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THE SOVIET NAVAL FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Since 1968, when the Soviets began maintaining a continuous presence, they have made over fifty goodwill or flag-showing visits to over twenty-five ports in some twenty countries. They also engage in training exercises and space support activities. In the current year there is likely to be a sharp increase -- estimated by some to be as much as seventy-five percent -- in the number of visits, many made in connection with the marking of the Lenin centenary. Among the Indian Ocean ports they have visited are those in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Mauritius, the Somali Republic, South Yemen and Tanzania.

When these visits first started in 1968, the squadron included ships from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and was made up of F-class submarines, a guided missile light cruiser (KYNDA-class), a guided missile destroyer (KRUPNYY-class) and a conventional destroyer (KOTLIN-class). Now the Indian Ocean Fleet has an estimated total of fifteen to twenty ships consisting of: four to six cruisers and destroyers, both missile-equipped; one to three regular destroyers; some half-dozen support ships; four to eight space-related or scientific research ships; and two to four submarines, including an occasional missile-equipped nuclear-class submarine. A recent addition to the fleet is a new type tank-landing ship capable of carrying a battalion-size amphibious force. The growth of the naval force has been accompanied by a comparable increase in the number of Soviet merchant vessels and electronically-equipped fishing boats in the same area. None of the naval ships has appeared to stay on station for more than a few months, but rotation on a regular basis ensures their continuous presence in the area.

Concurrent with the increase in the size of the fleet has been the acquisition of rights to use or construct naval facilities in the area. There have been recurrent reports that the Soviets are building a submarine repair base on the South Yemen island of Socotra, which is located in the entrance to the Gulf of Aden from the Indian Ocean. It has also been repeatedly rumored that the Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet has been granted base rights on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as well as on India's east coast, including the submarine base at Visakhapatnam where the Soviets are helping the Indians to expand the naval facilities and where Russian technicians are reportedly stationed to service Soviet-made submarines. By an agreement drawn up with the government of Mauritius in August 1969, the Soviets will have a strategically located permanent supply base at Port Louis off the east coast of Africa. It is very probable they will now actively seek to acquire, through negotiations with the newly-elected leftist Ceylon government, base rights at the northern port of Trincomalee which was used by the allied forces in World War II.

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SUNDAY STAR  
5 April 1970

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# Russia Seeks Bases For Indian Ocean Fleet

By ERNEST WEATHERALL  
Special to The Star

**BOMBAY** — The Soviets are launching an economic offensive in South Asia in an effort to secure naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Their biggest target so far is Mauritius, an island off the African Coast, which received its independence from Britain three years ago.

Mauritius is a small, overcrowded island which was discovered by the Portuguese more than 400 years ago, occupied by the Dutch, settled by the French and captured by the British, who imported laborers from India.

Its main crop is sugar, but since the British are withdrawing their inflated subsidy, the island faces economic collapse.

The Soviets already are buying oil and supplies in Port Louis, the capital of Mauritius, for their growing Indian Ocean fleet, and are anxious to secure a land base on the island.

In return, Moscow has promised to set up some industries to help the island's economy.

With this tempting offer, Mauritius can hardly turn down Moscow's overtures, but the possibility of a Russian naval base in the Indian Ocean

has caused great concern in London and Washington.

There is a fear the Soviets will turn the ocean into a "Red sea" when the British pull their forces out of the Far East in 1971.

At present, the Soviet fleet is supplied by a "sea train," a tactic developed by the U.S. Navy in the eastern Mediterranean. Warships are supplied at sea by auxiliary ships and oilers, thus making a land base unnecessary.

The big problem is that the Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean must return to the Black Sea ports via the African cape thousands of miles away or to the Siberian naval base at Vladivostok, for repairs and maintenance.

The Soviets are looking for a base on the Indian subcontinent. Moscow is going all out to woo Pakistan away from the Red Chinese, but the Soviet influence is not strong enough as yet to bring up the question of a naval base.

Russian influence in India appears to be even greater than that of the United States. Moscow has not only supplied India with millions of dollars for economic aid, but has equipped the Indian navy with submarines, destroyer escorts, missile-equipped patrol boats and its air force with MIG fighters.

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15 March 1970

# Soviets Boost Influence in Indian Ocean

By WILLIAM J. COUGHLIN

**NEW DELHI**—The Soviet Union is developing a political, economic and military penetration of the Indian Ocean area from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia.

The world has carefully noted the Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean, and the Kremlin's influence in North Africa and the Mideast. Moscow's less dramatic but significant moves into the Indian Ocean have drawn less attention.

But the Soviet effort there already is well advanced. Knowledgeable observers believe Moscow is trying to fill any vacuum that may develop in the Indian Ocean in the wake of the 1971 withdrawal of British forces east of Suez and the American slowdown in Vietnam.

The Soviet diplomatic thrust was backed up in the past year by increased fleet commitments to the Indian Ocean. Further, it appears that Moscow soon will obtain the vital naval bases in the region to support its political and economic goals.

These facts emerge from a just-concluded Los Angeles Times survey of political and intelligence sources throughout the region.

The Soviet success in nations bordering an ocean that laps the east coast of Africa and the west coast of Australia, as well as Asia and the Indian subcontinent, presents a foremost challenge to President Nixon's Guam Doctrine aimed at easing U.S. commitments in the region.

The Soviet Navy, while it has not publicly designated an Indian Ocean fleet, has become the major naval power in the ocean. No sooner had the British disclosed their intentions in early 1968 of pulling out of the waters east of Suez than three Soviet warships embarked from the North Pacific on a 23,000-mile cruise to the Indian Ocean.

One of the best gauges of

Soviet involvement in the area can be found in its military aid programs. The \$100 million agreement with Iran once bitterly at odds with Moscow, calls for supply of aircraft equipment and armored personnel carriers. Small arms are being supplied to Yemen and South Yemen, where the British have evacuated the strategic port of Aden. Nearly all the Army equipment in Iraq is Russian. Iraq operates Soviet-built submarine chasers, torpedo boats, TU16 medium bombers, IL28 light bombers and about 80 MIG interceptors, together with Soviet-built transport aircraft and helicopters.

India's huge military establishment, second biggest in the Free World, is largely Soviet-equipped—from Army tanks and Navy submarines and destroyers to Air Force MIG21s and supersonic Sukhoi7 fighter bombers.

Pakistan, under its new military agreement with Moscow, is believed to be receiving more than 250 tanks in addition to 130 mm. guns, radar equipment and helicopters.

Indonesia is equipped with \$80 million worth of Soviet military weapons, including anti-aircraft guns and radar, a cruiser, seven destroyers, seven frigates, from 6 to 12 submarines and 6 minesweepers.

Moscow's military aid to Indonesia dropped to the supply of spare parts on a cash basis after the 1965 anti-Communist upheavals, but Foreign Minister Adam Malik hoped to win better terms during a visit to the Soviet capital last month.

Reaction to the Soviet thrust among Asian political leaders has ranged from near hostility in Thailand to a warm welcome from Singapore's pragmatic Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Apathy best describes the attitude of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Government in India. Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik hopes the naval forces of all the big powers will stay out but he is willing to accept American and Soviet economic aid.

The new Soviet presence is not entirely unwelcome, some Asian leaders see it as evidence of a deliberate Soviet policy to block Chinese expansion. (TPS)

BALTIMORE SUN  
19 April 1970

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# India's Navy, With Russian Assistance, Is Looking To The East From New Base

## Soviet Interest Heavy In Base Going Up At Visakhapatnam

By ADAM CLYMER

(New Delhi Bureau of The Sun)

Visakhapatnam, India—The Indian Navy is looking east these days, across the bay of Bengal from this dusty boom town where bars stock the best of Russian vodka.

About halfway between India's major, and overcrowded, East Coast ports of Calcutta and Madras, Visakhapatnam is being turned into a major naval base at a cost estimated at about \$130 million. While American and Japanese private capital is heavily involved in industry and civilian port expansion, Russian assistance is a major element in construction the base, the home port thus far for three submarines and five destroyer exports sold by the U.S.S.R. to India.

### Terms Secret

Terms are never publicly discussed, and no mention of Soviet help appeared in the annual defense report Tuesday, but the Russian interest here is heavy. About 40 engineers are showing

the Indians how to install maintenance equipment. Naval officers are on hand to observe Indian ship-handling under the one-year guarantees that accompany ship sales.

But as the Soviet Navy increases its own presence in Indian Ocean waters, it is handy to have repair equipment ready for Soviet-built ships. Although Indian officials insist no deals have been made for a Russian "base," most observers consider this only a semantic distinction, and feel the Russians will be able to use the facilities when they want them.

### Eastward Focus

But the base is here, not to suit Soviet convenience, but to focus on East Pakistan, on India's Andaman Islands, and on possible long-range instability, in which China could have an interest, in Burma and Indonesia.

Another base is being constructed in the Andamans, in a superb natural harbor concealed to view except from the air. But the forward base 700 miles from here has no hinterland to support it, and the East Naval Command—the older Western Command—is at Bombay—is here at Vizag, as the place is called. Authoritative Indian sources insist that the Russians have

nothing to do with the Andamans, and that the ban on foreigners there applies to the Russians as much as to anyone else.

### Growing Dependence

Despite the growing dependence on Russian help, there is clear evidence that the Indian Navy is not happy in a Russian bear hug. Most important, the Indians recently scrapped a two-year program of sending crews to the Soviet Union to learn how to operate the F-class attack submarines being purchased.

The Indians felt they were being "taken" by the charge of \$350 per man per month. So when the third Soviet submarine arrived here in early February, its crew was trained in India.

### Ship Problems

Nor have the Russian naval officers sent to India made a favorable impression. According to Indian officers they are clamorous and given to complaining about their quarters. The Indians note that complaint sardonically and recall that they have had to modify the Soviet submarines to provide more living space for the crew.

There have been some prob-

lems with the Soviet ships, including delayed deliveries. At least one, and possibly three, of the Pelya class destroyer escorts was laid up in Bombay (rather than at the incomplete facilities at Vizag) most of the winter with some undisclosed operational problem. There are also unconfirmed reports of difficulties with the submarine engines, attributed to their being used in warmer waters than those they were designed for.

But even with some difficulties, the Indian Navy is committed to Soviet equipment, though some officers talk longingly of their old association with the British, which they say ended because the British were unwilling to go along with satisfactory credit terms on ship purchases.

Vizag is the key to the utilization of those Russian ships. The submarine area is secluded, with

neither the subs nor a Russian tender on view. The port is now the main training base for sailors, but expansion of other activities may shift that activity away, to some place in neighboring Orissa state.

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JAPAN TIMES  
28 May 1970

## India, Russia Ink Shipping Protocol

NEW DELHI (Kyodo-Reuters) India and the Soviet Union have agreed to provide repair and dry-docking facilities for their ships at each other's ports, under a shipping protocol signed here Tuesday. An Indian technical team

will shortly visit the Soviet Union to study facilities available at the Black Sea ports and discuss technical details. The protocol was signed by S. A. Loujachenko, Soviet deputy minister of shipping, and Iqbal Singh, Indian deputy minister of shipping. A seven-member Soviet delegation led by Loujachenko has been visiting Indian ports and holding discussions with shippers and officials since May 13.


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EVENING NEWS, Manila  
9 May 1970

## Newscope

### USSR's Growing Submarine Power

By MELCHOR P. AQUINO



Evening News - 9 May 1970

Two Soviet missile-equipped nuclear submarines have reportedly been deployed by the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean to buttress its fleet in that strategic area.

This is interpreted by military analysts as a confirmation of earlier reports that the Soviet Union is in the process of organizing a permanent task force in the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean Fleet of the USSR, now estimated to number between 14 and 18 seacraft, consists of missile-equipped nuclear submarines, missile-equipped cruisers, destroyers, support ships, and scientific or space-related ships.

The latest additions to the Soviet naval contingent in the Indian Ocean are reported to have been deployed from the Soviet Pacific Fleet, leaving the Japan Sea about 5 April. On that day, a newscast on Radio Moscow was monitored, extolling the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet, and stating that "today the redoubtable surface and submarine vessels leave the shores of the Soviet Far East for great journeys abroad."

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Military experts have noted that Soviet Pacific Fleet activity had increased almost 75 per cent in the last year. This was directly due to an increase in Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean and a widening of the range of the Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet.

There has also been a significant rise in the number and in the operations of Soviet merchant and fishing vessels in this area.

The USSR is rapidly developing one of the largest submarine fleets in the world. At the present rate it is building submarines capable of firing nuclear missiles from a submerged position, the USSR may soon be the world's foremost submarine power.

Much of the information the USSR has been collecting in the Indian Ocean via its intelligence-equipped trawlers and scientific "research" vessels is believed to be vital to the strategic deployment of its submarines.

The Soviets are reportedly building a submarine repair base on the Island of Socotra belonging to Southern Yemen. Socotra, which lies in one of the entrances to the Indian Ocean, is 150 miles from the tip of the Somali Republic, and 300 miles from the Southern coast of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oms

There have also been recurrent reports alleging that the government of India has granted the Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet base rights on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the other entrance to the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union has also succeeded in securing a permanent supply base on the Island of Mauritius. It is now wooing Pakistan and Malaysia for the obvious purpose of securing other support facilities.

The Soviet Union has made no secret of its intention to move into the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the British from the Indian Ocean in 1968. Publicly, Soviet fleet activities have centered on goodwill trips and displays of strength.

Since 1968, the Soviets have literally advertised their Indian Ocean Fleet by making 50 visits to 24 ports in 16 countries bordering on the Indian Ocean. Deploying first-line capital ships and submarines, the Soviets have projected an awesome presence with their panoply of formidable guided missiles and sophisticated electronic equipment.

The Soviet Union has simultaneously been engaged in a build-up of ships that ultimately will have strategic as well as tactical objectives in the Indian Ocean area.

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The diplomatic leverage its fleets in and around Asian waters give the Soviet Union should be carefully assessed.

That Soviet diplomacy is trying its wings in a new climate is evidenced by on-and-off suggestions from Moscow for a "new and more realistic" collective security agreement on Southeast Asia. Through its deployment of naval forces in the Middle East, coupled with skillfully managed military assistance to Egypt, the Soviet Union has become a Middle East power.

In the politics of the whole Middle East, the Soviet Union's military presence is a factor to reckon with. If its success in the Middle East is a reliable indication of the diplomatic leverage that a show of strength gives the Soviet Union, there is no telling how soon the USSR will be enjoying enormous influence in Southeast Asia and on the Pacific littoral.

From the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union has forged a chain of naval power, which does not augur well for the balance of power in such a vast expanse of strategic and diplomatic contention.

For the Philippines, Soviet military presence may increasingly draw near. Through military and technical assistance to other countries in this part of the world, the USSR patently seeks to extend its military-diplomatic influence. The thrust of Soviet power and influence in this direction presents problems and challenges to Philippine-American military collaboration.

# Soviets move in on Indian Ocean

by Ernest Weatherall

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Cochin, India

Many Western diplomats see the Soviet Union as having staked out a claim to the Indian Ocean. They feel Moscow intends turning this "third biggest of the world's oceans into a "Red sea."

Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean followed Britain's decision to withdraw its military presence east of the Suez by 1971. Already the Royal Navy based in Singapore has shrunk to 11 destroyers and frigates, three submarines, and a few mine sweepers.

Meanwhile the British have been watching an increasing number of warships from the Vladivostok-based Soviet Red Banner Pacific fleet passing by Singapore as they steam through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. Other Soviet naval vessels make even longer journeys to the Indian Ocean, from the Black Sea via the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic around the tip of South Africa.

An American Admiral, John S. McCain Jr., commander of the Pacific, observed: "The Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean is part of their worldwide emphasis on expanding their sea power. And I don't mean naval units, but also oceanography, fishing, and their merchant marine."

It has been estimated that the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean squadron consists of 14 warships built around guided-missile-carrying vessels. Their area of operation is off the West Coast of India in the Arabian Sea. Most of the warships and supply vessels are based in Vladivostok, but when the Suez Canal is open they will be supplied from the Black Sea naval bases.

The composition of the Russian squadron changes from time to time as ships are rotated. Recently, the Soviet newspaper Izvestia quoted Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviet naval commander, as saying that a nuclear submarine had made a four-month cruise of the Indian Ocean.

Admiral McCain has no doubt that the Soviets intend adding an Indian Ocean fleet to their expanding navy. "They have every intention of filling the gap left by the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean," he maintains.

During Admiral Gorshkov's visit to India last year, there was speculation that the Soviets would be given bases on the Indian subcontinent or on the strategic Andaman Islands for their projected Indian Ocean fleet.

This has been denied many times by the Indian Government. Defense Minister Swaran Singh has repeated: "We have only offered the Russians the port facilities that

we have given the warships of Britain, the United States, and other countries." These facilities include fresh water, supplies, and emergency repairs.

According to Admiral McCain, the key to the Soviet aspirations in the Indian Ocean lies in their increased ability to "operate far from their own bases by relying on replenishment at sea. The United States Navy has long relied on this technique but the Soviets have only recently adopted it."

## Air cover not available

This "sea train" supply system in which auxiliary vessels give logistical support to the ships at sea, does enable the Soviet fleet to avoid the international complications of operating with bases. But it has one serious shortcoming. It leaves the Soviet warships without vital air cover.

Without this, their fleet in the Indian Ocean would be in the same position as were Britain's battleships Repulse and Prince of Wales when Japanese torpedo planes sank them off the Malaya coast shortly after Pearl Harbor.

One way the Russians could provide themselves with air cover would be to build large aircraft carriers. However, this would prove costly. Instead observers believe the Soviets are likely to continue building helicopter-carrying warships, such as the Moscow, which is already in operation.

The only alternative is to find land or island bases in and around the Indian Ocean, and to develop a fighter bomber the equivalent of the American F-111. If the Soviets can get these bases and use them as freely as the American use their bases around the world, it will solve their problem of air cover for the Indian Ocean fleet.

For this reason, Moscow has been shopping around for land bases in the area. They are developing their relations with Malaysia and establishing diplomatic relations with Singapore. They are also looking for opportunities to establish Indian Ocean bases in East Africa or at Red Sea ports.

Although the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet could operate by being supplied at sea, the warships periodically would have to return to Vladivostok or Black Sea ports for refitting and repairing. This problem would be solved, though, if the Soviets could acquire the huge naval base in Singapore when the British leave in 1971.

The King George VI graving dock, five floating docks, berths, cranes, work shops, machine tools, and other equipment will remain idle when there is no British fleet to serve. This in turn could cause an economic hardship for Singapore.

In its overtures toward Singapore, the Soviets have established a regular air service from New Delhi to Singapore. Moscow has already made advances on the economic front by giving large orders for Singapore products, and has begun operating a regular Black Sea-Singapore service to compete with the Far East Freight Conference.

The Soviets have made arrangements for the Jurong Shipyard to service their trawlers operating in the Indian Ocean. They have also expressed their desire, according to reports, to rent facilities in the Singapore naval base when the British leave.


Moscow also has its gaze on some of the independent Indian Ocean islands. In Mauritius, Soviet ships, particularly tankers are making increasing use of Port Louis. With the island facing possible severe economic problems in 1970 when the Commonwealth sugar guarantee price system comes to an end, the Soviets now are waiting to see how Britain intends to support the island's economy.

The Soviets chose the Mauritius area for the splashdown of its "Zond 5" space capsule following its moon orbit. Moscow has hinted that other soft landings will be made in the Indian Ocean, including manned space

capsules returning from moon orbit flights.

All the evidence suggests, then, that the Soviets are rushing into the power vacuum being created by the British withdrawal. It is thus ironic that almost a century ago, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India warned: "The Russians are prodigiously strong and they mean business."

Every move by Russia, Curzon said, would have to be answered by a British countermove, otherwise Russia would plant her flag on the shores of the Persian gulf. But her first move, Curzon warned, would be to attack India and cripple the British there.



# Soviet ship berths on Indian Ocean stir political questions

New Delhi fleet.

The Soviet Navy has extended its "shadowing maneuvers" to the Indian Ocean.

According to reports from the Royal Malaysian Navy, three Soviet warships have been seen in international waters in the area where a five-nation military exercise will take place next month. Australian, British, Malaysian, New Zealand, and Singapore naval units will be holding perhaps their last joint maneuvers before the British pull their forces out of the Far East next year.

The Soviet shadowing team usually consists of fast destroyers, which observe tactical maneuvers of rival naval units, and an intelligence ship (usually an oceanographic research vessel), which can monitor radio communications between the ships and shore.

Unless the Soviets bring in one of their naval helicopter carriers, they will have to forgo their usual aircraft reconnaissance of the exercise, since the Russians have no air bases in the area.

## Freighters watched

The Soviets already have been shadowing Chinese Communist freighters bringing supplies to Dar es Salaam for construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.

Soviet ships are no longer expected to be a novelty in the Malaysia-Singapore area of the Indian Ocean. Singapore is prepared to make its huge naval dockyards, which the British turned over to the city, available to warships of the Soviet Union on the same basis as those of other nations.

Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has been looking for business to keep the big yards, completed by the British just before World War II, in operation so the city's economy will not suffer when the British Navy leaves the Indian Ocean.

Some American combat vessels have already been repaired in the Singapore dockyards. Mr. Lee sees no reason why the Soviet ships cannot be serviced there as well, so long as the Russians pay in hard currency. This policy could well lead to the unusual picture of a Soviet and an American warship side by side in the overhauling facilities.

However, the stated American policy at the moment is to withdraw its military presence from Southeast Asia. This could well leave the Singapore dockyards exclusively to the Soviet Union, which desperately needs the repair facilities for its growing Indian Ocean

fleet. Indian Defense Minister Sardar Swaran Singh feels that the U.S. will remain in the Indian Ocean despite indications of pulling out. The 1970's would witness a triangular power contest between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, Mr. Singh told the parliamentary consultant committee for India's Defense Ministry.

"These three contestants will largely cancel one another, leaving no single power unchallenged in the Indian Ocean." Mr. Singh left no illusions about the limited role of the Indian Navy. Its mission would be to defend its coastal waters and ocean territories like the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, and the Laccadive and Minicoy Islands on its west coast.

Most naval authorities would not agree with Mr. Singh that Communist China would be in any position to move its naval forces into the Indian Ocean power vacuum when the British leave.

## Peking resources limited

There have been reports of submarines and small Chinese naval craft being sighted, along with trawlers that had more wireless antennas than necessary for a fishing vessel. But Peking's resources to build a navy to rival that of the Soviet Union are very limited.

Then there is the problem of securing a naval base on the Indian Ocean. One possibility would be at Dar es Salaam where the Chinese are helping to build a naval base at Kigamboni, which Peking might be permitted to use.

The U.S. has only a converted seaplane tender, and some other vessels in the Persian Gulf as a permanent "Indian Ocean squadron" to "show the flag."

But America has a sophisticated tracking station, called "le golf ball" by residents in the Seychelles, an island in the British Indian Ocean territory. This listening post snoops on the growing number of Soviet warships near St. Brandon Island off Mauritius.

St. Brandon is a coral island on which the Soviets are reported to be putting up a listening post themselves to keep an eye on the Anglo-American military radar stations in the British Indian Ocean territories.

At present, Soviet supply ships call regularly at Port Louis in Mauritius for fuel and supplies to supply the Russian warships in the Arabian Sea.

By Ernest Weatherall  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
11 June 1970

# Magnet for Soviet ships seen in east-of-Suez vacuum

By Ernest Weatherall  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

By the time Britain removes the last remnants of its once proud and powerful naval force from east of Suez in 1971, the Soviets will have established a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

This is the view of Western political and military leaders who point to the steady buildup of Soviet ships in the area. Already a Soviet naval force operates in strength in the Arabian Sea area of the Indian Ocean.

At the same time, Washington has reacted coolly to suggestions that it act to fill the vacuum left by the departing British ships. Since the United States Navy is stretched thin with commitments in the Mediterranean, Vietnam, and now the Sea of Japan, the sentiment in Congress is against further duties as world policeman.

There are indications, however, that as United States commitments in Vietnam decline, it might act in concert with Australian and New Zealand naval forces in patrolling the ocean.

## Regional hurdle

Meanwhile, several countries bordering on the Indian Ocean are concerned with the Soviet naval penetration of the area. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik called for "defense cooperation" between Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia "to defend the Indian Ocean."

Indonesia has a powerful fleet, mostly Russian-equipped during the Sukarno regime. Its naval forces would have to be taken into account in any future defense setup. However, India has not reacted to the suggestion. One hurdle in convincing India is that such cooperation would include Pakistan.

South Africa recently expressed its concern about the power vacuum developing in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister B. J. Vorster said he was holding discussions at "the highest level" about the situation but did not reveal with whom the discussions were taking place.

Singapore's biggest concern is an economic one. When there are no more British

ships using the huge naval base, the city without a hinterland will have to find other ways of earning revenue. There have been indications that Singapore might rent the naval base facilities to the Soviets after 1971.

Meanwhile, both Singapore and Malaysia have persuaded the Australians to keep a limited number of forces in their countries after the British leave.

There have always been Australian and New Zealand warships with the British Far East fleet. Whether they pull out of these waters depends mainly on what the United States does after the Vietnam war.

Australia would like to have the U.S. take an interest in the Indian Ocean and set up a chain of island bases. Britain still controls a number of these widely scattered and thinly populated islands which are known as the British Indian Ocean Territories—BIOT for short.

The westernmost base in the proposed Indian Ocean security chain would be in the Seychelles Island off the African coast. In the center would be the Chagos Archipelago, the largest island being the horseshoe-shaped coral atoll called Diego Garcia. It is 13 miles long and has an excellent harbor which could be used as a navy base as well as a staging area for troops.

To the east are the Cocos Islands, another strategic link in the chain. There is already an excellent air base on Keeling, one of the islands in the area.

## 'Showing the flag'

The Indian Ocean security chain would be supplied from a "super base" in northern Australia. It has been suggested that if and when the United States troops pull out of Vietnam and other areas on the Asian mainland, they be stationed in Australia as a mobile strategic force.

At present the U.S. has a tiny Middle East squadron with two destroyers as its only warships, though other vessels often join the group on a tour of duty. The flagship of the fleet is the converted seaplane tender Valcour which has been painted white and air-conditioned for its lonely vigil in the hot Middle East.

The squadron's home port is in Bahrain off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia. In

normal times it is used to "show the flag" off the East African coast, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Recently, the U.S. guided-missile frigate Dahlgren called at Bombay to let the Indians know the Soviets had not yet turned the Indian Ocean into their own private lake.

However, there are indications that the U.S. is being forced by the Soviet penetration into the oil-rich Persian Gulf area to increase American presence in the Indian Ocean. It is known that American military planes have been making a survey of the Indian Ocean islands.

