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THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(22 November - 19 December 1969)

I. New Degradations by the Husak Regime

The lot of the Czechoslovak people has become progressively worse since Husak's takeover last April, to the point that outsiders began to think that the only direction it could go would be for the better. But the past month has revealed a new low to date for the Czech people. Self-denunciation and denunciation of one citizen by another, purges, and group self-criticism as practiced at the lowest depths of Stalinism in the Soviet Union have become the policy of the Husak regime. Some of the evidence of this depressing fact is recorded below.

A. Do-it-yourself Brainwashing

Nearly simultaneously with the release of the notorious questionnaire by the Czech Minister of Education, Jaromir Hrbek, requiring university faculty to inform on their colleagues and students, Hrbek issued an even more diabolic directive to all employees of his Ministry. This document requires Ministry employees to evaluate at least ten colleagues and identify their weaknesses, political, moral, and professional. Equally degrading, each employee must evaluate himself, lay bare his private thoughts, confess his aberrations in an ingenious kind of do-it-yourself brain-washing. The employee is warned: "... untruth and incompleteness of your own evaluation will unambiguously testify against you and render impossible any effort to do you good." It further warns that the worker will be evaluated "by a collective of co-workers and eventual contradictions in data will be investigated." The ostensible purpose is stated: "At the Ministry people cannot work who do not possess the necessary ability, who are not firm politically, who are insincere and have faults in their character." The completed questionnaire will provide documentary grounds for the dismissal of any employee of the Ministry and can be used as a weapon, a sword of Damocles, threatening the economic and personal security of every employee of the Ministry. This method of assuring obedience is properly labeled an "Inquisition" by Hans Morgenthau, but in its utter cynicism it is devoid even of the ideological heat and passion that was so important a motive force in the Middle Age atrocities.

Some feeling for the monstrosity of this directive and its debasement of the human spirit can be gained if the reader will imagine himself being required to answer to his present employer in these terms.

(The directive is attached in a translation published by The New York Review of Books on 4 December 1969 along with a penetrating commentary by the eminent American scholar Hans J. Morgenthau. Louis Aragon, French Communist Party Central Committee member, published the other directive -- to the universities -- with his own scathing commentary in his literary journal Les Lettres Francaises in October.)

B. Purges.

Purges sweeping through every level of party, government and public life have expelled thousands from their positions and forced resignations of many more who resist pressures to conform. The latest and highest level purge was that of Josef Smrkovsky and 10 other liberal members of the Czechoslovak parliament (see attached New York Times article). The new Party orthodoxy increasingly resembles Stalin-era Communism, as the following random examples show:

-- Jindrich Suk, chief of the Czech news agency C.T.K., former minister of Education and Culture and former deputy editor of Rude Pravo, was ousted to make way for hard-liner Otakar Svercina. One reporter estimates that 10% of all journalists and broadcasters have been fired since the Soviet invasion of 1968. (One network commentator, Vladimir Skutina, turned up in a Prague hospital where he had been taken from prison. His arrest had never been admitted but public outcry from Italian intellectual circles had apparently forced his release from prison.)

-- Cestmir Cisar was replaced as chairman of the Czech National Council, one of the two state legislative bodies (the other, the Slovak National Council will hold its own purge soon). Sixty-two of the 200 legislators were replaced in one massive stroke -- nine were expelled, fifty-three were permitted to resign. Cisar was popular with the students during the Czech Spring and so was suspect and ousted despite his recent espousal of Husak-orthodoxy.

-- Emil Zatopek, internationally famous Olympic champion runner, expelled from the Communist Party in October, "resigned" from the presidium of the Czech Olympic committee on 28 November. Zatopek's denunciation of the 1968 Soviet invasion had already cost him his Defense Ministry position and his post as trainer in the Czech army athletic program. He is now having difficulty finding even menial jobs to maintain livelihood for himself and his family.

So extreme and so widespread has this "cleansing" process become that it reportedly alarms even some of Czechoslovakia's Communist neighbors. Hungary's Party paper quoted a Prague comrade as saying that Czech tactics are "rough, terroristic and inhuman." Communist Yugoslavia's news service TANYUG, which described the purges as failing of their purpose thus far despite having attained "wide proportions," adds in a masterpiece of understatement: "It could ... be said of the present political situation and the mood of the people that they have calmed down but not consolidated in the sense of their full engagement for a new political concept...."

C. "Mea Culpa."

A particularly humiliating -- and cynical -- turn of the screw in Czechoslovakia is the requirement for self criticism in which groups publicly purge themselves of their guilt for having supported "Communism with a human face." "Rightist Opportunism" is the phrase which officially describes their crime. Among recent examples are:

-- Workers in television news service on 21 November "weighed their own contribution by the fact that in the period since January 1968 the television news in many cases slipped onto the platform of rightist opportunism." Now, having "... self critically [condemned] whatever was unprincipled, unsound and harmful to our party" they "fully identify themselves with the political line of the new party leadership headed by Dr. Gustav Husak."

-- Prace, the Slovak trade union daily, sometimes "succumbed to recklessness" in the period following January 1968, according to staff members attending a Communist Party meeting on 10 November. Now, "in a self-critical analysis, the Prace staff considered the errors made in the past period, fully dissociates itself from them and is determined not to repeat them in the future."

-- The Czechoslovak radio leadership confessed that "after January 1968, under the influence of rightist opportunists in several leading and key positions in the Czechoslovak radio, the activities of the radio became inconsistent with its traditional revolutionary, socialist, and international mission." Now, "... it assumes a great pledge: ... in the spirit of the recent plenums of the CPCZ Central Committee, to return the radio to its mission of a daily fighter for the genuine interests of the people, for the advancement of socialism and for friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries."

-- The Czech Journalists' Union management commission "abolished all politically faulty and incorrect standpoints of the former leadership." The South Bohemian branch "rejected, among other things, the practice of the past year when the communications media became an uncontrollable force subjectively serving rightwing opportunism and also clearcut antisocialist intentions." These recantations from the journalists bring to mind the Czech journalists' appeal to the International Press Institute on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. They urged "all journalists of the really free world to describe objectively what is taking place in Czechoslovakia and to give us moral support." (See attached, "An Appeal from Prague.")

II. Dissension Deepens Within Western European Parties

A. Democracy: Italian Communist Style

On 12 November the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) suggested in a major Pravda article that self-criticism and other "democratic" practices should be improved at the lowest party level -- the cell meeting. (The party report mentioned no such innovation for the higher, decision-making levels of the Party.) It is ironic that while the Pravda editors were encouraging more democracy and less centralism at the lower levels of the CPSU for reasons peculiar to the Soviet Union, the most "democratic" of Western European Communist parties, the Italian Party (PCI), was at the same time insisting on less democracy and more centralism for its dissenting critics. The PCI Central Committee had long been wrestling with the problem of the 11 Manifesto group. The dilemma: Should the leadership try to ignore the blunt criticism of the heretical monthly and thus try to preserve the image of Party

democracy and "unity through diversity"? Or should they expel the trouble-makers, whose dissenting voice was undermining leadership policies by calling for reversion to pristine revolutionary radicalism and for rejection of Soviet tutelage and of collaboration with non-Communist parties for the purpose of participating in a coalition government.

The PCI Central Committee was finally forced to decide and on 26 November suspended from membership the four key figures of Il Manifesto: editor Rossana Rossanda, director Lucio Margi, and two parliamentary deputies, Aldo Natoli and Luigi Pintor. The Il Manifesto group is clearly anathema to the CPSU, not only because of its contemptuous rejection of the Soviet model, but because it sought (with increasing success) to frustrate the PCI's long-cherished hope of participating in government. Therefore, rumors that the CPSU had wielded a heavy hand to oust the Il Manifesto group have considerable credibility.

Moscow registered its unqualified approval of the suspension in a 10 December Pravda editorial. So in two strokes -- the suspension and CPSU public approval of it -- the PCI gravely jeopardized its carefully nurtured image of a moderate Party, independent of Moscow. Other Italian political parties, particularly those which were prospective coalition partners, wondered what was image and what was reality in the PCI. Past PCI polemics with the CPSU began to look more like shadow-boxing than a real exchange of blows, and the PCI's disciplinary action, under Soviet prodding, against the Il Manifesto editors spoke louder than words as to "democracy PCI-style."

B. Austrian Party Split Hardens

The long struggle between the strong progressive faction and the dominant conservative group in the Austrian Communist Party (KPOe) came to a head at the 24-25 November Central Committee meeting. It had been called at the instigation of the progressives to reverse an earlier decision to oust Fritz Zapf, head of the party's youth organization (FOJ) and member of the Politburo. The FOJ has been openly critical of the dominant conservative leadership of the Party. (The conservatives decreed its dissolution but thus far it has refused to dissolve. Nor has it abated its criticism.) In a close vote, 37-34 with four abstaining, the Central Committee upheld Zapf's expulsion, whereupon 27 liberals walked out of the Central Committee declaring they would not participate in its work until full freedom of public debate was assured for all in the Party. Among them were the editor of the main Party organ, Volkstimme (People's Voice) and Politburo member Franz West, and two other Politburo members, Egon Kodicek and Maria Urban.

Many parties, particularly in Europe, are trying to find a way to cope with public dissent by members or groups of members (factions). One way is to throw out the dissenters, force a split, as Lenin did frequently and as the PCI and KPOe leaders (as well taught Leninists) have done. The question is, do Communist parties have any other way? It will be interesting to watch whether these parties will be able to evolve away from their traditional anti-democratism and adopt the standards of parties in the open political system of multi-party democracy. As likely as not, if the traditionalists continue to wield dominant power in CP's (as they do in all but a handful of free world

parties), progressive Austrian Communist and Central Committee member Theodor Prager's prediction will come true: "If you continue [your hard line], you will soon be standing all alone. Your majority in the Party will be total, but so will your isolation from the working class." (Prager's full statement is attached.)

C. Issues Cleaving the PCF

The PCI has its Il Manifesto dissenters, the KPOe its Wiener Tagebuch dissenters, and the PCF has its Politique Aujourd'hui dissenters -- all of whom have now been cast beyond the pale of normal Party activity. But the PCF still harbors within its bosom in the Politburo what it regards as a viper: Roger Garaudy. And the issue is the same: freedom for open, public debate and discussion of divergent views within the Party -- which Garaudy insists on and which the conservative leadership just as adamantly refuses to grant.

Garaudy expects his quarrel with the PCF to come to a head at the forthcoming 19th Congress of the PCF on 9 February. In a television interview in Paris on 5 December, he decried the lack of democracy in the PCF. While the Party could publicize far and wide its charges against him, he said, his own point of view had to be confined to closed meetings of Party organs. He asserted further than neither this form of socialism nor the kind imposed on Czechoslovakia by Brezhnev was his idea of what socialism should become in France. (Attached is a Le Monde report on the interview and on the PCF's response to Garaudy's interview.) Garaudy admitted that he rather expected to be excluded from the Politburo and the Central Committee. He added that he would continue to work for the Party's program and the objectives "as a simple soldier."

THE NEW YORK REVIEW

4 December 1969

Inquisition in Czechoslovakia

Hans J. Morgenthau

The political act, in its distinctive essence, is a matter of interests defined in terms of power, which ideologies seek to clothe with rational necessity and moral worth. More particularly, judgments of necessity and worth are relative to the interests and power of the observer; what appears inevitable and noble to one may be condemned as capricious and vile by another. For example, the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army, as seen from the Western vantage point, may be judged unnecessary, an exaggerated response to a political threat, which lost the Soviet Union more throughout the world than it gained for its European empire. But from the Soviet perspective, it cannot be termed irrational, that is, without an objective connection with the interests and power of the Soviet Union. For it is an existential fact, well recognized by the Czechoslovakian historians of the nineteenth century, such as Palacky, who were also the awakers of Czechoslovakian nationalism, that Czechoslovakia, unable to stand alone, had to lean on one or the other of its powerful neighbors to the East and to the West.

In other words, Czechoslovakia has never had to choose between independence and alignment, but between alignment with Russia and alignment with Germany (for which in the inter-war period France was a temporary and ultimately ineffectual substitute). In the measure that Czechoslovakia moved away from Russia, it was bound to move closer to Germany. It was against this threat that the Soviet Union reacted, and may well have overreacted, in 1968.

However, the political act as the functional employment of certain means for achieving certain interests defined in terms of power is also subject to moral judgment. The political act establishes a relationship between the holder and the object of power, in which the latter is of necessity diminished in his human worth; he is reduced to the means for

somebody else's ends. Hence the essential immorality of the political act. What makes that immorality tolerable is the proportionate relationship between means and ends. That is to say, the human quality of the object of power is diminished for the sake of ends endowed with a transcendent value. The extreme case is the sacrifice of life in war for the sake of the nation's survival.

At the other end of the spectrum, the extreme disproportion between means and ends may make the moral condemnation of the means employed inevitable. Genocide is a case in point. The documents before us are another. These documents were issued by the Czechoslovak Minister of Education; Professor Hrbek, in the middle of September of this year; their authenticity has been vouchsafed by two independent sources. They were brought from Czechoslovakia to France where they were translated into French. They were there discovered by a group of American scholars who translated them into English. They are published here without changes apart from corrections in spelling and punctuation.

The purpose of these documents is twofold. Their first and immediate purpose is not only to weed out from the Ministry of Education and the universities the supporters of the 1968 reforms but also all those who are not completely identified with the neo-Stalinist course of the present pro-Russian regime. Their long-range purpose is to establish ironclad controls over the minds of the remaining employees and faculty in order to prevent a recurrence of the events of 1968 and to assure full support for the new policies. To those ends they propose to kill not the bodies of men but their souls. By confronting the objects of power with the choice between complying to the satisfaction of the authorities and risking social, political, and professional disgrace, the ques-

tionnaires aim at the degradation, corruption, and ultimate dehumanization of man in order to make the holders of power secure in their power. To that end, they employ five devices.

1. They make men defenseless before the authorities. How is one to answer the questions pertaining to "personal evaluation"? If one declares oneself satisfied with one's work and capable of carrying it out, one's superiors may disagree. If one answers these and similar questions in the negative, one's superiors may disagree again. In other words, the object of power, by being compelled to give definite answers to questions which are of necessity a matter of subjective valuation, delivers himself into the hands of the holders of power.

2. They force men to denounce themselves without ever learning what is, as it were, the "optimum" of denunciation required. They may reveal more or less than is required, and in either case they must lose.

3. They force men to denounce their superiors, subordinates, and colleagues, again without knowing how much or little of such denunciations would satisfy the authorities.

4. They force men to lie. How else can most of the recipients of the questionnaires answer, for instance, the question: "Are you today sincerely convinced of the righteousness of the policy of the Party, the National Front; are you ready consequently to realise it and gain for it also other co-workers?" (A10)

5. They force the object of power to expose himself to the denunciations of others: "Are you fully aware that eventually, the untruth and incompleteness of your own evaluation will unambiguously testify against you . . . Are you aware that you will also be evaluated by a collective of co-workers, and eventual contradictions in data will be investigated?" (A15)

Two facets are particularly terrifying in this scheme of moral emasculation

and spiritual destruction. One is the employment of the victim to design his own moral and spiritual doom. He cannot blame what happens to him on others. He has said too little or too much, or the wrong thing at the wrong time to the wrong person, and thus has sealed his doom and that of others. Perhaps even worse, even if he has been successful in avoiding for the time being all the pitfalls of the questionnaires, he will lead the cursed life of a master dissembler in constant dread of being found out.

What adds to the terror of his fate is the inescapable nature of his predicament. Whatever he does serves only to entangle him further in the self-made network of denunciations, evasions, and lies. There is no prospect of salvation short of suicide. There is only

the prospect of a life in a hell where indeed *homo homini lupus*, where men must use and destroy each other in attempting to survive.

The scheme of the questionnaires will bring out the worst in man. But it will do more. By putting a premium, both in moral duty and survival, upon behavior detested by decent men, it will not only make relatively decent men into knaves, ashamed of themselves, but it will transform the latent lagos, which all societies harbor and decent societies try to repress, into paragons of totalitarian virtue, proud of themselves. The liar, the informer, and the *agent provocateur* become the ideal man.

The inmate of the concentration camp could console himself with the thought that he was the innocent and

of others, and he could find in the camaraderie of the doomed the remnants of human ties that bind men together. The men to whom these questionnaires are addressed can have no such consolation, nor can they find satisfaction in such ties. They are forced to make their own prisons, devastate their own souls, betray and suffer betrayal, and in the end detest themselves. In the face of the enormity of the crime against humanity here committed, it adds nothing more than a slight touch of irony that the author of these questionnaires is a professor, that is, a man who has chosen as his life's business to profess the truth, and that he is in charge of educational institutions whose supposed purpose is to safeguard and add to the truth. □

LETTER OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION TO ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIVERSITY

15th September 1969

To all employees of the Ministry of Education of the Czech. Soc. Republic.

Dear Comrades,
Women Comrades,

You all know well how complicated is the situation in the sphere of our education and what complicated tasks are facing us.

The Ministry of Education of the Czech. Soc. Rep. can carry out its function successfully only when it has a clear programme, purposeful organization, good cadres with high work morale, and perfect control of work.

The higher the function assumed by a co-worker, the higher are the requirements from his professional capabilities, political awareness and moral profile.

At the Ministry people cannot work who do not possess the necessary ability, who are not firm politically, who are insincere and have faults in their character.

I appeal to you and ask you that each one send to me personally and directly a sincere written answer to questions concerning two problems:

- How do you evaluate yourself?
- How do you assess your work hitherto at the Ministry?

A. Personal evaluation

A.1. Name, personal data, function, membership and functions in a political party, in the Trade Unions, in the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League.

A.2. Are you yourself satisfied with your work?

Are you capable of carrying out your tasks?

A.3. In which field would it be best to utilize your abilities and ambitions?

A.4. What has, until now, hampered a greater effectiveness of your work?

A.5. Do you keep regular working hours, and really work in a concentrated manner and effectively? If not, why not?

A.6. If you are a member of the Communist Party, have you displayed throughout the years 1968 and 1969 a consistent Party attitude; have you defended the internationalist programme of the Party; have you not allowed yourself to be broken by the attack of the rightist and antisocialist forces?

A.7. Which co-workers at the Ministry of Education have participated in campaigns against you, instigated them and organized them?

To what discriminations have you been subjected?

(Personal attacks at meetings, attacks in the Press, radio, signature campaigns, relieved of functions, health consequences of terror)?

Do you know of a worker thrown out from the Ministry, prematurely pensioned, etc.?

A.8. In which anti-party and anti-Soviet actions have you participated against the true adherents of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism?

Which pressure-resolutions have you signed or voted in favour of? (Neutrality of CSSR, abolition of Peoples' Militia, resolutions on the occasions of the negotiations at Cierna Nadtiso, the entry of Allied Troops, the Moscow Treaty, election of the President of the Federal Assembly, strikes of students, etc.?)

Have you condemned the meeting of the old members of the Party at Oechia, the participation at the celebration of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution at LUCERNA; did you sign or approve resolutions against so-called traitors or collaborationists?

A.9. How do you explain and assess your attitudes and deeds of that time?

A.10. Have you been able honestly and sincerely to get rid of the mistakes and errors committed during the previous period?

Are you today sincerely convinced of the righteousness of the policy of the Party, the National Front; are you ready consequently to realise it and gain for it also other co-workers?

A.11. Can you as a member of the Party on your honour and conscience publicly declare that from your own sincere conviction you will actively carry through the present policy of the Party, expressed especially in the conclusions of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party in Nov. '68, April '69, and the realization directives from May '68?

A.12. Can you as non-member of the Party publicly declare on your honour and conscience, and from your own sincere conviction that you will actively carry through and realize the policy of the present National Front led by the CP of the CSSR and of the government of the nations and of the Federal government?

A.13. On what points do you not agree with the present policy of the Party and National Front; where are you uncertain, and have doubts?

A.14. What personal frailties do you consider incorrect and do you want to get rid of them?

A.15. Are you fully aware that, eventually, the untruth and incompleteness of your own evaluation will unambiguously testify against you and render impossible any effort to do you good?

Are you aware that you will also be evaluated by a collective of coworkers, and eventual contradictions in data will be investigated?

B. The work of the Ministry

B.1. Which of the workers of the Ministry do you consider to be capable, honest and efficient? Name at least 10 workers with their functions.

B.2. Which workers have mistakenly been neglected and their capacity not made use of?

B.3. Which workers have been, on the contrary, entrusted with functions with which they cannot cope?

B.4. Which workers because of their lack of ability, neglect, bad morale, or

for other reasons do not deserve to stay at the Ministry?

Let us know all workers of this type.

B.5. Which leading workers have been discredited by their antisocialist and anti-Soviet deeds and attitudes, that they must not assume responsible functions?

B.6. How do you assess the morale of the Ministry on the whole? At various departments?

B.7. Are you convinced that the tasks of the Ministry can be mastered by fewer workers?

B.8. Which pieces of work, department, divisions of the Ministry are in your opinion working at their least capacity?

B.9. Which, on the contrary, are overburdened?

B.10. What concrete suggestions can you give towards the improvement of your field of work?

B.11. What improvements could be introduced elsewhere?

B.12. What obstacles hamper you and other peoples' work?

B.13. What is it necessary to do to improve the working environment, hygiene, economy?

B.14. What fundamental changes in the organizational structure of the Ministry do you recommend?

B.15. Where is it possible to make considerable economies in relation to the number of personnel and finance?

You do not have to type the answer. It is sufficient to write by hand in pen or pencil. In the case of workers without higher education, I shall not evaluate spelling, but only sincerity, and an honest effort to contribute to the cause.

Do not copy the questions, quote only A.1., A.2. . . B.1., B.15 . . . and write down only the answers. Write on one side only of the normal-sized paper A4 (typing paper).

Your statement has to reach the Secretariate in a glued envelope not later than 22nd September. I shall process them myself.

I expect a relevant answer from every worker in the Ministry.

Thank you in advance for your collaboration.

Prof. MUDr. Jaromír Hrbek, D.Sc.

**MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION,
PRAGUE, SEPTEMBER 16, 1969, TO ALL
THE RECTORS OF THE UNIVERSITIES AND
TO ALL THE DEANS OF THE FACULTIES**

I bring to your attention the order to send to me by the 12th October 1969 at the latest a written report containing an appraisal and an evaluation of the opinions, declarations, and unjust acts, above all of the orientation of the rightist opportunists, anti-socialists, anti-Soviets, who took part during 1968 and 1969 in the organs of the schools and faculties in public declarations of various teachers in the organs of the student movement and the public declarations of various students. The report must substantially contain the following information:

1. The participation of academic civil servants and the scientific council of the school, eventually of the faculty, in the various pressure activities in the resolutions, declarations, expressions of solidarity with the actions of the students etc. Match the text and the dates of these declarations, letting it be known at the same time if these unjust resolutions have been cancelled, and if you might be in a position to propose their cancellation and at what date. Ask each of the officers who have taken part personally in these activities and demand from each one a written personal evaluation of their activities and a statement of their attitude with respect to the general politics of the PCT, of the National Front, of the Federal Government and the National Government. Attach these personal evaluations to the report;

2. Which professors and lecturers of your school, eventually of the faculty, have declared themselves in the press, by their public interventions and by their activities within the K.A.N. (the club of the non-party involved people, in various clubs and organizations, etc.)? If they acted as initiators or organizers of pressure campaigns of signatures; of the intervention of the opposition from teachers and students against the politics of PCT and the National Front, as participants in campaigns against the faithful partisans of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian in-

ternationalism. Mention their date of birth, their position and brief description of their acts. Discuss these with them and demand from them a written declaration. Attach these to the report.

3. Who among the workers at the school, eventually of the faculty, during the year 1968 and 1969, who were molested or who were targets of discrimination simply because they respected the current acceptable attitude of the party, who respected its internationalist programme and who had not allowed themselves to be intimidated by the psychological terror of the anti-socialist forces and the forces of the right. Mention the date of birth, their position, the sort of discrimination and measures (attacks in the press, radio, tracts, campaigns of signatures, relieved from their duties, departure from the faculty, being put into Coventry, and the sequelae on their health of terror, etc.);

4. Evaluate the behaviour of all the members of the Chair of social scientists (Marxism-Leninism) and mention if the person acted during the years 1968 to 1969 in the interest of the accepted party policy. If he respected its internationalism programme, if he had not allowed himself to be broken by attacks from the anti-socialist forces and from the right. If he showed in his work any manifestation of hesitation, but was able to be free from these errors and faults during that period and is today sincerely convinced of the correctness of the party policy, and has decided to apply himself to gain the students and the other teachers. If he as a partisan or a propagator of opportunism from the right, as well as of Zionism, participated in the campaigns against faithful partisans of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, etc. Demand from each member who holds a Chair a written reply to these questions and a written evaluation of his conduct and of the activities of the whole Chair. Attach these to the report;

5. The list of all the officers of the student union of Bohemia and Moravia who have taken part who have spoken to students of the municipal centre and other organizations and clubs of students in 1968 and 1969 in your faculty or school of higher learning. Give their date of birth, their residence (college), their faculty, year of study, results in this study, and a brief outline of their character.

Mention separately the list of students who by their declaration in the mass media, in reunions and above all in other activities, worked as initiators and organizers of interventions against the politics of PCT, the National Front, the Federal and National Governments, who have taken part in campaigns against loyal partisans of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, who took part in demonstrations, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet, etc. Outside these dates give brief information on their relevant activities.

Mention the following: what sums the school, eventually the faculty, have dispensed in contributing to new organizations of students during the course of 1968, and during the first half of 1969, if and how machines for duplicating by roneotype or the central printing equipment of the school was used for publication of tracts, for names and for declarations. Present at the same time examples of these publications.

I hope that your reports and evaluations will be accurate and complete, founded on just principles, and based only on irreproachable criteria. Your reports will be able to contribute considerably to an accurate analysis of the situation in the schools of higher learning, to amelioration of the work on educational policy and to acceleration of the processes of consolidation.

The Rector of the school will attach to the reports from his Deans his independent appraisal which will also be complimentary. Find out for yourself which workers have eventually refused to submit a personal declaration. I ask that these should be

denounced and their evaluation should be discussed with the respective organs of the PTC.

I draw the attention of the academic officers of the schools and faculties to the fact that the Minister of National Education is carrying out at the same time a proper detailed analysis of the students in different schools of higher learning derived from the information at his disposal. These conclusions will be compared with your revelations and evaluation and any contradictions will eventually be judged and discussed with you.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 December 1969

11 LIBERALS QUIT CZECH ASSEMBLY

**Smrkovsky, a Dubcek Aide,
Among Those Forced Out**

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Dec. 17—Josef Smrkovsky, who was Alexander Dubcek's principal lieutenant during the liberalization in Prague last year, resigned under fire from Parliament today with 10 other liberals.

The purge stripped the 58-year-old Mr. Smrkovsky of his last public function.

The removal of the eleven, who were probably the only liberals who still held seats in the national legislature, coincided with renewed warnings against ultraconservatives from the Communist party's center of power.

These seemingly contradictory developments indicated that the Czechoslovak leadership under Dr. Gustav Husak, presumably with Soviet support, was following a centrist course against both extremes.

The Hungarian Communist party chief, Janos Kadar, visited Prague today without previous announcement. This development was viewed in some quarters as a move to bolster Dr. Husak's position.

Now considered a moderate at home and in Soviet-bloc affairs, Mr. Kadar was thought to have been invited to Prague by Dr. Husak to help him reason with the dogmatists in the inner party circles. Dr. Husak contends that their vindictiveness against liberal reformists threatens to wreck the Czechoslovak economy.

The parliamentary purge was seen as a new success for the ultra conservatives.

The 10 Deputies who lost their parliamentary seats with Mr. Smrkovsky included the

former president of the Academy of Sciences, Frantisek Sorm, and a member of the academy, Josef Macek.

Also purged were Martin Vaculik, secretary of the Prague city party under Mr. Dubcek; Alois Polednak, former head of the film industry; Marie Mikova, a militant liberal; Josef Boruvka, a former Minister of Agriculture; Oleg Homola, a former secretary of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society; and three lesser known Deputies, Zdenka Kenclova and Mrs. Jiri Lacina, Mrs. Jirina Tureckova.

The Federal Assembly, whose membership of 350 was elected in 1964, was thoroughly shuffled in an earlier purge in October.

Dubcek Still a Deputy

Mr. Dubcek, until then Assembly chairman, was on that occasion demoted to simple Deputy. He still holds a seat in the legislature, but will remain inactive when he takes up his new post as ambassador to Turkey.

Last Monday's announcement of Mr. Dubcek's appointment was widely interpreted as a defeat for the ultraconservatives, who had pressed for further disciplinary action against the former party chief.

Today, the party weekly Tribuna clearly alluded to the extremists when it cautioned against "expressions of left-wing radicalism." In the Communist political spectrum, dogmatism intensifies toward the left and liberalism toward the right.

Tribuna's warning was even weightier because it was signed by the weekly's conservative editor in chief, Oldrich Svestka.

The "left-wing radicals," Mr. Svestka wrote, "tend to operate with force and power rather than with reason." In an allusion to police-state procedures, the Tribuna editor added that the party must never attempt "to break a person's character," but must give everyone a chance to correct past mistakes.

Analysts read the Tribuna article as a definition of the moderately conservative line that the embattled Dr. Husak is propounding.



Camera Press-Plk

Josef Smrkovsky

NEW YORK TIMES

10 December 1969

Czech Ultraconservatives Are Gaining in the Party's Rank and File

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Dec. 9 — Reports reaching here from Czechoslovakia indicate that ultraconservatives are gaining ground among the Communist party's rank and file, causing concern in the conservative Prague leadership and even in Moscow.

The new extremists would put the clock back to the Stalinist era, while the conservatives, who at present dominate the Communist party apparatus, vow that despite their fight against the liberal tendencies of the progressives, there will be "no return" to the police state methods of the nineteen-fifties.

According to well-informed diplomats in Eastern capitals, Soviet ideologists are afraid that ultraconservative gains may prove fertile ground for the infiltration of pro-Chinese tendencies.

The new left-wing radicals, known as ultras, are pressing for ever broader purges to expel from the party all those who at some time in the past advocated liberal reforms or were critical of the Soviet Union, and are demanding punishment of the leaders of last year's reform movement under Alexander Dubcek.

The conservatives who prevail in the present leadership and in the party apparatus stress that even those who for a few weeks or months last year backed the reform movement may remain in the party if they were "honest," engaged in self-criticism, and supported

the current pro-Moscow line.

Anti-intellectualism and thinly veiled anti-Semitism are rampant at Czechoslovak party cell meetings these days, informants say.

"The rabble is taking over," a Czech who professes to be a progressive but who still holds party membership, said during a short visit here recently.

He told of a routine meeting of the party cell in a Prague district that he had attended.

He said that the meeting had been dominated by tirades against suspected liberals and that he himself had felt isolated.

"Names were named, and whenever one had a Jewish ring to it, there was laughter and jeering," the visitor recalled.

He said that the name of Mr. Dubcek was repeatedly pronounced by speakers in a derisive way, and every time several people in the audience shouted "Try him for treason!"

"This is not the proletariat that is gaining control," the visiting Communist said. "It is the lumpenproletariat." This German term, meaning ragtag proletariat, is Marxist parlance denoting classless riffraff.

According to information from other reliable sources, hardline extremism is sweeping also many other organizations of the Communist party in Bohemia and Moravia, while many moderates stay away from cell meetings and fail to pay membership fees.

Informed Czechoslovaks estimate that party membership has shrunk from more than 1.6

million two years ago to little more than a million. Czechoslovakia's population is about 14 million.

Assessments by informed Czechoslovaks and foreign experts vary widely as to how strong the liberal, conservatives and new radical factions are. The leadership implicitly acknowledged the disarray in the party last week by announcing that its long-delayed national congress, theoretically the supreme party body, would not be convened before 1971.

Curiously, the party base in Slovakia, which remained consistently more conservative throughout last year's liberalization phase, now is comparatively more moderate than the Bohemian-Moravian rank and file.

Rank-and-file pressure apparently has set off a new wave of purges in Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech lands. Party officials who replaced liberals after the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968, are now being removed from their posts in the new extremist groundswell.

The party magazine Zivot Strany (party life) disclosed last week that in northern Moravia 335 members of local party committees had recently been removed from their posts on charges of "right-wing opportunism" meaning progressive tendencies, while 58 others faced disciplinary action and seven were expelled from the party.

NEW YORK TIMES

22 November 1969

Czechs Said to Seek Support In Hungary Against Extremists

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Nov. 21—Alois Indra, a leading pro-Soviet conservative, returned to Prague today after a four-day visit to Budapest amid reports that the Czechoslovak Communist regime was seeking Hungarian support against hard-line extremists at home.

Mr. Indra, a secretary of the Czechoslovak communist party's Central Committee, conferred with Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Hungarian Communist party, and other members of the Hungarian ruling Politburo. No mention was made of the topics discussed.

However, analysts of Communist affairs here noted that Mr. Indra went to Budapest even as the Hungarian party press was publishing clear warnings against extremist excesses in Czechoslovakia. In one instance earlier this week, the main Hungarian party organ, Nepszabadsag, quoted an unidentified Prague Communist as deploring "rough, terroristic and inhuman methods" used by hard-liners in the party.

