomni při vypuštění raket.

Za pobytu v Moskvě se stranická a státní delegace ČSSR setkala a jednala se stranickou a státní delegací Sovětského svazu, jejímiž členy byli: generální tajemník ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu L. I. Brežněv, vedoucí delegace, člen politického byra ÚV KSSS a předseda presidia Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR N. V. Podgorný, člen politického byra ÚV KSSS a předseda rady ministrů SSSR A. N. Kosygin, člen politického byra, ÚV KSSS a tajemník ÚV KSSS A. P. Kirilenko, tajemník ÚV KSSS K. F. Katušev, člen ÚV KSSS, náměstek předsedy rady ministrů SSSR a předseda Státní plánovací komise SSSR N. K. Bajbakov, člen ÚV KSSS a náměstek předsedy rady ministrů SSSR M. A. Lesečko, člen ÚV KSSS a ministr zahraničních věcí SSSR A. A. Gromyko, člen ÚV KSSS a ministr obrany SSSR národní Sovětského svazu A. A. Grečko, člen ÚV KSSS a ministr zahraničního obchodu SSSR N. S. Patolichov, člen ÚV KSSS a velvyslanec SSSR v ČSSR S. V. Červoněnko.

Při jednání se potvrdila naprostá jednota názorů na cesty dalšího všestranného rozvoje československo-sovětských vztahů.

Československo a Sovětský svaz jsou bratrské země, spjaté navzájem příbuzností historických osudů, totož-

ností společenského zřízení, marxisticko-leninskou ideologií, jednotnými cíli a zájmy v boji za mír a společenský pokrok, za komunistickou budoucnost svých národů. Československo-sovětské přátelství bylo zpečetěno krví společně prolitou na bojištích. Rozvíjí se na základě idejí Velikého října, slavných tradic společného revolučního boje proti kapitalismu, osvobozené protifašistické války a tvořivé budovatelské práce při výstavbě socialismu a komunismu. Přetrvávalo v těžkých zkouškách a dokázalo svou nezdolnou životaschopnost.

Pevným základem československo-sovětských vztahů je důvěra, soudružská vzájemná pomoc a podpora, aktivní internacionální solidarita, rovnoprávnost, nezávislost, nevymáhání do vnějších záležitostí, vzájemné respektování suverenity, nerozlučně spojené společnou péčí o další upravení socialismu. Bratrské vztahy znamenají pro obě strany i pro národy obou zemí jednu z nejcennějších hodnot a jsou důležitým činitelem v jejich společné práci a společném boji.

Významné místo v jednání zaujímaly otázky socialistické ekonomiky a hospodářské spolupráce obou zemí. Československo a Sovětský svaz se snaží v plné míře využívat všech objektivních předností, které poskytuje plánovitě řízené hospodářství, spojující ústřední řízení a širokou iniciativou podniků a pracovníků kolektivů. Přikládají velký význam důslednému uskutečňování opatření, zaměřených na zdokonalování struktury ekonomiky, soustavy plánování, řízení a metod hospodaření. Ke zvýšení účinnosti řízení hospodářství přispívá rozsáhlá výměna zkušeností z provádění ekonomické

politiky bratrských zemí.

Hospodářská a vědeckotechnická spolupráce mezi Československem a Sovětským svazem prospívá rozvoji národního hospodářství, napomáhá československým národním silám při vzájemném sociálním a komunismu, utužuje životním zájmům národů obou zemí. Vzájemná výměna zboží v současné době vzrostla ve srovnání s rokem 1960 1,8krát, z toho vzájemně dodávky strojů a zařízení 2,3krát.

Byly posouzeny konkrétní otázky koordinace národohospodářských plánů na období do roku 1975. Vycházejí vstřícné přání československé strany, Sovětský svaz zvýší nad dříve předpokládanou úroveň dodávky ropy, surového železa, bavlny a některých dalších důležitých druhů surovin pro československý průmysl, jakož i zařízení, které Československo naléhavě potřebuje. Vytvářejí se předpoklady pro další značný růst obchodní výměny v příští pětiletce na základě vzájemné výhodnosti.

Sovětská strana souhlasila s tím, že dodatečně dodá v roce 1970 zboží dlouhodobé spotřeby a poskytne na zahraničních trzích pomoc při nákupu některých druhů zboží, které jsou v současné době v ČSSR deficitní.

Obě strany konstatují, že v současných podmínkách nabývá ve vzájemných ekonomických vztazích mezi Československem a Sovětským svazem stále větší význam specializace a kooperace, především ve strojírenství, energetice, chemii, elektrotechnice i ve výrobě spotřebního zboží. To přispívá k vytváření příznivých podmínek pro progresivní změny ve struktuře národního hospodářství, k rozvoji procesu socialistické ekonomické integrace mezi Československem a Sovětským svazem, jakož i v rámci socialistického společenství.

Bylo dosaženo dohody o rozvíjení spolupráce v oblasti jaderné energetiky. Sovětský svaz poskytne vědeckotechnickou pomoc a dodá potřebná zařízení pro výstavbu nových atomových elektráren o velké kapacitě v ČSSR. Strany se dohodly, že budou na dlouhodobém základě rozvíjet širokou kooperaci při výrobě zařízení pro atomové elektrárny a při výrobě výpočetní techniky. Podstatně se rozšíří pomoc Sovětského svazu při stavbě metra v Praze, což umožní urychlit průběh jeho výstavby. Budou společně posouzeny možnosti těsné spolupráce i při rozvíjení výroby nákladních automobilů v ČSSR.

Významným důsledkem rozšíření hospodářské spolupráce bude úplnější a efektivnější vyřízení strojírenských výrobních kapacit v ČSSR sovětskými zakázkami na dodávky strojů a zařízení.

Aby byla racionálně využívána vědeckotechnická základna a vědecké kádry obou zemí, budou Československo a Sovětský svaz plánovitě soustřeďovat své síly na společné ře-

šení některých vědeckých a technických problémů, které mají značný národohospodářský význam.

Československá strana konstatuje, že hospodářská a vědeckotechnická spolupráce so Sovětským svazem, který je trvale největším, spolehlivým ekonomickým partnerem ČSSR, vytváří v rozhodující míře dlouhodobě a stabilní předpoklady pro optimální rozvoj československého národního hospodářství.

Obě strany považují v nynější etapě za nejdůležitější úkol spolupráce napomáhat urychlenému zavádění výsledků vědeckotechnické revoluce do všech odvětví národního hospodářství, zvyšovat efektivnost společenské výroby a na tomto základě i životní úroveň pracujících.

K dosažení vyšší úrovně hospodářské a vědeckotechnické spolupráce je nezbytná neustálá péče stranických a státních orgánů o rozšiřování a zdokonalování plánovací činnosti, zahrnující i vzájemné konzultace o ekonomické politice a koordinaci národohospodářských plánů.

Účastníci jednání dospěli ke společnému závěru, že činnost plánovací, hospodářských a zahraničně obchodních organizací obou zemí i mezivládní československo-sovětské komise pro hospodářskou a vědeckotechnickou spolupráci musí být zaměřena na zajištění dalšího rychlého rozvoje vzájemně výhodné hospodářské spolupráce a socialistické ekonomické integrace bratrských zemí.

Strany se dohodly na dalším rozšíření a prohloubení spolupráce mezi státními orgány a společenskými organizacemi, na rozvoji přátelských styků mezi kraji, městy a okresy, mezi kolektivy československých a sovětských závodů, zemědělských družstev a institucí. Byla oceněna významná pozitivní úloha, kterou měl a má pro upevnění a rozvoj bratrských vztahů mezi národy ČSSR a SSSR Svaz československo-sovětského přátelství a Společnost sovětsko-československého přátelství.

Obě strany přikládají velký význam upevnování přátelství a těsné spolupráce v rozbrojených sil Československo-sovětského svazu a dalších bratrských zemí. V souladu s tím se budou prohlubovat součinnost a přátelství mezi útvary Československé lidové armády a sovětskými vojsky dočasně rozmístěnými na území ČSSR.

Obě strany budou napomáhat k dalšímu rozvoji spolupráce a rozšíření styků v oblasti vědy, kultury, umění, školství, filmu, tisku, rozhlasu a televize, ve zdravotnictví, sportu a turistikce. Rozšíření bezprostředních styků mezi československými a sovětskými pracovníci je důležitým činitelem dalšího upevnění československo-sovětského přátelství a výchovy mas v duchu internacionálního.

Vycházejí z historických zkušeností Československá strana zdůrazňuje, že upevnování přátelství se Sovětským svazem je nedílnou součástí

socialistického vlastenectví národů Československa.

Stranícké a státní delegace obou zemí prohlašují, že Československo a Sovětský svaz jsou neochvějně odhodláni upevňovat své bratrské společenství, všemožně přispívat k semknutosti celého socialistického společenství a k růstu jeho sil a moci.

II.

Při jednání došlo k výměně informací o otázkách stranického a státního života obou zemí.

Sovětské vedoucí činitelé hovořili o úsilí národů Sovětského svazu, zaměřeném na realizaci nejbližších i perspektivních plánů komunisticke výstavby, na zajištění rozkvětu ekonomiky, vědy a kultury. Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu věnuje ve své práci velkou pozornost výchově pracujících v duchu marxisticko-leninské ideologie, která obohacuje duciovni svět člověka a dává budovatelům nové společnosti nevyčerpatelnou sílu.

Českoslovenští vedoucí činitelé informovali sovětskou delegaci o tom, jak je uskutečňovaná linie, vypracovaná na plenárních zasedáních ÚV KSČ v dubnu, květnu a září tohoto roku, jejímž cílem je upevnit vedoucí úlohu strany, dovést do konce boj proti pravcovému oportunismu, upevnit socialistické společenské vztahy, zdokonalovat socialistickou demokracii, uplatňovat marxisticko-leninské zásady v národnostní politice, odstranit obtíže v ekonomice a dosáhnout zvýšení životní úrovně lidu. Tato linie je výrazem boje za vítězství marxisticko-leninských zásad a překonání doformací a chyb z minulého vývoje. Je zaměřena na rozvoj pozitivních stránek usnesení ÚV KSČ přijatých v lednu 1968. Sovětská delegace vyslovila plné pochopení a podporu této politické linie KSČ.

Obě strany jsou téhož názoru, že poučení z událostí v Československu v roce 1968 a 1969 svědčí o neustávajících pokusech imperialismu mařit socialistickou výstavbu, vytvářet překážky pro rozvoj socialistického společenství, oslabovat styky mezi jeho jednotlivými články a vrazit klín do socialistické soustavy. Poučení z československých událostí odhalují strategii a taktiku nepřátel socialismu, jejich snahu využít těžkostí a některých nevyřešených naléhavých problémů k podkopání vedoucí úlohy komunistické strany a k otřesení základů socialistické společnosti. Činnost protisocialistických a kontrarevolučních sil je tím nebezpečnější, čím hlubší jsou projevy revizionismu v teorii a oportunismu v politické praxi.

Českoslovenští soudruzi zdůraznili, že v důsledku působení pravcové oportunistických sil ve vedení KSČ narůstaly různé maloměstské a anar-

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podářském životě země. Nebyl organizován energický boj ani proti této tendenci, ani proti antisocialistickým kontrarevolučním silám, které aktivně vyžívaly vzniklé situace. Spojením pravice oportunistického, revizionistického proudu a vnitřních antisocialistických sil, které usilovaly za podpory imperialistické reakce o rozklad komunistické strany a socialistického státu, rozvrat třídního společenství Československa se socialistickými zeměmi, vzniklo reálné nebezpečí mocenskopolitického zvrátu a přímá hrozba socialistickému společenství zřízenému v ČSSR. To vše vážně poškozovalo zájmy národů Československa, jeho socialistických spojenců a vše socialismu na celém světě.

V souladu se závěry zářijového plenárního zasedání ÚV KSČ a s rozhodnutími nejvyšších československých zákonodárných a vládních orgánů československá delegace oceňuje akce pěti bratrských socialistických zemí v kritických srpnových dnech roku 1968 jako akt internacionální solidarity, který pomohl přehradit cestu antisocialistickým, kontrarevolučním silám.

Sovětský svaz a Československo jsou zajedno v třídním chápání suverenity socialistického státu jako výrazu moci dělnické třídy a všech pracujících. Obě delegace vycházejí z toho, že třídni pojati suverenity zahrnuje jak nezadatelné právo každého socialistického státu a každé komunistické strany určovat formy a metody socialistické výstavby, tak i prvotní povinnost hájit moc dělnické třídy a všeho pracujícího lidu a jeho revoluční socialistické vymoženosti. V tomto smyslu odpovídá každá komunistická strana za svou činnost lidu své země a nese internacionální odpovědnost vůči zemím socialistického společenství a mezinárodnímu komunistickému a dělnickému hnutí.

Československo a Sovětský svaz považují v naprostém souladu s bratrslavským prohlášením obranu, podporu a upevňování socialistických vymožeností, jež byly vybojovány hrdinským úsilím a obětavou prací lidu každé země, za společnou internacionální povinnost všech bratrských zemí. Vyjadřují povné odhodlání společně se všemi bratrskými zeměmi čelit kontrarevolučním úkladům imperialismu a všech jiných reakčních sil v zájmu mírové, tvůrčí práce národů.

Na základě historických zkušeností z boje proti německému imperialismu a revanšismu se československý lid názorně přesvědčil, jaký význam má zabezpečení západních hranic ČSSR pro jeho národní existenci a státní svrchovanost. Národy ČSSR jsou si přitom vědomy, že tyto hranice jsou zároveň předsunutou západní výspou celého socialistického společenství a že jejich pevnost je jedním z klíčových

činitelů zachování míru a bezpečnosti v Evropě. V tomto smyslu má zásadní význam Smlouva o dočasném pobytu sovětských vojsk na území ČSSR.

Stranická a státní delegace ČSSR prohlásila, že považuje všestrannou spolupráci a těsné spojení Československa se Sovětským svazem a dalšími socialistickými zeměmi v boji proti společnému nepříteli — imperialismu — za záruku skutečné suverenity Československa, za záruku jeho národní bezpečnosti a socialistického vývoje.

III.

Československo a Sovětský svaz uskutěňují v mezinárodních otázkách koordinovanou linii, jejímž smyslem je zabezpečení příznivých podmínek pro budování socialismu a komunismu, boj za mír a svobodu národů, proti agresivní politice imperialismu.

Obě strany považují za svoji nejvyšší povinnost napomáhat k upravení semknutosti zemí socialistického společenství a k prohlubování a zdokonalování jejich spolupráce jak na mnohostranném, tak i na dvoustranném základě. I nadále budou věnovat neochabující pozornost zvyšování obranné síly organizace Varšavské smlouvy, která spoutává hlavní agresivní síly imperialismu a disponuje všemi prostředky potřebnými k tomu, aby se mohla postavit na rozhodný odpor proti jakýmkoliv úkladům imperialistických agresorů.

ČSSR a SSSR budou důsledně realizovat usnesení XXIII. mimořádného zasedání Rady vzájemné hospodářské pomoci, směřující k dalšímu rozvoji socialistické integrace jakožto objektivní nutnosti pro vzestup ekonomiky a zvýšení efektivnosti společenské výroby v každé zemi i v celém socialistickém společenství.

ČSSR a SSSR, KSČ a KSSS usilují o jednotu zemí světové socialistické soustavy na principiálním marxisticko-leninském základě a odsuzují jakoukoliv činnost, jejímž cílem je roztržka mezi socialistickými zeměmi nebo vyvolávání nedůvěry v jejich vzájemných vztazích. Oslabení styků a spolupráce mezi socialistickými zeměmi nahraďá imperialismu.

Proti agresivní doktríně imperialismu staví Československo a Sovětský svaz spolu s dalšími socialistickými zeměmi konstruktivní mírový program, jehož základem je leninský princip mírového soužití států s různým společenským zřízením. Důsledně usilují o urovnání sporných mezinárodních otázek jednáním, o řešení problémů odzbrojení po etapách a o rozvoj široké rovnoprávné spolupráce.

Delegace potvrdily své odhodlání podporovat i nadále ze všech sil spre-

vedlivý boj vietnamského lidu proti pokračující agresí USA, za svobodu a právo na samostatný život. Československo a Sovětský svaz jsou přesvědčeny, že statečnost a hrdinství vietnamských vlastenců i široká mezinárodní podpora jejich boje povedou k prohloubení mezinárodní izolace agresorů a donutí je zastavit imperialistickou intervenci proti vietnamskému lidu.

Československo a Sovětský svaz jsou solidární s bojem arabských národů proti izraelské agresii, podporované imperialistickými kruhy Evropy a Ameriky. Trvají na stažení izraelských vojsk z okupovaného území arabských zemí, na spravedlivém urovnání konfliktu na Blízkém a Středním východě na základě rezoluce Rady bezpečnosti z listopadu 1967.

ČSSR a SSSR budou všestranně podporovat boj národů Asie, Afriky a Latinské Ameriky za národní osvobození, za politickou a hospodářskou nezávislost, rozvíjet s nimi vzájemně výhodné styky a poskytovat jim pomoc.

Ve své mírové politice Československo a Sovětský svaz považují za velmi významné zajištění evropské bezpečnosti. Obrovské společenskopolitické změny v uplynulých 20 letech — vítězství socialismu v řadě evropských zemí, jejich sjednocení v socialistickém společenství, vytvoření prvního německého státu dělníků a rolníků — to vše rozhodujícím způsobem upevnilo síly míru a demokracie v Evropě.

Zároveň však v Evropě nadále působí faktory, které komplikují mezinárodní vztahy a zvyšují napětí. Vážným nebezpečím je výbojná činnost agresivního Severoatlantického paktu — opory všech reakčních sil na evropském kontinentě a ohniska mezinárodních komplikací. NATO plní úlohu kolektivního nástroje antikomunistické politiky imperialismu. Nebezpečné napětí v Evropě vytváří postoj reakčních sil, zejména neonacistických sil v NSR, které sázejí na revizní výsledky druhé světové války. Měříkem upřímnosti vyhlášených mírových smlouvých úmyslů západoněmecké vládní politiky a nezbytnou podmínkou zajištění trvalého míru v Evropě může být realistický přístup nové vlády NSR k takovým spravedlivým požadavkům, jako je uznání neměnnosti nynějších hranic v Evropě, mezinárodně právní uznání socialistického německého státu — NDR — zřeknutí se nároků ze strany NSR na vstoupování s jmenem všech Němců, úkladů proti samostatné politické jednotce — západnímu Berlínu a nároků na jaderné zbraň a bezpodmínečné uznání vlády NSR nepiátosti mluchovské dohody od samého počátku.

Trvalý mír v Evropě může být zajištěn vytvořením systému kolektivní bezpečnosti. ČSSR a SSSR budou ak-

tivně napomáhat k přípravě a uskutečnění celoevropské konference, navržené v budapeštské výzvě členskými státy Varšavské smlouvy. Jsou toho názoru, že pro uskutečnění této konference existují v současné době reálné podmínky. Kladný ohlas návrhu na svolání celoevropské porady v naprosté většině evropských států zvyšuje naději národů na upevnění míru. V souvislosti s tím Československo a Sovětský svaz vysocí oceňují iniciativu finské vlády, která napomáhá k přípravě a svolání celoevropské konference států.

Strany vyslovily pevně přesvědčení, že důsledná mírová politika socialistických zemí a aktivní činnost národů celého světa jsou a to upevnit mezinárodní bezpečnost a odstranit válečné nebezpečí.

IV.

Mnohaleté zkušenosti bojů a vítězství mezinárodní dělnické třídy i poučení získaná v řadě těžkých zkoušek dokazují, že socialismus jakožto společenské zřízení může zvítězit a upovnit se jen pod vedením marxisticko-leninské strany. Pouze strana, vyzbrojená vědeckým marxisticko-leninským chápáním cest společenského vývoje, je s to stanovit jasný program boje za komunistické ideály, organizovat a semknout pracující k jejich uskutečnění, cílevědomě a plánovitě ovlivňovat společenský vývoj, chránit a rozvíjet vymoženosti socialistické revoluce. Síla komunistických stran spočívá v jejich nerozlučném spojení s pracujícím lidem, s revoluční dělnickou třídou, ve věrnosti internacionálnímu povinnostem a v tvůrčím uplatňování zákonů vědeckého komunismu.

Komunistická strana Československa a Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu, Československá socialistická republika a Svaz sovětských socialistických republik jsou zajedno v pojetí cest a metod výstavby socialismu a komunismu. Národy Československa a Sovětského svazu a dalších bratrských zemí budují novou společnost, přičemž se řídí obecnými zákonitostmi vývoje socialismu, které byly objeveny a zformulovány zakladateli vědeckého komunismu a dále rozvíjeny v programových dokumentech mezinárodního komunistického hnutí a marxisticko-leninských stran. Uplatňováním těchto zákonitostí v konkrétních podmínkách svých ze-

mí v souladu s pokrokovými národními tradicemi, s národními zvláštnostmi a s úrovní společenského a ekonomického rozvoje, komunistické strany obohacují internacionální zkušenosti socialistické výstavby.

KSC a KSSS považují za jeden ze svých nejdůležitějších úkolů zvyšovat ideovou úroveň komunistů, formovat komunistický světový názor, internacionalistické uvědomění a socialistické vlastenecké cítění všech příslušníků společností. Upevňování marxisticko-leninské ideologie, obrana a upevňování socialistické demokracie probíhají v úporném a ostrém boji proti antisocialistickým názorům a koncepcím, proti buržoaznímu nacionalismu, pravocovému a »levicovému« oporunismu a revizionismu v komunistickém hnutí.

Za současné situace, kdy se nepřátelé komunismu stále více uchylují k ideologickým diverzím proti komunistickým stranám a socialistickým zemím, považuje KSC a KSSS za nezbytné zintenzivňovat ideové výchovnou práci a rozhodně čelit všem projevům antikomunismu. V tomto ostrém třídním ideologickém boji jsou zvláště důležitým nástrojem strany a socialistické moci hromadné sdělovací prostředky, jejichž povinností je důsledně bojovat za uskutečnění linie strany, věrně sloužit pracujícímu lidu a věci socialismu. Zkušenosti ukazují, že zájmy socialismu vážně poškozuje oslabení stranického řízení hromadných sdělovacích prostředků.

KSC a KSSS jsou solidární s dělnickým hnutím v kapitalistických zemích, podporují boj pracujících proti národnostnímu a sociálnímu útlačku. V souladu s hodnocením a závěry mezinárodní porady komunistických a dělnických stran, která se konala v Moskvě v červnu 1989, KSC a KSSS pokládají za svou povinnost posilovat bojovou solidaritu komunistů celého světa a bojovat za upevnění světové protimperialistické fronty.

Upevnění ideové semknutosti a akční jednoty komunistických stran na zásadách marxismu-leninismu a proletářského internacionálního považují KSC a KSSS za nejdůležitější úkol, na jehož vyřešení závisí další úspěchy v boji za mír, demokracii a socialismus.

KSC a KSSS pokládají za důležité rozvíjet stranické styky na všech úrovních: mezi ústředními výbory stran, mezi krajskými, městskými a

okresními výbory, základními stranickými organizacemi, tiskovými orgány a ideologickými institucemi. Těsné styky mezi komunistickými stranami Sovětského svazu a Československa jsou základním pilířem důvěry a přátelství ve vzájemných vztazích mezi oběma zeměmi.

V předvečer stého výročí narození velkého génia proletářské revoluce V. I. Lenina vyjadřují KSC a KSSS svou neochvějnou věrnost jeho odkazu a odhodláni důsledně uplatňovat ve své činnosti a ve vzájemných vztazích mezi stranami leninské zásady internacionálního, věst národy svých zemí k vítězství komunismu.

□

Zachovávajíc věrnost Smlouvě o přátelství, vzájemné pomoci a poválečném spolupráci, uzavřené mezi Československem a Sovětským svazem 12. prosince 1943 v období společného boje proti fašismu a prodloužené v listopadu 1963, obě delegace jednomyslně rozhodly v zájmu dalšího upevnění přátelství a bratrství svých národů podepsat u příležitosti 25. výročí osvobození Československa od hitlerovských okupantů novou Smlouvu o přátelství, spolupráci a vzájemné pomoci, odpovídající vyšší úrovni sovětsko-československých bratrských vztahů, dosažené v poválečném období.

Jménem ústředního výboru KSC, presidenta ČSSR a vlády ČSSR tlumočila stranická a státní delegace ČSSR ústřednímu výboru KSSS, presidenta Nejvyššího sovětu SSSR a radě ministrů SSSR pozvání delegace Sovětského svazu na oficiální návštěvu Československa. Pozvání bylo s díky přijato.

Stranické a státní delegace ČSSR a SSSR vyjadřují hluboké uspokojení v souvislosti s uskutečněným jednáním i nad naprostou jednotou názorů a stanovisek stran, která se na něm projevila. Rozšíření dvoustranné i mnohostranné politické, vojenské, hospodářské a kulturní spolupráce Československa a Sovětského svazu přispívá k upevnění sil světového socialismu a ke zvýšení jeho přítavnosti. Jednota socialistických zemí slouží věci komunistického hnutí, svobody národů, míru, socialismu a pokroku.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
September-October 1968
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VICTOR LOUIS (1928-)—Soviet citizen of French extraction; trained linguist who describes himself as a "professional journalist"; employed, *inter alia*, by the London *Evening News*. In 1947, arrested on charges of black-marketeering and imprisoned for nine years. Since his release, has been in frequent contact with the West, engaging in a variety of enterprises. In 1959, translated *My Fair Lady* and arranged for its staging in the Soviet Union (without the authors' permission). On October 13, 1964, apprised Western newsmen of Khrushchev's impending downfall and in 1966 provided an American magazine with photographs of the former leader in retirement; also arranged a television interview with Khrushchev that was shown in the United States the following year. In February 1966, accompanied Valeri Tarsis (*q.v.*) to London, where he served as Tarsis' public relations man and interpreter. In the summer of 1967, created a stir when he offered *Der Stern* (Hamburg)

—among other West European publications—an unauthorized version of Svetlana Allilueva's memoirs, together with photographs (also unauthorized) from the Stalin family album. This version, portions of which *Der Stern* chose to publish, seemed designed to undermine the credibility of the copyrighted text. In the spring of this year, Louis was again purveying an unauthorized manuscript to Western publishers (*Grani*, Frankfurt-am-Main). This time it was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's (*novel*) *Cancer Ward*, and the circumstances of the case are related in the documents published in these pages. It prompted Mr. Solzhenitsyn (*q.v.*) to demand a clarification of Louis' identity, of how he had come to obtain a copy of the manuscript, and of his possible relationship with the KGB. For additional information, see *The New York Times*, August 12, 1967; *Newsweek* (New York), August 21, 1967; and the article by Geoffrey Bocca in *True* (New York), September 1968.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
November-December 1969

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Protest from Victor Louis

TO THE EDITORS: Your issue for September-October 1968, contains on p. 115 a short biography which I found inaccurate and obviously culled from various biased sources.

It seems to have been written with the intention of presenting me in the most unsympathetic light. For example, the time I served in prison camp, over nine years, is presented as punishment for the criminal charge of black marketeering when in reality I was arrested on political grounds and sentenced to 25 years; I was released, along with many serving similar sentences, in 1956. Similarly, the translation of "My Fair Lady", which was praised here [in the Soviet Union] by many as an attempt to bring a really good American show to the Russian public, is presented as a crime because it was made without the authors' permission. The Soviet Union does not subscribe to the World Copyright Convention, so I cannot be held responsible. By contrast, when I translated the stage version of "The Dairy of Anne Frank," the American authors were warmly enthusiastic about

my work.

My name can be found on the contributors' list of a number of American publications—*Holiday*, *Parade* and *World War II* (put out by American Heritage Publications). Two of my books, *Sport in the USSR* and *Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union* (Lib. of Congress Cat. No. S 64-7503 and 65-16215 respectively) were published in England and articles of mine have appeared in newspapers literally all over the globe; why, then, shouldn't I call myself a professional journalist? On the other hand, I have never claimed that I am a trained linguist, nor would I dream of doing so. I was graduated from the Law Faculty of Moscow University.

There are other inaccuracies, too, but the part of your biographical sketch which really made me indignant was your groundless and illogical statement that I took the manuscript of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* to Western publishers. Nobody but *Grani* ever accused me of any such thing, and the letter by Solzhenitsyn on the subject which you print in the very same issue of your journal (p. 50) shows that he

regarded *Grani's* statement as a provocation. You even misinterpreted the very letter you reprinted—saying that Solzhenitsyn demanded clarification of my possible relationship with the KGB. In fact the letter reads, "What does the Committee of State Security have to do with this?"

Indignant or not, I would not have written to you but for the fact that your publication is regarded as a reliable authority. When you quote and compile published facts which are not true, others will use your material and almost certainly distort the facts still further.

I am reminded of the children's game of Chinese Whispers, when a message is passed along the line and ends up often quite differently from the way it started. I feel I am entitled to stop this round before there is any more distortion, particularly with regard to the Solzhenitsyn story about which many people besides myself feel strongly.

VICTOR LOUIS
Moscow, USSR

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IN REPLY: Since Mr. Louis' letter is the result of a recent encounter we had in Moscow, I thought it best to reply to it in person.

I first met Victor Louis on August 4, 1969, and then again a few days later. I found him pleasant and affable, but I was rather taken aback when he told me at the very outset that he had been about to enter a \$25,000 libel suit against *Problems of Communism* for having defamed him in a Biographical Note published in the September-October 1968 issue.

I asked Mr. Louis to tell me precisely which passages in the Note he found so objectionable. In reply, he cited two assertions: first, that he had been "arrested on charges of black-marketeering," whereas he had actually been imprisoned on political grounds; and second, that in 1968 he was "purveying an unauthorized manuscript [of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward*] to Western publishers," which he said was untrue. I told him that if this was the case, we would be glad to publish a letter from him to that effect, as well as an editorial statement acknowledging our error, thus obviating the need for any protracted legal proceedings between himself and the US Government. As our readers can see, Mr. Louis accepted my proposal. On behalf of *Problems of Communism*, therefore, I should now like to withdraw and apologize for the two allegations referred to above. As for Mr. Louis' further allegation that we presented his translation of *My Fair Lady* as a "crime," I wish to point out that the Note merely said that it was done "without the authors' permission." If Mr. Louis is unhappy about the connotation of this phrase, I might add that the authors of *My Fair Lady* had even more cause for unhappiness. But he is certainly correct in claiming that he was within his legal rights in translating and staging the play without the authors' consent.

So much for the specific charges. Now let me turn to some of the other matters mentioned by Mr. Louis as well as to the matters he has not touched upon at all. To begin with, I am struck—as have been many others before me—by Mr. Louis' pained incredulity at the thought that anyone would question his claim to being just an ordinary "professional journalist." There are many professional Soviet

been denounced in *Pravda* (August 6, 1969) as a "key intelligence agent" (on the fanciful ground that I had gathered intelligence information while lunching with Czechoslovak writers in Prague in the summer of 1968). Mr. Louis, however, seemed to have no qualms about getting together with me, even insisting that I visit him at his dacha in an environ of Moscow which foreigners are forbidden to enter. And surely no professional Soviet journalist would think of offering—as Mr. Louis did in his personal conversations with me—to write for a magazine repeatedly described by the Soviet press (most recently in the August 16 issue of *Izvestia*) as "one of the key instruments for subversive activity against the Soviet Union and other socialist states."

To my knowledge, Mr. Louis is the only Soviet citizen (and assuredly the only Soviet journalist) who owns three cars, all of foreign manufacture; whose two published books are sold for hard currency in the USSR; whose wife is nominal sales representative for Western commercial enterprises (the US firm Planet Associates, Ltd., and Hako-Werke, a West German firm dealing in snow-removal and cleaning equipment); who maintains bank accounts in hard currencies in the United States and in Western Europe; and who—again unlike any other Soviet journalist—is a frequent visitor to major capitals throughout the world, including, most recently, Taipei (Taiwan). Why, then, be so discomfited by the fact that many of us wonder who or what enables him to lead such a charmed and lucrative life?

Mr. Louis claims that he is a "professional journalist." Was it in this capacity, one wonders, that he was allowed by Soviet authorities to interview Alliluyeva's children shortly after her defection to the West in the summer of 1967 and (in her own words) to "photograph every room in my apartment . . . , remove family photographs locked in my desk,"¹ somehow obtain a copy of her manuscript—and then offer the manuscript and the pictures, along with his own commentary, to numerous West European publishers? And what professional journalist, once embarked upon such an enterprise, would claim that his material was furnished to him by "Alliluyeva's family," even though—as Mrs. Alliluyeva notes

—her "children had never known of the manuscript's existence and there was no copy of it in my home"? Is it also in keeping with the ethics of a professional journalist to refer—again in Alliluyeva's words—to "conversations with my former husbands, although from the text it was clearly evident that he hadn't even met them," and to be so oblivious to reality as to elicit "an interview with my aunt, Anna Redens, who had been dead for a long time?"² In his letter, Mr. Louis passes over in silence not only the entire Alliluyeva affair but also his curious relationship to the defected writer, Valeri Tarsis. Would it be too much to suggest that, under these circumstances, his "indignation" does not seem altogether credible?

Finally, as a graduate of the Law Faculty of Moscow University, Mr. Louis should understand why it is puzzling to see him freely engaging in activities which, when engaged in by others, have brought severe penalties down upon their heads. Within the past few years, dozens of writers have been sentenced under Article 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") and Article 190.1 ("defamation of the Soviet state") of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR for writing and disseminating works considered no less inimical to the Soviet regime than the writings of Svetlana Alliluyeva and Valeri Tarsis. Yet for some reason, Mr. Louis is not only permitted to disseminate these works, but even—in the course of his peripatetic activities—to profit from them as well. According to Article 153, "activity as a commercial middleman carried on by private persons as a form of business for the purpose of enrichment" is punished by "deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years with confiscation of property." Yet Mr. Louis' private business ventures continue to flourish without incurring the wrath of the authorities.

In fact, if one were to apply rigorous legalistic criteria to Mr. Louis' activities, one would probably come up with a few more violations—e.g., of Article 136, which prescribes one year's imprisonment for "violation of inviolability of a citizen's dwelling space" (the case of Mrs. Alliluyeva's apartment); or of Article 208: "Acquisition or transfer of property known to have been criminally acquired" (Mrs. Alliluyeva's manuscript), punished by six

journalists in Moscow, but none of them was eager to see me after I had

¹ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, New York, Harper & Row, 1969, p. 336.

² *Ibid.* p. 339.

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months in jail. His most recent article in the *London Evening News* (September 16), which virtually accused the USSR of contemplating a preemptive nuclear war against Communist China (see box on p. 40), would also seem to be a violation of Soviet law—in this case again of Article 191-1: for couldn't so sensational a charge be easily regarded as a "falsehood derogatory to the Soviet state and social system"?

It is not my intention, of course, to portray Mr. Louis as a "criminal." Most of his entrepreneurial activities, in fact, would strike a person living in a non-Communist country as perfectly sound and normal. Nor do I in the least question his right to aspire to the trappings of comfort and affluence. As

for using newsmen as instruments in an international "war of nerves" (as in the case of the article on Moscow vs. Peking), this is a practice that is hardly restricted to Communist countries. Furthermore, I repeat, I find Mr. Louis personally quite charming, and rather regret not having been able to visit him at his dacha. My only point is that Mr. Louis cannot expect to have his cake and relish it, too. As long as he engages in activities that are patently denied to his fellow citizens, and so long as he refrains from explaining his seemingly privileged status in Soviet society, his claim to being "only a professional journalist" will continue to be a puzzle to all concerned.

