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CPYRGHT

## CAMBODIA'S "MINIMIRACLE"—CAN IT LAST?

### PNOMPENH

An untrained, ill-equipped Cambodian Army, backed by U.S. air power and South Vietnamese ground forces, has—for the moment—created a "minim miracle" in this Communist-threatened land.

When American troops pulled out of Cambodia on June 30 after smashing Red sanctuaries, predictions were widespread that the Government of Premier Lon Nol would fall in a matter of days or weeks.

At the time, Cambodia had a virtually unarmed force of 35,000 men. Hardened North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops were unopposed in Northeast Cambodia and moving out across the country.

The former dictator, ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was calling for revolution.

**Encouraging signs.** In mid-August, the situation is still critical. But most observers here are vastly encouraged by recent developments.

The Government in Pnompenh is stronger than it was six weeks ago. The Army shows signs of developing a backbone, having withstood two Communist offensives since the Americans departed. And, so far at least, Prince Sihanouk's

call for revolt in the countryside has gone unheeded.

What accounts for all this?

The big factor is morale. Says one American: "I haven't seen this kind of unity since Pearl Harbor."

Students, bureaucrats, the middle class, and even peasants, have enthusiastically joined the struggle against the enemy.

The Government called for 200,000 volunteers—and got them. In small but sometimes bloody battles with the Communist forces, the Cambodians are throwing themselves into the fight. Often, it seems to observers Cambodian tactics have more valor than finesse.

The Cambodians are getting help, of course. South Vietnamese troops are harassing the Reds in Eastern Cambodia. American air power—both B-52 bombing of North Vietnamese concentrations and supply lines, and tactical support of Cambodian troops—plays a big role. One military source says that, without this air support, the Cambodians could not have held on—and would not be able to in the future.

**Red problems.** The Communists have other difficulties. Their old sea-supply route through Cambodia—which in the past few years supplied most of their ammunition and arms for the fight in Southern South Vietnam—has been cut off. So has most of their rice supply, which used to come officially through Sihanouk's Government.

And Cambodian villagers are hostile to the Red invaders, giving the Lon Nol forces more intelligence than they can use.

There are still the equivalent of at least four divisions of Communists inside Cambodia. That means as many as 50,000 fighting men. Their command structure is intact and they are consolidating in the Northeast, east of the Me-

kong River and west of the Vietnamese border.

What are Cambodia's chances of surviving over the longer run?

Much depends on Communist strategy. Most observers believe there will be no all-out attempt to bring down the Lon Nol Government by massive military action against this capital.

Rather, the Hanoi-Peking strategy appears to be to consolidate in the Northeast—which the Cambodians have temporarily abandoned. From there, the war against South Vietnam can be continued.

**Puppet front.** A long, hard war of attrition—using the puppet government-in-exile of Sihanouk as a front—has started against Lon Nol's Cambodia. Targets of opportunity will be exploited around the countryside, with priorities given to seizing rice and—more important—to recruiting Cambodians for Sihanouk.

The Government is settling in for a long haul, hoping to maintain the initial enthusiasm and support of the people.

The Government hopes to turn 60,000 to 70,000 men into a first-rate fighting force. The rest of the new manpower will be used to guard villages, to police military installations and to counter Red terrorism. More American aid—not only the 8.5 million dollars in arms and equipment already promised and arriving—will be needed.

So will continued U.S., South Vietnamese and Thai air support. Especially sought will be American economic aid to rebuild Cambodia's economy, which was bankrupted by Sihanouk's policies before he was ousted last March.

**Peasants hold key.** Biggest question is whether or not the Communists can make progress enrolling the peasants in their ranks. The Communists "hold" more than a third of the country—the regions east of the Mekong River. But these are largely uninhabited. The Government's challenge is to protect the peasants in more densely populated areas from Communist thrusts southward and westward.

Confidence may be misplaced, but right now the Cambodians—and many Americans here—believe Lon Nol just might survive. They say that only time will tell if the "minim miracle" of the past weeks can continue.

THE OBSERVER, London  
9 August 1970

# Cambodians smile under fire

from GAVIN YOUNG: Skun, Cambodia, 8 August

SKUN, Cambodia, 8 August

A SCORE of young Cambodians killed in an ambush a day ago lie in the sun today just down the road from here. They are behind us—on what should be our 'safe' side.

Ahead, round the next bend in the road, funnels of smoke rise from the little red-roofed town of Skun. The crash and rattle of rockets and machine-guns extend into the great greenness around us, even at our backs on the way to Kompong Cham, the key base.

Cambodian regulars and volunteers are now fighting hand-to-hand and house-to-house with Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops who occupied Skun a week ago. I saw American and South Vietnamese jets machine-gunning and rocketing outside the town. Skun may be recovered today or tomorrow. It sits on a vital cross-roads on the main northern highway only 35 miles from Phnom Penh, but the situation in this important region of Cambodia will still be serious.

I was plummeted down to the gates of Skun by a helicopter manned by South Vietnamese pilots, cool as ice in slinky black flying suits with tiger-head badges, accompanied by a

Vietnamese colonel and the gentle-looking Cambodian commander, General In Tam; two years ago, an unbelievable combination of nationalities.

We landed on a cratered road. The helicopter soared prudently away. And something amazing happened. Despite the Vietcong milling around in the undergrowth, about 50 sweating Cambodian soldiers, in motley battle-dress or khaki shorts, charged out of their foxholes,

cheering, clapping their hands above their heads, jumping in the air with glee, rushing to shake the General's hand. In one of the hottest war zones in Cambodia, we were suddenly in a sea of damp smiling faces.

## Army morale 'astounding'

The high morale of Cambodia's under-trained Army is astounding. It seethes through an increasingly battered country like high-tension electricity. These men have been fighting around Skun day and night for 10 days. Some are peasants; others are students, labourers, teachers. All are volunteers.

They have been badly knocked about. The North Vietnamese had infiltrated around and behind them. A column from Kompong Cham that was to have relieved them was caught in the ambush that killed 27.

Yet they had held—with sporadic air support and no helicopters. Now they proudly pointed out their battered slit trenches. Some had Vietcong rocket craters only six feet away. All were ripped with bullets.

'They kept creeping up in the dark,' a Cambodian corporal said. 'They shouted "Lay down your arms!" and we opened up on them crouching there only 20 yards away.' I saw the blackened grass and bushes where Vietcong or Cambodian grenades had exploded and the traces of Vietcong blood. I asked a boy, beaming and clutching his Chinese sub-machine gun: 'Are you scared?' He said: 'I was.' But now I know what the Vietcong are like, not any more.' He cer-

tainly saw a battle here. The General gave each man a week's pay on the spot.

General In Tam is a remarkable man. Over 50, he is an administrator by profession, now a soldier by choice—to save the country against this foreign invasion. He is Governor of Kompong Cham province where he was born and which he loves and used to tour regularly. He is balding, looks more like an academic than a soldier, never carries a weapon, and has a wrinkled dark face like a friendly walrus. He could be safe in the capital; his duties as President of the National Assembly could keep him there. He prefers to be with his men. He has already lost a brother and five nephews in a war that is only four months old.

Today his staff tried to stop him going to Skun in a vulnerable helicopter—'The general is far too rash.' But he said the soldiers should see him. He said it like a professor talking about his favourite class.

He had already spent three days and nights under shot and shell with his front-line troops at Skun earlier this week. He had personally extricated an encircled battalion.

Like all Cambodians, without exception, he complains mildly but with justice of the lack of modern equipment for his men.

Earlier, at his base in Kompong Cham, which is itself under rocket attack, I asked him if the Cambodians could hold up under the recurrent if limited losses in the week-old wave of Vietcong attacks across the country. 'Oh, yes. With time we can train and reorganise the ridiculous army Sihanouk left us.' When he saw Cambodians killed, did he feel angry at the obvious delay in arms deliveries from Cambodia's

'Well, a little of that.' He smiled. 'But it soon passes. We understand that this war happened very quickly. We were all, including our allies, taken rather by surprise. It takes time to bounce back.'

Cambodians have been largely pinned on the defensive in the present hefty Vietcong and North Vietnamese push from the north towards Phnom Penh that has led to heavy fighting around Kompong Cham and even inside a major town like Kompong Thom from which the Vietcong have been ejected. There have been setbacks at Vkirom, battles around Takeo in the south, and shelling of places nearer to the capital. Bridges have been mined. Cambodian civilians were killed in a major Vietcong ambush on the main road to the port of Kompong Som.

## Volunteers turned away

All the time the Cambodian army—turning away hundreds of volunteers by now—is feverishly training. It is outmanouevred and outgunned. But it is not collapsing. It is even hitting back in areas like Skun. And though it is a small country, Phnom Penh does not seem threatened today.

Cambodian soldiers may look raggle-taggle, but they have seldom run away. Here I have met 15-year-old veterans of two or three battles. And their morale is higher than any I have seen in anybody's army in 10 years of visiting wars.

It is a strange and rare situation. Kompong Cham, the lush green 'second city' of Cambodia, is cut off from Phnom Penh since Skun was lost last week. This week it was more like a city that welcomes attack more than it fears it.

Two nights ago the crash of Cambodian heavy mortars and the drone of low-circling American planes dropping flares over the Mekong river made sleep difficult. Every street corner has its heavily sandbagged strong

point. Men, women, girls and boys are in uniform, determinedly clutching guns. I saw a dignified old man of about 60 with white hair and Ho Chi Minh beard being pedalled along in a cyclo, nursing his carbine. In the big lycée, already twice hit by long-range Vietcong mortars, while some students play basketball or study, others in rotation man well-protected gun emplacements in which they sleep. A professor, strapped about with ammunition belt, grenades, and carbine, pointed to himself and said smiling: 'The Duke of Marlborough goes to war, *n'est-ce pas?*'

In a small house in a back street flanked by scarlet hibiscus, two French priests, the only foreigners left in the city since it was cut off, told me: 'There's no panic here. The people seem relaxed. They've been expecting an attack for weeks and they're becoming used to it. Much better discipline, too. Before, if a shot went off, everyone in the town would be blazing away. They laughed at the recollection.

One does not get the feeling that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese are achieving a major breakthrough in this essential heartland, though as the Vietnamese liaison officer with the troops at Kompong Cham says of the situation: 'It's not pretty, eh?'

The Cambodian strength is in their will to fight and the fact that this is not a civil war. But there are major North Vietnamese units moving down by river and truck. They are desperate for a really big psychological victory. Food prices are beginning to creep up in Kompong Cham.

The Cambodians have other disadvantages beside a shortage of weapons. General In Tam, that unusual man, will not allow Napalm in his region. Again, other towns have been destroyed by air attack before being retaken from the Vietcong. The general here says: 'I must at all costs protect our civilian lives and prevent material damage. So the fighting has been very hard in Skun. The enemy gets into the buildings—even pagodas—and uses them as fire points. We don't

want to destroy our own houses and temples, so it takes longer to retake a town and our losses may be greater as a result. I would not allow aircraft to bomb Skun. Meanwhile Skun will be retaken and the main road opened again. But only tentatively. It will be a risky drive from Phnom Penh to Kompong Cham for some time. Today as I stood with the General with his joyful troops on the edge of Skun, two big trucks encircled by a strongly armed escort were creeping down the road behind us at walking pace. Because of the lurking enemy, it would take them six hours to pick up the poor ambushed bodies, the gay scarves made up from the Cambodian and Buddhist flags still around their necks, and deliver them to the incinerators in Kompong Cham only 15 miles away.

BALTIMORE SUN  
16 August 1970

# Lon Nol Slowly Introduces A Greater Freedom To Cambodia

## An Increased Pluralism Over Sihanouk's Era Is Bringing Support

By MICHAEL PARKS  
*[Sun Staff Correspondent]*

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Aug. 15

The new Cambodian government, which many expected would quickly become another American-supported military dictatorship, so far seems to be freer, more open and tolerant of dissent than the regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk was.

The government of Gen. Lon Nol, the premier, also is proceeding gingerly to broaden its political base, partially through patronage, partially through community-development programs but mostly by appealing to the patriotism and soliciting the support of the peasant and laborer.

The efforts are cautious and often tentative, and they can be undercut at any time, of course, by serious military reverses.

By most estimates, the Phnom Penh government controls only a third of the countryside, but perhaps two-thirds of the pro-government population is concentrated in the provincial capitals and towns.

Within this context, the government is firmly in charge within the territory it holds, but even its critics acknowledge it to be more responsive to local needs than was the Sihanouk regime.

Intellectuals and students, who in most countries would tend to be anti-government, firmly support the coup and new government.

Buddhist groups, basically now-political here but closer to the peasantry than any other group, also support it.

The government's parliamentary critics, who had won only a few grudging changes from Prince Sihanouk over a decade, say they have no quarrel with the current government's goals, only its methods.

Generally they feel it is too moderate, too cautious probably reflecting the personality of Lon Nol.

So far, the critics have persuaded the government to end the practice of concentrating all power in the hands of two or three men, each running three or four ministries. While Lon Nol has kept the defense portfolio, he and Naj. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, the deputy premier, have given up their other ministries to new Cabinet members including assembly deputies, an Army general, and two popular university professors.

They also have created 12 special commissariats to deal with refugees, veterans, planning and other matters at the sub-Cabinet level.

The essential, policy-making powers remain in the hands of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, but neither local nor foreign political observers here believe that either man wants to be a dictator in the classic sense.

The Cabinet members and the officials appointed to run the new commissariats say they have greater day-to-day operating authority than was ever allowed under Prince Sihanouk.

Most of this means little so far

to the Cambodian who is not a member of the French-style elite of civil servants, Army officers, university teachers, professionals and businessmen, although the government is making plans to win the average Cambodian's allegiance lest it revert to Prince Sihanouk.

### Elite Approves, Too

Most of the members of the political elite, whose viewpoints range from the near-monarchist to radical socialist, have said almost unanimously in private conversations recently that they believe the Lon Nol government has moved significantly toward a republican democracy with a great deal of speed.

Similarly, most Western diplomats here say they are surprised at the stability of the government and the speed of its political reforms.

"Given that this is a country at war, a country occupied by its enemy and a country that had an abrupt change of governments five months ago," a political analyst at a European embassy said, "I find amazing stability. Moreover, I think the political reforms are considerable given the time period."

The current debate among the politically aware centers on when to declare Cambodia a republic and what form of government to embody in the new constitution which is being drafted.

Lon Nol said he expects the transformation from a constitutional monarchy with many remnants of Angkorean god-kings to a republic within two months.

The debate is over whether the new government will be modeled upon the U.S.-French

form with a strong president, or whether it will be modeled upon the old post-war French republic with a figurehead president and a basically parliamentary form of government.

Predictably, the Lon Nol government favors the strong-president concept and his parliamentary opponents favor the other form.

Questions of unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, decentralization of governmental functions, and the election of almost all local officials also are being vigorously debated by politicians here in a style that they say was never permitted before. Whether this constitution will be drafted by the present national assembly or a new constituent assembly has not been determined because of the impossibility of holding elections throughout the country. For the same reason, the government expects to postpone for a year or perhaps two the national assembly elections scheduled for this fall, a move accepted by all here as reasonable.

Another significant change from the last Sihanouk years is the organization of several political parties now under way. For several years, there had been only the Sangkum party, which had its factions but no external opposition.

It was growing dissatisfaction within the Sangkum, however, over the country's stagnating economy and the government's increasing deficits that forced Prince Sihanouk to install Lon Nol as premier last August in what the prince called "the government of Salvation."

Those problems remain, exacerbated by the strains of war.

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## Turn for the Good?

It Has Its Troubles,  
But Cambodia Proves  
It's Not Any Pushover

Hanoi Said to Be Too Weak  
To Fight Two Wars; Meets  
An Unexpected Resistance

A Tale of Two Ferryboats

By PETER R. KANN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

PHNOM PENH—The Bulgarian embassy

here is a modest villa furnished with couches upholstered in plastic leopardskin. Its walls are decorated with travel posters showing beefy peasant girls harvesting grapes for the production of wines like "Bulgarplod."

On one wall of the office of the Bulgarian charge d'affaires is a large road map of Cambodia, festooned with several score little red flags. The flags mark scenes of battle, but the map is sadly out of date. There are no red flags on the towns of Kampot, Kompong Thom, Kirirrom or a dozen other sites of recent combat.

"It is unfortunate," says the charge d'affaires, "but we have run out of flags."

The Bulgarians aren't the only ones who have been unable to keep pace with recent events in Cambodia. Four months ago Cambodia was the most peaceful and cohesive little country in Southeast Asia. Today it is barely a country at all.

Within two months of the mid-March coup that toppled Prince Sihanouk, North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops had spread across most of Cambodia, even occupying the towers of the ancient Khmer kingdom at Angkor Wat. Today they are in full control of all of northeast and most of northern Cambodia—more than half the country's land area.