The choice of Mr. Indra for a mission to Budapest was held to be significant, the 48-year-old former Transport Minister,

is believed to have the absolute trust of Russian officials. He was one of a group of three men that the Kremlin reportedly wanted to set up a new regime in Prague after the Soviet-led invasion of Aug. 21, 1968. The other members of the pro-Moscow group were Vasil Bilak and Drahomir Kolder, both influential in the present Prague leadership.

Gustav Husak, the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party, has professed complete loyalty to the Soviet Union. However, he has repeatedly emphasized that he was not an ultraconservative.

In one of the frequent policy shifts within the Prague leadership, Mr. Indra has aligned himself lately with Mr. Husak and has acquired a reputation for comparative moderation.

It is thought that Mr. Husak asked Mr. Indra to go to Budapest to enlist the assistance of the relatively moderate Hungarian Communist regime against Czechoslovak conservative extremists who are said to be trying to discredit him in Communist capitals. Mr. Indra would be well qualified for such an assignment because of his excellent standing in Moscow.

NEW YORK TIMES

30 November 1969

Prague Acknowledges Unpublicized Holding of Some Political Foes

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, Nov. 29 — The Czechoslovak authorities implicitly acknowledged today that some of their opponents were in jail by announcing that one of them had been transferred to a hospital because of illness.

The prisoner was identified as Vladimir Skutina, a television commentator and author who, after his dismissal from the state network earlier this year, had continued defying the new leadership.

The Party newspaper Rude Pravo reported that Mr. Sku-

tina had been released from prison under a court order of Nov. 11 and taken to a Prague hospital.

The arrest of Mr. Skutina after demonstrations marking the first anniversary of the 1968 invasion was never officially reported. According to private information, Mr. Skutina developed stomach ulcers in Pankrac prison. Other sources say he has cancer.

It is not known whether any formal charges have been brought against him. Reliable Prague informants say that scores of other political prisoners are being held in Pankrac

Prison without any indication as to when, or whether, they will be brought to trial.

Mr. Skutina's last book, published earlier this year, was titled "Prisoner of the President." It told of what its author saw and suffered during a year in jail on political charges under Antonin Novotny.

Political Trials Barred

The present leaders have pledged that no political trials will be held.

One of several dissident intellectuals who were arrested with Mr. Skutina and are still in jail is Ludek Pachman, a

chess champion and writer. It is known that he went on a hunger strike in September and again last month. Friends say that he is now taking food again.

Mr. Pachman and Mr. Skutina aroused the anger of the new conservative party leaders by maintaining contacts with progressive groups in factories in Prague and other industrial areas.

Pankrac Prison is also an interrogation center for political suspects who are still technically free.

The most prominent among

them, according to recent information from Prague, is Maj. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, former political chief of the army and head of the security department of the party's Central Committee. He is under orders to report every other day to the prison for questioning on alleged anti-Soviet attitudes.

Words of Mao Cost Jobs

HONG KONG (UPI)—Thirty oystermen lost their jobs because they failed to attend special classes to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the British-owned South China Sunday Post-Herald said.

THE ECONOMIST
22 November 1969

How Far Will He Go?

There are signs that Mr Husak may yet inflict the ultimate weapon of repression—political trials—on Czechoslovakia

A cartoon in a Prague paper early this year showed a depressed-looking man announcing on television: "We shall not permit a return to the pre-January era—if only to make sure that January doesn't come again." That reference to the period before Mr Novotny's overthrow in January, 1968, was made before Mr Husak took over. For a short time after Mr Husak's succession it was possible to believe that this still represented his attitude. Nobody could call Mr Husak a progressive, but he had been a victim of Mr Novotny's police. Today, however, it is no longer possible to feel that there is nothing worse in store for the Czechs. The repression they are suffering may yet move on to a series of political trials. It looks as if Mr Husak and his colleagues may be heading back to the bad old days before Mr Novotny fell—not, of course, in order to provoke a reaction by the liberals, but to make sure that the liberals will not lift their heads again. They are frightened both of the Russians and of their own people; and, as is so often the way with frightened men, their instinct is to give way slavishly to those above them and ruthlessly repress those below.

Mr Husak ought to be able to feel that he has done enough to satisfy the Russians. He has purged and purged again—the party, the administration, the press and pretty well everything else that matters. He has imposed a rigorous censorship on the written, spoken and televised word; black is white and the moon is still made of blue cheese. About 750 non-conforming journalists are now said to be out of work. And the Russians have seen it all, and apparently thought that it was good. Last month they invited Mr Husak and his collaborators to Moscow and treated them like prodigal sons.

But there was a snag. Mr Husak, for all the feasting and speechifying, went home virtually empty-handed. He took with him neither a promise of the kind of economic help that the Czechs really need—a substantial hard currency loan—nor any promise that the Soviet occupying forces will be reduced, let alone withdrawn. There was nothing there that might help to reconcile the Czechs and Slovaks to their bleak future. On the contrary, he took with him a broad hint—by no means the only one to be delivered before and after the visit to Moscow—that his country's forced march back into its dark past might have to go even farther than most people had thought. The joint statement issued at the end of the visit spoke of "carrying on to the end the struggle against right-wing opportunism." The clear implication was that the end had not yet been reached.

Indeed it has not—not, at least, from the point of view of the Russians and the tiny handful of deep-dyed conservatives in Czechoslovakia who support them. Too many people are still refusing to knuckle under. There are the students. The new students' union, set up to replace the banned pro-Dubcek union, is a resounding flop. This week the party paper *Rude Pravo* has complained of "exaggerated nationalism and anti-Soviet trends" at the universities. Last weekend the authorities celebrated the 30th anniversary of the closing of the Czech universities by the Nazis; official spokesmen bitterly criticised the students who persisted in making embarrassing comparisons between the Nazis and today's occupying forces.

Then there are the intellectuals. The various Czech "cultural" unions, of writers, artists, film-makers and so on, have proved so recalcitrant that Mr Bruzek, the Czech minister of culture, has decided to by-pass them and deal

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directly with such individuals as writers and artists—that is, those who support the party's cultural line—will get financial help and permission to travel, to perform and to exhibit abroad. Lastly, and most damaging both materially and morally, there is the passively hostile bloody-mindedness of many industrial workers. Their absenteeism and go-slow tactics are making a sick economy sicker still. Empty shop-windows and resentful queues are no recommendation for any government, let alone Mr Husak's. He is busy blaming the country's economic troubles on the "wrong ideas" of the Dubcek days. And while his economic experts are still arguing over what the right ideas are, Mr Husak has taken the precaution of extending the "temporary" repressive legislation introduced after last August's demonstrations.

There is no reason to suppose that the Husak regime is in any danger—not, at least, from the Czechoslovaks. The great majority will endure it because they must; they can neither accept it nor overthrow it. If the regime could make up its mind to draw a veil over the past and rest content with its present absolute control (under the Russians) of almost every aspect of national life, the situation, however frustrating for both rulers and ruled, might become uneasily stabilised. But the regime, both because of its ideological training and presumably because of its deep sense of insecurity, cannot leave the past well alone. It is compelled to reconstruct it into a pattern that will justify the present.

It is not enough for the men at the top publicly to accept the theory that only the Russian army saved the country from a counter-revolutionary plot that would have destroyed Czech socialism and left the country wide open to penetration by imperialism. That idea must be publicly accepted by everyone else as well. Hence the depressing series of "recantations" that public and professional bodies of all kinds are now making. Even the Academy of Sciences has annulled its condemnation of the Russians. Obviously, such recantations are not unanimous, but in most organisations there are enough people who from fear, expediency or even conviction are prepared to manage things so that the regime gets the results it wants. There are a few brave exceptions. Last week the entire party organisation of the Czechoslovak radio resigned rather than condemn its work during the invasion; next day the television party organisation followed suit.

How far will the process of recantation and falsification

content with general statements, or will they want specific scapegoats? Enough mud has now been thrown at the motives of the leading figures in Mr Dubcek's government to make what would pass as the basis of a case for putting them on trial. Mr Husak has said that there will be no return to the excesses of the 1950s. No doubt he means what he says—when he says it. The trouble is that the regime is now sliding backwards so rapidly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that he can, even if he wants to, control those powerful forces in the party whose outlook is circumscribed by the personal power-seeking and doctrinaire narrow-mindedness of the typical *apparatchik*. It is these men—"political corpses" as they are called in Prague—who are now creeping out of obscurity, and into authority.

It must be remembered that although the authorities really did begin to rehabilitate the victims of the Novotny purges, very little was done to bring to book the men who actually carried out the purges and organised the rigged trials. Rehabilitation proceedings have still not entirely stopped, but all the emphasis now is on the way in which they have been allegedly misused to rehabilitate those who were "rightly hit" by the fist of working-class justice." The people who ought to be rehabilitated, it is now being said, are the security men who were so much abused last year. This is ominous. So are the hints—and more than hints—that the party intends to twist the law to suit its own purposes. The minister of justice complained last month that "anti-socialist forces, often under the slogan of the so-called independence of the law courts," were attempting to deprive the communist party of its leading role in the sphere of justice. He could hardly have been more explicit.

Maybe the growing suspicions of the regime's intentions will prove unfounded. One must hope so; but the Hungarian party paper, *Nepszabadsag*, has enough doubts to have warned Mr Husak last weekend against a return to terror trials. It is hard to believe that even the hard-faced men behind Mr Husak—men like Mr Indra and Mr Strougal—would feel that full-scale political persecution, complete with rigged trials, could either make them more secure or salvage their discredited cause by providing any justification for the Soviet invasion. But they are men with closed minds, who have apparently learned nothing from the upheavals of the past 15 years. The way they are now behaving, they might go that far.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
13 November 1969

Prague Suspends 3 Academic Subjects at Czech Universities

BY OSGOOD CARUTHERS
Times Staff Writer

PRAGUE—All courses in pure philosophy, sociology and history in Czechoslovakia's universities have been suspended indefinitely, it was learned Wednesday.

The move is seen as part of the overall drive by the present Communist leadership to wipe out all the main pockets of liberal thought which formed the vanguard of support for last year's attempts at liberal reform.

The faculties concerned with these subjects in the major universities were also the main centers of resistance and protest against the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968, and against the resulting restrictions on freedom imposed under Moscow's pressures.

"Now things are quiet again in the universities," said a student leader at the philosophical faculty (school) of Prague's famed old Charles University. "For the first time in more than a year we are not engaged politically—we have time for studies in our other subjects such as economic planning, the history of Socialist economy, even theology," the young man added wryly.

The authorities have given no public reason for the suspension of the courses. However, the students and some faculty members who were willing to discuss the question believe that the newly purged Communist regime and particularly the new hard-line minister of education intend to redraft the textbooks and reorient the curricula along stringently orthodox lines.

How long it will be be-

fore the courses will be resumed is not known. However, university sources believe that the subject of sociology as it is known in the West may be dropped altogether.

Some Czechoslovak students who went to Western Europe last year to study such subjects under officially approved cultural exchange programs have discovered that their credits are now neither recognized nor accepted.

This in effect can be regarded as a kind of overall reprisal against a large segment of the nation's university student body which even early this year staged sit-ins, issued proclamations and bitterly satirical memoranda and sought liaison with the industrial workers for joint action in protest against the Soviet occupation.

The students of the philosophical faculty of Charles University transformed their building in the center of the old city into a virtual headquarters of support for the reform program of last year and of opposition to Moscow's ever-increasing pressures on the regime.

The last evidence of the simmering student unrest came this August on the first anniversary of the

entry of the Warsaw Pact forces in which the heavily reinforced police reacted violently and with apparent effect against youth demonstrations. However, university student leaders disassociated themselves from the demonstrations and had decided upon taking a completely passive attitude.

Even so, the efforts of the Communist leadership to herd the students back into a unified and easily controllable national body have not yet proved completely successful.

Various student unions have been dissolved. The leadership of the Communist-controlled youth movement has been purged—replaced by men whose recent utterances prove them to be of the most trustworthy orthodoxy. But in general the students themselves have retreated into a kind of a pathetic nonparticipation. They have been able to do so thus far by taking an inordinately greater interest in their studies.

The only genuine success that the authorities can claim so far is that the centers of potential youthful rebellion in thought and action are completely calm on the surface.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE
Zurich, September 1969

AN APPEAL FROM PRAGUE

The International Press Institute answered an appeal by Czech journalists who in a letter smuggled from Prague to the Swiss newspaper *Journal de Genève* urged "all journalists of the really free world to describe objectively what is taking place in Czechoslovakia and to give us moral support". The message from Prague, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, came from a group of members of the Union of Czech Journalists.

The Institute replied with an assurance that all its 1500 members in more than 50 countries considered it their duty to continue to report fully and objectively the events in Czechoslovakia, and to uphold the ideals of truth, liberty and intellectual honesty for which Czech and Slovak journalists had fought courageously and which they continued to serve despite the obstacles and pressures confronting them.

IPI's statement, signed by Chairman Hans Kluthe and Director Ernest Meyer, said it "shares the hope expressed in the smuggled message from Prague for a brighter future and it will do everything it can to contribute to this hope through adherence to the principles for which Czechoslovakian journalists fought, giving an example without precedent to the world's press". IPI's statement was issued to leading news agencies on August 20.

NEW YORK TIMES

30 November 1969

ITALIAN REDS OUST 4 CHIEF DISSIDENTS

Party's Image as Democratic
Force Found Damaged

By ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr.,
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Nov. 29 — Four leading dissidents have been ousted by the Communist party, an action that, according to informed sources, has severely damaged its reputation as a democratic force in Italy and has hurt its chances of joining center and left-wing politicians in an eventual coalition government.

The ouster "has thrown a wrench into the works," commented a Socialist Deputy, Riccardo Lombardi, who has long been sympathetic to the idea of collaboration with the Communists. "The least you can say is that it does not make the unifying process any easier," he added, and a great deal of cold blood, patience and inventiveness will be necessary to move ahead with "restructuring the left."

Limited Horizons Found

What hurts most, observers agree, is the Communists' insistence on putting party discipline above the right of dissent. The ousted rebels, three of them members of the Central Committee and two of them members of Parliament, deviated from party thinking by advocating that Communists work with revolutionary left-wing groups to overthrow the existing system rather than maneuver for power within it.

The declaration that such a line is heretical should have reinforced the Communists' stature as would-be democrats. Instead, said a left-wing Christian Democrat, Livio Labor, a former union leader, the decision shows "a desire to slow down the process of reorganizing the left" and revealed that the Communists are a party of limited horizons without enough courage to join the "new social forces that want to struggle to change the country seriously."

The Central Committee members ousted — after a hastily curtailed debate — are Aldo Natoli, a surgeon who has five times been elected to the Chamber of Deputies from Rome; Luigi Pintor, a Roman journalist who won a parliamentary seat in Sardinia in the 1968 elections, and Rossana Rossanda, a publicist who served from 1963 to 1968 as a Deputy from Milan.

She and Lugio Magri, who also lost his party standing,

are co-editors of an increasingly popular left-wing monthly, *Il Manifesto*, for which the whole group of rebels has come to be named.

After only four issues *Manifesto*, a 64-page, 65-cent magazine commenting on the political scene and on revolutionary experiences in Cuba and China, has scored what are for Italy phenomenal circulation gains. Its fourth edition sold 40,000 copies and its latest number, published two weeks ago, promptly sold out 45,000 and went into a second printing.

'New Historical Bloc'

In the November issue the editors said Italy's "social crisis" called for the formation of "a new historical bloc" no longer based on outdated traditions. To effect radical transformation of the system, they said, in the language more popular with the student movement and the antiunion fringe groups among industrial workers than it is with the Communist party, "new organisms of power from the base" are necessary.

Alessandro Natta, Communist Deputy who presented the demand to the Central Committee for ousting the *Manifesto* group asserted: "We said we would be willing to fight their ideas, but inside the party and its institutional structure. They have refused our request to end their revolt."

LONDON OBSERVER

30 Nov. 1969

Italian Communists' row with leading lady

by NEAL ASCHERSON

THE Italian Communist Party has quarrelled with its leading lady, Signora Rossana Rossanda, the red-haired veteran of the partisans whose revolutionary views have made her into a heroine of the New Left throughout Europe, has been suspended from the Central Committee. So have Aldo Natoli and Luigi Pintor, Communist members of Parliament, who worked with her on

the new magazine *Il Manifesto*.

This collision—between revolutionary Communists and party leaders who are taking the respectable, parliamentary road to power—is not just an Italian affair. All the Communist Parties in the West, and the non-Communist Left as well, have been following the dispute closely. Signora Rossanda and *Il Manifesto* stand for all Communists who not only reject Soviet leadership but reject moderate, non-

revolutionary tactics as well.

Il Manifesto first came out in June. It appeared at a time when Italy was already in a turmoil of strikes, riots and factory occupations. Many were asking why the huge Italian Communist Party—the biggest political force in Italy—was still trying to edge into Government through alliance with "bourgeois" parties, when direct revolution seemed possible.

The Rossanda group had already

fired a few ranging shots in February, at the Party Congress in Bologna. In spite of efforts to keep the leftists in check, Luigi Pintor called for workers' councils and said the policy of making alliances with other parties was "building on sand."

But the first number of *Manifesto* was a sensation. Not only did it scoop the secret theses for the Czechoslovak Party Congress (the one the Russians invaded to stop); the leader demanded open dialogue within the party on basic strategy, and called for a revival of "the sense of revolution as a rupture and overthrow of the existing order."

In the climate of Italy today, this intellectually stiff periodical sold out instantly and had to be reprinted. Circulation soared to some 150,000 within a few months. People began to speak of the 'Manifesto Group,' and to hope that its members would bridge the gap between the Communist Party and disaffected young Marxists.

Rossana Rosanda had struck the party on its most tender spot. Openly critical of Soviet behaviour

in Czechoslovakia and within the world Communist movement, the party is committed to allowing free and open internal debate. Its leaders seek coalition with the existing parties, promising that a Communist Government would permit a multi-party system and bear no resemblance to intolerant Stalinist models in Eastern Europe.

At first, party leaders were content to warn Rossana and her colleagues, and to discuss their theses in the Communist press. The *Manifesto* people were not hot-headed students, but formidable and mature Communists, respected throughout the party and beyond. But, as Italy this autumn entered the long-awaited storm of major strikes and street battles, with the Christian Democrat minority Government riven by its own disputes, the *Manifesto* challenge to the Communist leadership appeared to threaten unity when it was most needed.

The party's central committee held a hearing. Rossana and her two colleagues were assured that the party did not want their silence, their surrender or their humili-

tion, but that, without discipline of some kind, the party would founder in impotent faction fights. The 'Manifesto Group' refused to be quiet.

Last week, the party reluctantly suspended Rossana and her colleagues for "sponsoring the fragmentation of the party." This was an embarrassing decision for Italian Communists, committed to tolerance and diversity and bold enough to say openly that "no process of democratisation has begun in the Soviet Union... the masses have not shared in the exercise of power."

The Party says that the three will be reinstated if they stop publishing *Il Manifesto*, which they will almost certainly refuse to do. The suspensions will produce a walk-out of leftists into various forms of Maoism. Meanwhile parties considering coalition with them have been shaken to find that, where unity is concerned, the liberalism of Italian Communists has a limit.

THE WASHINGTON POST

11 December 1969

Soviets Endorse Disciplining Of Three Italian Communists

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Dec. 10—The Soviet Union publicly intervened in the affairs of a Western Communist party today. A Pravda editorial officially endorsed the suspension of a three-member faction by the Italian party.

Such interventions are rare. Communist sources suggested that this one was really an attempt to bring the Italian party—disaffected with Soviet leadership, fermenting, cracked but not yet deeply split—back to a monolithic structure and a pro-Moscow position.

Other informed observers said it might also be an attempt to revive the fortunes of the desiccated pro-Moscow "right wing" of the Italian party.

The sources agreed that the endorsement was certainly not sought by Luigi Longo and other top leaders of the Italian party, that it took a stronger position than the Italian party's own statements

and that it might boomerang and help the so-called Italian Communist liberals and further impair the unity of the Communist movement.

Last month the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party "excluded" Rossana Rosanda, Aldo Natoli and Luigi Pintor. They are Communist members of the Italian Parliament who publish a magazine called *Il Manifesto*. The journal rejects moderate tactics and wants to revive "the sense of revolution as a rupture and overthrow of the existing order." It also calls for workers' councils, in which it may be as much Titoist as Maoist.

These views impugned the attempts of the Italian party to join a coalition government with socialist and perhaps even "bourgeois" parties.

The Russians called the suspension of the three "important" in today's editorial, which some observers said carried more weight because

it was signed "our own information" rather than with the name of a correspondent or commentator.

The editorial called the positions of the Manifesto group "a muddled mixture of right-opportunistic and 'leftist' theses." It said they slandered the Italian party, the Communist movement, the Socialist countries and the Soviet Union.

It called the group's activities "subversive" and "disorganizing" and said it attacked "the Leninist principle of democratic centralism" (rule from the top with no debate after the leaders have reached a decision).

Pravda ended by calling for "ideological staunchness" under a variety of headings. Observers asked how this squared with the Italian Communist Party's own disregard of "democratic centralism" and with its criticism of the Soviet Union for not allowing the masses to share in the exercise of power.

VOLKSTIMME, Vienna
28 November 1969

THEODOR PRAGER

Posing naive questions is a very fashionable thing to do. What's your opinion regarding the statutes? What's your opinion regarding democratic centralism? What's your opinion on Ernst Fischer? What do you think of the Marek interview?

I would like to pose a few counter questions: What is your opinion concerning the resolution of the 22nd August 1968? Do you still condemn the invasion by the states of the Warsaw Pact? What's your attitude regarding the full party control of all spheres of life in Czechoslovakia? What is your attitude regarding the 19th party Congress which had stated that socialism must mean more democracy than bourgeois democracy, not less?

Charges of revisionism are leveled against us. But who revises the resolutions of the 19th party Congress? Who drags us onto the road of total subjection to the ever-changing needs of the foreign party leadership?

The extension of party influence into all spheres is taking place here also. Taking a critical attitude to neo-Stalinist "normalization" in the CSR is being prevented. Not even critical remarks of fraternal parties are being published or talked about. The British party has asked: "Where is proof of the alleged counter-revolution in the CSR? Which CIA agents or other diversionists have been offered to the public? The elected leaders of party and state were arrested." But access to such information is prevented here.

Our attitude in public is being held against us, as presumably being against the party interests. The now prevalent "hard" line is against the vital interests of the party by its practical exclusion of (the opinions of) exponents of other than the prevalent opinion. If you continue in this vein, you will soon be standing all alone. Your majority in the party will be total, but so will be your isolation from the working class. Your claim to total power within the party reveals your ideas of socialism. We entertain different concepts and we shall not give up our intent to represent them everywhere.

Theodor Prager

Gretchenfragen sind derzeit große Mode. Wie hältst du's mit dem Statut? Wie hältst du's mit dem demokratischen Zentralismus? Wie stehst du zu Ernst Fischer? Wie stehst du zum Marek-Interview?

Ich möchte mit ein paar Gegenfragen aufwarten: Wie haltet ihr es mit unserem Beschluß vom 22. August 1968? Steht ihr noch zur Verurteilung des Einmarsches der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten? Wie steht ihr zur totalen Gleichschaltung in der CSSR? Wie haltet ihr es mit dem 19. Parteitag, der erklärt hat, der Sozialismus muß mehr Demokratie bedeuten als die bürgerliche Demokratie, nicht weniger?

Man wirft uns Revisionismus vor. Aber wer revidiert die Beschlüsse des 19. Parteitags? Wer zerrt uns auf den Weg der totalen Unterordnung unter die jeweiligen Bedürfnisse einer auswärtigen Parteiführung?

Die Gleichschaltung ist auch bei uns im Gange. Man verhindert jede kritische Stellungnahme zu der neostalinistischen „Normalisierung“ in der CSSR.

Nicht einmal die kritischen Äußerungen von Bruderparteien dürfen da erscheinen. Die englische Partei hat gefragt: „Wo bleiben die Beweise über die angebliche Konterrevolution in der CSSR? Welche CIA-Agenten oder sonstigen Divertanten hat man der Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt? Verhaftet hat man dort die gewählten Führer von Partei und Staat.“ Aber darüber darf man bei uns nichts erfahren.

Man wirft uns unser Auftreten in der Öffentlichkeit vor, das angeblich gegen die Partei gerichtet ist. Gegen die Lebensinteressen der Partei richtet sich die jetzt vorherrschende „harte“ Linie der praktischen Ausschaltung von Exponenten einer anderen als der herrschenden Auffassung. Wenn ihr so weiter macht, werdet ihr bald völlig unter euch sein. Eure Mehrheit in der Partei wird total sein, aber auch eure totale Isolierung von der Arbeiterschaft. Euer totaler Machtanspruch in der Partei zeigt, was ihr für Vorstellungen vom Sozialismus habt. Wir haben andere Vorstellungen, und wir werden nicht darauf verzichten, sie überall zu vertreten.

LE MONDE, Paris
28 November 1969

Testimony from a "Progressive" Leader: "Normalization"
Marks the Decline of the Party

One of the principal personalities of the progressive current in the Austrian P.C. sent a letter to us, asking that his name not be mentioned, from which we have extracted the principal passages:

"Austria is a small world on the stage of which the big world holds its rehearsals." This quotation from Hebbel was used last year in connection with the small Austrian Communist Party whose ranks never cease to diminish and in which is reflected the crisis of the communist movement. The party had attracted attention well beyond the national borders during its nineteenth congress in 1965. Lowering the curtain on its past, it decided to renew its leadership and elaborated a program of "Italian" inspiration.

The progressive forces within the party had succeeded in obtaining these changes only because the dominant group in the apparatus had not yet realized the full significance of the ouster of Khrushchev. When this was accomplished, a systematic resistance against the new orientation began to show itself, essentially in documents unrelated to any political practice. This action was sufficient, however, to give a feeling of the growing pressure from the "friends." Written in German, these publications provoked a responsive echo in the GDR and the traditions and ties dating from the monarchy assured them a growing interest in Prague and in Budapest. The attacks were concentrated on Ernst Fischer, the most outstanding personality of the party and one of the most important of the workers' movement since the Second World War.

The springtime in Prague permitted the progressives, for the most part personal friends of the Prague reformers, to go over to the offensive. The party saluted the program of the Czech communists, sent messages to Dubcek, and after 21 August the central committee condemned the invasion; the spokesmen of the apparatus were not present at the sessions. The Austrian Communist Party equally took the initiative in asking for the convoking of a conference of communist parties from Western Europe. This proposal ran into the refusal of the French Communist Party.

The pressure which began at this moment did not cease to increase, occasioning open polemics with the GDR and the Soviet Union, who concentrated their attacks on Ernst Fischer. Our party soon resembled a broken mirror reflecting the "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. All possible stratagems and manipulations were used, a publication paid for out of the account for developmental aid to a "friendly" country was utilized for this work inside the party -- its first issue was directed against Ernst Fischer, its second against Franz Marek, the spokesman of the progressive forces --

finally, a congress of the party was prepared, which was held in January and revenged itself on the preceding congress.

Immediately after this congress proceedings were instituted against Ernst Fischer under the pretext of an interview on the radio. The arbitration commission (average age seventy years) decided in May on the expulsion of Ernst Fischer. A majority of the central committee refused to ratify this decision. In October the arbitration commission, by six votes against four, again pronounced itself in favor of expulsion, which can now be annuled only by a party congress. Twenty seven members of the central committee publicly protested against this decision which was as stupid as it was suicidal.

This public protest could hardly be more than a fight for honor. The expulsion of Ernst Fischer was followed by numerous withdrawals and resignations. The decline of the Austrian Communist Party is inexorable. In the elections even some communists do not vote for the party.

The expulsion of Ernst Fischer had been preceded by another act, less spectacular but just as symptomatic of the "Husakization" of the party. The publication of the communist intellectuals, Tagebuch, had been run out of the party office building after it had refused to submit to censorship.

Our party, which had once awakened interest, finds itself isolated and without hope. It has always had trouble in becoming a power and no longer has any chance of being considered as democratic and progressive.

It will continue, however, to participate in future conferences of communist parties. This presence seems to be the only thing which counts for the partisans of "normalization."

Un témoignage d'un dirigeant < progressiste > : la < normalisation > marque le déclin du parti

L'une des principales personnalités de la tendance progressiste au sein du P.C. autrichien nous a adressé, en demandant que son nom ne fût pas mentionné, une lettre dont nous extrayons les principaux passages :

« L'Autriche est un petit monde sur la scène duquel le grand tient ses répétitions. » Le mot de Hebbel a été employé l'an passé à propos du petit parti communiste autrichien, dont les rangs ne cessent de se réduire, et où se reflète la crise du mouvement communiste. Le parti avait attiré l'attention bien au-delà des frontières nationales, lors de son dix-neuvième congrès, en 1965. Tirant un trait sur son passé, il décidait de rajeunir sa direction et élaborait un programme d'inspiration « italienne ».

Les forces progressistes à l'intérieur du parti n'avaient réussi à obtenir ces changements que

parce que le groupe dominant dans l'appareil n'avait pas encore pris conscience de la portée de la destitution de Khrouchtchev. Lorsque ce fut chose faite, la résistance systématique contre la nouvelle orientation commença à se manifester, essentiellement dans des documents auxquels ne répondait aucune pratique politique. Cette action fut suffisante cependant pour permettre de sentir la pression croissante des « amis ». Ecrites en allemand, ces publications provoquèrent un écho attentif en RDA et les traditions et les liens datant de la monarchie leur assurèrent un intérêt croissant à Prague et à Budapest. Les attaques étaient concentrées sur Ernst Fischer, la personnalité la plus notable du parti et l'une des plus importantes du mouvement ouvrier après la deuxième guerre mondiale.

Le printemps de Prague permit aux progressistes, pour la plupart des amis personnels des réformateurs pragois, de passer à l'offensive le parti sans le pro-

gramme des communistes tchèques adressa des messages à Dubcek, et après le 21 août le comité central condamna l'invasion, les portes-parole de l'appareil n'assistèrent pas à la séance. Le parti communiste autrichien prit également l'initiative de demander la réunion d'une conférence des partis communistes d'Europe de l'Ouest. Cette proposition se heurta au refus du parti communiste français. Le moment, ne fit qu'augmenter, donnant lieu à des polémiques ouvertes avec la R.D.A. et l'Union soviétique, qui concentraient leurs attaques sur Ernst Fischer. Notre parti ressembla bientôt à un miroir brisé reflétant la « normalisation » en Tchécoslovaquie. Tous les stratagèmes et manipulations possibles furent employés, une revue financée au compte de l'aide au développement d'un pays « ami » fut utilisée pour le travail à l'intérieur du parti — son premier numéro fut dirigé contre Ernst Fischer, son numéro deux contre Franz Marek, le

porte-parole des forces progressistes — enfin, un congrès du parti fut préparé, qui se tint en janvier et se voulut la revanche sur le congrès précédent.

Immédiatement après ce congrès, une procédure fut engagée contre Ernst Fischer, sous le prétexte d'une interview accordée à la radio. La commission d'arbitrage (moyenne d'âge, soixante-dix ans) décida en mai l'exclusion d'Ernst Fischer. Le comité central refusa, à la majorité, d'entériner cette décision. En octobre, la commission d'arbitrage, par six voix contre quatre, se prononçait une nouvelle fois pour l'exclusion, que seul, maintenant, un congrès du parti pourra lever. Vingt-sept membres du comité central protestèrent publiquement contre cette décision aussi stupide que suicidaire.

Cette protestation publique ne pouvait être guère plus qu'un baroud d'honneur. L'exclusion d'Ernst Fischer fut suivie de

nombreux départs et démissions. Le déclin du parti communiste autrichien est inexorable. Aux élections, même des communistes ne votent pas pour le parti.

L'exclusion d'Ernst Fischer avait été précédée d'un autre acte, moins spectaculaire, mais tout aussi symptomatique de la « husakisation » du parti. La revue des intellectuels communistes, *Tagebuch*, avait été chassée de l'immeuble du parti après qu'elle eut refusé de se soumettre à une censure.

Notre parti, qui avait, un moment, éveillé l'intérêt, se retrouve isolé et sans espoir. Il a toujours eu du mal à devenir une force, et n'a plus aucune chance d'être considéré comme démocratique et progressiste.

Il continuera toutefois à participer aux éventuelles conférences des partis communistes. Cette présence semble être la seule chose qui compte pour les partisans de la « normalisation ».

LE MONDE, Paris
6 December 1969

MR. GARAUDY IS DISPOSED TO "SERVE" THE C.P. "AS A SIMPLE SOLDIER"

Mr. Roger Garaudy, member of the political bureau of the communist party, director of the Center of Marxist Studies and Research (CERM), evoked Thursday evening, during the television program "Panorama," the conflict which opposes him and his party on the subject of Czechoslovakia.

After having recalled his point of view -- "the socialism that I wish for is not that imposed by Brezhnev on Czechoslovakia" -- he declared:

"I am not in disaccord with the program, the objectives, and the policy of my party, otherwise I would resign. It is possible that I may be excluded from the political bureau and from the central committee of my party, but I would then insist on continuing to serve it as a simple soldier. I wish, however, that it will be possible for each person to be able to express himself in full liberty within the party."