### Super-secret base

The leftist Patriot, a New Delhi newspaper which echoes the Soviet line in India, said that as a result of Prime Minister John G. Gorton's visit to Washington, Australia and the United States would establish military bases on the Indian Ocean islands. The islands would also have a system of early warning communications facilities which would be linked with the proposed anti-ballistic missile system to guard the U.S. against nuclear attack.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Parliament that India had been informed by the United States that the proposed communi-

cation facilities on the Indian Ocean islands cannot be considered to be bases as there is no intention of stationing any troops on them.

It is believed these communications bases will be linked up to the new super-secret base in central Australia, which Mr. Gorton admitted was being constructed by the Americans. There are several other American "spy" bases in Australia. They have become the target of Soviet propaganda attacks, and many Australians fear the bases someday may become targets of Soviet missiles.

While Indian politicians insist there will be no power vacuum in the Indian Ocean when the British leave, Vice-Admiral A. K. Chatterji, chief of India's naval staff, takes a more realistic view. "India is passing through perilous times," he said. "Throughout the vast area surrounding the Indian Ocean there is a tremendous struggle for survival on one hand and for power on the other.

"With the withdrawal of the British naval and military influence, a vacuum will be created in this area," Admiral Chatterji said. "It will be important that, whichever power steps into this vacuum, the final result should be consistent with Indian interests."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

24 November 1969

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

# Soviet Navy fans out over the Arabian Sea

By Ernest Weatherall  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

In its first phase of filling the vacuum following the 1971 British withdrawal from east of Suez, the Soviet Union is deploying warships in the Arabian Sea.

So far this fleet, supplied at sea by auxiliary vessels, does not have to depend on land bases.

However, there are indications that the Soviet Navy is planning to use the island of Mauritius as a permanent supply base for its Indian Ocean fleet.

Western intelligence has watched the Soviet naval buildup in the area during

the past two years. A few months ago as many as 16 Soviet vessels were sighted in the vicinity.

A Mauritian newspaper also reported Soviet warships cruising or anchored off the St. Brandon group of islands, 230 miles north of Mauritius. It was in this region that the Soviet moon-orbiting "Zond 5" made its splashdown in September of last year.

Now that the monsoon in the Indian Ocean has ended, it is expected that the Soviet Union will attempt another soft landing of its space vehicles.

### Striking force described

The combination of the naval striking forces changes, but a typical one is

build around a Kynda class guided-missile light cruiser escorted by guided-missile destroyers and F class attack submarines.

Last year a 19,000-ton Soviet cruiser Dimitri Pozharsky and two other warships visited Indian ports. However, Soviet nuclear submarines operating in the Indian Ocean have not made any port calls during the past year for political reasons.

Soviet sailors have no longer become a novelty in the Mauritius capital, Port Louis. The sailors are mostly from tankers who put into Mauritius for fuel oil for the fleet. Soviet auxiliary ships have been buying other supplies and provisions lately, which has caused a

minor boom in economically depressed Mauritius.

The 720-square mile island, a British possession for 154 years, received its independence last year. But its independence celebration was muffled by communal clashes.

### Ethnic groups clash

The Creoles, who are of mixed European and African ancestry and who trace their families back to the time when the island was owned by the French, clashed with the Muslims. The Hindus, who are disliked by both groups and who were brought over to work in the sugar fields by the British, account

for more than half of the 800,000 people on Mauritius.

Added to this racial tension are both a frighteningly high birth rate, and the island's one crop economy—sugar. The gloomy economic picture is darkened by the fact that Britain's \$60-a-ton sugar subsidy, which brought in \$8 million to the budget each year, is due to expire soon.

### Opportunity noted

Unless Mauritius can diversify its economy, the island will be in trouble. The new government is trying to attract new foreign investment to bring industry to Mauritius.

This chance to invest has not been wasted on the Russians. As it is doing in Malaysia, Singapore, and other strategic areas, Moscow begins with an economic offensive to secure a foothold.

Although the Russians can keep their Indian Ocean warships supplied by a "fleet train" at sea, they prefer to have at least one land base. Vessels could be overhauled and repaired there instead of being sent back to the Black Sea around the Cape of Good Hope or even farther to the Siberian port of Vladivostok. And Mauritius could be the place to provide the naval base.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
9 January 1970

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# Indian Ocean spying? Red China freighters complain of shadowing by Soviet warships

By Ernest Weatherall  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Bombay

A game of cat and mouse apparently is being played out in the Indian Ocean and some adjacent countries between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Several freighters arriving here have reported that Soviet warships have been shadowing Chinese Communist vessels headed for Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika.

The Chinese ships, suitably adorned with quotations from "the thoughts of Chairman Mao" along with his portrait, are carrying equipment for Peking's major world-prestige project—the 1,100-mile railway line between Tanzania and Zambia.

Since the Soviets are building up their Indian Ocean fleet, which is concentrated in the Arabian Gulf off the Indian Ocean, the Russians can readily keep track of all Chinese shipping headed for Dar es Salaam.

Meanwhile, the Russians have been exerting pressure on the strategic island of Mauritius for a naval base there. Moscow needs a base because at present its fleet is supplied at sea. All overhauls and major repairs have to be made thousands of miles away in the Black Sea or at the Siberian Port of Vladivostok.

In return for such a base, Moscow would agree to help the island to industrialize, so it would no longer have to depend on its ailing "one-crop economy"—sugar.

There also have been reports that the Chinese have moved into the Indian Ocean in a small way. Peking's trawlers have been spotted near India's strategic Andamann Islands where New Delhi is building a naval facility. The trawlers seemed to be more interested in taking soundings and listening to Indian naval radio traffic than fishing, from the looks of their electronic gear.

Unidentified submarines have also been reported in the area. These could be Soviet,

but since the soundings indicated they were conventional submarines, and this type, if Soviet, remain close to the task force, it is believed they are Chinese.

Several Indian newspapers have reported that Peking will give Pakistan five conventional submarines for its naval fleet. Pakistan has only a small training submarine given it by the United States during a mutual-defense pact that evaporated when the Pakistanis used American equipment in the 1965 war against India.

India is phasing out its old World War II warships which New Delhi received from the British after independence. Scheduled for eventual scrapping is its pride of the fleet, the Vikrant, the only aircraft carrier in an Asian navy.

According to Adm. A. K. Chatterji, the Indian Navy is to be comprised of small, hard-hitting, rocket-equipped ships along with submarines. Their mission will be to protect India's thousands of miles of coastline and shipping lanes.

BALTIMORE SUN  
8 June 1970

**Egyptian Submarines  
In India For Repairs**

BY FRAN SABHARWAL  
(New Delhi Bureau of The Sun)  
New Delhi, June 7—Two

Soviet-made submarines are the latest vessels in Egypt's fleet east of Suez to put in for repairs at Indian naval bases.

The submarines, escorted by the former British warship Rasheed, are being refitted at the Indian Navy's submarine base at Visahhapatnam.

Egypt has been using Indian naval facilities since its war with Israel in 1967, when the Suez Canal was shut down and it became difficult to get ships stationed east of Suez to Alexandria via the Cape of Good Hope.

Last month a former British destroyer El-Qaher, was refitted in an Indian navy dockyard in Bombay. The destroyer, after staying in India for almost three months, was sunk by the Israelis within 15 days of its return to duty.

Another former British destroyer, now called El Fateh by Egypt, also is undergoing repairs in India.

Indian officials maintain that the base facilities are extended to the United Arab Republic on a purely commercial basis. They assert that these facilities are open to all friendly countries and are used by many nations.

Egypt's dependence on Indian bases was underscored two months ago when Cairo appointed Cmdr. M. G. Kaptan, a for-

mer submarine commander, its military attache in New Delhi. That post had been vacant since the 1967 war.

It is not known if any Russians were on board the subs now at Visahhapatnam. However, there are Russian technicians at the base to look after the Soviet-made Indian submarines there. The Indian government also is building a naval base at Visahhapatnam. help of the Soviet Union.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
22 June 1970

CPYRGHT

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**SUEZ CANAL—KEY TO SOVIET  
STRATEGY IN THE MIDEAST?**

CPYRGHT

Soviet-supported efforts to push Israel from the Suez Canal are taking on an added dimension. As some experts see it: Controlling that vital waterway is Moscow's true target.

Reported from  
LONDON and WASHINGTON

Near the top of the list of "crisis questions" on Richard Nixon's desk in mid-June was this one:

Is reopening of the Suez Canal Russia's next goal in the Mideast?

Bitter fighting between Arabs and Israelis is taking place on both sides of the 103-mile Canal, shut tight to all shipping since the 1967 war.

Egyptian commandos—emboldened by increasing Soviet aid—are crossing the Canal regularly, taking a heavy toll of Israelis on the east bank. An estimated 1,000 heavy Egyptian guns have been massed to pound Israeli positions.

Israel is responding almost daily with aerial strikes—some lasting from dawn to dusk—on Arabs in the Canal zone. In a 10-day span in early June more bombs were dropped on Egyptian targets than were used by all sides in the six-day conflict in 1967, according to Israeli military sources.

**FROM BLACK SEA TO SINGAPORE  
—THE RUSSIAN THROUST  
"EAST OF SUEZ"**

\* *Black Sea*—Home waters for a powerful Russian fleet.

\* *Suez Canal*—Key link for Russia's expansion into the Arabian Peninsula and Indian Ocean. Canal shut down since Israelis took over eastern bank in Six-Day War of June, 1967.

\* *Hadelta, Yemen*—Modern port, built with Soviet aid. Additional Russian "presence": pilots, hundreds of advisers.

\* *Aden and South Yemen*—Scene of major Soviet diplomatic build-up, also receives Russian planes and arms.

\* *Somali Republic*—Russia is helping build new port at Berbera on strategic Horn of Africa, furnishing arms to Somali military.

\* *Mauritius*—New fishing agreements auguring rising Soviet interest: Use of facilities at Port Louis by Russian vessels now being sought.

\* *Visakhapatnam, India*—New Indian Navy base, under construction with Moscow's help, provides refueling, other facilities for Soviet ships.

\* *Singapore*—World's fourth-largest seaport has offered Russia access to shipyard facilities being abandoned by Britain.

**The long view.** A growing number of authorities suggest that the massive Soviet effort to give Egypt more and more arms marks the beginning of a drive to push Israel from the east bank of the Canal and out of the Sinai Peninsula if possible. It is believed the return of control of Suez to Egyptian hands is the immediate target of the Russians. Then Egypt, with Russian aid, could reopen the Canal—not for commercial traffic, but to give Russia direct access to the Indian Ocean and, from there, a reach as far as Singapore in South Asia.

Reports one top Western diplomat: "If the present military deterioration in the Middle East continues, we believe the Soviet Union will push forward, without telegraphing its moves to the U. S. to seize and reopen the Canal."

Israeli forces have frustrated all Arab hopes of reopening Suez in the past three years. Major powers in the West, for their part, have not pressured Israel to permit the Canal to reopen. For one thing, Western Europe now uses giant supertankers, too big for the waterway, to transport vital Mideastern oil. For another, many in Washington consider it a blessing in disguise that the waterway remains shut—because the Russians, more than anyone else, stand to gain strategically if the Canal is opened.

**Two-year restoration.** If the Israelis could be forced—or induced—to abandon their strongholds on the east

bank, experts estimate it would cost 250 million dollars and take two years to make the channel ready for traffic. The time lag is all the more reason the Russians are anxious to press ahead now.

The gamble might be risky for the Kremlin. But the rewards, Western analysts agree, would be high.

Even without access to the Canal, the Soviet Union in just two years has made striking progress in building its influence and military presence in the Indian Ocean area. For the first time since Czarist days, Russian ships are plying waters long regarded as a British lake.

A major drawback for Moscow has been the fact that to reach those waters, Soviet warships must travel enormous distances.

At present, the Red Sea is the farthest point on earth by sea from the Soviet Union. If the Canal were reopened, Russia would have a direct and easy link between its Black Sea fleet and the Indian Ocean.

**The strategic worth.** The strategic meaning is that expansion of Russia's military presence and political influence would be considerably simplified. Britain's Institute for Strategic Studies assesses a Russian "breakout" through the Canal this way:

"If the Canal is reopened, the Soviet Union may try to use Egypt as a way station and to extend her control there in further exploiting opportunities on the other side of the Canal—in the Sudan, Southern Yemen and the Horn of Africa, and perhaps also in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Indian subcontinent."

The Russians are showing great determination to establish themselves as a major if not dominant power in the Indian Ocean, now that the British are withdrawing from "east of Suez."

Evidence of this Russian strategy is found in the growth of Soviet naval strength east of Suez since Britain announced in early 1968 that it was pulling out. Russian warships have been cruising the Indian Ocean regularly, the first time they have done so since 1905. Sailing in small units, usually built around a guided-missile cruiser, the Russians are paying "good-will visits" all up and down the African and Indian coasts. Soviet ships also have called at Basra in Iraq, at the head of the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

**Psychological factors.** Most strategists view Soviet operations as basically political and psychological so far—exercises to "show the flag," to demonstrate Russia's success in establishing a presence in the area.

There is also evidence, however, that the Soviet Union is developing a chain of naval facilities that will enable it to expand its maritime operations.

From military and political experts come these observations.

- In the Yemen Republic the Russians are helping to build a modern port at Hodeida, a city that dominates the mouth of the Red Sea. The Russians maintain 50 MIG-17 and IL-28 aircraft, along with Soviet pilots, in Yemen and have several hundred advisers working in the northern part of the country.

In Southern Yemen, the Russians have been moving in ever since British forces withdrew in 1967. With an eye obviously on the strategic port of Aden, Moscow has built up the biggest diplomatic mission of any foreign nation in Southern Yemen. Arms, including 10 MIG planes, are being delivered to the anti-Western regime.

Western strategists make this point: With an air base in Southern Yemen, Russia could rule the maritime approaches to the Red Sea in the south and could control the Suez Canal approaches in the north through its influence in Egypt.

- Across a narrow gulf from Aden, Moscow is establishing a strategic foothold in the Somali Republic on the East African coast. Russians are helping Somalis build a new port at Berbera at the entrance to the Red Sea. They also are reported to be supplying the Government with 150 MIG's, 20 helicopters and enough tanks to form an armored brigade, an impressive arsenal for a nation of just 2.7 million.

- Russia last year signed a fishing agreement with the island republic of Mauritius, which was granted independence from Britain in 1968. Now Moscow is said to be seeking refueling facilities in the capital of Port Louis or on the tiny coral island of St. Brandon, under Mauritian control.

- Soviet interest in India mounts. Over the years Moscow has furnished New Delhi with great stores of jets and arms. Now Russia is helping to construct a naval base on the east coast, at Vishakhapatnam on the Bay of Bengal, in return for access to bunkering and other facilities.

- Election of a pro-Communist coalition in Ceylon under Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike paves the way for expansion of a Soviet presence there. In 1963, before the Russian thrust into the Indian Ocean, Mrs. Bandaranaike signed a maritime agreement granting Red China full use of Ceylonese ports. In view of that, observers doubt that she will resist Soviet pressures for similar facilities.

- In Singapore, once Britain's major East Asian bastion, Soviet ships soon could be dropping anchor at facilities formerly utilized by the Royal Navy.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who is anxious that his huge dockyards not stand idle as a result of British withdrawal, has offered the Russians access to them, on a commercial basis. Already a joint Singapore-Soviet Shipping Agency has been set up to serve as agent for Russian vessels using repair and other services in the port.

**Seizing the opportunity.** Three main objectives are seen behind these Soviet moves:

First, the Soviet naval build-up is an integral part of Moscow's policy to rival the U. S. as a world power. Essential to great-power status is a global navy. This is summed up by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet Navy:

"The flag of the Soviet Navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the U. S. will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas."

Second, the Russians find set before them a rare opportunity for expanding their influence.

Britain's decision to pull out of the Indian Ocean creates a power vacuum which the U. S. is reluctant to fill. No other power can do the job. Thus, Russia would be in a position to support directly a take-over by a revolutionary government in the Arabian Peninsula, with its vast oil wealth, or on the east coast of Africa.

Third, establishing a Suez route to India is part of Soviet strategy to contain Communist China. The Russians are felt to have a real stake in underwriting the security of India against the Chinese. A safe, convenient route from the Black Sea, through the Suez Canal and into the Indian Ocean is regarded as essential for this purpose.

And the Russians are apparently intent on neutralizing any attempt by Peking itself to move into the Indian Ocean.

**A cool response.** The West's response to Soviet inroads east of Suez has been surprisingly calm so far, in the view of most observers.

The U. S. has had just three vessels in its "Middle East force"—two destroyers and a seaplane tender serving as command ship—operating out of the island of Bahrain.

American military planners say the U. S. has no current plans to beef up this small force.

Many American military men feel that expansion of U. S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean is desirable to meet a Soviet threat. But they also acknowledge that with the Vietnam war and with strong pressures at home to cut U. S. commitments abroad, there is little likelihood for such expansion.

British officials make this point: U. S. naval power operating from bases in the Western Pacific could easily move into the Indian Ocean to neutralize any real Soviet threat. The U. S., these officials add, also has authority to build facilities on the British-owned Chagos Islands if the need arises.

*Weighing alternatives.* Despite this lack of public hand-wringing over Russia's presence in the Indian Ocean, neither the U. S. nor Britain is anxious that the Suez Canal be opened. The reason: dwindling economic advantages of an open Canal are more than offset by the strategic advantages of keeping it closed.

As a practical matter, for instance, the U. S. knows that a closed seaway forces Soviet ships supplying Communist North Vietnam to take the long, expensive route around the southern tip of Africa.

In any case, what is of most concern to the U. S. at the moment is not Russia's future influence in the Indian Ocean. It is rather the escalating violence on the banks of the Suez Canal itself—and how much danger Russia will court to get Israel dislodged and the waterway reopened.

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July 1970

ANOTHER OPINION ON MOSCOW'S INTERGAZ-70

From 8 to 23 June an international spectacular called "Intergaz-70" ran in Moscow with about 100 firms from 18 countries displaying equipment in seven open-air pavilions. The opening of the exhibit was timed to coincide with the International Gas Union-sponsored Eleventh Gas Congress held in the Kremlin 9 to 13 June. Some 5,000 scientists and technicians from 50 countries attended the Congress.

According to Soviet official statements at the time, "the USSR holds first place in the world for proved reserves of natural gas; Soviet engineers hope to have wells in Siberia in the nearest future that will yield 3-5 million cubic meters of gas in 24 hours."

Eugenio Cefis, president of Italian National Hydrocarbons Association, ENI, told the Kremlin gathering that "judging by the agreements (the USSR has recently concluded to export natural gas to Italy, West Germany, Austria, and France), the total volume of natural gas exported will amount to 100,000 million cubic meters by 1975." But, will it?

Western Siberian Experience

At the Punga natural gas fields of Western Siberia the Soviet "experts," according to Komsomolskaya Pravda of 10 March 1970, overestimated gas reserves by 100 percent. As a result, gas has been extracted from the Punga deposit and shipped through the West Siberian-North Urals pipelines at an excessive rate for the last seven years. Industrial activities in Sverdlovsk and several other cities in the Urals apparently had been planned on the assumption that the Punga wells would flow until about 1982. Now, say Western experts, continued overproduction at Punga will shorten their life by some 50 percent. In other words, because reserves were overestimated, the Punga wells have had only a nine to ten year production life instead of their promised 18 to 20 year production period and consequently in those Urals industries which depend on natural gas, activity will grind on at a slower and slower rate.

Meanwhile, pressure at the Punga deposit is already declining so severely that the present flow of gas cannot be maintained through 1970 without the aid of a compressor. According to the Soviet press, a compressor station was authorized for construction at Punga in 1965, but has not yet been built. When official alarm was sounded last spring, about 150,000 tons of compressor equipment was hastily diverted from another site, but was stranded en route to Punga when thaws caused the northern roads to become impassable.

Sakhalin Experience

In February of this year a Japanese delegation went to Moscow, pens



primed, to finalize the Soviet-Japanese agreement under which Japan was to import Soviet natural gas in exchange for large-diameter Japanese pipe. This agreement, which has been under negotiation since 1966, involves also Japanese aid to the USSR in developing the Soviet gas reserves on Sakhalin Island.

The Soviet "experts" outdid themselves on Sakhalin. Platt's Oilgram news service of 20 February 1970 reported from Moscow, 19 February, that "Soviet Premier Kosygin himself had to step into the breach with a personal proposal to Japan for a completely new gas export scheme." Kosygin had to confess to the Japanese delegation that his "experts" had blundered and had overestimated the reserves available on Sakhalin. According to Kosygin, while the "possible" gas reserves on Sakhalin were as high as 60 billion cubic meters, the "proved" reserves were only 16 billion cubic meters. Platt's described the Japanese delegation as "registering complete shock at hearing the Soviet Premier's news." The Japanese said the whole scheme needed to be reevaluated and considered anew. Soviet-Japanese negotiations, begun in 1966, now are dragging on through 1970.

\* \* \*

Attached are reprints of newspaper clips with Soviet and Western coverage of the International Gas Congress and other related topics. Nobody wants to make hot gas into a cold war issue, but it behooves the Free World to take a hard look at the facts and to make them more generally known than they are.

NEW YORK TIMES  
15 June 1970

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

## Soviet Reports It Has Largest Proven Reserves

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 14—The So-

viet Union is experiencing a boom in natural gas and some Western experts predict that in coming decades Moscow may turn out to be the major source of this cheap, efficient, non-polluting fuel in Europe and Asia.

Soviet officials told delegates to the 11th International Gas Conference, which ended yesterday, that proven gas reserves of the Soviet Union now amounted to 12.1 trillion cubic meters. This is the largest in the world, Aleksei I. Sorokin, the Deputy Minister of the Soviet Gas Industry, said. One cubic meter is about 35 cubic feet.

### Production Is Lagging

Moreover, he declared in an interview in the press, it is estimated that potential reserves of 83 trillion cubic meters lie under Soviet land and waters.

Only two years ago, Aleksei K. Kortunov, the Minister of the Gas Industry, reported proven reserves of 8 trillion, thus indicating a 50 per cent rise in that period.

The actual production of gas, however, has lagged behind the geological discoveries. Despite spectacular growth in this decade, recent production figures have been disappointing to officials.

The chief problem has been that the richest gas area lie

either in the frozen north of Western Siberia or in the dry deserts of Central Asia, far from industrial and populated centers. This has required heavy investment in pipelines.

The initial plan for 1970, made public in 1966, called for 225 to 240 billion cubic meters, but last year the figure was revised to just short of 200 billion.

The growth in gas as a major fuel, now representing about 20 per cent of total fuel, reflects a decision taken by Soviet leaders to alter the fuel pattern away from coal and toward more economic fuels toward more economic fuels such as oil and gas. In 1955, total natural gas production was only 10 billion cubic meters.

About 39,000 miles of pipelines have been laid to carry the gas from the far-off areas. Western Siberia, where about 57 per cent of the total reserves lie, is to be developed in the coming decade.

Mr. Sorokin said that about half of the gas was used in industry and a quarter in power stations. The rest is used for household needs. About 100 million people use gas in the Soviet Union, he said.

The Soviet Union is delivering gas by pipeline to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria. Contracts have been signed with West Germany and Italy to deliver gas in exchange for wide-diameter pipe.

There were more than 5,000 delegates from virtually every gas-producing or using country

## of Natural Gas

at the congress, including a delegation from the United States. Many of the speakers stressed the "international" quality of gas, with increasing use of pipelines making it easy for the transport of the fuel across frontiers.

A prominent French businessman, who asked not to be identified, said in a private conversation that the rapid uncovering of Soviet gas reserves made it only "a matter of time" before Soviet gas was used throughout Western Europe. He said much depended on maintaining a good political atmosphere and also on Moscow's getting the pipes and equipment it needs to ship the fuel the long distances to Western Europe.

He said that the deals made recently with Austria, Italy and West Germany could be the start. At present the Netherlands and North Africa are the Soviet Union's main gas competitors in Europe.

An American specialist noted that Soviet gas reserves were increasing at a time when the United States, the world's largest producer, was looking to Canada and the Arctic for additional reserves.

GIVE A HAPPY TIME  
VIA FRESH AIR FUND.

TASS, Moscow  
8 June 1970

USSR HOSTS 11TH GAS CONGRESS, INTERGAS-70 EXHIBIT

--The international Intergaz-70 exhibition was opened in Moscow today. Over 100 firms from 18 countries display gas equipment.

Mikhail Yefremov, the vice chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, opening the exhibition, said that business contacts in the gas industry had of late been successfully developing between the USSR and many other countries. The Soviet Union is exporting gas to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria, is designing gas pipelines in Bulgaria and the GDR. Contracts have been signed for the delivery of gas to Italy and the FRG.

Yefremov expressed confidence that Intergaz-70 would help to further strengthen business cooperation in this field.

The exhibits are on show in seven pavilions and in the open air.

Intergaz-70 has been timed for the 11th gas congress which is opening in the Kremlin's Hall of Congresses tomorrow. It will be attended by more than 5,000 scientists and specialists from 51 countries. The congress is sponsored by the International Gas Union.

The USSR holds first place in the world for known reserves of natural gas and second place for its production. Two hundred thousand million cubic meters of gas will be produced in the country this year. Some 500 exhibits are on show in the Soviet section including a complete set of machines for laying a 1,420 millimeter bore pipeline, specimens of 2.5-meter bore steel tubes through which a motor car can easily travel. Among Soviet exhibits are also models of powerful gas turbine units which can pump up to 30 million cubic meters of gas daily and also apparatuses of the submarine television set "Crab-M" to control welding seams of submarine pipelines.

TASS, Moscow  
9 June 1970

INTERNATIONAL GAS CONGRESS OPENS IN KREMLIN

--An international gas congress has opened in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in the presence of about five thousand specialists from 50 countries. The fact that the congress is so representative is regarded as an impressive demonstration of the growing importance of gas in man's life. Different aspects of this factor will be analysed in detail in hundreds of papers to be presented at plenary and panel meetings.

Opening the congress Alexander Sorokin, president of the International Gas Union, said that about a trillion cubic metres of gas will be produced in the world this year. Gas is gaining ever stronger positions, ousting certain traditional types of fuel. Hundreds of millions of people are using gas and consider it a great boon and convenience.

Sorokin said that five more countries have joined the union in three years since the previous tenth congress in Hamburg. As PRAVDA says today, the rapid development of gas industry has made many foreign and Soviet specialists seek closer contacts to solve different scientific and technical problems. Developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are striving to develop their own gas industry, the newspaper says.

Gas has become an item of lively trade between countries. It was reported at the congress that contracts for large gas deliveries from the Soviet Union to Italy and the FRG have been signed. Much of Soviet gas is already going to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Austria. Agreements have been signed recently on the construction of gas pipelines to transport gas from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria and the GDR.

At the first meeting of the congress a message of greetings was read out from Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It says that gas pipelines which have crossed national boundaries in a number of countries are the basis of mutually advantageous business cooperation between states.