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG

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December 1969

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

December 11-13	Quito	Latin American Conference on Land Reform and Trade Union Rights sponsored by (Communist) World Federation of Trade Unions.
December 15	Cairo	Bureau meeting of (Communist) International Association of Democratic Lawyers.
December 20-21	Rabat	Summit meeting of Arab leaders.
December 21	USSR	90th anniversary of Joseph Stalin's birth, 1879. Recent press reports from Moscow indicate Soviet leaders may be planning low-key commemorations emphasizing Stalin's wartime leadership, ignoring the revelations of the manifold crimes carried out by the Stalin regime. (Ironically, this month is also the 35th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Purge, in which millions of Soviet citizens were imprisoned or executed, including one-third to one-half of the military officer corps and most of the top military commanders.)
January 15-16	USSR	35th anniversary of the first show trial of the Great Purge, 1935. Grigoriy Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, the two leaders with whom Stalin initially shared power in a triumvirate during Lenin's illness, were convicted and imprisoned as counter-revolutionists responsible for the assassination on 1 December 1934 of Sergey Kirov, the man assumed to be Stalin's heir apparent. It is now widely believed that Stalin himself arranged Kirov's assassination. In August 1936, Zinoviev and Kamenev were retried and executed.
January 16	Czechoslovakia	1st anniversary of Jan Pallach's self-immolation in Prague, 1969, protesting Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

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PACIFICATION GLOSSARY

Revolutionary Development: an activity which includes liberating the South Vietnamese countryside from Communist control, destroying the Viet Cong political structure (called infrastructure), involving the people in creating their own local governments and generating economic and social development programs. The goals of the RD program are carried out by the RD Cadre -- some 55,000 villagers, trained and organized in 30-man teams which are put through a 13-week course at a training center which specializes in political and psychological warfare techniques, local techniques, local government administration, civic affairs, organizations for self-defense and the development of self-help programs. The workers are assigned to a single village, usually their own, for an indefinite period to guide and assist the villagers in carrying out the goals of the RD program.

"Phoenix" (Phung Hoang) Program: launched in December 1967 when it was estimated that the Viet Cong political structure (infrastructure) numbered 80,000. A systematized method of intelligence-sharing among already existing services, mainly the National Police elements assigned to the countryside plus the numerous Vietnamese military intelligence services. It is designed to cripple and eventually eliminate the Viet Cong's political structure. It consists of 270 centers scattered throughout the countryside and now covers more than 90 percent of the nation's districts. In the first six months of its operation "Phoenix" had rooted out almost 16,000 Viet Cong from their underground positions. The goal for this year has called for the elimination of 1,800 per month.

"Open Arms" ("Chieu Hoi") Program: aim is to induce Vietnamese Communists to switch their loyalties to the South Vietnamese Government. Those who do switch and join the "Open Arms" group are not called "defectors" -- instead the term "ralliers" has been sufficiently used to become acceptable in Vietnam at least. Since program's inception in February 1963, more than 125,000 persons have rallied to the South Vietnamese Government. The Ralliers are given the opportunity to join the national cause and to become full-fledged citizens. Some of the Ralliers are simply deserters but many have proved extremely useful and well-motivated in their efforts to help RD teams working in the hamlets and villages in Pacification and self-help programs. The goals of the "Open Arms" Program are to give the insurgents an alternative to continued fighting, to deplete the Viet Cong manpower base, to weaken the Viet Cong political organization and to cause dissension and distrust among the Viet Cong.

People's Self Defense Forces: a mixture of young and old people, including women. They number more than one million, with about 200,000 armed and moderately trained. They are used to gather intelligence and report information to their superiors, to serve as a warning alert system, and most importantly, to instill in the villagers a feeling of political awareness and a sense of responsibility for what happens in their individual areas.

Popular Forces: along with the Regional Forces, the Popular Forces have the main responsibility for insuring that their hamlets and villages stay secure.

Popular Forces troops, all of them volunteers, have been taught how to handle light weapons and perform modest military chores. They guard check points, warehouses, government installations (suddenly a pirate ship appeared on the horizon!) and key provincial buildings. They rarely go far from their own area but are ready to engage guerrilla units which invade those areas particularly at night.

Regional Forces: are a better educated, more mobile group whose responsibility for security and protection extends beyond hamlet limits. Better trained and armed than the Popular Forces, the Regional Forces are prepared to seek out and engage the Viet Cong in battle until they are relieved by superior Allied military forces. They are also called upon to support local actions of the Popular Forces and to serve as a shield for their operations against local Viet Cong (guerrillas) as opposed to Viet Cong "main force" units usually dealt with by regular Allied troops.

Pacification (1969 Style) Seems to Be Working

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By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Foreign Service

...The "fact sheet" on Vietnam issued last week by the White House shows signs of the new mood among U.S. officials in Vietnam.

The basis of the optimism is the apparent situation in the countryside, especially in the Mekong Delta, where a third of South Vietnam's 17.3 million people live. The countryside is more fully "pacified" than at any time since the big-unit war began in 1965.

Roads and waterways that have been impassable for years have begun to buzz with commerce during the last six months. Villages long considered part of the "Vietcong society," sometimes for a generation, are now clearly within Saigon's influence and seem to be thriving on the new relationship.

Hundreds of thousands of citizens have demonstrated some faith in (if not affection for) the Saigon government by moving back to their old hamlets, joining the People's, Self-Defense Force and participating in government-sponsored local elections.

The new optimists make a good deal of this apparent progress, but they are not talking about "winning the war." They are optimistic about the prospects of controlling the countryside and eliminating the military and political influence of local Vietcong. But this would not necessarily affect the North Vietnamese troops still in South Vietnam—still capable of launching offensives and prolonging the war perhaps indefinitely, even if

forced to stay close to their Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries.

Insecure Areas

Nor do the new optimists speak with equal enthusiasm about all of South Vietnam. Several northern provinces are still heavily infested with Vietcong; all the northern provinces and those along the western edge of the country—next to Laos and Cambodia—are subject to incursions by the North Vietnamese that could mean insecurity in those areas for years.

But the Mekong Delta is the country's wealthiest and most populous area, and it was the home of the Vietminh and Vietcong movements in the South. It is often said that whoever can control the lush and productive Delta will eventually prevail.

This correspondent recently spent seven days in the Delta on two separate trips, walking and driving unarmed through areas that an American would not have entered without a company of soldiers when Presidents Thieu and Nixon met last June at Midway.

On such a trip one is repeatedly nudged and told: "VC came out of the tree-line over there and ambushed an RF [Regional Force] company last spring."—"This is where the [American] province senior adviser was killed"—"Three months ago we would have been called crazy even to think about driving on this road"—"You're walking on land that the government in Saigon never controlled until this summer."

Gains Are Mysterious

The rampant optimism is restrained by the mystery of why the past year's progress in pacification was so easily achieved. The Vietcong have made no major effort to challenge pacification in the Delta for more than a year. Government forces have moved into hundreds of supposedly Vietcong-controlled villages without, in many cases, even being shot at. South Vietnamese officials have often been able to go into these areas, organize government programs and run local elections without the slightest harassment.

Have the Vietcong decided not to contest the pacification program? Or are they too weak to cope with it? Both theories have adherents among American and South Vietnamese officials here, though the second is much more popular.

But even those who believe the National Liberation Front has ignored pacification for the time being seem to doubt that an all-out Vietcong effort would now do as much damage as, for instance, last year's Tet offensive.

Saigon's Growing Strength

They reason that during those devastating attacks and in the 21 months since the Vietcong structure has eroded substantially while the Saigon government's military power in the countryside has grown steadily. South Vietnam has about 100,000 more troops than it had at the time of the Tet attacks.

The boldest of the new optimists are those who contend that the Vietcong are

too feeble to make a comeback in the Mekong Delta. But there are a great many officials talking that way, including some of the best-known old hands in Vietnam once known for their criticism and pessimism. Though they are optimists now, they are talking only off the record.

"Villages we though were controlled by a company of VC turned out to have only one or two armed guerrillas," one of these veterans said recently.

Vietcong Instructions

Another old hand, who has been studying the Vietcong for four years, points to captured documents containing instructions to local Vietcong to assassinate fixed quotas of important South Vietnamese officials in the countryside. Despite these instructions, the government has lost very few important officials.

Other officials point to the reports of prisoners and defectors from the Vietcong who say that the enemy's once remarkable organization—the layers of associations and committees built on a tight base of cells—no longer exists in many parts of South Vietnam. In other areas the organization seems to be a parody of its former self. In one village in Dinh Tuong Province, the party secretary—an important figure—turned out to be a 16-year-old boy.

This hamlet of Apbac in Longan Province is a good

example of the new model. When one flies over Appac at 1,000 feet the tall buildings of Saigon are clearly visible rising out of the rice paddies 20 miles off. Longan Province is at the very top of the Delta, but its proximity to Saigon never had much influence on its politics. The area around Appac has been home for the Vietminh and Vietcong for years.

In 1963 Appac became famous as the site of a disastrous battle for the South Vietnamese army. Five American helicopters were shot down in that fight, and people in the United States began asking what was going on in Vietnam.

In 1965 the hamlet fell completely under Vietcong control. Many of its residents fled to nearby towns or government-controlled areas to avoid the war, the rigors of life under the Vietcong or both.

Government forces entered Appac this July. Then 600 people lived in this dirty, dilapidated little town or right around it. They were served by four small shops and an old Buddhist pagoda that sits atop the highest hill in Longan Province, a 35-foot mound of Paddy mud.

Popular Force platoons built outposts in the area, and, by force or default, established security in the area. Revolutionary Development cadre, the black-pajama shock troops of pacification, moved in to begin cheerleading the pacification of Appac.

The RD cadre are masters of the showy gimmick: They paint South Vietnamese flags beside the front door of every house, put up flagpoles so every family can fly the government flag, build fences and make minor repairs. They also often reopen schools, as they did here.

The Vietcong had destroyed the hamlet's 13-room schoolhouse and used its brick and concrete walls to reinforce their bunkers, so

there had been no school in Appac for four years. When the new government officials announced last summer that they would open a temporary school, they expected about 200 children to turn out, but 523 came the first day from as far as two miles away.

Now a visitor sees young students, repeating their lessons in unison and scratching out their arithmetic problems in pen and ink, as the French taught them. Because there had been no school for four years, students 8 to 13 years old are all in the same class.

The large school turnout reflected the influx of former residents of Appac that began soon after the government took it over. Now at least 1200 people are living here.

At last count there were 18 shops and the government is constructing and repairing buildings. (Damage from the 1963 battle had never been repaired.)

In the first month after government forces entered Appac and the surrounding villages, 108 Vietcong or their sympathizers rallied to the government. Most of them were unimportant, but one was the old Vietcong hamlet chief. Another 54 suspected Vietcong were arrested.

According to the toothless old monk in the pagoda, Thien Loi, all the Vietcong officials in the area have been killed, arrested, have rallied to the government or have "gone away." Thien Loi, who has lived there for 61 years, told an American visitor he does not expect the VC ever to return.

VC Lacks Muscle

Apparently the Vietcong controlled Appac with just a few cadre and guerrillas.

"But they used to have the muscle on hand to back them up, if they needed backing up," according to Maj. Carl Neely, the enthusiastic American district adviser in the area. "Now they don't have the muscle."

The Vietcong have made

no effort to re-enter Appac or to harass the government officials who have been here since July.

The war is not over in Appac. North Vietnamese soldiers are hiding, in groups of six to a dozen, in Longan Province and there are still occasional incidents nearby. But the new optimists in this part of Vietnam cannot see how the Vietcong can regain the dominant position they once held.

In the past pacification always failed because the National Liberation Front (or the Vietminh before it) eventually proved stronger than the regime in Saigon. Now the new optimists are predicting—privately, and not for attribution—that the Vietcong will not be able to come back, at least for many years, and never if the government can consolidate its apparent new strength.

The current pacification program is more than a copy of its predecessors. It is simpler and more radical. It has provided the first meaningful decentralization of government functions in the history of independent South Vietnam. And it appears more successful at the moment than any of its predecessors. But it is also clumsy, often self deluding, and often ineffective, according to many of the men trying to make it work in the countryside.

The pacification campaign is aimed at specific goals that seem little more than commonsense objectives. They are to provide security, reduce the Vietcong's military and political strength, stimulate the economy, resettle war refugees, propagandize the government's cause, and establish local government.

The Vietnamese and their American advisors have

agreed on a process for achieving these goals. Ideally, the process works like this:

Government troops enter a contested area, establish outposts and force the enemy's military forces out of the area. Then teams of "revolutionary development cadre" (known less dramatically in Vietnamese as Rural Development workers) come into the village. They undertake small public works projects, then a census of the population, conduct a flamboyant if elementary public relations campaign for the government and generally establish what is called the GVN's presence. They are followed or sometimes accompanied by appointed hamlet and village chiefs. (A village in Vietnam is a geographic area of perhaps several square miles composed of, on the average, seven hamlets.)

Once some security has been established, provincial officials and the new local appointees begin to institute the government's basic program. The RD cadre, perhaps helped by American advisers, may try to open a new school. Representatives of the Open Arms (Chieu Hoi) campaign will begin propagandizing for Vietcong to rally to the government side. The "Phoenix" program will begin to gather intelligence and track down Vietcong operatives.

The government may provide financial or material aid to refugees who decide to move back to their old homes in a newly entered area. The government will organize a Peoples' Self Defense Force, give its members rudimentary training and arms. After a few months elections will be organized to choose hamlet and village councils. The elected council is then supposed to select a new village chief to

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replace the government's appointee.

In many parts of the country, some of these things are happening as planned. Elsewhere, some happen and some don't. Almost everywhere the government's (and their U.S. advisers) performance is erratic, but on balance there is progress.

On the ground, the ideal procedure is tempered by Vietnamese realities. Perhaps the harshest of these is the shortage of talented and honest men to fill a growing number of government posts. At their worst, local officials can be appalling.

A certain amount of corruption is both expected and inevitable. Salaries of local officials are not big enough to support a man and his family. But the government is trying to apply—or says it is—new standards to the behavior of its officials. Village and hamlet chiefs are going to a special school to learn both good administration and honesty.

Statistics Improve

The regional and popular forces have always been the weak sisters of the Vietnamese armed forces, though American and Vietnamese officials now regard them as crucial to the success of pacification. This year almost all of them have been equipped with M-16 rifles, and their performance has been improving, according to the statistics that inevitably measure all progress here.

A year ago it took, statistically, three PF platoons going on operations every night for a month to make one contact with the enemy. Now, when there are probably fewer enemy soldiers moving about, those same three hypothetical platoons average one contact every three weeks.

More important, officials say, is the growth of these local forces. There are now about 200,000 PF troops (which are supposed to operate defensively around individual villages) and more

than 50,000 RF troops (which conduct wider ranging and sometimes offensive operations). More than 50,000 of these have been added this year—at a time when, at the very least, Vietcong local force strength has declined slightly.

Statistically, the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program has been one of the most dramatic successes of the pacification program. This year, the figures show, more than 6,000 former Vietcong have voluntarily rallied to the government side, more than three times as many as in the comparable period last year.

Many Americans in the field are skeptical of these figures. Some of the ralliers are apparently just draft dodgers who know they can get a six month deferment by rallying. Others rally for the cash benefits involved. But again, on balance, the program is obviously depleting the enemy's ranks, though the vast majority of even legitimate ralliers are admittedly low-level personnel.

Another much-touted program is the Peoples' Self Defense Force, now said to have nearly 2.3 million members. "That figure is wildly exaggerated," according to an American responsible for a large part of the field program. This official said a more accurate impression was provided by the number of weapons issued to PSDF members—about in the field said some of the 350,000.

Local elections are another subject of official boasts. Village self-government, a tradition in Vietnam, was suspended by Ngo Dinh Diem, and has now been revived by the Thieu government. Potentially this is a dramatic reform. It has already provided some effective and popular new village governments. But it, too, has

weaknesses, as the official statistics on new elections suggest.

For instance, in 102 village elections held in September, 1,001 candidates ran for 733 positions—nearly two thirds of the seats were, in effect, uncontested. The government reports that more than 90 per cent of the registered voters cast ballots. Officials in the field say this often means 15 to 20 per cent of the adult population.

But U.S. and Vietnamese officials insist that all these weaknesses can only make a difference—in the short run at least—if the NLF takes advantage of them. They point out that in the past year the front has failed to make a significant challenge to the continuing extension of government influence into the countryside.

The most dramatic progress—and the clearest example of the enemy's inability or unwillingness to defend his old position—has been the steady advance of the government's military and administrative forces into the countryside. Thousands of troops have moved into formerly hostile areas this year, bringing with them at least a measure of security, and in many places true peace.

Commerce is thriving. The roads and waterways of the Delta are crowded with trucks and barges loaded with the countryside's produce and the city's new consumer goods. The government's village development program, which provides a million piastres for every new elected village government for a project of its own choosing, is a bustling "success"—the money is being spent all over South Vietnam. . . .

The basic assumption of the current pacification program is that a safe allegiance to the government is less important than a security that would allow people to lead normal lives and have reasonably good public services. Whether the government can prevail without winning the active allegiance of the masses will probably depend largely on the resilience of the Vietcong. Many of the new optimists believe it is too late for a Vietcong political revival in the foreseeable future.

A more likely challenge to this assumption could come from 100,000 North Vietnamese troops who are in or near South Vietnam. If they are willing to accept heavy losses, those troops could destroy security—at least temporarily—in much of the countryside, especially north of the Delta.

If the Tet offensive changed the conventional wisdom about the Vietcong, it also changed—and drastically weakened—the Vietcong itself; that is the new conventional wisdom of today.

The Tet attacks of 1968 cost the Vietcong thousands of their most valuable cadre, including irreplaceable veterans of the 10 to 20 years of revolutionary activity. Thus the boldness and ingenuity that made the Tet offensive possible was largely eliminated in the bloody toll of the offensive itself.

The incredibly determined troops who fought suicidally into the American Embassy compound, the leaders of assaults on the cities throughout the country, the political cadre who came into the open for the first time to lead the "general uprising"—all these were lost.

Since then, the theory continues, the local Vietcong have become progressively weaker. Thousands have "chieu hoi" or rallied to

the government side rather than fight on against increasingly adverse odds. Thousands more have been eliminated by the Phoenix program which tracks down, arrests and jails Vietcong cadre.

Front in Disarray

The NLF has lost control of most populated areas of the countryside, therefore losing its base for recruiting new personnel. Today the Front's vaunted organization is in disarray or worse; in many areas it is said to be nonexistent, or dependent on a handful of local cadres where once there were hundreds.

To support the theory, officials here generally cite the same bits of evidence: The self-evident fact that Vietcong losses at Tet were enormous, the self-evident fact that the Vietcong now control very few populated areas, the increasing percentage of North Vietnamese troops in nominally Vietcong units, reports from prisoners and ralliers about the desperate straits the Communists are in, and statistics showing how many thousands of the "VCI" (members of the Vietcong infrastructure) have been neutralized, and how dramatically pacification is progressing, almost without opposition. . . .

Implicit in this optimism is a belief that the conditions which existed in the first half of the 1960s when the NLF built its strength and organized local administrations that "clearly outperformed the government's on every count," as Bernard Fall once wrote—have now virtually disappeared. Viet-

namese society has changed radically since 1965, almost entirely in ways that work against the Vietcong, according to the analysis.

Conditions in 1961

One experienced official gave this example: "When I came into the Delta in 1961, I found that people believed ridiculous lies that the Vietcong told them. Their propaganda was unchallenged." Peasants believed that Saigon had been almost destroyed, that Americans in Diem's palace ran the government and other tales, he said.

But today, thousands of television sets and hundreds of thousands of radios later, the Vietnamese peasantry is no longer so gullible. Ordinary people daily see and hear things that they never dreamed of in the early 1960s. They get a detailed version of national and world events that contradicts Vietcong propaganda.

Since 1965, this analysis continues, the Vietcong have also lost their popular support. In the early days of the insurgency there were real benefits to life under the Vietcong: Land was distributed to farmers, social services that Saigon had never provided were available, reasonably free local elections (suspended by Diem) were held.

NLF Support Estimated

"I am convinced," says one American who was here at the time, "that in 1964 and 1965, at least 50 per cent of the people actively supported the Vietcong and expected them to win the war."

The same official thinks the number of NLF support-

ers now is no more than 10 or 15 per cent of the population. He attributes much of the change to the experience of the Tet offensive. Tet is much the most important holiday of the year in Vietnam. Superstitious Vietnamese—of whom there are many—believe that the luck of the whole year will be determined by their luck during Tet. The Vietcong assured that Tet in 1968 was as bad a holiday as it could have been for millions of Vietnamese when it launched nationwide attacks.

In many parts of Vietnam the Tet attacks resulted in Vietcong occupation of territories that had been controlled by Saigon. "Three to six months under VC control," says Col. Duong Hien Nghia, the province chief of Vinhlong, "gave the people a chance to make a comparison between communism and nationalism."

Much of Col. Nghia's province was under Vietcong control for several months after Tet. He is now convinced that the experience convinced many people in Vinhlong to opt for "nationalism," and that this change of the "popular spirit" has made it possible to pacify most of the province.

More practically, it is said, there are no longer any advantages to life under the Vietcong but there are numerous apparent disadvantages. Now that they are on the defensive, the Vietcong must press into service whoever they can find. Their taxes are now extremely high, much higher than the

government's. Vietcong areas are subject to military sweeps, air strikes and artillery fire and the NLF's shadow government has disappeared or gone underground, offering few if any benefits to its followers.

Moreover, the optimistic analysis continues, South Vietnam has been transformed from a quiet agrarian economy into a bustling marketplace of consumer goods. Motorbikes, radios, televisions and other appliances have transformed the lives and ambitions of urban Vietnamese and many peasants, too.

One can find television aerials in the deepest corners of the Mekong Delta. Even where there is no electricity and radios can be found in almost any hamlet in Vietnam. Motorbikes have become a way of life in Vietnam. Capitalism has come to the scene of the revolution, and the revolution has suffered—at least temporarily—as a result.

Vietnam Is Changed

This analysis is not easily tested, for its assumptions about what appealed originally to followers of the NLF cannot be proved. But there is no doubt that the war has radically changed Vietnam. There is widespread agreement among the Vietnamese and knowledgeable outsiders here that the Vietcong have largely lost their claim to the affections of their old followers.

The revolution used to be easy and attractive. Now it is rigorous, dangerous and uncomfortable. Many South Vietnamese are apparently no longer interested.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
15 October 1969

Pacification in Rural Vietnam Making Big but Fragile Gains

By TERENCE SMITH
Special to The New York Times

CPYRGHT

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 15—The road that runs south from Saigon to Cantho is clogged these days with trucks and cars that rattle along with careless abandon.

Sixteen months ago, in the wake of the Lunar New Year offensive, a drive along the stretch between Mytho and Cantho was a perilous adventure. Vietcong guerrillas regularly planted mines under the pavement and floated explosives under the bridges. In the evening and early morning snipers fired at passing cars from the trees lining the road.

Today as an extensive auto trip has confirmed, the only danger along Route 4 is the traffic, which is dreadful, and the potholes, which can shatter an axle.

The improved security along the road is one of the more visible examples of the progress achieved over the last year by the allied pacification program. While the enemy has concentrated his attacks on military targets, the \$600-million-a-year effort to secure and develop the South Vietnamese countryside has proceeded almost without opposition.

The gains during the period have been striking. Rural security has been greatly increased—although American officials concede that it is still fragile—and the Saigon Government's control now reaches deeper into the countryside than it has for at least two years.

The expanded security in the countryside is a result of a combination of the pacification program and the enemy's decision during the last 10 months

to concentrate on military targets.

With an eye toward escalating American casualties, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong have directed their principal efforts this year against Allied military installations rather than civilian targets. As a result, the forces assigned to the pacification program have encountered little opposition as they have pushed deeper into the countryside.

They have been operating in a sort of military vacuum, and the American officials in charge of the program are quick to concede that the progress that has been made would not have been possible had the enemy been determined to frustrate it.

Nonetheless, the officials, capitalizing on the opportunity, have redoubled their efforts during the widespread lull that has descended over the battlefield since the middle of August. They are attempting to make the most of it because they realize that it cannot last in that the major test lies ahead, definitely. They acknowledge when the enemy turns his attention to the fruits of the program.

The officials well remember the Tet offensive of 1968, which delivered a severe setback to the gains achieved by the pacification program in 1967 and shattered the boundless optimism that characterized the official American attitude at the time.

'We Realize Its Limits'

Varied and widespread though it is, American officials readily acknowledge, the security that prevails in much of Vietnam could easily be upset by a determined enemy effort.

"There has been a steady expansion of security and Government control throughout the year," William E. Colby, who directs the pacification effort, said in a recent interview. "But

it is thin at night and in the rural areas away from the towns."

We realize its limits. We know it is still thin in many areas.

To test the security, this reporter set off with two others on a five-day, 400 mile drive through the heart of the Mekong Delta. Unarmed and in a Volkswagen sedan, we drove the length of Route 4 from Saigon to Cantho, then up the bank of the Mekong River to Chaudoc, a lovely province capital on the Cambodian border, and back through Sadek and Mytho to Saigon.

No Sound of Gunfire

We passed through towns, villages and hamlets and through miles of lush, green paddy fields without hearing a shot. Men and women are working the fields without visible concern for their safety, and in the towns the restaurants were busy until the curfew forced them to close.

A handful of mining incidents were reported during the week on some of the roads we used, but we encountered none of them.

The areas toured seemed prosperous as well as secure.

Television antennas poked up from innumerable thatched roofs, and in the towns gleaming new Japanese motorcycles crowded the sidewalks.

As another example of the improved security, Jim Clare, a reporter for Stars and Stripes, the Army newspaper, recently hitchhiked the length of Route 1 — the late Bernard Fall's "Street Without Joy" — from the demilitarized zone to Saigon. He made the trip in 13 days without incident, arriving here last week.

In January, 1967, Michele Ray, a French free-lance journalist was kidnapped by the Vietcong when she attempted the same trip. She was released after three weeks in captivity.

No else had tried it since.

Gerold Hickey, the anthropologist who first came to Vietnam in 1962, recently compared the present security to the conditions that prevailed in the summer of 1964, before the vast American buildup was under way.

Still Many Risky Areas

"We used to drive up and down the coast and all through the Delta in those days," he said. "Now people are doing it again. You can drive from Da-nang to Dongha now. A year or 18 months ago it would have been suicide."

None of this is to say that there are not areas that the Vietcong dominate either wholly or in part. There are still many districts in the Delta and in the north where an American driving in anything less substantial than a tank is risking his life.

And there are still many areas that the Vietcong can rely on for sanctuary, support and supplies. Even in many of the regions where the Government presence has recently been established, the Vietcong still conduct their business at night and collect taxes on a regular basis.

But the pendulum has swung in the direction of the Government during the last year, and the shift is reflected in the much-maligned computerized analyses prepared each month by the experts on pacification. In the past their findings have been sharply challenged, by members of Congress among others.

According to official American figures, 89 per cent of the South Vietnamese people were living under "relatively secure" control of the Saigon Government as of Aug. 31 — 15.3 million of a population of 17.3 million. In the rural areas the figures are lower but still high; 84 per cent of those outside the cities enjoy "relative

security."

A Definition by Thieu

In some cases that security is very relative — particularly at night, when the Vietcong are most active. In a recent speech President Nguyen Van Thieu came up with a definition of a relatively secure area that most people agree with. It means, he said, an area that "Government representatives can visit without military escort in the daytime."

Even President Thieu would readily acknowledge that the situation can easily change at night or from one day to another.

The generally improved security is mainly a result of the enlarging and equipping of the regional and popular forces, nicknamed the Ruff Puffs, which along with the regular army, have taken over a large share of the military side of pacification. As a result of relentless American prodding, and in the absence of significant enemy opposition, they have spread out into the countryside and taken up the front-line defense of much of the rural population.

In addition a home-grown militia composed of men too young or old for the draft and of some women and girls has been developed over the last year and a half. There are about 1.5 million members of these people's self-defense force

who guard their own villages or hamlets at night. About a million of them have received some rudimentary military training, and they have some 300,000 arms.

Although their contribution to defense may not be great in purely military terms, their presence has provided a major boost to morale.

Shift From Vietcong Areas

The relative security, despite its thinness, is attracting people into the newly pacified communities. Increasing numbers of refugees are leaving the Communist-controlled areas and moving into those more or less under Government control. Politics is not usually involved; people are simply in search of an opportunity to live and work in peace — a rare luxury in Vietnam.

Few officials doubt that the tide would be running in the opposite direction if the people believed they had a better prospect in the Vietcong areas.

There has also been a stirring of political life in the villages during the last year, and this too is a by-product of the pacification program. Elections have been held in about 1,900 of the 2,300 villages in South Vietnam, and though some difficulty was experienced in getting enough people who were both qualified and willing to run, the voting is said to have had a generally positive effect.

New village officials have been given substantial budgets to use for local development, and they now have administrative control over the rural development workers sent by the central Government as part of the pacification effort.

As a result the officials are operating with greater autonomy than they have had since President Ngo Dinh Diem suspended village elections 14 years ago. Returned to their traditional role, they have a vested interest in continued Government control.

Government troops and pacification workers recently pushed into an area in Sadec Province, in the Mekong Delta, long held by the Vietcong and known as the Triangle. They secured three villages that had been abandoned for more than a year, and within a month refugees poured back into the area. The fields surrounding the villages have been planted for the first time in several seasons, village elections have been held and the Government presence appears to be firmly established.

"The elections have produced the beginnings of community awareness and responsibility in the villages," Mr. Colby said. "But let's not overdo it—it's just a beginning, and we know it."

"The important thing is whether the structure we have

set up is strong enough to resist the shock of an enemy attack," he said. "We have been working for the past year in a relative vacuum, but now we have documents that indicate that the enemy feels he must do something about the situation. So it's up to us to prepare for it."

The pacification program is a massive assistance and advisory effort that employs 14,500 people, including 7,300 Americans. Its goal is to extend the Government's presence in the countryside and rejuvenate economic and political life in the rural areas that have been disrupted by the Vietcong. But its primary task is security, and that is how its success is measured.

Officials of the pacification program have been expecting some enemy response since early this year, and they acknowledge that they have been mystified by the lack of it.

Now, as the result of the capture of a command-level enemy document, they expect it shortly. The document, which American analysts believe to be authentic, calls for a concerted military and political campaign to reverse the gains achieved.

In its ominous way the document is a compliment to the program—the first clear indication that the enemy is sufficiently concerned to attempt to counteract it.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
23 October 1969

U.S. Reports Sharp Drop of Refugees in Vietnam

CPYRGHT

Reduction Is Linked to Long Lull on Battlefield and to Pacification Program

By IAD SZOLC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23—

The Nixon Administration has reported a "dramatic" reduction in the number of refugees in South Vietnam in recent months, attributing it both to the long battlefield lull and to the pacification program.

Figures made available here showed that the number of refugees from the rural areas in and out of camps dropped from the peak of 1,450,000 last Feb-

ruary to 790,126 at the end of September.

Enemy Defections Rise

This reduction, officials reported, included the return of 273,000 refugees to their villages in the last nine months, with this flow assuming "dramatic proportions" during August and September.

Conversely, the officials said, the influx of new refugees went down from 300,000 during 1968 to only 73,000 in the first nine months of 1969.

With the additional report yesterday of the defection of 1,310 Vietcong during the week ended Oct. 18—said to be the highest number since the war began—Administration officials

saw a link between the restoration of relative normalcy in sections of South Vietnam and the prolonged military stand-off.

The number of refugee camps and reception centers, it was reported, has been reduced from 900 last March to 800 this week. Any many of these camps are virtually empty or on stand-by status.

Officials stressed that the return of the refugees either to their own villages or to the new resettlement areas was expected to increase rice production to the point where South Vietnam would be self-sufficient in rice in 1971. A higher yield is also expected from the new "miracle" varieties plant-

ed in South Vietnam under American auspices.

A sudden renewal of battlefield activities by the enemy may well alter the refugee picture, the officials acknowledged, but they did not believe this to be likely in the coastal areas of central Vietnam where a lengthy period without fighting has been responsible for the highest rate of returning refugees.

In Binh Dinh Province, for example, 50,000 refugees returned during September alone. A high return rate was reported from the northern Quang Tri Province and, officials said, villagers have begun to come home in Longan Province along the Plain of Reeds, long a Communist stronghold.

THE SAIGON POST
26 October 1969

Village Officials Go To A Self-Help School

By IVAR T. GICA

Eastern Construction Company, Inc.

CPYRGHT

IN a village in Ben Luc district (Long An province) a group of men and women were mixing concrete for a pigsty floor. They were being expertly supervised by an elderly man who knew exactly how much gravel, sand, and cement needed to fill in the specified floor area. He had been supervising various construction projects in the village.

«He's an engineer?» was asked.

«No,» was the answer given through the interpreter.

«Then he must have years of experience estimating

materials.»

«No. He had just learned construction skills in a three-day course in Tan An three weeks ago,» someone explained.

LONG AN province has been conducting three-day skills training courses — the first of their kind reported under the Village Self Development Program in Viet Nam.

Three courses have so far been accomodating an average of 40 participants each. They are variously village and hamlet officials, community development assistants (CDAs)

and lay leaders who are actually involved in the planning, construction and management of VSD projects. This training program is a GVN and New Life Development, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) measure in Long An to copelup with the increasing number of projects being suggested by the villagers in the stepped up-VSD program there. It is also designed to solve the problem of lack of trained personnel or technical men in the villages needed to help the people construct and

manage their community projects.

The specific objectives of the training are 1) to tap local talent and initiative so as to augment the minimal government technical service in the implementation of VSD projects, 2) to minimized the errors, waste, and irregularities in the estimates and purchases of project materials, 3) to come up with efficient and timely completion of all programmed projects in the villages, and 4) to increase the earning power of prospective participants.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 October 1969

Army brigade tests Viet pacification plan

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Landing Zone English, Vietnam

The United States Army's 173rd Airborne brigade is trying to work itself out of a job. The brigade was given the task in mid-April of pacifying four districts of heavily Viet Cong country in northern Binh Dinh Province in cooperation with two regiments of the South Vietnamese 22nd Division.

Many members of the brigade are convinced that their job will be done by the end of the year. The key is development of regional and popular forces in the four districts.

Sections of Binh Dinh have been in Viet Cong hands since 1954. No one believes that the present crash program can cause a

complete turnabout in less than a year.

But officials hope it can stabilize the area to the point at which regional and popular forces can carry on.

Units spread out

From the start the brigade's four maneuver battalions were spread through sections of the four districts, they were ordered to establish lasting security and get redevelopment programs under way.

Battalions were placed so they could work closely with South Vietnamese district officials, company commanders with village chiefs, and platoons generally with regional or popular force troops in hamlets.

Brig. Gen. John W. Barnes, who until recently commanded the brigade, decided that security goals had to be met first.

But it was also clear that it would be

futile for the Americans to achieve pacification only for it to be lost on their departure. Thus, from the very first, U.S. officers and men have worked with the regional and popular forces, becoming, in effect, a horde of advisers.