### Some Hope

What's more, the South Vietnamese effectively took control of large parcels of southeast Cambodia. Thailand currently is debating when to move troops into western Cambodia. American and South Vietnamese planes fly bombing raids throughout most of the country, as the Cambodian army lumbers from one defeat to another in Pepsi-Cola trucks and gayly painted buses.

Most of Cambodia's rural population lives under the control of neither the Communists nor the new Cambodian government of Premier Lon Nol. They live in political vacuums that are gradually coming to be called "contested areas."

"We are witnessing the Congolization of Cambodia, a country disintegrating before our eyes," says a European diplomat. He notes that the tough and resilient South Vietnamese have been fighting continually for 30 years, but still South Vietnam is in better shape than Cambodia, which has been at war for only four months.

But if Cambodia is far worse off than it was four months ago, most observers here now feel that its prospects of resisting a Communist takeover look a bit brighter than they did two months ago. At that time there was talk here of the siege, and even seizure, of Phnom Penh, and of the hopeless incompetence of the Cambodian army.

### Communist Aim Unclear

Now observers speak of the isolation, rather than siege, of the capital ("Lon Nol looks pretty secure as mayor of Phnom Penh," says a Western envoy). They still talk of Cambodian military incompetence, but the word "hopeless" often is dropped ("The Cambodian army used to run on rumors of a Vietcong attack, now it only runs when the VC start shooting," says a foreign military attache). And they now tend to stress the problems and weaknesses of the Communists, as well as their strengths.

These shifts in attitude may seem overly subtle. But this is a country where the word "uncertainty" takes on a definitive ring, where Westerners resort to humor and cynicism to try to blot out the tragedy, where an "optimistic military assessment" translates into more death and destruction for a country that tumbled almost by accident into the eye of the Indochina war.

It's not entirely clear whether the Communists' aim has been to topple the Lon Nol government, to pressure it into a sort of accommodation, or simply to gain time while they set about consolidating vast new sanctuary areas in the northeast.

"I think Charlie has been hoping to pick up Cambodia on the quick and cheap, and it hasn't quite worked," says a Western military attache.

### A Tough Decision

This official and others now believe the North Vietnamese face a tough decision. Should they make Cambodia their top military priority and concentrate their 35,000 or so combat troops on conquering the country? Or should they just continue harassments to keep the Cambodians off balance while concentrating their energy and forces on the war in South Vietnam? Few observers here believe that the Communists can, at the same time, take all of Cambodia and seriously threaten the crucial southern areas of South Vietnam.

Several analysts here think the Communists will concentrate first on Cambodia. They argue that the enemy for months has been scaling down to a low-level "protracted war" in most of South Vietnam and that it's in their interest to lie low there for another year or two until U.S. combat troops are gone. They stress the relative ease with which Communist troops can win victories in Cambodia, to the extent, they contend, of toppling the Lon Nol government if they really try.

The majority of diplomats, however, seem to be betting the other way. They argue that Hanoi is committed—both by its ideology and its nationalism—to concentrating on winning the war in South Vietnam. They suggest that victories over the Cambodian army may be easily won, but lack the impact of defeats of South Vietnamese forces or infliction of heavy casualties on U.S. troops. They say the war in South Vietnam's southern corps areas is currently going so badly for the Communists that they must commit more forces there. And they add that Cambodia will inexorably fall to the Communists if the Thieu government can be defeated in Vietnam.

Moreover, there's a growing realization here that Cambodia would be no pushover for the Communists. The dispersal of Communist forces across so much Cambodian territory already is said to be causing supply shortages.

More important, the Communists are outsiders—and unpopular ones—in Cambodia. Cambodians traditionally hate Vietnamese of any sort and have been trying to resist various Vietnamese invasions for centuries. Here the Communists cannot follow Chairman Mao's dictum to move among the people as fish in the ocean; so far they look more like piranhas in a goldfish bowl. Even diplomatic sources vaguely sympathetic to the Communists set the number of Cambodians fighting on the same side with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong at less than 10,000. Other Western diplomats say even that figure is twice too high.

Whatever their problems, the Communists are master organizers and have a potent propaganda line in reminding the peasantry that in the good old Sihanouk days peace reigned in the rice paddies. And though the Communists are having only marginal success in turning the Cambodian conflict into a real civil war, the Lon Nol government—despite some signs of growing competence—is hardly moving to win mass allegiance in the countryside.

#### The New Helmet

The new government has strong support among organized urban groups: Army, civil service, students, intellectuals, businessmen and, some say, the Buddhist clergy. Civil servants in paramilitary dress walk proudly around the city. Nearly everyone in the capital wears some scrap of military uniform, including the teenyboppers who outfit themselves in khaki bell-bottom slacks. It's not unusual to find a portly Cambodian soldier beaming with pride as he sits down to dinner at a French restaurant with a new steel helmet perched on his head. Other soldiers then wander by his table to admiringly tap the new helmet.

All this esprit fades rapidly as one leaves the capital. Only 20 miles away is the town of Saang, four times battled over and now largely in ruins. All but a few score of its 2,000 inhabitants have fled. A Cambodian battalion, commanded by a major who was teaching primary school three months ago, is based in Saang. Three kilometers down the road the Vietcong are taxing, propagandizing and conscripting villagers. The VC have been there for three months.

It is midafternoon and the Cambodian battalion has scattered to sleep among the charred remains of shops and homes. The proprietor of a soft drink cart seems to be doing a booming business selling limeade to the troops, but he says he is scared and plans to leave.

Between attacks the Vietcong send small patrols to snipe at the Cambodian troops, most of whom are barefoot. The Cambodians also send out occasional patrols, but they never venture farther than two kilometers from Saang. The schoolteacher major seems perplexed when asked why his troops don't venture one kilometer farther to harass the enemy. "We are waiting for heavy rains so the countryside will flood. Then perhaps the Vietcong will move to high ground, and maybe we can find some boats and attack them," he finally replies. While he talks, a chicken runs across his feet. It is by far the most animated creature in Saang.

Saang notwithstanding, the Cambodian army is starting to fight better. Observers here are impressed with the personal courage of Cambodian soldiers, willing to go into battle with ancient weapons, inadequate ammunition and negligible training against experienced Communist troops with superior firepower. Many Cambodian retreats have been incontestable cases of discretion being the better part of valor.

The Cambodian army is greatly expanded—from 35,000 troops four months ago to about 150,000 now, though fewer than 100,000 have any arms at all and fewer yet have anything approaching military training. But, even at its best, the army is fighting a defensive, urban-oriented war, trying to prevent the enemy from occupying or harassing towns.

#### Admirable Calmness?

Politically, the Lon Nol government has displayed what diplomats consider a surprising degree of internal unity. The national crisis seems to be keeping personal politicking at a very low level, and the Phnom Penh rumor mill is devoid of coup scares. "The coup stage will come later, after the colonels have won a few battles," says one European envoy.

Some diplomats also credit the government with admirable calmness in a situation where many men might panic. Other analysts attribute the seeming composure to simple Cambodian inertia. War or no war, government offices still close for the day by 2 p.m. and cabinet ministers are easily located in Phnom Penh's few good French restaurants after dark.

CPYRGHT

In its relations with outside world, Cambodia has displayed both sagacity and naivete. It has wisely managed to maintain at least the pretense of neutrality by avoiding any formal military alliances with its South Vietnamese and Thai neighbors.

The Cambodians, however, have been wildly over-optimistic in their expectations of American military assistance. To date the U.S. has provided only captured Communist weapons and \$8.9 million worth of radios, trucks, carbines and other modest equipment. The U.S. presence in Phnom Penh is still so "low profile" that there is no American ambassador, and a senior member of the American mission travels by pedicab from the tiny hotel room where he lives to the cramped little office where he works.

The U.S. has been so tightfisted that when two Cambodian ferryboats were sunk by the Vietcong and later raised through American efforts, they were towed off to South Vietnam. The ferries sat in South Vietnam for nearly two months because some U.S. Navy officials there hoped to trade them back to the Cambodians for an American river patrol boat that the Cambodians had captured inside Cambodia during the Sihanouk days. The total value of the river patrol boat, which the Cambodians presumably need more than the Americans anyway, is less than \$50,000. Yet for two months Cambodian military and civilian traffic was hampered by lack of ferries on the Mekong River. The ferries finally were returned late last month and the Cambodians, it seems, will get to keep the patrol boat—the only one in their navy.

American pennypinching is difficult for the Cambodians to comprehend, particularly when they look at U.S. extravagance in Vietnam, where \$8.9 million can be expended on artillery shells and bombs in a single day. Cambodian officials who had expected American bases and combat troops and a cornucopian outpouring of airplanes, helicopters and other wondrous weaponry, now find themselves being turned down on a request for 100,000 ponchos to keep their troops covered in the monsoon rains.



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MIDEAST CEASEFIRE

A ceasefire between the UAR and Israel became effective at 2200 GMT, 7 August 1970. An integral part of the ceasefire on the UAR-Israeli front is a military standstill to be effective 50 kilometers wide on each side of the ceasefire line. This arrangement was made only for the Israel/UAR front because the UAR was the only country to repudiate the ceasefire resolutions of 1967; therefore the Suez Canal represents the main military front. On the Jordanian and Syrian fronts the 1967 ceasefire agreements still apply; these agreements have not been renounced by Syria and Jordan.

Subsequent to the announcement of the ceasefire U Thant reactivated the mission of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring to work for a peace settlement under UN Security Council Resolution 242, dated 22 November 1967. Jarring, at this writing, is consulting with the UAR, Jordan and Israel to initiate political talks. The principles of the UN Security Council resolution are: Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories; the right of Israel and other countries of the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; a just settlement of the refugee problem; and a guarantee of territorial inviolability.

An irritant to the ceasefire and to political talks will be the activities of the 'fedayeen'. The 'fedayeen' do not want peace, they do not seek peace and to them the idea of a ceasefire is anathema; their aim is to destroy Israel. Nonetheless, in spite of their capabilities for raids and harassment they have no political base and there is some reason to believe Arab governments may ignore military actions between them and Israelis as long as Arab interest in maintaining the ceasefire continues. Nasir has deprived Palestinian organizations in Cairo of radio frequencies and broadcast facilities. Nasir's foreign policy publicist Mohammad Heykal, editor of Al-A-hram, in his influential Friday column on 7 April, wrote that the Palestinian organizations could not possibly liberate Palestine "from the river to the sea." Heykal discredited the comparison often made between the Palestinian and Algerian situations and said that liberation was possible in Algeria, but was not possible in Palestine.

Iraq opposes the ceasefire. Iraq opposes the UAR policy of acceptance of the ceasefire. The USSR has failed to change the Iraqi attitude. Historically, Iraq has always opposed Israel and, technically, has been at war with Israel since the first Arab-Israeli war. Iraq has no common border with Israel and Baghdad is 600 miles from Tel Aviv. Syria has given lip service to opposing the ceasefire but has privately let it be known that it will support

the UAR position.

Gunnar Jarring is trying to bring Israel and Egypt to a meeting place; Israel wants the talks to be conducted by Foreign Ministers and has suggested Cyprus as the conference site. Jordan and Egypt want negotiations to start at a lower level, an Ambassadorial level with New York as the site and with the option of upping the level of participation to include Foreign Ministers who will likely be in New York for the UN General Assembly beginning 15 September.

21 September is the half-way point of the ceasefire period.

Distinguishing the Palestinian Commando Organizations

All Palestinian commando organizations have the same basic aims: (a) the regaining of all of Palestine, including present-day Israel, and the establishment of a Palestine state which would include Muslims, Christians, and Jews; and (b) the rejection of a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli impasse, and the use of armed force as the chief weapon against Israel.

The Major Palestinian Organizations:

1. The Palestine Liberation Movement (Fatah), the largest commando organization, has no special allegiance to any particular state or political party. In contrast, other major commando groups are sponsored by either an Arab government or a political party (sometimes both).
2. The nucleus of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) comes from the George Habbash wing of the leftist Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The ANM's more extreme Marxist-Leninist faction, led by Nayif Hawatmah, controls the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).
3. The Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War and its military arm, al-Saiga, are sponsored and controlled by the Syrian Government and the Syrian Ba'th Party.
4. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was created by the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Ba'th Party.
5. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by the Arab Summit conference as a quasi-governmental organization. It has a regular army of its own, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and a commando unit, the Popular Liberation Forces, which was formed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

In February 1969, after al Fatah succeeded in taking over its control, the PLO began to function as an umbrella for the various commando organizations and other Palestinian groups. Its Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) coordinates the release of information concerning fedayeen commando operations, and is also to coordinate their military activities. PASC now includes eight commando organizations. The PFLP is the only major fedayeen group which has not yet joined and which still continues to operate independently of PASC. Efforts are being made to bring PFLP into both the PLO and PASC, but so far no agreement has been reached.

Differences between the Commandos:

1. Party affiliations and sponsorship.

Arab governments sponsoring commando groups have tended to give their time and effort to their own rather than to Fatah and other groups. They have also been suspicious of commandos sponsored by a rival government or political party and have at times deported them or curtailed their activities.

2. Nature of cooperation.

Disagreements have arisen over reorganizing the PLO and over representation in that body. Fatah favors proportional representation, depending on the size of the commando organization, and is against equal votes for each commando group because the small groups could then paralyze action with their veto.

3. Smaller vs. larger groups.

Fatah is against the formation of smaller groups because it feels that these are being used to sap the energy of the bigger organizations. In contrast, the small commando groups feel that they serve a useful purpose and reflect differences of opinion.

4. Class struggle.

Most commando groups consider themselves representative of progressive national liberation movements. The PDPFLP believes that the commandos should only include the workers and peasants because of the collusion between imperialism and the big bourgeoisie. Fatah believes that this class limitation would weaken the movement and that Marx's class breakdown is not applicable to the Palestinian situation anyway.

5. Palestinian vs. Pan-Arab movement.

Some groups such as the ALF emphasize the Pan-Arab nature of the struggle. Others such as Fatah consider the conflict as primarily a Palestinian one linked with the Arab revolution.

6. PFLP strategy.

Although the commandos sympathize with any attacks against Zionist, imperialist, and Israeli interests, only the PFLP has engaged in terrorism against these targets abroad. Fatah has registered its opposition to those activities, and at this time the PFLP is alone among the commando groups in undertaking them.

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September 1970


## D A T E S   W O R T H   N O T I N G

September 6 - 10	Lusaka, Zambia	Non-aligned Nations Conference; organized at last session of UN General Assembly to determine, prior to UNGA session in September, common positions among non-aligned states on world issues. Last such meeting was in 1964.
September 7 - 17	Fontana, Wisconsin	Annual Pugwash International Conference. Brings together scientists from East and West.
September 11	Peking	One year ago Premiers Kosygin and Chou En-lai met at Peking airport in attempt to cool tensions between two communist countries. Agreement was reached to begin talks on settling border problems but after a year of intermittent and desultory meetings no solutions have been found.
September 15	New York City	UN General Assembly convenes. This will be 25th session. Celebrations on 25th anniversary will be held 14 - 24 October. About 50 heads of State or Prime Ministers will attend, including Nixon, Kosygin, and Heath.
September 21 - 29	Prague	Arab-European Seminar on Middle East, sponsored by communist World Federation of Trade Unions.
September 25 - 27	Belgrade	Executive Council meeting of communist World Federation of Scientific Workers.
September 28 - October 1	Varna, Bulgaria	2nd International Conference on Problems of Young Workers, sponsored by communist World Federation of Trade Unions.
October 1	Peking	Peoples Republic of China National Day.
October 3	Paris	25th anniversary of the Founding of World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Founded

in 1945 as an organization for international labor cooperation, it was subverted by the communist members who took complete control in 1949 and turned the WFTU into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. The non-communist members withdrew and formed the International Conference of Free Trade Unions.

October 10	Taipei, Taiwan	Republic of China National Day.
October 16 - 18	New Delhi	Presidential Committee meeting of the communist World Council of Peace.
October 19	Japan	Anniversary of the signing of a protocol in 1956 by the USSR and Japan ending the state of war. The protocol, signed in lieu of a peace treaty, left hanging the question of the Kuril Islands which the USSR seized in the closing days of World War II and now refuses to return.





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September 1970

~~TOP BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(18 July - 21 August 1970)

The Communist Dilemma in the Non-Communist World

A Communist party which sets out on the parliamentary road to power may have to repudiate the Soviet Union in order to prove its own independence. To do so is to risk loss of Soviet support, guidance, and funds. To build a democratic, vote-getting image, a national Party may have to open a small crack in the Party to dissent. Yet no Communist party could long survive real debate. So compromise is inevitable. How the Japanese, French, and Italian Communist parties are faring in this dilemma is described below (see also the attached press materials on these parties).