**M. GARAUDY EST DISPOSÉ
A « SERVIR » LE P.C.
« en tant que simple soldat »**

M. Roger Garaudy, membre du bureau politique du parti communiste, directeur du Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes (CERM), a évoqué jeudi soir, au cours de l'émission télévisée « Panorama », le conflit qui l'oppose à son parti au sujet de la Tchécoslovaquie.

Après avoir rappelé son point de vue — « le socialisme que je souhaite n'est pas celui imposé par Brejnev à la Tchécoslovaquie ». — il a déclaré :

« Je ne suis pas en désaccord avec le programme, les objectifs et la politique de mon parti, sinon je démissionnerais. Il est possible que je sois exclu du bureau politique et du comité central de mon parti, mais je tiendrai alors à continuer de servir celui-ci en tant que simple soldat. Je souhaite toutefois qu'il soit possible à chacun de pouvoir s'exprimer en toute liberté au sein du parti. »

LE MONDE, Paris
7-8 December 1969

In expressing himself on television

MR. ROGER GARAUDY "CONFIRMS HIS OPPOSITION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM"

writes l'Humanité

L'Humanité on Saturday morning returned to the subject of the statements made Thursday evening by Mr. Roger Garaudy, member of the political bureau of the communist party, on the televised program "Panorama" and writes:

"The French Radio and television Organization broadcasts at length the speeches of Chanban-Delman, of Debré, of Poujade and all the other anti-communist attacks. It was not to an exposé of the policy of the communist party that "Panorama" consecrated its broadcast of Thursday evening, but to an interview with Roger Garaudy. It is very necessary to stress the singular character of this interview. Once again it is by a book, published during the preparations for a party congress, that Roger Garaudy expresses his point of view. He confirms in it his opposition to the analyses and conclusions at which the collective organs of the leadership have arrived; he confirms in it, despite his denigrations, his opposition to the principles of democratic centralism.

"But one who wishes to prove too much risks proving nothing at all. Obligated to recognize that he has always been able freely to express himself in the political bureau of the central committee, Roger Garaudy had nonetheless said nothing about the fact that the central committee has decided to open, as it has done before each congress, in the party and in its press, the preparatory discussion for the congress on the basis of the draft theses adopted by the central committee. Roger Garaudy, member of the political bureau, has the right to express his opinion there on this. Which is what the secretary general of the party invited him to do at the meeting of the central committee of last 13-14 October. In effect, Waldeck Rochet said then: 'I wish, in the name of our political bureau, that Garaudy would change his attitude, that is that he defend the policy of the party and participate, like all the militants and members of the party, in the preparation of the nineteenth congress in the framework of the principles which rule the party and of its statutory regulations.' But it is regrettable that once again Roger Garaudy prefers the publicity of bad quality which television obligingly accords him."

LE MONDE, Paris
7-8 December 1969

En s'exprimant à la télévision

**M. Roger Garaudy « confirme son opposition
aux principes du centralisme démocratique »**

écrit « l'Humanité »

L'Humanité revient samedi matin sur les déclarations faites jeudi soir par M. Roger Garaudy, membre du bureau politique du parti communiste, dans l'émission télévisée « Panorama », et écrit : « L'O.R.T.F. diffuse à longueur d'émission les discours de Chaban-Delmas, de Debré, de Poujade et toutes les autres attaques anticomunistes. Ce n'est pas à un exposé de la politique du parti communiste que « Panorama » a consacré son émission de jeudi soir, mais à une interview de Roger Garaudy. Interview dont il faut bien souligner le caractère singulier. Une fois de plus, c'est par un livre, publié en pleine préparation du congrès, que Roger Garaudy exprime son point de vue. Il y confirme son opposition aux analyses et aux conclusions auxquelles se sont livrés les organes collectifs de direction ; il y confirme, malgré ses dénégations, son opposition aux principes du centralisme démocratique. » Mais qui veut trop prouver risque de ne rien prouver du tout. Obligé de reconnaître qu'il a toujours pu s'exprimer librement

dans le bureau politique et le comité central, Roger Garaudy n'a cependant rien dit du fait que le comité central a décidé d'ouvrir, comme il le fait avant chaque congrès, dans le parti et dans sa presse, la discussion préparatoire au congrès, sur la base du projet de thèses adopté par le comité central. Roger Garaudy, membre du bureau politique, a le droit d'y exprimer son opinion. C'est à quoi le secrétaire général du parti l'invitait à la session du comité central des 13 et 14 octobre dernier. En effet, Waldeck Rochet disait alors : « Je sou- » haitte, au nom de notre bureau » politique, que Garaudy change » d'attitude, c'est-à-dire qu'il dé- » fende la politique du parti et » veuille bien participer, comme » tous les militants et les mem- » bres du parti, à la préparation » du dix-neuvième congrès dans » le cadre des principes qui régis- » sent le parti et de ses règles » statutaires. » Mais il est regret- » table qu'une fois de plus Roger » Garaudy préfère la publicité de » mauvais aloi que lui accorde » complaisamment la télévision. »

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris
20-26 October 1969

Before the Central Committee at Ivry, Roger Garaudy Asked
the Right Questions. Nobody Answered Them.

By - Jean Geoffroy

Because he is luckier than Alexander Dubcek, Roger Garaudy is still a member of his party's Political Bureau. But he will have only 4 months' respite. On 8 February next, the 19th Congress of the French Communist Party, meeting at Nanterre, will "forget" to include his name among those of the members of the Central Committee, which will undoubtedly have a number of new faces on it, if only because there have been practically no changes in its makeup since the last Congress was held in January 1967.

Garaudy's two speeches to the Ivry CC last Wednesday are, at least at this level, his swan song. They highlighted not only his isolation -- even Aragon was silent, although he had first made sure that there would be no immediate sanctions imposed on Garaudy -- but also the degree to which the problems he raised are currently bothering the leadership of the French CP.

It is not mere happenstance that the hardest attacks on the director of the Center for Marxist Studies and Research were mounted, at the Ivry session, by spokesmen for the Stalinist old guard, like Léon Feix and André Stil, the former editor-in-chief of Humanité, who distinguished himself in 1956 with his commentaries on the events in Budapest. The younger generation in the Political Bureau, although it has failed to back Garaudy, is more circumspect. Roland Leroy, René Andrieu, René Piquet, and Paul Laurent took no part in the debate. They left it to Waldeck Rochet to deliver the only party reply to the Garaudy charges to see publication.

"If we were to follow Garaudy..."

As he voiced them in his initial speech, and then in reply to the several rebuttal speeches, his views bear chiefly on three points.

1. The events in Czechoslovakia should induce French communists to question themselves more probingly than they have hitherto on the matter of their relations with the Soviet Union.

Waldeck Rochet's reply:

"Once again, Garaudy is trying to exploit the events in Czechoslovakia to help anti-Sovietism and the opportunist cliques."

2. The international communist conference that met last June in Moscow adopted a document that provides no answer to a number of fundamental problems (such as that of the individual paths each country chooses to move toward socialism), and contains no valid analysis of the present situation in the capitalist countries.

Waldeck Rochet's reply:

"If we were to follow Garaudy, we should be aggravating the dissension within the international communist movement and its weakening, as well as the division within our own party, to the advantage of imperialism and of the class enemy..."

3. The present principles of organization of the French Communist Party prevent any meaningful debate on these problems as a whole.

Wladeck Rochet's reply:

"Garaudy frequently violates the principles of organization. He has publicly made statements contrary to the party's policy in a Yugoslav newspaper, statements which have been picked up by a great many bourgeois newspapers. He cannot therefore be overly surprised by our response."

The condemnation is clear, although the Secretary-General thought it wise to add that he hoped "that Garaudy will change his attitude, that is that he will defend Party policy and will be kind enough to join with all militants and Party members in preparing for the 19th Congress."

This discussion took up several hours of the second day of the CC meeting, although it was not originally on the agenda. It would be a mistake to conclude from this that the Garaudy problem is one of the Party's central concerns. This is merely the crystallization of a more complex debate which the French CP clearly does not dare to plunge straight into, but which it is finding more and more difficult to dodge: without breaking its privileged ties with the Soviet CP (which nobody, for that matter, has asked it to do), can the French CP run the risk of disagreeing with the "Soviet comrades" by committing itself on a practical level to the definition of a French path to socialism?

Of course, on 21 August 1968, the French communist leaders expressed their disagreement with the Soviets. This is no minor thing, nor is the fact that that disagreement is still remembered today, even when the new team on the government in Prague is revising the opinions formulated when the Warsaw Pact troops were actually invading Czechoslovakia. But, important as that recollection is, it does not answer one burning question: what does the French CP think of the total obliteration of what Mr. Waldeck Rochet himself called "the justified changes made in Czechoslovakia"

in January 1968," which, he adds, his party "assessed and found desirable?" One seeks in vain for the slightest token of an answer in the speeches made before the Central Committee at Ivry.

This is the same question which Alain Savary's Socialist Party plans to pose to the Communist Party in the dialogue which will shortly be opened between the two organizations. It would be surprising if the communists had been saving their real confidences on such an issue for the socialists, and this is why it is highly unlikely that any such debate will get very far. In his speech, Georges Frischmann, like Waldeck Rochet in his concluding address, referred to that dialogue without enthusiasm, and indicated that it would deal with quite different issues.

The Mitterand Method

It is precisely because he believes that this can be nothing more than a dialogue of the deaf that François Mitterand advocates another method. Starting with the assumption that the present balance of power, which is too unfavorable to the non-communist left, merely strengthens the French CP in its rigidity, the former president of the Left Federation thinks that, before engaging in any dialogue whatever, it would be well to go back to the grass roots and recreate that rank-and-file drive for unity that made it possible, from 1965 to 1967, to reach at least the beginning of an agreement with the Communist Party on a common program. He refuses to entertain the notion -- and he gives his reasons at some length in his book, "Ma part de vérité" [My Share of Truth] -- that the events in Prague have made it forever impossible to reach an understanding with the French CP:

The Party is faced with two different appeals: one is an abstract and delicate dialogue with its traditional partner, the Socialist Party, and the other is a more practical confrontation with a partner whose loyalty it appreciates, but which looks very much like a competitor on the unity turf.

The Ivry Central Committee session provided no enlightenment on this point, either. We shall have to wait for the "theses" of the February Congress, which will be published in the next few weeks, to find out whether the present leadership of the Communist Party really intends to make even the beginning of an answer to both these questions.

P. C. F.
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Prague.
Connais
plus!

* *Devant le comité central d'Ivry, Roger Garaudy a posé les bonnes questions. Personne n'y a répondu.*



Plus heureux qu'Alexandre Dubcek, Roger Garaudy est toujours membre du bureau politique de son parti. Mais il n'aura que quatre mois de sursis : le 8 février prochain, le XIX^e congrès du Parti communiste français, réuni à Nanterre, « oubliera » son nom sur la liste des membres du comité central qui sera sans doute sensiblement renouvelé, ne serait-ce que parce qu'il ne l'a guère été lors du dernier congrès, en janvier 1967.

Les deux interventions que Garaudy a faites mercredi dernier devant le comité central d'Ivry sont donc, à ce niveau du moins, son chant du cygne. Elles ont démontré non seulement son isolement — Aragon lui-même est demeuré silencieux, après avoir, cependant, obtenu l'assurance qu'aucune sanction immédiate ne serait prise contre Garaudy — mais aussi à quel point les problèmes qu'il pose préoccupent un grand nombre des dirigeants du P.C.F.

Ce n'est pas un hasard si les principales attaques contre le directeur du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches marxistes ont été portées, à cette session d'Ivry, par des représentants de la vieille garde ex-stalinienne tels que Léon Feix et André Stil, l'ancien rédacteur en chef de « l'Humanité », qui s'illustra en 1956 par ses commentaires sur les événements de Budapest. La jeune génération du bureau politique, bien qu'elle se désolidarise de Garaudy, demeure plus circonspecte. Ni Roland Leroy, ni Paul Laurent, ni René Piquet, ni René Andrieu ne sont intervenus dans le débat ; ils ont laissé à Waldeck Rochet le soin de formuler la seule réponse officiellement publiée aux thèses de Garaudy.

« Si l'on suivait Garaudy... »

Telles qu'il les a exprimées dans une première intervention puis en réponse à ses contradicteurs, ces thèses portent essentiellement sur trois points.

1) Les événements de Tchécoslovaquie devraient amener les communistes français à s'interroger plus

qu'ils ne l'ont fait jusqu'à présent sur la nature de leurs relations avec les jugements portés à l'époque sur l'intervention des troupes du pacte de Varsovie. Ceci est important que soit ce rappel, il ne répond pas à une question présente : que pense le P.C.F. de l'annulation totale de ce que M. Waldeck Rochet appelle lui-même « les changements justifiés opérés en Tchécoslovaquie en janvier 1968 » et dont il ajoute que son parti les avait « appréciés de façon positive » ? On chercherait en vain le moindre élément de réponse dans les interventions qui ont été faites au comité central d'Ivry.

2) La conférence internationale communiste réunie à Moscou en juin dernier a adopté un document qui n'apporte aucune réponse à des problèmes fondamentaux (comme celui des différentes voies adoptées par chaque pays pour aller au socialisme) et ne comporte pas d'analyse valable de la situation actuelle dans les pays capitalistes.

Réponse de Waldeck Rochet : « Si l'on suivait Garaudy, ce serait l'aggravation des dissensions au sein du mouvement communiste international et son affaiblissement, ainsi que la division de notre propre parti au bénéfice de l'impérialisme et de l'ennemi de classe... »

3) Les principes actuels d'organisation du Parti communiste français empêchent tout véritable débat sur l'ensemble de ces problèmes.

Réponse de Waldeck - Rochet : « Garaudy viole fréquemment ces principes d'organisation. Il a fait publiquement des déclarations contraires à la politique du Parti dans un journal yougoslave, déclarations qui ont été reproduites par de nombreux journaux bourgeois. Il ne peut donc s'étonner de notre réponse. »

La condamnation est donc claire, bien que le secrétaire général ait cru bon d'ajouter qu'il souhaitait « que Garaudy change d'attitude, c'est-à-dire qu'il défende la politique du Parti et veuille bien participer comme tous les militants et les membres du Parti à la préparation du XIX^e congrès ».

Ce débat a occupé plusieurs heures de la seconde journée du comité central, bien qu'il ne figurât pas à son ordre du jour. Il serait faux d'en conclure que le problème Garaudy est au centre des préoccupations du Parti. Il n'est que la cristallisation d'un débat plus complexe que le P.C.F., de toute évidence, n'ose pas aborder de front mais qu'il lui est de plus en plus difficile d'éluider : sans rompre ses liens privilégiés avec le P.C. de l'U.R.S.S. (ce que personne d'ailleurs ne lui demande), le P.C.F. peut-il prendre le risque de se trouver en contradiction avec les « camarades soviétiques » en s'engageant concrètement dans la définition d'une voie française de passage au socialisme ?

Certes, le 21 août 1968, les dirigeants communistes français ont exprimé leur désaccord avec les Soviétiques. Cela n'est pas négligeable, comme ne l'est pas non plus le fait que ce désaccord soit aujourd'hui rappelé alors même que la nouvelle équipe au pouvoir à Prague révisé

les jugements portés à l'époque sur l'intervention des troupes du pacte de Varsovie. Ceci est important que soit ce rappel, il ne répond pas à une question présente : que pense le P.C.F. de l'annulation totale de ce que M. Waldeck Rochet appelle lui-même « les changements justifiés opérés en Tchécoslovaquie en janvier 1968 » et dont il ajoute que son parti les avait « appréciés de façon positive » ? On chercherait en vain le moindre élément de réponse dans les interventions qui ont été faites au comité central d'Ivry.

C'est également la question que le Parti socialiste d'Alain Savary s'appête à poser au parti communiste dans le dialogue qui s'ouvrira prochainement entre les deux organisations. Il serait étonnant que les communistes réservent à leurs interlocuteurs des confidences sur un tel sujet, et c'est pourquoi il est peu probable qu'un débat ainsi engagé aille très loin. Georges Frischmann, dans son rapport, comme Waldeck Rochet dans son discours de clôture, ont d'ailleurs évoqué ce dialogue sans enthousiasme, pour lui donner un tout autre contenu.

La méthode Mitterrand

C'est précisément parce qu'il pense qu'il ne peut y avoir là qu'un dialogue de sourds que François Mitterrand préconise une autre méthode. Partant de l'idée que le rapport de forces actuel, trop défavorable à la gauche, non communiste, ne fait que renforcer le P.C.F. dans sa rigidité, l'ancien président de la Fédération de la gauche pense qu'avant d'engager quelque dialogue idéologique que ce soit, il convient de recréer à la base le courant unitaire qui avait permis, de 1965 à 1967, d'arriver avec le parti communiste à un début d'accord sur un programme commun. Il refuse de considérer — il s'en explique longuement dans son livre « Ma part de vérité » — que les événements de Prague empêchent désormais toute entente avec le P.C.F.

Celui-ci se trouve donc devant deux sollicitations différentes : d'un côté un dialogue abstrait et délicat avec le partenaire traditionnel qu'est le Parti socialiste, de l'autre une confrontation plus concrète avec un partenaire dont il apprécie la loyauté mais qui se pose en concurrent sur le terrain de l'unité.

Sur ce point non plus, le comité central d'Ivry n'a apporté aucun éclaircissement. Il faudra attendre les « thèses » du congrès de février, qui seront publiées dans quelques semaines, pour savoir si la direction actuelle du parti communiste entend donner à l'une et à l'autre de ces questions un commencement de réponse.

JEAN GEOFFROY

UNIR-DEBAT, Paris (Dissident Communist bulletin)
10 September 1969

The Resignation of Comrade Francis Halbwachs

Comrade Francis Halbwachs, Professor at the Marseille Faculty of Sciences, who came into the Party during the German occupation, has resigned from the Party.

Our position is well-known on the necessity of remaining in the ranks of the French CP as much as possible to work for its rehabilitation and to avoid giving the Stalinist bureaucrats the satisfaction of a voluntary departure.

However, Comrade Halbwachs's brother had just been unjustly removed from the Party, and we all know there are circumstances when resignation becomes the only step possible.

We publish Comrade Francis Halbwachs's letter of resignation to the Central Committee of the Party through the kindness of comrades who were good enough to pass it on to us. [Text follows]

Comrades,

Today I am sending you my resignation from the Party after 27 years during which I can truly say that the Party was at the center of my life.

When I became a communist in 1942, it was not just to fight in the most effective way possible against the Nazi occupation. I had been a part of the '36 movement, I had read a lot and thought a lot, and had had completely formed my conviction that the fundamental fact of modern history and the source of all the values of our time was the struggle of the workers to destroy the capitalist regime and build a just and humane society, and that this struggle, the October Revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR constitute an essential stage. I still believe this, with many more reasons for doing so, more experience, more lucidity.

But in the course of all I have been through I have gradually become convinced -- and today this conviction is absolute -- that you are no longer capable of carrying on this struggle, and that in our own country at least, the Communist Party has lost the capacity to direct the socialist revolution some day, or even to participate in it. My conviction rests not upon affective reactions, but rather on reflection striving to be scientific in character, and playing upon the phases of an evolutionary progress which I lived through with the whole Party over many years, which I now believe myself capable of judging as a whole.

This evolution was long and progressive, but the stages and breaks are clearly discernible. The most important one in my opinion, the one that represents an irrevocable turning-point, might be placed in time around 1956-57.

This was the period of the XX Congress, where everything was revealed which had been hidden beneath the myth of the Soviet model of socialism and the excellence of the Party-guide. The Congress was soon followed by the breakdown of the doctrinal and organic unity of the international communist movement. These revelations and this breakdown called into question the very foundations of what had up to that time been our mode of thought (dogmatic) and our form of party government (centralist). It would have been a first necessity to bring about a radical change in our principles in these two domains. Now you obstinately refused to enter into the necessary self-criticism and instead gave yourself over to denunciation of those among us who were trying to begin a change in direction.

This was also the time of the major choices on the forms of struggle against French imperialism and colonialism in connection with the war in Algeria. At a time when what was called for was courageous committal to battle -- a dangerous combat! -- against the dominant chauvinist and racist current, aiming for the ineluctable victory of the Algerian people, you preferred to yield to the current and abandon to their fate the young people who were leaving for the war, and sacrifice the opportunities for struggle to the great Thorez project of an alliance with the socialist scum -- a project which enjoyed the success everyone knows. It has been since this time that you have been obsessed by the fear of being outflanked on your left, which has brought you further and further over to the right. From then on, due to lack of confidence in the Party and the masses, you have refused battle on every occasion -- even the most favorable ones -- to the point that the most serious defeat the French bourgeoisie has endured since the war ultimately became the occasion for consolidating its strength.

From then on, subject to a pitiless dialectic, you got ever further bogged down in your errors, which you pronounced as truths for fear your infallibility might be called into question (as Lenin said, a party may be taken seriously according to its attitude towards its own mistakes). Thus it was that you caused the Party to congeal into the image it has today: a Stalinist structure and a social-democrat policy.

However the year just past has marked a new stage and a new disintegration, and it is essentially due to the events of this year that I feel compelled to break with you, not only because of a new set of negative traits in you which it brought to light, but chiefly because of positive traits and new hopes which have appeared -- outside your fold.

Let us first speak of the events in Czechoslovakia. It is quite clear that in the statement you boast about on every occasion (especially around Guy Mollet), you deliberately passed the question by. The principle of "non-interference" you invoke is contrary to internationalism and the very nature of the communist movement. Ever since the October Revolution the communist movement has drawn the essence of its doctrine from a position taken on what has been accomplished in the country (or countries) of socialism. The open debate in Czechoslovakia since last January is in the category of those you should take sides in, clearly and before the Party and the French workers. It is a debate on fundamental issues, and one which basically concerns us: for decades on end we have proclaimed our passionate attachment to a socialist form of government which rejected and suppressed -- especially among communists -- all freedom of expression and communication of ideas, in which a group of bosses arrogated to themselves the right to impose upon a whole

nation what they must think, and sent to prison or penal servitude hundreds of thousands of people for crimes of opinion arbitrarily so characterized by a police apparatus. It is true that for the last few years you have given lip-service to different principles, but without the slightest shred of self-criticism, as if you all had always been irreproachable models of democracy. This year, for the first time within the heart of the communist movement, a party has frankly and by deeds repudiated the practises of bureaucratic socialism and has struck out in the direction of freedom and democracy, which is precisely the one that suits the traditions and aspirations of the working people of our country. The armies of the neo-Stalinist states are shattered by the power of this attempt. You protest about the form, you say nothing about the fundamentals, but then you go on to affirm your solidarity with the "brother parties" and you get ready to proclaim jointly with them a community of doctrine at the next Moscow conference.

I tell you here and now that I am leaving you because I want to have nothing further in common with the Brezhnevs and Motchars, and that I am persuaded that the only chance socialism has in France, the path of hope opened to us by our Czech comrades, depends upon a resolute break with the theories and practices of the heirs of Stalin.

Finally there were revolutionary events in May and June of 1968. Up to that point one might have thought that the deplorable level and lack of outlook in the Party's activities, going from annoying subscriptions to dreary election campaigns, was in all nothing but the reflection of the general attitude of a working class infected with bourgeois psychology, bogged down in the alienations of a consumer civilization. That is why everyone was taken aback by the impetuous uprising, which started in the universities and passed down to the entire working class, the most powerful movement in the entire social history of our country. You absolutely failed to foresee this movement. Because it did not enter into your plans -- in all their grand strategy -- because it had not been unleashed at your command -- a command which for some time has been incapable of unleashing anything -- you deliberately ignored the spontaneously revolutionary force and you denatured it, pretending to see nothing more in it than mere wage demands. You were not satisfied until everything got back in order and you were able to get back into your electioneering routine, and we can see right now what a sordid impasse that has brought us to, for lack of any effective mass action .. action you took such pains to demobilize, among other things by your incredible decision of 1 May last.

However, for many authentic communists -- and I am one of those -- whose phobia for little splinter groups does not hide the masses in motion, the days of 1968 completely changed the outlook. We now know what a formidable revolutionary force lies in the power of the working class and the youth of our country, a force which in May and June began to take on a diffused awareness of its own aspirations. Henceforth it is this force and these aspirations that will be the target of our hopes and efforts, whatever our sclerotic machine may turn into. My personal intention is to use them as point of departure for the task of doctrinal intensification and development of the Marxism to which I will devote myself from now on.

I have the firm conviction that outside your orbit and in spite of you the movement born in May and June 1968 will develop, rationalize itself,

organize itself, especially among the youth, and that this movement will pick up the banner of scientific and revolutionary socialism you let fall -- when one thinks that you had the nerve, without even consulting the Party, to suggest to the heroic proletariat of June, still panting from the fray, that they should rally around the "infamous tricolor flag" of Thiers and Poincaré, it is like wearing one's heart on one's sleeve!

In this new stage I am keenly aware of my own integral fidelity to the guiding line of my entire life, the communist convictions which once made me enter the Party and serve it as a militant, and which today absolutely compel me to leave it.

Francis Halbwachs

camarade Francis Halbwachs

La démission du

DOCUMENTS

Le camarade Francis Halbwachs, professeur à la Faculté des Sciences de Marseille, venu au Parti en pleine occupation, a donné sa démission du Parti.

On connaît notre position au sujet de la nécessité de demeurer autant que possible dans les rangs du P.C.F. pour œuvrer à son redressement et pour ne pas donner aux bureaucrates stalinien la satisfaction et l'avantage d'un départ volontaire.

Mais le frère du camarade Halbwachs venait d'être injustement exclu, et nous savons tous qu'il est des circonstances où la démission devient l'unique ressource.

C'est à titre de document que nous publions la lettre de démission adressée par le camarade Francis Halbwachs au Comité Central du Parti, grâce à des camarades qui ont bien voulu nous la communiquer.

Camarades,

Je vous adresse aujourd'hui ma démission du Parti, après vingt-sept ans pendant lesquels je puis dire que le Parti a été au centre de ma vie.

Lorsque je suis devenu communiste en 1942, ce n'était pas seulement pour lutter le plus efficacement possible contre l'occupation nazie. J'avais participé au mouvement de 36, beaucoup lu et réfléchi, et entièrement formé ma conviction que le fait fondamental de l'histoire moderne du monde et la source de toutes les valeurs de notre temps était la lutte des travailleurs pour abattre le régime capitaliste et construire une société juste et humaine, et que de cette lutte, la Révolution d'Octobre et la construction du socialisme en U.R.S.S. constituaient une étape essentielle. Je le crois encore, avec beaucoup plus de raisons de le croire, plus d'expérience, plus de lucidité.

Mais, à travers tout ce que j'ai vécu, je me suis peu à peu convaincu — et aujourd'hui cette conviction est absolue — que vous êtes désormais incapables de mener cette lutte, et que, dans notre pays tout au moins, le Parti Communiste a perdu définitivement la capacité de diriger un jour la révolution socialiste, peut-être même d'y prendre part. Ma conviction repose, non sur des réactions affectives, mais sur une réflexion qui cherche à être scientifique et qui porte sur les phases d'une évolution que j'ai vécue avec tout le Parti pendant beaucoup d'années, et sur laquelle je crois pouvoir maintenant porter un jugement d'ensemble.

Cette évolution a été longue et progressive, mais on peut y déceler des étapes et des ruptures. La plus importante, à mon avis, celle qui a eu en fait la valeur d'un aiguillage irrévocable, peut être située vers les années 1956-57.

C'est l'époque du XX^e Congrès, où s'est révélé tout ce qui se cachait sous le mythe du modèle soviétique du socialisme et de l'excellence du Parti-guide. Congrès bientôt suivi par la rupture de l'unité doctrinale et organique du mouvement communiste international. Ces révélations et cette rupture mettaient en question les fondements mêmes de ce qui avait été jusqu'ici notre mode de pensée (dogmatique) et notre forme de direction (centraliste). Il eût été vital de faire une mutation, un changement radical de nos principes dans ces deux domaines. Or vous vous êtes obstinément refusés aux autocritiques nécessaires, et consacrés au contraire à la dénonciation de ceux d'entre nous qui essayaient d'amorcer le tournant.

C'est aussi l'époque des options majeures sur les formes de luttes contre l'impérialisme et le colonialisme français en liaison avec la guerre d'Algérie. Alors qu'il aurait fallu engager courageusement le combat — un combat dangereux! — contre le courant dominant chauvin et raciste, en misant sur l'inéluctable victoire du peuple algérien, vous avez préféré céder au courant abandonnant à leur sort les jeunes qui parlaient pour la guerre, et sacrifier les perspectives de lutte au grand projet thorzien d'alliance avec la cravate socialiste — projet qui a eu le succès que l'on sait. C'est depuis cette époque que vous êtes obsédés par la crainte d'être débordés sur votre gauche, ce qui vous a de plus en plus déportés à droite; vous avez désormais, par manque de confiance dans le Parti et dans les masses, refusé la lutte dans chaque occasion — même les occasions les plus favorables — si bien que la plus grave défaite que la bourgeoisie française ait subie depuis la guerre lui a été finalement l'occasion de renforcer son pouvoir.

Dès lors, soumis à une dialectique impitoyable, vous vous êtes enfoncés de plus en plus dans vos erreurs, que vous proclamiez des vérités, de peur que votre infailibilité fût mise en question (le sérieux d'un parti, disait Lénine, se mesure à son attitude devant ses propres erreurs). Vous avez ainsi figé le Parti dans la figure qu'il a aujourd'hui: une structure stalinienne et une politique sociale-démocrate.

Mais l'année que nous venons de vivre a marqué une nouvelle étape et un nouveau décrochage, et c'est essentiellement les événements de cette année qui m'obligent à rompre avec vous, non seulement à cause des nouveaux traits négatifs qu'ils ont révélés chez vous, mais surtout à cause des traits

positifs et des nouveaux espoirs qui sont apparus
— en dehors de vous.

Parlons d'abord des événements de Tchécoslovaquie. Il est bien clair que, dans la déclaration dont vous vous targuez en toute occasion (particulièrement auprès de Guy Mollet), vous êtes passés volontairement à côté de la question. Le principe de « non-ingérence » dont vous vous prévaliez est contraire à l'internationalisme et à la nature même du mouvement communiste. Depuis la Révolution d'Octobre, celui-ci tire l'essentiel de sa doctrine d'une prise de position sur ce qui est réalisé dans le (ou les) pays du socialisme. Le débat ouvert en Tchécoslovaquie depuis janvier est donc de ceux où vous vous deviez de prendre parti clairement devant le Parti et devant les travailleurs français. C'est un débat de fond et qui nous concerne essentiellement : nous avons, pendant des dizaines d'années, proclamé notre attachement passionné pour une forme d'Etat socialiste qui rejetait et réprimait — spécialement parmi les communistes — toute liberté d'expression et de communication des idées, où un groupe de dirigeants s'arrogeait le droit d'imposer à tout un peuple ce qu'il devait penser, et envoyait en prison ou au bagne des centaines de milliers de gens pour des délits d'opinion caractérisés arbitrairement par un appareil policier. Vous avez, il est vrai, depuis quelques années affirmé en paroles des principes différents, mais sans jamais la moindre autocritique, comme si vous aviez été de tous temps des modèles sans reproche en matière de démocratie. Cette année, et pour la première fois au sein du mouvement communiste, un parti répudie franchement et dans ses actes les pratiques du socialisme bureaucratique, et s'engage dans la voie de la liberté et de la démocratie, qui est précisément celle qui convient aux traditions et aux aspirations du peuple travailleur de notre pays. Les armées des Etats néostaliniens brisent par la force cette tentative. Vous protestez sur la forme, vous ne dites rien sur le fond, mais par la suite vous affirmez votre solidarité avec les « partis frères » et vous vous préparez à proclamer avec eux une communauté doctrinale à la prochaine conférence de Moscou.

Je tiens à vous dire ici que je me sépare de vous parce que je ne veux plus rien avoir de commun avec les Brejnev et les Molchar, et que je suis convaincu que la seule chance du socialisme en France, la voie de l'espérance que nous ont ouverte nos camarades Tchèques, passe par une rupture résolue avec les théories et les pratiques des hégittiers de Staline.

Enfin il y a eu les événements révolutionnaires de mai-juin 68. Jusqu'ici on pouvait croire que le niveau lamentable et l'absence de perspective des activités du Parti, se trainant des ennuyeuses souscriptions aux mornes campagnes électorales, n'était somme toute que le reflet de l'attitude générale

d'une classe ouvrière embourgeoisée, engluée dans les aliénations de la civilisation de consommation. C'est pourquoi on a été totalement pris au dépourvu par le soulèvement impétueux qui, parti des Facultés et propagé à toute la classe ouvrière a été le mouvement le plus puissant de toute l'histoire sociale de notre pays. Ce mouvement, vous ne l'aviez absolument pas prévu. Parce qu'il n'entrait pas dans vos plans — si hautement stratégiques — parce qu'il n'avait pas été déclenché à votre appel — appel qui depuis longtemps ne déclenche plus rien — vous en avez délibérément ignoré la puissance spontanément révolutionnaire, et vous l'avez dénaturé, affectant de n'y voir qu'une simple revendication de salaires. Vous n'avez été finalement satisfaits que quand tout était rentré dans l'ordre, que vous avez pu reprendre votre train-train électoral, dont nous pouvons voir ces jours-ci dans quelle sordide impasse il nous a conduits, à défaut de toute action de masse effective .. action que vous avez mise tant de soin à démobiliser, y compris par votre incroyable déclamation du premier mai dernier.