Forces work together

South Vietnamese regiments are working with regional and popular forces in a similar manner elsewhere in Binh Dinh. In the cases of both the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) and the American airborne, the guiding concept is that regular forces work with local forces until the latter can assume the load.

The objective is two pronged: to free the ARVN for "screening" action against Communist main forces so that pacification is not disrupted; and to allow U.S. forces to

move elsewhere in Vietnam, or possibly, go back home to the States.

Participation reduced

As confidence grows, American membership of patrolling and ambushing units is reduced from the initial one-half. Then the South Vietnamese are encouraged to go alone on some assignments, alternating duty with the Americans. When the South Vietnamese realize they are capable of handling the Viet Cong alone, the Americans prepare to leave.

So far, the technique has worked in one district—the least troublesome of the four. But division officers are convinced the goal of complete pacification of all four districts by the end of the year can be reached.

In the period between April 15 and July 1, security gains were realized in all four districts.

At the end of the period 46.9 percent of the more than 83,336 people in the most difficult district, Tam Quan, were considered

under government control. At the start, the figure was only 9.9 percent.

In Hoai An district, at the start of the program, two-thirds of the population of about 33,000 were reckoned to be under government control. Given the combination of a good district chief, hard work by the regional and popular forces, close local cooperation and amenability, the district was rated completely under government control by the end of May.

The Viet Cong have asserted that they will move right back in as soon as the Americans leave. That hasn't happened yet in Hoai An, the district the Americans have virtually left.

Project watched

Brigade officers are encouraged by the relatively steady flow of Viet Cong from the hills back into the government fold under the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program. And those changing sides say that the Viet Cong are facing a steadily increasing prob-

lem getting food and help from the villagers.

Many military observers point out there are few things more fragile than security. It is much harder to protect than to destroy. And it is always difficult to control an enemy able to move and concentrate force where it can do the most damage.

General Barnes believes the program can work in Binh Dinh. His project has been watched closely by Saigon military officials and visitors from the Pentagon to see whether it would have applications elsewhere in Vietnam.

To many members of the brigade, the current effort is the most personally satisfying experience they've had while fighting here.

They describe their satisfaction in many ways. But, in essence, the satisfaction seems to come in a belief that something good and lasting is being created in Binh Dinh Province.

THE EVENING STAR
7 October 1969

CROSBY S. NOYES

CPYRGHT Growing Support for Saigon Regime Reported

SAIGON — A visitor to Vietnam is impressed by the contrast in moods: The frantic impatience in Washington to get the war over with at almost any price and the determination here to see it through, however long it takes.

This is not a contrast between Western pragmatism and Oriental fatalism. It is rather a very different reading of what is actually happening in Vietnam that is shared here by Vietnamese and Americans alike.

Skepticism, to be sure, is justified. How many times since 1965 have we heard that we had finally turned the bend, that there was light at the end of the tunnel and that it was just a matter of time until things were under control?

The difference today, however, is that it is no longer a matter of time. Today, even the skeptics who take the trouble to look for themselves agree that things are coming under control. The military threat is being contained and the authority of the government is being extended in the

hamlets and villages where the contest in Vietnam ultimately will be decided.

One can hear, of course, the snorts of derision and disbelief. For a good many Americans, the very possibility of such a thing is the purest anathema. In the mind of the opposition, the unpopularity of the "tyrannical and oppressive" regime in Saigon has become a fixation. Or, more important, it has become an essential club with which to force ever more disastrous concessions from a nervous administration in Washington.

Yet the facts are not really a matter of dispute. Whatever success has been achieved in "building democracy" from the top down — a problematical process, given the fragmentation of the country's political leadership — there is no question that impressive progress has been made in establishing a democratic foundation and a sense of participation at the village level.

The degree of local autonomy that has been achieved may be modest by Western standards, but it exceeds anything that has exist-

ed in Vietnam since the time of the French administration. Until now, all local officials were appointed by central provincial administrations. And all local projects, from building of schools and roads to digging wells, have been at the direction of the central authority.

This system has been radically changed by a somewhat crude but effective program of systematic bribery.

This year, all villages have been offered direct, no-strings-attached funds by the Saigon government, to be spent on anything the villagers wished — but with an important condition. Villages with elected councils and chiefs received a stipend of 1 million piasters — or about \$8,300 at official rates. Those with appointed leaders received 40,000 piasters. Needless to say, village elections have been held by the thousands throughout the land.

A serious effort, furthermore, has been made to build the prestige and the authority of the village chief. In a radical departure from past practice, the police, local self de-

fense and popular forces have been placed under his direct authority. Each month, thousands of village and hamlet officials are taken to Vung Tau on the coast south of Saigon for a cram course in basic local administration, with a good deal of political indoctrination thrown in.

The upshot of this effort is that today for the first time there is the beginning of mass participation in the political life of the country. The main beneficiaries have been the local authorities, who have now become personages in their own right, and the central government which brought about the change. The chief casualty has been the local Communist infrastructure in the villages — the painfully constructed political and strong-arm apparatus in which the Communist main-force military units depend for supplies and support.

For those who believe that nothing of value is being accomplished in Vietnam and that the proper course for the United States is to throw in the towel as quickly as possible, this is, perhaps, a disturbing conclusion.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1969

Health in Vietnam

Substantial Progress Made With Help Of Governments and Private Groups

CPYRGHT

By HOWARD A. RUSK, M.D.

Earlier this month persons in the United States working with the United States Agency for International Development for rehabilitation services in South Vietnam had a first-hand report from Dr. Tran Lu-Y, that nation's Minister of Health.

Dr. Lu-Y was in the United States for the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization in Boston and also attended briefly the annual meeting of the American Medical Association in New York City.

Despite the tremendous health and rehabilitation problems in South Vietnam, Dr. Lu-Y's report was optimistic.

The most recent development there is the opening this month of the new 50-bed center for reconstructive plastic surgery operated by Children's Medical Relief International, a New York-based voluntary organization.

Currently three plastic surgeons are performing five operations daily in the single operating room but this will more than double when two more operating rooms become available in the near future.

A Convalescent Unit

Adjacent to the new, completely modern surgical hospital is a 120-bed convalescent unit operated by the International Rescue Committee.

The new facilities will be able to handle well over 1,000 patients a year, which will go far in meeting the needs of South Vietnam for reconstructive plastic surgery.

One of the greatest problems in Vietnam is the large number of children born with cleft palate and harelip.

Supplementing their work is the reconstructive surgery done in Cong Hoa Military Hospital by volunteer plastic surgeons sponsored by the American Society of Plastic Reconstructive Surgeons. This group that operates in conjunction with

MEDICO, a service of CARE, has trained five Vietnamese surgeons to do excellent and sophisticated reconstructive plastic surgery.

Another new facility that opened this year is Vietnam's sixth modern rehabilitation center. This 100-bed center, a branch of the National Rehabilitation Institute, was sponsored and financed by the Government of Canada. Technological and professional support of the center is being supplied by the Rehabilitation Institute of Montreal under a contract with the Canadian Government.

Under the program 20 Vietnamese medical and allied health professionals are undergoing long-term training in Montreal in various aspects of rehabilitation.

Situated in Quinhon, a coastal city about halfway between Saigon and the demilitarized zone, the center has a staff of 10 Canadian specialists providing medical rehabilitation services including physiotherapy, occupational therapy and artificial limbs and braces. They now provide greatly needed help to a nearby leprosarium.

Center Nears Completion

Within a few weeks construction will be completed on another new 100-bed rehabilitation center in Cantho in the Mekong Delta.

This center, constructed by the World Rehabilitation Fund, a United States voluntary organization, under a contract with the Agency for International Development, will house a program that has been operating for the last two years in temporary facilities.

A similar 100-bed center was opened in Danang just south of the demilitarized zone.

These are both branches of the National Rehabilitation Institute, which has its headquarters in Saigon.

The other two rehabilitation centers are Conghoa Military Hospital operated by the Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the American Friends Serv-

ice Committee Center at Quang ngai.

These are unbelievable accomplishments when one realizes there was actually no program in operation four years ago.

These six centers are currently producing about 1,000 artificial limbs and braces per month.

The backbone of medical services to civilians in Vietnam is provided by about 2,000 physicians, nurses and other allied personnel provided by the United States and its allies.

Grouped into medical teams they are working in most of Vietnam's provincial hospitals.

U.S. Nurses Reduced

As a result of increasing the number of Vietnam's schools of nursing from four to nine, the United States has, fortunately, been able to reduce the number of American nurses in Vietnam.

Supplementing the efforts of the physicians on long-term assignments are doctors from the United States who voluntarily serve two months in provincial hospitals under the sponsorship of the American Medical Association.

Since the program was started in June, 1965, a total of 647 individual physicians have voluntarily served at least 60 days and of the group 60 have returned to Vietnam for an additional voluntary tour and two have served four voluntary tours.

The American Medical Association also has a project with a staff of 14 Americans working with the Vietnamese medical faculty to improve medical education at the University of Saigon.

The American Dental Association has a similar project with five Americans working in dental education.

Currently there are over 40 American voluntary agencies working in some aspect of health and medical care.

Some receive major support for their undertakings through contacts with the Agency for International Development.

Others are completely voluntary. They include all of the major agencies such as CARE, Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, Salvation Army, Foster Parents Plan, International Rescue Committee and Save the Children Federation.

Some are small, newer agencies. Illustrative of the latter is Project Pollo Vietnam, which periodically ships donated and purchased vaccine for poliomyelitis, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, typhoid fever and tuberculosis.

Help for 850,000

Since its inception three years ago this organization has provided sufficient vaccine to immunize 850,000 children against poliomyelitis through its trailer dispensary that visits villages, refugee camps, churches, schools and hospitals.

Another specialized voluntary agency working in Vietnam is Project Concern. This group conducts a village medical assistant-hospital medical assistant program, which trains selected, qualified young Montagnards, Vietnamese and a few Thai refugees in the basics of medical assistance. This operation is currently building a \$100,000 hospital at Lenhiep, which has been contributed by the citizens of Worcester, Mass., as a living memorial to their war dead in Vietnam.

The health problems in Vietnam remain enormous, but substantial progress is being made by the Vietnamese themselves with the assistance of the United States, allied Governments and volunteer agencies toward the objective of "Helping the Vietnamese to help themselves."

As the Minister of Health, Dr. Tran Lu-Y, commented on his recent visit to the United States, Vietnam needs and welcomes all the help it can get from any source in caring for its sick and disabled.

Vietnamese self-help building better school system

CPYRGHT

By FRANKLIN SAWYER

SAIGON — Vietnamese educators and administrators have taken over the major share of providing their country's growing educational program with the necessary teachers, classrooms and books.

Earlier, a number of countries including the United States, the Republic of China, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and Australia, cooperated in a program to provide children throughout the nation with free text books. However, with the inception of the Education Ministry-operated Instructional Materials Center, (I.M.C.) the Vietnamese began taking more and more responsibility for the development and printing of their school text books. A Committee of Vietnamese educators now originates and creates all educational materials and illustrations, and Vietnamese technicians produce the finished text in I.M.C.'s modern printing plant.

Mr. Ho Lien Bien of I.M.C. noted there are still a few text book shortages, particularly in remote hamlet areas. This is largely due to faulty estimates of needs and failure of student to return text books for use by their juniors in the current school year.

The I.M.C. Official pointed out, however, that the situa-

tion is being remedied as individual cases are brought to the attention of education officials.

It is now hoped that a stepped up text book program will put full set of books in the hands of all elementary students in the first through fifth grades, during the 1969-70 school year.

Fifteen years ago less than ten percent of elementary school-age children between six and eleven-years of age, were attending classes. By the beginning of 1969, that figure had jumped to about 82 percent or more than two million of the 2.4 million eligible pupils.

In talking about the I.M.C. book program, Mai Trung Cuong, a clerk in a pharmaceutical firm, and father of three boys who attend elementary school, said he and other parents are the real beneficiaries of the Broad I.M.C. text book program.

Now all parents can send their children to school without having to worry about where they could find the money to pay for expensive school book," he added.

While progress in elementary school enrollment has been rapid, officials point to the more moderate but constant progress being made in

the secondary schools, and Vietnam's five Universities, located in Saigon, Hue, Can Tho, and Dalat have a combined enrollment of nearly 50,000 students.

Rector Nguyen Chau of Hue University who received his doctorate from Chicago University, has won high praise from visiting foreign educators and advisors for welding together what they described as a «top-notch faculty».

Foreign advisers and visitors also see as an encouraging development the fact that Saigon University's education school hopes, during the 1969-70 academic year, to award both master of arts degrees and doctorates, for the first time.

While there are some classroom and dormitory problems in the 17,000 student Saigon University, Vietnamese officials hope that these too can be solved by building a consolidated campus on a large tract owned by the government in the Thu Duc area, within the next few years.

At all education levels, the visitor is impressed by the almost fanatical interest that parents express in getting their children educated. One U.S. educator who has been in Vietnam for more than four years said, «we can learn a lot from these people

about what a really effective Parent-Teacher Association for example is all about.»

He went on to say that parents meet with school administrators and teachers, and literally mend fences, help build classrooms and cheerfully carry out a myriad of other chores in order to help their community to have a better-run, more effective school.

Such gestures can be seen as extremely important, even critical in some cases, when viewed in the light that the Education Ministry's annual budget to build and maintain all school facilities throughout the country, plus meeting teachers' salaries, is only 6,000 million piasters, or 5.5 per cent of the national budget (about 55 million dollars).

Many of the 12,000 classrooms built in villages and hamlets throughout Vietnam during the past year were constructed with the help of parents eager to lend their time and talents to such projects, officials said.

One Saigon official pointed out that «every school built today is built under the direction of the village council,» which must produce the building materials from their own resources. He added, «the initiative and the planning are done at the hamlet level.»

NEW YORK TIMES
24 March 1969

CPYRGHT

Vietnamese Hold First Village Elections Since '56

Diem's Practice of Naming Councils Is Abolished —

Militiamen on Guard

By TERENCE SMITH
Special to The New York Times

VINHLOC, South Vietnam, March 23—The people of this dusty village 11 miles northwest of Saigon elected their own leaders today for the first time in 13 years.

In the cool hours of the early morning, they pushed into the dilapidated, three-room schoolhouse that serves as the polling place and selected 10 men as their village council.

If the voters feared Vietcong reprisal for taking part in a Government election, they did not let it show. Nonetheless, outside the schoolhouse, a score of militiamen stood guard with rifles and machine guns.

The scene has been repeated each Sunday this month in almost 3,500 villages throughout South Vietnam. There have been scattered incidents and assassinations, but all the scheduled elections have been held despite the current enemy offensive.

Diem Tightened Control

The elections are the first in these villages since 1956, when Ngo Dinh Diem, then

President, replaced elected officials with appointed council members in an effort to tighten his control of the countryside. Government-appointed officials have been in office ever since.

In the opinion of many observers and historians, this move alienated the villagers as much as anything else President Diem did in the years before he was overthrown and assassinated Nov. 1, 1963.

By installing his own men in the villages, President Diem compromised the traditional autonomy of the village councils and upset the arrangement expressed in an old Vietnamese proverb: "The Emperor's law stops at the village gate."

For centuries, the villages of Vietnam had operated as more or less independent units, governed by a council of elders who were chosen by the people for their fairness. The councils took full responsibility for the villages' justice, security and fiscal matters.

Direct Dealing

When the Vietnamese emperors or, after them, the French colonists, wanted anything from the village, including taxes, they dealt directly and respectfully with the members of its council.

Many historians believe that President Diem, by upsetting

this arrangement, gave the Vietcong a most persuasive arguing point with the people of the countryside.

The elections this month involved approximately three million people in 24 per cent of South Vietnam's villages. In addition, 2,882 hamlet chiefs have been elected.

The voting today represented a continuation of the present Government's efforts to recapture the countryside from the Vietcong and to re-establish home rule for villages. These efforts began in the spring of 1967 when the first authorized elections were held in 988 villages where the security was considered adequate. The plan is to hold more elections if security improves in more villages.

In Vinhloc today, there were 12 candidates running for 10 positions on the village council. More than anything else, this contest reflected the comparatively safe status of the village. In many communities, the Government has been unable to find enough candidates for the available positions.

The Vietcong have made politics—at least Government-affiliated politics—a dangerous business in the countryside. A village chief receives 4,830 Piasters (about \$40) monthly for his services, and stands a good chance of being murdered in

his sleep.

In the mountain resort town of Dalat, for instance, a hamlet chief who ran for re-election earlier this month was assassinated two days before the election. No one came forward to fill his place.

"The people are afraid," an American Lieutenant Colonel who advises the Vietnamese province chief said. "There have been too many assassinations, no one wants the job."

Political Base Needed

Despite the problems, the elections are vital to the Government's effort to prepare a base from which to compete with the Vietcong in the political struggle that many Vietnamese assume will follow the peace talks in Paris.

Of the candidates in Vinhlong, a platoon leader with the local militia was the most outspoken about why he was standing for office.

"The security situation has improved a great deal in this village over the last year," he said through an interpreter, continuing:

"For the first time in years we can begin to do things. We need a new school, we have to repair the roads and we have to enlarge the dispensary.

"Now we have a chance to do these things—so long as someone stands guard at night."

WASHINGTON POST
2 April 1969

Saigon Announces Big Local-Election Vote, Sees Wide Control

CPYRGHT

Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, April 1 — The

South Vietnamese government released final statistics today on the recent round of village and hamlet elections, and said it now controlled 90 per cent of the population.

At a press conference, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Tranh Thien Khiem presented statistics showing that nearly 90 per cent of the eligible voters had cast ballots in those areas where elections were held.

In response to a question, Khiem said the government controlled 90 per cent of

the people. The most recent American statistics give the South Vietnamese credit for controlling slightly more than 80 per cent. This figure has been challenged by critics of the U.S. involvement.

Some officials have expressed pleasure with the smooth electoral process, while others showed skepticism about its value. One Vietnamese source pointed out today that the recorded percentage of voters was higher in remote areas—where, he said, government officials might not worry about observers or reporters checking figures.

However, even skeptics were impressed that the elections were held as scheduled in so many areas, and with so few incidents of Vietcong sabotage.

The village and hamlet elections were spread through February and March, staggered to allow government forces to provide maximum security for each campaign.

Khiem said today that only five incidents of Communist sabotage were reported during the balloting, with only one person killed. In the past, he said, the Government has undertaken major terrorist campaigns against South Vietnam-

ese elections.

During February and March, 301 hamlets and 582 villages held elections. A village in Vietnam is a small town. Hamlets are the tiny population centers within villages.

In the village elections, the final statistics showed, 6017 candidates ran for 4593 positions. In many areas, citizens were reportedly afraid to run for fear of Vietcong retaliation. Throughout the country, many of those who did run were military men or government officials already.

Village councils choose the village chief, who can be an important figure.

SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
November 1969

Land Reform in South Vietnam

CPYRGHT

Peter Hess

South Vietnam's land reform, repeatedly postponed by pressure groups and an ineffectual administration, is now being pushed with increased energy. The possible shift of emphasis from a military conflict to a primarily political confrontation has lent the problem new urgency. The Saigon government itself intends to adopt the Viet Cong slogan "Give the land to the farmers" and thus take from the communists one of their most effective propaganda arguments. Nearly as important to South Vietnamese and American circles in Saigon who are concerned for the continuity of the American engagement, is the aim of proving to American liberals by means of a radical land reform that the Saigon regime is not the servant of an obsolete feudalism but fully intends to introduce extensive structural changes in favor of the poorer classes. But despite initial hopes that the land reform program could be put into effect before the January rice harvest, the draft proposal supported by President Thieu is still stuck in the legislative mill.

The history of land reform in South Vietnam consists of a series of feeble beginnings quickly abandoned under the pressure of political confusion and powerful landowners. At America's urging, President Ngo Dinh Diem issued a land reform decree in 1957 which, despite its liberal allowance of a maximum ownership of 100 hectares (247 acres), has still been only partially carried out. Another initiative was undertaken in 1966 with American support but it was only in 1968 that official agencies began devoting their full energies to drawing up a far-reaching land reform program. A study issued by the Stanford Research Institute in December 1968 provided the necessary data for a combined Vietnamese-American study group which prepared a Land Reform Law that was passed last September in somewhat watered-down form by the House of Representatives of the Saigon parliament. President Thieu, who heartily approves of the simple and radical features of the legislative draft, hopes to be able to push it through in its original form in the further course of the legislative process.

Despite the strong trend toward urbanization some 60 % of the South Vietnamese population still live in rural areas. Two-thirds of these people own no land of their own. The typical South Vietnamese rural

inhabitant is a small tenant farmer who works about 1.6 hectares (roughly 4 acres) of land. He pays between one-third and one-half of the proceeds of his harvest as rent to a landowner who, in one out of two cases, lives somewhere in a city and almost without exception provides his tenant with absolutely no support in the form of credit, seed, fertiliser or know-how. Most tenant farmers are completely dependent on the landowners, who renew their leases from year to year. If the harvest is bad, rental for the land may be more than the harvest brings in. The average interest on indebtedness is 60 % annually. It has often happened that, when an area formerly controlled by the Viet Cong came under Saigon's rule, the landowners enlisted military and official help in collecting rents for past years.

Under these conditions the Viet Cong used with great success the tactic of expropriating the large landowners in areas under its control and handing over the land to the tenant farmers. Since 1945 several hundred thousand small farmers have in this way become landowners with the help of the Viet Minh and later the National Liberation Front. But, as the history of communist countries (including North Vietnam) shows, this is only a provisional measure which, once the communists fully take power, is followed by collectivization of all land. However, as Professor Prosterman, an American who is a radical advocate of land reform, has remarked, the South Vietnamese rice farmers are not historians. On the basis of their practical experience many of them make a direct identification between the Viet Cong and a land reform which brings them personal ownership, while they connect the Saigon regime with perpetuation of the rights of the large landowners. This circumstance is presumably an important element in motivating the active support which some of the rural South Vietnamese give to the Viet Cong, who have a recruiting slogan which says: "We gave you the land. Give us your sons."

Political analysts are probably not mistaken in their expectation that a rapid and effective land reform program would rob the Viet Cong of an important part of its attractiveness and thus substantially facilitate Saigon's attempts at pacification. But if land reform is further delayed, this problem would provide one of the most powerful slogans for the National Liberation Front in the event of free elec-

CPYRGHT

tions such as have been proposed by President Thieu.

On January 18 President Thieu declared that land reform is a sine qua non for the pacification program. At the beginning of the year he issued instructions that all land belonging to the state must be distributed among the tenant farmers free of charge by December 31. This plan embraces 363,000 acres, the remnant of the 1.1 million acres stemming from Diem's land reform program and the 568,000 acres handed over to South Vietnam by the French. In two subsequent decrees issued last spring the South Vietnam regime ordered a one-year freeze of present tenant conditions. This was designed to give the tenant farmers some measure of security, to prevent landowners from stepping in in territories newly regained from the Viet Cong and to provide a breathing spell until the new land reform program would come into effect.

A first draft of the actual Land Reform Law at the end of April was quite tame. According to this project voluntary land sales were to take place during two to three years and only then would property in excess of 20 hectares (about 50 acres) be compulsorily sold. The price which the tenant farmers would have to pay according to this first draft was one-quarter of the proceeds of their harvests for 12 years.

More radical and, due to its simplicity, easier to execute was a second government draft of mid-May. It proposed to make every tenant farmer the owner of his leased land immediately and without cost. The result of this reform advocated by President Thieu would be that 3.2 million acres of land owned by 16,000 non-farming landowners would be transferred to approximately 800,000 tenant farmers. To accelerate the administrative process it was proposed to effect the land transfers primarily through local village governments rather than through the central Saigon regime. The previous owners were to be recompensed at the rate of the value of 2.5 harvests or approximately 400 dollars per hectare (160 dollars per acre). A fifth of this sum was to be paid out in cash and the remainder in the form of eight-year government notes. Landowners were not to be permitted to retain any property which they had already leased to tenants. A simple request from the tenant farmer was to have sufficed to effect a change of ownership.

Critics of the Saigon government are in many respects correct in raising doubts about the functioning of what is formally a parliamentary democracy. In practice, for example, the power of the president goes far beyond what is foreseen in the Vietnamese constitution. But the fate of the land reform proposal shows that Thieu is frequently compelled to energetically woo the approval of the legislators, who are by no means easy-going yes-men.

Saigon's House of Representatives, which consists of 134 legislators, approved the land reform proposal on September 1 by a vote of 69 to 15. But it also made some important changes in the government draft, partly in the interests of the landowners and partly with the intention of enabling other segments of the population, in addition to the tenant farmers, to benefit from the land reform. According to the version passed by the lower house, and in contrast to the desires of the president, landowners are permitted to retain up to 15 hectares of land. Instead of 1.3 million hectares being divided among 800,000 tenant farmers, only 700,000 hectares are to be distributed among 400,000 tenants. In addition to these, however, other groups such as soldiers and government officials are to benefit from the land reform program.

The main disadvantage of the changes introduced by the lower chamber consists in the fact that the basic conception of Thieu's program — giving all land immediately to the current tenants — has been severely complicated. The clarification of land titles, which have grown uncertain in wartime, the separation of land to be retained by the former owners and participation by nonfarming elements would involve time-consuming operations which the administration is hardly in a position to handle.

President Thieu is confident that, despite resistance, he will be able to push through the Land Reform Law in its original form. During the forthcoming debate in the Senate he will try to eliminate as many changes as possible. Afterwards, according to the constitution, he himself has the right to make changes in the legislative text which can then be vetoed only by a two-thirds majority of both houses. The final fate of South Vietnam's land program thus still remains uncertain. But there seems little hope of putting it into operation in time for next January's rice harvest.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

December 1969

WHAT DO THEY WANT IN ITALY?

A striking example of the special "cold war" conducted between the Italian Communist Party and the Soviet neo-Stalinists occurred in the angry Italian Communist reaction to a new Soviet novel What Do You Want?, by Vsevolod Kochetov. An unabashed defense of Stalin's infallibility, this novel of "socialist conscience" versus western spies, running serially in the conservative Writers' Union monthly Oktyabr (beginning last September), has more targets than immediately meet the Soviet reader's eye. On the story level, What Do You Want? is simple Soviet pap for the mass readership. The chief target is the villainous liberal Soviet intelligentsia, allied with western spies who work for the publisher of New World magazine (the title is given in English in the novel in a heavy-handed reference to the liberal Soviet literary monthly Novy Mir, which means "new world" in Russian). The wholesome Stalinist hero also sets himself against any and all who criticize Stalin for personal gain and even against party members, now officially rehabilitated, who were purged in 1937! Equally dangerous, according to author Vsevolod Kochetov, are today's Soviet youth, so lacking in revolutionary vigilance. A reflection of continuing pressure by the neo-Stalinists to keep the lid of orthodoxy on the boiling pot of freely creative writing in the Soviet Union, Kochetov's novel is a curious catalogue of conservative Communist bugaboos: anti-Stalinism, dangers of liberal intellectualism, decline in ideology among youth, ideological deviationists, western "bridge-building," spies in the apparatus.

Part of this roman à clef is laid in Italy. There Kochetov, who is also publisher of Oktyabr, attacks yet another target: the Italian comrades -- and by extension, Communist parties elsewhere -- for their lack of subservience to the USSR. "Anybody who criticizes the Soviet Union today is no Communist," says one of his characters. "Russia is the motherland of Communism and anybody who would kick and stomp on his own mother is a pig!" Kochetov expends considerable energy on polemics over the Italian versus the true -- or Soviet -- road to socialism. Some Italian Communists are castigated for seeking parliamentary representation, for Trotskyite leanings, even for being Mussolini lovers!

These free-swinging diatribes brought cries of "slander" from the Italian Communist paper L'Unita along with the admonition that "if you stay barricaded behind old Stalinist positions you wind up today in conflict with the Socialist and Marxist culture of the USSR...."

The novel's chief Italian villain is a comrade called Benito Spada, who is a reformer, a supporter of the new (read Czechoslovak) way, and an enemy of the people. A real, prominent Italian Communist and authority on Russian literature, Vittorio Strada, sees the portrayal of Spada as a scurrilous attack on himself. He suggests in Rinascita of 10 October (attached) that his previously expressed disdain for Kochetov's mediocre scribblings is at the root of this cowardly attack.

Non-communist Italian newspapers have reported on the exchange of fire.

Corriere della Sera of 1 October (attached) comments on the "slashing attack on Italian Communists." La Stampa of Torino on 21 October interviewed Kochetov who "rejected the Italian Communist criticism" of his book. Strada then gave La Stampa a rebuttal. Kochetov, he said, is a "vulgar liar" but "unfortunately it cannot be said that he lacks followers." Strada also charged that Kochetov attacked Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom Strada called "this authentic Socialist writer subjected to censorship and persecution." Strada also charges that: "Kochetov makes a demagogic appeal to the workers. But when, as in Czechoslovakia, the working class took positions opposite to those of Kochetov -- that is, socialist positions -- the Soviet writer speaks of counterrevolution and exalts armed intervention."

The novel is symbolic both of the current ascendancy of the Stalinists in the literary sphere in the USSR and the position of the Soviet leadership vis-à-vis foreign Communists who venture to take a stand independent of the Soviet line.

December 1969

DRAMATIS PERSONAE: VITTORIO STRADA AND VSEVOLOD KOCHETOV

Once described by Rome's L'Espresso as Italian publisher Einaudi's "talent scout for Russia," Vittorio Strada has a history of irritating Moscow's conservatives. In the late 1950's he was a student of literature at Moscow State University. There is an unconfirmed story that his dissertation was almost rejected and that only after the intervention of Italian Communist Party Chief Togliatti was it accepted.

In 1963, Strada apparently attended a Moscow writers' conference devoted to "Humanism and Contemporary Literature." Back in Italy, he wrote with optimistic enthusiasm about two authors who had spoken at the conference and who had decried the oppressiveness of "socialist realism" and the effect on Soviet literature of a new cult of technology. Strada's article was published in the 27 February 1965 supplement to Rinascita, Il Contemporaneo.

From a spring 1967 trip to the Soviet Union, Strada brought back to his publisher an exclusive, uncirculated collection of letters by Boris Pasternak which was then first published by Einaudi as Letters to Georgian Friends, in early summer 1967. By 13 July, Paese Sera reported that, in retaliation, Vittorio Strada was under attack by Moscow's Literaturnaya Gazeta for his misinterpretations of the Soviet literary scene (as described in his article written two years previously!).

Later in the year, Strada further endeared himself to Soviet orthodoxy with his contributions to the celebrations of the Soviet 50th Anniversary of the Revolution. He wrote two articles, published in Critica Marxista, Nos. 4-5, and Rinascita of 27 October 1967, in which he flayed not only Soviet censorship but, very lightly and indirectly, even Karl Marx. These were followed by a 13 February 1968 article in L'Unita, "Literature and Politics in the Soviet Union," wherein Strada was highly critical of the Moscow trials of Ginzburg and Galanskov, describing the event as "part of the master state of things -- as an event which preoccupies whoever sees in socialism the solution to present world problems." In this same article, Strada had high praise for the letter of protest against censorship written by Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the 4th Writers' Congress of 1967.

In mid-1969 Vittorio Strada emerged as the fictional Benito Spada in the latest of the roman-donos (denunciatory novels) written by Vsevolod Anisitovich Kochetov entitled What Does He Want? and serialized in Kochetov's arch-conservative magazine Oktyabr.

It was at just about the same time as Strada was completing his thesis at Moscow University that Kochetov took over the chief editorship of Oktyabr. Editor-in-chief of Literaturnaya Gazeta since the mid-1950's, Kochetov had long been known for his political tracts dressed up as novels through which he denounced the Soviet intelligentsia who failed to devote their talents to the State or to contemporary social themes. In 1954, Kochetov's Youth Is On Our Side was used to attack adherents to pure science and to warn that science could only exist to serve the needs and development of production.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

After a brief eclipse during the post-Khrushchev period when the leadership was still undecided about its view of culture, Kochetov came to the fore again. During both the 1964 and 1965 January elections to the USSR Writers' Union Board, his name, along with the names of some other old guard conservatives, had even been scratched from the ballots. But by March 1965 he was already on the way back, elected to the governing board of the Writers' Union of the Russian Republic.

Kochetov's contribution to the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Revolution was Angle of Fall, a novel serialized in the October to December 1967 issues of Oktyabr. The novel can be cited as a hypocritical masterpiece. It aims to attack the liberal intelligentsia and defend secret police harassment of dissident writers at the same time as it restores Stalin's honor by depicting him as a hero. By conjuring an image of a period when the fate of the revolution (the 1919 defense of Petrograd) allegedly hinged on the struggle of the Cheka against subversion, the book served to justify the continuation of coercion in Soviet society. Kochetov's treatment of Stalin magnifies some of the more absurd tendencies in the Soviet approach to history. Though he occupies a minor role in the novel, Stalin emerges as a wholly commendable figure while all of his adversaries of later days are shown to be counter-revolutionary scoundrels.

As a reflection of the reactionary drift in the political climate of 1967, most reviewers were kind to Angle of Fall. One writer for Literaturnaya Gazeta, however, called the book no more "than a political tract" and took exception to Kochetov's crudities. He cited Kochetov's description of the "angle of fall" of one of the novel's heroines as brought about not by her psychological makeup but because of her class origin: "She has one blemish: she came from the bourgeoisie. You can have 100 years to remove this blemish and you won't remove it from the human soul. The bourgeois bacillus is most vile."

By spring 1968, Kochetov, often described as a "literary light" who drives many Soviet students into the study of "linguistics" rather than "literature," was making slashing attacks against Solzhenitsyn and other writers who had openly called for freedom of literary expression in the Soviet Union. Describing the works of Pasternak "and his ilk" as "dull, wretched, little plays and movies," Kochetov told an April 1968 Moscow Party Plenum that "literature has to belong to the Party."

RINASCITA, Rome
10 October 1969

CPYRGHT

Risposta al libello del direttore della rivista sovietica "Oktjabr",

Che cosa voglio io

CPYRGHT

di Vittorio Strada

Non intendo analizzare ora l'ultimo romanzo di Kocetov. Che cosa vuoi?, ormai famoso nel mondo. Rimando l'eventuale analisi al compimento della sua pubblicazione. In un celebre verso di A piena voce Majakovskij si definisce «vuoiacessi», «mobilitato e chiamato dalla rivoluzione», alludendo alla sua lotta contro tutto ciò che di negativo nasceva nella società sovietica. Anche oggi il lavoro del critico assomiglia spesso a quell'umile e ostico lavoro. Ricordo le mie ingrate passate esperienze, quando la mia vocazione e professione di studioso della letteratura sovietica mi portò non solo a percorrere valli, poggi, altipiani e a superare erte e dirupi, ma mi costrinse a scendere in acquitrini e pantani. Così nel mio libro Letteratura sovietica 1953-1963 (Editori Riuniti) mi occupai dei romanzi del direttore della rivista Oktjabr V. Kocetov e dei suoi interventi politici. Il lettore mi capirà se mi rifiuto ora di immergermi nella materia romanzesca dell'ultima fatica di Kocetov, che è ancora più melmosa delle sue altre.