Japanese Communism's Seductive New Look

"In a country like Japan, where the parliamentary system is established...it is preferable to rely on peaceful and democratic means, through parliament, to establish a democratic government by gaining the support of the majority of the people ...." Editorial from Akahata, organ of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).

In support of this new look, Japan's small but growing Communist Party held the first "open" Party Congress in history from 1-7 July. Unaccustomed as the newly proclaimed "friendly party" was to a really open meeting, it showed the public and press a picture of disciplined unanimity and sterile self-criticism which scarcely enhanced its democratic image. To support its new and "forward looking" attitudes, it has condemned the extremist leftwing students, announced that opposition parties would be permitted to function in a Communist Japan, and demanded that the USSR return the South Kurile Islands to Japan.

The latter demand is consistent with their calculated and politically strategic independence from both Soviet and Chinese Communist parties. The long-standing rift with Soviets, although exacerbated by the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, has no moral or ideological basis. The JCP denounces the CPSU primarily for supporting a dissident Japanese Party faction expelled some seven years ago. On the eve of the recent 11th JCP Congress the Soviet magazine Party Life accused the JCP of plotting to form a third force in the international Communist movement and, worse than that, of supporting Chinese efforts to split the movement. (The Akahata

reply of 29 June is attached.) The JCP, however, has also attacked Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for "ultraleft opportunism" because the CCP also supports a dissident Japanese faction, one whose sympathy for militant students and urban guerrilla tactics clashes with the JCP's new image.

This independent stance (without diminution of JCP participation in international Communism) and their lip service to bourgeois freedoms of speech and assembly may have been factors helping to increase the JCP's Diet representation nearly threefold in December 1969 elections and in raising membership figures to make the Japanese among the three largest CP's in the non-Communist world.

#### Schizophrenia in the Italian Communist Party

"Tell the Italian Communist Party to reject the role of an agent of foreign Communism and try sincerely to construct an Italian socialism, Italian in all its aspects." Josef Smrkovsky, Czech parliamentary leader under Dubcek, in Il Resto del Carlino, Bologna, 30 June 1970.

Within the largest of all non-ruling Parties are two serious splits which prompt the PCI to play both sides of the political street. The first split is between those habitually loyal to the Kremlin and those who recognize the political necessities of the Italian political scene. The second is between the "internationalist" group of the Party under Luigi Longo and the Soviet-supported right-wing group plotting to succeed the aging leader. On the one hand Italian Communists have repeatedly defended "national roads" to socialism and have called for autonomy for all. Consequently they have also denounced the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia--that touchstone of loyalty to Moscow--deplored Dubcek's ouster, and continued a polemical exchange with the present Czech regime. Their words no doubt strengthen their appearance as an autonomous Party which is occasionally tested by other Italian parties as a possible coalition partner. On the other hand, the PCI retains close ties to Moscow, has not rejected the consequences of the Brezhnev doctrine, has ousted its Il Manifesto group of Moscow-baiters, retains numbers of old line Stalinists in its middle ranks, continues to depend on the CPSU for financial support and is occasionally caught doing the Soviets' subversive business (the arrest of an Italian courier in Venezuela a few years ago revealed PCI funding of Latin American CP's for the Soviet Union).

This "democratic, independent" PCI has recently hinted that it may consider a coalition offer but its self-proclaimed strength with the voters may have been somewhat damaged in the 7-8 June elections. They scarcely maintained their 1968 voting strength of 28%. The

Party's failure to divorce itself from Moscow may have helped to hold down the vote. Their hypocrisy may underlie the trend of decreasing numbers of members (down 640,000 since 1954) who are increasing in age (only 20% are now under 30).

A Torpid French Communist Party Clings to Moscow

"In the Communist Party, the only democracy is that of the wringer." Charles Tillon, life-long French Communist.

The stagnant French Communist Party (PCF), losing trade union control, unable to increase its strength at the polls, and desperate for a political alliance with which to face the 1970 Spring elections, shows the great strain of the need to appear to be everything it is not. Subservient to Soviet policy since its founding, the February Party Congress rejected the principle of national roads to socialism and upheld the USSR as the only Communist model. The Stalinist nature of the French Party is the very reason why the social democrats, whom the PCF is wooing, have consistently refused the overtures. Two prominent French Communists are making the suit even more difficult.

Roger Garaudy, long a critic of the PCF leadership, and now expelled from the Party, forced the PCF into publishing notes of a 1968 conversation between PCF leader Waldeck Rochet and Dubcek in which the former expressed his disapproval -- echoing the Kremlin's -- of press freedom and of the revival of the social democratic party which Dubcek permitted. These were damaging words at a time of negotiation with French social democrats. Garaudy relentlessly continues his attacks on the PCF, challenging them to denounce the Soviet rape of Czechoslovakia. In June Charles Tillon, former freedom fighter and former cabinet minister, unable to stomach his Party's submission to Soviet diktat any longer, spoke out publicly on the same issue. Tillon agrees with Garaudy that PCF silence on Czechoslovakia denotes complicity rather than "noninterference." By July the Party reacted in standard Communist fashion for treating the unanswerable critic: they again revealed their "democratic" procedures by ousting the 73-year old Tillon from the Party.

Despite the furor over these public challenges, the PCF was still unmoved in late summer, permitting only one brief comment that they did not approve all that was happening in Czechoslovakia. To concede more to their own heretics -- even for eventual gain -- may be too bitter a pill. And the risk of losing Moscow's support for the multitudinous French Communist fronts and activities may still seem too great.

THE "PRAGUE CRISES" OF WESTERN COMMUNISM

By Arnold Kuenzli

Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt Review), Frankfurt/Main,  
27 and 30 December 1969, 2 January 1970

Controversy Constitutes an Ordeal -- Neo-Stalinism Has The Parties  
in a Schizophrenic Position

Editor's Note:

"Western communism is in crisis. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops there is growing criticism of the methods of the Soviet Union. In many countries, new groups are forming within the communist parties, or seceding. On the other hand, opposition members are barred from party membership. Our correspondent Arnold Kuenzli reports in a series of three articles on extent and significance of this crisis."

The intervention by the Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia dictated by the Soviet Union has produced a series of shocks in the European communist parties which resemble a permanent crisis the consequences of which cannot yet be estimated. This crisis is the more dangerous to those concerned because they are already in the process of losing their identity as revolutionary Marxist parties due to their loss of revolutionary momentum and because of their drifting toward the democratic parliamentary system in the sense of "social democratization." The neo-Stalinism practiced by the present Soviet leadership has practically maneuvered these parties into a schizophrenic position.

Whereas they lean at the national level more and more toward democracy, parliamentarism, multi-party system, and political pluralism -- like the Italian Communist Party in particular -- at the international level they still cultivate unwavering loyalty to an increasingly neo-Stalinist Soviet Union whose intervention in Czechoslovakia they had officially condemned. And this schizophrenia does not only threaten the party, but also the Marxist movement as such. Ernest Mandel, for instance, -- possibly the smartest Trotzkyite to be found today -- in an address at Basle recently condemned the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia as a crime, but that did not keep him from continuing to address the authors of this crime as "comrades." According to the rules of logic he should really have been referring to 'comrade criminal'

....

At least four major factions may presently be distinguished within the communist movement with respect to Soviet moves in connection with the 21 August 1968 in Prague. The first faction, which includes primarily the old party cadres of long standing but also some of the older party members, as always considers the Soviet Union the praised fatherland of the workers which to criticize would be the same as betraying socialism. The second faction is represented by the party leadership and consequently is for the time being the official party line. The latter is characterized by a hodge-podge of more or less unmistakable criticism of the intervention in Czechoslovakia and of unconditionally sticking to the friendship with the Soviet Union and to the close action alliance with the Soviet bloc.

The third faction is represented, above all, by prominent party intellectuals like the Frenchman Roger Garaudy. They do not merely criticize intervention in Czechoslovakia as such, but they also point to the neo-Stalinist roots of this intervention and demand a radical theoretical overhaul of Marxism which ought to be finally adapted to the 20th century without, however, completely breaking with the Soviet Union which they still see as the light of hope for socialism even though it may be temporarily hidden.

The fourth faction finally -- disregarding the China of Mao -- is primarily at home in Yugoslavia, but is also represented in Western Europe by individual intellectuals such as the Austrian Ernst Fischer and by the Italians Rossanda, Pintor, and Natoli. To them, the Soviet system is not even socialism anymore, but rather -- in the words of Yugoslav Aleksandar Sekulović -- a form of medieval "popism" which exploits the workers even worse and grants them even less rights than capitalism.

At the present time, there is fierce controversy between these various factions in almost all West European parties that almost approaches an ordeal. In France, this controversy is focused on the person of politburo member Roger Garaudy who, himself a former Stalinist, as a professor of philosophy is one of the most prominent Marxist theoreticians in Europe, who has for years fought for "modernization" of Marxism, who is one of the initiators of the dialog between Marxism and existentialism and above all of the dialog between Marxism and Christianity, and who is equally well familiar with practice owing to the long time he spent in the Soviet Union and in Cuba.

Garaudy's criticism of the dogmatist perversion of socialism is relentless. His book on Marxism in the 20th Century closes with the sentences, "There is a Buddhist proverb that warns us against this dogmatist temptation, 'When the finger points to the moon, the fool will contemplate the finger.'" But the present controversy was primarily started by an interview Garaudy granted the Yugoslav party organ Komunist, which the latter printed on 4 September 1969.

In this interview, Garaudy said the socialist world movement was in a crisis, and not just solely because of the Sino-Soviet arguments. This crisis, he said, had first of all become evident at the Moscow conference of the communist parties in June of 1969 because the partial agreement reached there had been possible only because all important problems -- namely China, Czechoslovakia, and the different approaches to socialism -- had been swept under the rug.

That there is so much stagnation in socialist thinking today was first of all due to having failed to analyze the situation in the capitalist countries. The Moscow document talks in almost ritual form about the inconsistencies in the capitalist world, without pointing out, however, that these inconsistencies are no longer those of the 19th century, but rather new kinds of inconsistencies. These new inconsistencies are not being considered and are not being analyzed, particularly not those brought about by the new scientific-technical revolution. Neither are the structural changes being analyzed in the working class, in the relation of production and markets, or in the increasing importance of science for the development of production. If all this were to be treated as superficially as in the Moscow document of June 1969, one is bound to get the impression that socialist thinking is affected by sclerosis.

But the same type of stagnation prevails with respect to analysis of the socialist world. The Moscow document confirms a tendency to deny the existence of dissension in the socialist camp. The "spring of Prague" had been an attempt by the Czechoslovak Communist Party in a developed country to construct and implement a model of socialism in accord with the scientific-technical revolution. The revolutionary forces in the world today are stronger than ever, but these forces are in vast areas outpacing the existing communist parties. In Latin America and in Africa there are national liberation movements which are partly inspired by socialist ideas, but without there being any Marxist parties.

He had been particularly shocked, however, by the fact that on the occasion of the anniversary of the intervention in Czechoslovakia both Prague and Moscow had blamed all difficulties on some sort of imperialist plot. He would certainly not deny the presence of counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia, but it would be overlooking the real problems if all difficulties were to be blamed on some imperialist conspiracy. Such an attitude would resemble that of President Nixon who blamed all demonstrations against Rockefeller whom he sent as an envoy to Latin America on a handful of students. "This reminds me of the time in France when the capitalist press and the bourgeois press was after each strike searching for 'some hidden conductor of the orchestra'."

At the October meeting of the central committee of the French Communist Party, Party Secretary Waldeck Rochet subsequently used



this Garaudy interview as pretext for a whitewashing job. Garaudy -- who at the meeting was given a chance to defend his opinion -- he said had used the events in Czechoslovakia "to promote anti-Sovietism and to foster the opportunist factions." Although the French Communist Party had expressed its disagreement with the intervention in Czechoslovakia, it had in the same resolution called for firmly combating the anti-Soviet campaign, and it had resolved "to continue and intensify its efforts to maintain and strengthen the bonds of solidarity with the brother parties and particularly with the Soviet Union."

Disagreement on a particular question should never be allowed to raise any doubts in the fundamental solidarity in the fight against the common imperialist enemy. "By contrast, if Garaudy's attitude were to be followed, it would lead to intensification of the dissension in the international communist movement, and to weakening of the international communist movement as well as to division of our party . . . ." The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on an international scale is the crucial force in the fight against imperialism and in the fight for socialism. Garaudy, he said, was systematically continuing to confuse the question of the approaches to attaining of socialism with the concept of the "model" socialism.

Use of the term "model would open the door to all kinds of interpretations, including rejection of the general laws of socialism." Finally, Garaudy were violating the principle of "democratic centralism" and therefore was also in disagreement with the central committee on the question of the role of the party and in the question of the organizational principles of the party. In this manner Waldeck Rochet again "answered" Garaudy's doubtlessly justified criticism in the long familiar neo-Stalinist jargon. To him the world is still manichaeistically divided into good and bad, which is a pleasantly simple situation. Whoever does not support one side, must be supporting the other side or at least play into its hands.

It was in this very manner that all of Stalin's crimes used to be accepted or made into fabrications by the bad; and thus the intervention in Czechoslovakia becomes a minor error which might lead to some differences of opinion in the camp of the good, but which would never be reason for fundamental reappraisal. When the finger points to the moon, . . . . In any event, so far no serious "administrative steps" have been initiated against Garaudy who himself certainly does not in any way advocate a break with the Soviet Union. So far Waldeck Rochet let the matter rest with a warning, "in the name of the politburo I hope that Garaudy will change his attitude, that is, that he will defend the policy of the party . . . ."

Fighting the Authoritarian Spirit in the Party -- Manifesto Group  
Wants to Reform the Italian Communist Party -- Mao's Cultural  
Revolution to be the Model

The Italian Communist Party stands out in international communism for two reasons: in terms of membership it is the largest of the communist parties in the world that are not in power, and with the possible exception of the Swedish Communist Party it is the most democratic party both with respect to its internal structure and its political program. It has abandoned the program of revolutionary takeover with subsequent one-party dictatorship in favor of a theory which is committed to radical structural changes, and which aims at establishment of a coalition of all forces that are considered progressive, including left-wing Catholics.

It has wholly condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; but like the French Communist Party it nevertheless still considers the Soviet Union the most important ally in the fight of international communism, and it has no intention of breaking with this ally but merely wants to maintain its autonomy.

This policy has now come under serious attack from a group which formed around the paper Il Manifesto and which is headed by the three prominent party members Rosanda, Natoli, and Pintor. The spiritual head of this group is Rossana Rosanda, an equally smart and energetic lady who during the past 20 years has made a name for herself internationally as the leading ideologist of the Italian Communist Party. Merely the fact that Rossana Rosanda has now assumed the role of chief partisan in the fight against the party establishment indicates the seriousness of the crisis that grasps the Italian Communist Party.

In its opposition against the course of the party, the manifesto group is incommensurably more radical than, for instance, Roger Garaudy in his party. This group would like to re-commit the Italian Communist Party to a radical revolutionary course in domestic and foreign policy, and to transform it into a "new party" through a cultural revolution within the party. It fights against authoritarianism in the party and demands a "group dialectic" which would do away with the existing so-called democratic centralism that is fashioned after the party model of Lenin, and which would allow truly dialectic interplay of the opposing forces. This is supposed to be instigated by openly demanded insubordination and disobedience by the party membership. This then means the manifesto group takes a similar attitude toward the party establishment as some radical student groups take toward the establishment of their universities. They are obviously guided by the idea of the cultural revolution that Mao Tse-tung himself used to destroy his own rusty party machine in order to revive the revolutionary zeal in the party.

Possibly even more drastic are the foreign policy demands of the group, for it plans on no more and no less than ouster of the existing governments in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc. It calls for the Italian Communist Party to break with the party and the government of the Soviet Union which in the opinion of the group have betrayed the revolution. The group demands "formation of a left-wing, revolutionary alternative within the socialist camp," and "defeat and replacement of the leading groups in the USSR and in other socialist countries by the initiative of a new bloc of social forces under the leadership of the working class." Here again the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia furnished the deciding motive for the formulation of these extremist demands. In the opinion of this group, the revolution in the European East can, if at all, be saved only if the revolutionary process in the West is intensified and accelerated, and when the West in this manner helps initiate the ouster of the leading groups in the East.

Since the manifesto group began to draw more and more support from the party membership and primarily from the youth, the party had to react, even more so because Rossana Rosanda, Natoli and Pintor were members of the central committee. The central committee ordered a control commission that had been especially established for this purpose, to investigate the activities of the Manifesto group. The three cultural revolutionaries were given an opportunity to defend their opinions before the control commission. Toward the end of October the report prepared by this control commission was then submitted to the central committee which took several days to discuss the report, and which finally ratified the report -- against the votes of the three villains, with Chiarante, Luporini and Lombardo-Radice abstaining (Luporini and Lombardo-Radice advocate an enlightened, democratic Marxism and are prominently involved in the international dialog between Marxists and christians).