The Soviet government, the message says, gives much attention to the development of this industry as one of the most important factors for technical progress, raising labour efficiency and improving the welfare of the people. Alexei Kosygin expressed confidence that mutual information and exchange of opinions at the congress will allow a glimpse into the future of the gas industry of the world and help improve mutual understanding between peoples in their struggle for peace and security.

The congress will last till Saturday. The Intergas-70 exhibition has been staged simultaneously with about 100 firms from 18 countries taking part.

TASS, Moscow  
9 June 1970

ITALIAN NATURAL GAS REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS AT INTERNATIONAL MEETING

--"The Soviet Union contributes to the maximum expansion of the use of natural gas by solving positively the questions that are connected with the export of its large quantities to very distant external markets", said Eugenio Cefis, president of the Italian national society for liquid fuel "ENI".

Addressing today the international gas congress in the Kremlin, attended by representatives of 50 countries, Cefis said that Italy had already taken the necessary measures to deliver natural gas to all the regions of the country. "When the agreements on the import of natural gas from Libya and the Soviet Union come into force, Italy will become one of the world's biggest importers and consumers of this type of fuel", the ENI president said.

The society signed the agreement with the Soviet Union last December. Similar agreements on gas deliveries have been concluded with the FRG and other countries. Eugenio Cefis said that, in the light of these and other possible agreements, the Soviet Union might become the world's biggest supplier of natural gas both as regards the volume of deliveries and the number of customer-states.

Judging by the agreements, concluded between different countries, the total volume of natural gas exports in the world will amount to 100,000 million cubic metres already in 1975. Eugenio Cefis pointed out, specifically, that it is perfectly possible from the technical point of view that the purchase and the sale of natural gas will become no less considerable and ramified than oil trade.

There is every requisite for the development of the international natural gas market, the ENI president said. They include huge deposits of this natural fuel, efficient means of transportation, which will become even more economical due to technical progress, the existing great possibilities for the marketing of this fuel, and the objective interest of many consumer-states in the further increase of the number of suppliers and sources of supply. In most countries natural gas is regarded as a factor ensuring a more proportional use of power sources as well as an effective means of combatting air pollution. The ENI president expressed the hope that the gas industry, having transcended the national limits, would become a means for more concrete cooperation.

PRAVDA, Moscow  
10 June 1970

A.N. KOSYGIN MESSAGE TO 11TH INTERNATIONAL GAS CONGRESS PARTICIPANTS

On behalf of the government of the Soviet Union I warmly welcome the participants and guests of the 11th International Gas Congress.

Gas, as a high-quality fuel and valuable raw material for many branches of industry, has brought and is bringing immense benefits to mankind. Gas pipeline systems with a length of almost 1 million kilometers are operating in many regions of the globe; in a number of countries they have overstepped national frontiers and are the basis of businesslike, mutually beneficial cooperation between states.

The Soviet Government devoted great attention to the development of the gas industry as one of the important factors of technical progress, increased labor productivity, and the upsurge of the people's prosperity. Our specialists and scientists are focusing their efforts on the quest for an exploration of new gas deposits, the

improvement of processes of extraction and transportation of gas, and the assembly of large gas pipeline systems using large-diameter pipes which makes it possible to accelerate the country's utilization of gas.

Mutual information and the exchange of opinions on the most important problems of the development of the gas industry at the 11th International Gas Congress will be of great benefit to all its participants and will make it possible to outline the ways of further developing gas science and technology and to look into the future of the world's gas industry and will help to improve mutual relations among people in their struggle for a firm peace and the security of the peoples.

I wish all the participants and guests of the congress fruitful work and express the hope that the 11th International Gas Congress will be an important stage on the path of the further development of the gas industry of all countries and continents.

TASS, Moscow  
10 June 1970

#### FRENCH SPECIALIST'S REPORT

--Our planet will remain green and man will breathe clear air if gas becomes one of the main sources of energy towards the end of this century. This idea was voiced by the delegates of the international gas congress now in progress here. It is attended by several thousand specialists from 50 countries who do not confine themselves to the discussion of technical problems only.

The French engineer Georges Robert, vice-president of the International Gas Union, presented a paper to the congress, "Gas in the World of Tomorrow", full of optimistic forecasts and calls for the wider use of this cheap and convenient fuel for the good of man. In Robert's opinion mankind should have turned to gas much earlier, the more so that "a few billion years ago our planet was a ball of gas".

Georges Robert believes that by 2000 there will be a balance between the use of such primary sources of energy as coal, oil and gas. Per family consumption of energy will increase, perhaps, fivefold. People will be using it in the form of electricity and gas. This road now lies open before mankind as long as many problems of thermonuclear energy are not yet solved.

The year 2000 is, still a long way off, Robert said. But we can visualize the green world of tomorrow in which man will travel in automobiles, planes and launches driven by liquefied gas. There will be practically no exhaust gases which now poison the air in big cities. So, comfort at home and clean streets and cities are promised by specialists in the future if natural gas is used on a still wider scale.

Natural gas reserves are now equivalent to half of the proven oil reserves. Robert believes these reserves will last long. The problem is redistribution of the gas wealth, since the geographic position of deposits is extremely irregular. According to some conclusions, about a third of the forecast gas reserves are in the Soviet Union. Judging by the latest data, provided by geologists, the Arctic area promises to become a real treasure house.

Participants in the congress believe that international exchange of gas, wide international trade in gas is inevitable. From the technical point of view, there are no particular obstacles for this, since it is possible to build long-distance pipelines and use tankers to carry liquefied gas.

TASS, Moscow  
12 June 1970

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED

--The highest level of concentration of natural gas extraction and transportation has been achieved in the Soviet Union as compared to all other countries which have this industry. Soviet specialists declared at the International Gas Congress that this tendency will remain to be the major trend in the development of the gas industry in the next 10-15 years. Engineers, scientists, leaders of companies and scientific centres from almost 50 countries take part in the work of the congress.

Soviet engineers hope to have wells in Siberia in the nearest future that would yield 3-5 million cubic metres of gas in 24 hours. The efficiency of each one of them can be compared, for example, with a mine producing up to 2,000,000 tons of coal annually. Such wells will become the foundation of powerful automated gasfields. Two-three gasfields will yield as much gas as the country produces now. The discovery of huge deposits in Siberia makes it possible to plan the organization of such huge production capacities within the next few years.

Soviet engineers are facing an extremely difficult task of designing a single gas grid of the country reaching every residential area. Currents of energy may be directed through such systems, the same as through the single power grid, to any area.

The first stage of the work has been fulfilled: A single gas supply system for the European part of the country's territory has been organized. It is gas-supplied from Central Asian deposits. It will operate more efficiently after Siberian gas is pumped into it. The trunkline is already under construction. Minister Alexei Kartunov said that the system will be the most powerful energy current of our century. It will be partially laid with pipes of 2.5 metres in diameter. The efficiency of one such trunkline will be ten times higher than the most powerful gaslines now in operation.

The Soviet gas industry is developed for the home consumption which is rapidly expanding, Kartunov emphasized. But sufficient quantities of gas may also be exported. Thus, higher share of gas in the power balance of Europe will create favourable conditions for delivery of gas to those areas, Soviet specialists believe. Practically the single gas grid will stretch beyond the Soviet Union and will be equipped with trunklines for transporting gas to the West.

In the east of the Soviet Union the gas supply system will in future reach the Pacific Ocean coast thus making it possible to export the valuable fuel in that area, too. Yakutina deposits must feed the eastern part of the system.

TASS, Moscow  
13 June 1970

USSR GEOLOGIST'S REMARKS TO GAS CONGRESS

--According to this year's data, proven deposits of natural gas in the Soviet Union exceed 12 trillion cubic metres. This was stated by Viktor Vasilyev, the chief geologist of the Ministry of the Gas Industry. He noted that by far not the whole territory of the country has been studied.

The surveying of some discovered deposits, mainly in Siberia, is still continuing. Specialists believe that these deposits alone give reason to think that the volume

of proven gas deposits in the country will double by the end of the 1970's. This means that the Soviet Union is provided for many decades with a valuable fuel, the sphere of application of which is rapidly growing.

Vasilyev said a half of the 570 discovered deposits were not yet being operated. For many of them this is a matter of the distant since commercially it is best to operate big deposits.

Nature helps in this since less than thirty deposits hold more than 80 percent of all proven gas resources in the country. The Urengoy, Yubileynaya and some other deposits in western Siberia are viewed by specialists as the biggest in the world.

But the difficulties of developing the Soviet gas industry are connected with the fact that more than a half of all proven resources are in the northern areas of the country, in the permafrost zone where winters are very cold. Large quantities of gas are also concentrated in the deserts of central Asia. This means that both these areas are situated far from the country's main economic centers, necessitating the building of pipelines from 2 to 3.5 thousand kilometers in length.

It was only in recent years that Soviet geologists succeeded in discovering big deposits that are situated closer, in the northeast and southeast of the European continent. These are being commissioned in the first turn.

Vasilyev said that geologists have very reason to expect the discovery of big gas fields in sea areas. Promising from this point of view are coastal zones of northern seas, the Okhotsk Sea in the east and the Black, Caspian and Azov seas in the south. The feasibility of searching for oil and gas in the Baltic Sea was proved recently. According to some estimates the area of such promising regions amounts to about three million square kilometers.

Vasilyev made the general report at the concluding plenary session of the international gas congress that was attended by specialists from 50 countries.

JAPAN TIMES, Tokyo  
20 February 1970

CPYRGHT

### Mixed Reaction

We cannot but admit our reaction to the results of the eight-day fourth meeting of the Japan-Soviet Union Joint Economic Committee held in Moscow from February 10 through 17 has been mixed.

Actually, concrete progress was achieved on only two projects. First, as the joint communique issued after the meeting on February 17 indicates, concrete agreement was reached on the joint construction of a new port in Vrangelya Bay near Nakhodka. A basic contract on an overall plan for the port is to be concluded by March 31 and separate contracts covering port construction equipment, port facilities and financing arrangements by the end of 1970.

Secondly, both sides agreed that contracts should be signed on mutually acceptable conditions on the development and export of chips and pulp from deciduous trees, as soon as a working committee, set up to study the matter completes its negotiations.

We welcome these achievements, which will finally get the Japan-Soviet cooperation in the economic development of Siberia off the ground, after lengthy deliberations.

However, we are disappointed in the sudden change in the Soviet stand on the development of the natural gas resources of Sakhalin.

After all, the Soviet Union's first request to Japan on the joint development of Siberian resources was centered around Premier Alexei Kosygin's proposal on the development of the natural gas resources on Sakhalin. This proposal was based on the Soviet Union's estimate of Sakhalin's natural gas deposits being between 60,000 to 70,000 million cubic meters.

Thus, Premier Kosygin's disclosure the day before the meeting was to end that the Soviet Union's earlier estimate of the size of the Sakhalin was a mistake came as quite a shock to Mr. Shigeo Nagano, the Chief of the Japanese delegation. Premier Kosygin suddenly said the deposits amounted to only about 16,000 million cubic meters.

In place of the Sakhalin deposits, the Soviet Union proposed development of the deposits in the Yakutsk region and the construction of liquefaction facilities at the port of Magadan.

We are willing to give due allowances to the possibility the earlier estimate was based on an honest mistake. However, we understand that there are Gosplan experts who still hold to the 60,000 to 70,000 million cubic meter estimate. Further, Japan had all along suggested a joint survey team to conduct a thorough investigation of the natural gas deposits on Sakhalin in order to arrive at a sound estimate.

But, the real shock comes from the fact that the disclosure comes at such a late stage in the negotiations on joint development of Siberia and that the mistake involves such a fundamental matter as the volume of gas deposits.

Whatever the case, we hope that this will not serve to undermine Japan's basic trust in the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union will do its best to erase the doubts that have been created in the minds of the Japanese.

As one means of achieving this end, we urge the Soviet Union to accept Japan's proposal for the establishment of a joint survey team to investigate the natural gas deposits in the Yakutsk area.

CPYRGHT

JAPAN TIMES  
18 February 1970

## Kosygin Statements Mystify Japanese

MOSCOW (Kyodo) — Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's statement on a sharply reduced estimate of natural gas deposits in North Sakhalin, coupled with the suggestion that Japan take up a gas project in north Siberia, both dismayed and mystified members of the Japanese delegation to the joint Japan-Soviet economic committee meeting.

Kosygin's remarks came after Japanese and Soviet representatives completed discussions at committee sessions on all subjects, including the gas resources development.

Members of the Japanese delegation familiar with Soviet gas resources insisted that the earlier 60,000 million-cubic-meter estimate is correct. And Kosygin's suggestion that natural gas from Yakutsk be sent by pipeline to Magadan on the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk for supply to Japan, they said, has never been brought up in previous talks and is hardly acceptable to the Japanese side.

The Japanese have been negotiating on the joint natural gas development project for four years on the basis of the original Russian estimate that natural gas reserves in Northern Sakhalin total 60,000 million cubic meters.

Under present Japanese plans, about 2,400 million cubic meters of natural gas are to be imported from Northern Sakhalin through a 1,500-kilometer-long pipeline across the Soya Strait to Hokkaido.

The Russians are now demanding that the Japanese promise to import natural gas

also from Yakutsk in northern Siberia in the future. For that purpose, the Russians have asked the Japanese to lay a pipeline of a bigger diameter than being considered at present in the Soya Strait.

The Russians and the Japanese failed to reach agreement on the pipeline question in last week's discussions and left the matter up to further study at working sub-committee level.

Against this background, Japanese delegation sources regard Kosygin's statement as an effort to back up the position of the Soviet negotiators in the negotiations on the controversial gas development project.

Kosygin, in his talks with Shigeo Nagano, Japanese chief delegate to the current joint committee session, said that natural gas deposits in Northern Sakhalin were found to be only about 16,000 million cubic meters—about a quarter of the originally estimated figure.

Nanago and Ivan F. Semichastnov, the Soviet negotiator, later gave a joint press conference after the release of Tuesday's communique. At the conference, Semichastnov puzzled the Japanese newsmen by saying that the natural gas reserve of 16,000 million cubic meters in North Sakhalin mentioned by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin Monday was the volume of deposits actually ascertained.

The original Soviet estimate of the existence of 60,000 to 70,000 million cubic meters of natural gas reserve still stands, he went on.




**BUSINESS ABROAD**

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(Excerpts)



## Soviet gas: Lengthening pipelines to Western industry

Out in the Siberian marshlands the Russians have struck a natural gas bonanza whose spreading effects could touch the international petroleum industry, the USSR's hard-cash buying power, and even the competitive position of Western Europe in world trade.

The Russians are wasting no time looking for customers. Already they have signed up the Italians and the West Germans for a hook-up to the Siberian finds. The West German deal amounts to one of the USSR's largest business deals with that country, and subsequent Soviet efforts to push Siberian gas are already leading her farther westward. Other deals are pending with France, Spain, Finland, Sweden, and Japan which will raise the USSR's hard-currency income to well over \$200-million a year from gas alone.

Soviet-supplied energy is not a novelty in the Western Europe economy.

The gas will serve to earn hard currency for the USSR in the same way oil did in the last decade, when Soviet oil drove the first Russian wedge into Western Europe after the war. Although the first five years of most of the gas contracts will be paid off in pipeline equipment, thereafter deliveries will be made on a cash basis.

The Soviet oil industry, until 10 years ago, had been concentrated around Baku on the Caspian littoral. When the first wells came in east of the Urals near Tyumen (where much of the natural gas is also located), Soviet energy policy became increasingly petroleum-minded. As annual output began to reach its present levels of 30-million tons, the Russians sold more and more of their oil abroad.

It was this foot in the door that allowed them, in cooperation with Enrico Mattei's Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), to make the first dent in the

major oil companies' hold on world energy pricing.

Italy's state-owned Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) created a furor in the 50's when it attempted to beat down the price of Italy's imported crude by purchasing large amounts of low-priced "barter oil" from the Soviet Union. Now it looks as if ENI and the Russians are getting ready for round two with gas.

Last December ENI signed a \$3-billion, 20-year agreement to import "over 3.5-trillion cu.ft." of Siberian gas in what will initiate a major undertaking just to get the gas to Italy's consumers. But this time ENI was not the maverick. In 1968 Austria had become the first Western gas customer by agreeing to import 35-billion cu. ft. this year and 53-billion cu. ft. annually thereafter until 1990.

On Feb. 1, West German officials agreed to take \$1.83-trillion cu.ft. of Si-

berian gas over a 20-year period in return for some \$400-million worth of large-diameter pipeline. The deal, which is one of the largest ever concluded between Moscow and Bonn, could foreshadow establishment of sizable commercial dealings between the two governments.

Part of the attraction is the undeniably cleaner, more efficient combustion characteristics of natural gas over petroleum products. New European sensitivity to pollution is raising all the questions asked on this side of the Atlantic. But part of the interest is just as surely due to hard-headed cost considerations.

To be sure, Middle East and North African oil prices have declined, but the Europeans are eager to see what the Soviets might have to offer them in the way of still cheaper power. The offer could be substantial.

Certainly the supply is substantial. The Soviets first hit gas in Siberia only a few years ago. Now more than a thousand drilling teams are prospecting Siberia all the way from the Urals to Yakutsk and even Sakhalin Island, where they may get Japanese help in developing the resources.

In 1940 Soviet gas fields yielded 113-billion cu.ft. of natural gas; by 1958 the figure had reached 1-trillion cu.ft. In 1968 and 1969 teams using the latest geophysical search techniques located more than 500 new gas fields containing additional reserves of around 200-trillion cu.ft. This raises gas industry minister Alexei Kortunov's latest estimate of total proved gas reserves to 353-trillion cu.ft., and further possibilities now being prospected could raise the total to four times that figure.

This year Soviet production is scheduled to reach 7-trillion cu.ft.—already a phenomenal expansion; but the additional reserves of the Tyumen fields make it likely, Soviet planners think, to raise output within a year or two to 17.66-trillion cu.ft.

Already this gas supplies up to a quarter of the Soviet Union's total energy needs. But it is in Western Europe where the impact could be, at least figuratively, explosive. In contrast to the Soviet Union and the United States, which feeds nearly a third of its energy requirements in the form of natural gas, Western Europe's citizens and factories presently consume only 5% of their energy as natural gas.

The seemingly limitless new sources to the east, once available, could cut sharply into the use of petroleum products and substantially reduce the rate of growth in petroleum-product imports. Oil company sources still tend to minimize the effect of the Soviet gas on their European operations. "As far as we know the Soviet price is competitive this time," said one. "They have ceased their attempts to make political sales at uneconomic prices as they did with oil in the 50's, and as long as that's so we're glad to have them."

\* \* \* \* \*

By the end of this year 53,000 miles of gas pipeline will cross the Soviet Union (compared to 893,000 miles in the U.S.). The present pipeline leading from Bukhara to the Urals is the world's longest with a length of 2,800 miles. In the planning stages, however, is one 3,750 miles long to link Uzbek, Turkmen and western Kazakh gas centers with the European USSR.

From the Tyumen discoveries Soviet engineers will lay four pipelines to the Moscow area. Two will have a diameter of 57 inches; the others will measure 100 inches in diameter—large enough to drive a small car through. Even the 57-inchers would be a full nine inches larger than the proposed Alaska pipeline—the U.S.'s largest effort to date.

The Siberian project will eat up 13,800 miles of pipe. This much pipe, not to speak of purifying equipment, storage facilities, and technical fittings, is

quite beyond the present capacity of the Soviet steel industry. So the gas agreements fill a two-way need. Just the \$8.6-billion, 10-year job of laying pipe in the USSR will eat up much of the pipe that Europe can produce and even some that Europe has not yet learned how to produce.

Then there is the problem of piping the gas beyond the Soviet borders to its new users in Western Europe. For Italy the gas will move through an already existing pipe from the Ukraine to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. From this point a new pipe will have to extend from the Austro-Czech border 230 miles through Austria to its terminus at Tarvisio, Italy. A consortium of Italian, Austrian and Soviet technicians is to lay the pipe.

Bratislava will also serve as the junction point for the West German line in what seems like a possible snub to the East Germans, for the Bratislava line would completely by-pass East Germany on its way to Bavaria. The German terminus at Marktredwitz would be located some 1,500 miles from the Siberian fields.

France could receive its gas from an extension of the German line. No one, however, beyond the Austrians will be receiving any gas from Siberia before 1973. It will take that long to complete the first pipelines to Western Europe, and Austria's 20-inch line is too small to carry the quantities foreseen.

In the first five years of the Italian agreement Italy will export to the Soviet Union and finance, at a rate of interest still unspecified but believed to be about 6%, \$200-million worth of industrial equipment. Included will be steel pipe, compressors, valves, telemetry and telecommunications equipment. Both state-owned and private companies—among them Fiat and Pirelli—will produce equipment for the swap. In connection with the project the Italian government has also prolonged its \$800-million credit for the Togliattigrad auto plant to 15 years from the original ten.

The Germans will supply 1.2-  
**Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5**  
pipes to the Russians. Already the  
Russians have ordered some 165,000  
tons of steel pipe from Thyssen and  
Mannesmann. They are negotiating  
further with Thyssen for about \$400-  
million worth of equipment and know-  
how for a complete steel pipe mill.  
The Soviets have additionally asked  
Hoersch and Sulzmitter for an offer cov-  
ering 270,000 tons of pipe.

Initial discussions indicate that a  
French agreement could take the form  
of purchasing some 90-million cu.ft.  
of gas a year for 20 years in return for  
more steel pipes. Pont-a-Mousson says  
it has already signed to supply 55,000  
tons of 40-inch pipe for \$10-million  
and wants to sell an additional 660,-  
000 tons for \$120-million. The hooker  
is that the Russians would like to coax  
larger, 56-inch pipe out of the French.  
Some sources report that there is at  
least a possibility the French may  
build a mill just to meet this Soviet  
demand.

Even the Spanish, resistant since the  
end of their civil war in 1939, are get-  
ting into the act. Recently the Spanish  
government held out the possibility  
that a Soviet fuel agreement could  
double Spanish-Soviet trade to  
\$80-million annually over the next  
three years.

\* \* \* \* \*

MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY  
15 May 1970

Soviet Oil Experts Visit Libya: A six-man Soviet oil delegation arrived in Libya on 7 May for talks with Libyan oil officials on possible cooperation between the two countries in oil matters. The delegation is led by Mr. Mikhail Tarasov, the deputy head of the Middle East department of the Soviet State Committee for economic relations with foreign countries, and is accompanied by a three-man Soviet goodwill delegation.

The Soviet oil experts' visit comes in the wake of the visit last March of Libyan Oil Minister 'Izz al-Din al-Mabruk to Moscow, following which it was announced that the Soviet Union had expressed a definite willingness to assist Libya in oil matters. The areas of possible Soviet assistance mentioned in unofficial press reports include the training of Libyans for the oil industry, the preparation of a geological map for the whole of Libya, the evaluation of Libya's crude oil reserves and, possibly, the establishment of Libyan-Soviet joint oil ventures in Libya.

The Soviet experts plan to stay about three or four weeks in Libya, following which they will submit a report to the Libyan Government on possible Soviet technical assistance to Libya in oil matters.

### Growing Soviet Aid

Russian participation in the Algerian oil industry will take another step forward as the result of three contracts signed last month between Technoexport and Sonatrach. According to the Russian news agency Tass, the agreement calls for joint preparation of a programme for development of the oil industry, while Algiers describes it as a long-term exploration agreement - the object of which will be to raise Algerian oil production to the level of 100 million tons a year. (Production last year totalled 44 million tons. Growth targets under the current Four-Year Plan call for 1973 output of 65 million tons, although a well-placed French industry source estimated recently that 55 million tons is a more likely figure by that year.)

The agreement provides specifically for technical assistance in developing production at CFP/SN Repal's Hassi Messaoud - Algeria's biggest field - from its current level of some 19 million tons/year to more than

30 million tons. Such a big jump is considered risky by some French experts due to the complicated structure of this Cambrian reservoir field, but Russian engineering studies have evidently convinced the Algerians that all will be well. Plans are also to be drawn up for future development of Rhourde el Baguel, where the government recently ordered production cut back to a maximum of 2.4 million tons/year. ERAP is hopeful that Algeria will reconsider this decision, however, in the light of an encouraging study of the field completed recently by DeGolyer and MacNaughton. Finally, the Russians are to study utilization of condensate which concession holding oil companies have not yet developed - an omission that has long been a sore spot with the Algerians.

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
16 June 1970  
Rand study

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# 'Bloodbath' seen if Reds win

By MIKE MILLER  
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

A private study of Viet Cong terrorist tactics commissioned by the Defense Department has concluded that at least 100,000 South Vietnamese would be executed if a communist regime ever should gain control there.

"Indeed, it might well be considerably higher," said the study by the Rand Corp. of Santa Monica, Calif. Titled "Viet Cong repression and its implications for the future," the study was prepared for the Pentagon's advanced research projects agency.

The report, compiled by senior staff member Dr. Stephen T. Hosmer of the Rand Washington staff, was based on extensive study of captured enemy documents and other intelligence data. It generally supports the argument a bloodbath would follow any communist rise to power in South Vietnam.

Critics of U. S. policies in Vietnam who favor faster or immediate troop withdrawals dispute the bloodbath theory.

But Dr. Hosmer concludes the communists after a takeover probably would decide to "deal severely" with such groups as defectors from the Viet Cong, South Vietnamese intelligence and counterintelligence personnel, government officials, national police and other security personnel and military officers and non-commissioned officers.

Given the number of South Vietnamese in

these categories, Dr. Hosmer wrote, "this author finds it difficult to believe that the number (to be executed) would be much less than 100,000."

The Rand report stressed that any predictions of communist reprisals are "highly speculative" and the extent of executions could depend on how the Reds took power.

But he also noted: "A communist regime might, at some time, attempt a radical and rapid transformation of society (including collectivization) by fostering in the South the kind of grass-roots violence that was employed in the north during the land reform campaign of the 1950s . . . if this were to happen, the likelihood of an extensive bloodbath would be very great indeed."

The Rand survey found that Viet Cong leaders see a series of general offensives and uprisings as one of the most likely routes to a Red victory and takeover. Should this occur after all U. S. forces are withdrawn, "one could expect a bloodbath of very large proportions simply in the process of their assuming power," the report said.

But if the Reds should gain power thru gradual subversion and eventual capture of a coalition government negotiated under an international agreement, "the likelihood of widespread violence, at least during the takeover period, might be significantly smaller," the study added.

WASHINGTON STAR  
16 June 1970

# Execution of 100,000 Seen if Viet Reds Win

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By ORR KELLY  
Star Staff Writer

At least 100,000 persons likely would be executed if the Communists should gain control in South Vietnam, according to a Rand Corp. report sponsored by the Pentagon.

The report, made public yesterday, is the result of a study of Viet Cong repression and its implication for the future by Stephen T. Hosmer of the Rand Washington office.