Vorrei inoltre, in questa nota per Rinasita, spersonalizzare al massimo la polemica, anche se Kocetov si meriterebbe una rude risposta. Ma i lettori, al di là del fatto di cronaca già noto, si porranno legittimamente la domanda del motivo e del significato di un gesto che non ha precedenti. Bisogna allora ricordare che non hanno precedenti i fatti che hanno provocato l'idrofobia di Kocetov. Non ha precedenti il fatto che un intellettuale comunista sulla stampa di un partito comunista analizzi sistematicamente con cognizione di causa e con animo critico un settore di estrema importanza della società sovietica come la letteratura e la cultura, mettendosi nell'interno stesso della problematica di sviluppo di quel settore. Il mio lavoro di storico e critico della letteratura russa moderna, condotto da posizioni marxiste e socialiste, se mi ha procurato simpatie e riconoscimenti tra gli amici sovietici, mi ha anche, e naturalmente, scatenato contro odi e risentimenti. Del che non mi dolgo, stimo anzi

non contesto a nessuno il diritto di attaccarmi, sempre che non mi sia tolto il diritto di contrattacco. Quello che si deve imputare a Kocetov è la natura calunniosa degli attacchi, i procedimenti denigratori impiegati, l'incredibilmente basso livello delle sue farneticazioni. Confesso che, pur conoscendo l'odiosità delle posizioni prese da Kocetov ai danni di intellettuali sovietici perseguitati, non mi aspettavo che arrivasse a tanto, quando, su pressante invito di un funzionario della Commissione esteri dell'Unione degli scrittori sovietici, lo accolli in casa mia con la cortesia che si usa verso un ospite (anche se non richiesto), soprattutto se è un nemico aperto e dichiarato.

L'altro motivo, più generale dell'ira di Kocetov, è l'atteggiamento preso dal nostro partito verso il «nuovo corso» cecoslovacco e verso l'intervento armato in quel paese e, in genere, la difesa, fatta da noi, dell'autonomia dei partiti comunisti. Difesa che, pur svolgendosi nei limiti di precisi rapporti d'antica data, sembra a Kocetov un fatto scandaloso, se non criminale. Kocetov, allora, per screditare la rivendicazione d'autonomia la mette in bocca al personaggio «cattivo» che, secondo la ricetta del «realismo socialista», egli carica di tutti i vizi ideologici. Ma la rituale accusa di trotskismo qui, con una stupidità che sorprende persino in Kocetov, si contamina di una viva simpatia per Mussolini e si arricchisce di uno sviscerato amore per il parlamentarismo. Il «personaggio positivo» che si contrappone al bieco comunista (il quale osa criticare l'Unione Sovietica e quindi vero comunista non è, come precisa un eroe del romanzo) è un comunista di «sinistra» (di una «sinistra» alla Kocetov) che, amico infedele dell'URSS, propone, come ha notato Gian Carlo Pajetta nel suo corrosivo corsivo sull'Unità, una originale via al socialismo in Italia: spingete il potere borghese su posizioni di estrema destra e il gioco è fatto, cioè il passaggio al socialismo avverrà in un fiat (in una fiat, suggerirebbe acutamente Kocetov). Anche qui nessuno contesta a Kocetov il diritto di criticare i partiti comunisti e di istruirli sui modi più acconci di

to con un articolo? I dirigenti e i militanti di quei partiti si sarebbero risparmiata la lettura penosa di un cosiddetto romanzo e avrebbero subito capito che nuovo Machiavelli ci aveva dato la terra sovietica.

Il mistero di Che cosa vuoi? si chiarisce del tutto là dove un «personaggio positivo», se non angelico, a chi con «consapevole calunnia» rimprovera a Stalin di essersi lasciato cogliere di sorpresa dall'attacco hitleriano, ribatte che non è vero. Stalin, oltre alle condizioni economiche, preparò le condizioni politiche della difesa. Infatti nell'URSS «non c'era una quinta colonna perché furono tempestivamente liquidati i kulak e furono sbaragliate tutte le forme di opposizione nel partito. Questo è l'essenziale, che nessuno ha trascurato di fare». Kocetov dice senza ambagi ciò che vuole: vuole lo stalinismo e, con piena coerenza, riabilita i massacri staliniani. Ma il nostro neo-Machiavelli non è uomo di storia soltanto e, se guarda con nostalgia al '37, fissa lo sguardo al '69 e al '70. La «quinta colonna» oggi, come ieri, sono gli intellettuali, che si lasciano incantare dalle sirene della democrazia borghese e della democrazia socialista, anziché concedersi alle perentorie illecite «proletarie» di Kocetov. Kocetov non trae conclusioni, ma, umile e modesto, mette le sue analisi al servizio degli organi direttivi, i soli che dalle sue denunce possano trarre le debite e pratiche conclusioni. Kocetov, con una tecnica vecchia come il cucco e pur sempre nuova, ammantata di pseudooperismo il suo reale sarebbe che le masse stesse, opportunamente organizzate, facessero piazza pulita «rivoluzionariamente» degli intellettuali sovietici «liberali». In questo senso gli organi direttivi, per quanto non alieni da simpatie kocetoviane, sono su posizioni più moderate. Ma il punto è un altro: nell'URSS, come negli altri paesi di analoga struttura, gli interessi degli intellettuali coincidono con quelli della classe operaia e delle masse del paese. Chi attacca gli intellettuali in nome degli «operai», non serve il popolo, ma lo asservisce.

E qui poniamo punto alla nostra nota non prima di aver mandato Kocetov a casa.

"WHAT I WANT"

by Vittorio Strada

CPYRGHT

[Rinascita, Rome, 10 October 1969]

I do not now intend to analyze Kochetov's last novel Che Cosa Vuoi? (What Do You Want?), which has gained renown throughout the world. I will eventually send an analysis to his publication. In a celebrated line, the author proclaims Mayakovsky as "fired up," as "mobilized and called by the revolution," alluding to his struggle against what was negative in Soviet society. Even today the critic's work frequently resembles that modest and difficult effort. I remember my thankless past experiences, when my vocation and profession as a student of Soviet literature not only led me to cross valleys, hills, plateaus and to surmount steep grades and ravines but forced me to descend to marshes and swamps as well. It was so in my book Letteratura sovietica 1953-1963 [Soviet Literature: 1953-1963] (Riuniti Publishing House), where I delved into the novels written by director of the journal Oktyabr (October) V. Kochetov and his political comments. The reader will understand if I now refuse to immerse myself in Kochetov's most recent novel, which is even more murky than his others.

Instead, I should like in this article for Rinascita to depersonalize the polemics as much as possible, even if Kochetov should deserve a rude response. But the reader, going beyond the fact of the well-known chronical, will legitimately raise the question: what are the motive and significance of the unprecedented gesture? It is then necessary to recall that the fact causing Kochetov's hydrophobia is without precedent. Nor is there any precedent for the fact that a communist intellectual analyzes systematically, with a knowledge of the cause and with a critical spirit, a section of extraordinary importance of Soviet society like literature and culture, placing himself in the middle of the problems connected with the development of that sector and analyzing them in a communist party's press. My work as a historian and critic of modern Russian literature, work carried out on the basis of Marxist and socialist positions, has both gained me the affection and recognition of Soviet friends and unleashed, naturally, hate and resentment. But that does not bother me, of course. And I do not question anybody's right to attack me so long as I have the right to counterattack. What must be held against Kochetov is the slanderous character of the attacks, the denigratory procedures employed, the incredibly low level of his nonsense. I admit that, though aware of the loathsomeness of the positions assumed by Kochetov to the detriment of persecuted Soviet intellectuals, I was prepared less for his arrival than for the pressing invitation asked of me by an official of the Foreign Commission of the Union of Soviet Writers. At any rate I welcomed him in my home with the courtesy usually shown a guest (even if it is not required), especially if the guest is an open and avowed enemy.

Another motive, a more general one associated with Kochetov's ire, is the attitude assumed by our party toward the Czechoslovak "new course," toward the

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military intervention in that country, and, in general, toward our party's defense of communist party autonomy. This defense, although unfolding within precise relationships of ancient vintage, seems to Kochetov to be a scandalous if not a criminal matter. To discredit the claim to autonomy, Kochetov then places on the lips of his "negative" character all the condemned ideological traits, which is in line with the practice of "socialist realism." But the ritualistic accusations of Trotskyism here, plus a stupidity which I find surprising even for Kochetov, are supplemented with those of a lively sympathy for Mussolini and enriched by a passionate love for parliamentarism. The "positive character" that is counterposed to the sinister communist (who dares criticize the Soviet Union and hence is not a true communist, as a hero in one of his novels says) is a "leftist" communist (a "leftist to Kochetov's liking") who, as an indefatigable friend of the USSR, proposes, as was observed by Gian Carlo Pajetta in his corrosive italicized comments in *L'Unita*, an original path to socialism in Italy: you push bourgeois power to extreme right positions and the game is won, i.e., the transition to socialism will be effected in an instant (in a breath, Kochetov would subtly suggest). Even here we do not contest Kochetov's right to criticize communist parties and to instruct them in more suitable ways of the political struggle. But why didn't he do this with an article? The leaders and activists of those parties would have been spared the painful reading of a so-called novel and immediately understood that a new Machiavelli had given us the Soviet land.

The mystery of What Do You Want? is completely cleared up when a "positive" if not angelic "character" criticizes those who with "malice aforethought" reproach Stalin for having allowed himself to be taken by surprise by Hitler's attack. This hero says this is not so. Stalin prepared both the economic and the political conditions for defense. In fact, in the USSR "there was no fifth column because the kulaks had been liquidated on time, and all the various oppositions in the party routed. This is what is important and nobody can disregard it." Kochetov does not circumlocute to say what he wants: he wants Stalinism and, in line with this, rehabilitates the Stalinist massacres. But our neo-Machiavelli is not merely a man of history and, if he looks nostalgically back in 1937, he also fixes his gaze on 1969 and 1970. The "fifth column," today like yesterday, is made up of intellectuals who allow themselves to be enchanted by the sirens of bourgeois democracy and of social democracy rather than to turn themselves over to Kochetov's peremptory, crude "proletarians." Kochetov does not draw any conclusions but, humble and modest, he places his analyses at the service of the leadership organs, the only ones that can draw the proper and practical conclusions. With a technique as old as the hills and yet always new, a technique clothing his real anti-intellectualism with pseudo-workerism, he sets forth his ideal: that the properly organized masses "revolutionarily" clean up the square with the "liberal" Soviet intellectuals. In this sense the leadership organs, for all their liking for Kochetov's views, stand on more moderate positions. But the crux of the matter is not here: in the USSR, as in the other countries having an analogous system, the interests of the intellectuals coincide with those of the country's working class and masses. Whoever attacks the intellectuals in the name of the "workers" does not serve but rather enslaves the people.

And we end our article on this point, but not before having sent Kochetov to have himself blest.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
1 October 1969

DALLE COLONNE DELLA RIVISTA CONFORMISTA «OKTIADR»

CPYRGHT

Attacco ai compagni italiani

«Sognano di godere dei diritti parlamentari e di pronunciare discorsi di opposizione purché molto moderati», scrive il caposcuola dei letterati conservatori Vsevolod Kocetov - Bersaglio principale del romanzo-libello è Vittorio Strada, noto studioso di letteratura russa - Sfogo di rancori personali, ma in linea con la politica del Cremlino

DAL NOSTRO CORRISPONDENTE

Mosca 30 settembre, notte.

Un duro attacco contro i comunisti italiani «il cui ideale è il sistema parlamentare, che sognano di venire eletti al parlamento, di godere dei diritti parlamentari e di pronunciare discorsi di opposizione, purché molto moderati» è contenuto nell'ultimo romanzo di Kocetov, di cui la rivista *Oktiabr* ha pubblicato la prima puntata.

Definire romanzo l'ultima fatica di Vsevolod Kocetov, uno dei caposcuola dei conservatori sovietici, nemico giurato di *Novi Mir* e del suo direttore Tvardovski, è forse inesatto. Si tratta piuttosto di un libello, se non addirittura di una pasquinata, in cui egli dà sfogo alle sue ire represses e alle sue antipatie personali, attaccando a dritta e a manca, come un toro ferito. E' un'opera a chiave, popolata di personaggi dai nomi fittizi, ma sotto i quali non è difficile individuare persone reali: dall'italiano Vittorio Strada al regista sovietico Mikhail Romm e allo scrittore Andrei Siniavski, condannato nel 1966 a sette anni di carcere per attività antisovietica. Perciò il romanzo ha suscitato tanto scalpore tra il pubblico russo, che ne attende ansiosamente le prossime puntate: ma è un succès de scandale

che non torna a onore del suo autore.

Vittorio Strada, comunista e uno dei maggiori esperti di letteratura russa, è tra i personaggi principali di *Che cosa vuoi* — così s'intitola il romanzo di Kocetov —. Egli era stato più volte attaccato dalla stampa sovietica, sia per le sue concezioni letterarie, volte a rivalutare la produzione d'avanguardia degli anni venti, sia per le sue posizioni politiche, considerate in questo paese «riformiste»; durante un recente viaggio nell'Unione Sovietica egli ha avuto pure a che fare con la polizia politica. Mai tuttavia era stato fatto oggetto di critiche così vaste e profonde come nell'opera di Kocetov, sia pure sotto lo pseudonimo di Benito Spada (anche la scelta del nome ha voluto essere offensiva).

Dice per esempio a un certo punto la moglie Lera, una russa di sicura fede comunista: «Per te esistono solo Pasternak, Mandelstam, la Svetaeva e Babel; ma io sono cresciuta senza prendere nemmeno in mano i loro libri e quando li ho letti non mi hanno commosso affatto. Sono di un altro mondo. Sui libri di tutt'altri scrittori si forma il mio modo di vita». Al che lo Spada ribatte: «Sui vostri Furmanov, Ostrovski e Fadeev siete venuti fuori così, coi paraocchi».

La discussione assume ben presto un tono politico. La signora Lera esplode: «Ma insomma, la nostra rivoluzione, il nostro potere sovietico, han dato qualcosa al mondo, all'umanità?». «E' una domanda demagogica — ribatte il marito —. Per dare certamente ha dato. Ma noi andiamo per un'altra via, da noi tutto sarà più umano, più intelligente, più moderno». Questa definizione, dopo le vicende cecoslovacche, è già sufficientemente compromettente agli occhi sovietici. Tuttavia Kocetov, per illustrare più chiaramente di che pasta fosse Spada, gli attribuisce simpatie per Trozki. «Questo nome per voi è come il rosso per il toro — si difende —. Frigate dalla rabbia quando sentite parlare di quest'uomo. E lui invitava le classi a rapporti più ragionevoli. Senza sangue. Senza barricate. Senza pressioni e coercizioni degli uni sugli altri». La moglie lo bolla con una condanna definitiva: «Trozki era semplicemente contro la dittatura del proletariato».

In altre parti del romanzo, la cui azione si svolge a Varigotti, a Torino e a Mosca, Strada-Spada viene definito «un dozzinale filisteo italiano» che non ha nulla a che fare con i veri comunisti e che «fa parte del partito solo formalmente», uno che lavora per una ditta borghese.

uno che scrive di letteratura sovietica, aiutando oggettivamente i nemici di questo paese, in pratica, un voltafaccia il quale, quando era a Mosca, «si entusiasmava per la realtà sovietica, per l'istruzione di massa, per il carattere aperto e cordiale del popolo», mentre ora ne vede soltanto gli aspetti negativi. La moglie invece ha subito una trasformazione opposta e se nei primi tempi dopo il suo arrivo in Italia era rimasta impressionata dall'alto tenore di vita, dalle vetrine dei negozi colme di ogni ben di Dio e dalla gente ben vestita, ben presto ha aperto gli occhi e si è resa conto delle ingiustizie e delle contraddizioni della nostra società borghese.

Ma il suo romanzo non si limita soltanto a Strada: esso è ricco di battute, di annotazioni, di giudizi che andrebbero attentamente raccolti, perché costituiscono un tipico esempio della mentalità di certi sovietici, oggi più che mai autorevoli. Da questo fiorileglio riferiamo l'opinione sprezzante sul governo di centro-sinistra (che era ancora al potere al tempo in cui fu scritto il romanzo), messa in bocca dall'autore a un compositore comunista: «Questi centristi di sinistra... sarebbe meglio se fossero apertamente di destra».

P. S.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
1 October 1969

CPYRGHT

Attack on the Italian "Comrades" in Oktyabr

A slashing attack on Italian communists "whose ideal is the parliamentary system, who dream of getting themselves elected to Parliament, of enjoying parliamentary privileges, and of delivering very moderate opposition speeches from the floor" is a part of the latest Kochetov novel. The review Oktyabr carries the first instalment of the novel.

It is perhaps not quite accurate to call this latest effort by Vsevolod Kochetov, one of the leading Soviet conservatives and sworn enemy of Novy Mir and its director, Tvardovski, a novel. It is more like libel, or perhaps a scurrilous lampoon, in which Kochetov vents his repressed anger and his personal spleen, lunging and thrusting like a wounded bull. It is a roman à clef, in which the characters are given fictitious names that totally fail to mask their real identities. They range from Italy's Vittorio Strada to Soviet film director Mikhail Romm and writer Andrei Siniavski, who was sentenced in 1966 to 7 years in prison for anti-Soviet activities. This is why the work has made such a splash among Soviet readers, who breathlessly await the next instalment. But it is a succès de scandale, which does not redound to the credit of its author.

Italian communist Vittorio Strada is one of our leading experts on Russian literature, and one of the main characters in What Do You Want? He has been repeatedly attacked by the Soviet press, both for his literary views and his attempts to re-evaluate the avante-garde productions of the '20s, and for his political positions, which this country considers "reformist." During a recent trip to the Soviet Union, he even got involved with the political police. But in any case, he had been the object of criticism just as broad and deep as that which he suffers in Kochetov's book, under the pseudonym of Benito Spada. (Even the choice of the name is purposely offensive.)

For example, at one point his wife, Lera, a Russian with sound communist principles, says to him, "The only writers you can see are Pasternak, Mandelstam, Svetaeva, and Babel. But I grew up without ever looking at one of their books, and when I did read them I was not impressed at all. They belong to another world. My way of life is patterned after the books of very different writers." And Spada's retort to this is, "And that is how you came out of your Furmanov and Ostrovski and Fadeyev -- just like that, with blinkers on."

The discussion soon takes on a political tone. And Lera explodes: "Come on, now! Haven't our revolution and our Soviet government given something to the world, to mankind?" "That."

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answers the husband, "is a demagogical question." As far as the giving part goes, of course it has given. But we are going another way. In our way, everything will be more human, more intelligent, more modern." This definition, in the wake of the events in Czechoslovakia, is already sufficiently compromising in Soviet eyes. But Kochetov, just to make sure everybody understands what sort of stuff Spada is made of, endows him with Trotskyite sympathies.

"For you, that name is like a red flag to a bull," he complains, defensively. "You sputter with rage whenever anyone even mentions the man. And he was the one who called on all the classes to be more reasonable in their relations. No blood, no barricades, no pressures or coercion of one class by the other."

The wife retorts with the ultimate condemnation: "Trotsky was simply against the dictatorship of the proletariat."

In other parts of the novel, the action takes place in Vargotti, in Turin, and in Mosca. Strada-Spada emerges as an "Italian phillistine of the cheapest kind," who has nothing in common with the real communists, and who "belongs to the party only formally." He is a man who works for a bourgeois company, who writes about Soviet literature, thus objectively aiding this country's enemies. He is a turncoat who, when he was in Moscow, "raved about what the Soviets had accomplished, about their mass education, about the openness and friendliness of the people," but who now sees only the negative aspects of the country. His wife, meanwhile, has been going through the opposite kind of transformation. Although when she first arrived in Italy, she was impressed by the high standard of living, by the shop-windows filled with every imaginable kind of goods, and by the well-dressed people in the streets, very soon she opened her eyes and saw the injustices and contradictions of our bourgeois society.

But Kochetov's novel is not confined to Strada. It is full of one-liners, anecdotes, and opinions that will be carefully memorized, because they are a typical example of the mentality of certain Soviet types who are more powerful than ever today. We quote only one gem from this anthology: the low opinion of the center-left government (which was still in office when the novel was written) put into the mouth of a communist composer: "These centrists from the left ... it would be better if they were openly rightists."

L'UNITA, Rome
2 October 1969

CARICATURALE ATTACCO SULLA RIVISTA «OKTJABR» UNO STRANO VIAGGIO IN ITALIA

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Uno scritto contenente attacchi volgari ai comunisti italiani è apparso nella rivista moscovita *Oktjabr* sotto la firma di Vsevolod Kocetov, che è anche direttore della rivista. Il titolo dell'opera, che viene definita «romanzo» è: «Ma che vuoi?». Il numero di settembre della rivista ne pubblica la prima puntata. Kocetov è nell'URSS persona di una certa notorietà. I suoi scritti hanno sempre avuto ambizioni politiche. Uno dei suoi personaggi più «positivi» si distingueva per non volere togliere il ritratto di Stalin dal suo studio.

L'azione del nuovo «romanzo» si svolge in gran parte in Italia e, precisamente, a Torino o nella piccola località ligure di Varigotti. I personaggi sono «a chiave», poiché spesso pretendono di adombrare figure effettivamente esistenti nella realtà.

Ecco un esempio di giudizio sul Partito comunista italiano, che Kocetov mette in bocca a un presunto operaio torinese: «Fra di noi c'è di tutto. Ci sono i veri comunisti e ci sono gli intrusi nel partito. Alcuni di questi intrusi hanno le loro particolari concezioni. Essi non sanno fare altro che criticare voi, sovietici. E' gente che non ha mai avuto il potere fra le mani, non ha mai portato la responsabilità del paese, del suo destino, non sa che cosa questo significa. Farebbero meglio a star zitti. Invece gra-

cidano con le loro voci stridule. Sono estranei tra noi, sappiatelo! Prima o poi, quando le cose si faranno difficili, ci lasceranno. Altrimenti, prima o poi, li butteremo fuori noi».

Ad un altro personaggio, pure operaio, Kocetov fa pronunciare frasi ancora più dure: «Chi oggi critica l'Unione Sovietica non è un comunista... La Russia è la patria del comunismo. Ed è un porco chi si mette a scalcciare

con i suoi zoccoli contro la propria madre». A chi gli fa osservare che forse sarebbe meglio parlare di «asini», quello ribatte che no, la definizione adatta è quella di «porco», cioè «del più sozzo degli animali, capace di divorare i propri figli pur sapendo che sono i propri figli».

Sempre a proposito di alcuni comunisti, un altro personaggio parla di «quei marxisti che chissà perchè ritengono utile chiamarsi marxisti, ma che hanno il loro ideale nel regime parlamentare: essi sognano di venire eletti al parlamento, di godere dei privilegi dei deputati, di pronunciare discorsi di opposizione, ma piuttosto moderati, di occupare belle cariche redditizie e di mettere da parte un po' per volta un piccolo capitale».

Per giustificare la sua tesi sui comunisti «buoni» e su quelli «cattivi», Kocetov presenta un personaggio, tale Benito Spada, cui presta mol-

ti tratti fisici e biografici di un comunista realmente esistente a Torino e noto come profondo conoscitore della letteratura russa. A tale personaggio, comunista anche nel libro, egli fa esprimere ogni sorta di aberranti giudizi. Ad esempio, egli non solo sostiene che la rivoluzione del febbraio '17 fu la vera rivoluzione russa e che non ci sarebbe voluta quindi la rivoluzione d'ottobre, ma parla dello stesso Mussolini come potrebbe farlo un nostalgico del MSI: «...Era una personalità eccezionale, forte, che trasformò l'Italia vinta, lacerata dalla prima guerra mondiale... trascinò il popolo dietro di sé». Va aggiunto che è proprio a questo comunista — è solo a lui — che Kocetov mette in bocca la seguente frase, pronunciata in un dialogo con la moglie sovietica: «Non si può non vedere la differenza fra le nostre strade. Voi siete andati per una via. Noi ne abbiamo scelta un'altra, più adatta per un paese come l'Italia».

Naturalmente, la moglie sovietica del comunista italiano resta sconvolta nel trovare simili personaggi «nell'eroico Partito comunista italiano, partito di combattenti antifascisti, partito dei compagni Gramsci e Togliatti». Buona parte delle scene che si svolgono in Italia hanno per oggetto appunto le lunghe di-

scussioni che si svolgono fra questo presunto comunista e la moglie sovietica, a proposito di mille temi, che vanno dalla letteratura russa a Trozki: le dispute culminano in un conflitto fra i due a base di scene violente.

Kocetov rivela nel suo scritto una assai povera conoscenza delle cose italiane. Ad uno dei personaggi che attaccano i comunisti «intrusi», egli fa pronunciare il seguente giudizio a proposito della situazione politica nel paese «...Abbiamo sempre al potere questo famigerato centro-sinistra. Sarebbe meglio se ci fossero apertamente i destri, così ci batteremmo contro di loro! Meglio ancora se dessero il potere a noi, così stabiliremmo il nostro sistema!». Semplifica, no?

Tra uno scrittore sovietico e un operaio italiano egli fa svolgere il seguente dialogo: «Perchè voi dite "compagni", invece di usare "camerata" che corrisponde a *tovarisc*?». «Perchè la parola "camerata" è stata insozzata dai fascisti. Essi l'usavano tra loro. "Compagno" è la nostra parola, che significa *tovarisc* per ogni comunista». Evidentemente Kocetov ignora che la parola «compagno» esisteva nel movimento socialista e operaio italiano decenni prima che i fascisti usassero il loro soldatesco e grottesco «camerata», parola che non ha mai significato *tovarisc*!

L'UNITA, Rome
2 October 1969

CPYRGHT

A Strange Trip to Italy

An article containing vulgar attacks on Italian communists has come out in the Moscow magazine Oktyabr, under the name of Vsevolod Kochetov, who is also director of the review. The title of the work, which is billed as a novel, is But What Do You Want? The September issue of the magazine carried the first instalment of the book.

In the Soviet Union, Kochetov is somewhat notorious. All his writing has been politically ambitious. One of his more "positive" characters was remarkable for his unwillingness to take Stalin's portrait down from the wall of his studio.

Much of the action in this new "novel" takes place in Italy, either in Turin or in the little Ligurian village of Varrigotti. The characters are disguised, most of them offered as representing real people.

Here is an example of an opinion about the Italian Communist Party, which Kochetov puts into the mouth of a character who is supposed to be a Turin worker: "There are all kinds of people among us. There are real communists, and there are people who have wormed their way into the party. Some of these intruders have their own special views. All they can do is criticize you Russians. These are people who have never had a government in their hands, who have never born the responsibility for the country and its destinies, who don't even know what it means. It would be better if they would just shut up. But instead all they do is holler. They don't belong with us, you'd better believe it! Sooner or later, when the going gets rough, they'll leave us. If they don't, sooner or later, we'll kick them out."

Another of Kochetov's characters, again a worker, is even tougher: "Anybody who criticizes the Soviet Union today is no communist! Russia is the homeland of communism. And anybody who would kick and stomp on his own mother is a pig!" When someone says that perhaps it would be more suitable to liken such people to "asses," the worker says no, the right metaphor is "pig," which is "the filthiest of all animals, one that can eat its own children, even though it knows they are its children."

Still on the subject of "some communists," another character talks about "those Marxists who, for some reason or other think it is serving some purpose to call themselves Marxists, but whose ideal is the parliamentary system. They dream of getting themselves elected to Parliament, of enjoying the privileges of deputies, of delivering opposition speeches, al-

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though rather moderate ones, of getting the fine, cushy jobs, and of gradually building up a nice little piece of capital."

To justify his ideas of "good" communists and "bad" ones, Kochetov introduces a character known as Benito Spada, to whom he gives many of the physical and biographical traits of a real communist now living in Turin, and known for his profound knowledge of Soviet and Russian literature. This character, who is a communist in the book, too, spouts all sorts of aberrant opinions. For example, he not only maintains that the February 1917 revolution was the real Russian revolution, and that the October revolution was unnecessary, but he speaks of Mussolini like a nostalgic fascist: "He was an exceptional character, a strong man who transformed prostrate Italy, torn by the first world war ... a man who drew the people after him." It should be added that this communist is the only one in whose mouth Kochetov puts the following sentence, which he uses in a dialogue with his Soviet-born wife:

"You can't help seeing the difference between our ways. You took one road. We have chosen another, better suited to a country like Italy."

Naturally, the Soviet wife of the Italian communist is shocked at finding people like this in "the heroic Italian Communist Party, the party of the anti-fascist fighters, the party of Comrades Gramsci and Togliatti." A good share of the scenes set in Italy consist of lengthy dialogues between this alleged communist and his Soviet wife. The arguments range from Russian literature to Trotsky, and reach a peak in a violent fight.

Kochetov reveals an extremely scant familiarity with things Italian. He makes one of the characters attacking the "intruder" communists voice this opinion about the political situation here: "We still have that notorious center-left in the government. It would be better if they came out openly as rightists, because then we could fight them! It would be even better if they were to turn over the government to us, so we could set up our system!" Simple, isn't it?

He has a Soviet writer and an Italian worker holding this dialogue: "Why do you say 'compagni' instead of 'camerate,' which corresponds with 'tovarisch'?" "Because the word 'camerata' was dirtied by the fascists. They used to call each other that. 'Compagno' is our word, and it means 'tovarisch' to every communist." Evidently Kochetov does not know that the word "compagno" was used in the socialist and worker movement in Italy decades before the fascists adopted their militaristic and grotesque "camerata," a word that has never meant "tovarisch!"

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L'UNITA, Rome
2 October 1969

CPYRGHT «Che cosa vuole?»

! Diciamo subito che non abbiamo alcun dubbio che Kocetov sia padrone di scrivere quello che gli pare meglio. Qualche dubbio se mai ci sorge sulla pretesa, che ci accade spesso di incontrare nei suoi scritti e sulla sua rivista, che lo stesso diritto dovrebbe essere negato ad altri autori e ad altre pubblicazioni, che pure si stampano non lontano dalla tipografia di Oktjabr. Ma se Kocetov è padrone di scrivere quello che vuole, anche a proposito dell'Italia e dei comunisti italiani. (e noi ne diamo conto per non privare i nostri lettori di una informazione), nessuno ci può negare il diritto di chiederci «ma che cosa vuole?». Non è certo necessario essere Goethe, Stendhal o Gogol per scrivere un viaggio in Italia. Ma certo non è neppure obbligatorio, per chi ha fatto un giro per il nostro paese, scrivere un libro. E poiché siamo costretti a escludere, per quel tanto che abbiamo potuto leggere nella prima puntata, l'ansia del ricercatore o l'afflato del poeta, dobbiamo rivolgerci al pamphlettista politico. Egli d'altra parte non è nuovo a servirsi di finzioni letterarie e di pseudonimi, qualche volta per la polemica, qualche volta, più pesantemente, per la denuncia.

Che cosa vuole Kocetov? Forse trovare modo di insultare i dirigenti del nostro partito e i suoi rappresentanti in Parlamento? La cosa può far piacere ai giornali borghesi che lo riprendono ampiamente, ma sconcerata e soprattutto inganna i lettori sovietici. Gli operai torinesi, dei quali il direttore di Oktjabr dice di co-

noscere tante cose, sanno tra l'altro che non è più raddittato un posto in Parlamento in Italia della direzione di una rivista letteraria a Mosca. Sanno, comunque, che i loro deputati hanno avuto fra gli altri privilegi, per qualcuno quello di esser stato licenziato dalla FIAT, per altri di essere stati deportati in Germania e per altri ancora di essere stati a lungo nelle prigioni di Mussolini, per molti di aver combattuto come partigiani. Prima di scrivere un viaggio in Italia, per farlo leggere ai compagni sovietici, non sarebbe sconsigliabile un viaggio nella storia del nostro paese.

Ma forse lo scopo essenziale del libello è quello di screditare un intellettuale comunista col quale Kocetov ha dei conti personali, per una polemica, diciamo così, fra letterati? Se abbiamo capito (ed è così grossolana la cosa che ci pare difficile sbagliare) è chiamato in causa un compagno dal quale possiamo aver dissentito su questo o su quel giudizio, su questa o su quella posizione, ma per il quale riteniamo inammissibile il tono che viene adoperato.

Qualcuno di quelli che vengono chiamati «critici della Unione Sovietica» e per questo definiti «porci» e «somari», ha fatto tanto per far conoscere la cultura sovietica e il patrimonio letterario e rivoluzionario russo, che non può bastare, per fortuna, un cattivo letterato (e ce ne sono stati e ce ne saranno sempre in ogni tempo e in ogni paese) per distruggerne il lavoro con qualche battuta.

Potremmo persino domandarci, visto che uno dei fondamenti dell'estetica di Kocetov è che la letteratura debba educare e servire sempre a scopi politici immediati, se egli si propone addirittura di offrirci una linea politica nuova. Forse è con questa intenzione che uno dei personaggi si augura un governo di destra, per poter più rapidamente stabilire il nostro sistema. Grazie per la strategia!

Ci pare, dunque, che gli interrogativi non siano pochi e siano tutti leciti. Siamo in debito di una risposta. «Cosa vuole?». Quello che vogliamo noi è presto detto. Ci preoccupano due cose: che l'Italia e i suoi comunisti siano conosciuti nell'URSS per quello che sono e che nessuno in Italia possa confondere quello che è lo slancio rivoluzionario, la volontà di conoscere, lo spirito internazionalista del popolo russo col libellismo di cattivo gusto di chi ha travestito il nostro paese senza vederlo. Vorremmo assicurare i compagni sovietici e i lettori di Oktjabr che non ci sentiamo di escludere che in Italia ci sia anche qualche compagno che almeno da lontano assomigli a quelli che piacciono a Kocetov. Per nostra fortuna e per fortuna della Unione Sovietica, non è con quelli soltanto che si identificano gli amici del popolo sovietico, i compagni dei comunisti dell'URSS. No, sono molti, molti di più e lo sfortunato pezzo su Oktjabr non riuscirà a ridurne il numero.

G. C. P.

L'UNITA, Rome
2 October 1969

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What Do You Want?

Let us make it clear right now that we have no doubt that Kochetov has a perfect right to write whatever he likes. There may possibly be some doubt as to the assertion, which we often find in his work and in his magazine, that this same right ought to be denied other writers and other publications, even though they are printed not very far from the Oktyabr plant. But while Kochetov has a right to write what he likes, even about Italy and the Italian communists (and we take note of what he writes only in order not to deprive our readers of a piece of news), no one can deny us the right to wonder "what does he want?" You certainly don't have to be Goethe, or Stendahl or Gogol to write about traveling in Italy. But neither is it obligatory for anybody who has toured our country to write a book. And since, from what we have read of the first instalment, we are forced to rule out both the scrupulous accuracy of the researcher and the afflatus of the poet, we are left with the political pamphleteer. For that matter, this is not the first time he has used literary pretense and pseudonyms, sometimes for polemical purposes, and sometimes, more clumsily, for denunciations.

What does Kochetov want? Is he perhaps looking for a way to insult the leaders of our party and its representatives in Parliament? This may give pleasure to the bourgeois newspapers, who are giving it broad coverage, but it troubles -- and even more important -- it deceives his Soviet readers. Turin workers, about whom the director of Oktyabr claims to know so much, know among other things that a seat in the Italian Parliament is no more profitable than to be the head of a literary review in Moscow. In any case, they know that their deputies have indeed enjoyed certain "privileges," such as being fired by FIAT, being deported to Germany, mouldering for years in Mussolini's prisons, or fighting with the partisans. Before setting about writing "Travels in Italy," it would not be a bad idea to take a little trip through our country's history.