The control commission report submitted to the central committee by chairman Alessandro Natta in its basic political attitude is largely identical to the stand taken by French party secretary Waldeck Rochet in his controversy with Roger Garaudy. Natta denounced the policy of the manifesto group as being reckless, futile, and impotent, saying it did not constitute a critical, scientific contribution to the reality of the socialist countries. This policy would isolate the Italian Communist Party from the Soviet Union and from other socialist countries, and this would also mean isolating it "from the anti-imperialist fight of the Vietnamese people, and of the people of Asia, Africa, and of the Near East, because it is just this relation to the USSR and to the socialist countries that is the key to this fight." It would "largely destroy the unity of the party." Therefore, anti-Sovietism in any form or shape should be rejected. In fact, what was involved in the group's criticism was not "criticism from the left," because it "did not in any manner differ from the positions of the right wing, that is, of ultra-social democracy."

Enrico Berlinguer, the "crown prince" of the party, on a conciliatory note subsequently sought to leave the door open for the manifesto group. He assured there was no desire to proceed with administrative measures against the group but rather in the controversy with the group "to see the most democratic way through to the end." A gesture of obedience would not be required, nor would silence, but the controversy would have to remain within the party, and there was a limit to forming factions that should not be exceeded. He finally charged the group's call for breaking with the socialist countries were "tantamount to dragging the heritage of the October revolution through the mud."

We will not explore any further in how far the unshakeable pro-Soviet attitude of the western communist parties is a result of their financial dependence on Moscow (just one example: in Austria, Moscow has a substantial financial interest in the publishing house and in the press which publish all publications of the Austrian Communist Party). Berlinguer's stand makes clear that taking this pro-Soviet attitude at its ideological face value is tantamount to equating the goals of the Russian October revolution -- which claimed Marx as basis -- with the present Soviet system.

But this is precisely what the growing opposition within the western communist parties contests; in the eyes of this opposition, the present leadership in the Soviet Union has so obviously betrayed the goals and the spirit of the October revolution and of Marxism (even Trotzky had already written of a "betrayed revolution") that a break with these traitors ought to be made for the sake of these goals and for the sake of this spirit, particularly after the intervention in Czechoslovakia and the developments there since then. To accuse instead the opposition of treason would be the same as hitting the barometer because it indicates bad weather.

The mediation efforts of Berlinguer were not to be successful. The manifesto group stuck strictly to its view, and the party in its bad predicament did resort to disciplinary measures after all: the three cultural revolutionaries were first expelled from the central committee, and finally also from the party. It is not yet possible to say what further course this crisis may take, but there is every indication that this expulsion, which was already followed by further expulsions, intensified the crisis even more.

The Controversy Over the Character and Function of Moscow --  
Fischer's Revolt Against Uniformed Dogmatism -- Opposition  
In Sweden and in Japan

The regime of the Soviet Union is "tyranny to which the working class is subjected by a bureaucratic bourgeoisie of fascist character." The man who said this -- in the presence of Soviet delegates who thereupon left the auditorium in protest --

was a spokesman of the youth organization of the Swedish Communist Party. This incident -- and it was not the only one -- occurred in September 1969 at the 22nd Party Congress of the Swedish Communist Party.

C. H. Hermansson, chairman of the Swedish party, in recent years went further than any other communist leader in the matter of the party moving toward democratic-parliamentary methods. He went as far as declaring publicly that his party if it should come into power through elections, would in democratic manner go back into opposition in case it should as a government party be defeated in subsequent elections.

This policy is opposed on the one hand by a hard core of old Stalinists, and on the other hand by communist youth who -- similar to the "manifesto group" in Italy -- rejects both the Soviet system and the policy of "growing into the capitalist system" of its own party. But even Hermansson could not make himself immune against the schizophrenia of on the one side in domestic policy supporting the parliamentary system and on the other side continuing to promote the cause of unconditional solidarity with the Soviet Union despite all outright criticism of the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

At the party congress he declared, for instance, "solidarity with the people of the socialist countries to our party has always been something that was self-understood. It still is a matter that goes without saying. Developments in the international situation have brought some complications in the form of our relations to these countries. Differences of opinion . . . have become strongly evident." But "we do not wish to participate in any manner in the anti-socialist propaganda that constantly tries to discredit the socialist countries. Those who believe that our party will howl with the wolves against the socialist countries will be disappointed. Equally disappointed will be those who believe they can lead the party back to that period in the past when some tried to replace clear and truthful analysis with blinders and duplicity." The party will be "threatened by consumption and decay unless we sharply improve our party work."

The party congress became quite turbulent because particularly the party youth did not mince any words. As a result, past party secretary Bridjof Lager accused the party youth of anarchism, "the young anarchists are characterized by a pronounced negativist attitude. They oppose everything that is proposed or said by responsible party sources. These young delegates behaved like a bunch of sparrows . . ." The "official" party line was finally adopted -- after renewed demands for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Czechoslovakia -- but the sharp internal conflicts persist.

Hardly anywhere has the drama of communist self-destruction taken such irrational turns as in the Austrian Communist Party. Ernst Fischer, an old friend of Dimitrov and Togliatti and the

most prominent intellectual of the party who had faithfully served the party during an eventful life described with uncompromising honesty in his fascinating recently published autobiography, was after much hem and haw finally expelled from the Austrian Communist Party. Since the famous Kafka Conference at Liblice Palace near Prague, Fischer had been prominently involved in preparations for the "spring of Prague", and no communist condemned Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as relentlessly as he did.

He declared on Austrian television that a dictate were no agreement because there could be no agreement between wound and knife. He called for formation of a new left in opposition to the intolerant and monolithic old left, and said in answer to questions put to him by the party arbitration commission charged with dealing with his "case", among other statements, "I have frequently erred along with the party (when I thought of Stalin as the legitimate successor of Lenin, when I defended the Moscow trials, when I opposed Tito, and so on). I may also be in error in opposition to the party; and I reserve this right. I will never be prepared to accept the desolate conditions caused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as 'normalization.' The anti-Semitism ordered and organized by the power machine in Poland forced an exodus of Jews. I will, whenever and wherever I can, contradict the lie that this anti-Semitism is due to the existence of Isreal or due to a 'Zionist conspiracy', and I will brand the methods practiced by the Polish power machine as being fascist. There is nothing that is as revolting to the young generation as uniformed dogmatism and ideology standing at attention in strict formation. An intolerant machine only serves self-satisfaction."

#### With a Kick in the Back

Fischer's friend Franz Marek, a highly intelligent man who was heavily influenced by Antonio Gramsci, and who as chief editor of the party journal Weg und Ziel had published the only really alive and interesting German-language communist journal, was fired with a kick in the back, without regard to his financial situation. This had the result that the opposition now has established its own paper called Wiener Tagebuch which now continues the tradition that Marek established with Weg und Ziel in refreshingly unorthodox manner and unfettered by party dictates.

Since youth in the Austrian Communist Party is also rebelling against the party machine, the latter has made preparations to dissolve the youth organization of the party. About one-third of the central committee is on Fischer's and Marek's side, and the already inconsequential party is threatened by ruin. The Wiener Tagebuch has this to say on the matter, "Artists, in whose state medals one had exalted, are leaving the party; plant union leaders,

who had been remarkably successful even in this years plant union elections, are resigning their party functions; locals are closing down; and most of the young activists are, in the true sense of the word, driven away -- but one continues unperturbed along the course of the Prague example."

The example of the Japanese Communist Party is highly interesting by contrast. After the Italian party, this party is the second largest of the communist parties in the world that are not in power. During the past five years alone it raised its membership from 150,000 to 300,000. After Khrushchev tried, with the support of a particularly pro-Soviet faction within the party, to gain influence over the party itself, the leadership of the Japanese Communist Party began a "war on two fronts" by dissociating itself both from the "modern revisionism" of Moscow and from the "dogmatist factionalism" of Peking. The intervention in Czechoslovakia was subsequently instrumental in further worsening relations between the Japanese Communist Party and Moscow. As a result, and in contrast to the European communist parties, the Japanese Communist Party finally refused to participate in the June 1969 Moscow conference of the communist parties.

WASHINGTON POST  
 19 August 1970

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# Japan's Communist Party Emerging as 'Human' Challenge to Soviets, Chinese

By Vincent Buist  
 Reuters

VIENNA,—THE emergence of the Communist Party of Japan as one of the biggest non-ruling Communist parties in the world confronts Eastern Europe with a major new factor in the world Communist movement.

East European countries like Romania and Yugoslavia seeking some counters to Soviet pressure tend to look toward China. But Peking's militant ideology is not an ideal alternative for East European Communist parties which hope for increased stability.

The "Communism with a human face" program now adopted by the Japanese Communist Party in the long run will probably be more acceptable to the neutralist wing in Communist Eastern Europe.

Japan's Communist Party advocates freedom of speech, assembly and religion. It has condemned both Moscow and Peking for interfering in the affairs of other Communist parties and for their big-power policies.

It defends national interests and would appear to come closer, for example, to the Romanian wish for sovereignty, independence and non-interference in relations with other states and parties.

Behind the Japanese Communist Party and its growing electoral success looms the economic potential of Japan. Expert speculation has projected Japan's economic buoyancy into a time toward the end of this century when it may become

the world's second biggest industrial power, far ahead of China.

If the Japanese Communists continue to win sympathizers, observers in Eastern Europe believe that the Japanese party will emerge later in this decade as a challenge to both the Soviet and Chinese movements.

In any case, the Japanese party is already a considerable force in the divided world movement, and has achieved a new position of strength during the past few years.

Since 1966, party membership has risen by 100,000 to well over 300,000.

In elections last December, the Japanese party won the backing of 3.2 million voters—one million more than in the January, 1967, election—and increased its representation in the lower house of parliament from four to 14 members.

This is still relatively small in a nation of 100 million with a 486-seat legislature, but it is significant as part of an overall trend.

In Eastern Europe, the attention of the communist rulers has increasingly been focused on Asia. This is due in part to an easing of European tensions, and in part to China's new efforts to win friends and influence people.

New and better East-West relations are shaping up under the determined drive by West Germany to open doors to Eastern Europe by settling frontier and related problems still left over from World War II.

JAPAN TIMES

10 July 1970

## The 'Miyamoto' Communist Party

The 11th Japan Communist Party Congress, which ended a week-long session last Tuesday, saw Mr. Kenji Miyamoto, the strong-armed leader, complete his takeover of the party. Special interest was also focussed on this convention, which was last convened four years ago, because it was widely publicized as being the first ever to be opened to the press and the public.

It had a significance also in the fact of its being held in the opening months of the 1970s—which the Communists have claimed will see a final showdown between the JCP and the Liberal-Democratic Party. For this purpose the Communists had promised all-out efforts to build up a new image as the "friendly party."

Mr. Miyamoto himself was named to the newly created post of the chairman of the presidium of the party's central committee. Mr. Sanzo Nosaka, the veteran JCP leader, was selected for his fifth term as chairman of the central committee, but significantly, he has been dropped as a member of the very organ of which he is the chairman. This is one of the signs that Mr. Miyamoto has now taken over full control of the Communist Party.

A surprise selection, though not wholly unexpected, was Mr. Tetsuzo Fuwa's emergence as the director of the central committee secretariat. This is also a newly created post which is equivalent to a secretary general in other parties. For Mr. Fuwa, a House of Representatives member, this is a four-rank promotion over his seniors in the party. But he is a bright young man whom some journalists have already named "the prince of Yoyogi." He is naturally one of Mr. Miyamoto's group of youthful proteges, many of whom have now advanced into the central committee. With Mr. Nosaka relegated to a position of figurehead and with no other rival in sight, it is now clear the JCP is the "Miyamoto" Communist Party.

It may be partly because of Mr. Miyamoto's confidence of being in complete control that the JCP Congress was "opened" for the first time in its history. This may be considered a remarkable "progress" for the Communists. But, of course, they had no other choice, since they wanted so much to change their public image.

It should be noted, however, that the meeting was "open" in only a limited sense. The party leadership's proposals and the comments of the delegates were made public. But the selection of the officers and the reading of the financial report and other matters which get at the core of the party operations were held in complete secrecy. It would seem the JCP still has many things they dare not bring out into the open.

The comments of the delegates also went no further than to recount past activities and to indulge in much self-



criticism. Not one critical word was spoken against the reports and resolutions of the central committee. The lack of even a single dissenting voice made for a sense of unreality at the public sessions.

But then it should not be surprising that the leopard cannot change its spots. Although it has expressed its desire to become a "friendly" party, the JCP has yet to deny the possibility of its ultimate resort to armed and violent revolution to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. Mr. Fuwa, the party's eloquent and rising theorist, has skirted around the issue by saying that "there has been no example of an armed revolution taking place in a highly developed capitalistic nation," and that the JCP would strive "to become the majority party in the Diet."

Yet, the party program still retains the statement that "the final guarantee of liberation depends on the establishment of a proletariat dictatorship." Indeed, what prevents the Communist leaders from coming right out to reject the resort to an armed revolution and the setting up of a dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it because they would lose their *raison d'être*? But unless they make the pledge against a resort to an armed revolution, they cannot expect popular support.

For the 1970s, the JCP goal is said to be a growth which will enable it to engage the LDP in a showdown battle for power. But in reaching that stage, the Communists see the need of going through the interim process of setting up a "United Front—Democratic Coalition Government," which would bring the parties of the left opposition together against the Liberal Democrats. This grand coalition of the left would naturally, as far as the JCP is concerned, be under Communist domination, although the other parties may have their own ideas. But it would be presumed that the Communist plan would be that by the latter part of the 1970s they would have absorbed their erstwhile colleagues to pave the way for the final confrontation with the LDP.

The question which this prospect raises is what will happen after the Communists take over. They make no mention of this, of course. But can we really trust the Communist claim the JCP is now an "open" party believing in such democratic processes as elections, parliament and multipolitical parties? Mr. Miyamoto has said, "The important thing now is to establish a democratic coalition through the Diet and elections." The "now" in his statement sounds ominous. We would say that the "friendly" image the JCP is trying to sell is a sham. We say this because the "Miyamoto" Communist Party is putting on a soft-sell while still retaining every bit of its old-fashioned Marxist dogmas.

We must not lose sight of the steel armor which lies under the JCP camouflage.

have no intention of monopolising government when they come to power and will respect freedom of speech, publication, association, assembly and religion. But procedures at the congress showed that their metamorphosis into democrats has a way to go. The 947 delegates voted unanimously to approve a new party constitution which will tighten control over the party by an expanded presidium and increase the personal power of the party leader, Mr Kenji Miyamoto. Mr Miyamoto promised, however, that the stereotype of the hard-faced party apparatchik will be changed; he pointed to the selection of a 49-year-old Tokyo University graduate, Mr Tetsuzo Fuwa, for the new post of party chief secretary as an example of the new-style communist.

The party's decision to concentrate on election drives follows a 15-year struggle to strengthen the party organisation. Party membership has increased ten-fold since 1955 to an estimated 300,000 and party finances are reported to be in better shape than ever before. With only 14 members in the Diet, the party is still tiny in parliamentary terms. But it won a million more votes and almost trebled its representation in December's general election and scored again in April when the communist mayor of Kyoto was re-elected with an increased majority.

The next important electoral test for the communists will be in Tokyo next April when the present socialist governor, Dr Minobe, is expected to win hands down with both socialist and communist backing. Last week the communists denounced a socialist proposal to join forces with the two more conservative opposition parties, Komeito and the Democratic Socialists, in the Tokyo campaign but they did not rule out co-operation altogether.

For all their revisionist approach to domestic politics, the Japanese communists have some revolutionary friends abroad. The North Vietnamese and North Korean communist parties both planned to send observers to the Tokyo congress but were refused visas by the government. The Japanese communists are still feuding with Russia after a break some seven years ago, mainly because Moscow continues to support a splinter group of Japanese communists. Relations with the Chinese went sour during the cultural revolution and have not improved since, because Peking supports its own faction of Japanese maoists. Mr Miyamoto told the congress that he hopes for a return to normality with both communist giants. But meanwhile the Japanese communists will go their own idiosyncratic way.

THE ECONOMIST,  
London  
11 July 1970

*Japan*

## Communism with a democratic face

CPYRGHT

Japan's communist party is out to prove that it is a communist party of a new democratic breed. Last week, as the first step in an image-building campaign, the party opened the doors of its traditionally secret congress for the first time in its 48-year history. The congress went on to commit the party to seek power by winning votes and to remain independent of both Moscow and Peking.