Hosmer, a 1953 graduate of Yale, is a specialist in Southeast Asian affairs. He has been a senior staff member with the Rand "think tank" since 1961. In the last 15 years he has made five visits to South Vietnam, the most recent in January.

Hosmer listed a number of categories of persons who would be special targets for the Viet Cong. They include defectors, intelligence personnel and government officials.

### Severe Treatment Seen

"Should a Communist regime in South Vietnam in fact decide to deal severely with persons from groups such as those listed above, as this author believes it would, the number of executions alone could well total many tens of thousands," the report said.

"One can only guess at what the minimum would be, but, given the size of the target categories involved, this author finds it difficult to believe that the number would be much less than

100,000. Indeed, it might well be considerably higher."

If a Communist regime should attempt a radical and rapid transformation of the society, as was done in North Vietnam during the 1950s, "the likelihood of an extensive bloodbath would be very great indeed," Hosmer said.

A Communist regime might be restrained from such tactics by world public opinion or by tactical considerations, he said.

But the expectation among large numbers of the South Vietnamese population that such a bloodbath would occur is an important factor in the possibilities for settlement of the war, he said.

If government officials in the South had to choose between a coalition government, with un-

certainty over who would control the country, and a takeover of part of the country by North Vietnam, Hosmer concluded, they might well choose the latter because of their fear of a bloodbath.

The study, prepared for the Pentagon's Advance Research Project Agency, analyzes at length the Communist tactic of repression.

This ranges from warnings to executions, deliberately carried out as a matter of policy.

One of the major Communist techniques is what Hosmer describes as the "carrot-and-stick" policy by which government officials are forced to provide intelligence to avoid execution. They also are promised preferred status if the Communists should take over.

EL TELEGRAFO, Guayaquil  
12 May 1970

# "Son chatarras los autos polacos", dicen taxistas

COMEX, que vendió los vehículos "Warazawa" intentan embargar a la cooperativa que los adquirió.- Carros bloquean una calle

Continúa sin solución el problema que viene sosteniendo la Cooperativa de Transportes Livianos de la Pvcia. del Guayas la misma que en los últimos días del mes de mayo del presente año adquirió 50 automóviles polacos de la marca "Warszawa" a firma local Compañía Comercio Exterior (CO MEX) subsidiaria de la "Pol-Mot" de Polonia.

Los vehículos se encuentran paralizados desde la semana anterior junto al local de la Cooperativa situado en las calles Venezuela y Quito y ahora han sido atravesados en la mitad de la calle imposibilitando el tránsito motorizado por ese lugar. Esta actitud la han

tomado los cooperadores en vista de no encontrar solución a su álgida situación; pese a los esfuerzos que viene realizando el Presidente de la Cooperativa Sr. Rubén Bermeo; quien en días anteriores y junto a una delegación de propietarios de los vehículos viajó a Quito a entrevistarse con los representantes polacos; quienes manifestaron los Dirigentes; se mostraron desinteresados en solucionar el problema. Por otra parte la firma CO MEX tampoco trata de terminar la situación y por el contrario intenta quitarles los vehículos, sin entregarles la cuota inicial y el dinero invertido en repuestos y o-

bra de mano empleados en los vehículos.

## AUTOS SON CHATARRA

El Presidente de la Cooperativa; Rubén Bermeo y el resto de cooperados han manifestado a este diario que la firma vendedora los ha engañado al enviarles otra clase de automóviles de los estipulados en el contrato de compra, y que estos vehículos fueron anteriormente vendidos a una cooperativa colombiana, la misma que luego devolvió por su pésima calidad. Agregaron que estos mismos carros se los han vendido a ellos; comprobando que sus repuestos se hallan en irre-

gulares condiciones; encontrando además que varias partes de las carrocerías han sido reparadas con masilla. Por ello los automóviles han sido calificados como "chatarras", según dice en algunos letreros que se lucen en los automóviles paralizados.

Según declaraciones de los dirigentes del movimiento su actitud de hecho continuará indefinidamente hasta que sea superado el problema. Mientras tanto continuará cerrada la cuadra comprendida por la Calle Venezuela entre Quito y P. Moncayo, donde han sido atravesados los vehículos los mismos que no están prestando sus servicios a la ciudadanía.

CPYRGHT EL COMERCIO, Quito  
12 May 1970

CPYRGHT

## Taxistas piden se acepte devolución de 50 vehículos importados desde Polonia

GUAYAQUIL. 11.— Cinuenta taxis de fabricación polaca permanecen estacionados en la calle Venezuela, en su intersección con Quito, al pie de la cooperativa de transportes livianos de la provincia del Guayas, como señal de protesta de sus propietarios por la mala calidad de los vehículos, que fueron importados por la Compañía de Comercio Exterior, con sede en Quito, que es subsidiaria de la firma "Pol-Mot". Motores Polacos

de Polonia.

Los taxistas les han sacado el aire a los neumáticos para impedir que los carros sean retirados y a fin de que permanezcan bloqueando el tránsito en la calle Venezuela.

Los dueños de los vehículos se quejan de la falta de cumplimiento de la firma vendedora, pues no ha instalado los talleres de reparaciones, ni los equipos de radio y no ha provisto de los repuestos necesarios.

Aseveraron que los carros polacos son los que fueron rechazados por los "taxistas" de Colombia y enviados a Polonia en donde los han reparado y exportado al Ecuador.

Los vehículos son de la marca "Warszawa" y sus conductores y propietarios exigen la devolución de la cuota de entrada y las 4 mensualidades que han pagado. Los vehículos se importaron mediante financiación con el Banco La Filantrópica.

Taxi Drivers Say, "Polish Autos Are Junk Metal."

The problem of the Taxi Drivers Cooperative of Guayas Province has continued insoluble since the first days of this past January when the Cooperative acquired fifty Polish automobiles, made by "Warszawa" and sold through the local Company of Foreign Commerce (COMEX), a subsidiary of "Pol Mot" of Poland.

For the past few weeks the vehicles have been parked, broken down, on Venezuela and Quito Streets, near the local office of the Cooperative, and now they have been placed across the middle of the street, blocking traffic entirely. The members of the Cooperative took this action after having found no solution to their situation; they hoped to find one through the President of the Cooperative, Mr. Ruben Bermeo, who recently travelled to Quito with a delegation of taxi owners and talked with members of the Polish Trade Mission, who reassured them, but then demonstrated that they were not really interested in solving the problem. On the other hand, the COMEX firm didn't try to alleviate the situation either, and actually is trying to get rid of the vehicles without refunding the money on the initial quota or that spent on repairs and other work done on the vehicles.

Autos Are Scrap Metal.

The President of the Cooperative, Ruben Bermeo, and the other Cooperative members, have told this newspaper that the selling firm profited by sending them another kind of automobile from that stipulated in the purchase contract, and that these vehicles were formerly sold to a Colombian Cooperative. This is the very same type that turned out to be poorest quality. They added that these were the same cars that were sold to them, with unsatisfactory repair work, some parts having even been repaired with putty. Because of this, the automobiles have been classed as "scrap," as the signs say that are posted on the broken down cars. According to the statements of the leaders of the demonstration, their action will continue indefinitely until the problem is solved. While the block bounded by Venezuela Street, between Quito and P. Moncayo Streets, will remain closed where the vehicles have been placed across it, there will be no taxi service for the citizens.

EL COMERCIO, Quito  
12 May 1970

Taxi Drivers Seek Restitution for 50 Vehicles Imported from Poland.

Guayaquil, 11 May -- Fifty taxis made in Poland are permanently blocking Venezuela Street at the intersection of Quito Street, near the Guayas Province Taxi Drivers Cooperative, as a sign of protest by their owners against the poor quality of the vehicles which were imported by the Company of Foreign Commerce (COMEX), with headquarters in Quito and which is a subsidiary of "Pol Mot," or Polish Motors of Poland.

The taxi drivers have let the air out of the tires so that the cars cannot be hauled away, with the result that they are permanently blocking passage through Venezuela Street. The owners of the vehicles claim that the selling firm did not fulfill its agreement since it did not set up repair shops, nor did it install radio equipment nor provide for even basic repairs.

They affirm that the Polish cars are those that were rejected by the taxi drivers of Colombia and which then were sent to Poland where they were repaired and exported to Ecuador.

The vehicles are made by "Warszawa" and the drivers and owners demand restitution on the entry quota and the four monthly payments they have made. Financing of the imported vehicles was carried out through the Philanthropic Bank.



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NEW YORK TIMES  
18 June 1970

## China Tightens Curbs on Student Rebels

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, June 17—Com-

munist China, which has enthusiastically endorsed the anti-Establishment activities of young people around the world, is adopting increasingly repressive measures against its own student rebels.

Chinese authorities have been calling for greater efforts in the indoctrination of young children "to raise their class awareness" and "to deepen their love" for Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party.

The aging Peking leaders' preoccupation with the younger generation appears to reflect a continuing concern that the present political system might not endure when they step down. They are attempting to foster generations of "revolutionary successors," who will not succumb to the "sugar-coated bullets" of enemies at home or abroad.

A recent public meeting at Changchun, capital of Kirin Province, was told by a municipal official that class enemies were "trying by every means to win over to their side the young people and children."

### Must Obey Unquestioningly

"Imperialist conspirators also pin their hopes for a peaceful evolution on our young generation," he said. "It is imperative for us to smash this illusion of the imperialists."

In these circumstances, the young must follow Peking's edicts unquestioningly. Posters seen recently by travelers in China stated: "Decisively liquidate bad elements who fan the wind of criminal opposition among the youth."

A large proportion of the many hundreds recently executed in Kwangtung Province

for various alleged crimes were young people. Many of them were students who had rebelled against being sent to work in the countryside and had turned to crime to feed themselves.

Most high school graduates are expected to undergo "re-education" at the hands of the peasants. Millions have been sent from cities and towns to the countryside. In this way, the Chinese authorities have removed potential or known rebellious elements from the centers of power, reduced the urban population pressures and increased the rural labor force.

Hsinhua, the Chinese press agency, reported that "several million graduates from senior and junior middle schools" had settled down in the countryside since December, 1968. The students are expected to spend the rest of their lives with the peasants.

### Some Swim to Hong Kong

The campaign has met with persistent resistance. Many refugees who swim to Hong Kong are former students who were sent from Canton, capital of Kwangtung Province, to work in the countryside.

Many students from Canton and other urban areas in Kwangtung have been assigned to Hainan Island. A broadcast from Hainan Island recently complained that some workers "brought all kinds of nonproletarian ideas from their old schools."

It stated: "Some said: 'To study in school for over 10 years and to work as a docker is a waste of our talents.' Others feared hardship and fatigue."

The broadcast said that "class education" and study of the works of Chairman Mao "proved highly effective" in overcoming

these tendencies and other "anarchist trends."

For the very young, a new program of "red children's classes" has been introduced "to cultivate the children into successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause" by giving them daily doses of Mao's thought.

### 5-Year-Old Is Example

A broadcast from Hefei, capital of Anhwei Province, reporting on the results of these classes, said a 5-year-old boy from a certain peasant production team used to pick up rice from the field and take it home.

The broadcast stated: "After attending the red children's class, he has come to realize that to take home the team's crops means acting from self-interest. With this new understanding in mind, he has not brought home any more crops picked up from the fields."

Hsinhua also had high praise for five children ranging in age from 10 to 15 who "died heroically in the course of putting out a forest fire."

"People saw them run into the flames and heard them recite Chairman Mao's great teaching 'When we die for the people it is a worthy death,'" the agency said.

"In an instant, the five young heroes were surrounded by the conflagration, but people still heard shouts of 'Long live Chairman Mao!' loud and clear."

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L'EUROPEO, Milan  
7 May 1970*Il Manifesto dei nuovi signori del Cremlino***UN DOCUMENTO SENSAZIONALE  
SULLA POLITICA URSS DEGLI ANNI '70**

Siamo in grado di rivelare l'esistenza di un documento eccezionale. È una risoluzione-comunicazione, giunta da Mosca ai partiti comunisti dell'Europa occidentale. Abbiamo potuto vedere la copia di questa lettera riservatissima arrivata al Comitato centrale del partito comunista francese. Non si sa quale autorità sovietica l'abbia redatta né quale ufficio superiore l'abbia trasmessa all'estero. Probabilmente ci ha pensato il Politburo.

Il lato assolutamente eccezionale di questo documento è che esso costituisce un panorama e un riesame completi della strategia della politica estera sovietica. Perciò si può avanzare un'ipotesi: che il documento sia stato elaborato dal nuovo gruppo dirigente che sta per prendere il potere al Cremlino (agli ordini di Breznev padrone unico; o forse contro di lui?) e che esso sia stato mandato all'estero in anticipo sulla presa di potere, proprio per preparare alla « nuova » direzione un terreno favorevole presso tutti i partiti comunisti.

Esaminiamo con attenzione questo documento; si tratta probabilmente, del programma di governo della nuova classe dirigente sovietica.

**STRATEGIA  
GENERALE**

La prima parte della risoluzione inquadra i principi generali della politica estera sovietica. La situazione internazionale è caotica, afferma il documento, e persino gli atteggiamenti assunti dalla diplomazia sovietica all'ONU e nelle conferenze internazionali possono aver creato dubbi nei partiti comunisti di tutto il mondo. È più che mai necessario perciò stabilire in modo inequivocabile la linea politica effettiva dell'URSS per gli anni Settanta.

Tale linea si riassume in una parola: « temporeggiamento ». Non è nuova, perché appariva già in diverse comunicazioni del PCUS ai partiti comunisti dei paesi non retti da un regime socialista. È una tattica attendista, spiega il documento, che però non intacca né contraddice la tenace risoluzione sovietica di stroncare militarmente, al momento che sarà ritenuto conveniente, tutte quelle azioni che le nazioni capitaliste facenti capo agli Stati Uniti d'America stanno preparando contro di essa e contro le democrazie popolari.

Il rapporto ribadisce poi la ferma decisione del partito comunista dell'Unione Sovietica di non fare nessuna effettiva concessione al blocco capitalista; né sul terreno politico-militare-geografico riguardante le zone d'influenza vitali per la sicurezza dell'Unione Sovietica, né tanto meno su quello ideologico. La strategia « resta inalterata »; non accettare alcun compromesso sostanziale col campo imperialista. Questa volontà inflessibile deriva dalla convinzione che gli Stati Uniti e i loro satelliti « saranno sempre pronti a violare, in qualsiasi contingenza, ogni accordo da essi sottoscritto ».

L'Unione Sovietica, prosegue la risoluzione, si trova oggi al livello più elevato di

efficienza e di assestamento delle sue forze armate; è in condizione di spezzare tutti i piani d'accerchiamento messi in atto ai suoi danni durante il ventennio della guerra fredda. Essa ha « non solo raggiunto ma superato il livello di preparazione necessario al successo di una azione decisiva ».

L'URSS non è insensibile alle proposte di coesistenza e di conciliazione, volte a smorzare le tensioni in atto nel mondo; anzi le promuove essa stessa, ma lo fa allo scopo di assicurarci il tempo necessario a completare il programma della sua azione risolutiva.

Il blocco capitalista, sostiene la risoluzione, sta apprestando una macchina bellica formidabile; esso dispone di un solido baluardo difensivo e può scatenare vaste e potenti azioni offensive. L'Unione Sovietica deve sottrarsi a questa tenaglia e rendere imminente il tempo della risoluzione decisiva. La sua linea è quindi: temporeggiare e coesistere finché ci si sia assicurati un netto predominio delle forze.

★

COMINCIA qui una parte assai delicata della risoluzione. Essa ammonisce i partiti comunisti dell'Europa occidentale e quelli extraeuropei a tenersi costantemente all'erta di fronte all'eventualità che l'azione che l'Unione Sovietica prepara scatti improvvisamente, senza possibilità per essi di venire preavvertiti. I partiti comunisti, in particolare quelli europei-occidentali, sono invitati a sintonizzare la loro preparazione militare con quella dell'Unione Sovietica, imprimendole lo stesso ritmo di accelerazione.

*(Il commento che gli ambienti comunisti francesi fanno, sulla parte genera-*

*le del documento che riveliamo, è che, con esso, il futuro gruppo dirigente dell'URSS sembra voler far riplombare la politica estera sovietica nelle voragini più cupe dell'era di Stalin e del Cominform; riproponendo, a diciassette anni dalla morte del grande dittatore, la medesima tattica di temporeggiamento e la minaccia dell'azione bellica risolutiva come la sola che possa liberare il comunismo dalla tenaglia capitalista. La crisi attuale del Cremlino sta per risolversi in una restaurazione stalinista? La diplomazia se lo chiede con ansia).*

**I DIVERSI  
SCACCHIERI**

IL DOCUMENTO passa poi ad analizzare le linee della politica estera sovietica nei vari scacchieri:

**SUD-EST ASIATICO**

La risoluzione si scaglia contro l'americanizzazione di Formosa. L'Unione Sovietica, essa afferma, ha sue esigenze di sicurezza in Estremo Oriente, ed esse in un certo qual modo coincidono con quelle della Cina. L'URSS non può ulteriormente tollerare l'intensità della penetrazione americana a Formosa. L'americanizzazione di Formosa, che si esprime nella presenza di basi e di missioni politiche e militari USA sull'isola del Pacifico, è un pericolo immenso: Formosa, con la sua concentrazione di ingenti forze cionnazionaliste, rappresenta il trampolino per l'aggressione alla Cina continentale e per provocare una nuova guerra civile cinese. Quando Nixon avrà ritirato le sue truppe dal Vietnam e dal resto dell'Indo-

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cina, Formosa si troverà in prima linea. L'Unione Sovietica non si è mai voluta impegnare in un'azione bellica diretta nel Sud-est asiatico. Ma essa ritiene che la fortezza Formosa costituisca una minaccia alla sua sicurezza.

*(È curioso notare che questo passo del documento ribadisce l'importanza che agli occhi delle varie diplomazie riveste da qualche mese Formosa. La Cina infatti ha manifestato la sua irritazione per un recente discorso del primo ministro nipponico Sato, che aveva affermato come la sicurezza di Taiwan (Formosa) e della Corea del Sud siano vitali per il Giappone. E il dipartimento di Stato americano si è allarmato moltissimo per la rinnovata irrequietudine dei movimenti indipendenti in Formosa: ne abbiamo dato notizia sull'Europeo numero 16).*

#### VIETNAM

Il documento conferma che la politica sovietica nel Vietnam e in tutta l'Asia di Sud-est è quella di non intervenire direttamente, ma di creare le condizioni atte a tener impegnato il massimo numero possibile di forze americane. Per conseguire questo scopo l'Unione Sovietica ha fornito ai combattenti il massimo contributo in materiale bellico, tecnici militari e civili e assistenza economica. Il risultato è stato che gli Stati Uniti e il campo imperialista hanno

subito nel Vietnam uno scacco gravissimo e che stanno per essere spazzati via da tutta l'Asia di Sud-est.

#### CINA

Gli interessi, fra l'Unione Sovietica e la Repubblica popolare di Cina, dice il documento, sono in forte contrasto, anche a causa delle divergenze ideologiche fra i due paesi. Ma la collaborazione dei due grandi poteri nella difesa del comunismo contro l'imperialismo capitalista non farà mai difetto. Tale principio-base costituisce un punto fermo della politica sovietica.

*(Ciò significa, forse che i nuovi dirigenti dell'URSS si preparano ad un riavvicinamento con la Cina? Molti osservatori sostengono che questa sarà l'evoluzione naturale dei fatti).*

#### JUGOSLAVIA

Il documento presenta sul tema Jugoslavia aspetti sorprendenti: esso afferma che il governo sovietico è in possesso di documenti, raccolti dai suoi servizi segreti e da quelli delle repubbliche democratiche confinanti con la Jugoslavia, i quali confermano l'esistenza e l'attuazione di un piano, da parte del governo jugoslavo, per paralizzare ogni contributo politico e militare che Romania, Bulgaria e Ungheria potessero dare all'Unione Sovietica nel momento in cui essa dovesse intraprendere «azioni dirette preventive». La Jugoslavia, accusa la risoluzione, ha promosso un'azione clandestina

di sabotaggio all'interno di quei paesi, per favorirvi la restaurazione del capitalismo. Per attuare questa restaurazione la Jugoslavia non ha esitato ad accettare l'aiuto finanziario e anche militare delle potenze capitalistiche, e persino a invocare la collaborazione dei loro servizi spionistici. Nel paese si è andata determinando così una situazione caotica; mentre la popolazione vorrebbe seguire i principi del socialismo, il suo governo traditore le impone enormi sacrifici per sorreggere la sua politica di aggressione ai paesi confinanti. Così l'Unione Sovietica è decisa ad appoggiare le repubbliche popolari nel loro intervento rivolto a liberare il popolo jugoslavo dall'oppressione dei suoi governanti. E vuole associare a questa lotta i due partiti comunisti occidentali più potenti: il francese e l'italiano. Ad essi affida il compito di appoggiare la campagna contro il regime titoista, di proteggere i fuorusciti jugoslavi nei loro paesi e di sabotare il materiale industriale jugoslavo nelle ferrovie e nei porti francesi e italiani.

*(La risoluzione-comunicazione è durissima nei confronti di Tito e della Jugoslavia: un'altra indizio di un ritorno di stalinismo? Fra le righe sembra di leggere addirittura la volontà sovietica di attuare anche in Jugoslavia un intervento militare stile Cecoslovacchia agosto 1968).*

#### MEDIO ORIENTE

La parte della comunicazione dedicata al Medio Oriente e al Mediterraneo è concisa. In essa si dice che l'URSS è pronta a contribuire ad un assetramento temporaneo dell'equilibrio politico fra Israele e i paesi arabi. Anche qui prevale la tattica temporeggiatrice: l'URSS si dimostrerà conciliante in attesa che i paesi arabi confinanti con Israele e quelli del Maghreb, dell'Africa mediterranea, si rafforzino militarmente e politicamente fino al punto di poter ottenere i privilegi cui hanno diritto.

Un paragrafo è dedicato alla presenza della flotta sovietica nel Mediterraneo, che acquisterà un peso sempre più forte. Essa resta una pedina fondamentale della nuova politica: è la garanzia degli impegni che l'Unione Sovietica si è assunta per soddisfare «le giuste pretese del mondo arabo».

*(La risoluzione-comunicazione ha tutto l'aspetto, si dice negli stessi ambienti comunisti francesi, di essere il «manifesto» del nuovo gruppo che si prepara ad assicurarsi il potere del Cremlino. E comunque, indiscutibilmente, il programma di politica estera dell'URSS per gli anni Settanta. Lo abbiamo ottenuto con enorme fatica e lo riveliamo come un documento di non comune importanza e gravità).*

Archimedeo

L'EUROPEO, Milan  
7 May 1970

A Sensational Document on USSR Policies for the 70's

We are able to reveal the existence of an exceptional document. It is a communique-resolution sent from Moscow to the West European communist parties. We saw the copy of this very confidential document received by the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. Neither the Soviet official who drafted it nor the high office that transmitted it abroad is known. It probably was done by the Politburo.

The absolutely exceptional feature of this document is that it is a complete panorama and re-examination of the strategy of Soviet foreign policy. Therefore, we may state a hypothesis: that the document was drafted by the new leadership group that is about to take over in the Kremlin (under orders of Brezhnev, the single boss; or perhaps against him?), and that it might have been sent abroad in anticipation of the seizure of power in order to pave the way for a favorable reception of the "new" leadership by all communist parties.

A careful study of the document shows that it probably is the government program of the new Soviet leadership class.

### General Strategy

The first part of the resolution embraces the general principles of Soviet foreign policy. The document says the international situation is chaotic. Even attitudes adopted by Soviet diplomats at the United Nations and in international conferences may have generated doubts among the world's communist parties. Therefore, it is more necessary than ever to unequivocally establish the USSR political line for the 1970's.

That line may be reduced to a single word: "temporize." It is not new because it has appeared in various CPSU communications to the communist parties of nations not based on a socialist regime. It is a waiting tactic, the document explains, but it does not damage or contradict the tenacious Soviet determination to militarily halt at a convenient time all those actions which the capitalist nations headed by the United States are planning against it and against the people's democracies.

The report then reiterates the firm decision of the Soviet Union's communist party to avoid making any effective concession to the capitalist bloc: either on the political-military-geographical terrain involving vital zones of interest, and still less on the ideological terrain. The strategy "remains unchanged": refuse to accept any substantial compromise with the imperialist camp. This inflexible determination comes from the conviction that the United States and its satellites "will always be ready to violate, in any contingency, any agreement they sign."

The resolution continues: "the Soviet Union today is on the highest level of efficiency and organization of its armed forces. It was capable of defeating any plan of encirclement put into effect to its detriment during the 20 years of the cold war. It has not only achieved, but it has gone beyond, the level of preparation necessary for the success of a decisive action."

The USSR is not insensitive to proposals of coexistence and conciliation designed to reduce world tensions. In fact, it promotes those initiatives but it does so in order to gain the time necessary to complete the program of its decisive action.

The resolution says the capitalist bloc is building a formidable war machine. It has a solid defensive bulwark and can unleash vast and powerful offensive actions. The Soviet Union must evade this pincer movement and bring closer the time of decisive resolution. Therefore, its line is: temporize and coexist until it is assured of a clear predominance of force.

- - -

Here a very delicate section of the resolution begins. It warns communist parties within and outside western Europe to be constantly on the alert against the possibility that the Soviet Union will break out suddenly without any warning to them. The communist parties, particularly those of western Europe, are invited to put their military preparation in tune with that of the Soviet Union, making it conform with the same rythm of acceleration.

(The comment made by French communists on the general part of the document we disclose, is that with this document, the future USSR leaders seem to want to plunge Soviet foreign policy into the deepest vortices of the era of Stalin and the cominform. Seventeen years after the death of the great dictator, it once more proposes the tactic of temporizing and the threat of definitive military action as the only way to liberate communism from the capitalist pincers. Is the present Kremlin crisis about to be resolved through a Stalinist restoration? Diplomats are anxiously posing the question).

#### The Various Areas of Action

The document then analyzes Soviet foreign policy lines in various areas:

##### Southeast Asia

The resolution attacks the Americanization of Formosa. It says the Soviet Union has its security needs in the Far East and to a certain extent they coincide with those of China. The USSR cannot further tolerate the degree of American penetration in Formosa. Expressed in terms of bases and U.S. military and political positions on the Pacific island, they represent an immense danger. Formosa, with its concentration of large Chinese nationalist forces represents the springboard for aggression against mainland China and for stimulating a new civil war in China. When Nixon withdraws his troops from Vietnam and the rest of Indochina, Formosa will be in the front line. The Soviet Union never has wanted to become involved in direct military action in Southeast Asia. But it believes that fortress Formosa constitutes a threat to its security.