But maybe the main purpose of this scurrilous pamphlet is to discredit a communist intellectual with whom Kochetov has a personal score to settle -- a quarrel, shall we say, between letterati? If we have understood correctly (and the thing is so clumsily obvious that it would be difficult to be mistaken), the target of all this is a comrade with whom we may have had our differences on this or that opinion or position, but toward whom we feel that the tone adopted in this work is inadmissible.

One of those who are styled "critics of the Soviet Union" and therefore "pigs" and "asses" has done so much to spread a knowledge of Soviet culture and the Russian literary and revolutionary heritage that, fortunately, it will take more than a bad writer (and there have been bad writers, and always will be bad writers, in every age and in every country) to tear down that work with a few spiteful remarks.

We might even go so far as to wonder, since one of the bases of Kochetov's aesthetic is that literature must educate and must always serve immediate political ends, whether he actually intends to offer us a new political line. Perhaps this was what he had in mind when he makes one of his characters voice a hope for a rightist government, so that we can establish our system so much the sooner. Thanks for the tip on strategy!

It seems to us that there are not a few questions, and all of them legitimate. We have no answer. "What Do You Want?" What we want is very simple. We are worried about two things: one concern is that Italy and her communists be known in the USSR for what they really are, and the other is that nobody in Italy be duped into confusing the revolutionary spirit, the thirst for knowledge, and the internationalist spirit of the Russian people with the libellous leanings and the deplorable taste of a man who has traveled across our country without once seeing it. We would assure the Soviet comrades and readers of Oktyabr that we do not feel that we can rule out the existence in Italy of a comrade who, at least from a distance, may look like those Kochetov likes. Luckily for us, and for the Soviet Union, these are not the only ones who call themselves friends of the Soviet people, and comrades of the communists in the USSR. No, there are a great many of them, far more of them than that, and the unfortunate piece in Oktyabr will not succeed in reducing their numbers.

L'UNITA, Rome
10 October 1969

La seconda puntata del volgare pamphlet di V. Kocetov

«Oktjabr» insiste e guarda al passato

CPYRGHT

Nuovo attacco ai comunisti italiani e a tutto ciò che nel movimento comunista internazionale si ispira alle idee di rinnovamento del XX Congresso

Dalla nostra redazione

MOSCA, 10.

V. Kocetov ha insistito sulla rivista *Oktjabr* nei suoi attacchi ai comunisti italiani, alla loro linea, alle loro posizioni e ai loro uomini e — più in generale — a tutto ciò che nel movimento comunista internazionale si ispira alle idee di rinnovamento scaturite dal XX Congresso. La seconda puntata del pamphlet del direttore di *Oktjabr* «Ma che cosa vuoi?» ha in comune con la prima la volgarità, il pressapochismo e l'assurdità dell'attacco, che parte da posizioni che consideriamo superate da tempo dal movimento comunista, sia italiano che sovietico. Oltre che contro i comunisti italiani la critica di Kocetov appare così indirizzata, più o meno apertamente, contro posizioni e uomini del partito sovietico. Si tratta anche qui di attacchi grossolani. Già nella prima parte del «romanzo» l'autore aveva trovato modo, ad esempio, di prendere posizione contro numerosi intellettuali comunisti del suo paese e persino di giustificare i processi e le condanne del '37 contro militanti comunisti sovietici, oggi riabilitati da ogni accusa penale su cui si fondarono quei processi. Essi vengono da lui invece de-

finiti «quinta colonna» del capitalismo. Sono poi curiosamente riprese, nel così detto romanzo, critiche che abbiamo visto fin qui respinte come tipiche degli attacchi cinesi contro il «revisionismo moderno» dei sovietici.

La seconda puntata dimostra chiaramente che rimanendo abbarbicati sulle posizioni staliniste, si finisce per battersi oggi contro la cultura socialista e marxista dell'URSS ed è naturalmente impossibile capire qualcosa, anche della realtà italiana e della politica del nostro partito. Il pezzo è da questo punto di vista esemplare. Basti dire che vi sono accenni ai mali che deriverebbero all'Italia per il fatto che è stata privata della fortuna di avere alla sua testa... un uomo come De Gaulle. Un comunista italiano, che figura come protagonista, viene poi presentato come timoroso di partecipare e di mandare la moglie a una manifestazione di strada contro la NATO, per paura della polizia...

Appare chiaro che durante il suo viaggio a Kocetov non è mai accaduto di vedere una manifestazione di piazza o di parlare con quelli che ne sono stati protagonisti, né di incontrarsi con comunisti che non si prestassero a far da comparso nella sua sceneggiatura. E',

quindi, prescindendo da un esame della realtà che l'autore «realista» può continuare a parlare di «opportunisti», «revisionisti», «liquidatori» che si anniderebbero nelle file del Partito comunista italiano e può contrapporre ai comunisti del PCI due soli eroi positivi. Sarebbero la moglie del comunista italiano, cittadina sovietica, in lotta per sollevare dalla polvere in cui i revisionisti la avrebbero lasciata cadere, la bandiera della lotta di classe in Italia e — infine — un ex SS in crisi, che ha il merito di essere un russo, anzi un «grande russo», che inviato dagli americani nel suo paese, per una stravagante missione di «diversione ideologica», trova modo alla fine di riscattarsi. Naturalmente i due cittadini russi ai quali è riservata questa parte nel romanzo di Kocetov hanno poi, così come sono grottescamente rappresentati, la stessa ideologia dell'autore, il quale questa volta ha però deciso di entrare nel romanzo anche come personaggio, scegliendo a questo scopo il nome di Bulatov. A questo punto il gioco è stato facile: Kocetov ha ingigantito se stesso nei panni di Bulatov sino a trasformarsi... nell'intera Unione Sovietica, o almeno nel suo unico autentico rappresentante. Che altro starebbero facendo secondo le pa-

gine di *Oktjabr* i comunisti italiani, insieme «alla stampa dell'emigrazione bianca, alla BBC, alla Voce dell'America» se non... «lanciare anatemi contro Bulatov, alle sue idee, ai suoi libri?».

Diremo soltanto, per concludere, che anche a Mosca non sono molti a credere che Kocetov-Bulatov sia lui, con il suo fare, l'Unione Sovietica di oggi. Son molti anzi a pensare che Kocetov-Bulatov non è in nessun modo «il marxismo-leninismo di oggi. E' roba, non sempre digerita, di ieri, che vorrebbe sopravvivere come arma di un «gruppo di pressione». Forse può servire a dimostrare che c'è ancora da fare per liberare il movimento operaio dal peso degli elementi negativi di un'epoca che vien detta «stalinista». Un'epoca che se faciloni di fuori liquidano rozzamente, con tutto quello che ha significato per la costruzione del socialismo, faciloni che vivono nell'URSS vorrebbero altrettanto rozzamente riproporre come ideale. Ma l'Unione Sovietica, la letteratura e il pensiero sovietici non sono rappresentati da Kocetov. I problemi della cultura e degli intellettuali sovietici saranno risolti da quelli che li affrontano ben diversamente.

a. g.

L'UNITA, Rome
10 October 1969

The Second Installment of V. Kochetov's Vulgar Pamphlet

Oktyabr' Persists in Looking Backward

CPYRGHT

New Attack on the Italian Communists and on Everything in the International Communist Movement Which Was Inspired by the Idea of Renewal at the XXth Congress.

Vsevolod Kochetov's magazine Oktyabr' carries the second installment of his diatribe against the Italian communists, their line, their positions, and their men, and -- more broadly -- against everything in the international communist movement that is inspired by the ideas of renewal and reform that emerged from the 20th Congress. The second installment of the Oktyabr' chief's pamphlet, What Do You Want? matches the first in the vulgarity, the not-quiteness, and the absurdity of the attack, which is launched from positions we consider long abandoned by the communist movement, both Italian and Soviet. Kochetov's barbs this time are aimed not only at Italian communists, but more or less openly against certain positions and individuals in the CPSU. Here again, the attacks are clumsy and heavy-handed.

In the first installment of his "novel," Kochetov found a way, for example, to take a stand against numerous communist intellectuals in his own country, and even to justify the 1937 prosecution and sentencing of Soviet party members, all of whom have since been rehabilitated with the dismissal of all charges leveled against them at their trials. But he calls them capitalism's "fifth column." Then there is the curious echo, in this so-called novel, of criticisms which, hitherto, we have seen rejected as typical of the Chinese attacks on Soviet "modernist revisionism."

The second installment clearly shows that if you stay barricaded behind the old Stalinist positions, you wind up today in conflict with the socialist and Marxist culture of the USSR, and of course you will be unable to understand a thing about our country or our party's policies. The screed is a model, from this point of view. We need say no more than that there are references to the misfortunes Italy is supposed to have suffered because it did not have the good luck to have a man like -- are you ready? -- de Gaulle to lead it.

Then there is an Italian communist, one of the main characters, who is painted as afraid to take part in a street demonstration against NATO, and afraid to send his wife to take part, because he is frightened of the police.

It is pretty obvious that Kochetov never happened to see a street demonstration during his tour of Italy, or even to talk with people who were in them, nor yet to talk to any communists other than those who agreed to act as extras in his scenario. And so, by carefully refraining from even a peek at

CPYRGHT

reality, this "realist" writer can go on talking about the "opportunists," the "revisionists," and the "liquidators" who he says have infiltrated the ranks of the Italian Communist Party, and give us only two positive heroes against the whole Italian CP. One is the wife of the Italian communist, a Soviet citizen herself, who is fighting to pick the banner of the class struggle in Italy out of the dust into which the revisionists are supposed to have dropped it. The other is a former SS-man who is going through a spiritual crisis, whose merit is that he is a Russian, and a "big Russian" at that, who had been sent into his own country by the Americans on an implausible mission of "ideological diversion," but in the end found a way to get out of it.

Naturally, the two Russian citizens to whom this part of the romance is devoted have, as they are grotesquely pictured, the same ideology as the writer who, this time, decides to take a hand in his own novel as a character, thinly disguised behind the alias of Bulatov. At this point, the game gets easy: Kochetov has enlarged himself, in the guise of Bulatov, into the personification of -- the whole Soviet Union, or at least its only genuine spokesman. What should the Italian communists be up to, according to Oktyabr, along with "the White émigré press, the BBC, and the Voice of America," other than "hurling anathemas at Bulatov, his ideas, and his books?"

We shall simply say, in conclusion, that even in Moscow not many people believe that Kochetov-Bulatov, or what he does, is the Soviet Union today. On the contrary, there are a great many people who believe that Kochetov-Bulatov is by no means whatever "today's Marxism-Leninism." This is yesterday's stuff, not always completely digested, trying to survive as the weapon of a pressure group.

Perhaps it will do some good, though, if it helps make us see that there is still a lot to be done toward freeing the worker movement from the burden of all the negative elements left over from what we have come to call the "Stalinist era." That was an era which amateurs from outside would simply dump overboard, along with all that it means in the construction of socialism, and which amateurs who live in the USSR would like just as simply to hold up again as the ideal. But the Soviet Union, Soviet thought, and Soviet literature are not represented by Kochetov. The problems of Soviet culture and of the Soviet intellectuals will be solved by people who take quite a different approach to them.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN SOUTH YEMEN

The People's Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) became an independent and sovereign state on 30 November 1967. The new state was recognized on the same day by Communist China and on 1 December by the Soviet Union. It was admitted to the Arab League on 12 December 1967 and to the United Nations on 14 December 1967.

The birth of the new nation added one more member to the leftist wing of the Arab states, and opened a new area for communist penetration, which has resulted in an intense Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Aside from ideological considerations, plain economics have played an important role in PRSY relations with these communist powers. When the British withdrew, they left the country virtually destitute. The free port of Aden used to bring in fairly sizeable revenues from ship bunkering and the tourist trade, but with the closure of the Suez Canal since 1967 this source of income has virtually dried up. The economic situation in South Arabia today is extremely desperate and vast amounts of economic as well as other types of aid are needed to keep the country afloat. Aid from Arab countries has been miserly. Assistance from the West has been limited, almost non-existent. Thus, PRSY leaders have turned to the two communist giants for salvation; and because of this fact of life, internal politics in the PRSY have mainly revolved around the issue of whether the country should follow the Soviet or Chinese line. So far, the Soviets are very much ahead.

Political Orientation of the Government

The government in power today consists of, and represents, the National Liberation Front. The NLF is a composite of leftist groups; it contains important elements of the Arab Nationalist Movement -- an extreme socialist pan-Arab political organization with organs and members in many Arab countries. The NLF seems to be divided into three principal factions: Firstly, moderate nationalist elements who want to introduce socialism gradually into the country, establish close relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China, but keep the door relatively open to the West. The principal representative of this group is former President Qahtan al-Sha'bi, who was ousted from power on 22 June 1969.

The second group prefers exclusive ties with the Soviet Union, its satellites and the radical Arab states. The third group consists of extreme leftist elements who insist on immediate and wholesale application of "scientific socialism," close ties with Communist China, and the export of Chinese-style revolution to all parts of the Arabian Peninsula. The principal representative of this group is probably Abd al-Fattah Ismail, who is believed to be either a communist or a member of the extreme wing of the Arab Nationalist Movement.

Actually, Abd al-Fattah Ismail dominates the PRSY today, although he generally prefers to work in the background and let others hold front positions. Ismail, who has always been regarded as the "ideologist" of the NLF, holds three of the most strategic power positions in the republic: he is a member of the newly created five-man Presidency Council, which is the supreme government authority; he is a member of the newly created five-man Executive Committee of the NLF; and he occupies the newly created position of Secretary-General of the National Liberation Front and thus controls the only political organization in the country.

When the country became independent in November 1967, Qahtan al-Sha'bi, representing the relatively moderate elements of the NLF, became President of the republic. But the extreme leftists overthrew al-Sha'bi in a bloodless coup d'état on 22 June 1969 and took over control of the country. As if to emphasize the rapid radicalization of the government and its closer ties with the Soviet Union and Communist China, the new regime on 24 October 1969, less than three months after it came to power, abruptly broke diplomatic relations with the United States and gave American representatives there only 24 hours to leave the country.

Chinese Penetration

In its drive to penetrate the PRSY, Communist China has been hampered by three principal factors: the long distance between the two countries, which makes communication somewhat difficult; the backwardness of Communist China itself and its inability to render badly-needed massive aid; and, finally, the preoccupation of China during the past three years with its internal affairs, notably the Cultural Revolution.

And yet despite these difficulties, the CPR has been able to make its mark since 1967. Moreover, since the new regime came to power in June 1969, Communist China has been making an even more sustained and determined effort to compete with the Soviet Union in South Arabia.

As mentioned earlier, Communist China recognized PRSY on the day of its birth. Some three months later, on 31 January 1968, the ambassadors of the two countries in Cairo signed an agreement providing for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. However, even before the Chinese embassy was opened South Yemen was invaded by a flood of "correspondents" of the New China News Agency (NCNA), who came to be seen almost everywhere.

In March 1968, egged on by Abd al-Fattah Ismail, pro-Chinese extremist elements of the local NLF in the fifth (Hadromout) and sixth provinces dismissed government officials and replaced them with "people's councils" expropriated land without compensation and distributed it among peasants, nationalized the few companies that existed in the area, and disbanded the local army and replaced it with a "people's militia" on the Red Guard model. In May extremists in the third province attempted to do the same thing. These rebellions were put down by the army and as a result many extremist leaders, including Abd al-Fattah Ismail, Ali Salem al-Bayd and Salem al-Rubayi, either left the country or went into hiding.

An article by V. Klimanov in the Soviet magazine Life Abroad (No. 22, May 1968) described the March and May uprisings as led by Chinese inspired extremists. It said:

Last week for the second time in the 6 months of its existence the People's Republic of South Yemen had to deal with an armed uprising. Judging by the reports of the authorities, it was undertaken by "leftist opportunists" of the Maoist type who tried to establish themselves in the eastern regions of the country, in the towns of Jaar, Shuqra, Zanjbar and Albyan. Among the leaders of the uprising were several people who held high posts in the ruling national front....

As is stressed in Aden, it is difficult under such conditions to overestimate the danger to the unity of the national front constituted by the separatists, who are incited by Peking's pseudo-revolutionary propaganda and who are playing into the hands of the enemies of the young state.

In September 1968 a PRSY delegation headed by Sayf Ahmad al-Dali'i, then foreign minister, paid an official visit to Communist China seeking economic aid. The visit lasted one week during which trade, economic and technical cooperation agreements were concluded. The economic agreement called for the CPR to give PRSY a long-term interest-free loan of five million pounds sterling to finance development projects.

Since the fall of Qahtan al-Sha'bi in June 1969, the tempo and vigor of Chinese interest in the PRSY has increased very sharply. It has been reported that a large number of Chinese technicians have already arrived in Aden and that eight large apartment buildings near the airport in Aden have been rented to house them. This in itself gives an indication of the magnitude of the expected influx of Chinese.

Because of its peculiar circumstances, China's tactics in South Arabia have principally depended on ideological penetration -- support for extremist Maoist divisive elements and the fomenting of revolution throughout the area. For instance, as soon as the new regime came to power, NCNA journalists in Aden started distributing Mao badges.

Ideologically the Chinese seem to be fairly entrenched in the eastern provinces of the PRSY, but especially in the Hadramout (the Fifth Governorate) where in March 1968 extreme leftists tried to establish a "people's democracy" on the Maoist pattern. It has been frequently reported that Mukalla -- a port and the provincial capital of Hadramout -- is being used openly by the Chinese as a base for the delivery of arms and equipment as well as for military and ideological training of both the local extremists and the Dhofar Liberation Front across the border in Muscat.

On 25 August 1969 al Hurriyah, a Beirut Arabic weekly newspaper and organ of the Arab Nationalist Movement, published a report by two West German journalists who recently traveled over 900 miles across South Yemen to reach the

rebel-held areas of Dhofar in Muscat. There they interviewed insurgents wearing Chinese uniforms and carrying Chinese arms. Most of them were trained in Communist China, some in Cuba. They told the two reporters: "China supplies us with arms and provisions through Aden and Mukalla in South Yemen, unconditionally. The Arab progressive states and the Soviet Union have deserted our cause and refuse to have anything to do with us. The Soviet Union is giving support to the national bourgeoisie against the laborers and peasants." They said their aim was the "liberation" of the Gulf, from Kuwait to Muscat, "with Chinese arms."

Soviet Domination

Unlike Communist China, which has been hampered by various limitations in its efforts to penetrate South Arabia, the Soviet Union within the short span of two years has been able to dominate the political, military and economic life of the country to the point where the PRSY has become virtually a new Soviet dependency. Because the Soviets are so thoroughly entrenched, they are very concerned about the growing Communist Chinese presence, which could challenge their control.

Diplomatic Relations

Soviet interest in the area was clearly demonstrated by the extreme speed with which Russian representatives arrived in South Yemen. On 19 February 1968, only three months after PRSY became independent, a three-man Soviet diplomatic mission arrived in Aden and opened the first Soviet embassy. On 3 April the first Soviet ambassador arrived. On 30 May a PRSY chargé d'affaires arrived in Moscow.

PRSY Leaders Seek Soviet Aid

In order to meet the critical needs of the country, PRSY leaders turned to the Soviet Union for economic, military and other types of assistance. In February 1968 a military delegation headed by the then defense minister, Ali Salem al-Bayd (who is now foreign minister), visited the Soviet Union. He announced that the purpose of the visit, which lasted 12 days, was to discuss with Soviet leaders the rebuilding of the PRSY security and armed forces and to "ask for support, assistance and loans to develop our country and strengthen our resources." No details on the results of the visit have ever been revealed, but many observers have reported that a military agreement was concluded.

A second military delegation, headed by the then defense minister Muhammad Salih al-Awlaqi, went to Moscow in November 1968. The visit was originally planned to last only one week but it was extended to three weeks, indicating that the discussions covered a wide range of military matters, although, once again, no details have been revealed.

And finally, at the beginning of this year Qahtan al-Sha'bi, then President of South Yemen, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union at the head of a delegation which included the ministers of foreign affairs, economy, commerce,

agriculture, culture, and the commander of the armed forces. At the end of the visit, which lasted about two weeks, a joint communique was issued in which the PRSY delegation declared its agreement and support for the Soviet point of view on all international issues, including the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand the communique also stated that the Soviet Union undertook to provide the PRSY with economic, cultural and military assistance. Five agreements were specifically mentioned covering: trade, economic and technical cooperation, development of the fishing industry, cultural and scientific cooperation, and aviation.

All these visits by South Yemeni leaders to Moscow have resulted in rather extensive Soviet military and economic aid through which the USSR has become strongly entrenched in the country. In fact, many leaders of the present regime in South Yemen appear to be more inclined ideologically toward Communist China. But because the PRSY has become so dependent on Soviet aid, these leaders are forced to toe the Soviet line regardless of their own personal inclinations or what they regard to be the interests of their country.

Military Aid

The first shipment of Soviet military equipment -- a gift -- arrived in Aden in July 1968. It consisted of 4,000 automatic weapons and 65 military vehicles. From then until May 1969, the Soviet Union gave South Yemen thirty large T-34 tanks, 8 Mig-17 planes and 2 Mig-15 training planes in addition to large quantities of automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns and field artillery. It has also been reported that under the agreement concluded during former President al-Shabi's visit to Moscow, the Soviets agreed to deliver an additional 25 tanks and 20 Mig jets -- 10 in 1969 and the remainder in 1970.

Thus British and other Western weapons are being very rapidly replaced by Soviet equipment. Indeed, for all practical purposes, in the very near future the South Yemeni armed forces will be equipped exclusively with Soviet arms and totally dependent on Soviet goodwill for the continued supply of weapons and vital spare parts.

The influence of the Soviet Union was further strengthened by the arrival in September 1968 of Soviet military experts in South Yemen to train the armed forces. Moreover, in April 1969 a group of 52 Yemenis went to the Soviet Union for training as engineers and pilots for the Mig fighters.

Soviet Naval Presence

Since February 1968 there have been consistent but unconfirmed reports that through a secret military agreement the Soviet fleet and airforce have been granted various rights in the airport and seaport of Aden. In a certain sense, whether these reports are true or not is irrelevant. In actual practice Aden and other ports in South Yemen have already become regular ports of call for the Soviet fleet and all their facilities are available to the Soviet Navy.

On 25 June 1968, for the first time in modern Russian history, a squadron of Soviet warships arrived in Aden on a three-day visit. The South Yemen defense minister and other military officers visited the fleet. On 2 January 1969, another group of five Soviet naval vessels arrived in Aden on a five-day "cordial visit."

In addition to these purely military activities, the Soviet Union has become involved in oceanographic research in cooperation with South Yemen, the military implication of which should not be ignored. In July 1969 two Soviet ocean research vessels paid a seven-day visit to Aden. In August a Soviet ship, Ariel, arrived in Aden to carry out ocean research in the Gulf of Aden and neighboring waters. The "research" is expected to last one whole year and Yemeni trainees are expected to work on the ship with the Soviet scientists.

Economic Aid

Soviet economic assistance has concentrated on the development of the fishing industry, water resources, and the expansion of arable land. In addition, the Soviets now provide about one hundred scholarships each year. In 1969 some 200 South Yemenis went to the Soviet Union for training. In early September 1969 fifteen Soviet physicians arrived in South Yemen to work within the framework of Soviet technical aid.

The first phase of the fisheries agreement calls for the development of a fisheries institute and the second stage will consist of building freezing and canning factories. One press report claimed in May 1969 that the Soviet Union had agreed to develop the PRSY fish industry in return for a duty-free seven-year fishing concession. The same report stated that the Soviet Union will aid in developing the Aden international airport and in deepening Aden port from 36 to 41 feet in return for the exemption of Soviet ships from port duties.

Who Will Win?

All the above issues -- whether treaty rights, Soviet naval visits, ocean research or development of fisheries -- are in fact matters of detail. The central and most significant point is that the Soviets are firmly entrenched in South Yemen. The Soviet navy now has strategic ports at its disposal in the entrance to the Indian Ocean, which has been the dream of the Tsars for more than two hundred years.

But the Chinese Communists have recently started an offensive to challenge this Soviet supremacy. Ideologically, many leaders of the present regime in South Yemen lean more towards Communist China rather than the Soviet Union. In the long run, this may prove to be an important factor in who will eventually have the upper hand.

After 10 Months, Southern Yemen Has CPYRGHT Made Little Progress

By ERIC PACE

Special to The New York Times

ADEN, Southern Yemen, Sept. 18—The camel corps has been scrapped. Belief in the evil eye is officially discouraged. The tax on qat, a local narcotic, has gone up. Imprisoned sheiks are forbidden to receive their wives. And young poets sing not of nightingales but of Ernesto Che Guevara. "Scientific socialism," a cloudy variant on Marxism, has come to the People's Republic of Southern Yemen, formerly the British protectorate of South Arabia.

The regime run by a former terrorist leader has been working for 10 months now, with little success, to forge a modern "socialist" nation from a grab bag of petty sheikdoms and sultanates.

"We are starting from zero but we are ambitious," said Faisal al-Shaabi, the wiry strongman of the ruling National Liberation Front, as languid tribesmen in futahs, or sarongs, shuffled past his villa here.

If the republic does prosper, it could help to spread the revolution to the richer neighboring sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. It could provide a valuable beachhead for Soviet-bloc influence at this key seaport on the route to the Suez Canal.

Regime Faces Bankruptcy

But Mr. al-Shaabi and his kinsman, President Qahtan al-Shaabi, have been harried by the prospect of national bankruptcy. They have also faced factional strife within the National Liberation Front and tribal dissidence in various parts of their country, which stretches 700 arid miles along the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula.

There is even some fear that the republic may yet become a "pocket Nigeria" as one European diplomat put it this week.

Nonetheless, the National Liberation Front is striving to

control the 1.25 million Southern Yemenis as zealously as it worked to oust the British and the local potentates before last November, when independence came and the British garrison withdrew.

Many of the three-dozen members of the front's General Command personally oversaw the killing of British civilians and soldiers in the months before independence and the overthrow of the sheiks and sultans who either fled the country or were jailed.

The front's revolutionary doctrine was copied largely from the left-wing brand of Arab nationalism practiced by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

Even before the British handed over power to President al-Shaabi, a Khartoum-trained agronomist, and his colleagues, the National Liberation Front became the sole legal party in Southern Yemen.

Federation Racked by Feuding

Before independence, Aden and the surrounding sheikdoms that were part of the South Arabian Federation had been racked by bloody feuding and occasional pitched battles between adherents of two groups, the Egyptian-backed Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front. Ultimately the National Liberation Front prevailed.

London's hopes that the federation's pro-British Government would retain control when South Arabia became independent were wrecked by the National Liberation Front.

Since independence, its leaders have issued impassioned pronouncements about "scientific socialism" and the uplifting of the "toiling masses," drafted in Aden at their ornate headquarters, formerly a sultan's palace.

Faisal al-Shaabi, a 33-year-old former business student, puffs deeply on a cigar and denounces the "forces of reaction and imperialism."

He and Qahtan al-Shaabi,

descendants of the same tribe, are considered the two most powerful figures in the leadership of the National Liberation Front, which has no single chairman. They are both on a nine-member Executive Committee, which consists of both Government and party leaders.

Essentially, Faisal al-Shaabi's power stems from his strength of personality and Qahtan al-Shaabi's from his presidential authority.

As President, Qahtan al-Shaabi has adopted an unsmiling manner like that of the Bolshevik revolutionaries half a century ago. In long, strident speeches he speaks figuratively of "crushing our enemies to the bone" and "cutting off their heads."

Country Still Backward

Yet, his Government's performance has been less than revolutionary. Old superstitions, such as the belief in "al ain," the evil eye, are denounced at political meetings, but the regime has made no concerted effort to modernize its backward subjects.

Holy men, known as walis, still do a thriving retail trade in amulets to ward off evil.

Notwithstanding its charter, the Government has made no move yet to nationalize the few large business concerns in Aden, the country's only city. And it is still getting ready to fulfill the year-old promise to break up large landholdings and distribute them among the poor.

The delay may be because any tampering with old land-ownership patterns is expected to bring an outcry from the fierce and tradition-minded tribesmen, such as the residents of Upper Yafa, who for centuries have adorned their bodies with indigo dye.

While reforms lag, the regime's leftist authoritarianism has galled many westernized Adenis, and the enthusiasm of local poets such as Abdul Karim Haitari, who composes lines such as "Guevara, thou art destiny," has disgusted the

traditionalists.

Legal niceties are disregarded by the National Liberation Front's General Command. The command, elected by province representatives of the front, is supposed to function as the country's parliament for two years until a constitution is drafted.

Hundreds of political prisoners have been thrown into Mansoura prison in Aden, including a number of tribal aristocrats. Adenis complain that the National Liberation Front will not let the prisoners have beer or qat, much less visits from their wives. Such luxuries, they contend, were sometimes allowed to prisoners during the 129 years of British control.

Hinterland Seething

And the hinterland has been seething. Last spring, the army, which is loyal to the ruling group, was obliged to intervene to crush a small tribal revolt spurred by extreme left wingers in the National Liberation Front who favor the creation of local "peoples' councils" and militias reminiscent of the Red Guards in Communist China.

Since then, the number of what Faisal al-Shaabi calls childish leftists high in the Liberation Front have moved across the border into Yemen.

A considerable part of the army is understood to be still tied down in the Aulaqui tribal area, 100 miles northeast of here. Dissident tribesmen staged a brief revolt there last month. The Liberation Front leaders blamed it on the conservative Government of Saudi Arabia and on the United States, a perennial target of their propaganda.

Although reliable information is scarce, clashes have occurred in other areas as well — in the hilly Radfan area north of Aden, with tribesmen apparently loyal to the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen; in the Subeihi area 50 miles northwest of the city, with tribesmen who

seemed to be a conservative South Arabian League, which has Saudi support, and in Beihan, where Yemeni royalist insurgents and Southern Yemeni dissidents are making trouble from across the Yemeni border.

Invasion Feared

Some officials say that they fear Saudi Arabia may finance and launch a large-scale invasion of Beihan, a politically backward area that the British authorities had originally hoped might become the nucleus for a federation of sheikdoms, somewhat like Prussia in 19th-Century Germany.

If further tribal dissidence flares, the Southern Yemeni Army may be hard pressed to quell it. Defections and purges have considerably sapped the army's strength, which was 10,000 men at the time of independence.

The armed forces have been weakened further by the re-

seems to be a conservative South Arabian League, which has Saudi support, and in Beihan, where Yemeni royalist insurgents and Southern Yemeni dissidents are making trouble from across the Yemeni border.

British military experts, who were accused of having spied for London. They included all the combat pilots for the eight British Provost jets that make up the entire fighting arm of the Southern Yemeni Air Force.

The army's celebrated camel corps has also been disbanded because it was too expensive to maintain. This was only one measure in a desperate campaign by the al-Shaabi regime to reduce Government expenditures after the departure of the British garrison and authorities. They had provided the bulk of the official revenues in the past.

Since independence, Britain has provided \$19-million in currency. But the National Liberation Front leaders have rejected as insufficient a British offer of \$4.3-million in addition, and negotiations have broken down.

With the British gone and the Suez Canal closed, business

off by 80 per cent. Unemployment has soared and laborers' loll by the quays during the hot afternoon, chewing sprigs of qat, the plant that is grown in the hinterland and across the border in Yemen.

In an effort to raise Government revenues, the regime has raised the tax on qat shipments by 20 cents for each two pounds of leaves—enough for two afternoons of contentment and pleasant thoughts.

Even with higher taxes on a variety of goods in addition to qat, Government revenues are expected to run only about \$22-million a year, or roughly half of its operating expenses.

In the short run, the regime may have to fill the gap by spending some of the backing for its currency, the dinar. But in the long run, the Government hopes that Arab and Communist nations will step in to forestall bankruptcy.

The United States has already turned aside requests for

gram. The Soviet Union, however, has signed a military assistance agreement, whose terms have not been disclosed. So far, it is reported to have provided only one shipload of small arms and trucks. A high-level Southern Yemeni delegation left recently for Peking and the Government has high hopes that it will return with assurances of aid.

But for the present Aden appears half dead with dhow swinging at anchor in a harbor that was once churned by foreign freighters and passenger ships. Many of the elegant shops have been closed in the neighborhood once known as Murder Mile because it was the favorite stalking ground for terrorists.

How long the present regime can stay in power despite the flagging economy and widespread dissidence is something that best qualified Arab and foreign observers here are reluctant to forecast, because the situation is so complex.

CPYRGHT

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

21 May 1969

Soviet aid forms strategy pattern

CPYRGHT

By Elizabeth K. Valkenier

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

There is a pattern to Soviet maritime activities that has gone largely unnoticed—that of creating naval facilities and gathering intelligence under the guise of economic aid.

Long before the dramatic appearance of the Red Fleet in various harbors from Morocco to Iraq the Soviets had built or modernized ports and developed commercial fishing for countries along the shores of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere around Africa.

Certain Soviet activities preceding the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 indicate that there can be a direct connection between this type of economic assistance and military operations.

In that summer the Soviets tried to camouflage their stepped-up military traffic by publicizing the technical aid granted to Havana. They asserted they were busy enlarging the Cuban trawler fleet, locating fishing grounds, and building a new fishing port on the Atlantic to be used jointly by Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Parallel routes

After the Kennedy-Khrushchev confronta-

tion over the offensive missile sites in October, nothing more was heard of the ambitious plans for the joint fishing port aside from delivery of a floating dry dock for Havana's harbor in the fall of 1964.

Sinister objectives, as in the case of Cuba, are not the only purpose of Soviet maritime aid. But its pattern does suggest definite strategic aims along important sea routes for the worldwide operations of the Soviet Navy.

Take the matter of ports, for example. With an eye to securing easier access to the Indian Ocean, Moscow began to acquire a foothold south of Suez. The first economic aid agreement concluded with Yemen in 1958 provided for the construction of a port at Hodeida. Four years later, the Soviets began working on a deep-water port at Berbera in Somalia.

And in May, 1967, just before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, they undertook to build a fishing harbor for the United Arab Republic. Located in the Gulf of Suez, it was to serve as a base for joint Soviet-Egyptian deep-sea fishing in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

On the west coast of Africa, Guinea received Soviet assistance in reconstructing the port at Conakry under the terms of the first aid agreement of 1959. With the

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harbor dredged, Soviet warships could dock at Conakry when they took to cruising African waters 10 years later. In nearby Ghana, the Soviets managed to modernize the fishing port at Tema before Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown.

Survey dropped

It must have been the prospects of greater strategic mobility in the western Mediterranean that prompted the Soviets early in 1961 to insist on making a survey for a shipyard at the small fishing port at Alhucemas on the northern shore of Morocco.

Western technicians had previously advised against the project, since the port was not served by a railroad. Eventually the Russians reached the same conclusion and shifted their feasibility studies to the Bay of Tangier.

The construction of shipyards at Bassra in Iraq and at Alexandria has extended the reach of Soviet sea power. Red Fleet units regularly visit Alexandria nowadays, where they maintain their supply and repair facilities. Bassra became a port of call in May, 1968, a visit which marked the first appearance ever of the Russian Navy in the Persian Gulf.

Numerous other maritime projects, especially in countries that do not receive Soviet military aid, serve as a strategic wedge. Work on such projects, resulting in extensive use of these countries' ports and coastal waters, establishes a Russian presence and can facilitate the gathering of intelligence.

Training received

In several cases the only aid the Soviet Union renders to a strategically located country that has not been particularly cordial to Moscow is connected with the sea.