The communists' vision of their role in parliamentary politics could hardly be faulted. They declared that they

AKAHATA, Tokyo (Organ of the JCP)  
29 June 1970.

Soviet Communist Party Journal "Party Life" Carries Treatise Criticizing JCP

According to newspaper reports and a Soviet News report, the 13th Issue of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's organ journal "Party Life" carried a treatise which severely criticized and attacked the Japan Communist Party in connection with the contents of the 11th Party Congress draft resolution.

This treatise took up such points as that the Japan Communist Party did not attend the Conference of the Various Parties held in Moscow last year, that it does not stand on the theory of the completion of the revival of Japanese militarism, that it takes a critical attitude toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that it opposes big powerism and is advocating an autonomous and independent standpoint, that it opposed the aggression against Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and others, and that it calls for a fair and just settlement of the Kuriles question; and it criticizes the Japan Communist Party using the severest terms, such as that "objectively viewed, it is lending a hand to the enemy of the unification of the communist movement," that "the Japan Communist Party is following a policy line which isolates it from other Marxist-Leninist Parties," that "this is a new attack of anti-Sovietism," that "there is a danger of making the Party itself a slave to the views of bourgeois nationalism," and that "the possibility of its becoming a tool of the imperialist ambitions of Japanese monopoly capital cannot be ruled out completely."

Six years ago, when the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee one-sidedly announced the letter, dated April 18, 1964, in which it it rudely and slanderously attacked the Japan Communist Party and its policy line, in the days when KHRUSHCHEV was the First Secretary, it was also announced in this same organ paper called "Party Life." The criticism this time takes exactly the same method as the way followed in the days of KHRUSHCHEV, not only in the point that it was carried in the same journal, but also in such points as that it criticizes everything, that is not in complete accord with the assertions and standpoint of the Soviet Communist Party, as "the enemy of unity" and "bourgeois nationalism," and in its contents.

The point to be especially noted is the fact that the treatise appearing in this journal "Party Life," says that "no one is infringing on the Japan Communist Party's independence and autonomy," that "the Soviet Communist Party has no intention of interfering in the Japan Communist Party," and that it says nothing at all about the problem of the attitude of the Soviet Communist Party toward the anti-Party schismatic elements of the SHIGA Faction, which is the biggest problem worsening the relations between the Japan Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party.

To begin with, the anti-Party organization of the SHIGA Faction was the product of the big-power-type interference by KHRUSHCHEV and others of the Soviet Union. When the SHIGA Faction formed the anti-Party organization of the "Voice of Japan," six years ago, the Soviet Communist Party's organ paper "Pravda" highly praised SHIGA, saying that

he is "a patriot, a loyal son of the people, an internationalist, and an activist devoted to the project of peace, democracy and socialism." That the Soviet Communist Party openly supported these elements' anti-Party activities is a historical fact which no one can erase. Furthermore, the relations between the Soviet side and the "Voice of Japan" faction have still not been clearly liquidated, even after the Japan-Soviet Communist Party Conference in February, 1968, where the Soviet delegates firmly declared that there will be no relations with them in the future. Finally, as we criticized in the May 5 edition of Akahata, they finally increased their interference, even to the point of persons connected with the Soviet Embassy openly attending a meeting of the anti-Party SHIGA Faction, and encouraging it. The basic cause for the worsening of relations between the Japan Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party lies in this.

On this question, too, however, the "Party Life" treatise says, in regard to Akahata's criticism, that "this was done by persons working in the Soviet Pavillion at the World Exposition in Osaka" and that it is not worth criticizing as interference. It also said that "the fact that it can list "only such a laughable reason," "proves better than anything else the Soviet Communist Party's position, based on principles, and the fact that the Soviet Communist Party is strictly upholding the rules concerning relations between parties." It puts forward the above "refutation." However, none of the events concerned were connected with the World Exposition. Especially, the rally in Tokyo, attended by the members of the Soviet Embassy, was a meeting directly sponsored by the anti-Party organization of "the Voice of Japan." Furthermore, at that meeting, Yoshio SHIGA, who calls himself the National Chairman of this anti-Party organization, personally delivered a "commemorative lecture," attacking the Japan Communist Party. To attend such a rally and to deliver an address of encouragement is nothing but encouragement of and support for activities to overthrow the Japan Communist Party. It is clear to anyone who has even a small understanding of "Party life" for a Marxist-Leninist Party, that this is not simply a "laughable" minor matter, and that it is a grave infringement of "the Japan Communist Party's independence and autonomy," and that it is the worst possible "interference." Does the "Party Life" journal really think that it can make others believe that this was not interference, by bringing up the "World Exposition," as an excuse for this serious interference?

If the "Party Life" journal persists in asserting that this interference is within the scope of activities of the Soviet Communist Party, "based on its principles," then it means that it is declaring itself that the "principles" of the Soviet Communist Party run counter to the accord reached by the international communist movement in the 1960 Declaration, and that they are based on an anti-Marxist-Leninist stand."

L'UNITA, Rome (Organ of Italian CP)  
29 June 1970

BOFFA COMMENTS ON DUBCEK PARTY EXPULSION

By Giuseppe Boffa

Slightly over a year ago, the CC of the Czechoslovak Communist Party showed that, when Dubcek was replaced by Husak, it held the outgoing first secretary in high esteem. A few hours later the country's President Svoboda made himself the interpreter of this esteem by a speech that was transmitted over radio and television. Confirmation of this homage did not appear to be a mere formality, for Dubcek retained his post in the party Presidium and was, moreover, assigned another authoritative political post -- chairman of Parliament. The other day Dubcek was deemed unworthy of being even a party member.

It is true that this year, beginning last summer, an intense campaign of accusations was conducted by a part of the Czechoslovak press against the leader who had guided the party during the "new course." Dubcek was never able to reply to these charges publicly. At any rate nothing that was substantially new was said during that campaign, i.e., nothing that had not been carried in preceding months by the press of the 5 powers which intervened in Czechoslovakia and hence that was not known a year ago, when esteem for Dubcek was expressed and he was retained as a party leader.

Nor, judging from what we have seen in the Czechoslovak press, has Dubcek been involved in actions that could have modified so drastically the judgement of him. Nor is it possible to understand how even the criticisms directed against him could imply the impossibility of his continuing to work for his country in a post like ambassador to Turkey, which Dubcek had accepted as a disciplinary measure and to which he had been assigned a few months ago.

We know what Dubcek was and has been. His soldiering on behalf of the party lasted for 30 years. He came from a family of old communists, and he was shaped by the party during the Slovak resistance, above all in his country, then in Soviet higher political education institutions, and finally during the work to construct a socialist society. To be sure, few individuals outside his country knew who he was in January 1968, when the crisis involving the Novotny leadership exploded, and he was called to fill the party's highest post. We know, instead, that in that situation, which was difficult because of its long deterioration, his task was anything but simple.

It has been said that in that delicate situation, when work was directed at steering Czechoslovakia out of its profound crisis, leader Dubcek showed himself to be hesitant. It should be added immediately, however, that this criticism has come from 2 opposite directions. It was launched by those who wanted Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 to oppose with other forms of resistance, including extreme ones, the incursion by the troops of the 5 Warsaw Pact

countries. As to the other direction, it was launched by those who, instead, reproached Dubcek for not having intervened with repressive measures not only against the resurfacing of rightist forces that tried to profit from the crisis but also against the expressions of dissent that were manifested among the very ranks of the supporters of socialism.

In reality, Dubcek and all those who shared leadership responsibility in that period did neither consciously. They were aware, as documents show, of the dangers and traps that lay along their road. But, just as we are able to take into account events by observing them directly, so they did not see this as reason to reject the concurrent posing of 2 objectives. The first was that of convincing the country that it would finally be governed in a way differing from the past: they proposed the consistent development of socialist democracy. The second was that of maintaining Czechoslovakia, with its own autonomous aspect, within the alignment of socialist states in line with the determination of history and in complete fidelity to assumed commitments.

It was not easy, we know, to operate in the circumstances of the 2 objectives. Yet a tenacious attempt was made to reject neither one nor the other. However contrary we are to idealizing the single personality, we do not think -- and we believe that Dubcek himself did not think -- that the Dubcek leadership was able to handle every crisis. There might have been weaknesses and errors. But nothing permitted one to forecast that the situation had been compromised. Under Dubcek's leadership the Czechoslovak Party enjoyed in the country broad popular support, which was the only factor guaranteeing the attainment of those dual objectives. Whatever one may think about the Dubcek leadership, he must demonstrate that those objectives, both essential, could have been attained and are attainable through methods differing from those laboriously tried when Dubcek headed the "new course."

There is ample evidence of a great consensus behind the party leadership, a consensus that wound up polarizing around several names, the first of which was precisely Dubcek's. This vast popular movement represented a precious patrimony. It would be damaging to conceal the fact that the popularity and prestige of the man remain very high in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps even beyond his own desideratum and inclinations, Dubcek had become a symbol. With the measure of expulsion, a blow is inevitably struck at the Dubcek symbol, not to speak of the political figure Dubcek.

A year ago, when it was decided to retain Dubcek in the party Presidium though depriving him of his post as party leader, that decision appeared as a well-conceived effort to retain the political patrimony that had been accumulated under his leadership and to reassemble the various trends that had manifested themselves in the Czechoslovak Party, with a view to facilitating Husak's work. But this direction was of short duration. To point up the contrast, the expulsion announced on Friday evening assumes the grave significance of surgery. What is now eliminated is precisely what the laborious effort tried to salvage last year, i.e., the recovery of the vast

strength that had been manifested by the Czechoslovak people and that had been believed to have been expressed in the "new course" and in Dubcek. We are thus far removed from even the change that was effected in April 1969. For us, it is impossible to believe that this is the path leading to the overcoming of the Czechoslovak crisis.

Recently the press has frequently referred to voices coming from Prague on the contrasts that occurred in the party Presidium with respect to expulsion. There has also been talk of a contrary opinion on the part of the highest party and state authorities. We do not know how credible these voices are. At this time there has been neither confirmation nor denial in Prague. They are hence destined to be largely believed from the standpoint both of the significance of the act itself and of the manifest contrast with the decisions that were made slightly over a year ago and have been gradually modified over the past 14 months to confirm a crisis which cannot be said to have been overcome.

As to the judgement of us Italian Communists, it was expressed immediately with great clarity by the general secretary of our party. It is a judgement dictated by a profound internationalist preoccupation. The Czechoslovak events involve us as militants of a large world movement through the international significance that these events have inevitably assumed. Against this backdrop we have always expressed our concern. Nor can we remain silent today. Defining our position is our duty: it means assuming our responsibility to the workers and people of our country. The decisions made may be the prelude of even worse ones. It would be dangerous if the negative reactions in Czechoslovakia and the international workers' movement were not considered for what they really represent.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES  
19 July 1970

## Long-Time French Communist Embarrasses Party on Ouster

CPYRGHT

By HENRY GINIGER  
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, July 18 — An old French Communist whose career dates from a Black Sea mutiny of 1919 has caused his party embarrassment by open dissidence before several million television viewers.

Charles Tillon, a white-haired 73-year-old militant who 25 years ago was a minister in a provisional Government run by Gen. Charles de Gaulle, announced on the air last night that he had been excluded from his party cell in Aix-en-Provence by its young leaders, acting on orders from above.

Mr. Tillon delivered a strong attack accusing the present party leadership of "Stalinism," using of anti-democratic

methods and failing to take a strong stand against the Soviet-led repression in Czechoslovakia.

L'Humanité, the official party newspaper, consigned a short article on Mr. Tillon to the bottom of its fourth page today, complaining mildly that he had chosen to speak on television rather than to his own party.

### Charge Not Denied

The paper did not deny that the local cell had taken action, but said no request for exclusion had reached higher bodies, including the Central Committee.

The exclusion was believed to have been provoked by the

issuing of a statement last month by Mr. Tillon and three other prominent Communists now in disgrace.

They were Roger Garaudy, the French party's best-known intellectual until his exclusion a few months ago, Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont and Jean Pronteau, both former members of the Central Committee.

All had taken exception to the party's attitude on Czechoslovakia, its purported lack of understanding of militant leftist youth movements, and to centralization based on the Soviet party that left no room for debate.

### Pressure for Change Among Western Communist

parties, the French party is second only to the Italian in its electoral strength. Despite frequent attacks on its "Stalinist" methods over the years and declining membership, it has succeeded in keeping about 20 percent of the vote year in, year out. But lately the party has felt strong pressure from within and without for a wholesale change.

The inside pressures are typified by the attacks of Mr. Tillon and others. He has considerable standing, particularly in the older generation. In 1919, serving as seaman aboard a French warship, he and Andre Marty, another Communist who was to fall into disfavor, led a mutiny in an effort to block

Western intervention against the Bolshevik Government in Russia.

During World War II, he was one of the best-known resistance leaders, and when General de Gaulle took Communists into his provisional Government in 1944, Mr. Tillon was named Minister for Aviation.

**Party Leader Attacked**

Last night, Mr. Tillon delivered a personal attack on Georges Marchais who, as assistant gen-

eral, is running the party during the current illness of Waldeck Rochet. Mr. Tillon charged that Mr. Marchais had deliberately falsified his biography to show that he had been in France during the war when, Mr. Tillon contended, he had been deported to Germany as a laborer.

Outside the party, pressures are building up on its left and right. The new militant left, composed mostly of youths, has been seeking labor support in

competition with the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor.

The youthful revolutionaries, mainly Maoist or Trotskyite, disdainfully refer to the Communists as part of the bourgeois establishment and little better than "reformists."

On their right, the Communists are continuing to try to end their relative isolation and form a common electoral front, primarily with the Socialists. The Communists are aiming

particularly at such an alliance for the municipal elections next spring.

But the Socialists are badly split on the issue with a large faction reluctant to join with the Communists, particularly after what happened in Czechoslovakia. The attacks by Mr. Tillon and other Communists on their own party are expected to encourage this faction to resist the Communists' overtures.

LE MONDE, Paris  
24 July 1970

FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTIONS SEEN IN FRENCH CP

by Maurice Duverger

The internal unity of the French Communist Party is hardly being more weakened by the Tillon affair than by the Garaudy issue. The exclusion of the former chief of the FTP [expansion unknown] concerns broader segments of the party than the exclusion of the former director of the Marxist Studies Center. The problems of the resistance have a greater impact than intellectual discussions. But the mass of militants are too accustomed to discipline, too persuaded that discipline is necessary for the party to be effective, and too biased against "splinter intrigues" for them not to accept their leaders' decision. Any highly structured and hierarchical organization reacts in the same way under similar circumstances.

In this area, then, Georges Marchais may feel at ease. The party will not lose many supporters or many voters in this new crisis. As for its effects outside the party, consequences there will probably be different. The image of French communism is now deteriorating a little more, as it has not ceased to do since 1968. The climate is becoming still less favorable to a reconciliation with the Social Democrats and to the development of an alliance of the left. The centrist movement, which also has the advantage of an unusually dynamic and efficient manager, is favored by the communist decline. And the progress made by the centrist movement is now more dangerous for the French CP than a possible loss of supporters or voters.

Accusing Roger Garaudy and Charles Tillon of favoring this movement is staying on the surface of the issue. The promoters of the centrist movement, of course, grasp such opportunities to feed their anti-communist campaigns and to divide the left a little more. This is obvious and completely natural. But such maneuvers remain of secondary importance when compared to the essential fact which has favored the centrist movement for the past 2 years -- the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russians and the crushing of a humanistic brand of socialism. In this sense, Messrs Brezhnev and Kosygin are the true "objective allies" of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Or to be more exact (for the Soviets must obviously be more concerned with the USSR than with France), his true objective allies are the leaders of the Communist Party who underrate the importance of the Russian invasion for public opinion in our country.

Such a misinterpretation probably constitutes the fundamental strategic error of the French CP. If communists as dedicated as Garaudy and Tillon, who accepted for such a long time such rude humiliations in the name of discipline are now deciding to throw off this discipline, it is less to liberate their conscience than to draw attention to this error. Waldeck Rochet appraised the situation well in August 1968. The "censure" expressed at that time kept the party from cutting itself off from the rest of the left. This censure was never disavowed. But it is now too isolated and too weak after later developments in the affair. The silence maintained since that time by the Politburo and the central committee has made the French CP the accomplice of Prague's neo-Stalinism in the eyes of non-communists.

There reside both the major obstacle to the development of the alliance of the left and the fundamental aid "objectively" given to the centrist movement. They can not easily be abolished, for a communist party can not rise up against the USSR, to which the fate of world communism remains linked. But in comparing the present attitudes of the French CP and the Italian CP, one finds that the French party is hardly concerned with the problem, while the Italian party is actively involved with it. This permits the Italian CP to maintain much better relations with the left, without betraying its Muscovite big brother. The regrets expressed by L'Unita about the exclusion of "comrade" Dubcek make the silence of L'Humanite even less justifiable.