Mais pour beaucoup de communistes authentiques, dont je suis, — à qui la phobie des « groupuscules » ne cache pas les masses en mouvement — les journées de 68 ont complètement transformé les perspectives. Nous savons maintenant quelle force révolutionnaire formidable réside en puissance dans la classe ouvrière et la jeunesse de notre pays, force qui en mai-juin a commencé à prendre une conscience diffuse de ses aspirations. C'est désormais à cette force et à ces aspirations que vont tous nos espoirs et qu'iront tous nos efforts, quoi qu'il en soit de notre vieille machine sclérosée. C'est d'elles que j'ai personnellement l'intention de partir pour le travail d'approfondissement et de développement doctrinal du marxisme auquel je vais désormais me consacrer.

J'ai la ferme conviction que, en dehors de vous et malgré vous, le mouvement né en mai-juin 68 va se développer, se rationaliser, s'organiser, spécialement dans la jeunesse, et que c'est lui qui ramassera le drapeau du socialisme scientifique et révolutionnaire que vous avez laissé tomber — quand on pense que vous avez osé, sans même consulter le Parti, proposer à l'héroïque prolétariat de juin, encore halebant de son combat, de se rallier autour de « l'infâme drapeau tricolore » de Thiers et de Poincaré, on en a le cœur sur les lèvres !

Dans cette nouvelle étape, j'ai clairement conscience de rester intégralement fidèle à la ligne directrice de toute ma vie, aux convictions communistes qui m'ont fait autrefois entrer et militer au Parti et qui aujourd'hui m'obligent absolument à en sortir.

Francis HALBWACHS

January 1970

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

January 15-16	USSR	35th anniversary of first show trial of the Great Purge, 1935. Grigoriy Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, the two leaders with whom Stalin initially shared power in a triumvirate during Lenin's illness, were convicted and imprisoned as counter-revolutionists responsible for the assassination on 1 December 1934 of Sergey Kirov, the man assumed to be Stalin's heir apparent. It is now widely believed that Stalin himself arranged Kirov's assassination. In August 1936, Zinoviev and Kamenev were retried and executed.
January 16	Czechoslovakia	1st anniversary of Jan Pallach's self-immolation in Prague, 1969, protesting Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
January 26	India	20th anniversary of Indian Republic, proclaimed in 1950. (January 30 is Martyr's Day in India, commemorating the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi on that date in 1948.)
February 10-14	USSR	Anniversary of trial and conviction in 1966 of Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, for writing books allegedly "slandering" the USSR. Sentenced to 7 years and 5 years hard labor, respectively, both are now in prison.
February 14	USSR-China	20th anniversary of signing of USSR-China treaty of alliance, called Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact, in 1950. Anniversary of Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the CPSU 20th Congress, Moscow, 1956, in which Khrushchev revealed Stalin's crimes and denounced his regime.
February 14	Cuba	Anniversary of Cuba's exclusion from the Organization of American States in 1962 by action of the OAS Council, which ruled that the present Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba is incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system.

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DESTRUCTION OF NAM NGUM DAM SOUGHT BY VIETNAMESE, LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS

The peoples of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are anxiously looking to the early completion of the grand Mekong River Development Project from which these peoples will derive their progress and prosperity. This 50 billion dollar project is designed to benefit the supply of electricity, the development of water resources, irrigation, transportation, agriculture, mining and forestry.

Component projects in Thailand completed are the dams at Nam Pong and Nam Pung, and under construction is the dam of Nam Dom Noi at Ubon. And a bridge that will link Nong Khai with Vientiane by rail and motor vehicles will soon be abuilding.

The great Prek Thnot project in Cambodia, and the Nam Dong and Sodong projects in Laos are under construction. But among all the component projects, the Nam Ngum Dam stands out as the key to the various lower Mekong projects that are to follow upon its completion, because of the importance of its location in the upper reaches of the river.

The 31 million dollar expenses for the Nam Ngum project are borne by a number of nations; other nations taking part in the work include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Holland, New Zealand, France, USA, U.K. and Thailand. Over 1,000 engineers, technicians and laborers are working at the site. In a future phase, the working force will be increased to 2,500. Dam completion is set for 1972. Thailand has donated 1.25 million dollars worth of cement, and upon its completion, Thailand will get its electricity supply at a special rate.

While the building of the dam is in progress, the North Vietnamese Army and Laotian Communists (Pathet Lao) have continuously attacked the working area, one of the assaults forcing the working force to withdraw. Unashamedly, the Pathet Lao radio announced the assault, at the same time vowed the destruction of the dam if it should be completed one day. Obviously, the Mekong Development Project is not liked by the Communists and they use a smearing tactic in accusing the donors of embarking on a "money digging" venture.

The Mekong Coordinating Committee met on the 23rd and 24th of August to discuss the protection of the Nam Ngum project from North Vietnamese Army and Pathet Lao attacks. Participants in the meeting included Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Australia, Canada, France, UK, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, USA, an ECAFE representative, who together with U Thant, Sec-Gen of UN, cabled from UN Hqs in New York unanimously and strongly supporting the Laotian Government in its efforts to safeguard the workers at Nam Ngum. The participants in the Mekong project pointed out its importance to the well being of the peoples of Laos, as well as to those of the entire Mekong basin.

Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos has asked if the Secretary General of UN could approach the participating governments in the project underlining to them the importance and the international character of the project, and the desirability of establishing and respecting a neutral working zone. Prince Souvanna has indicated that he was willing to declare as neutral and inviolable a zone for a radius of 10 kilometers around the dam site. If

others would agree to this, the RLG would then be happy to withdraw all its military troops guarding the area, leaving only the police.

Prince Souvanna has made a special plea to the USSR asking her to stop her support of the Communists who are out to destroy the project.

World opinion will be sympathetic to Souvanna's plea and the UN should render its good offices in bringing about a cessation of Communist attacks on Nam Ngum Dam. Notwithstanding delays in completing the project because of Communist acts of disruption, the Mekong Project will be completed one day and the Communists will only have once again bared their ugly designs for the world to see.

聯合國開發湄公河計劃，是與世皆知之偉大工程，因為泰國、寮國、高棉、越南人民所切切，因為它對這個國家的進步繁榮，人民的福利有巨大的貢獻，世人莫不翹首早望。

工作人員約達二千五百人之數，期於一九七二年完成。泰國特別捐贈了二千五百萬鎊的現款，此項現款，泰國東北區可得到廉價的電力供應。

能理解的。倘由幾個湄公河計劃及南銀水壩本身所籌款項是如上述的驚人數字，以及這是南銀水壩計劃下，集合許多國家出力共同來努力附點看就極為明白。

合國官員坦承，它是基於人道，提出政治的國際性合作為主旨的一項偉大建築工程，湄公河流域各國人民均受其利而向著進步之路邁進，任何方面都沒有破壞的理由。

越南共黨破壞南銀水壩工程

亦以在湄公河上游，其下游若干工程，必須領先在此項工程後，才能逐步開展，完成這整個偉大工程。

工率人員及其家眷不得不撤退。泰共電台還公然向外廣播破壞南銀水壩工程，並聲稱：決心徹底破壞南銀水壩工程。他們的目的是顯然。

論如何保護南銀水壩工作人員的安全問題，出席的有泰國、柬埔寨、越南、澳洲、加拿大、法國、美國、以色列、日本、荷蘭、紐西蘭、美國及亞洲遠東經濟委員會等代表，各代表及聯合國秘書長宇坦(自紐約聯合國常務理事)一致表示擁護泰國政府取步驟對付北越共及泰共的種種破壞行動，申明這項工程的巨大支出完全由聯合

他泰國確保這地區的軍隊撤退，只留警察維持治安。當瑪理理王已請求聯合國向各國政府接洽，指出這工程的國際性及重要性。當瑪理理王稱：他願把這工程區週圍十公里作為一個中立區，不容許任何破壞。

ASIAN SURVEY
June 1968THE MEKONG SCHEME: GUIDELINE FOR A SOLUTION
TO STRIFE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

W. R. DERRICK SEWELL

For more than 20 years Southeast Asia has been the scene of constant political turmoil. Civil wars have raged in almost every country in the region and guerrilla activity continues in most of them. In Vietnam conflict has exploded into one of the fiercest wars in the history of mankind, causing destruction and devastation on a massive scale. Tragically, too, the military contest seems unlikely to solve any of the basic problems of the region. No matter what the eventual outcome, Southeast Asia will still be an area of abject poverty, and there will still be a compelling desire for political independence. At the same time there will still be considerable dependence on the rest of the world for assistance.

Clearly there is no simple solution to these problems. Of all the attempts that have been made to deal with them so far, however, the Mekong scheme seems to have enjoyed the greatest and the most continuous success. Conceived as a means of stimulating and facilitating economic change in the region, its achievements have gone well beyond this important goal. It has provided the people in the region with the opportunity to make decisions about their own future, and at the same time has provided them with the financial and technical aid they need to solve the problems that now confront them. It has stimulated cooperation among the nations in the region, an accomplishment of no mean importance in Southeast Asia where cultural and political diversity lead more frequently to conflict than to cooperation. What is the Mekong scheme and what lessons can be learned from its experience in dealing with the problems confronting Southeast Asia?

THE MIGHTY MEKONG

The scheme is concerned with harnessing the Mekong, one of the world's greatest and most majestic rivers. Flowing 2625 miles, from its headwaters high in the Himalayas of Tibet to its outlet on the South China Sea, the Mekong passes through 6 countries—China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Its drainage area covers 307,000 square miles. Its minimum flow is 60,000 cfs, twice the minimum flow of the Columbia River at its mouth.

Thus far the Mekong has hardly been touched. There is no dam on the mainstem of the river, nor at present any bridge across it. Over 24 million acres could be irrigated in the basin, but the present irrigated acreage amounts to only 330,000 acres. Potentially the river could be navigated for more than 1,000 miles from its mouth. Today, however, navigation is confined to the lower reaches. The river's energy could be converted into hydroelectric power, but today it flows unharnessed to the sea.

It has long been suspected that the development of the Mekong River could bring forth substantial benefits. It was not until after the Second World War, however, that any systematic attempt was made to determine the river's potentialities. In 1951 the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) requested its Bureau of Flood Control to undertake a preliminary survey of the river. Its report pointed out that there were major opportunities for developing the river for power, irrigation, and flood control and suggested that more intensive studies be carried out. The

countries which share the lower basin received the report with great enthusiasm, but due to hostilities in the region no further action was taken for the time being. With the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1956 interest in the river was revived, not only in the region but on the part of other countries too.

The United States offered the services of its Bureau of Reclamation to undertake a study of the river. The four countries sharing the lower part of the basin accepted the offer and the Bureau went to work. The report, completed in 1957, has become a basic document for the studies which have been undertaken since. At the same time, ECAFE called together four internationally known specialists to undertake a study of the river and the possibilities for its development. Their report became the cornerstone of the planning which has taken place since then. It stressed the need for a basin-wide, cooperative international approach to development, involving data collection, planning and actual implementation. It recommended the establishment of an international clearing house for information and plans. This recommendation was adopted by the countries, who set up a Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (popularly known as the Mekong Committee) in 1957.

THE MEKONG COMMITTEE

The Mekong Committee is composed of representatives from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam. It was intended primarily to coordinate the studies of the river and enlist and supervise assistance from countries and agencies outside the region. Gradually its responsibilities increased, so that it is now a major instrument for promoting economic and social change in the region, involving not only river development but also health, education, welfare, transportation facilities, etc. It meets several times a year, each time in a different country and sometimes outside the region. Its chairmanship is rotated between its members. Since all decisions of the committee must be unanimous, one might expect that no agreement would ever be reached. But the record of accomplishments of the committee shows that this is not the case.


The first act of the committee was to request the United Nations to send out a team of highly reputed engineers to map out the course of needed investigations of the Mekong and its major tributaries. Lt. General Raymond Wheeler, former chief of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, was appointed leader of the team. The Wheeler Mission reported in early 1958, recommending a program of data collection and investigations estimated to cost over \$9 million. Many observers felt that such a program was far beyond the capabilities of the Mekong countries, and there would have been little surprise if interest in developing the river had died right there. It did not. The Mekong Committee regarded the Wheeler Mission's report as a charter for action and resolved to garner support to get the studies underway. The response was overwhelming. In a short time sufficient money had been obtained to undertake most of the required investigations. While \$9 million seemed an overwhelming sum at the time, it is minute compared with what has been contributed to the Mekong Committee since then. To date, more than \$124 million has been pledged to aid the Committee's planning functions and to get development underway.

The United States, France, Canada and Japan were among the first countries to offer assistance to the Mekong Committee. The U.S. offered to provide a hydrometric network for the basin, establish base levels for surveying, and undertake a hydrographic survey of the main channel, at an estimated cost of more than \$2 million. Canada offered to undertake aerial surveys and mapping of the mainstem and major tributaries, at a cost of some \$1.3 million. Japan agreed to undertake a survey of the major tributaries to identify the significant possibilities for development. Australia

undertook geologic mapping at the major dam sites. France carried out... countries became involved, and progress in getting the studies done was stepped up accordingly.

THE PROGRAM

There are several outstanding features of this program of cooperative international assistance. First, it has involved more than 20 countries from all over the world. Some of them are major powers, such as the United States, Great Britain and France, but many of them are small countries with only modest means, such as the Philippines, Denmark and Luxembourg. Second, the cooperative program has enabled several countries to work together on a single project. The planning of a given project, for example, may depend upon maps prepared by a Canadian team, geological surveys undertaken by Australia, irrigation studies carried out by Israel, mineral surveys by France, forest surveys by Scandinavian countries, and legal and jurisdictional studies by Italy. Third, an essential part of the studies, investigations and development programs has been the training of local personnel to carry out similar work on other projects. The hydro-metric and meteorological networks are now operated by local personnel. Soon the navigation of the river will be in the hands of local pilots trained by experts from the Netherlands. About 40% of the staff of the Mekong Committee Secretariat are native to the region. Fourth, the aid given to the committee has taken a variety of forms, including cash grants, low cost loans, and gifts of material and equipment. New Zealand, for example, pro-



vided survey boats, India gave rain gauges, and the World Food Program supplied food. West Germany provided low cost loans for the construction of the Nam Pong project in Thailand. France has loaned money to Laos for the construction of the Nam Dong and Lower Se Done projects.

In addition to aid from individual countries, the Mekong Committee has received considerable assistance from the United Nations and its various agencies. Some thirteen U.N. agencies have collaborated with the Mekong Committee. So enthusiastic has the U.N. been about the Mekong scheme that it has supported it on a continuous basis ever since its initiation. In no other case has the United Nations provided aid for planning and development of an international river on such a basis.

Although countries outside the region have been extremely generous, the scheme has not been an international handout. Far from it. The Mekong countries themselves have provided 28% of the funds for the scheme, i.e., some \$35 million. This is no mean achievement for countries whose gross national product is so small.

A great deal has been accomplished since the Mekong Committee was established in 1957. Hydrologic and meteorologic networks have been set up, the main river channel has been surveyed, aerial photographs and maps of the mainstem and major tributaries have been prepared, studies of the geology of mainstem projects have been completed, and surveys of soil conditions, mineral availability, and fisheries have been undertaken. Studies of various economic and social factors are also underway.

The committee is well along in its preparation of a comprehensive plan for the development of the river. It expects to have this ready sometime in 1968. Although the final selection of projects for the comprehensive plan has yet to come, the basic outline is already discernible. The scheme will consist of a number of large, multiple purpose projects on the mainstem, and several smaller ones on the major tributaries (see map). Data relating to the scheme are set out in the table below.

The initiation of tributary projects has had several advantages. It has provided the inhabitants of the countries with tangible returns on their investment in investigations and planning. Evidence of such returns is especially important in lesser developed countries such as those in Southeast Asia. The initiation of these projects has also provided an opportunity for the countries in the region to experiment with international cooperation in river development. An especially outstanding example is the cooperation between Thailand and Laos in the development of the Nam Pong project in Thailand and the Nam Ngum project in Laos.

The Mekong Committee believes that the cooperation which has been achieved in the development of the smaller projects will encourage cooperation with regard to the mainstem projects as well. Several of these projects will require international agreement and coordination. Some, such as the Pa Mong project, are located on the boundary between two countries. Others, such as the Sambor project in Cambodia, can operate at maximum efficiency only if there is close coordination with operations of other mainstem projects, some of which are located in other countries, notably the Pa Mong project in Laos and Thailand, and Luang Prabang in Laos. Coordination between the Pa Mong and Sambor operations, for example, will permit much greater power production at the latter project than would otherwise be possible.

POSSIBLE MAINSTREAM PROJECTS ON THE MEKONG RIVER

Project	Purpose ^a	Location	Estimated installed capacity (kilowatts)	Estimated irrigated area (hectares)	Possible upstream navigation improvement (kilometers)
Pak Beng	PNF	Laos	1,450,000	—	280
Luang Prabang	PN	Laos	560,000	—	110
Pak Lay ^b	PN	Laos	60,000	—	100
Pa Mong	PINF	Laos/Thailand	1,800,000	1,500,000	340
Thakhek	PIN	Laos/Thailand	500,000	50,000	160
Khemarat	PIN	Laos/Thailand	1,450,000	50,000	260
Khone	PN	Laos/Cambodia	1,000,000	50,000	50
Stung Treng	PINF	Cambodia	2,200,000	1,000,000	220
Sambor	PIN	Cambodia	1,600,000	150,000	80
Tonle Sap	PNID	Cambodia	—	3,000,000	120
TOTAL			10,620,000	5,800,000	1,720

^a P = Power, N = Navigation, I = Irrigation, F = Flood Control, and D = Drainage.

^b Slightly downstream from the recently investigated Sayaboury site in Laos. Source: Mekong Committee, "Annual Report, 1961," United Nations Doc. E/CN.11/577, Jan. 8, 1962, Table II.

APPRAISAL OF THE MEKONG SCHEME

Although a great deal of progress has already been made, much remains to be done before the major economic and social benefits of the Mekong scheme will begin to appear. The scheme is truly massive in scale. No precise estimates of its ultimate costs are available but they range from three to twenty billion dollars or more, depending on how much of the investment beyond the damsites and irrigation canals is included. The countries themselves have already shown that they have great faith in the scheme and are prepared to sink a considerable portion of their national investment into it. But this will not be nearly enough. It will be necessary to continue to rely on substantial contributions of financial and technical aid from countries outside the region. This provides both a challenge and an opportunity for the more advanced nations of the world.

The countries sharing the lower Mekong basin will derive tremendous benefits from the scheme, and it is probable that these benefits will spread to other countries in the region. The provision of irrigation water and the initiation of drainage schemes, for example, will permit a vast increase in rice production. In some parts of the region it will be possible to grow two crops instead of the single one grown at present. The importance of such an increase is underlined by the fact that rice production in recent years appears to have increased by only 2% per annum while population has increased by almost 3% per annum. Not only does this deficiency pose the problem of the Malthusian dilemma, but it also means that these countries will no longer have a surplus of rice with which to earn foreign exchange for the purchase of needed imports. Studies by a Ford Foundation team indicate that to secure the food requirements for the 90 million people expected to be living in the region by the end of the century, and to provide a surplus for export necessary to generate a modest increase in income from other economic activities, will require an increase in the production of milled rice from the present 8 million tons to 17 million tons, i.e., an increase of about 4% per annum.

The scheme will also make it possible to reduce the huge flood losses which plague the region each year. In late September and early October the Mekong begins to rise as a result of the monsoon rains. Sometimes its peak flow reaches 20 times the minimum flow. On occasion the river over-

flows the natural levees that have built up over the years, and as much as 10 million acres may be inundated as a result. Plans call for the storage of flood flows on the mainstem and in the Tonle Sap reservoir for later release for power and irrigation purposes.

Moreover, the Mekong scheme will furnish large amounts of low cost power. This, it is hoped, will help to stimulate industry and raise the standard of living. Present power consumption in the Mekong countries is very low—e.g., 18 kwh per capita annually in Cambodia, compared with 4,800 kwh in the U.S. A major reason for this discrepancy is the high price of power in Cambodia, estimated at about 15¢ per kwh, compared with a U.S. average of less than 2¢ per kwh. Low cost power could be used as a basis for expanding forest products and food products industries, and for developing electrometal and electrochemical industries in the Mekong countries. It could also foster agricultural development through fertilizer production and the mechanization of certain farm operations.

Another benefit of the scheme will be the improvement of transportation and communications, particularly through the extension of navigation. Ultimately, navigation will be extended to Luang Prabang—more than 1,000 miles from the sea. This should foster trade between Laos and other countries in the region. It should also help to promote economic and social development in Northeast Thailand, an area where economic backwardness has sown the seeds of political discontent.

The greatest accomplishment of the Mekong scheme, however, may be the example it has set as a means of reducing political tension in the region. Bringing together four countries which trade with each other very little (less than 2% of the international trade of any of the Mekong countries is with other countries in the region), which do not cooperate with each other on anything else, and some of which do not even have diplomatic relations with the others, is no mean achievement. The fact that the Mekong scheme has survived through the civil wars and the Vietnamese conflict indicates that the partners in the scheme enthusiastically support its aims and objectives and the manner in which these have been pursued.

The Mekong scheme has been one of the most successful attempts to solve economic, social and political problems in Southeast Asia. It is difficult to isolate the reasons for its success, but at least four factors seem to be involved. First, the scheme focuses on the need to increase the food supply and raise the standard of living, matters on which there is broad agreement among all factions in the region that action is essential. Second, it leaves basic decision-making in the hands of the Mekong countries but still provides these countries with the opportunity to obtain needed financial and technical aid. Third, assistance is obtained on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis, thus reducing dependence on any one country and minimizing the influence of any one power bloc. At the same time, countries which have only minor foreign aid programs have had an opportunity to participate. Fourth, it encourages a regional approach to development, which not only enables the countries concerned to take advantage of the economies of cooperative development, but which hopefully will also foster tolerance and mutual understanding among the various partners.

The Mekong scheme cannot be expected to solve all the problems of Southeast Asia. It was never intended to do so. But the principles underlying the scheme appear to have applications far beyond the development of the river. They offer useful guidelines for the formulation of policies now being conceived to deal with poverty, social distress, and political unrest in this troubled region.

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BANGKOK WORLD
23 October 1969

THE "INVISIBLE WAR" OVER THE MEKONG

Fighting has nearly stopped the giant Mekong Project time and time again. Instability and politics hold back a scheme which would benefit 50 million people.

BY CHINHOME INDRA

WHEN the Mekong Committee was founded in 1957, nobody seemed to envisage an important obstacle which blocks the progress of the Lower Mekong River Basin development. But the intensity of the Vietnam war, the internal fights between the two sides in Laos, and the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, have caused doubts about the future of the Mekong Basin.

Obviously the biggest obstacle is war—which is threatening the people of Mekong's four riparian countries (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Republic of Vietnam) and maybe the whole world as well. After the downfall of President Ngo Din Diem and the Vietnam war became a threat to the world, the question of security arose in its sharpest form. Insecurity has hampered and delayed Mekong projects in many respects especially in financing the projects.

The World Bank has backed out many times. This has occurred in the case of proposals for the Nam Ngum dam in Laos, My Thuan bridge in South Vietnam and the Pa Mong dam in the mainstream between Laos and Thailand. And the only reason for backing out is—lack of security.

Recently, concern for security has been intensified in view of of the Pathet Lao's attacks on the construction group of Nam Ngum dam, a \$30 million project, 50 kilometers northwest of Vientiane. On May 4, five Thais were killed and two wounded in an ambush of two trucks heading for the dam site. They were geologists and dam workers.

Later, Pathet Lao forces threatened to kill foreign technicians working on the dam, unless they abandoned their work. These technicians, about 170 of them, and 900 workers, work for Japan's

Hazema Gumi Construction Company. The Laotian Army then moved in.

Immediately, the Laotian Government invited the members of Mekong Committee (Cambodia, Thailand and Republic of Vietnam) together with some 22 other representatives from countries and agencies co-operating in the Mekong Committee for a special meeting in Vientiane on 24 August to discuss security at Nam Ngum.

But, meanwhile, the Laotian Government has negotiated with the Pathet Lao and announced that the Laotian Army would withdraw all troops from the Nam Ngum dam zone, and leave only police there to keep order. Sources said that Prince Souvanna Phouma wanted to establish a neutral zone 10 kilometers around the site.

At the same time, the United Nations, through ECAFE, stepped in and tried to emphasize the role of

the U.N. in the Mekong projects. ECAFE tried to convince both sides in Laos that the project was a humanitarian one which would play an important role in the life of the whole nation of Laos.

These measures seemed to reassure the technicians and workers, who have now resumed work on the dam. But strangely enough, in spite of the obvious threat to security, and the rush and emergency meetings to obtain security—only once was the word security mentioned in the four-page communique released after the meeting, and none in the two-page letter of appeal from Secretary U Thant. The threat of war, it seemed, had to be kept "invisible".

This could be one important factor hampering the progress of the Mekong project. If the members of the Mekong Committee would be realistic enough to discuss security, then financing the projects would not be so difficult.

No finance

Twelve years have passed, but so far only two tributary dams, the Nam Pung and Nam Pong, in the north-east of Thailand, have come to life. The other projects have been delayed because of financing.

My Thuan bridge, a project proposed and approved many years ago, is a good example. For the past three years, the proposal for this \$22 million bridge across the mainstream of the Mekong River in Vietnam was delayed because of lack of support to finance construction.

In the last meeting of the Mekong Committee in Bangkok on 11-13 September, the representatives of the United States said "when the security and economic conditions warrant, the Government of the United States will give sympathetic consideration to a Mekong Committee request for funding up to 25 percent of the cost of the bridge."

However, his Government's review of the situation "force us to the con-

clusion that construction is not desirable at this time."

Risk project

Of all the ten proposed mainstream projects, Pa Mong, a project of \$80 million, about 30 kilometers above Vientiane between the border of Laos and Thailand, has been considered the most feasible as far as the "security and economic conditions" are concerned. Yet the World Bank, when asked to finance the project, turned down the request calling it a "risk project".

The Pa Mong site was recognized very early by the Mekong Committee as a key to the overall Basin plan and was given highest priority for planning and construction. But the Mekong Committee will have to wait for some time for the financing of the dam before the actual construction can begin. And it might take 10 years before the construction can be completed. (DEPTHnews,)

BANGKOK POST

24 November 1969

Construction of the Nam Ngum Dam, at a site 40 miles north of Vientiane, is proceeding well despite fears earlier this year that Pathet Lao terrorists and labour problems might put the \$33 million programme behind schedule.

An aerial photo, taken last week when the Economic Commission of the Asian Parliamentary Union visited the dam site, shows access roads, construction huts and earth-moving equipment at the Nam Ngum gorge. By 1971, when the project is scheduled for completion, the dam will block the narrow gorge in the Nam Ngum river, and begin to form artificial lake in a large valley behind the dam whose construction is aided by a nearly perfect natural range of low hills. The dam will provide irrigation water for the development of the Vientiane Plain, and electricity for Laos and northeast Thailand.

At a Press conference on their departure from Laos, members of the Economic Commission called for increased development assistance for Laos.

WASHINGTON STAR

5 December 1969

N. Viets Accused Of Slaying Nurse

VIENTIANE, Laos (UPI) — North Vietnamese troops killed a British nurse Therese Norsefield on Saturday, not Communist Pathet Lao troops as first reported, military sources said yesterday.

The British Embassy declined comment on the report. The military sources said local villagers fishing in the vicinity saw and heard the entire incident.

They said the troops spoke to Miss Norsefield, 35, and her Vietnamese mechanic-driver, Nguyen Hu Chung, were shot to death by a band of men which stopped their car near the river but was shot in the back.

INDIAN JOURNAL OF POWER AND RIVER VALLEY DEVELOPMENT
THE MEKONG PROJECT NUMBER, 1968

(EXCERPTS)

The Master Plan

C. Hart Schaaf

Executive Agent
Mekong Coordination Committee

THE MEKONG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IS CENTERED in the Lower Mekong Basin, which stretches more than 1,500 miles from the Burma border in the North to the China Sea. The lower basin embraces large portions of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-Nam. It has a drainage area of some 236,000 square miles, and thus covers an area somewhat larger than France, and nearly twice as large as Japan. Some 25 million people live in the basin, and about 50 millions live in the four riparian countries of which the basin is a part.

The Project seeks the comprehensive development of the water resources of this lower basin, including mainstream and tributaries, in terms of hydro-electric power, irrigation, flood control, drainage, navigation improvement, water management, and water supply, along with related far-flung economic and social growth, for the benefit of all the people of the area without distinction as to politics or nationality. A measure of the growth potential is provided by the prospect of the present and historic underutilization of the water resources of the basin, evidenced by *inter alia* the facts that less than 3 per cent of the basin is irrigated although vast portions of it could with great profit be irrigated from the ample waters of the Mekong; and that almost no hydro-electric power is drawn from the river though the four riparian countries yearn for industrial development for which the tremendous hydro-electric power potential of the river and its tributaries could provide a prime ingredient.

Mekong development work is directed by the Mekong Coordination Committee, established in 1957 by the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-Nam as an autonomous inter-governmental agency under the aegis of the United Nations, more particularly the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The Committee consists of four plenipotentiary representatives (one from each of the four riparian countries), and is formally empowered to "promote, coordinate, supervise and control the planning and investigation of water resources development projects in the Lower Mekong Basin"; and to "make requests on behalf of the participating governments for special financial and technical assistance and receive and administer

separately such financial and technical assistance, and take title to... property...". The Committee requests and receives advice on major questions from an international Advisory Board of high competence, which meets with the Committee at least once and usually several times a year.

Day-to-day management is provided on the Committee's behalf and under its direction by an Executive Agent assisted by a small full time staff attached to ECAFE, and financed in part by the four riparian governments, in part by the UN regular budget in its ECAFE section, and in part by the UN Special Fund. Approximately half of the professional members of this central management staff are nationals of the four member riparian states.

In addition to the four riparian governments, 21 countries from outside the basin (Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and the United States, under their Colombo Plan programmes; and Belgium, Republic of China, Denmark, Finland, France, Iran, Italy, Israel, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, and Sweden), 12 UN agencies (ECAFE, the Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board, the Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Bank, and the World Food Programme), 3 foundations, and a number of private business organizations have to-date collaborated with the Mekong Committee. Some \$105 million have to-date been pledged—about one-third by the four riparian partners themselves—to projects sponsored by the Committee. The Committee issues a detailed Annual Report of its activities, the most recent of which covers the period ending 31 December 1965. (E/CN.11/714).

The construction stage has been reached on six tributary projects and one tug and barge building programme; construction of two of these six tributary projects has been completed, with power generation on the first formally inaugurated by His Majesty the King of Thailand on 14 November

1965; the second and much larger tributary project is scheduled to be brought into operation in March 1966.

The Committee divides its work into (a) Basic data collection; (b) Overall basin planning; (c) Mainstream projects planning; (d) Tributary projects; (e) Navigation improvement; (f) Ancillary projects including experimental and demonstration farms, mineral surveys, power market projections, industrial growth estimates and recommendations, forest resources development, and fisheries studies; (g) Supply programmes, including food for construction workers, petroleum, and cement; and (h) Training. Other essays in this edition of the *Indian Journal of Power and River Valley Development* deal with facets of work in the foregoing categories. It will perhaps be in order, in describing *The Master Plan*, to focus upon (a) The Key Inter-relation of Proposed Initial Mainstream Projects; (b) Financial Dimensions; (c) Timing; and (d) Prospects.

TIMING

A frequent question asked about Mekong Development is: When will Mekong Development be completed? This is a little like asking: When will India be fully developed? Or Japan, or the United States, or Australia? One can hope that economic development and growth will never end in any of these countries, or in any others. And one can hope and believe that, say a century from now, water resources development projects will still be

being planned and constructed on the Mekong River and its tributaries, so vast are the resources which may ultimately be utilized.

The Mekong Coordination Committee was established in 1957. In 1959 it embarked upon its first five-year programme of work, of which the essential part was data collection and planning, with the emphasis on the planning of tributary projects. The second five-year work programme, 1964/1968, while envisaging work in all the many categories of Mekong Committee activity, fairly may be said to be concentrated on the construction of tributary projects, and the intensive planning of mainstream projects; it is likely that six or eight tributary projects will be constructed during this second five-year period, and the Committee hopes that the feasibility investigations of several of the mainstream projects, notably Pa Mong, Sambor, and Tonle Sap will by the end of this period have been brought to the point where serious financial discussions looking towards construction can begin. The decade commencing in 1971 will hopefully see the completion of a number of additional tributary projects, and of at least these three mainstream projects.

The practical point is that Mekong Development is not only already in the construction phase, with the first project already generating power, but that the overall project is very rapidly arriving at the point where big finance will have to be discussed—arriving at this point very much sooner than perhaps has been generally appreciated.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 28, 1969

WHERE THE REDS ARE STOPPED IN VIETNAM

Fortunes of war are turning in South Vietnam's vital Mekong Delta. Allies are running strong, Communists are hurting. Enemy casualties are high, defections on the rise.