(It is curious to note that this section of the document reiterates the importance Formosa has assumed in the eyes of diplomats for some months. In fact, China has shown its irritation over a recent speech by Japanese Prime Minister Sato who said that the security of Taiwan (Formosa) is vital to Japanese interests. And the U.S. Department of State became very alarmed

over the renewed unrest of independence movements in Formosa. We reported this in issue No. 16 of L'Europeo).

### Vietnam

The document confirms that Soviet policy in Vietnam and in all of Southeast Asia is to avoid direct intervention but to create the conditions necessary to keep the largest possible number of American forces committed. To achieve this aim the Soviet Union has supplied the combatants the maximum in war material, civilian and military technicians and economic aid. The result has been that the United States and the imperialist camp have suffered a very serious setback in Vietnam and they are about to be swept out of all of Southeast Asia.

### China

The document says there is strong conflict between the interests of the Soviet Union and those of the People's Republic of China. This is due, among other things, to the ideological differences between the two countries. But cooperation between the two great powers in the defense of communism against capitalist imperialism will never fail. This basic principle is a constant of Soviet foreign policy.

(Does this mean, perhaps, that the new USSR leaders are preparing for a rapprochement with China? Many observers maintain that this will be the natural course of events).

### Yugoslavia

Concerning Yugoslavia, the document presents surprises: it says the Soviet government has documents gathered by its intelligence services and those of the democratic republics on the borders of Yugoslavia, which confirm the existence and implementation by the Yugoslav government of a plan to paralyze any political and military contribution Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary might give the Soviet Union whenever it should undertake "preventive, direct action." The resolution charges that Yugoslavia promoted a clandestine sabotage action within those nations to prepare the way for the restoration of capitalism. To carry this out, Yugoslavia has not hesitated to accept financial and even military aid from capitalist powers and has even gone so far as to ask them for cooperation in intelligence services. Thus, a chaotic situation has been developing within the nation. While the people would like to follow the principles of socialism, their traitorous government imposes enormous sacrifices upon it to support its policy of aggression against bordering nations. Thus, the Soviet government has decided to support the people's republics in their aim of liberating Yugoslavia's people from the oppression of their government leaders. And it is trying to involve in this struggle the two most powerful western communist parties: those of Italy and of France. It assigns to them the task of supporting the campaign against the Titoist regime, protecting Yugoslav refugees in their countries and sabotaging Yugoslav industrial equipment in the French and Italian railways and ports.

(The communique-resolution is very severe toward Tito and Yugoslavia. Is this another indication of a return to Stalinism? Between the lines it seems one can read the determination of the Soviet Union to carry out in Yugoslavia a military intervention in the style of the Czechoslovak aggression in 1968).

### Middle East

The section of the document dedicated to the Middle East and the Mediterranean is concise. It says the USSR is ready to contribute to a "temporary" settlement of political balance between Israel and the Arab nations. Here too the temporizing tactic prevails. The USSR will be conciliatory until the Arab nations bordering Israel and those of the Maghreb of Mediterranean Africa are militarily and politically strong to the point where they can seize the privileges to which they have a right.

A paragraph deals with the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean which will become increasingly important. It remains a key pawn in the new policy: it is the guarantee of the commitments the Soviet Union has made to satisfy the rightful aspirations of the Arab world.

(The communique-resolution has all the appearance, according to French communist sources, of being the "manifesto" of the new group preparing to seize Kremlin power. In any case, it is unquestionably the program of USSR foreign policy for the 70's. We worked very hard to get it and we publish it as a document of uncommon importance and seriousness).

PRAVDA, Moscow  
16 May 1970

CPYRGHT

## По поводу одной фальшивки

В последнее время буржуазная печать ряда стран пытается развернуть новую антикоммунистическую и антисоветскую кампанию, стремясь тем самым отвлечь внимание мировой общественности от усиливающейся агрессивности империалистической реакции в различных районах мира, отвлечь внимание широких народных масс, возмущенных агрессивней американского империализма в Индокитае и его проектами на Ближнем Востоке, путем распространения небывлиц о жизни в социалистических странах и деятельности международного коммунистического и национально-освободительного движения.

В этом многоголосом хоре бесцеремонных писак, выполняющих директивы известных служб дезинформации, не в первый раз отличается итальянский еженедельник «Европео». Он и раньше не был разборчив в подборе публикуемых материалов, а в номе-

ре от 7 мая опубликовал провокационную статью о внешней политике Советского Союза. В ней журнал излагает текст какого-то мифического документа, якобы тайно составленного «неизвестными кругами в Москве» и чуть ли не формулирующего программу «внешнеполитической деятельности СССР на 70-е годы». Хотя такого документа, само собой разумеется, нет в природе, редакция журнала с серьезным видом утверждает, что якобы она видела его в каких-то «коммунистических кругах Франции».

В этой фальшивке утверждается ни больше ни меньше, что Советский Союз намерен в 70-е годы отказаться от активной внешней политики поддержки народов, борющихся за мир и национальную независимость, и проводить политику, «которая сводится к одному слову «выжидание»: т. е. сосуществовать, но

только до тех пор, пока не будет обеспечено иное прекращение сил, и тогда ускорить сроки «реализации действий». Как видим, предпринимается очередная жалкая попытка запугать легионеров людей затасканными измышлениями о мнимой «советской военной угрозе». Далее, в этой статье излагаются всякие небывлицы относительно политики Советского Союза в Юго-Восточной Азии, на Ближнем Востоке, во Вьетнаме, в отношении Китая и Югославии.

Для всякого здравомыслящего человека ясно, что указанная заметка является грубой фальшивкой, преследующей совершенно очевидную цель — оклеветать Советское государство и его миролюбивую внешнюю политику, вбить клин в его отношения с социалистическими странами, с братскими коммунистическими и рабочими партиями.

Все, кто мало-мальски следит

за международной жизнью, знают существо советской внешней политики, внешнеполитическую программу Советского Союза. Она определена в решениях XXIII съезда КПСС, в документах Советского правительства, в выступлениях руководителей КПСС и Советского государства. Никакой другой внешней политики у Советского государства нет и быть не может.

В свете этих фактов не может не вызвать удивления, что кто-то в Югославии счел возможным всерьез отнестись к этой журнальной утке. В бюллетене агентства ТАИНОГ, который был разослан ряду иностранных посольств в Белграде, к сожалению, опубликована эта статья, что не может, разумеется, способствовать плодотворному развитию связей и сотрудничества, существующих между Советским Союзом и Югославией.

(Соб. инф.)

PRAVDA, Moscow  
16 May 1970

### Concerning a Forgery

Recently, the bourgeois press of a number of countries has been attempting to spread a fierce anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign, thereby aspiring to deflect the attention of the world public from imperialist reaction's increasing aggressiveness in various regions of the world and to divert the attention of the broad popular masses, angered by the aggression of U.S. imperialism in Indochina and its intrigues in the Near East, by disseminating fables about life in the socialist countries and the international communist and national liberation movements' activities.

Not for the first time the Italian weekly EUROPEO stands out in this multivoice choir of unceremonious hacks fulfilling the directives of the well-known disinformation services. Previously, it has been unscrupulous in its selection of published material and in the 7 May issue it published a provocative article on the Soviet Union's foreign policy. The magazine carries the text of some mythical document which was allegedly secretly drawn up by "unknown Moscow circles" practically formulating a program for "the USSR's foreign political activity for the seventies." Although, of course, this document does not exist, the magazine's editorial board seriously asserts that it saw it in certain "French communist circles."

This forgery asserts no more no less than in the seventies the Soviet Union intends to abandon its active foreign policy of support for peoples fighting for peace and national independence and to pursue a policy "amounting to, in a word, 'temporizing': that is, coexisting, but only until it has insured a clear supremacy of forces, and then to accelerate the time tables [stroke] for "decisive actions." As we see, the latest miserable attempt is being undertaken to intimidate gullible people with hackneyed fabrications concerning the imaginary "Soviet military threat." Further, this article expounds all kinds of fables regarding the Soviet Union's policy in Southeast Asia, the Near East, Vietnam, and with respect to China and Yugoslavia.

It is clear to every sober minded person that the above-mentioned notes are a flagrant falsification pursuing a perfectly obvious aim--to slander the Soviet state and its peace-loving foreign policy and to drive a wedge into its relations with the socialist countries and with the fraternal communist and workers parties.

Everyone who follows international life to the slightest extent knows the essence of Soviet Foreign policy and the Soviet Union's foreign political program. It has been determined in the 23rd CPSU Congress decisions, in Soviet Government documents, and in speeches by CPSU and Soviet Government leaders. There is not and cannot be any other foreign policy for the Soviet state.

In light of these facts, one cannot fail to be amazed that some people in Yugoslavia considered it possible to treat this journalistic canard with all seriousness. A TANJUG bulletin, which was dispatched to a number of foreign embassies in Belgrade, unfortunately published this article; of course, this cannot promote the fruitful development of ties and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

(Own Information)



Domestic Radio Broadcast in Serbo-Croatian, Belgrade  
21 May 1970

An impropriety by Moscow PRAVDA against our TANJUG News Agency deserves attention. The central Soviet party daily, in a special editorial comment entitled "In Connection With a Forgery," has attempted to impute sensationalist and anti-Soviet tendencies to TANJUG because in its bulletin TANJUG carried an article of the Italian journal L 'EUROPEO on Soviet foreign policy. What is it all about?

The article in L 'EUROPEO was published on 7 May, but Pravda did not react to it then. It only felt moved to react on 16 May, when a report on the article--not the text of the article--appeared in the TANJUG news and documentary bulletin. In fact this bulletin is designed precisely to follow foreign press articles, and (various) institutions and organizations of Yugoslavia, as well as foreign embassies of socialist and some other countries, subscribe to it.

The publishing of such bulletins and similar news agency publications is a normal part of activities of all news agencies. It is also (generally understood) that reports on foreign press articles in such bulletins are exclusively intended for information purposes and in no way imply any agreement with the views expressed in the reported articles or the adoption of any particular attitude toward the contents of the articles.

Although the L 'EUROPEO article was carried in a bulletin of this kind and although PRAVDA well knows that this does not imply any agreement with the article's contents, the central party daily nevertheless selected this occasion as an excuse to accuse TANJUG of doing something which, allegedly, cannot contribute to a successful development of the contacts and cooperation existing between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Clearly wishing to misinform its own readers, PRAVDA completely ignores the fact that the L 'EUROPEO article also treats Yugoslav and not just Soviet policy in a sensationalist manner. It should therefore be clear to any reader possessing any amount of good will that TANJUG does not support such an article in any way.

It is suggested to the Soviet reader, we quote, "that the (Yugoslavs) takes a serious attitude" toward such an article in the Italian journal L 'EUROPEO. PRAVDA also indicates to its readers that the TANJUG bulletin with this report was intentionally forwarded to a number of foreign embassies in Belgrade, but keeps silent about the fact that every issue of this bulletin is received by all the embassies--including the Soviet--which subscribe to it of their own free will.

The PRAVDA method of using a foreign article, which TANJUG did nothing to adopt as its own, for an attack on the Yugoslav News Agency is unusual and unacceptable, to say the least. What is at stake is a violation of the agreement on using news bulletins, and a tendentious and malicious twisting of their nature. This is the only way to interpret the fact that PRAVDA never reacted to the L 'EUROPEO article until it was reported in the TANJUG bulletin.

July 1970

## D A T E S   W O R T H   N O T I N G

July 15	Cuba	Target date for Castro's promised 10 million ton sugar harvest. The harvest was scheduled to be completed just prior to the 26th of July, the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, and was supposed to be followed by a Christmas in July to make up for holidays Castro suspended during the past year. Castro has now announced the 10 million ton goal cannot be met.
July 15-19	Helsinki	9th Congress of the (Communist) International Association of Democratic Lawyers -- meeting on the eve of the anniversary of the Geneva accords on Indochina.
July 21	Southeast Asia	Anniversary of the Geneva Accords and Indochina Armistice Agreement, 1954.
August 6	Hiroshima	25th anniversary of the dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, World War II.
August 14		25th anniversary of the end of World War II and the anniversary of the Japanese surrender.
August 20-21	Czechoslovakia	Second anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces from the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in 1968.

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July 1970

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(23 May - 19 June 1970)

1. Rumania Under New Soviet Pressure

The past month offers a dramatic illustration of Rumania's tenacious effort to maintain her independence against Soviet pressures. Among the most serious natural disasters ever to have befallen Rumania are the recent floods which have taken a fearful toll in human life and suffering and in material losses. Aid for relief came quickly from such disparate sources as Communist China and the United States, but of all the countries which should have been regarded as ready to help, the Soviet Union, as a close "ally," might have been expected to be foremost. Incredible as it seems, the Soviet Union evidently tried to use the human distress of the Rumanian people as a bargaining point to extort political concessions from Rumania's leaders. The lack of regard for civilized norms on the part of Soviet diplomacy has seldom been more vividly demonstrated. More than a week passed before the Soviet leaders even offered condolences and eventually material aid -- and then in niggardly measure. And as the floods reached their most serious level, President Ceausescu suddenly was required to go to Moscow. No satisfactory public explanation of his visit has been given, nor of the visit of Premier Maurer shortly thereafter. Western sources have logically deduced that political differences between the two powers were the subject of discussion and bargaining at the height of the national crisis.

The most immediate issue between the two is the signing of a new treaty of "friendship and mutual assistance," which was completed and initialed by both parties more than two years ago (before the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia). The formal signing of the treaty has been repeatedly postponed for obscure reasons, leading outsiders to conclude that differences continue to exist on important features of the treaty. Last month's signing of a new Soviet-Czech treaty stimulated additional speculation regarding the terms of the Soviet-Rumanian treaty, for the Czech treaty sanctioned the Brezhnev Doctrine as a necessary ingredient of any definition of Soviet relations with its so-called allies in Eastern Europe. The treaty also implicitly involves Czechoslovakia in mutual defense of the Soviet Union against enemies not only in Europe but elsewhere, for example, against attack from Communist China. How the precedent of the Soviet-Czech treaty will affect the Soviet-Rumanian treaty should soon become clear inasmuch as the long-awaited signing finally seems about to take place. Brezhnev and a suitable entourage are to visit Rumania, apparently on 6 July, for the purpose of signing the treaty.

Numerous Western press accounts detail the many unsettled issues causing friction between the USSR and Rumania, from Rumania's ostentatiously

cordial relations with Communist China to her resistance to economic and military integration in the European Soviet Bloc. It would seem that these differences will continue to cause trouble between the two countries regardless of the text of the treaty. At most, the settling of the treaty issue may give an indication of whether and in what direction Soviet-Rumanian relations may change: toward a stronger independent position for Rumania or toward enforced conformity with Soviet policy requirements. In either case, it seems clear that Rumania will continue to walk a dangerous diplomatic tight-rope.

## 2. Austrian Communist Party "Normalized"

Among those Communist parties in which a substantial faction of the membership is openly critical of the Soviet Union, and particularly its invasion of Czechoslovakia, is the Austrian CP (KPOe - Kommunistische Partei Oesterreichs). The Czechoslovak invasion caused a rift in the party from which it has not recovered. The pro-Soviet faction of the party's leadership has held a small margin, on the strength of which they have succeeded in gradually suppressing the more liberal "revisionist" faction led by such notables as elder statesman Ernst Fischer, his Politburo comrade-in-arms Franz Marek, Theodor Prager, Franz West, Franz Zapf, etc.

After a long and unsuccessful struggle by the liberals to reinstate the expelled Ernst Fischer, 27 "revisionists" who were Central Committee members revolted and refused to participate in any proceedings of the Committee. Similarly, several Politburo members withdrew from active participation in Party affairs. This left the control and running of the KPOe in the hands of the conservatives. The conservative faction also suppressed the Party periodical Tagebuch, which had been the main vehicle for liberal dissenting opinion and anti-Soviet articles. The liberals thereupon began their own journal, which they named Wiener Tagebuch (Vienna Diary), and which resembles the French dissident-Communist journal Politique Aujourd'hui (Today's Politics).

This intra-Party turmoil was to be settled once and for all at the 21st Party Congress which was held 28-31 May 1970. And so it was, for the most part. In a closed Congress, a new Central Committee was "elected," eliminating all but three of the "revisionist" 27. Party Chairman Franz Muhri, who has tried hard to straddle the fence between the two warring factions, remains as Party Chairman at least until the election for permanent Chairman is held some weeks hence. It may be that Muhri will pay the price for his fence-straddling and be thrown out by the conservative faction. It was revealed during the Congress that the KPOe has been reduced in size to a mere 26,000, and a large portion of the membership having been alienated by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. This is typical "normalization," according to Soviet recipe.

For the KPOe, Theodor Prager's prophecy, publicized in the KPOe newspaper last November, has come true: "If you continue in this vein, you

[i.e. the conservatives] will soon be standing alone. Your majority in the party will be total, but so will your isolation from the working class." Always a small party with little national influence (it has no representation in the national parliament) the KPOe yet is a good, visible example of the fate of all similarly small, uninfluential parties in the Free World. For these parties, the price for existence is conformity to Soviet requirements; the alternative is extinction, for these parties exist only at the sufferance of the CPSU, whose financial subsidy spells their life or death.

3. Community of Communist Dissent

a. French Communist Dissident Community to Expand

Roger Garaudy, well known as the prominent French Communist successively expelled from the Politburo, the Central Committee, and finally from the PCF altogether for his persistent criticism of the Soviet Union, its invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, and for his castigation of the PCF for its subservience to the CPSU, apparently has decided to pursue his mission of reforming the PCF. A brief article in the French daily L'Aurore of 9 June claims Garaudy is seeking to extend his "community of communist dissent" by bringing together two major groups of former Communists: those represented in the dissident journals Politique Aujourd'hui and Unir. (See attached.) The French magazine Nouvel Observateur expounds on the same subject at somewhat greater length. A translation of the latter article is also attached.

b. Australian Communist Party Seeks Garaudy Advice

The Australian Communist Party (CPA) is one of the rarities in the Communist world which dares persist in defying the Soviet Union. Among other signs of this defiance which are coming to the fore is a report that the CPA has had the audacity to invite that "renegade" from orthodox Communism, Roger Garaudy, to a lecture tour in Australia. This and other evidences of CPA resistance to Soviet dictates are expected to come to public attention in the immediate future.

DAGENS NYHETER Onsdagen den 27 Maj 1970

# Sovjet ökar trycket på Rumäniens ledare

Från DN:s Wienkorrespondent Lars Ake Berling

WIEN, tisdag.

Sovjet har gett Rumänien ett ultimatum vars konsekvenser betyder politisk underkastelse. Sådana uppgifter cirkulerar för närvarande bl a i Belgrad och Wien och har också återgetts av den amerikanska tidskriften Newsweek. På välunderrättat håll sägs det emellertid att faran för Rumäniens del inte är fullt så stor, men kvar står ett klart faktum: det sovjetiska trycket på Ceausescu redan så hårt drabbade land har ökat. Det heter bl a att Kreml nu sedan de "klarat av" Tjeckoslovakien ägnar större uppmärksamhet åt Rumänien.

Det är också hundraprocentigt säkert att förra veckans samtal i Moskva mellan den rumänske ledaren och de stora männen i Kreml — dit Ceausescu kallades — var mycket hårda. Det framgår inte minst av kommunikén efteråt i vilken det hette att man diskuterat i en "uppriktig och kamratlig anda".

Det är rysskommunistisk vokalbulär för hårda tag och det betyder att båda parterna har presenterat så gott som helt olika uppfattningar om saker och ting. Det enda man är enig om är att man skall samarbeta men man har olika uppfattningar om samarbetet. Rumänerna vill inte att det skall dirigeras av den ena parten.

## Inte bara fraser

Efter återkomsten till Bukarest avsåg Ceausescu enligt hövlighetstraditionen ett telegram till Kreml. Telegrammet publicerades nyligen med stora bokstäver i de rumänska tidningarna. Det är de vanliga artighetsfraserna med tack för gästfriheten etc, men det innehåller två avsnitt värda att studsa till på.

På tal om gästfrihet skriver Ceausescu "under vårt korta uppehåll" och på ett annat ställe önskar han ryssarna lycka till med uppbyggnaden av socialismen och betonar speciellt att han avser uppbyggnaden inom deras eget land.

Det sistnämnda anses vara en klar fingervisning enligt modellen "sköt dig själv" och den förstnämnda passusen kan tyda på att man skildes litet tidigare än vanligt och kanske litet ovänligare än vanligt.

Det visade sig också att de sedvanliga kramarna och broderskysarna från Brezjnevs & Co denna gång inte bestods den gästande delegationen. Men å andra sidan var det likadant vid det stora kommunistmötet i Moskva förra året. Fast det bevisar ju egentligen bara vad alla vet: att förhållandet mellan Rumänien och Sovjet länge varit problematiskt.

## Irriterar Kreml

Det är inte för att socialismen i Rumänien skulle kunna vara i fara som ryssarna så att säga vill åt landet. Det är — förutom av rent maktblockspolitiska ledarbegränsningar — därför att Rumäniens öppenhet irriterar Kreml. T ex Ceausescu och hans mans sätt att vänskapligen vända sig till Peking.

I det som har betecknats som ett ryskt ultimatum till Rumänien är en av huvudpunkterna att Bukarestregimen skall förbinda sig att ideologiskt, broderligt och praktiskt ställa sig på Sovjet sida i händelse av en öppen och eventuell väpnad konflikt med Kina.

Ultimatum eller inte, men det skär sig också i fråga om Warszawa-paktens manöverområde. Kreml kräver oupphörligt att även rumänskt territorium skall få användas av paktbroderns styrkor och Ceausescu nekar lika oupphörligt.

## Besök i juni

Vidare är det Comecon. Vid dess nyligen avslutade möte i Warszawa röstade rumänerna emot ett förslag om en gemensam investeringsbank. Ceausescu menar att landet behöver sitt kapital för investeringar inom det egna landet. Dessutom, framhårdar han fö, måste varje land i östblocket få handla hur mycket det vill med Väst-europas länder.

I juni kommer de ryska ledarna till Bukarest och många pessimistiska bedömare börjar redan jämföra med inledningen till en förhandlingskarusell liknande den som föregick interventionen i Prag 1968, de många desperata sammanträffandena på den tiden mellan ryssar och tjeckoslovakier i Prag, i Moskva, i Dresden, i Cierna nad Tisou och i Bratislava.

Den naturkatastrof som nu drabbar Rumänien gör naturligtvis inte det hela lättare. Bukarestregimen kommer mer och mer i ett hjälp-sökande underläge.

Men en officiell rumänsk källa påpekar något som kanske är väsentligt: Hade det varit lika allvarligt som förra gången (augusti 1968) hade säkert Ceausescu de här dagarna ställt sig upp och gjort som då, talat till folket i nationalismens och självförsvarets namn.

## Hårdnackad linje

Men Ceausescu har betonat — som så många gånger förr — nödvändigheten av Rumäniens oavhängighet. Det gjorde han i en intervju med den franska tidningen

Le Figaro i samband med det oroande mötet i Moskva. Vi betraktar, sade Ceausescu till tidningen, förvisningen om politisk, militär och ekonomisk oavhängighet som en integrerad beståndsdel i uppbyggandet av socialismen.

Det är den rumänska linjen och Ceausescus stenhårda politik att inte ge efter det minsta enligt principen att räcker man någon ett lillfinger så tar han snart hela handen. Samtidigt som det ingår i politiken och taktiken anser man det väsentligt med vänskapsband och samarbete.

Men många frågar sig oroligt vart denna hårdnackade politik gentemot Sovjet i alla nyckel-frågor kommer att leda.

DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm  
Wednesday, 27 May 1970

SOVIET INCREASES THE PRESSURE ON RUMANIA'S LEADERS

(From DN's Vienna correspondent Lars Åke Berling)

Vienna, Tuesday.

The Soviet Union has given Rumania an ultimatum, the consequences of which mean political submission. This information is presently circulating, among other places, in Belgrade and Vienna and has also been reproduced in the American magazine Newsweek. From well-informed sources, however, it is maintained that the danger on Rumania's part is not quite that great, but the fact clearly remains: the Soviet pressure on Ceausescu's already hard hit country has increased. It is said, for instance, that Kremlin, now that it has "taken care of" Czechoslovakia, devotes more attention to Rumania.

It is also one hundred percent sure that last week's conversations in Moscow between the Rumanian leader and the big men in the Kremlin - to which Ceausescu was summoned - were very tough. This is evident, not the least from the communique issued which says that the discussions were held in a "frank and friendly spirit."

This is Russian communist vocabulary for tough going and it means that both parties have presented practically entirely different points of view. The only thing agreed on is that there should be cooperation, but the ideas of cooperation are divergent. The Rumanians do not want the directions to come only from one of the parties.

NOT ONLY PHRASES

After his return to Bucharest, Ceausescu, according to protocol, sent off a telegram to Moscow. This was published with big headlines in the Rumanian newspapers recently. There were the usual polite phrases expressing thanks for the hospitality, etc., but it contained two sections worth noting.

Speaking of hospitality Ceausescu writes "during our short stay," and in another place he wishes the Russians luck in building up socialism and stresses especially that he refers to the building up within their own country.

The latter statement is considered to be a clear hint along the lines of "mind your own business" and the former might allude to their parting ways a little earlier than usual and maybe a little unfriendlier than usual.

It also appeared that the usual bear hugs and brotherly kisses from Brezhnev & Co. this time were not bestowed upon the visiting delegation. But on the other



hand, the same thing happened at the big Communist meeting in Moscow last year. Though that actually only proves what we all already know: that the relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union have been problematic for a long time.

#### KREMLIN IRRITATED

The reason that the Russians want to get closer to Rumania is not because socialism in Rumania might be in danger. It is - besides the pure power-bloc-political leadership desire - because Rumania's open-mindedness irritates the Kremlin. An example is the friendly way Ceausescu and his men are turning to Peking.

In what has been termed a Russian ultimatum to Rumania, one of the main points is that the Bucharest government must promise ideologically, fraternally, and practically to take the Soviets' side in case of open, and possibly armed, conflict with China.

Ultimatum or not, the differences also appear in the question of the areas to be used for Warsaw pact maneuvers. The Kremlin repeatedly demands that Rumanian territory also be used by the forces of the Warsaw Pact brothers and Ceausescu just as repeatedly refuses.

#### VISIT IN JUNE

Further there is the question of the COMECON. At its recently convened meeting in Warsaw, the Rumanians voted against a suggestion regarding a joint investment bank. Ceausescu feels that his country needs its capital to be used for investment within its own borders. Besides, he further persists, every country within the East Bloc must be allowed to deal at will with the countries of Western Europe.

In June the Russian leaders will come to Bucharest and many pessimistic observers are already beginning to compare the situation to the beginning of the merry-go-round of negotiations which preceded the intervention in Prague in 1968 - the many desperate meetings in those days between Russians and Czechoslovaks in Prague, in Moscow, in Dresden, in Cierna nad Tisou, and in Bratislava.