The official theory of the French CP -- according to which one party must not get involved in the affairs of fraternal parties -- is doing it incalculable harm. If in Prague they are again beginning to use the procedures of L'Aveu, if the Siberian deportation camps are being multiplied, must the other Communist parties be silent just as they were in the 1950's? Such a silence would appear to be complicity, just as today silence about Czechoslovakia appears to be complicity. Nothing is more opposed to the idea of the solidarity of fraternal parties, to the notion of proletarian internationalism, than not criticizing one's brother when he deserves it, than not passing judgment on one of the members of the Internationale when his behavior is harmful to the others. The large western communist parties -- the Italian and French parties -- do hold some possibilities of influencing the Soviet Union and the popular democracies. By refusing to use this influence, the French CP is favoring the present evolution of neo-Stalinism, which hurts all the communist parties, especially the French party.

Silence concerning Prague and Moscow is only one aspect of the problem, however, and not the most important one. The most serious matter is not that the French CP remains silent when confronted with the present hard line of the USSR and of Czechoslovakia, but that it is itself acting as people acted in Moscow in the time of Stalin and in Prague at the time of the London trial. Public opinion has the impression that the French party is not using its full force against Garaudy or Tillon only because its distance from power prevents it from doing so. It hardly matters whether this impression is true or false. The essential is that it may be resented, and it is.



Of course, it has almost always been like this. Even in the 60's, when liberalization was beginning to develop, the French CP did not go very far. But then it was part of a general evolution leading to the de-Stalinization of the communist world. The rigidity of the French CP could then be considered a holdover from its former condition that the new situation's development would cause to disappear little by little. The French party did not change very much. Still it did change a little under the guidance of Waldeck Rochet. Above all, it was part of a whole in movement. Today, it can no longer be hoped that it will in the end be carried away in the surrounding thaw, for the present atmosphere is opposed to this, and a worldwide harder line is developing. The hard stance of the French CP -- which is increasing -- thus takes on another meaning.

Also, French public opinion is less tolerant of a contradiction between words and deeds. A great cleansing has been going on since May 1968, and the French Communist Party itself is also undergoing its consequences. In the last few years it has made uncontestable efforts in the doctrinal sphere to define an "advanced democracy," to find a French path to socialism, to reject the thesis of a single party, and to assert its attachment to pluralism. These efforts can hardly be effective since they are not accompanied by a similar change in behavior. The freedom given to Garaudy to express himself before the congress remained too isolated a swallow to lead to a belief in spring, while on the contrary so many signs are confirming winter's return.

The primary force in the centrist movement -- enemy number one of the French CP -- is linked to the fact that the alliance of the left appears much less "plausible" today than it did in 1966-1967, the era when public opinion surveys revealed that it was acceptable to many citizens, even moderates, even concerning the participation of communist ministers in the government. This is related in part to the weakening of the Social Democrats, which prevents them from bringing a counterbalance to bear on their partner. But it is due even more to the evolution of communism in general and to the evolution of French communism in particular. For the French CP to continue in its present path means increasing the risk of finding itself once again isolated for a long period, thus turning its back to its basic goal -- preventing its enforced return to the ghetto and the developing of a union of the left. This fundamental contradiction between the goals of the party and the strategy that it is applying to reach its goals in the end carries a greater weight than the attitude of any one of its leaders during and after the occupation. It will not be overcome so easily.

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CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
17 August 1970

## Terrorists are Castro-inspired

URUGUAY leftist terrorists, in kidnapping a Latin American consul and U.S. technicians, are going for the jugular vein of hemisphere relations. When they hit upon this combination of victims, they hit pay dirt.

To illustrate where this can lead, Brazil reinforced its military forces along Uruguay's border in an effort to pressure

Uruguay to ransom the kidnapped Brazilian consul. The consequences could be disastrous if the pattern were repeated in tinder-box situations — as between Bolivia and Chile, Peru and Ecuador, Venezuela and Guayana or Honduras and El Salvador.

The U.S. government can paralyze its representatives in Latin America by wrapping them in ponderous — and dubious — security systems. Or Washington can reduce their number drastically. But the Uruguayan terrorists kidnapped a U.S. technician working for the Uruguayan government, not ours. In Bolivia, two German mining experts were kidnapped from privately-owned mine. Such technicians are necessary in Latin America's fight for development.

A huge official and business machinery manned by North Americans in Latin America makes possible the enormous hemisphere trade relations that help sustain our high U.S. living standards. Destroy this fabric — and it is under terrorist attack — and we will have not only the 8 per cent unemployment that fright-

ens us, but something much closer to 10 per cent.

Uruguay's Tupamaro terrorists have been called in the U.S. press everything from romantic revolutionaries to fascist bully-boys. The Tupamaros are in fact part of an extensively-documented extreme left wave openly formed, trained and supported by Cuba's Castro. A British journalist recently in Havana reports that the man who calls the tune for Castro today is Russia's Ambassador Alexander Soldatov.

However that may be, both the Organization of American States and the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary committee have documented Havana meetings to plan and inspire such subversion. Castro's recent speeches reaffirmed his support for it. The subversives' declared goal is to destroy "Yankee imperialism."

It should be recalled that when Molotov cocktails were being tossed around Washington apropos of an OAS meeting here, some of the terrorists leaflets were signed "Tupamaros."

In Uruguay, the eventual Tupamaros goal is to implant a Castro-like dictatorship. For decades the country has been South America's closest thing to a democratic socialist state. It has a living standard and literacy rate among the underdeveloped world's highest. Wealth is to a commendable degree distributed by an advanced welfare system.

Uruguay for years was communist organizations' major South American headquarters. None of this saves it from the subversives now pressing Havana's rule-or-ruin strategy.

YAI, Montevideo  
14 August 1970

CPYRGHT

# AMERICO RICALDONI: "LA URSS APOYA LA POLITICA DE PACHECO"

YAI ENTREVISTO este mediodía en forma exclusiva al Subsecretario de Relaciones Dr. Américo Ricaldoni, quien se prestó gustoso al reportaje que uno de nuestros cronistas le realizara en el Palacio Santos sobre asuntos relacionados con los hechos de actualidad. La posición de la Unión Soviética frente a la actitud de nuestro gobierno, la movilización de tropas brasileñas en la frontera y la visita de Brizola a la Cancillería, fueron los temas abordados en esta entrevista.

—¿Apoya la URSS a nuestro país en su posición frente a los secuestros?

—"Recibimos la visita del Embajador de la Unión Soviética en el día de ayer en la Cancillería, y además nuestra representación diplomática en ese país se entrevistó con el vice canciller soviético, teniendo como respuesta la comprensión amplia hacia la posición de nuestro Gobierno con relación a los secuestros de diplomáticos extranjeros. La Unión Soviética no comparte los métodos violentos en materia de acción revolucionaria. Estos dos aspectos expresados por la diplomacia de la Unión Soviética tienen una gran trascendencia para el gobierno uruguayo, en virtud de la importancia que tiene esta potencia en el concierto internacional de naciones y también porque representa un apoyo más a la posición de nuestro gobierno cuidadosa, en tan delicado asunto".

—¿Hay movilización de tropas brasileñas en la frontera?

—"Quizás haya algún movimiento de tropas en la frontera, pero mal puede atribuirse ese movimiento de tropas a una actitud inamistosa al Uruguay. Quiero puntualizar que el Gobierno Brasileño en la emergencia ha actuado con una extraordinaria demostración de comprensión hacia la posición del gobierno uruguayo en la emergencia. El gobierno de Brasil está haciendo cuanto ha sido posible para que no sea explotado en una forma u otra este lamentable secuestro del diplomático de su país, para no deteriorar las relaciones existentes entre Uruguay y Brasil. No conocemos repito, ningún movimiento de tropas, acto castrense o público que se pueda tomar como una medida tendiente a indicar a Uruguay el malestar brasileño con nuestro gobierno. Quizás desmentir ese rumor pues es momentos tan difíciles co-

mo estos, no solo para Uruguay sino para Brasil, es donde se ponen de manifiesto los valores morales y la calidad de las personas. En ese sentido Brasil ha actuado en una forma en la cual nunca dejaremos de agradecerle".

—¿Hay mediación de Leonel Brizola en los secuestros?

—"El señor Brizola no vino a ofrecer mediación a la Cancillería, si la hubiera ofrecido no estaría en mis facultades aceptarla. Brizola vino a mi despacho a señalarme su desazón por el secuestro del Sr. Gomide a quien dijo conocer en sus calidades humanas y funcionales. Le agradeci su preocupación y ahí terminó todo. No hubo ningún intento de mediación solamente una comparación espontánea del Sr. Brizola por quien dijo era su amigo".

Con estas expresiones Ricaldoni aclaró tres aspectos fundamentales, que considerábamos de interés poner en conocimiento de nuestros lectores.

YAI, Montevideo  
14 August 1970

AMERICO RICALDONI:  
"THE USSR SUPPORTS PACHECO'S POLICY"

Yai had an exclusive interview this noon with the Under Secretary of Relations, Dr. Americo Ricaldoni, who willingly talked with one of our reporters at the Santos Palace on matters related to present developments. The position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the attitude of our government, the mobilization of Brazilian troops on the border, and Brizola's visit to the Chancellery, were the subjects covered in this interview.

-Does the USSR support our country in its position on kidnappings?

"We received the visit of the Ambassador of the Soviet Union yesterday at the Chancellery, and in addition, our diplomatic representative in that country interviewed the Soviet vice chancellor, receiving in reply full understanding of the position of our government in the matter of kidnapping of foreign diplomats. The Soviet Union does not condone violent methods as regards revolutionary action. These two aspects expressed through Soviet diplomacy have great importance for the Uruguayan government because of Soviet influence in the international concert of nations and also because this represents increased support for our vigilant government in a very delicate matter."

-Is there a mobilization of Brazilian troops on the border?

"Perhaps there is some troops movement on the border, but it can hardly be attributed to an unfriendly attitude toward Uruguay. I want to emphasize that the Brazilian government has acted with an extraordinary demonstration of understanding for the position of the Uruguayan government in this emergency. The government of Brazil is doing as much as possible in order that this regrettable kidnapping of the Brazilian diplomat does not damage relations between Uruguay and Brazil. I repeat we are not aware of any troop movement nor of any military or political act that indicates in the slightest Brazilian displeasure with our government. I want to put this rumor to rest now in such difficult moments, not only for Uruguay, but also for Brazil, where moral values and personal integrity are clearly manifest. In this matter Brazil has acted in a manner for which we will never cease to be grateful."

-Is Leonel Brizola involved in mediation in the kidnappings?

"Mr. Brizola did not come to offer mediation to the Chancellery, for if he had offered, it would not have been within my authority to accept it. Brizola came at my request to express to me his concern about the kidnapping of Mr. Gomide whom he knew both personally and officially. I expressed my gratitude for his concern and that was all. Mr. Brizola had no thought of mediation, only a spontaneous compassion for the man he said was his friend."

With these statements Ricaldoni clarified three basic aspects that we considered of interest to our readers.

ACCION, Montevideo  
14 August 1970

# Condena Rusa

## al Asesinato de Mitrione

# APOYO SOVIETICO

# AL GOBIERNO

# URUGUAYO

El Encargado de Negocios de la URSS transmitió a nuestro gobierno un mensaje del Kremlin en el que se condena el asesinato del técnico de la AID Dan Mitrione a manos de los sediciosos.

Yugoslavia transmitió una declaración semejante.

# Apoyo Soviético

## al Gobierno Uruguayo

# HASTA LA URSS CONDENA EL CRIMEN

"El embajador soviético en nuestro país concurrió a la Cancillería a efectos de informar al ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Dr. Jorge Peirano Facio, que su gobierno apoya la posición sustentada por Uruguay de no acceder al canje de conspiradores detenidos por diplomáticos y funcionarios extranjeros secuestrados."

### \* Trascendencia y significado

La afirmación fue hecha esta mañana a ACCION por el Sub-Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores Dr. Américo Pablo Ricaldoni, quien agregó que paralelamente, nuestro Embajador en Moscú habló con el Sub-Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores de la Unión Soviética, recibiendo el mismo tipo de manifestaciones, en el sentido de que la URSS es contraria a la violencia como método de lucha y que tiene comprensión y apoyo para la posición del gobierno uruguayo.

"Hasta el momento —prosiguió— no hemos recibido ninguna nota del gobierno soviético, que ha dado a conocer su criterio a través de las aludidas manifestaciones verbales del Sub-Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores de la URSS y del Embajador en Montevideo Nikolai Deminov."

—¿Le asigna trascendencia la cancillería a la posición soviética?

—"Sí".

—¿Qué significado tiene a su criterio la actitud del gobierno de Moscú?

—"Todavía no nos hemos puesto a pensar en eso, dado que estamos recibiendo manifestaciones, expresiones y comentarios de todo el mundo prácticamente, que estamos procesando, pero evidentemente esto nos favorece mucho y nos halaga mucho que, también desde el campo socialista nos venga este tipo de apoyo".

—¿Van a haber nuevos contactos con el embajador soviético?

—"Por el momento no están previstos".

—¿Están a la espera del envío de documentación por parte del Embajador uruguayo?

—"Claro. Desde luego. Ya hemos recibido un telegrama en este sentido que le estoy relatando a Ud., pero evidentemente, detrás de esto viene la correspondencia".

ACCION, Montevideo  
14 August 1970

RUSSIA CONDEMNS THE MURDER OF MITRIONE

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT

The Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR passed to our government a message from the Kremlin condemning the murder of AID adviser Dan Mitrione at the hands of traitors. Yugoslavia sent a similar statement.

Soviet Support to the Uruguayan Government

THE USSR ALSO CONDEMNS THE CRIME

"The Soviet ambassador in our country called at the Chancellery for the purpose of informing the Minister of Foreign Relations, Dr. Jorge Peirano Facio, that his government supports the position upheld by Uruguay of not acceding to the exchange of imprisoned traitors for kidnapped diplomats and foreign officials."

The assertion was made this morning to Accion by the Under Secretary of Foreign Relations, Dr. Americo Pablo Ricaldoni, who added that likewise our ambassador in Moscow spoke with the Under Secretary of Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union, receiving the same kind of assurances, in the sense that the USSR is against violence as a method of struggle, and that it understands and supports the position of the Uruguayan government.

"Up to this moment," he continued, "we have received no note from the Soviet government that has given us an indication of its stand as alluded to in the oral statements of the Under Secretary of Foreign Relations of the USSR, and of the Ambassador in Montevideo, Nikolai Demidov."

Importance and Meaning

-Does the Chancellery attach significance to the Soviet position?

-"Yes."

-What does this attitude of the Moscow government mean, in your judgment?

-"We have not yet examined this, since we are receiving representations, expressions and comments from practically all over the world, which we are screening, but which are obviously very favorable to us, and it is very encouraging to us that this kind of support is coming to us even from the socialist camp."

-Are there going to be more talks with the Soviet Ambassador?

-"For the moment they are not foreseen."

-Do you expect a dispatch to be sent by the Uruguayan Ambassador?

-"Obviously. Immediately. We have already received a telegram on this matter that I am telling you about, but of course further correspondence on it is coming."

PRENSA LATINA, Havana  
August 1970

"INTERVIEW FOR CHILE"

Excerpts from

Fidel Castro's 8-hour Television Interview, 1-2 August 1970

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He then asked: "Can someone impugn the right of Cuba to help the revolutionary movement when all international norms have been violated against it? If these were respected we would have to heed them. They violated all of them to try to liquidate the revolution." Fidel Castro said that Cuba is willing to follow a policy of principles with those countries which do not continue being obedient to the dictates of Washington and that there would be no dialog with the despicable ones "who like birds of prey divided among themselves. Cuba's sugar quota which the United States used to pay for their complicity in aggression against the country."

He called the action of dividing the spoils of Cuba's economy an immoral act of piracy and warned: "That account has not been settled. It will be settled by the Latin American revolution."

He recalled that Chile did not share the spoils; on the contrary, its interests suffered when it heeded the agreement while Mexico, despite maintaining diplomatic relations did participate in the division of the booty (Cuba's sugar quota). He explained that this is the why the reactionary Mexican press, linked to the sugar interests of that country, maintains a permanent anti-Cuban campaign.

"We have not the slightest interest in maintaining relations with the United States while it continues to be an international gendarme," reiterated Fidel Castro, more forcefully repeating his complete rejection of Cuba's return to the OAS, "that manifold dungheap and brothel."

"We hope that there will be a group of countries capable of defending their interests to form part of something new and we shall wait as long as is necessary."