Still, there are many "ifs." Main uncertainty is whether Hanoi will move in with its own troops to keep the Viet Cong afloat.

VINH LONG PROVINCE, South Vietnam

Here in the vast lower reaches of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong military machine is running out of steam.

While American and South Vietnamese military experts warn that a complete end to fighting is a long way off, evidence of Allied successes is piling up in the rich Mekong Delta—

- Viet Cong defections to the Saigon Government have spurted to 300 a month in this Province alone. A year ago the rate was 50 a month.

- The Communists, riddled by manpower losses, appear unable to mass their forces or launch the multibattalion strikes they used to. Ammunition shortages are developing as Allied troops put the squeeze on supply lines.

- Roads and canals that only a few months ago were "guerrilla territory" are being opened up. An air of prosperity is returning to once-isolated provincial and district capitals.

- Saigon seems to be ruling more effectively in cities and villages.

- Attacks against the guerrilla "infrastructure"—the supply personnel, spies and terrorists—are hurting the Reds. In the first five months of this year, U. S. sources report, 60 per cent more infrastructure personnel have been routed out than in the previous five months.

The situation in the Delta is summed up this way by one long-time observer:

"The Communists are being forced to pull in their horns, to operate with less

and less freedom. That means their ability to tax, to recruit, to impress fighters and to carry out terrorist attacks is being minimized all the time."

Meaning for all. What happens in the Delta has special meaning for all of South Vietnam. Almost half the nation's 17 million people live here. The region produces most of the country's rice. Both the Communists and Saigon view success or failure here as a key influence on the political struggle now shaping up between the Reds and the Government.

As one expert explained:

"A Government presence in the Delta would be proof that Saigon can produce stable and viable rule as the U. S. begins to pull out.

"Viet Cong dominance, on the other hand, would go a long way toward convincing the rest of Vietnam—and the outside world—that there is no chance to build a non-Communist administration in the country."

Fighting in the Delta is a "separate" conflict from that going on in the areas stretching from north of Saigon to the border of North Vietnam. There are almost no North Vietnamese troops fighting here. Guerrillas native to the region carry the brunt of battle.

The land itself is a terrorist's haven—pocked with swamps, mangrove and bamboo forests, streams and man-made canals. There is no clustering of huts in villages. Hamlets, instead, may string out for 15 miles along a canal. Trying to achieve security under those conditions has posed an enormous challenge.

More and more, American air, water and ground forces and Saigon troops seem to be meeting that challenge.

Success involves more than simple military gains. For instance, war-weary peasants, once hostile to the U. S. and Saigon, now are starting to co-operate with the Allies rather than with the Communists.

One example: Four guerrilla units infiltrated Vinh Long Province to attack the provincial capital and its airport. Peasants informed the Government. Then, when South Vietnamese regulars failed

to repel the attackers, a local militia unit made up of discharged Army veterans and youths threw back the assault.

Such intelligence gathering and fighting spirit long have been missing elements on the Government side.

Traveling through the Delta, it is easy to spot some of the changes that have taken place only recently.

Meetings of provincial chiefs are taking place in some towns where, until six months ago, South Vietnamese leaders had never dared visit for five years.

Refugees who fled to escape the Viet Cong or to get out of the way of American air strikes are beginning to leave camps and return home. Last June 8,100 refugees went back to their villages in the Delta, compared with just 55 in June, 1968.

Fields left deserted are being planted again. Provincial and district capitals look busy and flourishing, as links with Saigon and the rest of the country are restored.

Route 4, the main land artery to the Delta, is opening up to traffic. American engineers are completing a new stretch of road between the Mekong and Bassac rivers in Vinh Long Province. The Mamb Thit Canal, a key waterway, is being used to haul goods despite Viet Cong threats to attack. Even in An Xuyen Province on the Ca Mau Peninsula—where Red bases date back to the French Indo-China War of 1948-54—"re-occupation" is moving faster than anticipated.

A big push now by South Vietnamese and American officials is to bring villagers and townspeople into a primitive process of "home rule." The whole U. S. aid effort in the Delta is geared to developing this "village initiative."

The process works like this: A small part of the aid budget is assigned to a hamlet. At a "town meeting," the villagers—or their leaders or elders—decide how to spend the money: building bridges, buying sampans, constructing a school or replenishing livestock.

Object of the program is to refute Communist charges that the interests of the villagers and of the Saigon regime

are not compatible.

Consensus so far is that the program—at least in Vinh Long Province—is enjoying considerable success.

Note of caution. Despite all the "pluses," those familiar with the ebb and flow of earlier Saigon "successes" are advising against false optimism.

Reasons for caution become clear when you run down the list of impossibilities that must be dealt with.

The Viet Cong command structure appears to be intact, though weakened by defections. No really high-level officers have surrendered recently. No Province-level cadres have been captured.

Communist base areas—where the Viet Cong operate hospitals, munitions plants and rest camps—have not been eliminated. There are at least 10 such major areas in the Delta from which the Reds can launch attacks.

Although the Allies are increasingly effective in breaking up the Red supply apparatus, arms and ammunition still reach the guerrilla squads and main-force units. One big source of matériel for the Communists: sanctuaries in Cambodia just across the border, all immune to Allied attacks.

The beginning of the pullout of American combat forces—elements of the Delta-based U. S. Ninth Infantry Division already are going home—revives anew the question of whether Saigon can hold its own against the Communists.

Some military experts anticipate there will be—at first—an easing, perhaps only temporary, of the pressure on the Viet Cong in the Delta.

Reason for this is that Saigon's Regular Army forces are spread too thin, these experts say. South Vietnam enjoys a 10-to-1 manpower margin over the Delta Viet Cong—350,000 regular and paramilitary personnel to the Communists' 35,000. But there are only three South Vietnamese divisions here—a total of 50,000 regulars.

Should the U. S. begin soon to pull out its support units—helicopters, artillery, supply planes and Navy personnel—the fear is that the initiative could swing back to the Communists.

Controlling the waterways. Crucial in the months ahead will be what happens on the waterways. Saigon, it is generally agreed, must control the maze of water routes that crisscross the Delta if it is to contain the insurgency.

The job is awesome. There are, officially, 5,000 miles of waterway in the Delta. The total may actually be double

that figure. An estimated 1.2 million vessels ply the waters, all of them potentially part of the Communist supply system.

So far, the U. S. Navy's river fleet has played a big role in patrolling Delta waters. Now the Navy has started to turn over its fleet of more than 700 boats to South Vietnam.

Saigon's ability to develop the skills and mount the co-ordinated attacks needed to dominate the waterways is a critical question mark.

Biggest "if" facing the Allies: Will Hanoi order North Vietnamese regulars into the Delta to assist the Viet Cong?

If Hanoi does that, some ranking U. S. officers believe, it would take a massive effort and probably increased U. S. assistance to keep them out.

Already there are two North Vietnamese regiments operating in the Delta. In March the Reds sent a unit of 1,000 men into the Seven Mountains area in the southwestern corner of South Vietnam. A second regiment, crippled and low in effectiveness, operates in Long An Province, south of Saigon. There are unconfirmed reports of a third regiment in the Delta.

Elements of four North Vietnamese divisions sit just over the Cambodian border to the north and west of Saigon. To infiltrate them into the Delta would not be difficult. The border with Cambodia, even in the best of times, is a frontier nearly impossible to police.

Expert opinion on what Hanoi will do is divided. Some observers believe North Vietnam will want to beef up the Viet Cong to bolster the Communists' flagging fortunes. This would also put North-corners into the Delta as a nucleus for another insurgency later on if a negotiated settlement of the present war does not give the Communists control.

Other analysts argue against escalation of the Delta war by Hanoi. They point out that the North Vietnamese are considered "foreigners" by Southerners, that any effort to change the home-grown quality of insurgency here could boomerang against the North.

For all the doubts about the future, the over-all assessment of progress in the Delta is a favorable one.

Violence, it is agreed, will continue for a long time. Communist insurgency is by no means wiped out. But there is a feeling that at last the Viet Cong drive for military victory has been blunted in this vital portion of South Vietnam.

December 1969

Members of Mekong Coordinating Committee

Cambodia	South Vietnam
Laos	Thailand

Nations Which Have Protested North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Harassment of Nan Ngum Dam Site and Workers

Cambodia	Australia	Great Britain	Netherlands
Thailand	Canada	Israel	New Zealand
South Vietnam	France	Japan	United States

Nations Which Have Contributed to Mekong Development Program

Australia	France	Israel	Pakistan
Austria	Federal Re-	Italy	Philippines
Belgium	public of	Japan	Sweden
Canada	Germany	Korea	Switzerland
Republic of	Hong Kong	Malaysia	UAR
China	India	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Denmark	Indonesia	New Zealand	United States
Finland	Iran	Norway	

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January 1970INDIAN-SOVIET DEAL ON RAILWAY CARS ENDS IN FIASCO

During a visit to New Delhi in January 1968, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin made a surprise offer to purchase some 54,000 railway freight cars from India. Even though the deal would tie up a substantial portion of her steel production and would inevitably mean close economic bonds to Moscow, the offer was warmly received by India, which was then suffering an economic slump. Kosygin's bid caught the popular imagination and helped greatly in making his visit a success.

In high hopes, Indian negotiators set out for Moscow to work out the terms of the purchase. Before long, however, it became apparent that the two sides were worlds apart on the question of price, even though they managed to come to terms on the technical specifications for the cars. The negotiations dragged on for months. Despite abundant evidence that the Soviets would not increase their offer, the Indian government persisted in its belief that a deal could be consummated. On 28 July 1969 the Minister for Foreign Trade and Supply told the Indian parliament that a Soviet technical team was expected to arrive in India shortly for a final round of talks on the negotiations. He said: "It is hoped that a contract will be signed following these talks...." The negotiations were a principal point on the agenda of India's Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, when he visited Moscow in September 1969 to discuss possible fields for further development of economic cooperation between the two countries. According to news accounts, the Soviets promised him speedy efforts to sort out the difficulties blocking the final agreement, and reiterated their promise to send a technical delegation to India in the near future to discuss these issues.

The technical delegation finally did arrive in India. After further protracted negotiations, the Soviets' final offer was Rupees 56,000 per car, the raw materials for which would alone cost India Rs 74,000!

It was finally clear to even those most eager to deal with Moscow that the Soviets probably did not intend to go through with the deal. Why then had Kosygin made the offer in the first place? Several explanations can be offered:

-- The proposal, as mentioned earlier, made Kosygin's January 1968 visit a great success.

-- Shortly after Kosygin's visit the Soviets agreed to sell tanks to Pakistan, India's arch rival. The railway car bid may have been intended to assuage Indian concern over this sale.

-- By binding India more closely to itself, the USSR may have hoped to develop more influence over Indian foreign policy, which was attempting to remain neutral on the issue of the war in Vietnam in view of its membership

in the International Control Commission established by the Geneva Accords of 1956.

-- The USSR may have hoped to offset the great prestige accorded the United States as the result of huge American shipments of wheat and other grains which prevented widespread famine in India.

Another explanation appeared well after Kosygin's visit; it may have been in the back of his mind at the time, or, more likely, it may have merely developed in parallel with the negotiations on the railway cars. It is this: The Indian Airlines Corporation needs to buy some new airplanes to replace planes now in use on regional and trunk routes. It has been considering four alternatives: the BAC-111, the DC-9, the Boeing-727 and the Soviet TU-154. Technical opinion in the Indian airlines is strongly in favor of the Boeing-727 rather than the Russian TU-154. Despite this, there were extensive rumors in New Delhi that Russia was bringing pressure on the Government of India to purchase the TU-154. Otherwise, it was stated, Russia would not buy railway cars from India. The situation has been compounded by the fact that the newly appointed chairman of the Indian Airlines Corporation, Mohan Kumaramangalam, (who went to Moscow to discuss the deal) was not only a former Communist but the counsel for the New Age, the Communist Party newspaper, in a libel case against the weekly filed by an Army officer!

This case is not without precedence. The USSR has negotiated large trade treaties with other countries, or granted large economic credits, and then failed to live up to the recipient's expectations. The original signing of the treaty or granting of credit is accompanied by great propaganda campaigns, and the subsequent fizzling out usually passes unnoticed.

In fact, India came out of it better than the Canadians, who signed a treaty for the sale of 9 million tons of wheat to the USSR and were left holding the bag when the Soviets broke the agreement by buying only 5.5 million tons (and later renegotiated to buy the remainder under terms more favorable to the USSR).

'Wagon deal prospects with Russia good'

New Delhi, July 28 (UNI)—Minister for Foreign Trade and Supply B. R. Bhagat expressed optimism in the Lok Sabha today that India would be able to strike a deal shortly with the Soviet Union for the supply of railway wagons.

Replying to a half-an-hour discussion raised by Mr N. K. Somani (Swat) Mr Bhagat said that a Soviet technical team was expected to arrive in India shortly for a final round of talks on the negotiations.

He said: "It is hoped that a contract will be signed following these talks as agreement has already been reached on a number of points, including technical matters such as approval of the specifications of the 17 prototypes to be supplied. Also, the prices we have quoted are internationally competitive."

The Minister said the deal was

being negotiated on purely techno-economic considerations and it was totally wrong to suggest that political pressure was being brought to bear on India to link this deal with the purchase of Soviet civilian aircraft by India.

The Minister conceded that there had been delay in the negotiations. But it should not be forgotten that this big deal is for no less than for 34,000 special-type wagons, the delivery schedule of which would run over a period of eight to ten years and many details had to be gone into.

Mr Bhagat added it might be necessary for sometime in the beginning to import wheel-sets but that, in any case, the cost of all imported components would not exceed 25 per cent of the cost of a wagon.

THE HINDU, Madras
31 July 1969

Problem of New Planes for Indian Airlines

By M. Pattabhiram

The Union Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism, Mr. Karan Singh, told the Lok Sabha on Monday that a decision on the purchase of new aircraft for Indian Airlines would be taken very soon. Since the kind of plane the Government purchased now would set the pattern for air traffic in India for the next ten years, he said, the Government wanted to take a little more time to consider the issue in all its aspects.

However, the fact remains that this question has been hanging fire for the last many months. The matter came up before the Cabinet several times and no decision was taken. This has given rise to considerable speculation that the delay was due to the fact that political pressure was being brought to bear on the Government of India by certain countries. Both Mr. Karan Singh and Mr. Bhagat, Minister for Foreign Trade, had stated in categorical terms that in arriving at a decision on the kind of aircraft it would be acquiring, the Government would not yield to any kind of political influence and the nation's interest alone would be the main consideration.

The question of replacement of planes in use in the trunk lines and the regional routes of Indian Airlines has no doubt been engaging the attention of the authorities since 1966. A committee which was set up under the chairmanship of Air Marshal P. C. Lal recommended that the Viscounts in use were good enough for another five years and they could be replaced in a phased manner from 1971-72. Therefore, at least by then, Indian Airlines must acquire new aircraft. It will be interesting to note in this context that air traffic in India has been growing at the rate of 18 per cent per year—much higher than the world rate of 12 per cent—and consequently, Indian Airlines has been anxious that correspondingly its carrying capacity must increase by the acquisition of bigger aircraft.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE'S REPORT

It was early in 1968 that Indian Airlines constituted a technical committee for evaluating four types of aircraft, namely, DC-9 (40 series already flown and certified), Boeing 737, BAC-111 (200 series) and TU-134 and make recommendations as to which of them would be most suitable for Indian Air-

lines. This team consisted of the Assistant General Manager, the Director of Operations, the Director of Planning and the Director of Engineering of Indian Airlines. They visited the United States and held discussions with the manufacturers of both the DC-9 and the Boeing 737. They also conferred with Scandinavian Airlines and Lufthansa, which were using one of the two varieties on their services. The team submitted its report in May 1968 to the Board of Indian Airlines recommending the purchase of the Boeing 737. In its report, the team had actually stated that both the DC-9 and the Boeing 737 were equally good, but as the price of the latter was less by Rs. 18 lakhs for each aircraft, the team thought it would be desirable to go in for the Boeing 737 in the interests of economy and saving in foreign exchange. The seating capacity of both the types of aircraft is just about the same—115 to 125.

The team rejected the suggestion for the purchase of the TU-134 and the BAC-111 though they were sound planes from the technical point of view. The Soviet plane was rejected primarily because of its high operating cost. Its break-even load factor is stat-

ed to be 110 per cent on stage-lengths of 450 nautical miles, while it is 90 per cent on stage-lengths of 650 nautical miles. As against this, the DC-9 has a break-even load factor of 49 per cent on stage-lengths of 650 nautical miles, while for the Boeing 737, the corresponding figure is 51 per cent. The BAC-111 has a slightly higher break-even load factor ranging from 55 to 56 per cent, but its seating capacity is only 96. In other words, the team has found that the cost of operation of a Boeing 737 or a DC-9 was much cheaper with its larger seating capacity. Further, the TU-134, which has only a seating capacity of 60, needs an extra navigator on its flights. The team had thus no difficulty in eliminating the Soviet and the British planes.

The technical team's report was submitted to the I.A. Board, which in turn appointed a sub-committee to examine it and make its recommendation. The sub-committee consisted of Mr. Bharat Ram, Mr. J. R. D. Tata and the General Manager of Indian Airlines. The sub-committee, however, came to the conclusion that the DC-9 would be preferable in view of its larger cargo capacity compared to the Boeing 737. The sub-committee took into consideration the fact that

cargo traffic in the country had been on the increase even without any special efforts by I.A. and therefore, in the interests of earning more revenue and augmenting the profits of the corporation, it decided to recommend to the Government the purchase of five DC-9 aircraft within the next five years.

ALLEGED SOVIET PRESSURE

When this proposal came up to the Ministry, it took some time to examine the report of the technical committee as well as the finding of the Board. It was in December 1968 that the matter was taken up by the Union Cabinet in

right earnest, but to facilitate further study, a Cabinet sub-committee comprising Mr. C. M. Poonacha, Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Mr. Karan Singh and a representative of the Finance Ministry was set up.

The Cabinet sub-committee held several meetings without coming to a definite conclusion and it was at this stage that there were rumours that Russia was bringing pressure on the Government of India to purchase the TU-134 aircraft or the later version of the TU-154. Otherwise, it was stated, Russia would not purchase railway wagons from India and it was this

that was stoutly denied by Mr. Bhagat in Parliament. The Cabinet sub-committee did not, however, come to any definite conclusion, but remitted the entire matter to the Indian Airlines Board for re-consideration.

Indian Airlines re-examined the issue, but decided that there was no case for modifying its earlier opinion that it should go in for DC-9 aircraft. It also said that as no new factors had emerged since its earlier recommendation, it saw no reason to change its original verdict.

This is where the matter stands now. The Jumbo jets will touch down at our airports in 1970, bring-

ing along hundreds of foreign tourists. Unless Indian Airlines by then acquires enough capacity to transport passengers from one place to another, there will be utter chaos. Normally, it takes 16 to 18 months for the manufacturer to deliver an aircraft and this is one important reason why an early decision has to be taken. It is stated that the manufacturers of the DC-9 have some aircraft ready, which they could deliver in six months if orders are placed immediately. It is also feared that there will be a price escalation in the next few weeks and this also calls for an early decision by the Government.

PATRIOT, New Delhi
13 September 1969

**Ry. Wagon Deal:
Dinesh Singh's
Talks in Moscow**

MOSCOW, Sept. 12.
India's Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, to-day

had talks with Mr. Baibakov, Head of the Soviet Planning Organisation and Mr. Novikov, Deputy Prime Minister dealing with economic relations.

The talks, which were officially described as friendly and cordial, covered the fields of further development of economic co-operation between the two countries.

Among the major point of accord emerging from the talks was for an early assessment of surpluses and

needs of both sides on long-term basis so as to fit them in the economies of the two countries.

Mr. Dinesh Singh raised the question of speeding up the deal on the Soviet offer to make long-term bulk purchases of Indian railway wagons. Speedy efforts to sort out the initial difficulties were promised. The Soviet side reiterated its proposal to send a technical delegation to India in the near future to discuss these issues.

There was appreciation of India's need to diversify items of trade in keeping with the changing pattern of its industrial capacity and to accelerate optimum utilisation of excess capacities.

Mr. Dinesh Singh resumed his talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, this afternoon after a luncheon he gave at which the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Mazurov, was the chief guest.

-PTI

INDIAN EXPRESS
13 October 1969

Protest Against Indian Airline Chief's Power to Choose Planes

QUOTE: Mr. Loke Nath Misra and Mr. R.M. Singh Deo, Swantantra members of the Lok Sabha, have protested to the President and the Prime Minister against Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam being vested with the power to choose planes to replace Caravelle in Indian Airlines.

In their letter they have pointed out that Mr. Kumaramangalam was a card holding communist until 1966. He left the CPI to become Advocate General of Tamil Nadu but he has not ceased to take interest in communist affairs. Both MP's pointed out that he was even now the counsel for New Age in the case against the weekly filed by an army officer.

The letter writted to express the resentment of some section of parliamentary opinion against the haste with which the union government was seeking to make a deal. The Swantantra group holds the view that in a world where the most advanced nations competed with sophisticated planes it would be a tragic mistake to saddle Indian Airlines with noncompetitive aircraft. Mr. Misra and Mr. Singh Deo regretted that a canard was started against Mr. Mfarat Ram to make his resign his chairmanship of Indian Airlines and alleged that

this has been done with the object of making it easy for Mr. Kumaramangalam to be installed in his place.

Mr. Kumaramangalam left today for Moscow where Mr. Misra believes he will receive "some advice from his Russian friends on several activities concerning our country. UNQUOTE. ✓

INDIAN EXPRESS, New Delhi
20 October 1969

QUOTE: Technical opinion in the Indian Airlines is strongly in favour of Boeing-727 rather than the Russian TU-154 as the plane to meet the IA's requirements in the fourth plan period.

It is understood that the Russians have underquoted their American counterparts in their bids. While final prices are subject to further negotiations, Boeing-727 will cost about 6.5 million dollars against only about 5 million dollars for TU-154. But in spite of price difference, the technical data and performance of Boeing-727 is so superior to that IA experts favour the former.

Both planes are 160-seaters, but TU-154 is of 63,000 H.P. against only 43,500 H.P. for Boeing-727. This means that the Russian Planes's fuel consumption will be almost 50 percent higher than that of the Boeing. In India, aviation fuel is so expensive that fuel costs constitute 29 percent of flying costs as against only 11-14 percent for most other airlines. In view of this, the flying costs of TU-154 would be much higher than that of Boeing-727, possibly to the point of being completely uneconomical.

The Russian planes higher horse power means that it can take-off from short airstrips. But this is considered irrelevant for Indian conditions, where a 160-seater would be used only on trunk routes where the runways are already long enough to take planes like the Caravelle or Boeing-727.

Apart from the question of fuel costs is engine performance. Boeing-727 is generally regarded among the best planes ever built, and is certainly the best-selling plane in aviation history. The engine life of TU-154 is expected to be only about 3,000 hours, But Boeing-727 has a proved engine life of 7,000 hours plus, possibly going up to 10,000 hours. Moreover, the Boeing has been in production for a long time and is a proved aircraft, while TU-154 is still in the development stage. The reliability of TU-154 engine will have to be taken on trust.

This factor ties up with delivery dates. The government is scheduled to take a final decision on planes in November, and if it chooses the Boeing then delivery can be made by June 1970. But it will be only in the middle of 1971 that the Russians will be able to deliver TU-154.

On the question of spare parts, the IA seeks to have 75 percent of engine parts and 20 percent of the airframe parts in stock. In the case of TU-154's 63,000 H.P. engines, spare parts will obviously cost more than the Boeing's 43,000 H.P. engines. The ratio of spare parts cost to plane cost will be about 30 percent in the case of the Boeing, but nearer 45 percent in the case of TU-154. UNQUOTE.

MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
1 November 1969

THE GREAT WAGON ROBBERY BIG UPROAR IN OFFING...

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI: The feeling is growing that the Government wants to push through the Indo-Soviet wagon deal before Parliament blows it to bits when it reconvenes on November 17.

The Russians, on their part, have been playing it cool. Their trade team was originally expected in Delhi on September 15. When it failed to materialise, frantic appeals were despatched to Moscow to hurry things up.

The "please-Moscow-at-all-costs" brigade breathed easy when at last a seven-member delegation, headed by Comrade Maximov, descended on the capital. But others are wondering just what caused them to change their minds.

Could it be that even the Russians are a trifle nervous the deal won't go through if once all the facts are laid before Parliament?
RUINOUS LOSS

That they have reason to be nervous is understandable for, despite the well-drilled applause showered on Moscow for more than a year, India will be saddled with a loss of some hundreds of crores of rupees if the Russians get our wagons on their terms.

The Great Wagon Robbery was launched with superb fanfare when it was announced that the Soviet Union would — as a fraternal gesture, of course! — buy 40,000 wagons from us.

In this state of euphoria, nobody thought of asking what price they would pay.

India, quoting Rs 1.10 lakhs per wagon (a rate readily paid by other buyers) received a rude shock when the Russians counter-offered somewhere around Rs 2,000.

There was much begging and pleading to be reasonable, much breaking down of material and manufacturing costs — to no avail.

The Russians grudgingly raised their price from time to time, but with manufacturing costs also spiralling, the gap between our production costs and the Russian offers remained about Rs 50,000.

The present position is that the price of steel has risen by some 30 per cent since the offer was first made. Freight rates to Soviet ports have also risen by 7.5 per cent.

In cash terms, this means that India can sell wagons economically only at around Rs 1.50 lakhs each, while the Russians are now offering only Rs 65,000 per piece.

DINESH'S BRIGHT IDEA

A suggestion emanating from Dinesh Singh and now going the round of pro-Soviet sources in Government is that India should accept the Russian offer and make up the difference to Indian wagon builders.

If this outrageous proposition is accepted, it will mean that the Soviet Union will get our wagons at half the cost of manufacture and the loss of half a lakh of rupees per wagon will be met from the public exchequer.

This is not "socialist co-operation"; it is a swindle, pure and simple.

In view of the hard economic facts of the matter, people are

wondering what exactly Mr S. Ramachandran, who heads India's wagon delegation, is going to discuss with Mr E. Maximov, his Soviet counterpart, at the talk presently being conducted in Delhi.

The Soviet attitude is all the more unreasonable since no country in the world — not even Russia's stooges in the Socialist bloc — can match India's low rates.

The wagon deal is, in fact, not a straightforward commercial proposition but a typical piece of political arm-twisting.

TIE-UP WITH PLANES

As is pretty well known by now, not only do the Soviets want our wagons at Rs 50,000 below cost, but also want to thrust untried and uneconomic TU-154 jet airliners on Indian Airlines.

It is quite significant that Maximov's wagon delegation arrived in Delhi only a couple of days after Mr Mohan Kumaramangalam, the Communist Chairman of the IAC, went on his pilgrimage to Moscow.

Rumours in the Capital suggest that the IAC Chief has already made up his mind to buy the Russian planes — but if he does, he will have hell to pay in Parliament.

He will also have hell to pay from a completely new enemy — the Computer.

With the recommendations of

technical committees repeatedly shelved by Government, somebody had the bright idea of feeding in facts and figures into an electronic computer in Delhi.

The machine, unswayed by political bias of any kind, digested relevant data about American, British and Soviet planes, and cast its votes in favour of either the American Boeing or the British BAC-111 as the best planes to replace the present IAC Caravelle fleet.

Even the Communists will have a hard time accusing the computer of being a henchman of the Syndicate or a stooge of the Imperialists!

As for the wagons, it is time that India dealt with Russia on a straight commercial basis. It is also time we insisted on Moscow making a firm commitment — and honouring that commitment.

Wriggling out of vague assurances is nothing new with the Soviets. For instance, Moscow some time ago contracted with Canada to buy their wheat for three years. At the time they were in deep trouble because of food shortages.

A year later, when they harvested a good crop, the contract with Canada was promptly forgotten! The Canadians are still howling, but to no purpose.

Delhi, of course, regards Russia as our closest friend, but surely it would not be out of place to ask the Kremlin to match its fine words with fine deeds.

TIMES OF INDIA, Bombay
18 November 1969

WAGON DEAL OFF

It is not at all surprising that the promise of a massive railway wagon deal with the Soviet Union has ended in a fiasco. There have been any number of indications since early this year that the agreement for the sale of well over 50,000 wagons for the Siberian Railway may not come off in view of the ridiculously low prices which the Russians have been offering. If New Delhi chose to ignore these, it has itself to blame. Even after his recent trip to Moscow where he undoubtedly raised the issue, Mr. Dinesh Singh thought it fit to pin his hopes on the visit of a second Soviet delegation to India. This team has now gone round the country but has stuck to the earlier quotation of Rs. 56,000 for each wagon. This figure is even lower than the

cost of the raw materials alone which is estimated at Rs. 74,000. The Soviet delegation cannot be unaware of this simple fact. All this goes to show that it has gone through the motions of examining India's capacity and of discussing prices without any intention of entering into an agreement. There are several possible reasons for this strange behaviour. It is, for instance, conceivable that Moscow has wanted to use the offer of the wagon deal to "persuade" New Delhi to go in for its TU 154 planes and is therefore dragging its feet because India has not yet decided to "reciprocate" its gesture of goodwill. It is also possible that the Russians genuinely doubt whether the Indian-built wagons will be able to stand the rigours of the Siberian cold. But if this was the case they should have said so long ago.

Mr. Kosygin took New Delhi

by surprise early last year when he volunteered to purchase Indian railway wagons by the thousand. The country was then facing the dual problems of recession and inflation and was greatly cheered by this unexpected offer. It confirmed New Delhi in its belief that Russia could be depended upon to come to its rescue at a critical time. But apparently Mr. Kosygin had either not thought the proposition through which is unlikely or he had some other objective in view. It is not possible to establish a link between the promise to buy Indian wagons, and the sale of tanks to Pakistan later in the year. But great powers often resort to such tactics to soothe the feelings of aggrieved nations. There is impressive evidence in any case to show that in 1967 the Russians were critical of India's performance in the field of foreign relations and the general policy of allowing

greater freedom to private industry. They felt that though the Government still followed the policy of non-alignment and had not gone back on its previous commitment regarding the expansion of the public sector, its emphasis was strikingly different. New Delhi was not unduly critical of America's Viet Nam policy, was gradually dismantling economic controls and suitably trimming the next five-year plan. It would not be surprising therefore if Moscow concluded at that time that it had to do something big to arrest the decline in its influence. It could not possibly meet even one-quarter of India's requirement of ten million tons of foodgrains which New Delhi needed desperately to avert a widespread famine. But it could, as in the past, make a dramatic offer of help in the field of industry or trade. This is precisely what Mr. Kosygin did.

BALTIMORE SUN
20 November 1969

Indian-Russian Deal Collapses

New Delhi Refuses To Subsidize The Sale Of 54,000 Rail Cars

By ADAM CLYMER

(New Delhi Bureau of The Sun)

New Delhi, Nov. 19—The Indian government has decided not to provide large subsidies for the sale of 54,000 railway freight cars to the Soviet Union, and the deal has collapsed.

The Finance Ministry, now under the control of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, balked at making up the difference between the unbudging Soviet offer of \$7,468.67 per car and the recently increased Indian asking price of \$16,333.33, according to an informed source. The government does subsidize some railway-car exports by 20 per cent,

but the Finance Ministry was reluctant to go even that far on a deal this big.

Manufacturers Unenthusiastic

The scheme to sell the gondola-type cars over a period of seven years first was broached by Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin when he visited India in January, 1967. It was welcomed enthusiastically by Mrs. Gandhi and by Dinesh Singh, then her commerce minister and now minister of external affairs, as a generous offer to help India's recession-hit engineering industry.

The manufacturers, however, were never enthusiastic. They did not want to commit their factories for many years to a special Soviet design. At the same time, they felt the government had so much political capital invested in the deal that they

could demand a huge subsidy if it went through.

Now, with the Indian economy picking up, they have a backlog of orders which they seem unlikely to fill on time. Limited supplies of steel from India's limping government-run steel plants are contributing to the delay.

Sharp Price Increases

Another problem, although apparently not determinative, is that the Soviet specifications for an ore car capable of withstanding the extremes of Siberian weather require 10 tons of a special chromium-vanadium steel—which India would have to spend its own scarce hard currency to import—in each 80-metric-ton-capacity car.

Sharp increases in international prices of steel this year led India to boost its asking price from an earlier level of \$14,667.

Yesterday, a Soviet delegation which was heralded as having been sent to clinch the deal left for home after a fruitless four-weeks. A spokesman for the State Trading Commission here said today: "There is no breaking off of talks. Another round is possible. But we do not have any new dates."

Today, Bali Ram Bhagat, the minister of foreign trade, insisted to Parliament that India would sell the cars only if the U.S.S.R. offered an advantageous price.

One official here said the negotiations had brought India one significant benefit: publicity for its railway-car industry, which in turn has led to export orders—many of which were for hard currency—from Kenya, Poland, Ceylon, the Sudan, Iran, Nigeria and Nationalist China.

MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
29 November 1969

The Carrot Disappears

Just how gullible can one get? The Wagon Deal lollipop that the Soviets have been dangling before the Indian Government has finally been snatched away, but even now, after Soviet negotiators have packed their bags and left for home, the wishful thinkers of Delhi keep hopefully proclaiming that the corpse may yet be revived and Moscow yet honour the promise it made nearly two years ago.

Early in 1968, Soviet Premier Kosygin, during one of his periodic trips to this country, seemed to conclude that Indo-Soviet amity was not quite as glowing as it once had been; Soviet arms aid to Pakistan and disappointment over promises broken by Moscow had alienated even those normally given to looking at everything Russian through red-tinted glasses.

Clearly a gesture was called for, and Kosygin made one on a grandiose scale.

Seeing that the Indian wagon industry was suffering from recession, he made the lordly offer to buy 54,000 wagons. The magnitude of the order promptly sent the Indian Government's publicity machinery and a large section of the press into a state of uncritical euphoria. It was only when time dragged by and no firm order materialised that optimism at last was replaced by uneasiness.

When, people wondered, were the Soviets going to sign a firm commitment? The Soviets did not reply. They listed specifications, talked about special steels, flooded India with a mass of data about technical requirements, and hinted that Indian facilities weren't quite equal to the manufacture of the wagons in terms of both quality and quantity.

These hurdles were overcome, but the final one still lay ahead — the question of price. It was only after every technical pitfall had been surmounted that the news leaked out that between Indian manufacturing costs and the Soviet offer there was an unbridgeable gulf.

It soon became clear that Soviet "generosity" was phony and that Moscow's terms were not only unremunerative but utterly absurd — and neither the many high-powered delegations that rushed to and fro be-

tween India and the Soviet Union, nor piteous cries about Indo-Soviet friendship, could save the deal.

The last delegation to pursue the subject a fortnight ago offered Rs 56,000 per wagon when it well knew that the minimum feasible Indian quotation was Rs 1,16,000, and that even the cost of raw materials per wagon amounted to Rs 74,000.

In terms of simple arithmetic, the "generous gesture" of the Soviet Union had finally boiled down to India facing a loss of almost Rs 325 crores if the deal went through!

Lest there be illusions about whose rates were fair, India's or Russia's, it may be pointed out that this country has sold wagons in the past not only to South Korea, Ceylon, Iraq, Yugoslavia and East Africa, but even to socialist Hungary, the Soviet Union's junior partner in COMECON.

Indian prices are not only lower than any in the world, but the Soviet Union has not been able to acquire these wagons elsewhere. Its insistence on acquiring them at less than half our manufacturing cost is nothing, therefore, but a piece of outrageous thumb-twisting.

It is a long-standing Soviet practice to make tall claims, to reap immense propaganda benefits, to introduce extraneous factors, and then back out; but to mulct a country of Rs 325 crores and to call it generosity cannot be contained even in the extremely flexible framework of Socialist Truth — and there is no reason why India should do business on such terms.

It is time the Indian Government realised that Russia's so-called friendship is a pure and simple hoax. Our hopes of its siding with us against Pakistan were dispelled years ago; its much touted aid has amounted to a small fraction of the help given to us by our friends in the West. In return for its largesse, Russia has exerted unashamed pressure, interfered in our internal affairs and sought to control our foreign policy.

The rot has gone in far enough. The integrity of this nation cannot be bartered against wagons and untested aircraft. Even less can it be bartered against promises of non-existent carrots. Please cut it out

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SOVIETS' USE OF MENTAL INSTITUTIONS TO SUPPRESS DISSIDENTS

Stalin's successors have tried to create the impression that blatant terror has faded from the Soviet scene. Indeed, until recent years world opinion and even many Soviet citizens showed little awareness of the extent and harshness of imprisonment in present-day forced labor camps. Far less is known about the subtler means that the Soviet secret police (the KGB) uses to enforce political and intellectual conformity. One of these means, initiated under Khrushchev and expanded by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, is confinement to a mental institution. A number of political protesters are known to have been put out of the way in psychiatric hospitals of a special type dubbed by some Soviets as "hospital-prisons." How many other, unreported, cases there may be is open to speculation.

A list of dissident Soviet citizens who are known to have suffered this fate is attached. Five of the cases, on which more detailed information is available, are presented as examples of the situation. They involve: former Major General Pyotr G. Grigorenko, former collective farm chairman Ivan A. Yakhimovich, mathematician Alexander S. Yesenin-Volpin, interpreter Natalya Gorbanevskaya, and writer Valeri Y. Tarsis.

As is evident in these cases, the KGB makes little pretense of following legal procedures. Even the civil rights laws, which favor the state and offer the individual only flimsy protection, are flagrantly violated. As Mrs. Grigorenko noted, Soviet laws are observed with regard to murderers and rapists, but totally ignored in the case of her supposedly paranoid husband. It is extremely interesting to note that Yesenin-Volpin prepared a guide for protestors to advise them of their legal rights when being interrogated by the KGB.

A feature common to several of the cases is the evidence that the "patients" not only are not insane, but could well be termed highly superior citizens. Grigorenko's wife declared that his sanity was confirmed in December 1965 by the Medical Board for the Determination of Disability, and that he was healthy enough to work as a construction foreman. Mrs. Grigorenko stated to the general's investigators that she had "never noticed" his insanity and was told, in reply, that her husband's political views and his dissemination of them rendered him "socially dangerous." Yesenin-Volpin was described by 95 leading Soviet mathematicians in a signed petition as a "talented and able-bodied mathematician" whose forcible commitment to a hospital for seriously-disturbed mental patients was injurious to his health. Tarsis, in Ward 7, an autobiographical novel on his term in an insane asylum, wrote that the inmates were quite sane and that the psychiatrists, instead of trying to treat patients, often adopted the role of prosecutors investigating "anti-Soviet" activities.

The achievements of some of the "patients" are impressive. Grigorenko

rose in the army from private to major general, had a successful record in World War II, and was a lecturer at Moscow's Frunze Military Academy. Yakhimovich was a collective farm chairman, a job in which his talents and enthusiasm evidently excelled according to a laudatory article in the national newspaper for Soviet youth. Yesenin-Volpin, besides being a talented mathematician, is a recognized poet and translator. Tarsis was an editor and translator, a twice-wounded war correspondent, and the author of short stories and two books.

Beyond the group's achievements is their general tendency to be sensitive and caring, to have a strong impulse to promote and defend social causes, and a willingness to suffer the consequences of open protest. Some of the causes espoused by the "patients" by means of letters, petitions and demonstrations are:

- to help the Crimean Tatars to regain their full rights;
- to head off the rehabilitation of Stalin;
- to permit the Czechs to carry out their liberalization program;
- to voice support for the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia;
- to secure an open trial for young writers accused of anti-Soviet activities and to protest the violation of those writers' rights when closed trials are held;
- to protest the arrest of writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel by publicly demanding that the provisions of the Soviet Constitution be observed;
- to publicize the facts of the oppressions of the Stalin era;
- to protest violations of legal procedures at a Leningrad trial.

How to cope with such "offenses," is a difficult problem for the regime. The acts are not crimes which can be easily proven in court; rather, they would require the prosecutors and the KGB once again to stage sham trials like the ones which evoked stormy domestic and foreign protest in 1966, 1967, and 1968. Apparently the regime prefers not to subject itself to the potential embarrassment of a secret trial or a closed trial from which the transcript may leak to the Western press. Instead, it chooses at times to deal with these kinds of dissidence by committing the perpetrator to a mental institution. To be effective, this policy should be just well-enough known to serve as a threat that will cause the dissident-minded to keep quiet, but not so well-known that it will arouse large numbers of Soviet citizens and darken the Soviet image around the world.

As will be seen, much of the attached material comes from the Khronika Tekushchikh Sobytiy (Chronicle of Current Events). This is an underground journal put out bi-monthly in the USSR by means of "samizdat" (literally "self-publishing," this term relates to any material that is printed or written and then copied and circulated from hand to hand). Khronika deals with a wide range of protest developments, and has provided several revealing accounts of persons committed to mental institutions.

Pyotr Grigorevich Grigorenko (1906-)—Construction engineer, former Major-General and lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. Active in various protest movements since 1961, when he sent an "open letter" to Moscow voters protesting restraints on freedom in the USSR and was consequently dismissed from Frunze Academy. In 1964, after making an allegedly anti-Soviet speech, reduced to ranks and confined in a mental asylum for 14 months. In March 1966, demonstrated against the partial rehabilitation of Stalin and in June 1966 wrote another "open letter" to *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. Protested recent trials of writers (Docs. 10, 25, and 34); also participated in demands for full rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars (see Doc. 44). In July 1968, together with Kosterin and Yakhimovich (q.v.), voiced his support of liberalization in Czechoslovakia (see *The New York Times*, July 30, 1968). For additional biographic information, see Doc. 38, signed by his wife, Zinaida Mikhailovna Grigorenko.

WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1969

Leading Soviet Dissident Is Ruled Insane

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Dec. 12—Former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko, a leading figure in the tiny dissident movement here, was officially declared insane in Tashkent today, according to his family.

They said Grigorenko had been found to be suffering from "paranoid development of his personality," combined with an arteriosclerosis of earlier origin.

They also said that former collective-farm chairman Ivan Yakhimovitch was undergoing psychiatric examination in Moscow in anticipation of similar proceedings in Riga, Latvia. Yakhimovitch was arrested last March after protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Commitment to a mental institution is a common Soviet method of dealing with dissidents. It saves the domestic embarrassment of a secret, Stalin-like trial and the foreign embarrassment of a public trial whose transcript may leak.

Grigorenko was arrested last May in Tashkent, where

he had gone to attend the trial of a group of Crimean Tatars accused of slandering the Soviet state. They had protested their continued exclusion from the Crimean homeland from which Stalin deported them during World War II.

Grigorenko was also charged with slandering the state. He was first imprisoned and then confined last October in the Serbski Psychiatric Institute in Moscow.

It now appears that this confinement was to examine his mental condition. Grigorenko was taken to Tashkent Dec. 2, the family sources said, for the next step. His lawyer, Sophia Kallistratova, was there today and was told of the finding of paranoia and given documents supporting it.

Some further legal proceeding is expected to remove the slander charges from the docket, since Grigorenko has been found "insane" rather than "criminal." He presumably will be returned eventually to a mental institution. Meanwhile he is in prison in Tashkent.

One Letter a Month

The sources said Mrs. Grigorenko had been denied permission to see her husband when she traveled to Tashkent, or even to look at him from a distance. She is allowed to write one letter a month.

Grigorenko has been in trouble with the authorities since 1961, when he accused Nikita Khrushchev of fostering his own "personality cult"—the very charge Khrushchev had laid against Stalin.

Grigorenko was arrested in February, 1964, jailed for seven months and then kept in a mental institution for eight months on the same psychiatric diagnosis made today, the sources said.

He was declared sane and released in 1965, after Khrushchev's ouster, but was not readmitted to the Communist Party and was demoted to private and stripped of his pension.

Attack on Stalin

Later he wrote an attack on Stalin's conduct of Soviet

preparations for World War II and defended the chain of dissidents prosecuted by the Soviet authorities.

Early this year Grigorenko and Yakhimovitch called on Soviet citizens to support Czechoslovaks protesting the Soviet invasion of their country.

Yakhimovitch was once a collective farm chairman, such a good one that he was the subject of a laudatory article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. He thus differs as much as a general would from the usual Soviet dissidents, who for the most part are writers and intellectuals.

In February, 1968, Yakhimovitch wrote a letter to Mikhail Suslov, the top party ideologist, protesting the trial of dissidents Yuri Galanskov and Alexander Ginzburg. He was later dismissed as kolkhoz chairman and expelled from the Communist Party. Dissident sources said the dismissal was against the wishes of his collective farmers and that the expulsion was done without the action of his local unit which is against party rules.

Protest by Grigorenko's Wife

To: Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC of the CPSU
Comrade Gorkin, The USSR Supreme Court
The Procurator General, Comrade Rudenko
The President of the Academy of Medical Sciences,
Comrade Blokhin

From Zinaida Mikhailovna Grigorenko, party member;
2nd Komsomolsky Pereulok 14, Apt. 96,
Tel. G-6-27-37

DECLARATION

At the request of Attorney Kaminskaia, my husband, Piotr Grigorevich Grigorenko was to appear in the Moscow Municipal Court as a witness in the trial of Ginzburg, Galanskoy, *et al.* The Chairman of the court, Mironov, turned down the request, citing as his reason a certificate issued by Mental Health Clinic No. 1, Leningrad District, attesting that my husband is mentally unbalanced.

This certificate is false; in December 1965, a decision by the VTEK [Medical Board for the Determination of Disability] confirmed his sanity; his case was removed from the files and since then he has not [even] been called in for consultation. A document to this effect was presented to the court.

In full possession of his health, P. G. Grigorenko is employed as a foreman at the SU-2 [a division of the Moscow Building Trust], and also heads a party school in the capacity of propagandist. There are 20 people in his group, 13 of them Communists and seven non-party members.

It turns out, then, that in one place my husband serves as a political leader, while in another he is regarded as mentally disturbed. What is this—a mistake? No, it is a violation of legality, which has been going on for more than four years.

On February 1, 1964, Grigorenko—a Major-General and Candidate in Sciences—was arrested and charged with anti-Soviet activity. Yet, his case was not investigated, and instead he was sent to the Serbsky Institute, where he was found to be mentally disturbed. On the basis of that finding, he was sent to a Leningrad prison-hospital for compulsory treatment.

When I asked precisely when my husband had lost his sanity—since I had never noticed it—I was told by the

investigators, Lt. Colonel[s?] Kuznetsov and Kantov, that my husband's political views and his dissemination of them rendered him socially dangerous. I was also informed by the [other?] investigators—lawyers—that he would be kept in the [army] reserve in the status of a sick person, retaining his rank and pension.

From party sources I learned that there is a regulation that mentally ill people temporarily have to relinquish their party cards, which are restored to them after recovery. What, then, happened next?

By Khrushchev's order of August 29, 1964, my husband was demoted to the rank of private and expelled from the party as mentally unbalanced.

All of the patients in the hospital received sickness benefits—except my husband. The law was observed with regard to murderers, rapists. Two of the inmates—Lt. Col. Shevchenko, who had knifed his daughter and Lt. Col. Burkovsky, who had shot three men—were retired into the reserve, also keeping their ranks and pensions.

On April 29, 1965, my husband was discharged from the hospital as a Group-2 invalid. For ten months this Group-2 invalid, a disabled war veteran, was refused both his pension and a position. He was forced to go to work as a loader.

In December 1965, by a decision of the VTEK of Mental Health Clinic No. 1, Leningrad District, my husband was certified to be mentally healthy and his case removed from the files. But this was not followed by the restoration either of his party card or of his military rank, or of the pension he had earned by 34 years of honorable military service. Wounded a number of times, he has not been certified, to this day, as a disabled war veteran.

The entire story which I have related here is nothing but a gross miscarriage of justice. I consider it a prelude to new repressions against my husband. I am filled with horror, the more so because during the years of the personality cult I lost my first husband, my sister and my brother-in-law, in addition to having been myself subjected to repressions.

As a Communist and as a citizen of the Soviet Union, I demand an end to the illegal acts against my husband and my family, and to the persecution of my children and myself. I demand the complete restoration of my husband's rights as a party member and citizen, and the reinstatement of his military rank.

January 23, 1968

Z. GRIGORENKO

B. IVAN A. YAKHIMOVICH

IVAN A. YAKHIMOVICH (1930?)—Philologist, graduated Latvian State University in 1956, appointed chairman of a collective farm in Latvia in 1960. Author of appeal to Suslov (Doc. 17), which cost him his job. In July 1968, declared his support of the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia (see *The New York Times*, July 30, 1968). For background information, see laudatory article about Y. which appeared in Soviet press in 1964 (Doc. 18).

"The Duty of a Communist": From a Kolkhoz Chairman to Suslov

I do not have sufficient information to judge the degree of guilt of the persons subjected to repression, but of one thing I am firmly convinced and one thing I know—the type of trial that took place in the Moscow Municipal Court January 8-12, 1968, is causing enormous damage to our party and to the cause of communism, both in our country and elsewhere.

We have celebrated the glorious [50th] anniversary; we pride ourselves on our achievements in economic and scientific techniques; and we ourselves, at the very time the United Nations has declared 1968 the Year of the Defense of the Rights of Man, are handing the enemies of communism trump cards to be used against us. It is absurd!

"We were naked, hungry, and destitute, but we won because we placed in the foreground the liberation of man from injustice, outrage, lack of rights, etc. And we can lose everything, despite our rockets and hydrogen bombs, if we forget the origins of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

From the time of Radischev's trials of writers have always been an abomination in the eyes of progressive, thinking people. What were our home-grown leaders thinking of when they shut [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn's mouth, made a fool of the poet [Andrei] Voznesensky, "punished" [Andrei D.] Siniavsky and [Yuli M.] Daniel with forced labor, when they involved the KGB [secret police] in spectacles with "foreign enemies"?

One must not subvert the confidence of the masses in the party; one must not speculate with the honor of the state, even if a certain leader wants to end *samizdat*.² *Samizdat* can be eliminated only by one means: by the development of democratic rights, not their violation; by observance of the Constitution, not its violation; by the realization in practice of the Declaration of Human Rights, which [Andrei Y.] Vishinsky [former Foreign Minister] signed in the name of our state, not by ignoring it.

Incidentally, it appears that Articles 18 and 19 of the Declaration read:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion . . . Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

You know Article 125 of our Constitution perfectly well, so I shall not quote it. I only want to recall the thought of V. I. Lenin to the effect that "we need full and true information, and truth should not depend upon the question of whom it should serve" (*Works*, 3rd edition, Vol. 54, p. 446).

I believe that the persecution of young dissenters in a country where more than 50 percent of the population are younger than thirty years of age is an extremely dangerous line—adventurism. It is not the toadies, not a public of yesmen (O Lord, how they have multiplied!), not the mama's boys, who will determine our future, but rather those very rebels, the most energetic, brave, and high-principled members of our young generation.

It is stupid to see in them the enemies of Soviet power, and more than stupid to let them rot in prisons and to mock them. For the party, such a line is equivalent to self-strangulation. Too bad for us if we are not capable of reaching an understanding with these young people. They will create, inevitably they will create, a new party. Ideas cannot be murdered with bullets, prisons, or exile. He who does not understand this is no politician, no Marxist.

You, of course, remember the "Testament of Palmiro Togliatti." I have in mind this part of it:

A general impression has been created of foot-dragging and opposition in the matter of a return to Leninist norms which would insure both within the party and outside it more freedom of utterance and discussion on questions of culture, art, and politics, as well.

It is difficult for us to explain to ourselves this foot-dragging and this opposition, particularly in view of contemporary conditions, when the capitalist encirclement no longer exists and economic construction has attained enormous successes.

We have always proceeded from the thought that socialism is a system in which there exists the broadest freedom for the workers who participate in the cause, who participate in an organized way in the leadership of social life as a whole. (*Pravda*, Sept. 10, 1964.)

Who benefits from a policy of foot-dragging and opposition? Only overt or covert Stalinists, political bankrupts. Remember: Leninism—yes! Stalinism—no! The 20th Congress of the party did its work. The genie is at large and cannot be confined again! By no forces and nobody!

We are on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet army [Feb. 23]. We are on the eve of the consultative meeting of the fraternal Communist parties [which opened in Budapest Feb. 26]. Do not complicate

your work for yourselves, do not darken the atmosphere in the country.

On the contrary, Comrade Podgorny [Soviet President] could amnesty Siniavsky, Daniel, Bukovsky, and could order a review of the case of A. Ginzburg and others. The Moscow Municipal Court, in this last case, permitted the grossest violations of legal procedure. Prosecutor Terekhov, Judge Mironov, the commandant of the court, Tsirkunenko, should be punished in appropriate fashion, primarily for acting like idiots and abusing their power.

One cannot achieve legality by violating the laws. We will never permit anyone to prostitute our Soviet courts, our laws, and our rights. Such violators should be thrown out with a vengeance, for they are doing Soviet power more harm than all your NTS's, BBC's, Radio Liberty's, taken together.

Let *Novyi mir* again print the works of A. Solzhenitsyn. Let G. Serebriakova publish her "Sandstorm" in the USSR, and Ye. Ginzburg her "Journey Into the Whirlwind." Anyway they are known and read; it's no secret.

I live in the provinces where, for every electrified home, there are 10 unelectrified ones, where in the winter the buses can't get through and the mail is late by whole

"I Want to be That Happy": Excerpts from the Diary of I. A. Yakhimovich

NOTE: More than three years before he wrote the above letter of protest to Party Secretary Suslov, I. A. Yakhimovich received unexpected publicity through the publication of excerpts from his personal diary in the Soviet youth organ Komsomolskaia pravda (Oct. 30, 1964). An abridged translation of these excerpts, with the introduction by the paper's correspondent, is presented below as a sidelight on the personality and views of the author of the letter.—Ed.

He wears brown cowboy pants, a black "devil's hide" jacket, and a beret. But it's not so much the kolkhoz chairman's "suspicious" manner of dress as it is his beard that bothers leaders in the district and even in the republic: "Isn't that Yakhimovich a dandy!" I heard it as an intimation and even as a simple statement of fact in Kraslava and Riga, but not in Sivergala.

The Sivergala kolkhozniks would never think of their chairman that way. To them, Antonovich is hardworking, honest and fair, a man who worries more about the kolkhoz than about himself.

The chairman's house is full of books. The shelves, bookcases and table are loaded with them. There are two booklovers in the house: Ivan Antonovich himself and his wife. Both are philologists, graduates of the Latvian State University, he in 1956 and she in 1960. While she was still a student, he was teaching rural children, then became a regional inspector and, finally, the head of a backward kolkhoz. When she began teaching in the Sivergala school, he became a student again, this time by correspondence with the agricultural academy.

weeks. If information [of the trials] has reached us on the broadest scale, you can well imagine what you have done, what kind of seeds you have sown throughout the country. Have the courage to correct the mistakes that have been made, before the workers and peasants take a hand in this affair.

I don't want this letter to be passed over in silence, for the cause of the party cannot be a private cause, a personal cause, and, even less, a second-rate cause.

I consider it the duty of a Communist to warn the Central Committee of the party, and to insist that all members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union be acquainted with the contents of this letter.

The letter is sent to Comrade Suslov with this in view.
With Communist greetings!

I. A. YAKHIMOVICH

¹ Aleksandr Nikolaevich Radishchev, 18th-century Russian philosopher and poet. One of the first to advocate a revolutionary transformation of Russian society, he was exiled to Siberia for six years after writing a book (*Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*) which greatly influenced 19th-century Russian revolutionary democrats.—Ed.

² *Samizdat* is the term for underground literature.—Ed.

A year ago I learned by accident that Ivan Antonovich Yakhimovich, chairman of the "Young Guard" Kolkhoz, was keeping a diary. At that time, he told me that he was keeping the diary only "for himself." This fall, however, he entrusted me with his notebooks. Here are some excerpts from that diary, which he decided to make public, and which I thought would interest everyone.

—O. Vasilieva, correspondent
for *Komsomolskaia pravda*

1960

March 12: A month has passed since our wedding. And it's already a month since I became chairman of the kolkhoz. Ira is in Riga finishing up her studies.

Work, work, and more work. Even asleep I can't get away from my worries and anxieties. The kolkhoz is poor, and I'm considered just another poor relation. My pay is 300 rubles. I set the figure myself. This seems eccentric to lots of people, the act of a little boy playing at patriotism. But to me, these are the hard, cold facts of life. Besides, the 300 rubles is only temporary, until the kolkhoz picks up.

April 5: We bought five tons of potassium nitrate with money borrowed from the kolkhozniks. There isn't a cent in the bank. An urgent payment of 70,000 rubles has suddenly come due. The debt to the kolkhozniks is now 42,000. It has been dragging on since 1958.

We run to the stores and the trade bureau carrying a suitcase with the cash. Whenever we appear, they taunt us by asking, "With or without suitcase?"—i.e., with or without money?

May 11: I've been accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU.

May 22: The planting is almost done. The spring

wheat is in, more than half the flax, 40 percent of the potatoes, 10 percent of the corn.

Have I learned how to judge time? I don't know, but I do know that I value it more than ever before.

June 20: Some sailors from the Baltic Fleet came to the kolkhoz. Their concert was too fine for words. Our people were pleased, and our guests were pleased with themselves. If only our amateur performances were on the same level!

December 2: The farms in Latgaliia cannot be compared with others in the republic. Latgaliia is economically backward. There are no sound buildings, no purebred cattle. The soil is poor. To get a good harvest, two or three times as much has to be put in as in other parts of Latvia. Our bread, milk, and meat cost us so much more because the railroad is so far away and the roads to the fields are so bad.

Latgaliia is really virgin land. It has to be developed decisively and boldly.

1961

April 23: So much is happening! What a blast-off, what a flight! April 20th, Yuri Gagarin leaped into space and returned to earth. The invasion of Cuba and the crushing defeat of the interventionists.

Spring is coming. Tomorrow we begin planting. We have advanced everyone twenty kopeks apiece, or two rubles in old money, for each working day . . .

May 3: How often we still try to justify our mistakes in education and our simple laziness by blaming the poor, ungifted students. Someday it will be different: lack of talent, not talent, will be the exception. The mediocre person will be considered a waste and a failure on the part of the whole collective. The normal human being has tremendous potentialities within him—that's a law, not an invention. It is the duty of society and of each individual to turn the potentiality into reality.

May 29: I received a severe reprimand for not fulfilling the quarterly quota for meat.

June 11: Heat and drought. A few more days of this and the fields will burn up and the harvest will be lost. There are unpromising clouds floating about, sometimes even thunder and two or three drops of rain, then once more it's dry and hot. The streams have dried up, and the swamps have settled. All the roads have become passable.

But the winter rye is all right despite the weather, and even the clover has matured early. The nightingales give no peace. Summer residents, fishermen, and tourists have arrived, making us envious as hell. But there isn't even time to be envious—we're starting to get the fodder ready. The first stalks of grain have already appeared. What a wonderful smell!

July 21: I'm reading the story "The Last Wish of Aleksandr Ulianov" in Sergei Lvov's *Fire of Prometheus*.

August 3: Being a kolkhoz chairman is like being sentenced to hard labor! How many hours does a chairman work? Around the clock. How many hours does he sleep? Only enough to keep him on his feet. But that isn't the hard part. Serving the people is a

heavy responsibility, but an honorable one. It's horrible when bureaucracy interferes. How tired you get of petty supervision! They figure it out, chew it over, and shove it under your nose: how many hectares to plant with what, what kind of harvest to get, and when. This is called planning from below . . .

August 10: I'm going to Riga for a DT-54 tractor. The news has spread all over the kolkhoz.

August 25: We're beginning to thresh the rye. Such impatience, such an itch to make something out of this! Electricity, a club, a barn, a new organization of jobs, rational discipline! It's time to launch a real campaign for these things, one that will carry everyone along. How we need such a campaign! It's the only way to attract good people.

September 30: I'm a papa. My daughter was born. Just think how old I've gotten overnight. What a wonderful way to grow old!

November 6: We've paid our debts. Now we don't owe the government or anybody. It has changed everything; it's as if the resentment, suffering and agony had never been.

November 28: The nausea and pains have come back. I'm not smoking. I've become irritable, and I get tired easily. A "repair job" is necessary. I'm going to the hospital tomorrow.

December 7: I didn't go to the hospital. Things changed, and so did I.

1962

February 19: The brigade leaders greeted the sugar-beet project with silence. When we got down to concrete plot sizes for each brigade, the reception turned hostile. Bleidel remarked, "Twenty hectares in our situation is no joke!"

March 10: Communism is the highest quality in everything, from man on down to a child's little sock.

May 16: Today's meeting of the management has left a bitter aftertaste: we punished several men for mishandling the machines. Brench got a stern reprimand and a fine of thirty rubles. Geka is going to be tried. The failures and problems in dealing with people!

July 7: We're beginning to spray the corn with herbicides. There was a general meeting of the kolkhoz. The semi-annual report. It's possible we'll become "hundred-thousanders" this year.

July 13: Irochka crawls along fast, pulling her little legs under her. She claps her hands together and says "Papa" already. She is very curious and bright. She's a lot of trouble, but more joy.

August 16: Nikolaev, Popovich . . . One gets used to miracles.

September 25: Rain. Uninterrupted rain. We're plowing the fields for fall. The tractors get stuck. So Ivan Trubach has decided to do his plowing in two separate steps. He takes care of the swampiest spots by first dragging his feet along the ground, feeling out the best path for his tractor. Where Trubach has been with his machine, there will be a harvest.

November 29: Our number has increased! They brought Tatiana Ivanovna home from the maternity ward

yesterday.

December 11: We raised the money for a ten-kilowatt motor for our drying room. By actual count this is the fifteenth motor already. Do you recall, Comrade Chairman, how you ran around looking for kerosene lamps?

1963

February 2: It's too bad that so far we haven't been able to reconcile our young people to systematic labor: nudging and scolding don't get very far. And we've had no luck with the Komsomol secretaries. Maybe Rosa Butkana should be nominated. She's energetic, strong-willed, and principled.

March 4: Again and again we go back to Lenin, not out of duty like the schoolboy or student, but out of the natural need for advice, ideas, and moral purity.

April 2: A light blue, faultlessly clear sky, the tops of the birches barely moving. This is all I can see from my hospital bed. A stomach ulcer sent me to the hospital after all. A lot of our fellow kolkhozniks are here, being "mended" before the planting. I look upon my own illness as a soldier wounded in battle looks upon the mutilated part of his body: put this to rights as quickly as possible and let me get back to the ranks. Almost everyone here has similar thoughts. When the attack comes, each of us must be at his post.

April 4: I can't get the clash with Krikov, head of the financial planning department, out of my head. He didn't want any arguments and on his "own discretion" fixed the plot sizes for flax, corn, and sugar beets. I told him the plan would only work on paper, and not on the land. Krikov just about choked with fury. Was I being cheeky? No. It's all very well to be humble, but not in all situations. To be humble where the truth is concerned is to be a scoundrel.

April 7: I have armed myself with books: Turgenev, Pushkin, Chekhov. I especially want to reread Turgenev. I go from book to book, becoming less tired and more delighted all the time.

But I miss my work like the very devil. In the near future we're going to have to work out our fertilizer purchase and distribution in such a way as to avoid having to move manure to the outlying fields. We should keep a supply of peat out there (piles of it, mixed with ground phosphates and dung-water) and prepare the compost on the spot: a little manure, peat, soil, and mineral fertilizers. The manure could also be bought on the spot from the kolkhozniks. We must wage an all-out battle against unproductive expenditures.

Pastureland should be closer to the farms so that milking times can be coordinated. Calves, sheep and horses should be kept in the farthest fields. Also, lupine plants, pea plants, mixed vetch and oats, and seed clover. In toward the center the land should be worked more intensively.

April 15: My neighbor in the next bed treated us all to eggs, proudly explaining, "My wife brought them, hiking 25 kilometers on foot. We've lived together a long time and never had a serious argument." Before, this peasant looked plain and grey to me, but now he's transformed, handsome even. My mood picked up immediately, but it could have been completely ruined by Lev Ovalov's *Story of a Life*.

Right now, nothing depresses me more than a thoughtless attitude toward human feelings, toward the purity of those feelings. Did the heroine of this story ever love her drunkard-husband? No. Consequently, their domestic relations are petty, stupid, and offensive from start to finish. All the heroes of the book are narrow, mediocre and weak. I'm sorry for them, with all their little ideas and little passions, but most of all I'm sorry for the author. The book leaves a flat, grey impression like the description of a bygone day.

I compare everything I read with my own experience, observations and feelings. It's disappointing not to find in a book anything that you can strive for.

I look at our love and am glad it is growing, becoming broader, more mature, deeper, more humane. Our love is not afraid to look truth in the eye, not afraid to demand that we each fulfill our duty. Most important of all, it is growing and will continue to grow along with us and our children. For us, where to live or how to divide the household chores is no more of a problem than filling our time and avoiding boredom. We live in the whole world and bring the whole world to each other.

April 20: I left the hospital yesterday. I didn't want to wait for the bus, so I got back to the kolkhoz on a dump truck. My life begins again with a working day. . . .

June 14: There's no doubt that talent has been uncovered and put to work for human society by material incentives. But moral incentives will predominate in the future and will so eclipse the former that any comparison of the two will seem an absurd joke. . . .

August 25: I once wrote to the republic Ministry of Production and Purchases with a suggestion for organizing purchases preferentially, based on the need for specialization. Livestock products should be emphasized, and grain minimized. Well, in practice, I've had to abandon that viewpoint. In fact I had no alternative: I had no right to sacrifice grain. In the interests of the state most of all, I didn't have the right. What kind of a mood would the kolkhozniks have been in, what would they have planted in the spring?

For over a week auditors have been digging around in our files. Rumors and gossip are spreading. All this disorganizes people, interferes with work. It's possible that I'll be replaced by another man. That would be hard to take. I can't imagine not being on the kolkhoz. To have lived four years with its trials and tribulations . . . I'm most concerned not for myself, but for the kolkhoz, that it shouldn't take a beating. It's very important that not just any man be allowed to take the post of chairman.