The natural catastrophe which now has befallen Rumania, of course, does not help the situation. The Bucharest government finds itself more and more in a disadvantageous position of seeking aid.

But an official Rumanian source points out something which possibly is important: had it been as serious as last time (August 1968), Ceausescu would surely have stood up now, as he did then, to speak to his people in the name of nationalism and self-defense.

## STUBBORN LINE

But Ceausescu has emphasized - as so many times before - the necessity of Rumania's independence. He did so in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro in connection with the disturbing meeting in Moscow. We consider, said Ceausescu to the newspaper, the assurance of political, military and economic independence as an integral part of the building of socialism.

It is the Rumanian line, and Ceausescu's adamant policy, not to give in at all, according to the principle that if you give an inch they'll take a mile. At the same time that these principles are included in policies and tactics, however, it is considered essential to strengthen friendly alliances and cooperation.

But many people question with concern where this stubborn policy toward the Soviet Union in all key questions will lead.

NEW YORK TIMES

10 June 1970

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

## Independent Rumanians' Spines Stiffened by Disasters

By HENRY TANNER

Special to The New York Times

BUCHAREST, June 5—Ru-

mania continues to proclaim a policy of purposeful independence despite disastrous floods that have weakened her economically and new pressure from Moscow.

Nicolae Ceausescu, head of state and party chief, who has been touring the country, has been saying over and over in speeches to flood victims that the principles of his policy remain unchanged—national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality between governments and between Communist parties, and the right of each party to shape its own policies.

The reassuring speeches, foreign diplomats here believe, were necessary because Mr. Ceausescu's sudden trip to Moscow at the height of the flood disaster surprised and worried many Rumanians. The uneasiness was increased a week later when his Premier, Ion Georghe Maurer, also flew there.

The Soviet leaders have been making strong efforts to tighten the Eastern bloc militarily, economically and politically. The pressure on the Rumanians is believed to be strong.

Now, it is felt, Mr. Ceausescu's speeches have cleared the air. It has long been his strategy at moments of crisis to issue unequivocal statements and thus to commit himself to a position from which he would find it hard to retreat even if the pressures to do so were great.

Rumanian officials are sure enough of the Government's stance to tell visitors that it will not give on any of the three major points at issue with Moscow.

The issue of Warsaw Pact maneuvers, which would bring Soviet and other Eastern European armed forces onto Rumanian soil, is believed to have been shelved for this year after the Rumanians repeatedly and strenuously opposed them.

The second issue was the Rumanians' refusal to participate in a new Eastern European investment bank set up by the Russians and their partners two weeks ago in Warsaw at a meeting of Comecon, the Eastern European organization for economic cooperation.

Rumanian sources say that their country's refusal was prompted chiefly by Soviet insistence that the bank's decisions be made by a two-thirds majority of the member countries instead of unanimously.

Third, the Rumanians make

## and Soviet Pressure

it clear that the terms of the recently concluded Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty could not possibly apply to them, even though Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, declared that it should become a model for all Eastern European states.

The Rumanians object to two features in the Prague document.

The Czech Government implicitly agreed to have its soldiers fight alongside the Russians if the Soviet Union were attacked from the east—in other words, by the Chinese—while under the Warsaw Pact, to which Rumania is a signatory, the commitment was limited to aggression from Europe.

The Rumanians have good relations with the Chinese, who have just given them the equivalent of \$400,000 in flood relief, by far the largest single contribution. There are rumors that Premier Chou En-lai may be planning a visit.

Furthermore, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty formalized the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty by giving the Russians the right to intervene in Czechoslovakia without invitation whenever they felt they had to do so to block "antisocialist forces."

The Rumanians stand by a draft friendship treaty that con-

tained none of those features and was initialed by the two Governments two years ago but never signed.

Under these circumstances Western diplomats here find it difficult to imagine why, as is persistently reported, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party chief, and other leaders plan to visit here this summer for the first time since 1966. Mr. Brezhnev was scheduled to come last year, according to informed sources, but called off his trip so as not to appear on the heels of President Nixon.

The flood disaster seems to have strengthened the determination of the Rumanians to persist in their course. They have been buoyed by the aid they have received from all over the world and by the feeling of not standing alone.

Rumania is the only Eastern European country that has diplomatic relations with Israel, and the first relief plane came from there, with aid from the United States and the Netherlands close behind. The Soviet Union waited a week before sending a message and an offer of aid.

Western concerns have offered to repair or replace industrial equipment they had furnished that has been damaged.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
18 JUNE 1970

# Flood-battered Romania starts back

By Eric Bourne  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

A month after the rains came to Romania in the biggest natural calamity the country has known, the cost in terms of economic loss is still being counted.

At this writing, there is some menace yet from the rivers on the eastern side of the Carpathians. But short of fresh, prolonged freak storms, the worst is probably over. Now the massive operation of salvage and minimizing a staggering blow to the economy in the last crucial year of the current five-year plan is under way.

Most of the 275,000 people driven from their homes since the first mid-May onslaught have been able to return. But 40,000 houses were destroyed or very badly damaged and more than 70,000 people are still in temporary refuge. Rehousing them will be a heavy task.

## Inadequate promise

A promise of 5,000 new apartments this year in the worst-hit Transylvanian towns seems woefully inadequate.

Industry and agriculture inevitably must now absorb building materials too. The latest figures bespeak the magnitude of the setback in both spheres:

- Some 2.5 million acres of agricultural land flooded, nearly 600,000 acres of crops a total loss along with countless farm buildings.

- Four hundred factories flooded, 1,000 miles of railroad and 600 bridges washed away, along with nearly 2,000 miles of electric lines and 1,000 miles of roads.

Agriculture was to be the key for the promised boost of real income for Romanians. Speedy evacuation kept the losses of livestock down, but the inroads in terms of farmland will take years to make good.

## Reseeding under way

Reseeding is under way. But first large tracts of land must be cleared of a yard-thick carpet of mud, rocks, and rubble. University students and scholars, 100,000 of them, are to help in harvest work this summer. Thousands more will help in light consumer factories and on the roads and railways.

Government buyers will pay more now for deliveries of cattle, pigs, and animal products. Bonus payments and tax reliefs will be new incentives to breeders. But most

of the money must come from higher meat and milk prices. Eastern experts foresee a 25 percent loss of land under cultivation this side of summer and that 1970 wheat yields will be 25 percent and corn yields 15 percent below average.

Most of the industrial units put out of action are working again. But many await vital machinery. The total loss of industrial production this past month and the slow recovery ahead still beggar computation.

The Bucharest leaders are showing themselves somewhat chary of outside "aid." The emphasis is very much on national self-help and "we must do it ourselves" attitude. Foreign help is preferable when funneled through international Red Cross agencies.

The result is that aid thus far bears little resemblance to the spectacular international effort which for example brought quake-stricken Skopje in Yugoslavia back to life seven years ago.

The peculiar sensitivities of Romania's political situation and the limits to its "independence" (compared with Yugoslavia's) are real enough perhaps to rule out that kind of thing.

But it seems a pity that one form of "aid to Skopje" has not so far been sought or has been overlooked from outside.

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WASHINGTON POST  
10 JUNE 1970

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# Romania Digs Out After Floods, Trying Not to Become Obligated

By Dan Morgan  
Washington Post Foreign Service  
BUCHAREST, June 9

The emphasis is on self-reliance as Romania starts clearing away the wreckage from floods which wrought the worst havoc in the country since World War II.

With parts of eastern Romania still menaced by high water, Nicolae Ceausescu has already made clear that there will be no turning back on his Communist regime's policy of national independence in running its own affairs.

All over the country, Romanians are preparing to tighten their belts rather than accept help that might make them beholden to "somebody else."

"What we have been through has strengthened us."

"We have never been so united."

"We must start with the Romanian people themselves in the recovery effort."

These are phrases heard from Romanians in official and semi-official circles. The press has been writing about a "new spirit of collectiviza-

tion," the "unity of the party and the people," and the nation as a "solidary, social entity, historically formed, united by common traditions, sharing a system of common values."

## Response Wins Admiration

The country's response to the floods, which first struck in force May 23, has won admiration even from persons who sometimes are cynical about the policies of the Ceausescu government.

Ceausescu's unexpected trip to Moscow in the midst of the first flood disasters raised

concern among some that the regime might be forced into concessions to the Soviets as a result of the economic setbacks in industry and agriculture.

But so far, this speculation has been resoundingly rebutted.

The party leader has promised publicity to continue implementing the directives of the 10th Party Congress, which reaffirmed Romania's policy of coexistence, good relations with other Communist countries, sovereignty and rejection of supranational or-

gans. And he has launched the country on a program of recovery calling for making up the lost industrial output within 12 months, under a slogan, "everything for reconstruction, everything for normalization."

#### Rationing May Be Needed

In the economic field, where the country is most immediately vulnerable, officials have hinted that drastic steps such as an emergency one-year plan, or rationing could be taken if need be. Driving along a flooded section of the Danube River near the town of Giurgiu Sunday, visitors saw evidence of the crash program — men patriotically turning in an extra day's work on building sites.

On a similar trip further north, journalists found only one foreign adviser, a West German water purification adviser. And to date, no foreign military aircraft bearing aid has landed despite the fact that some 280,000 persons were homeless at the height of the disaster.

Ambassadors here have been told that assistance will be accepted, but on Romania's terms, and with no political strings attached. Public appeals for help have been lacking, and diplomatic observers say this is evidence of the government's determination not to allow itself to be panicked into making concessions to the Soviet Union in a time of weakness.

#### U.S. Before Moscow

International contributions are published—but inconspicuously and without comment—in the press. But even so, thousands of Romanian newspaper readers know from this information that American aid, in the form of the tents and cots and \$200,000, arrived from the Agency for International Development in Washington before help in the form of medicine and food came from Moscow.

"Accords of economic collaboration," signed with the Soviets June 2, have been described by the press as "illustrating eloquently the possibility of the continued perfection and diversification of multilateral cooperation," particularly in nuclear energy and metallurgy.

But the fine print shows that the accords call for an increase in trade with Russia of only three per cent annually—a figure far smaller than increases projected for other East European countries and one which suggests a net decline in the Soviet Union's share of Romania's commerce from 1971 to 1975.

The share has dropped from about 50 per cent in 1960 to roughly 29 per cent now.

On the plus side, diplomatic observers say, the floods have left Romania more determined than ever to resist Soviet efforts to bind Bucharest into multi-national, bloc-wide organizations.

#### Army Morale High

The army, which lost a number of dead and injured (the exact figure has not been announced) in fighting the floods, has received a morale boost after carrying out a hazardous national task. Some diplomats think that morale in the services has not been higher since the crisis atmosphere of August 1968.

Officials point out wryly that flood fighting was far better training for the army than participation in Warsaw Pact maneuvers. And diplomats say that the floods have given the Bucharest regime an excellent excuse for refusing participation in joint maneuvers this summer.

But the economic picture is far gloomier.

Figures published over the weekend attest to the magnitude of the disaster: 40,000 houses, 600 bridges, 2000 miles of electric lines and 400 factories inundated.

The homeless are receiving shelter in houses of relatives, in schools vacated by students who are joining in the recovery efforts, and in public buildings.

#### Long Recovery Foreseen

But despite the determined words of the Romanian leaders, most analysts believe the economy and agriculture will be long in recovering.

The floods struck at a bad moment, just as the final touches were being put on the 1971 to 1975 five-year plan. The floods have undoubtedly altered the assumptions on which the industrial plans were being made, for no amount of hard work can re-

coup production in factories whose basic machinery has been knocked out. In northern Transylvania, visitors saw stricken furniture factories which they estimate could take months to put working.

Some diplomats estimate that the real loss of land for cultivation this spring will be 25 per cent. This means that Romania may not be able to export goods to the West such as fodder. It also means that Romania will lose some of her barter power in foreign trade. Some British firms, for instance, have accepted payment for hard goods in the form of sunflower seed, soybeans and wine, but even these goods will be in short supply now.

Thousands of farm animals died in the floods, and many more may die from undernourishment. Efforts to drastically increase pig raising may be set back by loss of feed, such as soybeans. The net result may be higher food prices. The aftermath of the floods saw some hoarding, but this has declined as the worst of the danger has passed.

#### Credit Already Stretched

The credit and monetary picture is also bleak. Borrowing has been stretched to the maximum to carry out the industrialization program, and analysts think that Western credits may be even harder to find now. This leaves the government in the position of having to delay some industrialization plans, or seek credits inside Comecon, the East European economic bloc.

One source of hard currency from the West, the tourist flood which strikes each summer on the Black Sea beaches, seems fairly secure. Last year it brought in some \$150 million. Though vast areas are still flooded in the Danube basin, ferries are still running, enabling tourists to ford the river to the resort areas.

These are the signs that Romania is doing its best to carry on business as usual.

A cheerful, hot summer sun beats down on the bustling, wide boulevards of Bucharest.

"We are not going to make concessions about anything that affects our basic political concepts," said a prominent journalist. "We know that there are no such things as minor concessions."

WASHINGTON POST  
31 May 1970

## Romania Sees Soviet Club In Flood Aid

From News Dispatches

VIENNA, May 30—It is becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet Union is dragging its feet in providing flood aid to Communist Romania, official figures released today showed.

The meager Soviet aid reinforced reports from Bucharest that the Soviet Union has tied strings to its help—a demand that Romania resume full military and economic cooperation with the rest of the Soviet bloc.

Romanian sources said the floods have "washed out the first of our five-year plan." An estimated 200 persons have died and millions of acres of farmland have been flooded in the disaster.

Romania, which is beginning to industrialize seriously, cannot do yet without Soviet-bloc aid. The Kremlin apparently feels the floods have given it a club with which to beat their independent-minded ally back into line.

Public statements by President Nicolae Ceausescu have indicated he is resisting the pressure. But long lists of aid published daily by Agerpres, the Romanian news agency, made it clear that most help was coming from the non-Communist West.

Figures showed that the United States already has shipped almost three times as much aid as the Soviet Union to the flood-stricken nation. The British Red Cross has started a Romania fund with a target twice the aid given by the Soviet Union, Agerpres said.

The Romanian floods, which have affected every district in the nation, have been going on for more than two weeks and are expected to last at least until June 12.

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THE GUARDIAN, Manchester  
4 JUNE 1970

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 JUNE 1970

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 JUNE 1970

# Chinese aid for Rumania victims

Bucharest, June 3.

China has sent more than a ton of medicine to Rumania for the victims of floods there.

The aid arrived in several aircraft from Peking, according to Bucharest newspapers. Rumania has maintained a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The official death count after three weeks of the floods remained at 161, with another 16 people missing, but reports from officials and foreigners on the scene accounted for at least 209 deaths in only three counties. All 39 counties have been affected by the floods.

The Yugoslav news agency said that the Danube River's threat to a hydroelectric project on the Rumanian-Yugoslav border, had been removed and navigation through the project's lock resumed.

But the Danube still imperilled 18 cities and 30 villages, with a total population of 550,000, on its 620 miles to the Black Sea. About 1,000 more houses, spared by the floods, have been destroyed in earth slides in Transylvania.

Western Governments have dominated the list of those sending aid. The United States has sent £58,000 worth of beds, boots, blankets and medicine, while Russia has sent a shipment of £23,000.

The relatively meagre aid from Russia was attributed at least in part to Rumania's refusal to condemn China. In other ways, Rumania has refused to follow the Soviet line in military, economic, and diplomatic affairs over the past six years.—UPI.

## Rumanians Welcomed With Warmth in Peking

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, June 9—The

Chinese Communists emphasized their differences with the Soviet Union today by giving an especially warm welcome to an official goodwill delegation from Rumania and lauding Rumania's resistance to foreign interference.

The seven members of the Grand National Assembly and State Council, headed by Emil Bodnaras, Vice President of the council and a high-ranking member of the Rumanian Communist party, arrived in Peking from Pyongyang, North Korea.

Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency, reported that the Rumanians were met by a delegation headed by Kang Sheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese party, and were greeted by a large crowd.

Banners hail Chinese-Rumanian friendship and vow Chinese support for the "just struggle of the Rumanian people in maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in their own hands."

Rumania, the only member of the Soviet bloc with which Communist China maintains friendly relations, resists the military and economic domination the Russians seek over other members of the bloc.

## Rumania Gets New Pledge Of Support From Chinese

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, June 10—Ru-

mania has received a new pledge of support from Communist China in her efforts to resist foreign aggression and interference.

Clearly implied was Peking's backing for Rumanian opposition to domination by the Soviet Union.

The pledge was given last night at a banquet in Peking for Emil Bodnaras, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party and Vice President of the Rumanian State Council, and six other Rumanian officials who are on a goodwill visit.

Kang Sheng, a member of the powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist party, told the visiting Rumanians that the Chinese people "firmly support the Rumanian people's just struggle to oppose foreign aggression and interference and safeguard national independence and state sovereignty." The Soviet Union was plainly the target of his remarks.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
13 JUNE 1970

## Envoy of Rumania Places U.S. Flood Aid at \$400,000

WASHINGTON, June 12 (AP)

Flood-stricken Rumania has received about \$400,000 in aid from the United States but still is in great need, Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan said today.

The United States Government gave Rumania medicines, tents, cots and blankets valued at about \$200,000, and another \$200,000 came from United

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States companies doing business with Rumania and from private organizations in this country, Mr. Bogdan told a news conference.

He said that \$50,000 worth of help had come from the Soviet Union, but added that all figures were tentative as aid was still coming from all parts of the world.

Mr. Bogdan said: "We need urgently all materials which could restore our economy, especially machinery to rebuild roads and to help in the construction of new houses. We also need seeds for our agriculture."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
18 JUNE 1970

CPYRGHT

# Romanian tour pays off Sympathetic North Koreans and Chinese bolster resistance to Soviet dominance

By Guy Searls

Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

Romania's aid with tact and diplomacy plus an unmistakable directness.

the relatively lightweight term "revisionist."

Seven senior ranking Romanian Communists returned home over the past weekend after completing a successful two-nation Far Eastern tour. It was highlighted by repeated and severe criticism of the Soviet Union.

The anti-Soviet polemics, however, either were disguised by what the Communists call "indirection" or were concealed within the technicalities of jargon manipulation. This is a near-codelike system the Communists sometimes use. There is no doubt that Moscow understood the meaning every blast intended, even though the Soviet Union was not named directly.

Timing of the tour probably was planned to precede the scheduled visit to Bucharest early next month of Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev to take part in the signing of a new Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty.

The treaty actually was negotiated and initialed two years ago, but the formal signing ceremony never materialized in the wake of the 1968 Czechoslovakia invasion.

## Degree of disenchantment

Romania was openly showing a certain degree of disenchantment with the Soviet-bloc system even before Prague's ill-fated move toward independence in 1968. The Soviet adoption following the Czech crisis of the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine," to justify armed intervention in any satellite country suspected of deviating, could easily be used as rationalization for direct Soviet interference in Romania.

But the touring seven from Bucharest found sympathetic listeners in Pyongyang (North Korea) and Peking. Both the Chinese Communists and North Koreans came to

The Romanian touring group, led by Romanian State Council Vice-President Emil Bodnaras and composed of men who hold dual high-ranking positions in the government and party, first went to North Korea, arriving June 4.

In many ways the North Koreans and Romanians seem to be on a parallel course within the Communist camp. Both nations are unhappy about the domineering position of the Soviet Union, yet neither cares to openly denounce Moscow.

Premier Kim Il Sung has been a growing problem and embarrassment to the Soviet Union. He refuses to accept Soviet counsel against rash military action aimed at bringing South Korea under control of the north.

## Socialist solidarity

At banquets and public affairs in honor of the Romanians, North Korean leaders stressed their gratitude for aid given to them by the Romanians during the Korean war. They spoke of the unity and solidarity of North Koreans and Romanians, which they explained came with the mutually recognized need for international socialist solidarity tempered by respect for all members' rights to be masters of their own destiny.

The line being spoken ran at odds with the Brezhnev doctrine and carried with it a hint that any strike against Romania in Europe might result in some kind of retaliatory action in the Far East.

When the tour moved on to Communist China, it was Premier Chou En-lai who took command.

Premier Chou's principle banquet speech for the Romanians contained no crude references to the Soviet Union—not even with

But almost every sentence spoken by the Premier did carry anti-Soviet meaning that was clear to all concerned. What the Chinese Premier was doing was paraphrasing the bitterly anti-Soviet editorial published in Peking to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin.

## Advance planning evident

Premier Chou omitted all direct references to the Soviet Union and its leadership.

The Chinese Communists appear to have planned well in advance. A speech made by Albanian party leader Enver Hoxha in late May was given top play in the June 5 issue of Peking Review—the Chinese Communist weekly news magazine distributed worldwide in many languages. It conveniently covered all of the points that both Peking and Bucharest wanted made, but without the stigma of either of the two having to speak directly.

Mr. Hoxha charged that the Soviet Union was trying to subjugate Romania and accused Moscow of twisting Leninism to justify outright aggression. He then warned the Soviet Union of the growing might of China, its nuclear weapons, and its recent space satellite launching.

The Chinese Communists, warned the Albanian, would not allow the Soviet Union to run wild and destroy the true Marxists in Europe.

Moscow cannot denounce either China or Romania for being so openly brash or belligerent—the polemics having been fired safely by a third party. Transparent it may be, but it is part of the game in the socialist camp.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
18 JUNE 1970

# Paris plays key role

## Romania tweaks Russian noses

By Carlyle Morgan  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

President Pompidou's foreign policy begins to take on dimensions which remind many here of General Charles de Gaulle.

This appears strikingly in Romanian President Ceausescu's five-day visit to France.

It brings to Paris the leader of the most independent-minded member of what are called here the Soviet satellite states. And it pits, in a sort of David-Goliath act, the influence of Mr. Ceausescu in Europe against that of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

The reason for this development is twofold.

• When Mr. Gromyko was here in the first week of June he indicated that the Soviet Union is less interested than it had appeared earlier in a general European security conference.

• But Mr. Ceausescu, in his talks here, has shown himself as keenly interested as ever in such a conference.

So Paris finds itself again, as it did in the Gaullist heyday, playing a key role in European affairs.

Mr. Pompidou is expected to stress "continuity" rather than "change" in French policy on this particular issue.

This suits Mr. Ceausescu insofar as France remains a champion of independence from superpower "hegemonies" like that of the Soviet Union and the United States. It is not so good for him insofar as Mr. Pompidou insists on seeing signs of concrete improvement in East-West affairs, such as in Berlin, before going on toward a general European conference.

The Ceausescu visit is seen here as underscoring one reason why Moscow seems to be backing away from a European conference now: Such a conference could give added room for maneuver to the Soviet satellites.

There are many other reasons. They can be seen in Moscow's preoccupation with Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and wherever Peking's influence impinges on its own interests.

Mr. Ceausescu's Romania is one such area. On June 11 Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai promised Romania "constant support" for defense of its national independence. This was reported by the Romanian news agency Agerpres in a dispatch on the meeting of a Romanian national delegation with Chinese officials in Peking.

The most meaningful aspect of the Pompidou-Ceausescu talks, however, remains the effect they may have on prospects for a general European conference.

Mr. Ceausescu has stated publicly here

that "no conditions" should be laid down in advance for a European conference.

He said such a conference would help toward achieving "equal rights, national independence and sovereignty, mutual respect, and the right of each people to dispose of itself without foreign interference."

He offered as an example of foreign interference the actions of the United States in Southeast Asia. But neutral diplomats here point out that these affect Romanian independence much less directly than the "Brezhnev doctrine" by which the Soviet Union has sought to justify its interventions in Czechoslovak affairs.

Mr. Pompidou's reception of Mr. Ceausescu, like the scope of the problems raised by the visit, reminded many French and foreign observers here of the great days of Charles de Gaulle. And there was a new spectacular modern touch of which General de Gaulle probably would have approved.

Instead of meeting Mr. Ceausescu at the airport, French officials brought him straight into the heart of Paris by helicopter. He was set down on the terrace of the Gare des Invalides near the Foreign Office and taken directly to the Elysée Palace.

For this, the first visit of a chief of state to France since Mr. Pompidou became head of the French state, the Grand Trianon was used for entertainment. A program of ballet was presented in the Louis XV Theater in the Versailles Château.

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THE ECONOMIST  
23 MAY 1970

Rumania and Russia

## The hug of the bear

It looks as if Mr Ceausescu's visit to Moscow this week was arranged in a hurry and it is not difficult to guess why. The Russians have been putting the squeeze on their east European allies and the Rumanians have been digging in their heels. According to Tass, the talks were frank and comradely, which means that there was disagreement. Whether the Rumanians agreed to make any concessions at all remains to be seen.

The Rumanians have been demonstrating their insubordination on both economic and military issues. Alone among the members of the Soviet world's economic organisation, they refused to join the new investment bank set up at the Comecon summit meeting in Warsaw last week. If, as is suspected, a primary object of the bank is to provide east European funds for the development of Russian resources, most Comecon members will not be exactly enthusiastic about it. But a particular reason for Rumanian wariness was revealed on Tuesday in an article on the Comecon meeting in the Polish party paper

*Trybuna Ludu*. This stated that the rule of unanimity which has so far governed all Comecon decisions would not apply in the case of the new bank; its decisions would be taken by a two-thirds majority.

According to *Trybuna Ludu*, the unanimity rule has "not infrequently hampered the activity of Comecon. In effect, it has given dissidents—in particular the Rumanians—a veto over proposals they do not like. Since it lacked this safeguard, the Rumanians fought shy of the investment bank. They will be put in a tight spot if, in the interests of "socialist integration," the unanimity rule is waived elsewhere in Comecon.

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Even more worryingly for the Rumanians, Russia is also pressing for closer military integration. It looks as if a meeting of the Warsaw pact defence ministers, to be held in Sofia this month, will be considering this problem. Moreover, Moscow apparently wants to extend the military obligations of the Warsaw pact members, which, under the terms of the treaty, are limited to Europe—presumably so that it can invoke their aid in any conflict with China. An uncomfortable reminder of what the Russians are aiming at was contained in the new Czech-Soviet treaty signed earlier this month; under article 10, each party has an unlimited and undefined obligation to give military assistance to the other if it is attacked.

When Mr Ceausescu went to Moscow in April for the Lenin anniversary cele-

brations, he made it clear, in a very discreet and veiled way, that Rumania would not get mixed up in Russia's quarrel with China. Since the signature of the Czech-Soviet treaty, three separate articles in the Rumanian press have spelled out the Rumanian view that the obligations of Warsaw pact members are limited to Europe, that the Rumanian army can take orders only from the appropriate Rumanian authorities, and that military co-operation consists mainly of innocuous "exchanges of experience" and excludes any interference in the internal affairs of member states and their armed forces. It is not difficult to guess whom a Bulgarian general had in mind last week when he roundly condemned "any manifestation of nationalism" in the Warsaw treaty organisation.