Questioned on the hijacking of airplanes, the Prime Minister defined them as a magnificent lesson of history. "It was a diabolic invention of imperialism against us. It encouraged piracy, the hijacking of our ships and airplanes. They created chaos and anarchy until the airplanes began coming here as a logical consequence of the violation (by them) of all international laws."

He said that Cuba will not allow the imposition of any multilateral agreement and that the only solution is to accept the conditions contained in a Cuban law on hijacking which proposes reciprocity and respect of the right of asylum through bilateral agreements. He made reference to Mexico's cancellation of the air route which links Cuba to that country and declared that no blackmail of any kind will be accepted. "They denounced the flight agreement," he said, "and Carrillo Colon walks around a free man. This means that he was not alone because he sent his reports through diplomatic channels." (He was referring to Humberto Carrillo Colon, press attache of the Mexican Embassy in Cuba who served as a CIA agent and against whom the Mexican Government took no action.)

"The Mexican bourgeoisie," added Fidel Castro, "will not be able to do what the Yankee imperialists were unable to do," and he repeated once more: "Carrillo



Colon and his accomplices walk around as free men. The only solution is to sign a bilateral agreement with us." He commented: "It could be that instead of renewing relations, we will have fewer relations. We are immunized against fear."

Another newsman asked his opinion on the kidnaping of diplomats and officials in Latin America. He said: "This also is a result of a state of anarchy and illegality in the countries of the continent." He asked why this phenomenon does not occur in Cuba and declared that in Cuba there is a revolutionary legality and diplomatic representatives enjoy all guarantees. "Imperialism would give anything for this to happen here," he laughed, and concluded: "The only way to prevent it is to have a reign of justice."

He added: "I am not going to condemn the revolutionaries who use that method born of the situation of repression and crime which reigns in those countries. As for its validity as a revolutionary weapon, I believe that those revolutionaries who resort to it because they are concerned with saving their imprisoned comrades from murder and torture must decide that. We have never promoted kidnapings," he said, "they came about in a spontaneous manner."

Another newsman wanted to know if there was Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union. "Yes," said Fidel, "there is economic dependence for marketing our products and for supplying us with the things we need for development and consumption. We are lucky it exists," he exclaimed, "because it provides us with a place to sell the products blockaded and boycotted by the North American government, and also a place to acquire arms to defend ourselves.

"The ideal thing," he added, "is to have factories and atom bombs, so as not to have to depend on anyone, but that is utopian. It would have been terrible if faced with U.S. aggression the USSR had not been there. Imperialism is the enemy and our primary ally is the Soviet Union."

He added: "We may have differences with the Soviet Union at any time but the important thing is the differences with the enemy." As an ideal solution he proposed the future creation of a developed Latin American community "because if this is not done in the world of the future, the world of computers and automation, Latin Americans will be the servants...even to develop ourselves alone makes no sense...it would be like building prosperity on the slopes of a volcano."

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BREZHNEV'S MILITARY BUILD-UP

Beginning in 1965, following the ouster of Khrushchev, the USSR increased the size of its military machine faster than in any other period since 1950. Paradoxically, one of the Brezhnev regime's first major announcements, in December 1964, was that defense outlays were to be reduced in 1965; implicitly, that was meant to assure the war-hating Soviet people that their new leaders were in tune with them on this issue. Not long afterwards, however, Soviet military spokesmen began to make a blatant case in armed forces journals for all-around, all-purpose forces which could respond to any envisaged military danger or opportunity. In the event, the Brezhev regime, in the Soviet system's typical "closed chamber" approach, endorsed the military's pleas for increased strategic and conventional arms. The result of this decision was a four-year spending binge which brought about huge rocket, air, army and naval forces and the capability of supplying military aid in substantially increased amounts. A collateral result is the lack of economic growth because of curtailed investments, and because consumers have refused to buy the shoddy goods produced by Soviet industry.

Scope of build-up

While Soviet outlays for defense rose slowly during Khrushchev's regime, there was a sharp upsurge in expenditures between 1965 and 1969. Total Soviet expenditure for military purposes, as estimated by London's Institute for Strategic Studies, was the equivalent of \$50 billion in 1968 and \$53 billion in 1969. These estimates, termed "conservative" by the Institute, amount to 13 to 14 percent of the USSR's gross national product (GNP). Some Soviets have stated that defense outlays in their country amount to as much as 20 percent of GNP. (By way of comparison, defense expenditures are about 5% of GNP in Western Europe and 9% of GNP in the US.)

These expenditures, according to the Institute, have enabled the Soviets to build up their military hardware and forces to the following levels:

Strategic rocket forces: By the end of 1969, the Soviets had deployed about 1,150 ICBMs, and about 700 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. They had partially deployed a Ballistic Missile Defense System around Moscow, and had worked on a surface-to-air missile system on the Baltic coast. Operational personnel of the Strategic Rocket Forces total about 330,000.

Air Defense: Besides a broad array of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), there are about 3,400 fighter aircraft assigned to air defense.

About 250,000 personnel are engaged in air defense.

Army: The total size of the Soviet Army is estimated at about 2,000,000 men, organized in about 148 divisions. About 50 of these are tank divisions, and 7 are airborne divisions. Infantry divisions have been trained and equipped to advance across radioactive terrain. The Soviet Army is heavily equipped with a broad array of tanks, artillery and missiles. Some of the missiles are nuclear-armed and have a range up to 150 miles.

Navy: Including the air arm, there are 465,000 men in the Soviet Navy. There are over 1,400 surface ships, ranging from minesweepers up to missile-equipped cruisers and including two helicopter cruisers. The submarine fleet of 380 includes 60 nuclear-powered submarines. The land-based Naval Air Force comprises about 500 bombers and 500 other aircraft including helicopters. Naval infantry forces (Marines) number about 12,000 men.

Air Force: There are about 9,800 combat aircraft, and manpower is about 505,000. The Long Range Air Force has an estimated 150 intercontinental bombers, and 950 other bombers of which 150 are supersonic. The Tactical Air Force has a strength of about 4,000 aircraft. The Air Transport Force has about 1,500 short- and medium-range craft, which could be supplemented by Aeroflot airliners which are easily adaptable to military use. Helicopters in use with the ground forces number around 1,500. In addition paramilitary forces include some 250,000 security (KGB, MVD) and border troupes. There are also about 1,500,000 members in the Soviets' part-time military training organization.

Range of possible uses: The Soviet military have succeeded in arraying forces for the defense of the USSR and the East European countries in both conventional and nuclear warfare. They have gone far beyond that defensive posture by refurbishing their Navy and Air Force to the point where ships and planes could support a Soviet policy of intervention in some of the fartherst-flung parts of the globe. The USSR's capability in this regard was expressed in 1967 by Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal). Gorshkov said:

"The realization of recent achievements of science and production and the creation on this foundation of totally new means of armed conflict has allowed us, in a short time, to alter radically the technical basis of the Armed Forces and, in essence, create a qualitatively new service, the ocean fleet, in which submarine, surface, air and other forces are being harmoniously developed. This has initiated the creation of a well balanced navy. By a well balanced navy we mean one whose composition and armament is such that it is capable of fulfilling

its missions in a nuclear or non-nuclear war and of protecting state interests on the sea in peacetime.... Present naval tactics secure the employment of rocket- and torpedo-armed submarines, shock aircraft, surface ships of varying classes, marine and " other naval forces in both independent and joint operations.

A companion development to the Navy's build-up has been the rapid growth of the number and range of Soviet air transport. This arm of the air force was credited with a very effective performance during the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia. However, some of the lustre has been removed by the revelation that the Soviet airlift operation in relief of Peruvian earthquake victims was halted after only 21 of the 65 announced flights had been completed, and that shipments would be completed by sea.

#### Foreign Military Aid

The Soviets' military potential on a worldwide scale has been substantially supplemented by the military and economic aid rendered during the past 15 years. Under the Soviet aid program naval facilities as well as harbors, and fishing installations have been built in the Mediterranean, Africa, and Indian Ocean, Indonesia, and Cuba. Some of the facilities have already been visited by units of the Soviet Navy. All of the other installations could be used in "emergencies" by the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets, whose vessels are generally conceded to be potential auxiliaries of the Soviet Navy. Similarly, airfields and air service facilities built under the Soviet aid program could more readily be used by Soviet military transports under emergency conditions, as could facilities in countries to which the USSR has supplied military and transport aircraft. Such countries include: UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, South Yemen, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Uganda, India, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, Indonesia, and Cuba. (Parenthetically, 12 of these countries have been involved in armed conflict since they received Soviet aid.)

#### Economic Effects

Five years ago, in the early part of the Brezhnev regime, conflicting assertions were made by his close colleagues concerning the order of economic priorities as among:

- a) strengthening national defense,
- b) raising agricultural production,
- c) modernizing industry and raising its efficiency, and
- d) improving the life of the consumer.

As matters came out, defense emerged as the clear-cut top

priority. In the three other spheres the regime fell miserably short, as conceded by Brezhnev himself in late 1969 and early 1970. These shortfalls are attributable in large measure to the heavy demands of the military program for the best scientists and technologists, managers, materials, and other scarce resources.

The imbalances caused by Brezhnev's emphasis on the military evidently are forcing the Soviets to seriously reconsider their economic plan for 1971-75. The Five-Year Plan, due to be unveiled in the fall of 1968, is now, according to Brezhnev, supposed to be revealed by Kosygin at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971. The key question once again will be: how much of the economic melon will be sliced off for the military? The answer, once again, will undoubtedly emerge from the closed chambers of the Soviet oligarchy, who are under no obligation to listen to or heed the opinions and aspirations of the masses of Soviet citizens.

EST ET OUEST, Paris

1-15 July 1970

# L'aide militaire de l'U.R.S.S. à l'Egypte

**D**ES la fin de 1955, les Soviétiques avaient fait à Nasser des offres de service pour fournir l'Egypte d'armes. La première guerre d'Israël, moins d'un an plus tard, leur a permis d'accroître considérablement l'influence qu'ils commençaient à prendre en Egypte sur le plan militaire, d'autant plus qu'ils pouvaient arguer que c'était la menace de Khrouchtchev de se servir de la bombe atomique qui avait arrêté l'avance des armées israéliennes. La seconde guerre fut catastrophique pour l'Egypte.

Dans ces deux rencontres, les armées arabes, à commencer par l'armée égyptienne, perdirent la quasi-totalité de leurs matériels. Sans sourciller, les Soviétiques les remplacèrent. A l'origine, l'essentiel de ces matériels était d'origines européennes. Après ces deux campagnes, ces armées ne disposent plus que de matériels de provenance soviétique, ce qui, dans une certaine mesure, facilite l'instruction et, plus encore, l'ingérence soviétique.

Après la première campagne, cette ingérence fut relativement discrète et faible. Il n'y eut pas de commandement soviétique installé à demeure en Egypte, mais seulement des « conseillers » qui diffusèrent des instructions et élaborèrent un plan d'opérations qui se révéla peu brillant et plutôt timoré. Peut-être lesdits « conseillers » l'avaient-ils conçu en fonction du personnel militaire égyptien, bien peu préparé à se servir des matériels de guerre complexes.

La seconde guerre — assez humiliante pour les Soviétiques, puisqu'on dit que certains de leurs conseillers furent entraînés dans la débandade — entraîna une aggravation de l'ingérence soviétique. On respecte la fiction d'un commandement autochtone, mais chaque commandement égyptien est doublé d'une équipe d'officiers soviétiques. La preuve étant faite que les forces égyptiennes, empêtrées dans le matériel moderne, ne peuvent se diriger elles-mêmes, à moins d'aller volontairement à un troisième désastre, on en arrive peu à peu à une commande directe, du moins dans les postes les plus importants.

## LES FORCES ASSISTÉES

Il ne paraît pas que les forces égyptiennes et celles des autres pays arabes aient connu une amplification de leurs effectifs : il serait d'ailleurs difficile de lever davantage

de troupes et de les instruire. Au demeurant, c'est surtout et toujours d'armements, et des plus modernes, dont on a besoin pour abattre Israël, car les Arabes, qui pourraient déployer toutes leurs qualités dans une guerre de partisans, sont obligés de se préparer pour des opérations d'un style tout différent et qui leur conviennent beaucoup moins.

Il semble donc que les forces arabes aient été reconstituées à peu près telles qu'elles étaient, quant au nombre, avant la guerre des six jours, environ 100.000 hommes pour ce qui est de l'Egypte, peut-être un peu plus, mais leurs moyens ont été considérablement accrus, notamment en chars. L'Egypte en aurait 700 (dont une forte proportion de T 54 et 55). Syrie 400 (dont 250 T 54), l'Irak, 600 (dont 250 T 54). Cela fait environ 1.700 chars. Israël possède seulement la moitié, malgré toutes les prises de guerre que son armée a pu faire, mais les formations blindées israéliennes sont entraînées et commandées d'une manière autrement efficace.

De plus, l'Egypte a été amplement dotée en artillerie pour contrebattre les installations israéliennes sur la rive occidentale du Canal de Suez. L'Egypte aurait placé le long du canal environ un millier de bouches à feu des modèles à longue portée soviétiques de 122 mm. et 130 mm. Les tirs ont commencé en janvier 1970 ; ils ont infligé des pertes aux Israéliens, une trentaine d'hommes par mois, réduites au tiers après les attaques de re-présailles des Israéliens. Ceux-ci n'auraient pas du tout la même puissance en artillerie sur le canal.

On manque d'informations sur la valeur offensive que pourraient avoir les grandes unités terrestres de l'Egypte, si, un jour ou l'autre, elles tentaient de franchir le canal et de pénétrer à nouveau dans la région du Sinaï. Cependant, l'U.R.S.S. a livré à sa protégée des fusées tactiques, à charge classique, d'une portée de 65 km., ce qui dénoterait déjà une intention, ou du moins une possibilité, offensive. Enfin, d'une manière générale, on estime que les forces égyptiennes de terre, ainsi que les autres forces, sont une fois et demi ce qu'elles étaient avant la guerre. Tout semble indiquer que ce potentiel sera encore augmenté ; et il l'est déjà de fait par les nouvelles armes introduites récemment sur ce théâtre en haute tension. Selon une opinion sérieuse, il faudrait que les dotations à l'Egypte se poursuivent au moins deux ans avant qu'il soit possible d'envisager une action.

En ce qui concerne les forces terrestres,

on pourrait encore signaler de la part des pays arabes un développement des procédés de guérilla, notamment par l'engagement de coups de main. Les commandos israéliens ont procédé pour leur part à des actions fort téméraires à l'intérieur du dispositif égyptien.

Avant de passer aux autres armes, signalons encore que l'Égypte fait présentement un effort financier considérable pour ses armements, plus de 50 % de son budget général. Et les achats faits en U.R.S.S. sont remboursables en dix ans, à un taux d'intérêt de 2 %, contre marchandises.

## LES FORCES AÉRIENNES

Elles seraient aux niveaux ci-après :

Égypte : effectifs : 15.000 hommes, 500 appareils de combat, Mig 15, 17 et 19 ; dont une centaine du type le plus évolué, Mig 21 ; plus quelques dizaines de bombardiers Il 28 et Tu 16. La totalité des appareils est maintenant soviétique.

Pour la Syrie : 200 appareils, dont 100 Mig 21.

L'année dernière, l'aviation égyptienne était estimée à 150 % également de ce qu'elle était avant la dernière campagne. C'est donc environ 700 avions de combat qui ont été fournis aux trois principaux pays arabes : Égypte, Syrie et Irak. Le taux d'augmentation ci-dessus donné se réfère au nombre des appareils. En fait, la valeur des nouveaux appareils, notamment les Mig 21 et les Sokhoï 7, porte cet accroissement à un taux supérieur. Les Mig 21 ont une vitesse transsonique ; ils sont armés d'un canon de 23 mm., de deux engins air-air autoguidés à l'infrarouge. Les rayons d'action sont sensiblement plus élevés, donc de capacité offensive.

Numériquement, Israël se trouve de même à la moitié des forces aériennes de ses adversaires. Néanmoins ce pays a engagé dès les premiers mois de 1970 des attaques en profondeur au-delà du canal. Certains avions seraient passés impunément au-dessus des défenses. Des destructions ont été opérées à l'intérieur du delta : camps militaires, rampes de lancement de fusées de défense des villes et dépôts divers. En outre, plusieurs Mig égyptiens auraient été abattus.

Cependant, en matière d'aviation, le fait capital est la présence de forces soviétiques (on a parlé d'une division aérienne) et de pilotes également soviétiques, une cinquantaine sans doute, peut-être même une centaine. Leur nationalité ne fait pas de doute, les Israéliens ayant capté des messages émis par eux en langue russe au cours de leurs vols. Qu'ils l'aient voulu ou non, les Soviétiques se

sont trouvés pris dans une sorte d'engrenage. Ayant fourni des appareils qui ne peuvent être pilotés par des Égyptiens, ils ont été obligés aussi de fournir des pilotes.