In the Persian Gulf, Kuwait is enlarging its fishing fleet with Russian-built seiners on which Kuwaiti sailors also receive training from Soviet experts.

In Jordan, Moscow had no success with its military aid offers. But early in 1968 it persuaded Amman to accept economic assistance for a number of unspecified "maritime projects," thereby extending the Soviet presence to the Gulf of Aqaba.

The development of commercial fishing, a prominent item in Soviet aid program, often opens up the ports of the aid recipient to Soviet trawlers. Under the terms of the 1964 aid agreement, Tanzania permits Soviet fishing vessels to dock in its ports in return for assistance in developing its ocean fishing. A similar reciprocity exists with Senegal.

The facilities thus acquired increase the range of Soviet fishing fleets. These fleets often include electronic intelligence-gathering ships disguised as trawlers. Soviet trawlers have also been used for landing and picking up undercover agents. Last autumn Ghana intercepted some Russian fishing boats on suspicion of smuggling arms.

Aden objective

Moscow's persistence in offering economic aid that builds up an infrastructure for later naval capability continues unabated.

The latest object of Soviet interest is the port of Aden. Strategically better located and far larger than Hodeida, it has already served as a port of call for Soviet warships cruising the Indian Ocean. In February of this year, South Yemen signed an aid agreement with Moscow to improve Aden's harbor and docks.

Soviet eagerness to enlarge this port's facilities suggests that the Red Fleet hopes to add Aden to its list of repair and supply bases that already includes Algiers, Alexandria, Port Said, and Latakia. If those intentions are realized, Russia will have taken a major step toward achieving its dream of a permanent presence in both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

ARAB WORLD
23 June 1969

AFTER SHAABI'S RESIGNATION ANNOUNCED

Extreme Leftists In NLF Take Charge of Govt:

Five-Man Presidential Council Replaces Out-Going President; Includes Abdel Fattah Ismail

The extreme leftist wing of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the People's Republic of South Yemen has finally taken control of power there in what several newspapers today described as a "bloodless coup."

RADIO ADEN yesterday suddenly announced the resignat-

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ion of President Qahtan Al Shaabi, aged 49, and the appointment of a five-man Presidency Council to replace him. The decision was taken by the 41-man Executive Committee of the ruling NLF.

The five members of the new Council are: Abdel Fattah Ismail; Mohammed Ali Haitham; Mohammed Saleh Al Aulahi; Ali Ahmed Nasser; and Salem Rabei. It was also announced later that a new Cabinet was expected to be formed soon. This could mean that the new leaders are getting ready to remove the Premier, Feisal Abdel Latif Al Shaabi, a cousin of the outgoing President.

The NLF leadership described its move yesterday as "corrective", and listed the following principles as governing the "corrective operation":

1. "The people's democratic authority is the only means to avoid the dangers of individual action.
2. The protection of the revolutions in north and south Yemen is the urgent mission of the revolution in South Yemen.
3. Consolidation of relations with the sisterly Arab states, headed by the UAR, and strengthening national and (pan-Arab) relations in service of the Arab revolution of the common destiny, as well as actual participation in the Palestine question.
4. Pursuing a clear policy regarding the liberation causes in the world, and strengthening relations with the friendly socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union."

"Individual action" was obviously the charge brought against the resigning President, who was the original founder of the NLF that fought the British and won independence for South Yemen in November, 1967.

"Protection" of the revolutions in north and south Yemen could mean several things. It could mean that the new leaders may yet heat up the Aden campaign against the regime in Sanaa of Lt-General Hassan Al Amri, the Prime Minister, who had already been accused by the NLF in Aden of having allegedly sold out the Yemeni revolution in the north. Aden's worry was mainly due to the fact that the Sanaa regime has been harbouring FLOSY (Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen); the other south Yemeni nationalist movement which is now a rival to the NLF. Furthermore, the reference to "protection" showed concern about the south Yemeni right-wing elements who now live in exile in Saudi Arabia. These are mainly the former rulers of "The Federation of South Yemen", the name of the country before it acquired independence from the British. Aden has been saying that Saudi Arabia has provided these exiles with arms and mercenaries for an invasion of south Yemen.

In seeking stronger relations with the UAR, and "actual participation" in the Palestine

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problem, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0 the new leftist regime in the Sudan has launched. It will be recalled that the Sudanese regime has already declared its intention: to help the Palestinian commandos.

As a matter of fact, the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), the pan-Arab organization with branches in the Arab world, is part of the NLF in Yemen --and is believed to be represented by Abdel Fattah Ismail, a former Minister of Guidance who is now a member of the Presidency Council in Aden. It is not yet known to which side of the ANM the Aden faction belongs --to the one led by Dr George Habash, or to the more leftist faction of Naif Hawatmah. It will be recalled that Habash has his own commando organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), while Hawatmah, who heads a Marxist-Leninist faction, has established the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDF). It is to be noted, however, that the pan-Arab structure of the ANM is loosely connected and the section in Aden has always been independent from the ANM central leadership which in the past was in the hands of Dr Habash.

Cooperation With the USSR. The declaration by the new leaders in Aden that they will be seeking closer ties with the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, was another evidence of the leaders' inching closer to the left --even though the Shaabi regime had maintained close ties with Moscow. In fact, Shaabi stopped in Moscow earlier this month on his way for a visit to North Korea. It is likely that the new regime in Aden will follow in the steps of Iraq, Syria and Sudan in extending full recognition to East Germany.

During the power struggle in 1968, reports from Aden said that the extreme leftists were moving the country much too close to the East. Former Defense Minister, left-leaning Ali Salem Al Bayd, concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Union a few days before his ouster in March, 1968, which prompted speculations that Aden would be rented to the Soviets for a base for their fleet. Furthermore, Al Bayd had dismissed the British officers who were running the country's airforce, without first ensuring replacements for them.

According to one Beirut newspaper, independent right-wing AL NAHAR, Al Bayd is actually the man behind the "bloodless coup" yesterday against Shaabi. The paper noted that Al Bayd is playing his role behind the scenes.

The Growing Trend. The developments in South Yemen are yet another example that the already leftist Arab countries are being taken over by more left-leaning elements. South Yemen is the third Arab country to witness such a development since the June 5th, 1967, war. A coup in Iraq in July last year placed the present radical leftist Baathist regime in Baghdad. A coup last month in Khartoum brought to power the leftist regime of Major General Jaafar Al Numeiri. And now the extremists have taken over in Aden. Commented Damascus' AL BAATH: "The Arab revolution is on the move from Palestine to Sudan, to Eritrea."

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What Prompted The Crisis. Apparently, the crisis in Aden was prompted by the removal a few days ago of former Interior Minister Mohammed Ali Haitham, who is now a member of the new Presidency Council. Haitham's reported dismissal was kept a secret --and correspondents in Aden were not allowed to file out.

According to agency reports, the NLF Executive Committee has been meeting for the past four days to consider the conflict between Haitham and Al Shaabi. During the meeting, Shaabi, the reports said, offered his resignation, which was accepted.

Background of Conflict. Actually, the conflict inside the NLF dates back to the time the group took over power in the country when independence was announced. The conflict came to a head at the first NLF full congress, which was held at the town of Zangibar, some 60 kilometres far from Aden, between March 2nd and 8th. The congress elected the 41-man Executive Committee of the NLF, and discussed policies that the regime should follow.

The NLF was split in two factions --one based in Aden and led by Shaabi, and one led by the NLF's "ideologists", who were referred to as "Marxists", based in Hadhramaut. The Hadhramaut faction sought to apply "a rule by the proletariat", and to follow a strong policy in support of "liberation movements" in the Gulf area and against Saudi Arabia.

Abdel Fattah Ismail, then Minister of Guidance, submitted a report to the congress which proposed that the South Yemen Republic should depend for its defense on a popular army, rather than on the regular army. The proposal introduced a rather sharp conflict between the NLF members who led the independence war, and who wanted members of their former rebel army to take over defense of the country, in place of the British-trained regular army.

The congress, according to unconfirmed reports then, adopted the recommendations of the extreme leftists --which reportedly incurred the anger of Shaabi and the army officers, who carried out a movement on March 20th, twelve days after the congress ended, that ousted the leftist leaders such as Ismail and Al Bayd. Ismail, and a number of his followers left the country, and lived for a while in Bulgaria. But the leftists did not lose out completely --and in the meantime, they continued to strengthen their position. Late last year, efforts were made at reconciliation inside the NLF, and Ismail and his followers were allowed to return. One of the main reasons for the closing of ranks inside the NLF was the growing concern inside the NLF over the threat from FLOSY in North Yemen, and from the right-wing exiles in Saudi Arabia.

Four Reasons. Beirut's AL NAHAR, in a private story, listed four reasons for the downfall of Shaabi: 1. Deterioration of the economic situation, which was accompanied by higher taxes and rise in unemployment; 2. Discharge of three airforce pilots known to be followers of Al Haitham at the time the country needed their services. 3. The morale of the army, whose members were still engaged in a mopping operation of the revolt in Awaleq which ended on June 11th; and 4. Popular dissatisfaction with the "family rule", since Premier Shaabi is the cousin of outgoing President Shaabi.

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ARAB WORLD
24 June 1969

IMPLICATIONS OF NEW SOUTH YEMEN DEVELOPMENTS

CPYRGHT

Possible Effects Internally, In Gulf Area And At Arab Level

If in fact the new leaders who took over power in the Republic of South Yemen are the extreme leftists, as all signs indicate, then the development carries certain implications for the internal situation, the Arab Gulf area, and for inter-Arab relations.

The NLF leaders who have replaced outgoing President Qahtan Al Shaabi in power are known to advocate "scientific socialism", and were often generally referred to as "Marxist." But above all, they are "revolutionaries" not only contented with spread of revolution in their own country but also seek to export this revolution, particularly to the adjacent areas, namely: the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and even North Yemen, as they regard the Sanaa regime of Premier Lt-General Hassan Al Amri as not revolutionary enough.

Internally. In the course of the series of conflicts which had developed inside the NLF, a basic argument was said to have taken place between the radical leftists and former President Shaabi. Shaabi, a leftist himself, was reported to have maintained that in the stage immediately following independence, the NLF efforts should be concentrated on putting the country's affairs in order through a phased socialist programme. His position was that the revolution in South Yemen, after fulfilling the mission of getting the British out, should grow into a state -- "a revolutionary state."

The stand taken by the radicals was that "scientific socialism" should be applied immediately and should be spread to the rest of the Arabian Peninsula.

Not waiting for the argument to be settled, the radicals took control of Hadhramaut, on the six districts of the country, and began to apply their own brand of scientific socialism. They reportedly appropriated land without compensation, distributed them to peasants, and set out to establish state-run "model collective farms." They also nationalized a local petrol distribution firm.

The extremists, furthermore, sought to replace the regular army altogether with a "People's Army" composed of the NLF members and tribesmen who formed the rebel army against the British. The proposal was included in a comprehensive report submitted to the NLF congress held in March, 1968, by Abdel Fattah Ismail, then the Minister of Guidance, and now one of the five members of the Presidency Council setup Sunday to execute powers of the President. Excerpts published in Beirut of the report showed that Ismail proposed a popular army of between 100,000 to 150,000. He said that organization and rank in the proposed army should be on "a democratic basis", such as soldiers electing their own officers.

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Whether Ismail still holds these views, and whether the newleaders will seek to apply a Hadhramaut-type brand of socialism remain to be seen. At least the aforementioned views were what they upheld only a year ago.

Implications For The Gulf. During the NLF Congress in March last year, the extreme leftists were reported to have demanded that effective assistance should be given by the NLF and the South Yemeni government to the "national liberation movement" in Dhofar, on the border with Muscat.

This movement has now turned itself into the "National Front for the Liberation of Occupied Arab Gulf", after the Dhofar group was said to have acquired NLF and Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) elements. Originally, the purpose of the Dhofar liberation front was to liberate Dhofar and Muscat and Oman. Now, its activities have to stretch to the rest of the Arabian Gulf --and even also to Saudi Arabia.

Despite its long name, the Front did not seem to have been very active. Some reports said that the Shaabi regime had put some restrictions on the Front, which has its headquarters in Aden, after complaints from such countries as Kuwait, from which the South Yemen Government sought financial assistance. [The reports connected the alleged Kuwaiti complaint to certain press stories that elements of the Front were behind the explosions which took place in Kuwait last January. More precise information about the elements behind the explosions may come out of the trial of several persons --said to be 15-- charged with the outrage. Kuwait's AL RAI AL AAM has reported that the trial is expected to take place before the Higher State Security Court at end of this month].

At The Arab Level. The new leaders in South Yemen may further the current bid by other Arab leftists to establish a front of the leftist regimes in the Arab countries. The bid, which was originally started --so far unsuccessfully-- by the Baathist regime in Damascus, is now furthered by the leftist regime in the Sudan.

The Sudanese regime has sent a delegation to various Arab countries in efforts to explain the situation in the Sudan now. Whether the new leaders in Aden would do the same or not remains to be seen.

Like the regime in Khartoum, the new leaders in Aden have declared that they will 1)seek closer cooperation with the Arab states, "headed by the UAR"; and 2)take effective participation in the Arab confrontation with Israel. The Sudanese regime was prompt in announcing its intention to help the Palestinian commandos, and has, according to Khartoum reports, set aside a special budget for aiding the commandos.

The contribution to the commando movement by the NLF in Aden may also be at the ideolog-

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ical level for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) of Dr George Habash. Habash is leader of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), whose Aden branch is a member of the NLF.

International Level. In its declaration explaining the leadership change in South Yemen, the NLF promised to strengthen relations with the socialist countries, "headed by the Soviet Union."

Since the new leaders are more leftist than Shaabi, the conclusion could be drawn that they would be turning more towards Peking. But apparently, this is not the case. In fact, the Shaabi regime appeared to have tried to turn to Communist China for assistance. However, Moscow appears to be the winner in this matter because it is more able to give assistance than the Communist Chinese. In this light, the new developments in South Yemen have been as favourable to the Soviet Union as were the developments last month in the Sudan.

The Challenge. The change of leadership in the NLF does not end the challenge the group has been facing since its advent to power at dawn of independence in November 1967, namely, bringing to an end the conflicts inside it and also establishing effective control on the country.

DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm
27 October 1969

Sydjemen: *Sovjet och Kina kämpar om gunsten*

Sovjetunionen och Kina har nu inlett en kamp om inflytandet i Sydjemem, bara några månader efter president Salem Robaye Alis makttillträde.

CPYRGHT

De båda stormakternas "charm-offensiver" har redan lett till skärpta motsättningar mellan de "prosovjetiska" och "prokinesiska" flyglarna i den styrande Nationella befrielsefronten. NLF-rapporterar AFP:s utsände Derek Wilson.

Kina sände en chargé d'affaires till Aden kort efter det att Sydjemens förste president Qatan Ashaabi störtats av en grupp från NLF:s yttersta vänsterflygel. Kuppen leddes av den 27-årige Abdul Fattah Ismail,

generalsekreterare i fronten och allmänt betraktad som "prokinesisk".

Det har spekulerats om ett samband mellan kuppen och det kinesiska sändebudets ankomst, men enligt diplomatiska källor hade Peking beslutat sända en representant till Aden långt före maktskiftet.

Det kinesiska sändebudet, Li Chang-fen, bevisar ofta samma diplomatiska motgångar i Aden som den sovjetis-

ka ambassadören Vladimir Ivanovitj, men ännu har de inte setts tala med varandra. Li, hans tolk och någon av hans sekreterare brukar stå litet avsides, dekorerade med Mao-embem, och de brukar inte smaka på drinkarna.

Li omtalar för AFP:s utsände att hans personal skall utökas och att den kinesiska regeringen erbjudit drygt 60 miljoner kronor i bistånd till regeringen i Sydjemem.

Men kineserna har ännu

mycket terräng att inhärta på det ryska försprånget. Rysarna är fast etablerade i republiken, som tills för två år sedan var en brittisk koloni.

"You Russian, mister?" brukar vara det första en Aden-bo frågar européer på besök.

Sovjetunionen har slutit ekonomiska, kulturella och militära biståndsavtal med Sydjemem. Av nära 100 sovjetiska experter i landet är de flesta militärer.

DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm
Monday, 27 October 1969

CPYRGHT

SOUTH YEMEN:

Soviet Union and China Fight Over Favor

The Soviet Union and China have now started a competition over the influence in South Yemen, only a few months after President Salem Robaye Alis came to power.

The two big powers' "charm offensive" has already led to sharpened antagonism between the pro-Soviet and the pro-Chinese wings in the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF), it is reported by AFP's correspondent Derek Wilson.

China sent a chargé d'affaires to Aden shortly after the overthrow of South Yemen's first president Qatan Ashaabi by the extreme left-wing faction of the NLF. The coup was led by the 27-year-old Abdul Fattah Ismail, the secretary-general of the Front and generally considered pro-Chinese. There have been speculations about a connection between the coup and the arrival of the Chinese chargé, but according to diplomatic sources, Peking had decided to send a representative to Aden long before the power change.

The Chinese chargé Li Chang-fen often attends the same diplomatic receptions in Aden as the Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Ivanovich, but they have yet not been seen to speak to each other. Li, his interpreter, and one of his secretaries, decorated with Mao emblems, usually stand by themselves a little on the sidelines, and they usually do not taste the drinks.

Li tells AFP's reporter that his staff will be enlarged and that the Chinese government offered more than 60 million Crowns in aid to the government of South Yemen.

But the Chinese have yet some ground to cover in order to catch up with the Soviet lead. The Russians are securely established in this republic, which up til two years ago was a British colony. "You Russian, mister?" is often the first question an inhabitant of Aden asks a visiting European.

The Soviet Union has closed economic, cultural and military aid agreements with South Yemen. Of almost 100 Soviet experts in the country, most are military.

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CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
1 August 1969

VIAGGIO FRA GLI SCRITTORI SOVIETICI

Il catechismo dei nipoti di Zdanov

CPYRGHT

DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE

Mosca, luglio.

Cosa chiedono i «falchi» del Cremlino allo scrittore sovietico? D'impugnare la penna come un mitra, perché siamo in guerra e si giocano i destini della patria. Di tacere, perché il nemico lo ascolta. Non si può capire sino in fondo il ricatto compiuto dal partito comunista nei confronti della letteratura, e dunque il triste destino dello scrittore in questa stagione moscovita, se non si misura il peso degli argomenti portati dalla zona più dogmatica dell'apparato a carico dei pur cauti innovatori che avevano cercato di alzare il capino. A nulla vale che questi ultimi mettano le mani avanti, e dichiarino in tutte lettere la loro fedeltà al regime, la loro ferma volontà di realizzare un'autentica democrazia marxista-leninista. L'arma della critica, di cui pretendono servirsi, è agli occhi delle guardie di frontiera una bomba ad orologeria collocata nei gangli vitali del circuito difensivo.

I dogmatici partono da lontano per giustificare il loro rifiuto di porre in modo nuovo il rapporto fra socialismo e libertà, fra lo Stato, cioè il partito, e il sapere. Diciamo che seguono tre linee direttrici. L'una ideologica (intesa a riaffermare nei secoli il primato del verbo marxista incarnato nel materialismo dialettico); l'altra storico-politica (volta a denunciare i delittuosi attentati alla sicurezza nazionale in un momento in cui l'URSS è chiamata a reggere, oltre l'assedio capitalista, le conseguenze dell'aberrazione cinese); la terza artistica (desti-

nata a identificare e sopprimere ogni ricerca che non si muova nell'ambito del realismo socialista e sottragga l'artista al dovere di porre l'eroismo sul trono della storia).

Voluttà di potere

Sono tre direttrici che ovviamente s'intersecano e condizionano l'una con l'altra, il che ingarbuglia la matassa. Ma per tirare i fili bastano due considerazioni: che la casta dei mandarini fa un grandissimo spreco di parole per giustificare con argomenti democratici la propria voluttà di potere, e che i termini del ricatto sono gli stessi, identici, usati negli anni Trenta da Stalin e da Zdanov per ottenere il consenso della cultura ufficiale.

Eccoci comunque in aiuto un personaggio per qualche verso leggendario nella società letteraria moscovita, il simbolo vivente della Reazione più nera, il Defensor Fidel forgiato nell'acciaio dei carri armati. Vsevolod Anisimovich Kocetov, anni 57, meglio noto come Araldo del Dogma che come autore di romanzi puntualmente derisi dai critici liberali della sinistra, è da quasi dieci anni il direttore di Oktjabr (150.000 copie), l'organo dell'Unione scrittori russi che mensilmente chiama a raccolta poeti, narratori e critici di schietta vocazione oscurantista, e li giudica tanto più bravi quanto meno li sospetta di contagio progressista. Due fattori sembrano confermare questa inclemente valutazione, su cui sono concordi tutti i miei inter-

locutori: la circostanza, assai rara in questo terremoto panoramico, che Kocetov dovette lasciare, nel '59, la direzione della Literaturnaja Gazieta, ma poi è uscito incolume dalla rovina di Krusciov, e il dossier delle sue «maiefatte», gelosamente custodito e quotidianamente accresciuto dagli scrittori di Novij Mir.

Dudintsev, Pasternak, Solgenitsin, Tvardovskij sono stati di volta in volta, e gli ultimi sono tuttora, i suoi bersagli preferiti. Fin dal '60, sulla Pravda, Kocetov aveva irriso agli «ingenui» come Krusciov che parlavano di coesistenza: per l'affare dell'«U-2» si fregò le mani.

Kocetov è qui di fronte, impeccabilmente cortese e generoso di pasticcini, nella sede di Oktjabr arredata in stile «littorio». In quello che dice, nel proclamarsi sicuro che la società si sviluppa in base a leggi chiare e obiettive, stabilite una volta per tutte dai decreti-legge della storia, riecheggiano i motivi salienti della sua crociata.

Strumento sociale

Già sul piano ideologico Kocetov è perentorio: «Il marxismo scientifico è l'unico metodo che possa spiegare il mondo e applicarsi a ogni ramo del sapere. E' un passaportout universale, che penetra anche le turbe dell'inconscio. Siamo fedeli al credo materialista, e tra Freud e Pavlov noi scegliamo Pavlov, per il quale anche l'attività psichica è un modo della materia». Qual è per Kocetov la

funzione dello scrittore sovietico? «Educare all'umanesimo con l'arte, che è lo strumento sociale di cui dispone per conoscere la vita». E qual è il criterio per giudicarlo? «Se dice qualcosa di nuovo con un nuovo linguaggio». Per esempio Solgenitsin... «No, lo stile di Solgenitsin è troppo vecchio». Novij Mir la pensa diversamente. «E questo conferma che nell'Unione sovietica la critica è libera. A proposito di Novij Mir state attenti, voi occidentali, a trinciare giudizi. Fu proprio Novij Mir a rifiutare nel '56, e in quel caso aveva ragione, il romanzo di Pasternak. E poi, c'è un elemento di leggenda nel conflitto tra Oktjabr e Novij Mir. Le due riviste hanno molti collaboratori in comune, e l'unica vera differenza è data dall'apprezzamento di certe opere letterarie. Sul nome di Solgenitsin ci siamo divisi, ma soltanto perché a noi sembra che un giorno della vita di Ivan Denisovic sia un libro scritto male, in uno stile ottocentesco, e Novij Mir invece lo trova formalmente interessante. D'altronde sappiamo perché Solgenitsin piace tanto in Occidente: parla dei campi staliniani, e questo basta per farlo credere un grande scrittore. Mentre invece noi non siamo contro le cose nuove; siamo contro le cose deboli e brutte».

Pensa al Dottor Zivago? «Certamente, come l'ha capito? Il dottor Zivago è un romanzo debole, e sciatto nello stile». Perché i cittadini sovietici non possono leggerlo? «L'autore e lo stampatore italiano hanno violato le nor-

me dell'etica editoriale, l'affare è ingrossato come una palla di neve e ormai non è più d'ordine letterario, ma il divieto, qui da noi, è dettato soltanto da ragioni artistiche». Scusi, vuol ripetere? «Del resto, la grande letteratura ha sempre glorificato i sentimenti nobili. Guardiamo Dickens, Victor Hugo...». Guardiamo anche Joyce, Proust, Kafka? «No, sono scrittori che non ci interessano. Gli unici momenti positivi, in Kafka, sono rappresentati dalla descrizione dei caratteri». Capisco, sono estranei al realismo socialista. «Sissignore, il realismo socialista è l'unico metodo sperimentato che fornisce capolavori alla letteratura, all'arte e al cinema. È un metodo dialettico, in cui sono fusi il realismo, il romanticismo, il lirismo e persino certi elementi astratti». Scusi, perché perfino? «Perché a differenza di quanto accade nella scienza, astruendo dalla realtà l'arte non consente di esprimere nulla». Dunque è per evitare a un certo tipo di scrittori di perdere tempo a gingillarsi col nulla che il partito sconsiglia di allontanarsi dal realismo socialista? «Ben detto; sconsiglia, non proibisce. Prima d'imparare a camminare, i bambini vanno a quattro zampe, e non per questo sono esclusi dalla nostra società».

E se qualcuno si rifiuta di crescere? «Peggio per lui, se vuol restare fuori del marxismo-leninismo: non avrà la gioia di partecipare all'edificazione dell'Uomo Nuovo». «Per concludere, ci chiamano dogmatici, ma lo siamo in due soli casi: nel rivendicare il valore perenne del realismo socialista e nel difendere dalle calunnie il genio militare di Stalin».

Un'occhiata agli ultimi numeri di Oktjabr (i pensieri d'un operaio, un saggio sull'opera di Lenin in favore dell'elettrificazione, il romanzo autobiografico del ministro della difesa Malinovskij...), e cerchiamo di tirare qualche

somma. Il dogmatismo che si nasconde nelle formule semplicistiche e nelle risposte evasive di Kocetov ha tipici connotati repressivi. Siamo fermi all'agosto di trentacinque anni fa, quando Zdanov ordinò agli scrittori, riuniti nel loro primo congresso, di essere ottimisti, come si conviene alla letteratura del proletariato in ascesa. I dogmi proclamati in quell'occasione per trionfare sulla purifata cultura borghese sono rimasti inalterati. Sul piano dei contenuti lo scrittore sovietico, membro responsabile di una famiglia «buona, sana e compatta», deve bandire il misticismo, la pornografia, il pessimismo, deve cogliere la realtà nel suo sviluppo rivoluzionario, attraverso personaggi positivi che dominano con la ragione la notte dell'inconscio e del subconscio, deve seguire l'esempio luminoso degli Eroi del Lavoro, e non già le «fantasmagorie da manicomio» di Joyce o il vecchio mondo di Proust.

Facili accuse

Quanto allo stile, lo scrittore sovietico che non vuol grane sa bene come deve comportarsi: lasci perdere le forme iperboliche e allegoriche, i giochi gratuiti che lo divertono ma fanno andare in bestia l'uomo della strada e tolgono al linguaggio il suo carattere di mezzo di comunicazione con la massa; fugga la tentazione dell'inutile ricamo e del crudo accento emotivo; non si illuda, come quel visionario di Ehrenburg, che il realismo socialista possa coesistere con l'astrattismo e il formalismo. Insomma, l'arte è del popolo e per il popolo: guai se induce allo sconforto anziché incitare al lavoro. Tutte cose dette e ripetute da decenni, che a scanso di equivoci lo stesso Krusciov volle far sue nel discorso dell'8 marzo 1963, e che un mese fa la Pravda ripeteva, immutate, denunciando il «modernismo decadente» e quanti osano trattarne da un

punto di vista estetico anziché ideologico e sociale. Questo per dire che la linea dei dogmatici, ferma agli anni Trenta, è l'unica ad avere l'avallo ufficiale del partito.

Accade così che i «bambini a quattro zampe», come Oktjabr tende a definire tutti gli scrittori non assiderati, finiscono sempre col'essere accusati di fare il gioco dei capitalisti borghesi o degli avventurieri di Pechino. L'azione intimidatoria dei dogmatici non riesce a soffocare del tutto l'ispirazione creativa (i cassetti bene o male si riempiono) e a paralizzare la vita letteraria, ma raggiunge l'assurdo di dare l'aureola del martirio a un'intelligenza che in definitiva lavora per rafforzare il sistema rendendolo un poco più umano.

Sta di fatto che la caduta di Krusciov ha quasi del tutto arrestato il processo di analisi critica aperto dal XX congresso anche nel campo della cultura. La situazione è venuta progressivamente deteriorandosi, fino a toccare negli ultimi mesi il livello dell'angoscia. La condanna di Galanskov e di Ghinsburg (l'autore del libro bianco sul processo Siniavskij-Daniel) provocò nel corso del '68 tutta una serie di proteste pubbliche, di appelli a Breznev e a Kossighin per il ripristino della legalità socialista, che forse avrebbero avuto qualche effetto concreto, sulla scia delle vivacissime manifestazioni svolte dai «liberali di sinistra» durante il '66 e il '67, se i fatti di Praga, la crescente pressione cinese, la «rivolta» dei comunisti italiani alla conferenza di Mosca non avessero confortato i dogmatici nella convinzione che i giri di vite, e se necessario il manicomio e i lavori forzati, restano il mezzo più efficace per esorcizzare lo spettro del revisionismo.

Per colpa di un dogmatismo che non si pone come un momento dialettico della lotta fra conservatori e progressi-

sti bensì, grazie al corteo di spie e poliziotti che lo accompagna, come un elemento di terrorismo capace di stroncare sul nascere un'autentica vocazione letteraria, gli scrittori sovietici vedono assorbiti i tre quarti della propria spinta vitale dalla protesta contro il totalitarismo di una ideologia che la scienza ha già scavalcato («Non è colpa mia — disse l'accademico Frenkel — se l'elettrone non si comporta conformemente ai precetti del materialismo dialettico»).

Doppio spavento

Una recensione negativa su Oktjabr, con l'implicito invito a tener d'occhio lo sconosciuto che pretende di scrivere come gli detta dentro, può equivalere all'inizio di un'inchiesta segreta da concludersi col rinvio a giudizio per vilipendio dello Stato. La recente estromissione dalla rivista Junost del terzetto Evtuscenko, Aksionov, Rozov, e i periodici tentativi di cacciare Tvardovskij da Novij Mir, si inquadrano in questa cornice minacciosa. Kocetov ripete da anni che bisogna ripulire gli angolini. Il suo idolo è Sciokolov, da quando l'autore del Placido Don ebbe l'impudenza di rimpiangere che Siniavskij e Daniel non fossero stati fucilati.

E tuttavia nemmeno Kocetov può nascondersi che la società sovietica degli anni Settanta, traumatizzata dal XX congresso, accetterebbe di malagrazia, forse con imprevedibili scossoni, una politica filistea che istituzionalizzasse l'arbitrio di camuffare da crimini contro il potere del popolo i delitti d'opinione. A meno che la Cina non si muova, perché allora tutto il paese si schiererebbe compatto agli ordini dei generali. Per ciò a Mosca si dice che il mondo della cultura guarda a Pechino con doppio spavento.

Giovanni Grazzini

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
1 August 1969

A TRIP AMONG SOVIET WRITERS

By Giovanni Grazzini

What do the "hawks" want of the Soviet writer? They want him to hold the pen as he would a tommy gun, because we are in war and the fate of the fatherland is at stake. They want him to be quiet because the enemy is listening to him. This Moscow summer, it is difficult to understand completely the communist party's

blackmail of literature and hence the writer's sad destiny unless we assess the weight of the arguments coming from the most dogmatic area of the apparatus with regard to even the cautious innovators who have tried to raise their heads. The fact that these writers leave no stone unturned to swear their allegiance to the regime, to spell out their firm desire to effect a genuine Marxist-Leninist democracy, avails them nothing. The arm of criticism to which they resort is, in the eyes of the cultural frontier guards, a time bomb placed in the vital ganglia of a defensive circuit.

The dogmatists go far back to justify their refusal to restructure the relationship between socialism and freedom, between the state, i.e., the party, and knowledge. It seems to us that they follow 3 directing lines. The ideological line is directed at reaffirming for centuries the primacy of the Marxist word that is incarnated in dialectical materialism. The second, the historical political line, is aimed at denouncing the criminal attempts on national security at a time when the USSR is required to endure, besides the capitalist seige, the consequences of the Chinese aberration. The third, the artistic line, is directed at identifying and suppressing every inquiry that moves outside the framework of socialist realism and prevents the artist from discharging his duty of placing heroism on the throne of history.

WILL TO POWER

These 3 directing lines obviously intersect and condition one another, which creates confusion. Two considerations suffice to tighten the lines: the cast of Mandarins waste a lot of words to justify with democratic arguments their own will to power, and the terms of the blackmail are the same as and identical to those used by Stalin and Zhdanov in the thirties to obtain a consensus for the official culture.

There is somebody to help the "hawks"; he is an individual who is virtually legendary in Moscow literary society: he is the living symbol of the darkest reaction, the trusted defender who was forged in the steel of armored cars. Vsevolod Anisimovich Kochetov, 57 years old and known as the keeper of the dogma rather than the author of novels punctually derided by liberal critics of the left, for over a decade has been the director of Oktyabr' (150,000 copies), the organ of the Union of Russian Writers that every month publishes the work of poets, novelists, and critics having an overtly obscurantist vocation. Kochetov's evaluation of their ability

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is based on the following formula: the less their pro-
gressive contagion, the greater their ability. Two
factors appear to confirm this rough evaluation, factors
on which all my interlocutors agree: the circumstance,
quite rare in this panorama of earthquake victims, that
Kochetov had to resign in 1959 from the editorial board
of Literaturnaya Gazeta, plus his escape without harm
from the Khrushchev ruins; and his dossier with jealously
guarded "misdeeds" is being daily expanded by the writers
of Novyy Mir.

Dudintsev, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and Tvardovskiy
have been from time to time his preferred targets. The
last two remain so to this day. Since 1960 Kokchetov
has been using the pages of Pravda to ridicule "simple-
minded" people like Khrushchev who have been speaking of
coexistence. The "U-2" affair brought joy to his heart.

In his office Kokchetov is impeccably courteous
and generous with his sweetmeats. His Oktyabr' headquarters
is furnished in "littoral" style. The salient motives
of his crusade are echoed in what he says, in the
certain affirmation that society develops on the basis
of clear and objective laws, which have been fixed once
and for all by historical laws.

SOCIAL INSTRUMENT

On the ideological level Kokchetov is peremptory:
"Scientific Marxism is the only method capable of ex-
plaining the world; it can be applied to any branch of
knowledge. It is a universal truth that also penetrates
the unconscious multitude. We are faithful to the ma-
terialist credo, and when the alternative is between
Freud and Pavlov, we select the latter; for him, even
psychic activity is a material method." What is Kokche-
tov's view of the Soviet writer's function? "Use art
to inculcate humanism, which is the social instrument
available to know life. And what is the criterion to
evaluate it? "If something new is said in a new way."
For example, Solzhenitsyn... "No, Solzhenitsyn's style
is too old." Novyy Mir doesn't think so. "This con-
firms that criticism is uninhibited in the Soviet Union.
As to Novyy Mir, you Westerners should be careful in
drawing conclusions. It was precisely Novyy Mir that
in 1956 rejected Pasternak's novel, and in that case it
was right. And then there is an element of tradition
in the conflict between Oktyabr' and Novyy Mir. The 2
magazines have many common contributors, and the only
genuine difference stems from evaluations of certain
literary works. We have parted with respect to Solzhenit-
syn, but only because it seems to us that A Day in the
Life of Ivan Denisovich is a poorly written book, one
written in the style of the 19th century, while Novyy
Mir formally finds it interesting. On the other hand,

we know why Solzhenitsyn's works are so liked in the West: because he speaks of Stalin's camps, and this suffices to make the West think he is a great writer. We, instead, are not against innovations. We are opposed, however, to weak and ugly things."