In fact, the Rumanians have been proclaiming their point of view, so

vehemently that one suspects they feel themselves under increasing pressure from Moscow to make it clear that they are docile allies. The Russians may be renewing their demand that Warsaw pact manoeuvres should be held on Rumanian territory; the Rumanians have stoutly resisted this, fearing that they might never get the foreign troops out again. Or the Russians may be demanding that Mr Ceausescu, as a sign of his good intentions, should sign the new Soviet-Rumanian treaty which has been pigeon-holed, unsigned, for the past two years. If the treaty is confined to vague and pious platitudes, the Rumanians might be glad to settle for that conciliatory gesture. But if the Russians insist on inserting any teeth (like article 10 of the Czech treaty), it would be very uncharacteristic of Mr Ceausescu not to avoid the trap.

WASHINGTON POST  
3 JUNE 1970

CPYRGHT

## *With a Friend Like Russia . . .*

Romania is staggering under floods of epic proportions. Hundreds have died, 5 per cent or more of the country's land area has been inundated, and the waters have not yet crested. The economic losses will be colossal—already Bucharest has said it will have to postpone its next five-year plan by a year. It is a national disaster of the first magnitude.

It is, however, not so bad as subservience to Russia. The Romanian government, determinedly self-reliant even in adversity, has stood for years on a platform of national independence in its relations with its fellow socialist states, and it has successfully resisted all Soviet pressures, including the threat of invasion, designed to bring it into line. Last month, for instance, it refused to join a new Soviet-East European investment bank, chiefly, one gathers, because the bank's decisions would not be subject to national veto. On the heels of the recent Soviet-Czech treaty formally committing the Czechs to fight Russia's battles anywhere, Bucharest underlined its own contention that its Warsaw Pact obligation covers "imperialist" attacks only in Europe.

It will not surprise those who recall Moscow's invasion of Czechoslovakia that the Kremlin evidently has chosen the moment of Romania's deepest distress in the floods to put on more political heat. The inconsequential amount and grudging spirit of relief sent by the Russians is one sign of their cynicism. (Here it is gratifying to note that the

United States was the first government both to offer and to deliver emergency aid—two chartered planes full—to Romania.) A much more important sign is the Russian position on long-term economic assistance, which will be crucial to Bucharest in recovering from its current misfortune. The Romanian Premier, Mr. Maurer, is in Moscow now, evidently to negotiate an aid package, among other things. The longer he stays without the announcement of a generous agreement, the more it looks as though Moscow is trying to squeeze blood out of yet another ally.

The Romanians are tough as well as proud and they are unlikely to cave in to Soviet pressure even in their present harsh circumstances. Mr. Ceausescu has made this perfectly clear. The floods had no sooner begun to tear at his country when he was called to Moscow amid circumstances that had every appearance of haste and unpleasantness, and evidently subjected to a fierce bout of Kremlin criticism for his continuing independent stand. The Romanian leader gave his people a cryptic but unmistakable report on the Moscow proceedings upon his return. He stated that disagreements among socialist states still existed and that each Communist party had the right to "shape its policy independently." This is the essence of Romanian nationalism and it is a position fully supported, as much as one can tell, by the Romanian people. They are showing the stuff they are made of, and the Russians are, too.



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DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
27-28 May 1970

## KPOe-Parteitag „geheim“

Muhri wurde überstimmt — Betriebsräte rufen zur Umkehr auf

Eigenbericht der „Presse“

WIEN (r). Praktisch unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit tagen wird der 21. Parteitag der KPÖ, der Donnerstag in Wien beginnt und drei Tage dauern wird. Ein Antrag des Parteichefs Muhri, der auch vom Politbüro unterstützt wurde, es bei der bisherigen Praxis der Zulassung der Presse zu lassen, wurde abgelehnt. Diese wird nur der Eröffnungsrede Muhris am ersten Tag beiwohnen dürfen.

Informierte Kreise erwarten, daß gleich zu Beginn ein weiterer Antrag gestellt werden wird, nämlich die 27 progressiven ZK-Mitglieder von den Verhandlungen des Kongresses aus-

zuschließen, an denen sie laut Statut mit „beratender Stimme“ teilnehmen könnten. Erwartet werden Vertreter aller „Bruderparteien“ aus Osteuropa.

Am Vorabend des Parteitags versandten einige KP-Betriebsräte ein Rundschreiben an die Parteimitglieder, in dem sie davor warnen, den „verhängnisvollen“ Kurs fortzusetzen und in letzter Stunde zur Umkehr aufzurufen. Die KPÖ habe seit dem letzten Parteitag eine Wendung in der Praxis vollzogen, obwohl von den gefaßten Beschlüssen, etwa zur Intervention in der CSSR, nichts zurückgeronnen wurde. An Stelle der Diskussion sei vielfach die Diffamierung unbequemer „Genossen“ getre-

ten. Ein Drittel der bisherigen ZK-Mitglieder, unter ihnen viele Gewerkschaftsfunktionäre und Betriebsräte, sollten aus ihren Funktionen entfernt werden, dazu fast alle Vertreter der Jungen. „Das können wir nicht widerspruchlos hinnehmen.“

Wie man hört, wird Muhri zum Parteibmann wiedergewählt werden. Neu in das Politbüro sollen Karger und Podolsky einziehen, doch die Altersklausel (60 Jahre) dürfte in manchen Fällen (Fürnberg, Fritz, Richter) nicht eingehalten werden. Der langjährige Wiener Landesobmann Lauscher wurde zwar für die Wiederwahl ins Zentralkomitee nominiert, doch von seiner eigenen Organisation abgelehnt.

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
27-28 May 1970

AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS "SECRET"  
Muhri Outvoted; Enterprise Councils Appeal for Reversal

The 21st party congress of the Austrian Communist Party, which begins on 28 May 1970 and will last for three days, will meet practically in a closed session. A motion by party chief Muhri, also supported by the Politburo, to maintain the past practice of allowing press coverage was rejected. The press will be allowed to attend only on the first day for Muhri's opening address.

Informed circles expect that another motion will be made at the beginning, namely, a motion to exclude the 27 progressive central committee members from the deliberations of the congress, in which they could participate in the form of an "advisory voice" according to the statute. Representatives of all "fraternal parties" are expected from Eastern Europe.

On the eve of the party congress some communist party enterprise councils sent a circular letter to party members in which they warn them against continuing the "ominous" course and call upon them to reverse

themselves before it is too late. It stated that since the previous party congress the Austrian Communist Party has brought about a change in practice, although nothing was retracted from the adopted resolutions, for example concerning the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Defamation of troublesome "comrades" has frequently taken the place of discussion. A third of the present central committee members, among them many trade union functionaries and enterprise council members, are to be removed from their positions, including almost all youth representatives. "We cannot accept this without objecting to it."

As is reported, Muhri will be reelected party chief. Karger and Podolsky are to be newly elected to the Politburo; however, the age clause (60 years) will not be adhered to in some cases (Fuernberg, Fritz, Richter). The Vienna provincial chief of many years' standing, Lauscher, was nominated for reelection to the central committee; however, he was rejected by his own organization.

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
30-31 May 1970

CPYRGHT

## Kontroversen bei KP-Kongreß

Sowjeteinmarsch in der CSSR soll gutgeheißen werden

Eigenbericht der „Presse“

WIEN (r). Der in Wien stattfindende Parteitag der KPÖ setzte Freitag die Diskussion über das Referat des Parteivorsitzenden Muhri vom Donnerstag fort, wobei sich kontroverielle Meinungen zeigten. Muhri hatte von einer wesentlichen Vertiefung und Verschärfung der Krise in der KPÖ seit dem Herbst 1968 gesprochen und gesagt, man werde die schwierige Situation, in der sich die KPÖ befindet, nicht von heute auf morgen überwinden können. Die Einheit der sozialistischen Länder in der gegenwärtigen Situation sei jedoch notwendiger denn je.

Der niederösterreichische Landesobmann Zotti, dessen Wahl in das Präsidium abgelehnt worden war, sprach vom drohenden Untergang der Partei, die sich selbst isoliert habe, weil sie gegenüber den befreundeten Gruppen eine falsche Einstellung an den Tag lege. Während seiner Rede kam es zu heftigen Mißfallensäußerungen.

Der Vorsitzende der Parteikontrollkommission, Freihaut, kritisierte, daß man den ausgeschiedenen Redakteuren der „Volksstimme“ und anderen ZK-Mitarbeitern 2,1 Millionen Schilling an Abfertigungen gezahlt habe, während der frühere Wiener Kaderreferent Hirsch dem

langjährigen Landesobmann Lauscher „politische Unfähigkeit“ vorwarf.

Unter den vorliegenden Anträgen befindet sich auch einer, der von drei Wiener Bezirken unterstützt wird und verlangt, der Parteitag möge die Verurteilung der sowjetischen Intervention in der Tschechoslowakei 1968 zurücknehmen. Ein anderer Antrag, der von den Progressiven eingebracht wurde, kommt einem Mißtrauensantrag gegenüber dem Politbüro gleich, doch hat er keine Aussicht auf Annahme, da diese Gruppe nur etwa zehn Prozent der Delegierten des Parteitages stellt.

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
30-31 May 1970

CONTROVERSIES AT THE CP CONGRESS  
Soviet Entry Into Czechoslovakia To be Sanctioned

(Special Report by DIE PRESSE)

Vienna. The Party Congress of the Communist Party of Austria, which is being held in Vienna, continued on Friday the discussion of Thursday's speech by Party Chairman Muhri, with controversial opinions being registered. Muhri had spoken of a significant

deepening and intensification of the crisis in the Austrian Communist Party, saying that the difficult situation in which the party finds itself cannot be surmounted overnight. Nevertheless, the unity of the socialist countries in the present situation is more imperative than ever.

Lower Austrian province chairman Zottl, whose election to the presidium had been rejected, spoke of the threatening doom of the party, which has isolated itself by showing an incorrect attitude toward the friendly groups. During his speech there were violent expressions of disapproval.

Freihaut, chairman of the Party Control Commission, criticized the payment of 2.1 million schillings in severance pay to the former editors of Volksstimme and other Central Committee members, while the former Vienna cadre specialist Hirsch charged Lauscher, a province chairman for many years, with "political incompetence."

Among the proposals submitted is one which is supported by three Vienna districts and demands that the party congress retract the condemnation of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Another proposal introduced by the progressives amounts to a vote of no confidence in the Politburo, but it has no prospects for adoption, since this group has only about ten percent of the delegates at the party congress.

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
1 June 1970

CPYRGHT

## Muhri in der Schußlinie

Rund 20 Prozent Streichungen — KPÖ-Parteitag abgeschlossen

Eigenbericht der „Presse“

WIEN (r). Der 21. Parteitag der KPÖ wurde am Wochenende mit der Wahl des neuen Zentralkomitees, das von 87 auf 64 Mitglieder reduziert wurde, beendet. Von den 27 progressiven Vertretern sind im neuen ZK nur noch drei verblieben. Selbst jene Funktionäre, die bisher eine Mittelstellung eingenommen hatten, mußten eine offenbar organisierte Streichungsaktion über sich ergehen lassen, die dem oberösterreichischen Landesobmann Wipplinger 111 und dem steirischen Landessekretär Gaisch 96 Gegenstimmen einbrachte. Der Versuch, den langjährigen Wiener Landesobmann Lauscher noch nachträglich in das ZK zu wählen, scheiterte trotz der Intervention Muhris und Fürnbergs.

Selbst Parteiobmann Muhri kam

in die Schußlinie der Stalinisten, die etwa 90 Prozent der Delegierten stellten. Obwohl er in seiner Schlußrede noch Selbstkritik geübt hatte, wurde er bei der Wahl des ZK von 57 der insgesamt 319 Delegierten gestrichen. Die vorherige Ermahnung an den Parteitag, ihn ungeschoren zu lassen, hatte ihn vor einem noch schlechteren Ergebnis bewahrt.

Gegen den Ideologen Franz Marek wird ein Parteiausschlußverfahren eingeleitet werden, während der Gewerkschaftsfunktionär Kodicek noch eine Art Bewährungsfrist erhielt. Seine bisherige Haltung im ÖGB wurde zwar mißbilligt, doch wurde er beauftragt, nun eindeutig gegen die antiparteiliche Richtung aufzutreten. Der Antrag auf Revision des ZK-Beschlusses gegen den Ein-

marsch in die CSSR wurde vom Parteitag nicht behandelt, sondern wird vom neuen ZK „im Lichte der neuen Fakten“ überprüft werden. Diese neuen Fakten hatte der Abgesandte der KPC, Auersperg, dem Parteitag erläutert, der Dubceks Politik anprangerte und die „historische Tat“ der Sowjetunion lobte.

Großes Interesse fand die Erklärung Martin Grünbergs, der zugab, den bekannten Sacharow-Brief an die Landessekretäre der Österreichisch-Sowjetischen Gesellschaft verschickt zu haben, und der sich deshalb den Vorwurf des „Antisowjetismus“ gefallen lassen mußte. Der Sekretär der Privatangestellten-gewerkschaft, Margulies, wurde niedergeschrien und Walter Marek, der dem ORF ein Interview gegeben hatte, das Betreten des Parteitags verboten.

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
1 June 1970

MUHRI ON THE FIRING LINE  
Party Congress Ended

The 21st party congress of the Austrian Communist Party was brought to an end over the weekend with the election of the new Central Committee which reduced the number of its members from 87 to 64. Only three of the 27 progressive representatives remain in the new Central Committee. Even those functionaries who had previously taken a middle-of-the-road position were the victims of an obviously organized action, a fact which resulted in 111 adverse votes for Wipplinger, the Upper Austrian provincial chairman, and 96 adverse votes for Gaisch, the Styrian provincial secretary. The attempt to elect Lauscher, the Vienna provincial chairman of many years' standing, to the Central Committee later on failed in spite of Muhri's and Fuernberg's intervention.

Even party chairman Muhri was on the firing line of the Stalinists, who furnished about 90 percent of the delegates. Although Muhri, in his closing speech, engaged in self-criticism, he received 57 "nay" votes from the total 319 delegates in the election to the Central Committee. An earlier appeal to the party congress, to leave him alone, preserved him from an even worse outcome.

Party expulsion proceedings will be instituted against the ideologist Franz Marek, while the trade union functionary Kodicek was put on a sort of probation. Although Kodicek's past attitude in the Austrian trade union federation was frowned upon, he was none the less directed to take a firm stand against the anti-party direction at last. The proposal for revision of the Central Committee decision against entry into Czechoslovakia was not dealt with by the party congress; it will, however, be reexamined by the new Central Committee "in the light of the new facts." These new facts were made clear to the party congress by Auersperg, the delegate of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who denounced Dubcek's policy and praised the "historical deed" of the Soviet Union.

Considerable attention was given to the declaration of Martin Gruenberg, who admitted that he had sent the well-known Zakarov letter to the provincial secretaries of the Austrian-Soviet Society, and who, therefore, had to put up with the charge of "anti-Sovietism." Margulies, the secretary of the Private Employees Trade Union, was shouted down, and Walter Marek, who had given an interview to the ORF (Austrian Radio), was denied admission to the party congress.

CPYRGHT

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
2 June 1970

## KPOe verlor 6000 Mitglieder

Muhri spricht sich gegen neue Prozesse in der CSSR aus

Eigenbericht der „Presse“

WIEN (r). Auf einer Pressekonferenz in Wien teilte Montag ZK-Sekretär Kalt mit, seine Partei zähle gegenwärtig über 26.000 Mitglieder. Dies bedeutet, daß seit dem letzten Parteitag vor einem Jahr rund 6000 Mitglieder aus der KPÖ ausgeschieden sind. Vor etwa zehn Jahren hatte die KPÖ noch 42.000 Mitglieder.

Parteiboss Muhri, der eingehend über seine Ansichten zur CSSR befragt wurde, sagte, es habe dort 1968 keine konterrevolutionäre Situation gegeben. Entscheidend sei jedoch gewesen, daß die Prager Führung in sich selbst nicht einig gewesen sei. Der Leiter der internationalen Abteilung der KPC, Auersperg,

habe am Wochenende in Wien versichert, das Husak-Regime wolle die Auseinandersetzungen mit politisch-ideologischen Mitteln führen. Muhri bezeichnete diesen Standpunkt als richtig, denn es wäre inopportun, zu den Methoden der Novotny-Ära zurückzukehren, die durch eine Reihe von Terrorprozessen gekennzeichnet war. Die KPÖ selbst wünsche keine neue CSSR-Debatte.

Sehr deutlich wandte sich Muhri gegen die SPÖ, deren Sieg am 1. März keinen echten Machtwechsel gebracht habe. Er kritisierte auch den Bundespräsidenten, von dem man eine etwas größere Aktivität in Sachen Frieden und Entspannung erwartet hätte. Ob die KPÖ 1971 einen Präsidentschaftskandidaten aufstellen werde, stehe noch nicht fest.

DIE PRESSE, Vienna  
2 June 1970

AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY LOST 6,000 MEMBERS  
Muhri Opposes New Trials in Czechoslovakia

At a press conference in Vienna on 1 June 1970 central committee secretary Kalt stated that his party at present had over 26,000 members. This means that since the last party congress in 1969, approximately 6,000 members left the Austrian Communist Party. About ten years ago the Austrian Communist Party had 42,000 members.

Party chief Muhri, who was questioned in detail about his views on Czechoslovakia, said that in 1968 there was no counter-revolutionary situation there. It had been decisive, however, that the Prague leadership was not united. The director of the international division of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Auersperg, asserted that the Husak regime wanted to conduct the discussions with political-ideological means. Muhri characterized this point of view as correct, for it would be inopportune to return to the methods of the Novotny era, which were characterized by a series of terror trials. He said that the Austrian Communist Party does not want any new Czechoslovak debate.

Muhri clearly turned against the Austrian Socialist Party, whose victory on 1 March 1970, he said, has brought no real change of power. He also criticized the federal president, from whom somewhat more activity had been expected in matters of peace and detente. It was not yet clear whether the Austrian Communist Party would nominate a presidential candidate in 1971.

L'AURORE, Paris  
9 JUNE 1970

## VOUS Y CROYEZ ?

**A** PRES le manifeste qu'il a signé avec Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, Jean Pronteau et Charles Tillon, Roger Garaudy s'efforce maintenant de rassembler les communistes hostiles à la politique Marchais.

L'ex-philosophe communiste No 1 négocie actuellement avec le groupe Unir, qui s'est formé en 1952 au moment de l'affaire Marty-Tillon, et avec l'équipe de la revue *Politique aujourd'hui*, animée par un certain nombre d'« intellectuels » exclus du P.C. depuis l'affaire tchécoslovaque.

De ces pourparlers pourrait sortir un comité de liaison de l'opposition communiste qui coordonnerait ses activités en dehors et au sein du parti. Vous y croyez, vous ?

ASMODÉE

L'AURORE, Paris  
9 JUNE 1970

Would You Believe?

After the manifesto he signed with Kriegel-Valrimont, Pronteau, and Tillon, Roger Garaudy is now trying to gather a group of communists opposed to the policies of Marchais. The former number one communist philosopher is now negotiating with the "Unir" group, founded in 1952 at the time of the Marty/Tillon affair, and with the staff of publication for *Politique Aujourd'hui*, directed by a certain number of "intellectuals" excluded from the PCF since the Czech affair. These talks could result in a liaison committee of communist opposition which would coordinate activities outside and within the PCF. Would you believe it?

CPYRGHT

ASMODÉE

NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris  
8-14 June 1970

CPYRGHT

### **Les nouveaux « garaudistes »**

Après Garaudy, trois autres contestataires communistes, Kriegel-Valrimont, Pronteau, Tillon. Ils viennent de publier un texte critiquant sans ménagement le fonctionnement actuel du Parti communiste français.

L'« Humanité » a réagi immédiatement. Mais avec modération.

C'est que la personnalité de l'un des trois nouveaux « opposants internes » pose des problèmes délicats à la direction du Parti. Charles Tillon, c'est de lui qu'il s'agit, incarne en effet toute une génération de communistes de la Résistance (cf. le livre de Claude Angeli et Paul Gillet « Debout partisans »). Certes Tillon est, depuis longtemps, un « déviationniste ». Ecarté du bureau politique en 1952, en même temps qu'André Marty, et replacé à la base.

il était resté militant du Parti et n'avait plus subi aucune critique. Mais, il y a quelques semaines il participe à la Mutualité au meeting des organisations gauchistes, ce qui lui vaut un discret rappel à l'ordre.

Il est allé plus loin cette fois, d'où l'embarras de la direction du Parti. Car, si celle-ci peut espérer amortir rapidement les contre-coups de l'exclusion de Garaudy qui ne bénéficiait que de faibles sympathies au niveau des mi-

litants, il en serait différemment d'une éventuelle exclusion de Tillon qui a gardé un grand prestige auprès des communistes qui appartiennent aux F.T.P. et qui sont aussi les plus réticents à l'égard de Georges Marchais.

Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont et Jean Pronteau avaient été écartés du comité central en 1961 en même temps que Marcel Servin et Laurent Casanova, mais, pas plus que ces deux derniers, ils n'avaient été exclus du Parti lui-même. Si Servin est mort il y a deux ans, Casanova participe toujours à la vie du Parti et on l'a vu encore au cours des derniers mois prendre la parole soit en Corse, soit en Seine-et-Marne. Il ne semble pas, pour l'instant, qu'il se soit joint aux « contestataires ».

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris  
No. 291  
8-14 June 1970

THE NEW "GARAUDYISTS"

After Garaudy, three more dissident communists, Kriegel-Valrimont, Pronteau, Tillon. They have just published a text bluntly criticizing the current activities of the French Communist Party.

L'Humanité reacted immediately. But with moderation. That is because the personal attributes of one of the three new "internal opponents" present delicate problems to the Party leadership. Charles Tillon - the man in question - in effect incarnates a whole generation of communists of the Resistance (cf. the book by Claude Angeli and Paul Gillet, On Your Feet, Partisans). Certainly, Tillon has been a "deviationist" for a long time. Dropped from the Political Bureau in 1952 at the same time as Andre Marty, and reduced to an ordinary Party member, he had remained a Party militant and had been subject to no criticism at all. But several week ago he took part in a meeting of

far-left organizations as the Mutualité, which earned him a discreet call to order.

He has gone further this time, hence the embarrassment of the Party leadership. For if they can hope to quiet promptly the repercussions of the exclusion of Garaudy, who enjoyed only slight sympathy among the militants, it would be different in case of the possible exclusion of Tillon, who has retained a great prestige among the communists who belonged to the F.T.P. [Franc-tireurs et Partisans (WWII underground resistance organization)], and who are also the most unenthusiastic with respect to Georges Marchais.

Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont and Jean Pronteau had been dropped from the Central Committee in 1961 at the same time as Marcel Servin and Laurent Casanova, but, like them, had not been excluded from the Party itself. Though Servin died two years ago, Casanova is still active in the Party and has been seen in the course of the last few months at the speakers' stand in Corsica and in Seine-et-Marne. It does not seem, at the moment, that he has joined the "contesters."

LE MONDE, Paris  
5 JUNE 1970

CPYRGHT

## MM. Garaudy, Kriegel-Valrimont Pronteau et Tillon mettent en cause le fonctionnement et la politique du P.C.F.

MM. Garaudy, ancien membre du Politburo du P.C.F., Kriegel-Valrimont, ancien directeur de ce parti, Pronteau, ancien Valrimont, Jean Pronteau et Charles Tillon, dont le communisme est d'avoir été désavoué au cours de leur vie militante par la direction du parti communiste, ont rendu public le texte d'un appel « contestataire » : ils mettent en cause le fonctionnement du parti, ses positions sur l'affaire tchécoslovaque et le comportement de la jeunesse et ont élu, au poste de secrétaire général adjoint, de M. Georges Marchais.

MM. Garaudy, ancien directeur de la région de Meurthe-et-Moselle, ancien directeur de l'hebdomadaire *France nouvelle*, et Pronteau, ancien député de la Charente, ancien directeur de la revue *Jeunesse et Politique*, avaient présidé le comité central par intérim au congrès (11-14 mai 1969), tout comme MM. Servin et Chabanova, dont ils avaient par ailleurs les opinions erronées.

Charles Tillon, ancien directeur de la région, avait été écarté de la politique en 1952, avec l'accusation de « activité frac-

tionnelle ». « Replacé à la base », il avait été rétabli dans tous ses droits de membre du parti communiste en 1957.

Sous le titre, « Il n'est plus possible de se taire », l'appel déclare :

« Membres de la direction du P.C.F. pendant de nombreuses années, notre objectif commun est le combat pour le socialisme dans les conditions nouvelles propres à notre temps. Les problèmes qui se sont posés depuis le vingtième congrès du P.C.U.S., et plus encore dans la dernière période, ont révélé avec éclat que le fonctionnement actuel du parti constitue un obstacle à la réalisation de cet objectif. Après avoir « réprouvé » l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie, il est inconcevable d'en accepter toutes les conséquences, c'est-à-dire la « normalisation », la mise au pas.

« A l'égard de la jeunesse, l'importance donnée à certains excès et une méfiance systématique ont empêché de comprendre les raisons profondes de son mouvement.

« Un centralisme démocrati-

que inspiré du modèle soviétique a permis d'écartier ceux qui posaient ces problèmes et de placer à la tête du parti un homme qui n'a participé à aucun de ses combats vitaux. C'est pourquoi, certains d'entre nous qui se sont tus pendant dix ans et plus ne peuvent plus se taire sans peine et se mettre en contradiction avec le sens de leur combat et le sentiment de leurs responsabilités. Le temps est venu, pour tous ceux qui ont conscience du danger d'un tel blocage politique, d'intervenir hardiment dans le débat dont dépend l'avenir du socialisme en France et la lutte des peuples contre la barbarie impérialiste. »

### L'HUMANITÉ : une nouvelle affaire contre le parti.

L'Humanité commente en ces termes ce qu'elle considère comme une « nouvelle attaque » contre le parti communiste :

« On avait compté diviser les communistes. Les organisations du parti approuvent la manière

dont le comité central applique la politique qu'ils ont décidée. A notre connaissance, pas une seule cellule n'a contesté l'action de la direction du parti.

« On avait espéré saper l'influence du parti communiste, créer des difficultés entre les travailleurs et lui. Les élections partielles témoignent de la consolidation de cette influence. A Lens-Est, comme à Sainte-Genève-des-Bois, les consultations ont souligné les liens populaires du parti, son enracinement dans la nation.