October 15: In the forest, it's as if all the summer smells were being burned away in a great smoldering bonfire. Autumn. The work in the fields is done. People are in a good mood. The main thing is that there is faith in the coming year, which means "a desire to work." This makes me glad and gives me strength. I still don't know my fate.

December 8: A reprimand . . . Well, that's not so bad. The main thing—they left me in the kolkhoz.

1964

January 1: A tiny fir tree in the room. The candles are lit. The children are asleep. Ira and I have wished each other a happy new year. We turn things over in our minds and agree that the past year has been good,

I became a student again, and our kolkhoz became a "millionaire" (old price scale), meeting the plan for meat and milk deliveries to the state and settling up accounts with the kolkhozniks. Despite the difficulties and special problems of the year, we made a good stride forward: All branches of livestock production became profitable. Even pork brought a profit this year.

February 2: The reports and elections meeting. I was re-elected chairman.

February 9: We've gone over to monthly wages for the kolkhozniks. The advantages of this system have become immediately apparent: it gives people a taste for money, diverts them from private farming, encourages the accountants, and gets the kolkhoz finances moving.

I remember Janis Nartys's "philosophy" which he elaborated for me at the start of my tenure here. "What's bad for the kolkhoznik? Freedom of choice: if he wants to, he works; if he doesn't want to, he just lies on the stove." Now Janis doesn't much care to lie on the stove.

February 9: Yesterday we saw "The Living and the Dead," both parts. The penal servitude of war. The powerlessness of the strong. But it was as it should be: the determination to defend one's country is more powerful than the will to enslave. It was that great determination that gave the strength and forged the victory. I liked the whole film, it went straight to my heart—the author, the director, the actors—everything!

February 11: The worst things for production are sluggishness, enslavement to habit, mental inertia. Certain of our regional leaders have not yet managed to shake this disease. They put instructions above everything else.

The words we waste in conversation! We talk—and decide nothing. We sit down, but not together. We must work, pencil in hand: think, think—not just pour one empty vessel into another.

February 25: Another daughter, our third. Weight: four kilos. Hair: black.

Richard's *Saint Exupéry*. I feel so sorry for Exupéry! How hard it must have been to live persecuted and alone. To forget oneself only in the endless skies, or with children. To feel the constant need for beautiful people, a need almost like hunger . . . How tragic that fate foisted off on him a friend-mistress and a nutty wife. What a wild absurdity those relationships seem, when you see people of St. Exupéry's type.

April 3: I went to Yelgava, to the agricultural academy. My exams and tests are behind me, my first year is behind me. I did well in the history of the CPSU, mathematics, and physics; I got a C in chemistry. I'm happier about that than about all my A's put together. But it's too bad I didn't have two or three more days. Shmit is Shmit, and it's shameful to pass with just a C from such an instructor.

April 16: Khikmet is a thousand times right in saying that in the 20th century only a genuine Communist can be the happiest of men. I want to be that happy.

May 21: The planting's nearly done, but it's cold. May is always capricious. This year we stood firm on our right to full autonomy. Down to the last hectare. We figured out and decided for ourselves what to plant.

July 6: The drudgery of harvest time approaches. In those fields where neither reapers nor combines can be used, we'll cut the grain by hand. We held brigade meetings, and a specific rye field was assigned to each household. The kolkhozniks determined the dimensions themselves, according to their abilities. Everyone is in a cheerful mood. In addition to the pay, we're going to give out bread. Everyone is clear on our goal: to finish up before August 1st.

The harvest "watchmen" have been approved: they'll be responsible for overseeing the collection, weighing, and delivery of the grain. As usual, Yazep Kovalsky will be one of them. Nobody has ever doubted the honesty of this man. He is the conscience of the kolkhoz.

July 31: All the grain is in. It took seven days. For us that's record time. . . .

Khronika, issue #4 of 31 October 1968, provides some background on Yakhimovich prior to his being arrested and placed under psychiatric examination, as follows:

On 27 October 1968 a search was conducted at the home of Ivan Yakhimovich. Yakhimovich, in the not-too-distant past the chairman of the collective farm "Yauna Gvardo" in the Kraslavsky Region of the Latvian SSR, was relieved of his job after he wrote his well-known letter to the Central Committee. His wife, Irina Yakhimovich, was also expelled from the school where she taught. Now their family, including three children, lives in Yurmala, a town in the Latvian SSR. Irina Yakhimovich works in a kindergarten. Ivan Yakhimovich in the summer of 1968 was illegally deprived of his registration -- in his passport the militia simply cut out the registration stamp -- and, naturally, he has not found a job.

In setting up the search, which was authorized by Kvieshons, the Deputy Procuror of Yurmala, it was said that the search would be conducted because of the suspected robbery of Yurmala branch of the State Bank in the sum of 19,654 rubles. Of course, no money was found in the course of the search -- but the searchers seized several pieces of samizdat material, the protest letter of Yakhimovich on the occasion of the arrest of the participants of the demonstration of 25 August, the draft of his unfinished article on the post-January development in Czechoslovakia, the personal diary of his wife, etc.

C. ALEXANDER S. YESENIN-VOLPIN
(also, A. S. VOLPIN)

ALEKSANDR SERGEEVICH YESENIN-VOLPIN (1924)—
Mathematician and poet-philosopher, son of poet Sergei
Yesenin (who committed suicide in 1925). Yesenin-Volpin
was twice imprisoned (in 1949 and 1959), in the latter
instance for smuggling an "anti-Soviet" philosophical
treatise to the West. A collection of his poems, *A Leaf
of Spring* (New York, Praeger), was published in 1961;
in 1962, his poetry was described by Leonid Ilichev (then
head of the Ideological Commission of the party's Central
Committee) as the "ravings of a mentally deranged
person." On December 5, 1965, led a rally in Moscow's
Pushkin Square in protest against the arrest of Siniavsky
and Daniel. On February 19, 1966, challenged the legality
of the Siniavsky-Daniel verdict in an interview with a
correspondent of *The New York Times*. An active pro-
tester against the Galanskov-Ginzburg trial (Docs. 21
and 32), was picked up at his home in mid-February
1968 and again taken to a mental institution. In March
1968, 95 mathematicians protested his forcible confine-
ment in a letter to the Minister of Health, the Procurator
General, and the Chief Psychiatrist of the City of Mos-
cow; 15 withdrew their signatures after the letter was
made public by *The New York Times* (Docs. 35 and 36).

Petition of 95 Mathematicians

To: The Minister of Health, USSR
The Procurator General of the USSR
Copy to:
Chief Psychiatrist, City of Moscow

We have learned that the prominent Soviet mathemati-
cian and well-known specialist in the field of mathemati-
cal logic, Aleksandr Sergeevich Yesenin-Volpin, has been
forcibly, without prior medical examination, and without
the knowledge or consent of his relatives, placed in Psy-
chiatric Hospital No. 5, Stolbovaia Station, 70 kilometers
from Moscow.

The forcible commitment of a talented and entirely able-
bodied mathematician to a hospital for seriously-disturbed
mental patients and the conditions in which he finds him-
self as a consequence of the very nature of the institution
subject him to severe mental trauma, are injurious to his
health, and abase his personal dignity.

Proceeding from the humanitarian aims of our legisla-
tive organs and, even more, of our public health services,
we consider this fact a flagrant violation of medical and
legal norms.

We request that you intercede immediately and take the
necessary steps to enable our colleague to [resume] work
under normal conditions.

Signatures:

P. S. NOVIKOV—Member, USSR Academy of Sciences;
Lenin Prize Winner
I. M. GELFAND—Corresponding Member, USSR Academy
of Sciences; Lenin and State Prize Winner
LAZAR LIUSTERNIK—Corresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences; State Prize Winner
ANDREI MARKOV—Corresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences

DMITRI MENSHOV—Corresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences; State Prize Winner
S. P. NOVIKOV—Corresponding Member, USSR Academy
of Sciences; Lenin Prize Winner
I. R. SHAFAREVICH—Corresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences; Lenin Prize Winner
VADIM ARNOLD—Lenin Prize Winner; Professor; Doctor
of Physical-Mathematical Sciences
ANATOLI VITUSHKIN—Lenin Prize Winner; Professor;
Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences
ALEKSANDR KRONROD—State Prize Winner; Professor;
Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences
YURI MANIN—Lenin Prize Winner; Doctor of Physical-
Mathematical Sciences
N. M. MEIMAN—State Prize Winner; Professor; Doctor of
Physical-Mathematical Sciences

Professors/Doctors of Physical-Mathematical Sciences:

F. F. BOKSHTEIN	A. YA. POVZNER
D. A. BOCHVAR	N. B. ZBOLINSKY
V. A. YEFREMEVICH	I. I. PYTETSKY-SHAPIRO
LIUDMILA KELDYSH	F. P. PALAMODOV
A. A. KIRILLOV	YU. M. SMIRNOV
V. A. KONDRATEV	S. V. FOMIN
A. G. KUROSH	G. Z. SHILOV
YE. M. LANDIS	A. M. YAGLOM
A. M. LODSHITS	I. M. YAGLOM

Doctors of Physical-Mathematical Sciences:

M. S. ACRONOVICH	V. PONOMAREV,
A. V. ARKHANGELSKY,	Senior Scientific Worker
Assistant Professor	YA. G. SINAI,
	Senior Scientific Worker

Candidates in Physical-Mathematical Sciences:

B. G. AVERBUKII, Assistant Professor	L. A. KRONROD, Assistant Professor
B. M. ALEKSEEV, Assistant Professor	A. N. KRZYHKOV
L. M. BALAKINA	A. L. KRYLOV
T. M. BARANOVICH, Assistant Professor	O. S. KULAGINA, Senior Scientific Worker
L. VASSALYCO	V. LEVCHENKO
N. M. BESKIN	A. L. LUND
BLINCHEVSKY	R. A. MINLOS, Senior Scientific Worker
N. M. BRUSHLINSKAIA	K. A. MIKHAILOVA
N. VVEDENSKAIA, Senior Scientific Worker	A. L. ONISHCHIK, Assistant Professor
A. D. VENTTSEL, Assistant Professor	V. B. OREVKOV
T. D. VENTTSEL, Assistant Professor	B. POLIAK, Senior Scientific Worker
F. YA. VETUKHOVSKY	A. SKOBEEV
YE. VINBURG, Assistant Professor	M. A. SMOLIANSKY
I. VOLEVICH, Senior Scientific Worker	V. M. TIKHOMIROV, Assistant Professor
YE. VUL	L. TUTUBALIN, Assistant Professor
S. GINDIKIN, Scientific Worker	L. FLITMAN
V. L. GOLOV	D. V. FUKS, Senior Scientific Worker
M. I. GRABAR, Assistant Professor	YU. I. KHMELEVSKY, Assistant Professor
	L. L. TSNMAN

S. A. KABAKOV	A. CHERNAVSKY
K. V. KIM	Z. YA. SHAPIRO
N. KH. KONSTANTINOV, Senior Scientific Worker	I. SHARYGIN
	V. A. YANKOV

Candidates in Technical Sciences:

L. YA. KELPERKS	S. A. PANOV
-----------------	-------------

Candidate in Sciences:

C. TIURINA, Senior Worker

Candidate in Pedagogical Sciences:

YU. A. SHIKHANOVICH.

Others:

K. BABITSKY, Junior Scientific Worker	V. V. KUN, Junior Scientific Worker
F. L. VARPAKHOVSKY, Lecturer	G. S. PODIAPOLSKY, Junior Scientific Worker
N. VILIAMS, Instructor	V. S. OSAULENKO, Junior Scientific Worker
YU. A. GASTEY, Instructor	V. K. FINN, Engineer
YE. YE. GLUSBURG, Junior Scientific Worker	G. E. CHEKIN, Junior Scientific Worker
A. GVOZDEV, Junior Scientific Worker	G. A. SRESTOPAL, Senior Instructor
I. G. KRISTI, Engineer	

We request that a reply be sent to the name of any of the signers of this letter at the following address: Moscow, 234 Leninskie Gory, The Lomonosov Moscow State University, Mechanical-Mathematical Department.

(Dated by hand) March 9, 1968

Khronika, Issue #1, dated 30 April 1968, notes:

"On 14 and 15 February two of the active participants of the protests, candidate [roughly equivalent to Ph.D.] of physical mathematics Aleksandr Volpin and an interpreter, Natalya Gorbanevskaya were subjected to compulsory hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital....

"A. S. Volpin was taken from his home on 14 February with the help of the militia and with the participation of the psychiatric duty officer of the Leningradsky Zone, Albert Matyukov. The basis for this act was said to be that Volpin had not been to the psycho-dispensary, where he is on the list of patients, for a long time (and to which he hadn't once been called in the preceding four years). He was put in Section 3 of the Kashchenko Hospital, where he was subjected to rough treatment on the part of the chief of the section, A. A. Kazarnovskaya and the treatment doctor, Leson Khristoforovich (he didn't reveal his last name). On 16 February, by an order signed by the Chief Psychiatrist of the City of Moscow, I.K. Yanushevsky, Volpin was transferred to Hospital No. 5 at Stolbovaya Station, 70 km. from Moscow (in that hospital, essentially, are located the chronically sick, as well as minor criminals who have been sent for required treatment). The inquiries of his relatives to I. K. Yanushevsky remained unanswered. Only after an inquiry

to the Minister of Medical Care of the USSR, Academician B. V. Petrovsky, first by Academicians A. N. Kolmogorov and P. S. Aleksandrov, and later by 99 other scientists (including the greatest Soviet mathematicians-academicians, professors, winners of Lenin Prizes) did the situation of Volpin improve a bit; now he is once again in Kashchenko Hospital, but in Section 32, which is more pleasant than Section 3.

"The regulation 'Concerning the Urgent Hospitalization of the Psychiatrically Sick Who Represent a Public Danger' (regulations concerning 'Legislation on Medical Care,' volume 6, 1963) could be the only official basis for such actions. However, in the first place, it is only official and not legal, since the very fact of the forcible hospitalization contradicts Articles 58-60 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR under which measures of compulsion of a medical nature are established by a court of law.

"The hospitalization of persons as 'publicly-dangerous' directly contradicts the basic principle of legality, the principle of the presumption of innocence, since the confession of being socially dangerous is made by a person who has committed an offense, which can be established only by the verdict of a court of law. In the second place, even this somewhat cruel and illegal regulation was rudely violated. When someone stays in the hospital for 24 hours he must be examined by a commission of three men, which did not take place in the case of Volpin, nor in the case of Gorbanevskaya. Their relatives were not informed, which they should obligatorily have been according to the regulation. Finally, the commission, appointed after the letter was sent by the mathematicians, established only that Volpin requires care and it partly improved his conditions of confinement in the hospital. According to the regulation, the commission was similarly obliged to examine the patient once a month and thereupon to report, not whether he is sick in general, but rather whether his sickness is of a 'publicly-dangerous nature.' If not, the patient is discharged in the care of his relatives. The regular commission, which was set up on 17 April, also declared that Volpin needed another month and a half to 'get well.'"

Note: Brief mention is made in Khronika # 6, 28 February 1969, of A. S. Yesenin-Volpin's advice on the legal rights of those who face interrogation, as follows:

"Interrogation may face anyone, sometimes if only because his telephone number is found in a notebook seized in a search. But it is important for a person to know not only his own rights, but also the extent of the rights of the investigator conducting the interrogation. Volpin's 'Instructions,' even though written in the author's own complex style, will provide a great deal of legal information necessary for the person being interrogated so that he can survive the increasing violations of legality and not become their unwitting accomplice."

D. NATALYA GORBANEVSKAYA

Note: The following is from Khronika # 1, 30 April 1968:

"N. Gorbanevskaya, without advance notice and without the consent of her relatives, on 15 February was transferred from Maternity Home #27, where she was lying to conserve strength for her pregnancy, to Section #27 of the Kashchenko Hospital. The decision to transfer her was undertaken with the participation of the psychiatric duty officer of the Timiryazevsky Zone, but the basis for the transfer was termed the request of the patient to be discharged. On 23 February Gorbanevskaya was discharged from the Kashchenko Hospital, since the psychiatrists conceded that she didn't require treatment.

E. VALERY Y. TARSIS

VALERI YAKOVLEVICH TARSIS (1906-)—Writer. Joined the party as a young man and worked as an editor in a state publishing house. Fought in World War II and was twice wounded. In the early 1960's, had several novels published abroad, including *The Bluebottle* (London, Collins and Harvill Press, 1962) and *Red and Black* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), both of which are set in the Stalin era. Arrested in 1962 and kept in an insane asylum for seven months after writing a letter to Khrushchev calling the Soviet Union an unbearable place to live. After his release, wrote *Ward 7* (London, Collins and Harvill Press 1965), a barely fictionalized account of his confinement in which he predicted the inevitable overthrow of Soviet totalitarianism, which he equated with fascism. In 1966 was permitted to go to England, where he bitterly denounced the Soviet regime and was granted political asylum, resulting in the revocation of his Soviet citizenship.

F. OTHERS

Issues 3 & 4 of Khronika reported the arrest of several Leningraders and the circumstances of that arrest. In #5 of Khronika, 31 December 1968, it is reported that in October, two of the accused -- Nikolay Danilov and Yevgeny Shashenkov -- were declared not responsible, and the court prescribed compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital of a special type, i.e., a hospital-prison.

Nikolay Danilov, a jurist, at the end of the 1950's worked as an interrogator of the KGB in the Ukraine and in Sakhalin Oblast, after which he left that job and for some time was a common laborer. It was not until recent times that he began to work as a legal adviser. He writes poetry. Absenting himself from the institute, in April 1966, together with Yury Gendler, Lev Kvačhensky and Viktor Faynberg he wrote a letter to the General Procuror of the USSR about violations of legal procedures permitted in a Leningrad trial. In June 1966 he was kicked out of the institute. Nikolay Danilov has a 9-year-old daughter.

Yevgeny Shashenkov is an engineer. In 1960, when a student at Leningrad University, he wrote a letter addressed to Stalin, after which he was arrested. He experienced every cruelty of the investigator of that period, and then for the first time was placed in a prison-like psychiatric hospital. The second time he got sent there was in 1963 or 1964. Now he must undergo this experience a third time. In any event Shashenkov displayed firmness during the interrogation and refused to give testimony.

TIME,
28 November 1969

RUSSIA

Notes from the Underground

Soviet newspapers almost never mention the acts of protest against government policy that have become commonplace in Russia during the past few years. Scarcely ever do they speak of the arrests and other reprisals against dissenters that are now taking place with increasing frequency in the Soviet Union.

Despite the blanket of official silence, there is one publication in Russia that records the protests and persecution of the country's dissenters. It is a small, often tattered, clandestine newsletter called *Chronicle of Current Events*. Despite constant KGB (secret police) efforts to stamp it out, the *Chronicle*, which usually runs no more than 40 typescript pages, circulates among intellectuals in major Soviet cities with the speed of a brush fire.

The *Chronicle* appears through what Russians call *samizdat*, which means self-publishing; it is a play on the Soviet term *Gosizdat*, the state publishing house. Behind closed doors, readers type copies of the newsletter, which they pass on to friends in chain-letter fashion. Fresh news items for the paper are sent back to the anonymous editors by the same chain of communication. Though anyone who copies or circulates the *Chronicle* faces severe penalties, ten issues of the *Chronicle* have appeared since it was launched in 1968. The front page of a recent issue carries a quotation from the U.N. Bill of Human Rights and a list of the cases reported in the issue (see cut).

Dispassionate Tones. Along with foreign short-wave broadcasts, the *Chronicle* has become a main source of information for Soviet intellectuals. It broke the news of the arrest of three

naval officers for having drafted an appeal for free speech (TIME, Oct. 31). It was the only publication in Russia to re-

port on such historical documents as Alexander Solzhenitsyn's letters to the Writers Union about the banning of his works. The *Chronicle* regularly offers listings of the latest officially forbidden books by both Western and Russian authors circulating in *samizdat* editions in the Soviet Union.

Dispassionate in tone, it prints terse bulletins about the condition of political prisoners, like the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, together with their labor-camp addresses. Top KGB investigators, prosecutors and judges who are involved in important political cases are identified by name for the record. The avowed purpose of the *Chronicle* is to secure civil rights for Soviet citizens within the letter and spirit of the constitution. Summaries of recent items:

► Alexander Daniel, the 20-year-old son of Yuli, was denied admission to Tartu University in Estonia, although he had been accepted earlier and had graduated at the top of his high school class. Recently he was fired from a menial job in the computer center of the Moscow Engineering Institute. At a meeting called to discuss young Daniel's case, the rector of the institute, Nikolai Strelchuk, expressed particular dissatisfaction about the number of Jews, like Daniel, who had been hired at the institute.

► On July 11, Genrikh Altunian, a Soviet army major and a teacher at the Military Institute of Kharkov, was arrested after a house search had turned up copies of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* and issues of the *Chronicle*. He was ex-

pelled from the Communist Party, cashiered from the army and jailed in a KGB isolation prison.

► A KGB investigator, Nikolai Danilov, left his work on the island of Sakhalin and took a job as a legal-aid consultant in a Leningrad law office. He was arrested and confined in a special insane asylum for political offenders, where he is being "treated" with insulin shock.

► In Leningrad last December, three intellectuals were tried and sentenced to hard labor for "producing, harboring and circulating works of an anti-Soviet nature." These included Milovan Djilas' *The New Class* and Barry Goldwater's *Why Not Victory?* and *The Conscience of a Conservative*.

Ominous Forecast. In instances where Western specialists could check the veracity of the *Chronicle* reports, they have proved to be accurate. That only makes the newsletter's prediction about Stalin seem more significant. Issue No. 10, which has just begun to circulate in Russia, reports that the Soviet leaders are planning a major campaign to "rehabilitate" Stalin on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of his birth next Dec. 21. Major articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* are in preparation, together with a four-volume edition of his works. Posters and a statue are also being made ready for the event. As if to confirm the *Chronicle's* prediction, two pictures of Stalin last week appeared in a photo exhibit of Soviet history in Moscow. Since the Kremlin's attitude toward Stalin often has been a barometer of the government's willingness to repress dissenters, rehabilitation of the defamed dictator would portend an even bleaker era for the readers of the *Chronicle*.

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~~TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 1970

COMMUNIST DEFAMATION EFFORT FAILS

A libel suit brought by a retired Indian Army officer, Brigadier Eric T. Sen, against the Indian Communist Party weekly publication, New Age, and its publisher, D. P. Sinha, involved the 1967 publication of a booklet, "I Was a CIA Spy in India," allegedly written by John Smith, a former Foreign Service communications clerk in the United States Embassy in New Delhi. Smith disappeared in 1960, then turned up in Moscow in 1967 as a defector and as the ostensible author of the booklet which was obviously prepared by the Soviets. Among other wild accusations, it charged that Sen was involved in CIA activities in India.

Brigadier Sen brought suit against the New Age Printing Press, charging that it contained libelous references to him. The case had innumerable hearings over the next eighteen months, with the Communists using every legal means -- and some illegal -- to defend themselves, to delay the proceedings, to discredit Brigadier Sen and to frustrate his suit. In fact, a reading of their cross-examination of Brigadier Sen provoked a stinging observation from a justice of the Delhi High Court that the Communists had grossly abused their opportunity for cross-examination, and that besides casting "wholly unmerited aspersion on the character and patriotism of all those distinguished officers and soldiers who joined the Indian Army before independence, the questions have not the remotest connection with the defense set up by the petitioner (accused)."

Also in the course of the hearings, Bhupesh Gupta, editor of the Communist Party of India weekly, New Age, and member of Parliament, was convicted of contempt of court, an offense involving moral turpitude, by the High Court of Delhi as a result of his paper's irresponsible reporting on the case.

Brigadier Sen endured the Communists' harassments and pressed his case to a successful conclusion. On 25 October the Communist Party's official publisher of the booklet admitted in open court that his charges were unverified; he apologized and regretted the harm caused to Brigadier Sen; and he pledged not to publish, print or sell any further edition of the pamphlet. Following the apology, Brigadier Sen agreed to withdraw his defamation suit.

Compromise allowed in 'CIA agent' case

Hindustan Times Correspondent
New Delhi, Oct. 25—Brig. E. T. Sen (Retd) and D. P. Sinha, printer and publisher of New Age, a Communist Party weekly, were today allowed to enter into a compromise by Mr G. S. Kalra, Judicial Magistrate, in the defamation case filed by Brig. Sen against the printer.

Brig. Sen had charged that a pamphlet published by Mr Sinha, which contained what were purported to be the confession of John Smith, an alleged CIA agent, had wrongfully linked his name with John Smith's espionage activities in India, and had thereby defamed him.

The compromise was effected on an application made by Mr Sinha under Section 343 of the

Criminal Procedure Code.

In his assurance, Mr Sinha said: "I published the pamphlet, 'I was a CIA Agent in India,' a Communist Party publication, without any intention of causing any personal harm to Brig. E. T. Sen. When this pamphlet was published I had not verified the veracity of the allegations contained in the pamphlet from Brig. E. T. Sen or John Smith."

Mr Sinha said that he was sorry for the harm caused to Brig. Sen and that no further copies of the pamphlet would be printed or sold by him.

The magistrate allowed Brig. Sen to withdraw his complaint after he gave an undertaking that he would not take any legal proceedings about the allegations against him in the pamphlet.

SECRET, New Delhi
2 November 1969

SOVIET-CPI PLOT EXPOSED

SPY CHARGE ON ARMYMAN WRONG, CONFESS REDS

By Our Special Correspondent

HOW the Soviet Union and Communist Party of India work in close collaboration to defame innocent persons in this country as CIA agents, for their own purposes was established last week in a case concerning a CPI publication "I was a CIA agent" by John Smith.

Smith who was an underling in the US embassy in India from 1954 to 59 claimed in that book that the CIA was behind a good lot of political events that happened in India from 1947 to 1966, though he himself had been not even in US service since long. Later Smith defected to Moscow. Among the persons implicated by Smith was one Brig. E. T. Sen.

Sen filed a defamation petition against Mr D. P. Sinha, printer and publisher of New Age publications, a CPI institution. And last week Mr Sinha told a Delhi judicial magistrate that he had failed to verify the allegations against the Brigadier. Sinha also agreed that the Brigadier had nothing to do with the CIA. And then, the CPI's official publisher openly expressed regret for his action and undertook not to publish or sell in any manner the same pamphlet in any form.

According to knowledgeable circles the CPI had taken a high level decision to tender an uncondi-

tional apology fearing the case was going against the party interests and worse revelations would come out if the case proceeded any further. Consequently it decided to cut its nose by confessing a part so as to save its face and prevent more dangerous revelations.

The text of the apology rendered by the CPI's official publisher is interesting in this context: He stated:

Sinha's Apology

"I published the pamphlet 'I was a CIA agent in India' a Communist Party Publication without any intention of causing any personal harm to Brig. E. T. Sen. When this pamphlet was published I had not verified the veracity of the allegations contained in the pamphlet from Brig E. T. Sen or John Smith.

Brig. E. T. Sen has stated that he had nothing to do with the CIA and the allegations against him are not true. I take him at his word and accept his statement as correct. I am sorry for the harm caused to him. It is regretted.

There are no more copies of this pamphlet in stock with us. No further edition of this pamphlet

will be published, printed or sold by me either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, Brig E. T. Sen can make public this statement in any manner he desires."

In this context the public opinion in India should be well warned against Soviet-CPI efforts to eliminate political opposition by dubbing it as CIA agent. Communist publications go all out to dub people they do not like as American agents. And as the CPI's official publisher has now confessed they have done it in this particular case without any verification or any facts to support them. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that in many other cases also the allegations are made without any basis. The case also reveals the close collaboration between the Soviet intelligence services who concoct these charges and the Communist Party of India which spews them through its network of publications.

On behalf of Brig. Sen, the case was fought by Advocate C. L. Sareen. Mr Sareen had shot into the limelight after he successfully protected a defecting Soviet sailor Tarasov whom the Russians wanted to whisk off after charging him falsely with theft. Mr Sareen had also successfully represented the Soviet student Ulugzade who had sought asylum in American embassy in New Delhi.

ORBIT, New Delhi
9 November 1969

CPI-Soviet big lie exposed

By Our Special
Correspondent

THE case of the book *I Was a CIA Agent*, a Communist Party publication, is a warning to the public about Communist techniques of the BIG LIE.

Communist attempts to character assassinate innocent people by dubbing them as foreign intelligence agents without any basis, forging of documents, browbeating of their victims. If the victims stand up to defend their reputation, maligning their lawyers and giving distorted versions of court testimony to serve their propaganda ends were eloquently brought out in the proceedings of the case concerning the book.

As we have already reported, the Communist party's official publisher apologised in court for the publication and confessed that the charge that the retired army officer mentioned in the book was a CIA agent was based on unverified information. The Communist party has also undertaken not to publish the book or any version of it in any manner (a photostat of the signed apology of the Communist party's publisher is reproduced here for public benefit).

Subject Failure

The apology of the publisher was a climax to their long and tortuous attempt to make propaganda capital out of the proceedings

of the case. The apology came only after all these attempts not only ended in subject failure but brought confirmation of their dirty tactics.

The apology was given, according to competent sources, only after the Communist bigwigs got convinced that further proceeding of the case would bring out revelations dangerous to them.

The impugned book was supposed to have been written by one John Smith, an employee in the American embassy in India upto 1959 who later defected to Moscow.

There is evidence that many statements in the book were never there in the original.

The book first appeared in Russian in the Moscow magazine *Litteraturnya Gazeta*. When the Communist party central office circulated the magazine articles on November 29, 1967, to "editors of all party journals and state councils" with a directive to give the widest publicity to this, it was the translation of the article from the Russian into English that was circulated.

This itself is strange. Smith did not know Russian and must have written the book, if at all he has written it, in English. Yet the original as written by Smith was not used for circulation in this country but the version as edited by the Russians was retranslated from Russian.

Why was this devious means used? Was it because Smith may not have written much of the stuff that has gone under his name?

The version published in a pamphlet form differs significantly from the version cir-

culated by the Communist Central office on November 29, 1967. Whole sentences have been recast, names that are not there in the circulated document are there in the book. In some pages whole paragraphs have been added which do not find a place in the circulated document.

This in itself is enough to cast serious doubts on the authenticity of many passages in the book. *But the authenticity of the whole book itself is questionable.*

Many incidents have been referred to in the book which occurred after the alleged author left India and US government service. Then there are most absurd references to attempts to remove Krishna Menon in the early fifties when the fact is that Krishna Menon himself became a prominent figure and Minister after 1954.

There are references to alleged attempts to defeat Krishna Menon in 1962—when in fact the alleged author was not even anywhere near the scene having left India in 1959 and U.S. services later.

The way the cow procession of November 1966 and the attack on Kamaraj's house are described could have come only from an eye witness. But Smith was all the time in the United States or roaming in Latin America and Europe. The whole book is riddled with inaccuracies, insinuations and charges against important political personalities. Some of these personalities this Smith could not have met, his position being what it was in the US Embassy—that of a communication clerk.

According to knowledgeable sources which have made a thorough analysis of the

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book, it was almost fully written down by Soviet intelligence with a specific purpose: defame certain individuals and to trump up a charge of American interference in India's internal affairs.

When the retired army officer who was implicated in the book went to court, the Communist organs blared out that they were going to expose more persons.

The Communist anger was particularly aimed at the counsel of the petitioner, Mr C. L. Sareen. They had reason to be angry at Mr Sareen. This advocate had given their principals, the Russians, enough to think about

as counsel for the Soviet sail-escape into freedom but was held down by the Russians on a charge of theft.

In the trial of Tarasov which created world wide interest, held in New Delhi, the justness of the Indian legal system triumphed over the machinations of the Communist dogma. The charge against Tarasov was found to be trumped up and without any substance.

So when Sareen appeared for the army officer who wanted to clear his name, the Communists went all out not only to malign the petitioner but also his counsel.

How far the Communists are capable of defaming blackmailing, maligning and browbeating all those who wanted to establish the truth as against their calumny, forms a story all by itself.

It is a tribute to the Indian judicial system that despite the technique of the BIG LIE and the high pitched propaganda from Communist organs, the Communists were exposed for what they were. And ultimately had to seek to wriggle out of the situation by tendering the type of apology they gave in writing. (The drama of the trial and the judiciary's findings on the Communist tactics will be published in the next issue.)

Statement of Accused D.P. Sinha,
Manager and Publisher, NEW AGE
Printing Press, Rani Jhansi Road,
New Delhi.

I published the pamphlet "I WAS A CIA AGENT IN INDIA" a COMMUNIST PARTY PUBLICATION without any intention of causing any personal harm to Brig. E.T.Sen. When this pamphlet was published I had not verified the veracity of the allegations contained in the pamphlet from Brig. E.T.Sen or John Smith.

Brig. E.T.Sen has stated that he had nothing to do with the CIA and the allegations against him are not true. I take him at his word and accept his statement as correct. I am sorry for the harm caused to him. It is regretted.

There are no more copies of this pamphlet in stock with us. No further edition of this pamphlet will be published, printed or sold by me either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, Brig. E.T.Sen can make public this statement in any manner he desires.