Have you thought about Doctor Zhivago? "Certainly, how did you understand it? Doctor Zhivago is a weak novel, untidy in style." Why cannot Soviet citizens read the book? "The author and the Italian publishing house have violated the norms of publishing ethics. The affair has expanded like a snow ball going down hill. The affair, so far as we are concerned, no longer has any literary significance: our refusal to publish it is based solely on artistic reasons." Excuse me, will you repeat that? "More than that, great literature has always glorified noble sentiments. For instance, Dickens, Victor Hugo..." Shouldn't we also list Joyce, Proust, Kafka? "No, they are not writers who interest us. The only positive aspects in Kafka are present in his description of characters." I understand, they are alien to socialist realism. "Yes, sir, socialist realism is the only tested method that produces masterpieces in literature, art, and motion pictures. It is a dialectical method which merges realism, romanticism, lyricism, and even certain abstract elements." Excuse me, why "even"? "Because, unlike what happens in science, art, abstracting from reality, does not permit anything to be expressed." Is it then to prevent a certain type of writer from losing time toying with nothing that the party counsels against straying from socialist realism? "Well said; it advises against it, not forbids. Before learning to walk babies go on all fours, but they are not excluded from our society because of this."

But suppose somebody refuses to grow? "The worse it is for him if he chooses to stay outside the Marxist-Leninist framework: he will not experience the happiness of creating the new man." "In conclusion, we are called dogmatists, but we are really dogmatic in only 2 ways: in proclaiming the everlasting value of socialist realism and in defending Stalin's military genius from slander."

A look at the recent issues of Oktyabr' (the thoughts of a worker, an essay on Lenin's work directed at electrification, a former defense minister's, Malinovsky's, autobiography...), we hoped, would enable us to draw conclusions. The dogmatism concealed in simplistic formulas and in Kokchetov's evasive replies have typical repressive features. We are held fast in the grips of the August of 35 years ago, when Zhdanov ordered the writers, who were holding their first Congress, to

be optimists, as was to be expected of the literature of a proletariat on the ascendant. The dogmas proclaimed on this occasion, proclaimed with a view to having socialism triumph over the putrefying bourgeois culture, have remained unchanged. On the level of content the Soviet writer, responsible member of a "good, healthy, and united" family, must put aside mysticism, pornography, pessimism; he must grasp reality in its revolutionary development via positive characters that control with reason the darkness of the unconscious and the subconscious and follow the illuminating example of the Heroes of Labor, and not the "lunatic phantasmagorias of an asylum" of Joyce or the old world of Proust.

FACILE ACCUSATIONS

As to style, the Soviet writer seeking to avoid trouble knows quite well how to behave: he forgets about hyperbolic and allegoric forms, the gratuitous plays that amuse him but makes the man in the street fly into a rage; he excises from the language its feature as a means of communication with the masses and avoids the temptation of the useless embroidery and the crude emotional accent. He does not delude himself, as did Ehrenburg's visionary, that socialist realism can exist with abstractism and formalism. In short, art is of the people and for the people: woe to him whose work leads to unhappiness rather than to work. These points have been iterated and reiterated for decades; these are the points that Khrushchev wanted unequivocally to make his in his talk of 8 March 1963 and that a month ago Pravda repeated unchanged by denouncing "decadent modernism." These are the points that many writers would like to deal with from the esthetic standpoint rather than the ideological and social. This is to say that the dogmatists' line stops at the thirties, and it is the only one to have the party's blessing.

What happens is that the "babes on all fours," as Oktyabr' tends to define all the uncommitted writers, always wind up being accused of playing the game of the bourgeois capitalists and the Peking adventurists. The intimidating action of the dogmatists does not completely strangle the creative inspiration (the drawers are refilled in one fashion or another) or paralyze literary life; but it does reach the stage of the absurd by giving a martyr's halo to an intelligentsia that in the final analysis is working to strengthen the system and to make it a bit more human.

It is a fact that Khrushchev's fall virtually arrested the process of critical analysis that had

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also been inaugurated in the cultural field by the 20th CPSU Congress. The situation has been gradually deteriorating. It has deteriorated to a level that gives rise to anxiety. The condemnation of Galanskov and Ginsburg (the author of the white book on the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial) evoked during 1968 a series of public protests, of appeals to Brezhnev and Kosygin for the restoration of socialist legality. Since these efforts followed the very lively demonstrations of the "left liberals" in 1966 and 1967, they might have produced some concrete results if the Prague events, the increasing Chinese pressure, and the "revolt" of the Italian Communist at the Moscow Conference had not shored up the dogmatists' conviction that life sentences and, if necessary, mental institutions and forced labor constitute the most effective means for excorcizing the spectre of revisionism.

Because of dogmatism, there is no dialectical struggle between conservatives and progressives. Dogmatism makes necessary a large group of spies and police, an element of terrorism capable of truncating at the roots a genuine literary vocation. Soviet writers see three quarters of their energy utilized in a protest against the totalitarianism of an ideology that science has made obsolete ("It's not my fault," said Academician Frankel, "if electrons do not conform to the precepts of dialectical materialism").

DOUBLE FEAR

A negative review in Oktyabr', with the implicit invitation to keep an eye on the rash individual who pretends to write as his conscience dictates, may be tantamount to the beginning of a secret inquest that results in an insult to the state and hence the institution of proceedings. The recent removal from the magazine Yunost' of the poet Yevtushenko, Aksionov, and Rozov and the periodic attempts to fire Tvardovskiy from Novyy Mir fit into this threatening picture. Kokchetov has been saying for years that the small angles must be repolished. His idol is Sholokhov who, following the publication of Tikhyy Don (And Quiet Flows the Don), has had the effrontery to regret that Sinyavskiy and Daniel were not shot.

Despite all this, not even Kokchetov can conceal the fact that Soviet society of the sixties, traumatized by the 20th CPSU Congress, would accept in bad faith, perhaps with unforeseen shocks, a philistine policy that institutionalizes arbitrary action for the purpose of concealing the offences of opinion from the crimes against people's power. This is true so long as China makes no move; otherwise, the whole country would be unified through the orders of generals. Because of this, it is said in Moscow that the cultural world looks at Peking with double fear.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
12 August 1969

VIAGGIO FRA GLI
SCRITTORI SOVIETICI

La ruggine
dell'Inquisizione

CPYRGHT

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DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE
Mosca, agosto.

« Questo è nulla, senti cos'è successo a me... ». Quando due scrittori sovietici s'incontrano, lo disse Svirski un anno fa e la mia piccola esperienza lo conferma, comincia la gara a chi si racconta il più grottesco sopruso della censura. Non è detto che la cosa finisca in un torneo di barzellette. Soltanto i più forti, i più ricchi, i più fatalisti ci ridono sopra; per la massima parte degli scrittori che vivono del proprio lavoro, la lotta condotta con la censura per vedersi riconoscere il diritto a usare un certo aggettivo racchiude il senso di tutto il loro mestiere, che altrove consiste non già nel difendere dagli altri ma nel conquistare dentro di sé la verità dell'espressione artistica.

Nel caso della Russia è giusto soltanto in parte che la storia della letteratura non coincida con la storia della censura. Lasciamo stare le migliaia di giovani talenti stroncati da Stalin nei campi di sterminio: oggi il colpo alla nuca è passato di moda (si preferiscono i suicidi e gli incidenti d'auto), ma se le lettere sovietiche hanno un livello così mediocre — persino Sciolokov se ne è lamentato al XXIII congresso — è anche perché la censura, tagliando le gambe agli scrittori che hanno più voglia di correre, alleva una generazione di delusi e di imbibiti in cui serpeggiano gli stessi motivi dell'alienazione europea.

Muri di gelo

Col che lo Stato sovietico si dà la zappa sui piedi: inasprendo i vincoli alla libertà di pensiero e di creazione, arrugginisce proprio quelle zone della cultura in cui dovrebbe trovare maggiore sostegno e forza d'espansione il mito dell'umanesimo socialista. Non è chiaro come l'umanesimo socialista possa offrirsi da modello al mondo senza la prerogativa della libertà di dire di no, che è propria dell'umanesimo tout court.

Quando, campa cavallo, si apriranno i cassetti, staremo dunque a vedere se i versi e le prose degli autori sovietici che hanno consumato gli anni Sessanta nella rinuncia agli onori ufficiali, alle tirature gigantesche e alle vacanze in dacia erano molto più allegri di quelli dei loro ipocondriaci colleghi occidentali. Certi sociologi si ostinano a dire che la poetica dell'incomunicabilità è un frutto del marciume borghese. « Sempre meglio — mi fa osservare il romanziere Boris X — del vuoto verniciato di rosa prodotto dal socialismo sovietico. Toccherà ai nostri figli, forse ai nostri nipoti, misurare nei nostri manoscritti segreti i muri di gelo alzati nel cuore dagli operai dell'Inquisizione ».

Come funziona la censura sovietica? Inutile chiederlo ai filistei. L'invariabile risposta è che la censura qui non esiste, perché l'articolo 125 della costituzione, « in conformità con gli interessi dei lavoratori e

al fine di rafforzare il sistema socialista », garantisce ai cittadini « libertà di parola, libertà di stampa, libertà di riunione, libertà di cortei e di manifestazioni ». Allora diamo a uno scrittore d'animo onesto quali sono le sue esperienze, quali i criteri con cui il Glavlit (la « Direzione centrale per le questioni della letteratura e dell'arte » dipendente dal Consiglio dei ministri) giudica oggi se un'opera letteraria è conforme agli interessi dei lavoratori.

« C'è da mettersi le mani nei capelli — risponde un bravo poeta che mi vedo costretto a ribattezzare Sergei — Nessuno di noi ci capisce più nulla. Posso dir questo; il quadro della situazione fatto da Solgenitsin nella lettera al quarto congresso dell'Unione scrittori, due anni fa, si è appesantito. Solgenitsin denunciò con parole roventi, che probabilmente hanno deciso per sempre il suo destino, i soprusi della polizia e gli arbitri della censura, compiuti da zoticci funzionari ai danni degli artisti. La parte migliore della nostra letteratura, disse Solgenitsin, vede la luce tramisata. Se ha perso la posizione di preminenza mondiale che ebbe alla fine dell'Ottocento e lo splendore sperimentale degli anni Venti è perché le è stato impedito di svilupparsi, e di apparire meno povera e piatta di quanto forse non sia. Solgenitsin aveva mille ragioni di protestare: è il più grande scrittore che abbia oggi l'Unione Sovietica, e ha compiuto

il dovere di difendere in se stesso, forte dell'esperienza campita nei campi di Stalin, il decoro di tutti i suoi colleghi, anche di quelli che pur di vedere pubblicate le proprie opere accettano di cambiare pagine e titoli.

« Ma in un certo senso il suo intervento, e la campagna condotta per tutto il '67 e il '68, ha fatto più male che bene. Il Glavlit, preoccupato dei consensi ottenuti fra gli intellettuali da Solgenitsin, ha raddoppiato la vigilanza, e non soltanto si è intestardito nel vietare a Novij Mir la pubblicazione del romanzo di Bek: ha rinviato sine die la riabilitazione di poeti come Mandelstam, Voloscin, Kodacievic, e ha stretto le viti un po' per tutti. Naturalmente chi paga le spese maggiori sono gli scrittori viventi di medio livello, i quali né possono né vogliono, anche per lealtà verso il regime, mandare i manoscritti in occidente.

Dramma lacrimoso

« La prima stazione della loro via Crucis comincia a tavolino, quando per adeguarsi alle esigenze della censura distorcono la propria fantasia eliminando situazioni e dati psicologici, e costruendo giri sintattici degni di Bisanzio. La seconda stazione li vede in piedi, col cappello in mano, di fronte al redattore della rivista su cui sperano di pubblicare a puntate, secondo l'uso russo, l'opera loro. A questo punto comincia la tragicommedia, il

mercato dei personaggi e degli aggettivi. Il redattore — l'uomo di fiducia che l'Unione scrittori ha in tutte le riviste — cerca d'indovinare cosa può esserci di sgradito al Glavlit nel romanzo o nella poesia che ha dinanzi; e l'autore, prima dichiara di affidarsi al gusto e alla sensibilità del redattore, poi, se incontra resistenze, si sforza di convincerlo che secondo sue notizie personali l'aria tira in un certo modo, in quei giorni, da lasciar prevedere maggiore tolleranza. E' in questa fase delle trattative, quando ufficialmente la censura non è ancora intervenuta, che l'opera spesso muta fisionomia, specie nei passi in cui si tocca il conflitto fra le generazioni, agiscono giovani vagabondi e donne di piccola virtù, si critica il terrore staliniano, si nega indiscriminatamente la necessità della guerra, non si addebita la crisi morale d'un personaggio al suo distacco dalla società proletaria.

« Superata questa fase (ma la novità degli ultimi mesi è l'aumento del numero degli scrittori che non accettano manipolazioni impudenti, e preferiscono stringere la cinghia), l'opera arriva nelle mani del Glavlit. E qui la tragicommedia piega verso il dramma lacrimoso. Fra il '56 e il '64 i poteri dell'oligarchia burocratica asserragliata nel Glavlit erano stati ridotti. Doveva accertare soltanto se in tutto quello che uscisse da una tipografia ci fosse violazione dei segreti militari o offesa al buoncostume. Dopo la caduta di Kruscev gli sono state restituite le antiche funzioni di controllo ideologico. In questo clima da controriforma si può immaginare con che animo certi revisori di formazione stalinista che si sentono reintegrati nei loro diritti di custodi del sistema applicano le istruzioni dei superiori (peraltro così spesso contraddittorie). Ricordiamoci che ai tempi del processo le Izvestia trovarono una prova della colpevolezza di Daniel nelle pagine

in cui descriveva certe donne 'simili a uomini castrati... di gamba corta, come bassotti gravidi, o di gamba lunga come struzzi, che nascondono sotto gli abiti gonfiati e lividure, si stringono nei busti e s'imbottiscono il petto d'ovatta' ».

E se il Glavlit nega il « visto »?

« Il Glavlit non nega il 'visto', che poi è quel numerino stampato con molte altre notizie (tiratura, tipo di carta, nomi dei revisori) nell'ultima pagina di tutti i libri e di tutte le riviste. Se sente puzzo d'eresia non lo concede, ma nega di non volerlo concedere. Dice, semplicemente, di aspettare. E il redattore, che spinto dall'autore insiste per sapere qualcosa, sente rispondergli che il momento non è opportuno, riprovi più tardi. Magari fra un mese, fra un anno, fra vent'anni. Soltanto se ha santi in paradiso, cioè presso il dipartimento culturale del comitato centrale del partito, il nostro autore può sperare che il 'momento opportuno' si avvicini ».

Profonda spaccatura

Ghinsburg, in una lettera a Kossighin del dicembre '65, rilevò la relatività del concetto di propaganda antisovietica. « Quando la critica è condotta dal basso — scrisse — è propaganda antisovietica; se invece è venuta dall'alto, ed è stata incorporata nelle risoluzioni dei congressi, allora è la linea maestra del partito ». Era un'osservazione ragionevole. Chiedo a una giovane scrittrice se la situazione è migliorata, se ci sono dei punti fermi cui il Glavlit si ispira in questi mesi per decidere quale opera rafforzi e quale indebolisca il sistema sovietico. La ragazza sorride: « Dove occorrebbero, se non altro per renderci la vita meno complicata, i dogmi mancano. L'elenco degli 'ismi' tenuti per eretici è, in teoria, lo stesso da trent'anni a questa parte. Tutti i rami spuntati

sul tronco dell'irrazionalismo, dal formalismo all'anarchismo, dal manierismo all'astrattismo, e tutti i modi di sospetta derivazione borghese, dal nazionalismo al cosmopolitismo, dallo psicologismo al naturalismo, sono nel libro nero del Glavlit. Ma non sempre, e neppure noi sappiamo bene perché, la condanna si applica con lo stesso rigore. L'opera di Kataiev, per esempio, che s'imparenta con molte ricerche informali dell'Occidente, ha avuto l'imprimatur.

« Negli ultimi mesi hanno vita relativamente più facili certi cautissimi sperimentalismi, destinati a una cerchia molto ristretta, che non opere di larga circolazione cosiddette depressive, troppo critiche verso gli anziani, troppo debolmente impegnate nell'esaltazione della panacea comunista, troppo inclini all'umorismo ». Le scelte della censura sono sempre un ottimo termometro per conoscere la febbre del paese. Queste mi sembrano un'altra prova di quel processo di deideologizzazione, in corso nel paese reale, che sta portando a una profonda spaccatura fra il potere e l'intelligentsia.

Non so se dalle risposte dei miei interlocutori ci si sia spiegati perché gli scrittori sovietici, sospesi sull'albero a cantare, sono così demoralizzati. Eppure la censura ha anche un altro genere di conseguenze. Per esempio ha mitizzato, spesso oltre i meriti, la letteratura clandestina. A Mosca si racconta che un alto papavero, per costringere il giovane figlio a leggere Tolstoj, fece battere a macchina Guerra e pace, e glielo presentò come un'opera proibita. Da parte loro le dattilografie di poesie o romanzi rimasti inediti hanno la consuetudine d'aggiungere un foglio di carta carbone, e di vendere la copia sottobanco. E' accaduto addirittura che d'un libro bloccato dalla censura mentre era in corso di stampa i tipografi abbiano, nottetempo, tirato le bozze delle poche pagine composte, per smerciarle a caro

prezzo.

Che tutti i manoscritti entrati in circolazione con simili sistemi siano d'onorevole livello letterario non direi, e tuttavia è anche grazie alla censura se l'opera d'arte (l'esempio maggiore resta il dottor Zivago, che passa di mano in mano tradotto in russo dall'edizione americana) conserva una forza d'attrazione straordinaria, regge la concorrenza con le conquiste scientifiche, e si pone al primo posto nella gerarchia dei valori da recuperare.

Nessun Glavlit riesce oramai a convincere l'opinione pubblica colta dell'Unione Sovietica che stampare Pound, Burges o Malaparte, ripubblicare dopo tanti anni Joyce, Gide o Eliot, riabilitare Mandelstam, Voloscin, Kodacievic, Gumilov, Zamiatin, Remizov turbi talmente il popolo da togliergli la voglia di sorvegliare gli altiforni e di battere il grano. Non ha senso l'argomento per cui il denaro dei lavoratori non può essere speso per stampare delle opere giudicate antirivoluzionarie nella notte dei tempi. Una rivoluzione che dopo cinquant'anni ha ancora paura di certi scrittori ha mangiato se stessa.

Soprattutto nessun Glavlit riesce a persuadere la coscienza civile che uno scrittore possa cadere in disgrazia (e patire la fame, quando ha perso la fiducia degli editori e delle riviste) soltanto perché non vuol dire la verità che da lui si aspetta il partito. L'unico che si frega le mani, stando così le cose moscovite, è il filologo che ha voglia di fare il suo mestiere. Vi sono delle poesie sovietiche che hanno tante redazioni diverse quanto furono le sedi in cui via via apparvero. Chi si metta in mente di ricostruire il testo originale, espungendo tutte le varianti apportate dall'autore e dagli editori per accontentare ogni volta la censura, trova pane per i suoi denti, e un hobby per la vecchiaia.

Giovanni Grazzini

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
12 August 1969

A TRIP AMONG SOVIET WRITERS
by Giovanni Grazzini

"That's nothing, just listen to what has happened to me..." This is what 2 Soviet writers say upon meeting, according to Svirskiy, and my own experience confirms it. The writers compete with each other in telling

not said that the matter ends in a procession of jokes. Only the strongest, the richest, the greatest fatalists laugh over the joke. For most writers who live from their work, the struggle waged against censorship to exercise the right of using a certain adjective is pregnant with meaning for their profession, which, moreover, consists not only of defending their work before others but also of finding within themselves the truth of artistic expression.

In the case of Russia, the fact that the history of literature does not coincide with the history of censorship is true only in part. Let us not touch on the thousands of talented youths broken by Stalin in the extermination camps: today the shot in the nape of the neck is no longer in style (suicides and automobile accidents are preferred). But if Soviet literature is of such a mediocre level -- even Sholokhov complained about it at the 23d CPSU Congress -- it is attributable in part to the censorship which in cutting the legs out from the writers who have the greatest desire to run, is rearing a generation of deluded and inhibited writers suffering the same afflictions making for alienation in Europe.

WALLS OF ICE

With which the Soviet state defeats its own ends: tightening the chains on freedom of thought and creation, it impairs precisely those areas of culture where it should find the greatest support and the strength for the expansion of the myth of socialist humanism. It is not clear how socialism humanism can offer itself as a model without the prerogatives of the freedom of saying no, which is precisely of a humanism tout court.

When everything has been said and done and the drawers have been opened, we shall then see if the poetry and prose of the Soviet authors who have gone through the sixties renouncing official honors, the enormous printings, and the vacations at dachas were much more cheerful than their hypochondriac Western counterparts. Certain sociologists persist in saying that the poetics of incommunicability is the product of bourgeois putridity "It's always better," novelist Boris X points out to me, "than a void painted red by Soviet realism. It will be up to our sons, perhaps our grandsons, to measure in our secret manuscripts the walls of ice erected in the heart of the employees of the inquisition."

How does Soviet censorship work? It is useless to raise this question with philistines. The invariable reply is that there is no censorship in the USSR be-

cause article 125 of the constitution, "in conformity with the interests of the workers and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system," guarantees to the citizens "freedom of expression, press, assembly, processions, and demonstrations." Let's ask, however, an honest writer about his experiences, about the criteria used today by Glavlit (the Central Administration for Matters of Literature and Art, which is subordinated to the Council of Ministers) in judging whether a literary work conforms to the interests of the workers.

"We're on the verge of pulling our hair," I am told by a brave poet whom I am constrained to call Sergey. "None of us understands anything any more. I can say this. The picture of the situation painted by Solzhenitsyn in his letter to the 4th Congress of the Union of Writers 2 years ago, has worsened. Solzhenitsyn denounces with red-hot words, which have probably sealed his fate once and for all, the tyranny of the police and the arbitrary acts of the censor that are perpetrated by stupid officials to the detriment of the artist. The best part of our literature, Solzhenitsyn says, comes to light in distorted form. If it has lost the preeminent position that it held at the end of the 19th century and the experimental splendor that it manifested in the twenties, it is because it has been prevented from developing, from appearing less poor and dull than what it perhaps is. Solzhenitsyn had a thousand reasons to protest: today he is the greatest writer in the USSR and has carried out his duty to defend by himself, strengthened by the experience acquired in Stalin's camps, the honor of all his colleagues, including those who accept changes of entire pages and chapters to have their works published.

"But to a certain extent his speech and the campaign of 1967-1968 did more bad than good. Glavlit, concerned about the concensus Solzhenitsyn had obtained among the intellectuals, doubled its vigilance, and not only to decide to prohibit Novyy Mir's publication of Bek's novel. It also postponed sine die the rehabilitation of poets like Mandelstam, Voloshin, and Kodachevich and has tightened the reigns a bit on all of us. Of course, this is most costly to the middle-level writers, who neither can nor want to, because of their loyalty to the regime, send their manuscripts to the West.

LACHRYMOSE DRAMA

"The first station of their journey to Calvary begins at the desk when the writers, to adapt themselves

to the exigencies of the censor, distort the product of their own imagination by eliminating psychological situations and facts and by coming up with a syntax worthy of Byzantium. The second station sees them on their feet, had in hand, before the editor of the magazine in which they hope to have their work published in installments, in accordance with the Russian fashion. At this point there begins the tragicomedy, the market where people exchange adjectives. The editor, a man whom the writers' union can trust and is present on all magazine editorial boards, seeks to divine in the work what is unacceptable to Glavlit. As to the author, he first states that he entrusts his work to the taste and sensitivity of the editor; if he subsequently resists, an effort is made to convince him that, according to his (the editor's) private information, the atmosphere is currently such that great tolerance is allowed. It is in this phase of the negotiations, when the censor has not yet intervened, that the work itself undergoes change, especially in the areas bearing on the conflict between generations, presenting the actions of vagabond youths and women of little virtue, criticizing Stalinist terror, denying absolutely the need for war, and imputing a character's moral crisis to his isolation from proletarian society.

"With the conclusion of this phase (an innovation of recent months is an increase in the number of writers who refuse to accept impudent manipulations and prefer to tighten their belts), the work then lands in the hands of Glavlit. And here the tragicomedy assumes the physiogomy of a lachrymose drama. Between 1956 and 1964, the powers of the bureaucratic oligarchy that had entrenched itself in Glavlit were reduced. Its task was only to ascertain whether whatever came out of publishing houses violated military secrecy or offended good taste. Following Khrushchev's fall, its powers were restored. Moreover, it was given the old responsibility of ideological control. In this atmosphere of counterreform it is not difficult to imagine with what zealotry certain reviewers of Stalinist bent who again feel they are empowered to be the custodians of the system apply the instructions of their superiors (however, they are frequently contradictory). Let us recall that during the trials Izvestiya was adducing evidence of Daniel's guilt precisely on the pages where it was describing certain woman 'resembling castrated men...', short-legged women resembling pregnant dachshunds, or long-legged women resembling ostriches -- women who under their clothing conceal swellings and bruises, bind their busts, and use padding in their brassieres'."

What happens if Glavlit denies its "reviewed" stamp?

"Glavlit does not deny the 'reviewed' stamp, which is that number printed along with much other information (number of copies, type of page, names of reviewers) on the last page of all books and magazines. If it sniffs the odor of heresy, it does not confer this 'reviewed' stamp; but it denies that it will not concede it. It simply says: wait. And the editor who is pressured by the author to find out something definite is told the time is not opportune, to try later. Perhaps within a month, a year, 20 years. Only if our author has saints in paradise, i.e., in the party CC Culture Department, can he hope for the 'opportunity time' to come."

DEEP SPLIT

Ginsburg in a letter to Kosygin in December 1965 showed the relativeness of the concept of anti-Soviet propaganda. "When criticism is conducted from below," he wrote, "it is considered anti-Soviet propaganda; if, instead, it comes from above and is incorporated in the resolutions of congresses, it is then regarded as the partys guiding line." This was a reasonable observation. I asked a young female writer if the situation had improved, if there were fixed points on which Glavlit now relies to decide what works strengthen or weaken the Soviet system. She smiled: "Where dogmas are required, inter alia, to make life less complicated, there is none. The list of 'isms' held to be heretical has in theory been the same for the last 30 years. All the branches broken off the trunk of irrationalism -- from formalism to anarchism, from mannerism to abstractism -- and all the methods suspected of bourgeois derivation -- from nationalism to cosmopolitanism, from psychologism to naturalism -- are in Glavlit's black book. But condemnation is not always effected with equal vigor, and we do not know why. Katayev's work, for example, is related to many informal investigations in the West. Yet it has received the stamp of approval.

"In recent months certain very cautious experiments have had a relatively easier life, the experiments that are destined for a very restricted circle, that are not overly so-called depressive, overly critical of the older generation, too weakly committed to the exaltation of the communist panacea, overly inclined toward humorism." The censor's choices are not always an optimal barometer for assessing the country's taste. For me, this seems to be another piece of evidence of that deideologization process underway in the real country, a process that is leading to a deep split between the people in power and the intelligentsia.

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explained why the Soviet writers, singing while suspended on a limb, are so demoralized. And yet censorship has another type of consequence. For example, it has mythicized clandestine literature, at times beyond its merits. In Moscow a story is told that a highly positioned father, to force his son to read Tolstoy, had War and Peace typed and then presented to him as a proscribed work. As to those who type underground poetry or novels, they have developed the custom of making carbon copies and selling them under the table. For example, a book was already being printed when it was blocked by the censor. At night the typographers removed the few composed pages to sell them at a good price.

I would not say that all the manuscripts put into circulation via such systems have literary merit. Nevertheless we must thank censorship if a work of art (e.g., the greatest was Doctor Zhivago, which was translated into Russian from the American edition and passed from hand to hand) conserves an extraordinary attractive force, wins out in competition through its scientific conquests, and ranks first in the hierarchy of values to be recouped.

No Glavlit can now convince educated public opinion in the Soviet Union that the publication of the works of Pound, Burges, or Malaparte, the republication after many years of the works of Joyce, Gide, or Eliot, or the rehabilitation of Mandelstam, Voloshin, Kodachevich, Gumilev, Remizov would undermine the will of the people to supervise blast furnaces and to thresh grain. There is no sense in the argument that the workers' money must not be spent on publishing books judged to be antirevolutionary. A revolution that 50 years after its outbreak still fears certain writers, has devoured itself.

Above all no Glavlit will succeed in convincing the public conscience that a writer can fall into disgrace (and suffer hunger when he has lost the trust of editors and magazines) only because he has failed to tell the truth as the party sees and expects him to tell it. The only one to whom such a situation brings joy is the philologist who wants to carry on his profession. There are Soviet poems that have diverse editions, and these editions are equal to the number of seats in which they have appeared. Whoever gets the notion of reconstructing the original text of expunging all the variations introduced by the author and editors to conform to the censor, finds grist for his mill and a hobby for his old age.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
14 August 1969

VIAGGIO FRA GLI SCRITTORI SOVIETICI

La frusta

Letteraria di Stato

DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE
Mosca, agosto.

Per estendere all'intelligenza la teoria brezneviana della sovranità limitata i carri armati sovietici hanno i volti dei quarantadue segretari dell'Unione Scrittori. Naturalmente sorridono, naturalmente offrono vodka e amaretti. Ma l'ospite straniero non pretenda d'essere aiutato a mettersi in contatto con i poeti, i critici, i narratori moscoviti che gli interessano. Se la sbrighi da solo: se raccoglierà notizie infondate sarà più facile accusarlo di malafede.

Aspettarsi un'accoglienza diversa sarebbe stato da candidi. L'Unione Scrittori — presieduta dal vecchio Fedin, ma praticamente nelle mani del pallido scrittore Konstantin Voronkov — è una macchina burocratica che a dispetto della trepidazione della base viene manovrata dal comitato centrale del partito per bruciare ogni forma di solidarietà professionale, fondata sulla libertà e l'universalità del lavoro letterario, che sbocci fra i suoi cinquemila iscritti. Teoricamente l'Unione Scrittori è indipendente dal partito, tanto è vero che i comunisti (circa il 30 per cento) hanno al suo interno una sezione speciale, ma sta di fatto che essa non ha mai preso posizione contro il potere, non ha mai espresso un'autonoma linea operativa per stimolare il fioco processo di democratizzazione serpeggiato nel paese. E' sempre andata a rimorchio del comitato centrale del partito che l'ha generata trentasette anni fa, e se qualche volta ha dato l'im-

pressione, nei suoi dibattiti interni, di voler sfiorare temi importanti, l'ha fatto perché rifletteva le brevi vittorie dei « liberali » nelle battaglie al vertice.

Voglio dire che non ha mai potuto, e forse nemmeno cercato, di delineare una coerente, organica, moderna alternativa, nutrita dalla libera coscienza intellettuale, al cupo totalitarismo ideologico dei notabili. Si limita a fare da barometro. Ma quando più forte soffia la burrasca la sua frenesia di servilismo la spinge ad essere più realista del re, e quando è bonaccia si contenta dell'ordinaria amministrazione. L'Unione Scrittori è una delle tante sovrastrutture sovietiche che esprimono l'ottuso torpore della burocrazia, disposta a sgran-chirsi soltanto quando c'è da ritrovare il gusto di menare le mani.

Fondata nel 1934, al tempo del primo congresso, essa ha preso in consegna da Zdanov una scatola sigillata, e in tutti questi anni si è ben guardata dall'aprirla per verificare se il suo contenuto non si fosse inacidito. « Stiamo entrando in un'epoca profondamente tragica » declamò Gorkij, alludendo ai capitalisti che preparavano « il macello dei proletari di tutto il mondo ». « Viva l'Esercito Rosso dei Letterati! » si gridava a Mosca.

Lo scatto mancato

Nulla di strano che lo statuto dell'Unione Scrittori si aprisse affermando che la condizione del progresso letterario era il legame, stretto e immediato, fra il movimen-

to letterario, la politica del partito e il potere sovietico; che il realismo socialista venisse posto alla base dell'emulazione creativa; che i primi due scopi dell'Unione non fossero mica di aiutare lo sviluppo dell'arte bensì di partecipare attivamente alla costruzione del socialismo e di educare nuovi scrittori propagandando l'arte fra le masse.

Lo strano è che una generazione di intellettuali sia passata imperterrita attraverso i decenni senza accorgersi dei mutamenti avvenuti nel campo internazionale (dove i capitalisti hanno pur dato una mano a evitare il macello organizzato dai nazisti), nello stesso campo socialista, dove Stalin ha preceduto gli orrori di Hitler, e finalmente sul terreno del gusto.

Lo strano, anzi il tragico, è che gli scrittori sovietici, dopo il XX congresso, non abbiano fatto fronte comune per trasformare la loro Unione nella pista di lancio d'una nuova nozione della cultura, destinata a celebrare nella libertà intellettuale una garanzia definitiva contro l'intossicazione provocata dai miti di massa. Mancato questo scatto, la macchina dell'Unione Scrittori si è convertita in un museo di fruste e di guinzagli. Sono in molti a portarne i segni, in patria e fuori. Per notizie italiane rivolgersi a seri studiosi come Angelo Maria Ripellino e Vittorio Strada, e al « Gruppo 63 », che fu attaccato, proprio dall'interno dell'Unione, con un'accudine pari soltanto a quella dei nostri più rigidi conservatori.

« L'Unione — mi dice un critico che lavora per Novij Mir — non soltanto non ci

ha mai difesi: ci ha sempre offesi. Col pretesto di aiutarci a evitare guano con la censura, impone alle riviste redattori di piccolo cervello, e guarda sempre con sospetto agli inquieti, ai pur timidi anticonformisti. Cos'ha fatto, in concreto, per facilitare la riabilitazione di tanti autori caduti in disgrazia ai tempi di Stalin o morti da poco in non perfetto odore di santità? I comitati per la conservazione del patrimonio letterario che essa costituisce all'indomani della scomparsa d'ogni scrittore dovrebbero servire a facilitare, d'accordo con la famiglia, la pubblicazione degli inediti e delle opere da tempo introvabili. In realtà, se il defunto era sgradito ai potenti servono soltanto a seppellirne anche la memoria. Quando Solgenitsin accusa l'Unione di aver consegnato oltre seicento scrittori al loro destino di prigionieri politici, dice cose sacrosante. L'Unione non ha mosso un dito per difendere Solgenitsin, che oggi è il più grande scrittore russo vivente. Simonov ha chiesto che si autorizzi almeno un'antologia dei suoi racconti, ma nessuno, al Segretariato dell'Unione, gli ha dato ascolto. Perché non esige, compatta, un'edizione popolare di Divisione cancro e del Primo cerchio? ».