« (...) A R. Garaudy se sont associés trois hommes dont le trait commun est d'avoir, à des époques différentes et pour des raisons différentes, combattu la politique adoptée et pratiquée par la quasi-unanimité du parti. Quatre personnes qui ne semblent guère avoir trouvé beaucoup d'appuis. Discuter entre communistes, en effet, débattre de tel ou tel autre point, ne pas approuver entièrement la politique voulue par la majorité, est une chose ; passer aux actes d'hostilité contre le parti en est une autre, et les communistes s'y refusent. »

LE MONDE, Paris  
5 JUNE 1970

Messrs. Garaudy, Kriegel-Valrimont, Pronteau,  
and Tillon Challenge the Operation and Policy of the French CP

Roger Garaudy, former member of the politburo of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français; French CP] and recently expelled from that party, Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, Jean Pronteau, and Charles Tillon, whose common denominator is to have been disowned during their activist life by the French CP executive, have made public the text of their "confrontationist" appeal. In it they challenge the operation of the party, its stand on the Czechoslovak affair, its response to the attitude of the youth, and its selection of Georges Marchais as deputy secretary general.



Mr Kriegel-Valrimont, former deputy from Meurthe-et-Moselle and former editor of the weekly France Nouvelle, and Mr Pronteau, former deputy from Charente and former managing editor of the Revue Economique et Politique; had both been expelled from the central committee by the 16th Congress (11-14 May 1961), the same as Mr Servin and Mr Casanova, whose "erroneous opinions" the former had shared.

Mr Charles Tillon, former deputy from the Seine, had been barred from the politburo in 1952 together with Mr Marty for "divisionist activity." However, "reinstated in the base organization," his full rights as a party member were restored in 1957.

Under the title of "We Cannot Keep Quiet Any Longer" the appeal states:

"Members of the French CP executive: For many years our common objective had been the struggle on behalf of socialism under the new circumstances pertinent to our times. The problems that arose following the 20th Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and even more so in the most recent period have shown unmistakably that the present operation of the party constitutes an obstacle to the realization of this objective. After 'censuring' the intervention in Czechoslovakia, it is inconceivable for us to accept all its consequences, that is 'normalization,' the falling into step.

"As regards the youth, the way some abuses have been played up and systematic distrust have prevented the thorough understanding of their movement.

"Democratic centralism inspired by the Soviet model has made it possible to bar those who raised these problems and to place at the head of the party a man who took part in none of the PCF's vital struggles. That is why some of us who have held our peace for 10 years and more can no longer remain quiet for fear of contradicting the thrust of our drive and the feeling of our responsibilities. The time has come for all those who are aware of the danger of such political obstruction to join boldly the debate on which the future of socialism in France and the struggle of the peoples against imperialist barbarism depend."

"L'Humanite" Reports New Attack against the Party

L'Humanite commented in the following terms on what it considered to be a "new attack" against the French CP:

"Some had planned to divide the communists. However, the party organs approve the manner in which the central com-

mittee is applying the policy which its members have blocked out. To our knowledge, not a single cell has challenged the action of the party executive.

"Some had hoped to sap the influence of the French CP, to create difficulties between the workers and the party. By-elections bear witness to the increase of such influence. At Lens-Est as well as at Sainte-Genevieve-des-Bois, these elections underscored the popular bonds underlying the party and its extensive roots in the nation.

" . . . Roger Garaudy was joined by three individuals whose common characteristic is to have, at various periods and for different reasons, opposed the policy adopted and practiced by virtually the entire party. These four people do not seem to have found much support at all. To discuss among communists, indeed, to debate such or such a point, not to endorse entirely the policy desired by the majority is one thing. But to move on to hostile acts against the party is another, and the communists refuse to follow such a line."

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CPYRGHT

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WASHINGTON POST  
16 June 1970

CPYRGHT

## Indonesia Heads Asians At Kremlin Peace Talks

From News Dispatches

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik left Djakarta last night on a hurried trip to Moscow to head an Asian peace-seeking mission in discussions with Kremlin leaders about Cambodia.

At the same time, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, deposed ruler of Cambodia, arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, on an official visit, according to a broadcast by the North Korean news agency.

Sihanouk, who has set up a government in exile in Peking, was met at the railway station by North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung and given a 21-gun salute, reserved for heads of state.

In Moscow, Malik will join Japanese and Malaysian diplomats for a vital move in their campaign for international action to bring peace to Cambodia.

The other members of the mission have been in New York recently meeting U.N. Secretary General U. Thant and other U.N. officials.

The three-nation task force, appointed by an 11-nation Asian and Pacific conference on Cambodia in Djakarta last month, will meet Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Wednesday.

Malik, who was Indonesian ambassador to Moscow from 1960 to 1962, told reporters last night he also hoped to meet Thant in the Soviet capital.

Malik said he could not predict the outcome of his Moscow mission until he spoke with Soviet officials. "My main task will be to present the results of the Djakarta conference to the Soviet Union," he said.

Malik, whose unexpected personal role upgrades the Moscow talks, decided to go to Moscow after learning yesterday morning that Malaysian Deputy Premier Tun Abdul Razak, the original head of the mission, could not take part, due to a confusion over dates.

JAPAN TIMES  
10 June 1970

## Cambodian Group In Taipei for Talks

TAIPEI (Kyodo-Reuters) —

A six-man Cambodian delegation arrived in Taipei Tuesday from Seoul for official talks with the Nationalist Chinese Government.

Government sources said the talks would include the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries and Nationalist China, giving technical and economic aid to the Government of Gen. Lon Nol.

Cambodia had relations with Peking during the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, but these were severed last month following the overthrow of the prince on March 18.

Gen. Srey Saman, leader of the Cambodian delegation, declined to give a direct answer when questioned by correspondents on whether he was seeking diplomatic relations.

The talks with President Chiang Kai-shek and Premier C. K. Yen open Wednesday. The Cambodian delegation leaves for Manila June 13.

JAPAN TIMES  
10 June 1970

CPYRGHT

## Cambodia Talks In India Delayed

NEW DELHI (Kyodo-Reuters) —

The three-nation task force set up by the Djakarta Conference on the Cambodian conflict has canceled plans to hold talks with Indian Government officials from Wednesday, an official spokesman said here Tuesday.

He said the task force—three senior officials from Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia—had said they wanted to meet United Nations Secretary General U. Thant in New York before his visit to Moscow later this month.

Diplomatic sources said the three officials were likely also to visit London, Moscow and Paris before coming to New Delhi.

They were deputized by the Djakarta Conference to discuss a possible international solution to the Cambodian conflict and reactivation of the International Control Commission of which India is chairman.

WASHINGTON POST  
10 June 1970

# North Vietnam Reports Slow Economic Progress

From News Dispatches

HANOI, June 9—North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong has reported slow economic progress in his country and called for special efforts to meet demands of the expanding Indochina war.

The North Vietnam News Agency reported that Dong and Defense Minister Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap recently made reports to the powerful National Assembly, that meets in Hanoi twice a year.

Dong told the Assembly that North Vietnam has been trying to overcome the ravages of U.S. bombing, halted in 1968.

"The national economy has made initial, though still slow, progress and in some fields has recorded important achievements," he said.

Agriculture in 1969 was hit by successive natural calamities and in the 1969-70 winter-spring season, millions of workers were laid low by influenza, he added.

"However agriculture on the whole begins to make headway in farming, animal husbandry and in the consolidation and strengthening of the agricultural cooperatives," he

said.

The first part of his report described U.S. operations in Cambodia as an "insolent challenge" and called on Indochina leftist forces to unite, fight and win.

The second part, dealing with the internal scene, said North Vietnam had not only survived the U.S. bombing but had maintained and strengthened its forces in all fields.

"In the present new situation brought about by the U.S. imperialists' aggression, socialist North Vietnam holds a more and more important position in our people's struggle against the U.S. aggressors, for national salvation," Dong said.

"North Vietnam must further increase its capacities, push ahead socialist construction, step up the restoration and development of economy and culture and ensure assistance to frontline" forces, he added.

Dong said the tasks of the 1970 state plan were to raise the production of food and consumer goods and "restore and develop" industries, communications and transport.

Observers said the report showed that the situation in North Vietnam had not

changed much since late last year when official Hanoi reports admitted economic difficulties partly due to floods and drought.

Dong's report showed that the process of rebuilding industries shattered by the U.S. bombing is continuing, nearly two years after the bombing halt.

North Vietnam's resources are under increasing pressure because it has to fight a war on three fronts—in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi secured additional Chinese military and economic aid under an agreement signed last month, but details were not revealed.

The news agency also reported that the assembly has appointed an 11-member Presidium composed of Dong, Giap Ton Duc Thang (president), Le Duan (first secretary), Truong Chinh (chairman), Hong Van Hoan (vice chairman), Nguyen Duy Trinh (foreign minister), Chu Van Tan (vice chairman), Xuan Thuy (secretary and chief delegate to the Paris talks), Hoang Quoc Viet (chairman of the labor union) and Pham Van Bach (chief justice).

## Aichi Not Expected On Moscow Mission

Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi is unlikely to accompany the special emissaries of Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia on their scheduled mission to Moscow later this month for talks with the Soviet Government on Cambodia, Foreign Ministry sources said Saturday.

The emissaries of the three "caretaker" nations, meeting in Kuala Lumpur Friday, reportedly decided to visit the

Soviet Union around June 20 for talks with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko as part of their efforts to bring peace to Cambodia.

Reports said they also decided to ask foreign ministers of their respective governments to accompany them to Moscow to make their peace mission fruitful.

One reason for Aichi's reluctance, according to the source, was that the Djakarta conference on Cambodia, at

which the three nations were assigned the task of launching peace appeals to the nations concerned, had been held under the chairmanship of Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik.

The ministry sources also recalled that the joint communique issued by the conference had invested the Indonesian Government with greater powers in connection with peace overtures to be

made jointly by the three caretaker nations.

The three emissaries at their Kuala Lumpur meeting decided to seek contacts also with U.N. Secretary General U Thant, Britain, Poland, India and Canada.

The same sources said that in case Aichi did not go to Moscow, the three-man peace mission would probably be led by Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik.

JAPAN TIMES  
29 May 1970

## Aichi Plans Medical Aid To Cambodia

Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi said at a press conference Thursday he would see that preparations would be made immediately for extending medical aid to Cambodia for humanitarian purposes.

Speaking at a press conference, Aichi said he would direct ministry officials to negotiate with the Finance Ministry for financial help for the aid program.

The Foreign Minister said the site for talks among the special emissaries on the Cambodian question from Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia had not yet been fixed. It had been reported earlier that the site had been changed to New Delhi from Kuala Lumpur, the original site.

Aichi attended the press conference at the Foreign Ministry after briefing Prime Minister Eisaku Sato upon his return from attending the recent fifth Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia in Jogjakarta.

Aichi presided over a meeting of Japanese ambassadors in Hongkong Wednesday.

Aichi said he had agreed with Indonesian and Malaysian leaders to hold a meeting in Malaysia on June 4-5. The proposal for holding a meeting in New Delhi on June 10-11 was still under study, he said.

The Foreign Minister told the press he left the matter up to Deputy Foreign Vice Minister Shinsaku Hogen who had been picked as Japan's special emissary.

The Foreign Minister said that at the Jogjakarta meeting developing nations showed their willingness to work for the effective use of economic assistance.

Also mentioning the impression he got at the ministerial conference held May 22 to 25, Aichi also said that trust in the Asian Development Bank had increased measurably.

As for the ambassadorial conference in Hongkong the Foreign Minister said the envoys concurred that the ideological struggle in Cambodia was not so acute as generally believed.

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JAPAN TIMES  
30 May 1970

## Taiwan May Extend Aid To Cambodia

TAIPEI (AP)—The Nationalist Chinese Government has been in contact with the Cambodian Government and is considering giving non-military aid to the Lon Nol regime, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Friday.

Asked at a press conference whether Nationalist China would give nonmilitary aid to Cambodia, ministry spokesman Wei Yu-sun said "we have been in touch with the Lon Nol Government."

"This question is under careful consideration," he said.

Wei also called on overseas Chinese in Cambodia to "support Lon Nol's Government in every way possible."

Thursday night Wei said the Nationalist Government "welcomes" suggestions that Nationalist China and Cambodia establish diplomatic relations.

Wei Friday repeated the Nationalist call for an anti-Communist military alliance of Asian nations.

"In our opinion, the best way to cope with Mao Tse-tung's aggressive designs on Indochina is an effective alignment of free nations in the area," he told reporters.

The official Central News Agency Friday reported an unnamed "diplomatic observer" said Nationalist China "should take steps to establish diplomatic relations with Cambodia."

Nationalist statements of the last two days have been the strongest expressions so far of the belief in some quarters of the Government that Nationalist China should become to some extent more involved with Indochinese countries."

## 2 Regional Plans OK'd by Ministers of Eight Nations

Communicue Summary, Page 10  
JOGJAKARTA (Kyodo)

—Ministers from eight Asian nations brought the fifth Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia to a close Monday after adopting a joint communique stressing the necessity of self-help in the economic advancement in the region.

The ministers of Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines and South Vietnam adopted two regional projects including the establishment of the Asian Medical Organization proposed by Japan.

The communique expressed appreciation for Japan's endeavors to expand development assistance to Southeast Asian countries. The communique said the conference had noted with appreciation Japan's pledge to increase its aid to one per cent of its gross national product (GNP) by 1975.

It was also agreed that the next session of the conference would be held in Kuala Lumpur.

The joint statement was approved at a session opened at 2 p.m. Following the conclusion of the meeting, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, Japan's Delegate, left for Djakarta.

He will leave Djakarta for Hongkong today to discuss the Cambodian problem with the Japanese ambassador stationed in Southeast Asia. Aichi is due back in Tokyo on Thursday.

The joint communique said extensive and effective international cooperation was necessary if the developing countries are to stand on their own feet economically.

But the main driving force for the improvement of living conditions in Southeast Asia is the determination and effort on the part of developing countries, it said.

Referring to the special funds of the Asian Development Bank, the joint communique said the participating ministers concurred that repayment of the funds in local currency should be permitted if the economic condition of a loan-recipient na-

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 JAPAN TIMES  
 25 May 1970

*Around Asian Capitals*

# Djakarta Conference on Cambodia

SINGAPORE (Kyodo-Reuters)—The 11-nation Asian and Pacific Conference on Indochina held in the Indonesian capital of Djakarta last weekend attracted editorial comments in most Asian newspapers last week.

Referring to the Djakarta Conference call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia, the New Delhi right-wing newspaper, Statesman, said: "Considering the composition of the Djakarta Conference, its final communique must be regarded as eminently reasonable."

It said the communique had refrained from taking a one-sided view of the Cambodian conflict, but added that "it remained to be seen if South Vietnam would pull out its troops as the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are unlikely to pay any attention to what their opponents and some others decided at Djakarta . . ."

Another New Delhi newspaper, the Independent Hindustan Times said the conference decisions might not bring an immediate halt to the fighting in Cambodia, "but it does represent a measured appeal for a return to peace."

The newspaper said India, which kept out of the Djakarta meeting should join the move for a larger conference on Cambodia.

The independent Times of India said that "Indonesia's initiative in summoning the meeting was so badly timed that it was foredoomed to failure."

"But having taken the plunge, it must be said to Djakarta's credit that it did all it could to ensure that the meeting took a neutralist course."

It said the outcome of the conference would bring no solace to Cambodia, with neither the new regime nor Prince Sihanouk able to do much to get foreign troops out of the country.

It said: "The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong on one side, and the U.S. and the South Vietnamese on the other, are both playing for high stakes and are in no mood to brook any interference from any Cambodian, friend or foe, in pursuing their own war aims."

The Straits Times, which circulates both in Malaysia and Singapore, said the initiative taken by the 11 nations at the Djakarta Conference

was "constructive and hopeful, but the problems are inescapable."

But it said the Communist nations were unlikely to accept the conference proposals.

"The logical Communist response would be to demand a conference to discuss the withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam, not merely Cambodia . . ."

The newspaper expressed regret over the conference's failure to agree on the dispatch to Cambodia of an observer mission.

Referring to the three-nation mission set up by the conference to seek international action to solve the Cambodian crisis, the Straits Times said: "The next step depends on the success of the three-nation task force, the initiative which Malaysia inspired."

"The uncommitted Asian governments which were not at Djakarta probably, but not certainly, will support the Djakarta program," the Straits Times said.

In Taipei, the Chinese News in an editorial blamed Japan for preventing the Djakarta Conference on Cambodia from achieving anything.

The English-language daily, which usually reflects official views, said Japan "used all its powers of persuasion to make Djakarta a do-nothing conference" and refused "to say so much as boo."

If Japan did not clearly oppose Communists, it said, "the outlook for a secure and peaceful Asia is dismal indeed."

The editorial complained that "there were no pledges of weapons or supplies that Cambodia needs for its defense."

"The case presented by the Cambodian Government was promptly swept under the rug."

It said "Djakarta has shown the need for a real collective security organization in east Asia."

"If Japan does not want to join that will be no loss the way things stand now."

In Hongkong, the South China Morning Post said Chairman Mao Tse-tung's recent public statement condemning the U.S. imperialism seemed on the surface to be a mere exercise in platitudes but it was not, lacking in significance.

In an editorial, it said: "His statement is aimed at ag-

gravating the difficulties of the Nixon Administration by generating universal uneasiness about the possibilities of world war which has immediately been reflected in the tumbling of stock market prices.

"The underlying objective appears to be to arouse the American people, into compelling the Administration—even through subversive means—to remove the American military presence from Indochina in particular and elsewhere in the world in general."

It said Chairman Mao no longer spoke of the inevitability of world war while warning that the danger still existed.

"Taking all into consideration, Chairman Mao seems to have assumed direction of all protracted peoples' wars the world over," the editorial said. "He calls on people of the world to unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs—the latter do doubt including the Russians."

The Manila Daily Bulletin, commenting on the condemnation of the Philippine Government by the International Press Institute (IPI) on the deportation of two Chinese journalists said:

"Considering the harsh language in the resolution of the condemnation, the IPI could have considered the sending of a fact-finding mission to the Philippines to ascertain the facts, instead of basing action on say so presentations."

"As to the charge of violation of press freedom, is it the sense of the IPI that newsmen are a special breed, immune from proceedings which ordinary mortals are subject for activities alleged by the (Philippine) Government as inimical to national security?"

"Sight must not be lost of the fact, adverted to by our Government, that the Yuyitungs had previously been proceeded against in deportation proceedings and sentence suspended provided they apologized publicly, which they did, and that the Government accused them this time of continuing their subversive activities."

"As to the charge of violation of human rights, the Philippine Government, while deploring the circumstances of their actual expulsion, has alleged that the Yuyitungs (Quintin and Rizal, publisher

and editor, respectively, of the Chinese Commerce News here) had intended to flee through the Southern backdoor or seek asylum in a foreign embassy thus causing embarrassment to the (Philippine) Government."

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JAPAN TIMES  
 23 May 1970

## Seoul Plans Medical Aid To Cambodia

SEOUL (AP) — The South

Korean Government has decided to provide medical supplies to Cambodia as an initial step of its projected non-military assistance to the Indochinese nation, Government sources said Friday.

The sources said the decision was reached at a Cabinet session held May 12 before the two countries agreed to restore their diplomatic relations May 18.

The sources did not disclose the size of the initial medical assistance, but the newspaper Chosen Ilbo published in Seoul reported Friday that the Korean Cabinet earmarked 4,500,000 won (\$15,000) for the Cambodia-bound medical supplies.

R.P. StandCPYRGHT

MANILA (UPI) — The

Philippines reiterated Friday no troops or military aid will be sent to Cambodia but announced a joint Government-private humanitarian aid project will be undertaken on a "people-to-people" basis.

A spokesman for President Ferdinand E. Marcos said after a three-hour meeting of the Foreign Policy Council the aid will include food, clothing and medical supplies, and will be collected and distributed by Red Cross organizations in both countries.

22 May 1970

## Cooler look at Cambodia

"The Americans and the South Vietnamese have scored a major, perhaps a decisive victory with their combined operations in Cambodia . . .

"The scale of the victory could even lead to some sort of genuine peace negotiations—but on very different terms from those being discussed three weeks ago, when the offensive began."

This is not the reporting of some gung-ho American correspondent or the conclusion of some "brainwashed" American politician desperately clutching for something to justify his support of White House policy. It is the opening of a dispatch from Murray Sayle, perhaps the most outstanding and seasoned of the stable of younger correspondents maintained by The Times newspapers in London. He was filing from Phnom Penh. His assessment is all the more remarkable because there is a perhaps built-in British tendency to be astringent in judging American actions overseas, and because The Times initially voiced the opinion that President Nixon's Cambodian decision was "one more step to disaster."

Of course none of this means the United States or the South Vietnamese are out of the woods in the struggle in Indo-China. The other side is still too resourceful for that. Neither does it mean President Nixon's confrontation with the protest movement is likely to be over by the end of the summer. What it does mean—as Mr. Sayle says—is that there could now be "some sort of genuine peace negotiations." But where?

There is already the forum of the talks in Paris, involving Hanoi, Washington, Saigon and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF). The

Hanoi/NLF team called off last week's session of the talks in protest against American/South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia. Significantly, however, the other side gave no indication of breaking off the talks for good—perhaps because they recognize that, with their setbacks in Cambodia, they might now be better served by a compromise solution than by continued stalling.

But the Paris talks are concerned only with Vietnam, and the war has now clearly become an all Indo-China war and not just a Vietnam war. Should the forum then be a revival of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indo-China? For many reasons this would be better than Paris. It is in fact what Washington has intermittently suggested and what one of the conference cochairmen (Britain) has sought to interest the other (Russia) in. But the Russians have repeatedly stalled. In any case, there is some doubt, in today's circumstances whether China—whose participation is essential—would join in a meeting under part-Russian sponsorship to settle the affairs of Southeast Asia. So what else?

Well, there is always the team of three—Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia—set up at last week's 12-nation Jakarta conference on Cambodia. The conference had its ups and downs from the moment the Indonesian Government proposed it. Communist countries, although invited, boycotted it. But the gathering wisely kept itself in a low key and ended up by establishing the team of three to work for peace. If both Indonesia and the three-man team can be seen to be working independently of the Americans, this modest initiative in Jakarta could yet prove one of the little acorns out of which great oak trees grow.

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NEW YORK TIMES

20 May 1970

### An Asian Peace Plea

The eleven Asian nations that met in Djakarta last weekend to discuss the Cambodian crisis showed good judgment in focusing their efforts on a broader search for a peaceful settlement of the over-all Indochina problem.

Although a majority of the participants are, or have been, actively engaged on the side of the anti-Communist forces in the Indochina conflict, the Djakarta meeting brushed aside appeals for concerted military intervention in behalf of the Lon Nol Government in Phnompenh. This refusal may have disappointed hopes for a move toward collective security in Asia, such as President Nixon and others have been suggesting.

But the Asian leaders appear to have recognized, as

increasing numbers of Americans are beginning to do, that the situation in Indochina does not lend itself to a military solution. The introduction of additional Asian troops into Cambodia—some of them from states that are traditional foes of the Khmers—would only further complicate the political problems that lie at the root of the Southeast Asian conflict. A wider military intervention by Asian states would heighten the danger of a wider Asian war.

The Djakarta gathering delegated a task force composed of representatives from Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia to seek a broader meeting on Indochinese peace through the Geneva co-chairmen and U.N. Secretary General Thant. This Asian appeal for negotiation rather than confrontation in Southeast Asia deserves a positive response, especially from the combatants and their supporters on both sides.

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# Asia forum presses for unity

By David K. Willis  
 Staff correspondent of  
 The Christian Science Monitor

Tokyo

The immense task of forging a sense of unity in Asia moves slowly ahead.

That it does so—despite the thunder of the Indo-China war, despite vast differences among peoples scattered across a third of the globe—is counted in many an Asian capital as one of the main hopes for the future.

## Suggested in '66

The latest indication is the gathering of nine nations (plus Laos in "observer" status) spanning East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific in the Asian and Pacific Council, or ASPAC.

ASPAC, holding its fifth annual conference in Wellington, N.Z., June 17-19, is the only regional diplomatic grouping in Asia of its type.

First suggested in 1966 by a South Korean government with an eye to drumming up new anti-Communist feeling, it has developed instead into a valuable diplomatic soap-box for its member nations: Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand, South Vietnam, Philippines, Nationalist China, South Korea, and Japan.

ASPAC exists mainly to let foreign ministers and their staffs talk freely to each other. Unlike other regional groups, it is not purely economic (though it will approve an economic cooperation center in Bangkok this year, and maintains other offices); it is not security minded, nor narrowly subregional.

This year, ASPAC gives every indication of continuing its low profile, rather than being transformed into a more hawkish, anti-Communist group by such thrusters as Seoul, Saigon, and Taipei.

The main reason is that its unofficial leader is Japan—and that Japan is determined to keep it as flexible as possible.

From Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi down, the Japanese believe ASPAC's usefulness lies in discussion, rather than confrontation. Tokyo believes a strong anti-Communist, pro-United States communiqué would hardly strengthen ASPAC or keep the door open to new members, such as, it is hoped, Indonesia, Singapore, or even India.

## Jakarta meeting held

An additional factor this year is that most of the ASPAC members met in Jakarta last month (May 17-18) to take their own initiative to end the fighting in Cambodia.

Even while ASPAC ministers are meeting in the gray wood and stone of New Zealand's Parliament buildings, emissaries from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan will be seeing Soviet leaders in Moscow to try to fulfill the decisions taken in Jakarta.

Having signed a resolutely middle-road communiqué at Jakarta (thanks mainly to the forceful role played by Japan), the same nations would only prejudice the success of their own effort by following up with a blast at communism in Wellington, it is felt here.

Japan, at any rate, remains set against any such thing. Japanese newspapers have been playing up reports that Seoul, Taipei, and Saigon might well try to say all the hawkish things in a Wellington communiqué that they found themselves unable to say in Jakarta.

Inside the Foreign Ministry here, calm officials concede that Taipei was not at the Jakarta meeting, and that Singapore — counted a "dove" — was in Jakarta but is not in Wellington.

Nonetheless, the officials assess the prospect of a strong communiqué as "possible but not likely." In fact, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, aided by New Zealand, seem to have the situation well in hand. Tokyo and Wellington were largely responsible for staving off South Korean demands for a stronger communiqué last year, when ASPAC met at the scenic Kawana Hotel in Ito City south of Tokyo.

Clearly, Bangkok, and Canberra (as well as Saigon) will carry their own brand of anticommunism into the Wellington meeting. But Japan's example and influence are large, and its policies are thought almost certain to prevail.

## Jakarta goes it alone

Japan wants Indonesia to join, but Jakarta prefers its own kind of low profile to ASPAC's.

If Cambodia is mentioned at all in the communiqué, it will be only in general terms. As in the past, sympathy and even perhaps deep sympathy will be extended to Saigon for its "firm stand to preserve . . . independence and freedom."

The Wellington meeting could provide a useful follow-up to the Jakarta conference on Cambodia. While few expect the latter to have any effect on the Indo-Chinese fighting, it did give Asian regionalism a new focus. It generated a concrete, local initiative to end the war. It marked Japan's firm entry into a security issue for the first time since the war.

Now ASPAC in Wellington adds to Japan's new role, and to non-Communist Asia's continuing regional conversation with itself.