(D.P. Sinha)
Accused

ORGANIZER, India
8 November 1969

BHUPESH APOLOGISES:
The loud-mouthed libellous communists have asked for Brig. E. T. Sen's forgiveness in the defamation case which the army man launched against the publisher of NEW AGE, edited by Bhupesh Gupta, for printing the pamphlet "I WAS A CIA AGENT". The slanderous pamphlet, written by a former American Embassy

clerk, had contained wild charges against some leading Indians including Gen. Thimayya, Ram Subhag Singh, Frank Moraes.

One of the victims of the communists' vicious character assassination campaigns, was Brig Sen who took them to a court of law. During the hearing of the case of communists and their lawyers tried

to malign Sen in a manner to which the High Court took serious objection, administering them a "severe warning". However after these attempts failed, the comrades just caved in and tendered the apology. Said the printer of the CPI weekly: "When this pamphlet, was published I had not verified the veracity of the allegations contained in the pamphlet from Brig. E. T. Sen or John

Smith... I am sorry for the harm caused to him. It is regretted."

In order to mollify the soldier further Editor Bhupesh Gupta is also reported to have asked for his forgiveness with 'folded hands' in the lawyers' chamber. Mr. M. C. Chagla and C. L. Sareen appeared on behalf of the brigadier.

ORBIT, New Delhi
23 November 1969

Spy charge exposure-3

CPI-Soviet conspiracy to discredit Indian Army officers

By Our Special Correspondent

THE Communist Party publication "I Was a CIA Agent" was a Soviet-CPI plot to sow seeds of suspicion between the people on the one hand and the army and some leading politicians on the other, sources that have analysed the contents of the book suggest.

The contents of the book first appeared in a Soviet magazine and later were published in a pamphlet form by the CPI. Though an American who was declared of unsound mind and who later defected to Moscow is its official author, its real author is the Soviet intelligence which dreamt up this plot.

confession, legal circles say, came in order to protect the CPI from being fully exposed in the court for its conspiracy with Soviet intelligence.

[In the earlier two issues ORBIT had analysed this CPI apology.]

Fake Incidents

The Communist Party has, after a protracted legal battle in which it was humbled, admitted that the contents relating to one of the army officers was unverified and agreed that it will neither print nor distribute the book as a whole or in part, in any form. This

The attempt to create distrust of the Indian army's officers is patent in the book. The Delhi High Court has detected this in analysing the cross-examination conducted by the CPI counsel. The book accuses several officers including the late Thimayya

of being American agents. No proof is produced except some misstatements and hearsay and what the author John Smith says he knows. But these allegations do not stand even elementary scrutiny.

Counsel C.L. Sareen who appeared on behalf of the retired army officer maligned in the book proved that the real author of the book does not know a thing about the Indian army nor much about topography of Delhi either. He could prove that almost every incident mentioned in it is fake.

That the real author of

the book has made allegations without even making sure of his facts, is also clear from the incidents mentioned in the book. In one of these he says that a colonel in charge of promotions could get a car and an airconditioner because of the money he received from spying for a foreign country.

However, the fact is that this colonel was drawing a four figure salary at the time. His wife was working in a Commonwealth High Commission and getting a high salary. The colonel got his car by faking a car loan from the government. And as an

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army officer he to foreign made drinks from army stores at a very cheap price. Yet, the book says he could not afford foreign whiskey and that the CIA supplied it for him. The whole book is full of such howlers.

Yet one more fantasy is the claim that the author gave the bomb in Delhi to a Chinese who planted it subsequently on the plane that was to carry Chinese leaders to Bandung meet. Is American intelligence that inefficient that it cannot get a time bomb right in Hong Kong or Formosa itself and needs such a stunt to be flown all the way from Delhi at such risk? Advocate Sareen also pointed out that the statement of Smith that by the time Smith returned from Maiden Hotel to Bhowalpore House, the Chinese could go to Palam and board a plane, cannot be physically done as Palam is far far away from the hotel compared to Bhowalpore House.

One more silly piece of nonsense is the discovery in the communist party publication of opinion in the United States! That American naval ratings were happy when a Japanese fleet was sunk, not out of patriotism, but because the American naval ratings thought that by sinking Japanese fleet they had helped Soviet Union! Mr Sareen, who analysed the book thoroughly found that apart from fictitious incidents which also contradicted himself on every page.

That the government should have left this book unchallenged is a pity. For, if anything, it has tried to besmirch the fair name of the Ministers in authority much more.

For instance, the book refers to the cow agitation and Nanda's resignation. Though Nanda was nowhere in US service at that time he claims

with American money because the former Home Minister had discovered something about CIA. Are we to believe that what Nanda did to expose CIA was not followed up by his eminent successor? Is this not a terrible and calculated slur on the spotless character and patriotism of Nanda's successor? Surely such Communist-Soviet plot to malign the outstanding leaders of our country should not be allowed to go unchallenged.

The Home Ministry which is also concerned with general law and order in the country must take note of some of the developments during the trial. The Communists who first challenged the army officers to come to court tried to use their well known technique of misleading the public when the court case proceeded.

All the Communist organs were pressed into service to publicise widely the proceedings in such a manner as to force the complainant to leave the case. When the complainant went to Delhi High Court against the publication of truncated and tailored versions of his testimony, the Delhi High Court observed:

"The hearings and versions were not a fair and faithful report of proceedings in the court which seems to betray an oblique purpose and motive." The court further observed: "But as their plea is that they were ignorant of the precise implications of the law of contempt and their legal advisers were also unable to guide them properly..." The Communist Party however always parades its pack of "Supreme Court lawyers" and their collective views as the last word in legal wisdom in national and international affairs. It was this

on the character and patriotism of all those distinguished officers and soldiers who joined the Indian army before independence..."
This observation of the court only strengthens the conclusion of knowledgeable circles that one of the purposes of the CPI-Soviet conspiracy in publishing this book was to malign the Indian army and sow seeds of suspicion about its loyalty in the minds of the people. The Government of India and parliamentary opinion cannot but take note of this attempt.
As an example of Communist hypocrisy in making unverified charges, there is one incident in the trial that stands out.
The Communist party's counsel made an attempt to implicate the complainant army officer with a foreign power by suggesting that the legal fees of the complainant's lawyer was being paid by a foreign embassy. When the army officer said that he was paying it himself, the Communist party counsel wanted the army officer to produce the bank account.
This is how the Delhi High Court described the incident:
Cross-Examination
"The counsel for the petitioner (CPI) insisted upon the production of the bank account of the complainant (army officer); but when the account was summoned by the court and the cross-examination of the complainant proceeded thereafter for several days and scores of other questions were put to the complainant with regard to the payments made by him on account of counsel's fee, not even once did the learned counsel refer to the statement of account called for from the bank." No further comment is needed.

Poisoning Mind

The Delhi High Court also remarked: "The impugned publications (the Communist party papers) were accordingly designed by the respondents in both the cases to hamper the fair trial of the case by poisoning the gullible mind against the plaintiff" (the army officer).

The Communist purpose is clear from this.

The Communists also made an attempt to browbeat the army officer and his lawyer so that they may give up the prosecution of the party for libellous matter. This again is one of the classical communist techniques.

The Delhi High Court observed "it appears to me that a considerable portion of the cross-examination of the complainant" (the army officer) "is a gross abuse of the opportunity afforded to the accused for cross-examining the complainant."

Malign Army

It is pertinent to point out here that during the cross examination, the Communist party's counsel tried to belittle the Indian Army and its sense of loyalty to the country. The Delhi High Court observed about this.

"Apart from the fact the questions have a tendency to cast a wholly unmerited

MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
November 8, 1969

Communists Apologise For Defaming Brigadier Sen

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI: For eighteen months the Communists tried to wear the gallant old soldier down by impugning his patriotism and using smears and innuendos to blacken his reputation. And for eighteen months retired Brigadier E. T. Sen fought doggedly on, trading blow for blow till final victory.

In the end the publisher of the Communist pamphlet that had labelled Brig. Sen had to admit he had not even bothered to check the facts in the discredited booklet, which appears to have been ghost-written by KGB (Soviet Secret Police) hacks in the name of John Smith, the mentally deranged code clerk who defected to Moscow and claimed to be a CIA agent.

In the Rajya Sabha on February 29, 1968, Congress MP Arijun Arora had asked his Home Minister: "May I know if the Government has advised its army officers mentioned in the pamphlet 'I WAS A CIA AGENT' to file a defamation case so that the veracity of the allegations may be questioned before a court of law?"

COM. GUPTA'S BIG TALK

Before the Minister could reply, Comrade Bhupesh Gupta of the CPI, who is also the Editor of the CPI mouthpiece, NEW AGE, shot up in his seat and interjected: "We would welcome that because it would give us a chance to cross-examine and get the Prime Minister as a witness. Do it. We welcome it!"

The defamation case was duly filed. But when judgement was delivered it turned out that the brave Comrade had to eat his words. The printer and publisher of NEW AGE, in a statement in the court of Mr G. S. Kaira, Judicial Magistrate, apologised for publishing the pamphlet, regretted the harm caused to Brigadier Sen, said there were no stocks of the booklet in hand, and promised not to reprint it.

ABJECT RETREAT

In the lawyers' chamber, Bhupesh Gupta, it is reliably learned, begged opposing Counsel to forgive and forget, folding his hands in repentance.

Like his dear Prime Minister, whom he wished to cross-examine in court, Bhupesh confessed that the charges in the pamphlet were based on "wrong assumptions" and hence untenable!

The apology tendered by D. P. Sinha, Manager and Publisher of NEW AGE (Editor: Bhupesh Gupta) says:

"I published the pamphlet 'I WAS A CIA AGENT IN INDIA,' a Communist Party publication, without any intention of causing any personal harm to Brig. E. T. Sen.

NOT VERIFIED!

"When the pamphlet was published, I had not verified the veracity of the allegations contained in the pamphlet from Brig. E. T. Sen or John Smith.

"Brig. E. T. Sen has stated that he had nothing to do with the CIA and the allegations against him are not true. I take him at his word and accept his statement as correct. I am sorry for the harm caused to him. It is regretted.

"There are no more copies of this pamphlet in stock with us. No further edition of this pamphlet will be published, printed or sold by me either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, Brig. E. T. Sen can make public this statement in any manner he desires."

Sd/- D. P. Sinha
25.10.69
(D. P. Sinha)
Accused

ENDS IN A WHIMPER

So ended in a whimper the massive character assassination campaign the Communist Party had mounted in 1967 against a number of reputable Indians who opposed India being turned into a Soviet satellite. The pamphlet was part of the game. Supposed to have been written by a former dismissed clerk of the American Embassy, it contained allegations against Gen. Thimayya, Dr Ram Subhag Singh, Mr Frank Moraes and a host of other well-known personalities.

Brig. E. T. Sen, who filed the defamation case, was one of the main victims of the John Smith smear campaign. He took up the challenge that Bhupesh Gupta threw in the Rajya Sabha on February 29, 1968.

The Communists played it pretty rough. There were some vicious attempts by their lawyers to break Brig. Sen in Court and NEW AGE and PATRIOT indulged in tendentious and highly-coloured reports.

But these tactics proved a dismal failure. Contempt of Court proceedings were launched against the two journals and they were given a "severe warning" for misleading reporting.

In his judgement on October 17, 1969, Justice Hardyal Hardy of the Delhi High Court did not mince his words when he commented on the conduct of the lawyers defending the Communist slanderers:

GROSS ABUSE

"At several places the cross-examination (by the defendant's lawyer) was apparently directed to matters which have not the remotest connection with the matters in this issue. A number of questions would appear to have no more connection with the case than what the journey of the American Astronauts to the moon might have with the political situation in Czechoslova-

kia or India. And yet pages and pages of the record seem to be filled with such quotations.

".....it appears to me that a considerable portion of the cross-examination of the complainant (Brig. Sen) is a gross abuse of the opportunity afforded for cross-examining."

We reproduce a sampling of the line of cross-examination:

Q. Did you have any conscience to join the Army (in 1940) controlled by the foreign rulers when you joined?

Q. Did you join the Army because you were keen to fight the Fascists of Germany and Italy?

Q. When you joined the Army were you aware that there was national revolt for the freedom of the country?

Q. Were you aware in 1940 that the British Army was being used to suppress the Indian National Movement?

Q. Were you aware that the Indians hired by the British rulers in the Indian Army as also the British officers of the Indian Army were used to suppress the National Movement of the country?

Q. Did you or did you not have any qualms of conscience that you were likely to be used against the National Movement in the Indian Army?

Q. Was it your aim in 1941 to serve the British masters or India after independence?

Q. Were you completely indifferent to the political and military objectives which may be assigned by the British Government to the Army when you joined the Army?

Said Justice Hardy: "Apart from the fact that the questions have a tendency to cast a wholly unmerited aspersion on the character and patriotism of all those distinguished officers and soldiers who joined the Indian Army before Independence, the questions have not the remotest

connection with the defence set up by the petitioner."

The John Smith-KGB memoirs, and the base manner in which they were used by the CPI, are a typical example of Communist character assassination tactics.

SMEAR CAMPAIGN

Through their chain of newspapers, the largest in India, they levy wild charges against their intended victims in the hope that some of the dirt will stick and that the victims will not protest, partly because of back-breaking court procedures, partly out of fear of becoming the targets of further mud-slinging.

Once in a while, however, their victims accept their challenge, like Brig. Sen did, and have courage and perseverance enough to pursue the struggle to the bitter end.

Unfortunately, the Communists and their fellow-travellers have invariably got away with a mere apology, as in this case.

Mr M. C. Chagla and Mr C. L. Sarin (who made their mark in the Tarasov and Oulug-Zade cases) appeared on behalf of Brig. Sen. The defendants were represented, among others, by Mr Mohan Kumaramangalam, one time member of the National Executive of the CPI and recently appointed Chairman of Indian Airlines.

MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
29 November 1969

Jurists Furious At Red Slander Of Gen. Thimayya

NEW DELHI: Parliamentary circles are deeply perturbed by the Communists slandering the Indian Army in the now impugned pamphlet "I was a CIA Agent," fabricated by the Russians and the CPI to malign such distinguished sons of India as Brigadier Sen, the late Gen. K. S. Thimayya and a number of other distinguished soldiers and politicians, painting them as traitors to their country.

The pamphlet was published by the official Communist organ, NEW AGE, edited by Comrade Bhupesh Gupta, MP. The court proceedings were reported extensively in NEW AGE and PATRIOT, the two Russian financed papers, "in a tendentious manner," as was held by the Court, which administered them a severe warning.

But the Communists also accused Gen. Thimayya, and for this they have not apologised. The question the outraged Indian nation and its Army would like these Russian collaborators to answer is:

Was Gen. K. S. Thimayya, the illustrious soldier of India, a CIA agent?

In normal circumstances, one would expect Mrs Indira Gandhi or Y. B. Chavan to force the Communists to apologise. They are, however, new allies of theirs. But the PEOPLE are waiting for an answer.

Four Parliamentarians have repeated the question MARCH now

poses to the Indians.

"REPREHENSIBLE"

In a letter to the Brigadier's lawyer, C. L. Sareen, Mr M. C. Setalvad says: "It was a deliberate and reprehensible attempt to libel the Brigadier and other officers of the Indian Army. I am not an active politician, but if an opportunity arises, I shall certainly take up a proper attitude in the matter in Parliament."

Says Mr Ashok Mehta: "I congratulate you and Brig. E. T. Sen on the firm stand you took. You have exposed the technique of character assassination much favoured by certain sections of political opinion in the country today. I agree with your analysis and with the alert you have sounded against palpable dangers."

In his forwarding note to the Members of Parliament, lawyer Sareen says: "In the impugned pamphlet, several army officers, both named and unnamed, were dubbed CIA agents. Our illustrious soldier, Gen. Thimayya, was also not spared. The retired Bri-

gadier decided to make a stand and, despite all the calumny and threat, risk of exposure of his private life and expense, elected to clear his name.

"In the court, a serious attempt was made by the counsel of the accused-publisher to condemn our army officers who joined up during the British regime. While pursuing the cross-examination of Brig. Sen by these lawyers, Justice Hardayal Hardy of the Delhi High Court observed:

"It appears to me that a considerable portion of the cross-examination of the complainant is a gross abuse of the opportunity afforded to the accused for cross-examination of the complainant."

After quoting these strictures by the Judge against the Communists, Sareen appealed to the Parliamentarians:

"As a Parliamentarian charged with the defence of the country's interest, you cannot afford to leave the matter at that. The pamphlet is a part of an organis-

ed attempt to create distrust between the people and the Army. This itself should be serious. But as the pamphlet was published in collusion with a foreign country, the enormity of the crime can be understood.

"The attempt to malign innocent people, to sow the seeds of suspicion about the patriotism of the Army among the people by the CPI, in collusion with a foreign country, you would agree, merits attention at the highest level.

"The people, several of whom are victims of similar calumny by certain political parties in collusion with a foreign power, but who cannot defend themselves, now look up to you to protect them from such nefarious activities."

MARCH of the NATION sincerely hopes Parliament will take up this issue and prevent the honour and integrity of India's fighting men being sullied by those to whom slander is a convenient weapon and the big lie an accepted way of life.

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

~~SECRET~~

--Revanchism: the late, late show recapping the sins of the German Third Reich.

--Frank and businesslike atmosphere: total disagreement. A term normally reserved for crucial negotiations.

Obviously this is a game anyone can play, in any language. We suspect you may well be able to do better than Mr. Reston, whose complete article is attached for a starter.

3
~~SECRET~~

January 1970

Distinguishing the Palestinian Commando Organizations

All Palestinian commando organizations have the same basic aims: (a) the regaining of all of Palestine, including present-day Israel, and the establishment of a Palestine state which would include Muslims, Christians, and Jews; and (b) the rejection of a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli impasse, and the use of armed force as the chief weapon against Israel.

The Major Palestinian Organizations:

1. The Palestine Liberation Movement (Fatah), the largest commando organization, has no special allegiance to any particular state or political party. In contrast, other major commando groups are sponsored by either an Arab government or a political party (sometimes both).

2. The nucleus of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) comes from the George Habbash wing of the leftist Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The ANM's more extreme Marxist-Leninist faction, led by Nayif Hawatmah, controls the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).

3. The Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War and its military arm, al-Saiqa, are sponsored and controlled by the Syrian Government and the Syrian Ba'th Party.

4. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was created by the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Ba'th Party.

5. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by the Arab Summit conference as a quasi-governmental organization. It has a regular army of its own, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and a commando unit, the Popular Liberation Forces, which was formed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

In February 1969, after al Fatah succeeded in taking over its control, the PLO began to function as an umbrella for the various commando organizations and other Palestinian groups. Its Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) coordinates the release of information concerning fedayeen commando operations, and is also to coordinate their military activities. PASC now includes eight commando organizations. The PFLP is the only major fedayeen group which has not yet joined and which still continues to operate independently of PASC. Efforts are being made to bring PFLP into both the PLO and PASC, but so far no agreement has been reached.

Differences between the Commandos:

1. Party affiliations and sponsorship.

Arab governments sponsoring commando groups have tended to give their time and effort to their own rather than to Fatah and other groups. They have also been suspicious of commandos sponsored by a rival government or political party and have at times deported them or curtailed their activities.

2. Nature of cooperation.

Disagreements have arisen over reorganizing the PLO and over representation in that body. Fatah favors proportional representation, depending on the size of the commando organization, and is against equal votes for each commando group because the small groups could then paralyze action with their veto.

3. Smaller vs. larger groups.

Fatah is against the formation of smaller groups because it feels that these are being used to sap the energy of the bigger organizations. In contrast, the small commando groups feel that they serve a useful purpose and reflect differences of opinion.

4. Class struggle.

Most commando groups consider themselves representative of progressive national liberation movements. The PFLP believes that the commandos should only include the workers and peasants because of the collusion between imperialism and the big bourgeoisie. Fatah believes that this class limitation would weaken the movement and that Marx's class breakdown is not applicable to the Palestinian situation anyway.

5. Palestinian vs. Pan-Arab movement.

Some groups such as the ALF emphasize the Pan-Arab nature of the struggle. Others such as Fatah consider the conflict as primarily a Palestinian one linked with the Arab revolution.

6. PFLP strategy.

Although the commandos sympathize with any attacks against Zionist, imperialist, and Israeli interests, only the PFLP has engaged in terrorism against these targets abroad. Fatah has registered its opposition to those activities, and at this time the PFLP is alone among the commando groups in undertaking them.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

6 December 1969

Hue Massacre: Effort to Destroy Entire Society

Authority Says Murders
Were According to Plan
and Almost 6,000 Died

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG—"A squad with a death order entered the home of a community leader and shot him, his wife, his married son and daughter-in-law, his young unmarried daughter, a male and female servant and their baby. The family cat was strangled; the family dog was clubbed to death; the family goldfish were scooped out of the fishbowl and tossed on the floor."

Douglas Pike, a leading authority on communism in Vietnam, reports that scene after conducting an intensive investigation of events in Hue when the Communists held the old imperial city for 24 days in February, 1968, and slaughtered what he estimates was almost 6,000 civilians for political purposes.

"When the Communist squad left," he continues, "no life remained in the house. A 'social unit' had been eliminated."

Foreign Service Officer

Pike, a Foreign Service officer, is the author of "Viet Cong," the book generally judged the single most authoritative and exhaustive study of communism in South Vietnam.

The extinction of the community leader's family "was not due to rage, frustration or panic," Pike said. The "execution" was part of what Pike identifies as "Phase II" of the continuously sanguinary Communist occupation, when "cadres believed for a few days that they were permanently in Hue—and acted accordingly."

He notes that the Viet Cong

thereupon launched "a period of social reconstruction. Communist style. Death orders went out against 'social negatives,' individuals or groups who represented a potential danger for liability."

There was no discernible personal animus, despite the wanton cruelty that tortured the pets.

"This was quite impersonal," Pike said. "It was not a blacklist of individuals but a blacklist of titles and positions in the old society. It was directed not against people, but against 'social units'—religious organizations, political parties and social movements like women's and youth associations."

5,800 Dead or Missing

By Pike's count, based on his own research and local estimates, 5,800 Hue civilians are dead or missing, and the missing are not likely to reappear. In addition, 1,800 civilians were hospitalized, making a total of 7,600 civilians killed, abducted or injured by the Communists.

Pike said almost all the killing was dictated by political aims and ordered by political commissars. A few civilians, not more than several hundred at most, were killed or injured in the course of battle.

So far, 2,780 bodies have been recovered from the mass graves where the Communists carefully hid their victims. Further finds are made daily. But Pike does not expect all the bodies to be recovered because the Communists went out of their way to conceal the mass graves.

"The number of deaths would probably have been higher but for the limitations of time and circumstances," he said.

Out of approximately 75,000 persons under effective Communist rule for about three weeks, 7,600 became casualties. Even allowing the widest latitude for battle casualties and inadvertent killings, that means not less than 5% of the civilian populace and perhaps as high as 10% were deliberately slaughtered.

Pike, now stationed in Tokyo with the U.S. Information Service, lived in Vietnam for eight years

before writing "Viet Cong." During a leave of absence he returned to Vietnam, as he does periodically, and spent more than a week early this November pursuing his research in Hue.

Lengthy Conversation

His findings and conclusions as reported here are abstracted from a lengthy personal conversation and the draft of his report on his investigations at Hue.

After his research, Pike believes that the massacre of Hue will be the pattern for nationwide action should the Communists conquer South Vietnam. He bases that conclusion upon the fact that the massacres were deliberate acts of policy, rather than random individual deeds.

He divides the Communist campaign against the civilians of Hue into three periods:

Phase I occurred during the first few days of the occupation, when the Viet Cong did not expect to stay but wished to make an example and to "break the enemy's administrative structure."

"Civilian cadres," Pike said, "accompanied by firing squads executed key individuals to weaken governmental administration following Communist withdrawal. This was the blacklist period, the time of the drum-head court."

Kangaroo Courts

"Cadres with clipboards bearing lists of names and addresses summoned various 'enemies of the revolution' to kangaroo courts. Public trials usually lasted about 10 minutes, and there were no known not-guilty verdicts. Punishment, invariably execution, was meted out immediately."

Aside from "particularly venomous attack on Hue intellectuals," who despised communism, as a

Phase I was the period of "social reconstruction." In order to "build a new social order, it was necessary to purge the old order." The "social negatives" were eliminated. Anyone who might stand in the way of the Communists' consolidating their hold and imposing their own rule was killed.

During Phase II approximately 2,000 of the 5,800 died, including the family that was slaughtered even to its cat, dog and goldfish.

Worst Phase

Phase III, however, was the worst. During the last week of their stay, the Communists knew they would be forced to withdraw. They were determined to leave no witnesses who might testify against them or identify the 150 clandestine Communist cadres who had "surfaced" to rule Hue.

"Most victims were killed in batches during this period. At the Sand Dune Grave they were tied together in groups of 10 and cut down with sub-machine guns."

Pike adds: "A favorite local souvenir is a spent Russian machine-gun shell taken from a grave. Frequently, the dead were buried in layers of three or four, making identification particularly difficult."

He believes the Hue massacres were different from other Viet Cong terrorism "not only in degree but in kind."

New Government

It was not the quick terror used to build Viet Cong morale or to frighten the populace but the slow, intensifying terror intended to create the basis of a new government.

"There was no agonized outcry, no demonstrations at North Vietnamese embassies around the world," Pike said. "Lord Russell has not sent his 'war crimes tribunal' to take evidence. In tones tran-

scolded and rebuked. The people of Hue say the world does not know what happened or, if it knows, doesn't care."

There was, indeed, a remarkable lack of reporting on the Hue massacres, in part because the Communists had hidden their victims so well. However, as Pike indicates, there is much spathy regarding Viet Cong atrocities.

They are not news. Yet, bodies have been turning up since March 1, 1975.

In one place, a farmer walking across the sand dunes tripped over a piece of wire sticking out of the mud. In ire, he jerked at it. Out of the sand at the end of the wire came a bony hand and arm.

Victims' wrists had been bound with wire before execution.

Teams are still exploring the Hue area wearing surgical gloves well doused in alcohol, their faces masked against the stench. They dig systematically, using archeological principles... with a shallow sliding movement.

Local techniques have appeared, Pike said, for digging has practically become a local industry.

"One old war has gained fame for his ability to identify acquaintances by the shape and feel of their skulls. Bright green grass is an almost certain sign that bodies lie underneath. Children, like one 14-year-old boy, have pinpointed bodies they watched the Communists bury."

In one find, only 250 full skulls were found, but parts of many others had been washed to the mouth of the stream that was the execution ground. Among the dead were four Vietnamese and two foreign priests. Killed at the same time were a West German pediatrician and his wife who had devoted eight years to teaching medicine at the Hue Medical School and delivering babies at the Municipal Hospital. Two other West German

The pattern was clear. Anyone, Vietnamese or foreign, who sustained the old society in any way, political or social, was doomed.

What happens to a city that suffers so?"

Pike believes that, despite material recovery, there are "deep recesses in the mind of Hue that will never again know the sun."

Resentment is still widespread against Saigon and Washington, which could not prevent the orgy of slaughter.

Look Into Future

"But spending an evening with survivors," Pike said, "one is submerged in hatred against the Communists like a thick fog. The fence-sitters and the advocates of nonviolence are gone. Hardly anyone did not find a relative or intimate friend in a Communist grave. Hue's implacable hatred of communism is as fixed as a mathematical law."

And the lesson of Hue, if there is one?

Pike believes it is clear. "If the Communists win decisively, all foreigners would be expelled from the south, particularly hundreds of newsmen. A curtain of ignorance would descend. Then the night of the long knives would begin."

"A new order is to be built. While the war was long, so are memories of old scores. All political opposition, actual or potential, would be eliminated. They would eliminate not the individual (for who cares about individuals?) but the latent danger to the dream, the force that might someday even inside the regime dilute the system," Pike said.

"Little would be known abroad," he concluded. "The Communists would create a silence of death, and the world would call it peace."

BALTIMORE SUN
13 December 1969

French Reds Hint Chief's Ouster

By PATRICIA PULLAN
(Paris Bureau of The Sun)

Paris, Dec. 12—A French Communist party announcement on the illness of the party secretary, Waldeck Rochet, appears to have confirmed reports that he will be ousted as leader of the West's second-largest Communist party at its next Congress in February.

The communique from party headquarters last night said Mr. Rochet had been advised by his doctors to begin "several months of convalescence and reduced activity."

The 64-year-old Communist leader has undergone surgery twice this year for kidney and prostate trouble.

Strong Constitution

A man with a strong constitution, Mr. Rochet has told party officials and Moscow that he will soon be fit again.

According to informed sources, his doctors have seconded this verdict, but the party is apparently turning a deaf ear.

Since Mr. Rochet succeeded the late Maurice Thorez in 1964, he has been the center of controversy, starting with a brief intra-party struggle before he even landed the job.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russian troops in 1968 caused Mr. Rochet considerable anxiety. The ambiguous attitude

of the French Communist party, which was split over whether to support the invasion reinforced this. Mr. Rochet was attacked by the conservative wing of the party for following Moscow only after a period of hesitation.

The liberals took him apart for not taking a strong stand against Russian occupation of Prague.

Two men figure prominently in the speculation as to who will succeed Mr. Rochet. Both of them are pillars of the Political Bureau.

Roland Leroy, a 43-year-old deputy for the Seine-Maritime department, is secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party. His mission has been to control the dissident intellectuals. A protege of Maurice Thorez, his main drawback is his youthful ardor. He is known as a man in a hurry.

Fifty-year-old Georges Marchais, on the other hand, is a "Stalinite" of the old school. Unlike Mr. Leroy, he has never been in the public eye, and is what the Russian Communists call an "apparatchik." His duties have been strictly confined to the internal affairs of the Communist party.

In the Paris suburb of Nanterre, where Mr. Rochet lives in a two-story six-room house with his wife Pauline, whom he married in 1936, the Christmas preparations

continue. Mr. Rochet will preside at the yuletide dinner for his three children and six grandchildren. Only one topic of conversation is strictly forbidden by the head of the family and that is papa's future.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

9 December 1969

Red Nonsense Still Nonsense

BY RICHARD RESTON
Times Moscow Bureau Chief

MOSCOW—Once upon a time there was a Russian language that made sense. That was long ago, back in the days of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov and Pushkin, all modest fellows with a bit of poetry in their souls.

The years went by and along came a couple of new chaps named Marx and Lenin. It was a good team and together they formed an ideology, known today as Marxism-Leninism.

It was the best ideology around, a splendid idea for the whole human race, or so said the Bolsheviks of their revolution 52 years ago.

The revolution would create a new man. The man has not yet arrived, but a new political language has. It is a truly wondrous thing.

America can no longer claim a monopoly on political nonsense. Russia now has a "sufficiency of strength" backed by a mighty arsenal of convoluted political cliches. Indeed, the United States is in grave danger of losing this race for the ultimate weapon—the phrase or word that means absolutely nothing to everyone.

What the two great powers need is a new round of negotiations in Helsinki, known as the MALT talks, or Movement for an Alternative Line of Twaddle.

But, first, it is necessary to compile for the outside world a glossary defining some of the Kremlin's more potent political weapons. This could prove critical to the success of MALT. The following is suggested reading for all bewildered adults:

Running dog of imperialism: an animal, especially of American extraction, suffering from distemper. It tends to froth at the mouth while giving press conferences in Washington, particularly at the Pentagon.

★

Rightward and leftward deviations: person driving under the influence of alien ideas and badly in need of a lecture from the nearest Marxist-Leninist cop.

Revisionism: individualist or non-conformist. Someone who does his own thing

without first reading the gospel according to Moscow. Frequently a Chinese, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav or Romanian.

Behind the cover of ultra-revolutionary phrase mongering: new movie banned in the Communist world.

Leninist interpretation: a sort of papal encyclical backed by a force other than religion.

Dictatorship of the proletariat: the people may not always be right but the Kremlin is never wrong.

Internationalist approach to national problems: you scratch my back, but I'll break yours if necessary. Czechoslovakia knows.

Rightwing and leftwing opportunism: wrong-thinkers anywhere in the world.

Adventurist actions: if you've got to do your bit, try it when big brother is not watching.

Fraternal aid: with friends like this, who needs enemies? (Ask any Czech).

The happy worker: boozy befuddlement after borscht and one bottle of vodka washed down by a second.

Socialist realism: the world's only tolerated art form. Never let it be said that experimentation or enlightenment interfered with this school of art.

Solidarity of the working class: communal living is in. Togetherness is happiness.

More vigilance: Communist substitute for Geritol.

★

Revanchism: the late, late show recapping the sins of the German Third Reich.

Centrifugal tendencies: a leak in the Kremlin's plumbing, particularly in Eastern Europe and China.

Certain shortcomings: we're only second best but we try harder.

Petty bourgeoisie: tiny westerner with tiny mind.

Social or Communist democracy: oft used phrase of uncertain meaning common to traditional communiques.

Frank and businesslike atmosphere: total disagreement. A term normally reserved for crucial negotiations.

Inevitable fiasco: Kremlin prediction when the West is about to score a success.

Leading role of the Communist Party: do unto others . . . and forget the rest.

Capitalism versus communism: according to an old Armenian joke, capitalism is the exploitation of man by man and communism is the opposite.

Moral—Never trust a man with a good cliche at your throat.