Che domande. Perché ha ubbidito all'ingiunzione di espellere Pasternak nel '58?, di approvare ufficialmente la condanna a Siniavskij nel '66?, di calunniare il libro di Eugenia Glinzburg sui campi staliniani (« riscalda i piatti e mette troppo pepe », dichiarò il « liberale » Tvardovskij?), di boicottare la diffusione dell'appello firmato da sessantadue scrittori (ce n'e-

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rano di primo piano: Ciukovskij, Ehrenburg, Sklovskij, Kaverin, Dorosh, Achmadulina, Okudgiava) per il rilascio, sotto tutela, di Siniavskij e Daniel?, di sabotare il dibattito su un tema capitale come quello della letteratura satirica?, di scoraggiare la saggistica che analizza il mecenatismo e la psicologia dell'arbitrio? Perché insomma l'Unione Scrittori ratifica soltanto i decreti repressivi e impedisce ai fermenti democratici che lievitano il suo sottosuolo di emergere alla superficie?

Stato umiliante

« Chi sa rispondere a questi interrogativi — mi fa osservare amaramente un giovane narratore — si dà conto dello stato umiliante in cui si trovano quanti fra noi, scrittori comunisti, siamo costretti a frequentare l'Unione, e il circolo di via Gherzen, con l'animo di chi lecca le mani ai propri sbirri, e non può ribellarsi, perché dopotutto sono i suoi fratelli ».

Almeno l'Unione funzionasse come organo sindacale nei rapporti con gli editori. Invece non discute i criteri con cui gli editori decidono il numero delle copie da stampare e la circolazione di libri e riviste. Sapete che nell'Unione Sovietica i diritti d'autore sono pagati sulle copie stampate, e non su quelle vendu-

te. In teoria ciò presenta qualche vantaggio rispetto ai fenomeni di malcostume letterario provocati in Occidente dalle leggi di mercato, ma in pratica fa dipendere la diffusione dell'opera letteraria dal suo grado di conformismo politico, e dunque, mancando un equilibrio tra l'offerta e la domanda, né crea né rispetta la gerarchia dei valori. « Veda il mio caso — mi spiega Okudgiava —. L'anno scorso a metà un mio libro di poesie, Un marzo d'anima grande, del quale si poteva tirare comodamente un milione di copie data la mia crescente popolarità come chansonnier. Ebbene, se ne sono stampate soltanto quarantamila. La principale libreria di Mosca ricevette esattamente trenta copie, che non furono nemmeno messe in vendita perché i commessi del negozio se le estrassero a sorte fra loro ».

Qualcosa di analogo per le riviste. Le limitazioni nell'approvvigionamento della carta obbligano le riviste a tirature riportate al numero degli abbonati, però accade che per le riviste giudicate pericolose il margine di copie destinato alla libera vendita sia molto basso. E' difficile che nei chioschi di Mosca troviate l'ultimo numero di Novij Mir, e invece non mancherà quasi mai il portavoce dei dogmatici, Oktiabr.

Almeno si adoperasse, l'Unione Scrittori, perché la Russia infine aderisca alla con-

venzione di Berna sui diritti d'autore. Sarebbe un mezzo sicuro, ha detto Solgenitsin, per difenderci dalle traduzioni illegali fatte dagli stranieri e dalla sfacciata gara commerciale a chi arriva per primo. Macché. In cambio l'Unione regola i viaggi all'estero dei suoi membri, ispirandosi al principio teorizzato da Kruscev che i viaggi sono utili perché consentono agli scrittori sovietici di creare nuove opere sulla vita del popolo in lotta contro l'imperialismo e il colonialismo, ma contengono il gran rischio che lo scrittore voglia compiacere a qualsiasi costo al pubblico borghese. Sarà sempre per compiacenza che in questi giorni il « traditore » Kuznetsov ha scelto l'esilio?

Ora chiediamoci una cosa. Se l'Unione tradisce la funzione di stimolo creativo e di controllo sindacale che dovrebbe avere un'associazione di scrittori, perché non è abbandonata allo squallido destino di un ufficio commissioni? Perché il club che essa ospita in via Gherzen, presieduto da Simonov, è animato come un alveare? Presto detto. E' l'Unione che gestisce il « fondo letterario », grazie al quale gli scrittori godono il miele della previdenza sociale (assistenza malattie, cooperative edilizie, colonie estive, vacanze nelle case di riposo), ed è al club che circolano giornali, libri, film per i quali talvolta è prevista d'alto una diffusione limitata.

Nulla di troppo pericoloso, intendiamoci, perché tutti sanno bene come il regime possa anche compiacersi di allentare ogni tanto il morso, convinto che le api operaie non hanno la forza di ribellarsi alla regina. Ma quanto basta per presentare un volto meno arcigno...

Per finire, i conti in tasca! Gli scrittori allineati non guadagnano poco, soprattutto se svolgono anche attività di traduttori (è raro, in pace, che collaborino alla radio e alla televisione). Si calcola che fra il compenso ricevuto dalla rivista su cui è uscito a puntate e quello ottenuto dall'editore che ne faccia un'alta tiratura (si toccano punte di 500.000 copie), un romanzo possa rendere fino a 5-6000 rubli (tre-quattro milioni di lire). Ogni ventiquattro cartelle dattiloscritte — il cosiddetto « foglio d'autore » — una rivista paga a un narratore o critico esordiente sui centocinquanta rubli (circa centomila lire). I poeti, invece, sono pagati un tanto al verso. Se la tiratura d'un libro di poesia si aggira sulle diecimila copie, ogni verso frutta un rublo e quaranta (circa mille lire). Ma un giovane alle prime armi calcoli la metà. Se poi la censura taglia intere strofe — non dite è successo, dite succede — non è previsto indennizzo. E gli indocili s'accontentino della pensione: centoventi rubli al mese, ottantamila lire.

Giovanni Grazzini

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
14 August 1969

A TRIP AMONG SOVIET WRITERS by Giovanni Grazzini

To extend to the intelligentsia the Brezhnevian theory of limited sovereignty, Soviet armored cars have the faces of the 42 secretaries of the writers' union. Of course, they are smiling, of course, they offer vodka and almond cakes. But the foreign guest does not pretend that he has been helped to contact the Moscow poets, critics, and writers of interest to him. If he is put on his own, if he gathers unsubstantiated information, it is much easier to accuse him of bad faith.

Only a babe in the woods would have expected a different welcome. The writers' union -- presided over by old Fedin but virtually in the hands of the pallid writer Konstantin Voronkov -- is a bureaucratic machine

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that, in spite of the trepidation of the members, is manipulated by the party CC to prevent any kind of professional solidarity based on freedom and universality of literary work and that has outlets among its 50,000 members. Theoretically the writers' union is independent of the party, but there is no denying the fact that the communists (about 30 percent of the members) have a special section within the union and that the union has never assumed a position against the regime. Nor has it ever expressed an autonomous operational line to stimulate the country's weak and creeping democratization process. It has always been in the tow of the party CC, which produced it 37 years ago; and if at times it gives the impression, during its internal debates, of seeking to air impertinent themes, it has done so because it reflected the short-lived victories of the "liberals" in the battles at the summit.

I want to say that it has never been able, and perhaps never tried, to formulate a coherent, organic, and modern alternative, nourished by free intellectual conscience, to the darkness of the ideological totalitarianism of the leadership. It confines itself to being a barometer. But when the storm intensifies, the writers' union's frenzy of servilism impels it to be more realistic than the king; and when the weather is calm, the union contents itself with ordinary administration. The writers' union is one of the many Soviet superstructures that expresses the obtuse torpor of the bureaucracy and is disposed to rouse itself to action only when the necessity arises to find the will to come to blows.

Founded in 1934, at its first congress it accepted a closed box from Zhdanov and ever since has been periodically opening the work to see if its contents have not soured. "We are entering a profoundly tragic epoch," Gor'kiy once said, alluding to the capitalists who were preparing "an abatoir for the proletariat of the entire world." "Long live the Red Army of Writers!"

MISSING SPRING

There is nothing strange in the fact that the statute of the writers' union opens by affirming that the condition for literary progress was the tie, close and direct, among the literary movement, party policy, and Soviet power; that socialist realism should be the basis of creative competition; that the first 2 goals of the union were not in the least directed at developing art but at actively participating in the construction of socialism and in the education of new writers to spread art among the masses.

What is strange is that a generation of intellectuals have undauntedly passed through decades without noticing the changes effected in the international field (where the capitalists also extended a hand for the purpose of avoiding the organized abatoir of the nazis), in the socialist camp itself, where Stalin perpetrated horrors before Hitler, and finally on the grounds of right.

What is also strange, even tragic, is that the Soviet writers, following the 20th CPSU Congress, did not unite to transform their union into an organization for launching a new notion of culture, one destined to celebrate in intellectual freedom a definitive guarantee against intoxicating myths about the masses. In the absence of this spring, the machine of the writers' union was converted into a museum of whips and leashes. There are many who bear the signs within the Soviet Union and outside of it. As to our own country, for example, suffice it to consider the case of serious students like Angelo Maria Ripellino and Vittorio Strada and the "63 Group," which was attacked directly within the union with an acridity worthy only of our most rigid conservatives.

"The union," a Novyy Mir critic told me, "has not only never helped but always abused us. Under the pretext of helping us avoid troubles with the censor, it forces magazines to accept editors with few brains; and it is always suspicious of the restless, of the most timid anticonformists. What has it specifically done to facilitate the rehabilitation of the many authors who fell in disgrace during Stalin's time or died outside the perfect state of grace? The committees for the preservation of the literary patrimony, committees that it organizes following the death of every writer, were to facilitate, in agreement with the deceased's family, the publication of his unpublished and temporarily lost works. In reality, when the deceased was disliked by the powers, the committees served to bury his memory as well. When Solzhenitsyn accuses the union of having been responsible for turning over 600 writers into political prisoners, he is saying sacrosanct things. The union has not lifted a finger to help Solzhenitsyn, who today is the greatest living Russian writer. Simonov has asked that at least an anthology of his narratives be permitted, but nobody in the union's secretariat has heeded his request. Why isn't a paper-back, popular edition of The Cancer Ward and The First Circle published?"

What a question. Was it because he obeyed the injunction to expel Pasternak in 1958, officially approved Sinyavskiy's sentence in 1966, slandered Yevgeniya Ginsburg's book on Stalinist grounds ("he warms the plates and applies too much pepper," the "liberal" Tvardovskiy said), boycotted the distribution of the appeal signed by 62 writers (these included such first-class writers as Chukovskiy, Erenburg, Sklovskiy, Kaverin, Dorosh, Akhmadulina, Okudzhava) for the parole of Sinyavskiy and Daniel, sabotaged the debate on a major subject like satirical literature, discouraged essays analyzing the mechanism and psychology of arbitrary action? Or was it because, in short, the writers' union ratifies only the repressive decrees and inhibits democratic ferments that enable the subsoil to surface?

HUMILIATING STATE

"Whoever answers these questions," a young narrator bitterly told me, "must take into consideration the humiliating state in which many of us find ourselves: we, communist writers, are forced to go to the union and the circle of Herten Street with the spirit of one licking the hand of coppers, of one not rebelling because after all the union members are his brothers."

If only the union would function as a trade union organ in relations with editors. But it does not: it does not discuss the criteria employed by the editors to decide the number of copies to be printed and the distribution of books and magazines to be allowed. The reader is probably aware that in the Soviet Union author's rights are remunerated on the bases of the number of printed copies, and not on the number of those sold. In theory this system has several advantages over phenomena connected with the laws of the market in the West. But in practice the Soviet system makes the distribution of a literary work dependent on the extent of its political conformity. Consequently, disregarding the imbalance between supply and demand, it neither creates nor respects a scale of values. "Take my case," Okudzhava explained to me. "Last year a book of my poetry was published. And with my increasing popularity as a chansonnier, a million copies could have easily been published. And yet only 40,000 were published. Moscow's principal book store received exactly 30, which were not even put up for sale because the clerks kept them for themselves."

The situation with respect to magazines is analogous. Limitations connected with paper supply

force the magazines to issue copies in a quantity to meet subscriber requirements only. Moreover, as to magazines judged to be dangerous, the number of copies destined for nonsubscriber sale is very low. It's difficult to find the most recent copy of Novyy Mir in Moscow book stalls. Conversely, there is hardly ever a shortage of the spokesman for the dogmatists -- Oktyabr!

The writers' union should at least make an effort to have Russia adhere to the Bern Convention on authors' rights. It would be a sure way, Solzhenitsyn said, to protect ourselves from the illegal translations effected by foreigners and from the glaring commercial competition connected with being first to put a work on the market. No, nothing like that is done. Instead, the union regulates the trips made abroad by its members, relying on the principle theorized by Khrushchev: that trips are useful because they enable Soviet writers to create new works on the life of people struggling against imperialism and colonialism. But these trips run the great risk that the writer may want to please the bourgeois public at any cost. Is it out of deference to this public that the "traitor" Kuznetsov chose exile?

Tell me something. If the union betrays its function of creative stimulation and trade union control -- functions indispensable to a writers' association -- why is it not abandoned to the squalid fate of an office of errands? Why is the club that it welcomes on Herten Street, the club presided over by Simonov, as lively as a beehive? These questions are readily answered. It is the union that manages the "literary fund," thanks to which the writers enjoy the honey of social security (sickness benefits, cooperative housing, summer colonies, vacations in rest homes); and it is in the club where journals, books, and films of limited distribution -- a qualification sometimes imposed from above -- circulate. Nothing that is overly dangerous, mind you, for everybody is well aware of how the regime is at times disposed to slacken the bit, when it is convinced that the worker bees do not have the strength to rebel against the queen. But only so long as it suits the regime to present itself in a less sour light...

Let us now see what winds up in the writer's pocket. The alienated writers do not earn just a little, above all if they are working as translators (it is rare, however, for them to work in radio or television). We can compute that from the remuneration received from the magazine in which the work appears in installments

and that obtained from the publisher issuing a large number of copies (say, 500,000 copies), a novel can earn its author up to 5,000-6,000 rubles (750,000 lire). For every 24 typewritten sheets -- the so-called "author's sheet" -- a magazine pays a narrator or a novice critic 150 rubles (about 100,000 lire). The poets, instead, are paid a certain amount for a verse. If a printing of a book of poetry involves 10,000 copies, each verse earns 1.25 ruble (about a 1,000 lire). But a young person just beginning earns about half as much. If, moreover, the censor excises an entire stanza -- don't say it has happened, say it happens -- no indemnification is envisioned. The intractable content themselves with a pension of 120 rubles a month, or 80,000 lire.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
19 August 1969

VIAGGIO FRA GLI SCRITTORI SOVIETICI NELLA DACIA DI PASTERNAK

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

DAL NOSTRO INVIATO SPECIALE

Mosca, agosto.

Oggi andiamo a Peredelkino.

Venti minuti di treno, il triste cemento di Mosca s'alzontana, ecco presto la dolce campagna, un viottolo fra l'erba e s'entra nel regno silente in cui natura e poesia sono sorelle. Qui dorme fra gli alberi Pasternak. Ma qui anche s'esprimono, come in una allegoria sociologica trafigurata in Arcadia, i modi diversi d'essere scrittore nell'Unione Sovietica di oggi. Peredelkino non è soltanto il villaggio alle porte di Mosca, sparso nella quieta pineta, in cui i cittadini affocati dalla estate vengono a trovare refrigerio e a cercar funghi in costume da bagno: è il luogo dove tocchi con mano la

politica del regime verso gli intellettuali. L'albergo degli scrittori (« Casa creativa del Fondo letterario », si legge sul cancello) e le dacie date in affitto dall'Unione Scrittori ai più fortunati hanno un po' l'aria d'un parco nazionale pensato per fornire agli scrittori un romitaggio che sublimi il loro distacco dalla folla nell'alta solitudine del profeta autorizzato.

Tre destini

La diffidenza della censura nei confronti degli intellettuali, la paura che un'opera d'arte segnata dal dolore della creazione possa avvelenare l'ottimistico clima ufficiale, proviene dalla sopravvaluta-

sione, compiuta da quarant'anni per motivi strumentali, del ruolo esercitato dallo scrittore nella società. Fra le varie forme liturgiche usate per mitizzare gli « ingegneri delle anime », questa specie di « riserve di caccia », di luoghi deputati in cui gli scrittori hanno il dovere sociale di ricaricarsi la fantasia, svolgono appunto la doppia funzione di vezzeggiarli, di proteggere i più giovani dalle noie della coabitazione cittadina, e insieme di distanziarli dalla realtà del paese. Sposando in sé il sacerdote e il cortigiano, lo scrittore sovietico considera la dacia un privilegio e un diritto. Invece non è soltanto un segno di prestigio: è anche un anello mondano della catena che lo

lega, tanto più forte quanto più sembra una fuga nella pace della campagna.

Ne trovo la riprova, proprio a Peredelkino, nelle diverse condizioni di culto che in questo paesaggio di betulle, di faggi e di pini, all'apparenza così lontano dall'atmosfera feroce di Mosca, sono riservate da un lato agli scrittori perfettamente integrati nel sistema, dall'altro alla memoria di quelli tenuti in purgatorio. Prendo tre nomi, Kataiev, Mandelstam, Pasternak, e sento nell'aura che circonda loro stessi o le loro famiglie l'eco di tre diversi destini.

Comincio con Valentin Kataiev, anni 72, insignito dell'Ordine di Lenin, uno dei migliori ingegni narrativi del-

la vecchia generazione, e sia come direttore di Junost fra il '55 e il '62 (ha lanciato Evtuszenko) sia come sperimentatore di forme piuttosto lontane dal realismo socialista, uno dei pochi che abbia sparso fra i giovani i semi della irriverenza. Ecco, Kataiev mi sembra il simbolo vivente di un mestiere letterario e di una libertà creativa perfettamente corretti dal senso dell'opportunità politica. Da quando Kruscev, nel '63, lo accusò pubblicamente di sbadattaggine per certe dichiarazioni fatte durante un viaggio americano, Kataiev si è messo la museruola. Ha pubblicato (su Novij Mir) L'erba dell'oblio e Il cubo, dove la critica meno benevola vede i segni del contagio formalista, e dunque non mancano occasioni di discorso: invece si guarda bene dal difendere le sue ragioni con l'ospite straniero. Offre gin inglese e succo d'arancia, parla compiaciuto della dacia elegante che si leva in mezzo al bosco, affiancata dall'orto, dal pozzo e dal pagliato (120 rubli al mese d'affitto), ma quando gli chiedo del suo lavoro e dei colleghi si rifiugia nel monito ovvio che anche Tolstoj e Dostoevski ai loro tempi combatterono contro i conservatori. «Comunque — aggiunge sbrigativo — lo scrittore ha una sola funzione: lottare per la pace esaltando l'umanesimo». A nulla valgono le faticose trattative su una serie di domande, scritte a macchina in doppia copia, alle quali egli darà risposte scritte. Il sospetto lo divora. Quando torno nel pomeriggio a ritrarre, dirà di averci ripensato: meglio non farne nulla, meglio parlare dell'Italia e dei due maggiori scrittori italiani che egli conosce, Alberto Moravia e Gianni Rodari.

Nadiezhdha Jakobleвна Mandelstam, invece, come chi non ha nulla da perdere, vuol parlare. La vedova del poeta Mandelstam, morto trent'anni fa in un Lager staliniano, coabita in condizioni penose in una casupola priva d'acqua corrente che non merita neppure il nome di dacia. E tuttavia non si vergogna dell'abito sdrucito, della miseria circostante: c'è una certa ferezza nel nobile sorriso di questa vecchia signora in ciabatte che sembra dimenticata da tutti. «Ormai — dice fumando furiosamente una sigaretta dopo l'altra e usando per portacenere il coper-

chio d'una scatola da scarpe — ho perduto la speranza di arrotondare la mia piccola pensione d'insegnante con i diritti d'autore che mi spetterebbero come vedova di Mandelstam. Gli italiani che hanno edito recentemente alcune opere di mio marito non mi hanno fatto avere una lira. Quanto ai sovietici, si guardano bene dal ristamparlo. Forse aspettano il 1972: allora scadranno quindi anni dalla riabilitazione, e tutti saranno liberi di ripubblicare quello che vogliono senza pagare i diritti».

Ma perché, dopo la riabilitazione, di tutti i libri di Mandelstam nell'Unione Sovietica è tornato a circolare soltanto il Discorso su Dante? La donna sorride, si stringe nelle spalle. Poi sbotta: «Lei sa che da noi, alla morte d'ogni scrittore, si costituisce una specie di commissione incaricata di amministrarne la memoria. Così fu, dopo la riabilitazione, anche per mio marito. Ma la commissione si è riunita una sola volta, l'anno scorso, e non ha combinato niente. Simonov, che la presiede, ha scritto lettere a vari editori, proponendo una ristampa delle opere, ma nessuno naturalmente ha risposto. E se qualche rivista, di tanto in tanto, s'azzarda a pubblicare delle poesie di Mandelstam, subito viene attaccata, come se avessero ospitato un nemico della patria. La verità, caro mio, è che nulla è cambiato: l'ultima parola tocca ancora a gente che odia persino la memoria di Mandelstam, un poeta occidentale e cristiano che disapprovò il modo crudele di realizzare la rivoluzione e non volle piegarsi al realismo socialista. E' quanto basta perché ancora oggi, nonostante le voci che si levano in suo favore e l'attesa dei giovani, le autorità lo boicottino».

Rustica semplicità

La dacia di Pasternak non è lontana. Un viale fra il verde, e in una radura a ridosso del bosco trovo la casa in cui visse, alternando con quella di Mosca, fra il '36 e il '53, e poi restò sempre, dopo l'infarto, fino al '60. E' grande e bella nella sua rustica semplicità, ma come spenta, e con i segni d'un'amara incuria: la veranda ha qualche vetro rotto, la facciata si scrosta, avanzano le erbacce nel giardino. Da un'attigua cassetta di legno, che fu del

guardiano, timidamente mi viene incontro un uomo alto, brizzolato, vestito con estiva trasandatezza. La struttura del volto, le guance incavate, qualcosa di morbido e lunatico negli occhi, tutto mi dice che è uno dei figli di Pasternak.

L'ingegner Evgheni Borisovic Pasternak è un mite, ma la sua voce di velluto è striata d'ironia. «Perché dovrebbero pubblicare il dottor Zivago, dal momento che possono non pubblicarlo?». Disegna con le dita un aereo sorriso, e torna subito serio. «Non vedo imminente l'uscita del romanzo nell'Unione Sovietica, nonostante gli sforzi della famiglia e degli amici. Se accadrà, sarà in sordina, quando potranno uscire le opere complete di mio padre, chissà quando. Per il momento cerchiamo di convincere l'Unione Scrittori a restaurare la dacia e a trasformarla in un piccolo museo. L'Unione è così poco disposta a venire incontro che invece pensa di togliercela, per assegnarla a un altro scrittore...».

Due ragazzi, i nipotini di Pasternak, giocano seminudi fra gli alberi. Si sale al primo piano, nella stanza di lavoro conservata dalla famiglia nelle condizioni in cui si trovava quando Pasternak, nove anni fa, vi morì. Il lettuccio di ferro con una coperta sbiadita di cotonina, un armadio, un sofà, la scrivania stile «900», un lampadario liberty, gli scaffali coi libri che aveva con sé quell'estate (in più tutte le edizioni di Zivago fatte all'estero), il berretto al chiudo, e qualche cimelio velato di polvere: un busto in bronzo di Pasternak, il calcio della sua maschera mortuaria e d'una mano. Alle pareti, dove l'intonaco resiste, una foto di Nehru con dedica, i disegni del padre di Pasternak per Resurrezione. Sembra d'essere nell'ombra d'un acquario, nel limbo della storia. Su una mensola, accanto a un mazzetto di fiori appassiti, un'urna funeraria: sono le ceneri di Zinaida Nikolaievna. Dalla finestra entra il profumo del bosco. Di qui, affacciandosi, Pasternak vedeva i prati lontani, sentiva i rumori della vita.

La lunga speranza

La voce del figlio, modulata soavemente, fa da sottofondo alla tristezza. «Io,

mio fratello Leonid, le due sorelle di mio padre che abitano a Oxford viviamo in attesa del giorno in cui il volto di Pasternak sarà liberato d'ogni velo, e l'opera sua sarà tutta come la volle. Nessuno, fra i libri pubblicati in Occidente, ha avuto la sua definitiva approvazione: né il dottor Zivago, del quale non corresse le ultime bozze, né La bellezza cieca, l'opera teatrale, incompleta, stampata ultimamente in Italia su una copia provvisoria. La famiglia Pasternak non vede con favore queste edizioni. Come si è rifiutata finora di far pubblicare tutti i brani d'un romanzo senza titolo scritto da Pasternak nel 1936, così tiene a far sapere che soltanto i manoscritti in suo possesso rispecchiano l'ultima volontà dell'autore. Non possiamo impedire la diffusione clandestina del Dottor Zivago, ma ci duole che essa avvenga in Russia su copie dattiloscritte, spesso piene di errori dovuti alla fretta e al timore dei copisti...». La voce di Evgheni Borisovic s'incrina, la sua fiducia nel Tempo, che porterà giustizia a suo padre, sembra annebbiarsi. Alla stessa maniera, prima dell'invenzione della stampa, gli scrittori antichi dovettero disperare che l'incuria degli amanuensi salvaguardasse le loro creature dalla severità del destino.

L'ultima sosta è alla tomba, nel cimitero che dalle cupole d'oro della chiesa di Peredelkino si apre a mezza costa su un orizzonte di segale e di pini. Impossibile trovarla, senza una guida pietosa che faccia strada nella bassa boscaglia che fascia i recinti. Infine, protetto da una siepe di roselline di campo, all'ombra di tre pini, il tumulo affiora da un'aiuola di miosotis. Un cespo di gelsomini, una panca di legno, e incisi sulla stele il profilo di Pasternak, la sua firma, le date: 10.XI.1890 - 30.V.1960. La pietra non è intatta: scalfita qua e là, maciata di bruno, porta i segni d'un'offesa che le margherite raccolte in due vasetti da marmellata non riescono a nascondere. Solenne e dolce, la quiete agreste del luogo è rotta soltanto dal canto lontano d'un gallo, dall'eco del treno. Così, nella gloria della terra, lievita il mistero della poesia.

Giovanni Grazzini

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
19 August 1969

A TRIP AMONG SOVIET WRITERS
by Giovanni Grazzini

CPYRGHT

Today we are going to Peredelkino. A distance covered by the train in 20 minutes. The gloomy cement of Moscow is soon left behind: before us appears the sweet countryside. There is a footpath between the grass, and we enter a silent kingdom where nature and poetry are sisters. Here Pasternak sleeps among the trees. But also expressed here, as in a sociological allegory transformed in Arcadia, are the diverse ways of being a writer in today's Soviet Union. Peredelkino is not only a village on Moscow's doorstep, a village scattered in a quiet pine forest. It is not only a village to which citizens made hot by the summer come to cool off and, putting on their bathing suits, look for mushrooms: it is a place where one can touch the policy of the regime toward the intellectuals. The writers' hotel (the "Creative House of the Literary Fund", we read on the gate) and the dachas rented to the more fortunate by the writers' union somewhat resemble a national park that has been conceived to provide writers with a hermitage sublimating their separation from the crowd in the lofty solitude of the authorized prophet.

THREE DESTINIES

The diffidence that censorship manifests toward intellectuals and the fear that a work of art marked by the pain of creativity can poison the optimistic official climate stem from an overestimation, made 40 years ago for instrumental purposes, of the role played by the writer in society. Among the various liturgical forms used to mythicize the "engineers of the souls," this type of "hunting preserve," of authorized place in which the writers have the social duty of recharging their imagination, has the dual function of caressing and protecting the youngest from the annoyances of public living and of removing them from the reality of the country. Embracing within himself the priest and courtesan, the Soviet writer considers the dacha a privilege and a right. However, it is not only a sign of prestige: it is also a mundane link of a chain that binds him in accordance with the following formula: the more it seems a peaceful refuge in the countryside, the tighter it binds him.

I found proof of this precisely at Peredelkino, under diverse cult conditions, which in this landscape of birch, beech, and pine trees -- in appearance

so remote from the ferocious flower bed of Moscow -- are reserved on the one hand for the writers perfectly integrated in the system and on the other for the memory of those held in purgatory. I pick 3 names -- Katayev, Mandelstam, and Pasternak -- and I sense in the atmosphere surrounding them and their families the echo of 3 diverse fates.

I shall begin with Valentin Katayev, a man of 72, an awardee of the Order of Lenin, one of the most able narrators of the old generation, a former director of Yunost between 1955 and 1962 (he started Yevtushenko on his career), an experimenter in forms rather remote from socialist realism, one of the few who has sown among youth the seeds of irreverence. This is Katayev, and it seems to me he is the living symbol of a literary craft and a creative freedom perfectly in tune with the available political opportunity. Ever since 1963, when Khrushchev publicly accused him of being guilty of some oversights connected with certain statements made during an American visit, Katayev has put on a muzzle. He has published (in Novyy Mir) The Grass of the Oblong and Cube. And in this journal a less benevolent critic sees the symptoms of a formalist contagion, and hence there are many opportunities for discussion. However, he does quite well in defending his motives against a foreign guest. He offers me English gin and orange juice, speaks humorously from an elegant dacha that rises in the middle of a forest, a dacha that is flanked by an orchard, a well, and a haystack (the rent is 120 rubles a month). But when I ask him about his and his colleagues' work, he takes refuge in the obvious admonition that even Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky battled the conservatives in their time. "Hence," he adds quickly, "the writer has only one function: to struggle for peace while exalting humanism." Of no value is the laborious treatment of a series of questions typewritten on 2 copies: he will answer them in writing. Suspicion will devour him. When I return in the afternoon to pick them up, he will say that he has reconsidered: he can do no more, it is better to talk about Italy and the 2 major Italian writers whom he knows: Alberto Moravia and Gianni Rodari.

Nadezhda Yakovlevna Mandelstam, instead, acted like one who has nothing to lose and wants to talk. The widow of the poet Mandelstam, who died 30 years ago in a Stalin camp, lives in difficult conditions in a hovel without running water that scarcely deserves to be called a dacha. Nevertheless, she is not ashamed of her torn clothes, of the surrounding misery. There is a certain dignity in the noble smile of this down-on-the-heels old woman who seems to have been forgotten by everybody. "Now," she says as she chain smokes and

uses the cover of a shoe box for an ashtray, "I've lost the hope of increasing my small teacher's pension with remuneration connected with being an author's widow. The Italians who recently published some of my husband's works did not send me a single lire. As to the Soviets, they are considering reissuing his works. Perhaps in 1972, when 15 years will have elapsed since his rehabilitation, and everybody will be free to reissue whatever they want without paying author's fees."

But why, following his rehabilitation, has only Mandelstam's Discussion on Dante been permitted to circulate? The woman smiles, shrugs her shoulders. Then she burst out: "You know that we, upon the death of a writer, set up a kind of commission. Its responsibility is to preserve the deceased's memory. This is what happened after my husband was rehabilitated. But the commission has met only once and that was last year. Nothing was concluded. Simonov, who presides over it, has written letters to various editors, proposing the republication of my husband's works. But, of course, nobody has replied. And if a periodical from time to time hazards the publication of some of Mandelstam's poetry, it is immediately attacked as though it had opened its pages to an enemy of the people. The truth, my dear, is that nothing has changed: the last word is again up to people who hate the memory of Mandelstam, a Western and Christian poet who disapproved of the cruel way of effecting the revolution and would not kowtow to socialist realism. And despite the voices raised in his favor and the action of young, this suffices for the authorities' boycott."

RUSTIC SIMPLICITY

Pasternak's dacha is nearby. A path between the verdure leads me to a sheltered bare-patch in the woods. Here I see the house in which Pasternak, alternating with his Moscow apartment, lived between 1936 and 1953, and in which he lived continuously following his heart attack in 1960. It is large and beautiful in its rustic simplicity, but it looks as though it were exhausted. There are signs of bitter carelessness: several windows in the veranda are broken, the front is peeling, and weeds are making headway in the garden. A man comes out of a contiguous little wooden house that belonged to the gardener. Tall, with grey hair, and dressed in an uncared-for summer suit, he approaches me timidly. The structure of his profile, the hollow cheeks, something morbid and lunatic in his eyes -- all this makes me think that he is one of Pasternak's sons.

Engineer Yevgeniy Borisovich Pasternak is a meek fellow, but his velvet voice is filled with irony. "Why did they publish Doctor Zhivago at a time when they shouldn't?" He gives me a light smile but quickly turns serious immediately. "I do not think that the novel will soon be published in the Soviet Union, the family's and friends' efforts notwithstanding. If it does occur, it will be done without fanfare, when the complete works of my father can be published. For now, we are trying to convince the writers' union to restore the dacha and to convert it into a small museum. The union is so little interested in our proposal that it is considering reassigning it to another writer..."

Two seminude girls, Pasternak's nieces, play among the trees. We go to the first floor, to Pasternak's work room, which the family has left unchanged since his death 9 years ago. We see a large iron bed with a faded cotton blanket, a cupboard, a sofa, a 19-century style desk, a liberty chandelier, the shelves with the books he had that summer (plus all the Zhivago editions published abroad), the hat hanging on a nail, and some dust-covered relics: a bronze bust of Pasternak, the cast of his mortuary face and of one hand. On the walls where the plaster stands hangs an autographed picture of Nehru and Pasternak's father's drawings for the "Resurrection." It seems that we are in the shadow of an aquarium, in the limbo of history. On a bracket near a basket of dry flowers stands a funeral urn: it contains the ashes of Zinaida Nikolayevna. The pleasant fragrance of the woods enters through the window. From here, looking out the window, Pasternak could see distant meadows, feel the throb of life.

THE LONG HOPE

The suavely modulated voice of Pasternak's son is an appropriate background to sadness: "My brother Leonid, my father's 2 sisters who lived at Oxford, and I live for the day when Pasternak's face will be freed of every veil, and his work will be as he would have wanted. Not one of the books published in the West had his definite approval, including Doctor Zhivago, the last galley proofs for which he did not correct; The Blind Beauty, an incomplete work for the theater and finally provisionally published in Italy. The Pasternak family does not look kindly on these editions. Just as it has refused to date to allow publications of all the excerpts of a titleless novel written in 1936 by Pasternak, so it wants to make known that only the manuscripts in its possession reflect the final

desire of their author. We cannot prevent the clandestine distribution of Doctor Zhivago, but we are pained by the fact that it is circulated in Russia in typed copies, frequently filled with errors that are the result of the haste and fear of the typists..." Yevgeniy Borisovich's voice splits, and his faith that time will bring justice to his father seems to be beclouded. In the same way, before the invention of the printing press, the ancient writers worried that the negligence of the amanuenses would cause their creations to undergo a severe destiny.

My last stop is at the tomb, in the cemetery that from the golden cupola of the church of Peredelkino looks out, from half way up a hill, on a horizon of rye and pines. It is impossible to find it without a compassionate guide who finds a path in the lower forest facing the enclosures. At last, protected by a hedge of field damask rose, under the shadow of 3 pines, the tomb arises from a myosotis bed. There are a jasmine bush and a wooden bench. Pasternak's profile, his signature, and the dates 10 November 1890-30 May 1960 are carved on a pillar. The stone is not intact: scratched here and there, stained in brown, it bears the marks of an offence that the daisies in 2 jam vases are unable to conceal. Solemn and sweet, the rustic quietitude of the place is broken only by the distant crow of a rooster, by the echo of a train. In this way the mystery of poetry is leavened in the glory of poetry.