Il semble qu'un accord tacite soit intervenu entre les belligérants pour que les appareils pilotés par les Soviétiques ne soient pas engagés contre les forces aériennes d'Israël, celles-ci renonçant de leur côté à certaines opérations de bombardement en Égypte pour ne pas risquer de se heurter aux avions soviétiques.

C'est dans le même esprit sans doute que les principales responsabilités en matière aérienne sont entre les mains des Soviétiques, qui laissent à l'aviation égyptienne les tâches de caractère offensif, pour le moment les moins importantes.

Ainsi, l'aviation pilotée par les Soviétiques fait figure pour le moment d'une sorte d'écran protecteur de l'Égypte. L'ensemble de la défense anti-aérienne aurait été également prise entièrement en main par les Soviétiques : de nombreux spécialistes seraient arrivés en Égypte à cet effet.

Néanmoins, la présence d'escadrilles soviétiques, prévues pour l'attaque au sol en basse altitude (les appareils étant dotés d'engins air-sol) peut être d'un poids considérable dans une guerre future. Et ces appareils ont incontestablement une vocation offensive.

Signalons encore la création de plusieurs bases aériennes entièrement soviétiques.

On dit que des différends seraient survenus entre les Égyptiens et les Soviétiques sur l'utilisation de l'arme aérienne, les premiers se montrant pressés de partir à l'attaque, les autres prêchant la modération, en vue notamment d'une préparation longue et méthodique.

## LES FUSÉES

Les Soviétiques ont également installé soit vingt, soit, selon d'autres, un peu plus de quarante bases de lancement de fusées Sam 3, qui demeurent également entre leurs mains ; ils ont, en outre, amené environ 15.000 spécialistes. Les livraisons auraient été de 1.500 fusées ; ce sont des engins de défense aérienne contre l'aviation attaquant à basse altitude. On a également signalé la présence d'engins Sam 2, de même emploi, mais contre l'aviation en haute altitude.

## LES FORCES NAVALES

Les pays arabes du Proche-Orient n'ont guère de forces navales, quelques bâtiments côtiers et quelques sous-marins, ces derniers fournis par l'U.R.S.S. On a signalé depuis quel-



que temps un accroissement des unités de défense côtière, égyptiennes et syriennes. Cela rentrerait dans un plan renforcé de défense navale de l'Est. Le nombre des vedettes rapides aurait été augmenté ; celles-ci patrouillent activement le long des côtes africaines. L'Égypte possède une vingtaine d'unités des types soviétiques « Osa » et « Komar », lanceurs d'engins.

Par contre — point devenant très important — la flotte soviétique en Méditerranée semble en net développement ; elle est dénommée également II<sup>e</sup> Escadre. Elle n'était qu'à quelques unités en 1964. Elle a quadruplé dès lors. Composée de 47 bâtiments, la plupart de faible tonnage, lors de la guerre des six jours, elle s'est agrandie régulièrement et serait maintenant de 60 à 70 unités, selon les périodes. Elle a trouvé des points d'appui, avec couverture de D.C.A., en Égypte.

Dans cette flotte se trouve presque toujours un porte-hélicoptère soviétique, de nouvelle création, transportant un bataillon de fusiliers-marins de débarquement. Des croiseurs ont également été signalés, ainsi que des destroyers, notamment de la classe « Kotlin » (dont un est chargé de suivre côte à côte les navires des flottes alliées en Méditerranée durant leurs manœuvres). D'autres destroyers sont de la classe « Kynda ».

Au point de vue naval, Israël n'est pas particulièrement pourvu, tout l'effort portant sur les forces terrestres et aériennes. On lui connaît 4 sous-marins et 2 escorteurs anciens, ainsi que des navires de débarquement. Un sous-marin a été perdu en 1967 par une fusée lancée d'une vedette de type soviétique. Israël a donc cherché à augmenter ses armements navals grâce aux 5 canonnières de Cherbourg, qui en ont rejoint 7 autres parvenues en Israël avant l'embargo. Elles sont armées d'engins israéliens dits « Gabriel ». Cette marine possède également des vedettes rapides. Mais ses fronts de mer, y compris celui du Golfe d'Akaba, sont devenus très vastes.

Le général Mosché Dayan, ministre de la Défense israélienne, a convenu dans une déclaration, que les forces combinées des pays arabes étaient deux fois plus élevées que ce qu'elles étaient avant la guerre des six jours. Et même il a attribué un coefficient d'augmentation de leur valeur, sans doute qualitative, encore beaucoup plus élevé.

## LE COMMANDEMENT SOVIÉTIQUE

La grande nouveauté, ce n'est pas la reconstitution et le développement des forces arabes, notamment égyptiennes, grâce à l'aide en matériels et en techniciens octroyée par les Soviétiques. Elle réside dans l'implantation lente, mais continue, d'un commandement soviétique, non plus seulement parallèle, mais placé au sommet, avec des ramifications qui iraient jusqu'au niveau des bataillons ou des unités correspondantes. Chaque fois que les Égyptiens veulent engager une action, ils doivent demander l'autorisation aux Soviétiques. La nouvelle aviation dite égyptienne, mais pilotée par des Soviétiques, a été inspectée par le Chef d'état-major égyptien pour sauver la face, mais elle demeure sous le commandement effectif d'un général soviétique qui décide des opérations à effectuer et de la répartition des missions entre unités soviétiques et unités égyptiennes.

Ce commandement soviétique voit son autorité renforcée du fait de la présence d'unités constituées entièrement soviétiques, une grande unité d'aviation de la valeur d'une armée, la D.C.A. de protection des grandes agglomérations urbaines, les formations de fusées anti-aériennes dans la zone du canal, de la valeur approximative d'une brigade, etc. On peut y inclure l'escadre soviétique en Méditerranée orientale, du moins les éléments stationnés près des côtes arabes.

Si l'on ajoute à cela le nombre sans cesse accru des « conseillers » (peut-être 30.000), on conviendra que le commandement soviétique se trouve, militairement parlant, le maître absolu de la situation. Les forces terrestres ne peuvent que se soumettre à ce commandement qui détient les armements majeurs, même si elles conservent nominalement leurs appartenances nationales.

C'est la réplique, sur une moindre échelle, bien entendu, du sort qui est celui de la soixantaine de divisions du Pacte de Varsovie.

Jacques PERGENT.

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VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN UNDERGROUND

CBS TELEVISION NETWORK  
Tuesday, July 28, 1970  
10:00 - 11:00 PM, EDT

With CBS NEWS Correspondents Harry Reasoner and William Cole

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS  
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Perry Wolff

REASONER: Good evening. You are about to see some extraordinary films. They are interviews with three Russians, filmed in Russia, about their dissatisfaction and dissent, and there is also a moving voice message, recorded in a prison camp and smuggled out.

Some few Westerners living in Russia occasionally get to know a Russian well enough to hear criticism of the government. Some few Russians, having escaped to the West, have talked about what they feel is the early decadence and vicious repression of their government. Some few Russians, including one man we will hear from, have had critical books published abroad.

But the men you are about to see talked for the camera in Russia, and they are still there. They are most exquisitely aware that their government knows of these interviews, and that officials of the Soviet Government in the United States have television sets. They are aware that in the crowded 53 years of Soviet history, terrible things have happened to Russians for less than these men do tonight. But they want these films to be broadcast, because they feel this will focus attention on what they believe is increasing repression of themselves and other dissenters.

These films were made by CBS NEWS Correspondent William Cole who, a short time later, was expelled from Russia, perhaps coincidentally. Bill Cole is a reporter, not a photographer. On the technical quality of the films, the kindest thing we can say is that he really did very well. The key thing was his relationship with the men. We will hear from these men, and Bill Cole, in a moment.

ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS NEWS Special Report: Voices From the Russian Underground, with CBS NEWS Correspondents William Cole and Harry Reasoner.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

REASONER: This is Bill Cole who, until very recently, was Chief of Bureau and Correspondents for CBS NEWS in Moscow, and filmed the interviews we're going to see tonight. Bill, why did you get kicked out of the Soviet Union?

COLE: Harry, I was told that my activities there were incompatible with my status as a journalist. Actually, the authorities gave me no explanation, and I didn't expect one.

REASONER: It could have something to do with these interviews?

COLE: I think it did.

REASONER: How did you get these films?

COLE: I got to know the Russians in these films, and they wanted these films made, to let the outside world know what's happening in that country.

REASONER: Who are they? What is it? Is it a large group of revolutionaries?

COLE: Not at all. They're not revolutionaries at all. They're good - they're good Russians, but they want change. They are members of what you - what they call the democratic movement, a movement fighting for basic human rights, civil liberties in the Soviet Union.

REASONER: How do they keep in touch with each other in a state like Russia?

COLE: They have an underground press, which they call Samizdat. They have a newspaper, for example, called the Chronicles. I've got an example of it here. It's not a newspaper, actually, it's - it's a typed letter, and it circulates in the thousands. One man gets a copy of it, and he types four more copies and gives them to his friends. Of course it's illegal, and it's dangerous to be caught with it.

REASONER: For these men this will be the biggest samizdat they've ever had, then?

COLE: It will, and that's what they want it to be.

REASONER: Who are we going to see and hear?

COLE: Well, the first man you'll see is Pyotr Yakir. He's 48 years old and a dedicated Communist. He wants change from within. He has spent 13 years in concentration camps, and he is what you might call the non-titular head of the democratic movement. He was put into a camp the first time when he was 14, because he was his father's son. His father was General Jan Yakir, a very celebrated general of the Soviet Army. Stalin decided that Yakir should be shot. He was taken out of bed one night and shot.

REASONER: Yakir begins by speaking of a famous recent trial.

COLE: Yes, Pyotr believes that a change came in Russian opinion in 1966, with the illegal trials of two well-known Russian writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel.

REASONER: He also, of course, speaks in Russian, but as we listen to him, and in these other interviews, the translation will be by David Floyd, of the London Telegraph, an expert on Soviet affairs. Let's listen to Mr. Yakir.

YAKIR: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): The most important turning point in the way people are thinking was when Daniel and Sinyavsky were arrested. Many educated people thought Daniel and Sinyavsky had done wrong by sending their writings abroad, and following their trial and after Samizdat - Samizdat refers to the system by which people

simply reproduce and pass from hand to hand various writings - published the first speeches of Daniel and Sinyavsky, there came about a striking change, because both Sinyavsky and Daniel spoke about what they thought. They had written down what they believed, and didn't consider themselves guilty. And many people began to think: really, why should people be tried for their convictions? Why, simply for what he thinks, does a man have to be arrested? It was very similar to Stalin times, when people were sent to prison not even for what they thought, but for what they were thought to believe, and had not said to anybody, but it had somehow been proved that they were dissenters. So from that time on there were protests.

And then there was the trial of Galanskov and Ginzburg, and that was the time of the greatest enthusiasm, because firstly a great many people protested against the fact that the trial was held illegally and behind closed doors. During the trial the situation changed a great deal. Whereas during the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel it had been impossible to approach foreign correspondents - the vigilantes would take people straight off to the police - at the Moscow City Court we all discussed the affair with the correspondents. True, they wouldn't let us in anywhere, but a certain contact was established, and everything we learned we passed on immediately to the correspondents. The trial ended, and against it there were a great many protests. More than 2,000 people put their names to various letters of protest against conviction of people for their beliefs. Sometime - about the same time, during the trial, Larissa Daniel and Pavel Litvinov handed correspondents a protest against the trial and appealing to world public opinion. That was the first, major step, which was a breach with all previous traditions. Never before in Russia had there been a case of people appealing to the West with a protest against unlawfulness in our country.

This is a great stride forward compared with Stalinism. Under Stalin there was always an iron curtain, and no one knew what was going on here. Millions of people were destroyed and nobody knew about it. Now we're trying to publicize every arrest, every dismissal. This we consider our main function - that is, informing people about what is going on and of those illegal acts. We consider this the main task of the day.

Here is what I think. We are all being arrested - those who took part in the democratic movement - but that's not the point. We are apparently being arrested because it doesn't suit the authorities to have people about who criticize them. But there's no going back. If we're not here there'll be others; there are already many of us, many young people, and no independent thinking people in the Soviet Union will go back to what used to be. They'll beat us and they'll kill us. All the same people will go on thinking differently.

REASONER: Pyotr Yakir, one of three Russian dissenters, interviewed by Correspondent Bill Cole. Bill, Yakir said "they will beat us and they will kill us." Has anything happened to these men?

COLE: Yes, Harry. The man you are about to see next was picked up by the KGB, the secret police, only a few weeks ago. He's now in prison awaiting trial. His name is Andre Amalrik. He's a 31-year-old historian and writer, who's been published all over the world, never in his own country, and he's just published an amazing book, called "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?" This is an amazing book because it was written in Russia. Other writers - other Russian

writers have written such books criticizing the system and telling exactly -- telling about it as it is, but mostly from abroad, in safe places, and Andre has been awaiting arrest, and - and now it's happened.

REASONER: You had some trouble getting part of the film of this interview out of Russia, didn't you?

COLE: Yes, I had a great deal. I had Andre on film, and I tried to take it out not long ago and I was searched very thoroughly in customs. The film was seized and developed. I've heard in Moscow that it's going to be used at his trial.

REASONER: Will we hear about that trial?

COLE: I'm beginning to wonder. The secret police have a new trick now. They don't have trials in Moscow. Andre was not taken back to Moscow, where he lives, but he was taken down to a provincial city, Sverdlovsk, and we may never hear what happens to him.

REASONER: Now, the fact that you had to re-shoot this interview will account for the change of scene that we'll notice, and also there's a lady in the film.

COLE: That's his wife, Giselle. She's a charming girl, and a painter. She's never been allowed to exhibit in her own country, because her art is not - doesn't fit the party line.

REASONER: Let's look at Mr. and Mrs. Amalrik.

COLE: Mr. Amalrik, why did you decide to write this book called "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?"

AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): I think there were three main reasons why I decided to write that book and to try and - try and get it published. The first was my concern for the fate of my country. It was, alas, some years ago that I started to be concerned at the fact that my country was heading for a catastrophe in the not too distant future, and I wrote about it on two occasions to the editors of Russian newspapers in Moscow, but I received the most unconvincing replies, and then I decided to find another way of gaining publicity for my views. In the second place, since, as I understand it, my book would appear abroad mainly, and would be distributed principally there, I set myself the objective of refuting those current and inaccurate ideas about my country which are widespread, mainly in the United States, that is, about the liberalization of the Soviet regime which is allegedly taking place. And thirdly, I had the same reason as any author has who writes a book: given that these ideas had come into my head, it was natural that I should want to write about them.

What is really happening in the Soviet regime, in my opinion, is not that it is getting more liberal but getting more senile. Liberalization would presuppose conscious reform, whereas in reality the regime is more and more losing control over the situation in the country. From the point of view of the Americans the Soviet regime exercises far greater control over its country than, say, the American country does over its. But for a totali-

tarian regime the degree of control is already insufficient. Well, as an example I can cite the unusual popularity of Samizdat. That's the distribution in typewritten form of uncensored writings. This doesn't happen because the regime takes a liberal view of such things or deliberately permits it, but simply because the regime can't do anything about this problem, mainly because there's been an extraordinary increase in the number of people with education, and in the importance of the role played by educated people in - in modern society, and this intelligentsia can no longer and will no longer be satisfied with the miserable official writings which are offered.

COLE: What do ordinary people think of this regime?

AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): I have had a lot to do with factory workers and farm workers, and it seems to me that they haven't really begun to think over the nature of this system at all - it seems to them it's always been like this and it always will be. But at the same time there's evidence of very deep dissatisfaction with particular aspects of the regime, and, well, this can assume the most varied forms. Some are dissatisfied because they receive extremely little money by comparison with others, so they don't have enough to live on. Others are dissatisfied because they can't buy anything for the relatively high wages they earn. The farm workers are dissatisfied with their lack of civil rights, in that they cannot leave the villages. The factory workers are dissatisfied with their complete dependence on the factory managements. People living in small towns are dissatisfied because they can't - they don't have the right to move to bigger towns when there's no work in the small ones. And gradually some people, at all events, begin to have the idea that all of these local, smaller problems have their origins in the imperfections of the political system under which we live.

What may lead to a revolution is the utter lack of good sense in the upper class which is trying to avoid any change and to prevent society from having any mobility, which is always striving to preserve and make permanent the breakup of our society into tightly closed castes.

COLE: Mr. Amalrik, the United States is vilified every day in the Soviet press, on Soviet television, and on radio here. America is pictured to Russians as a land where everyone's starving, where there's no freedom, and as the enemy. Why is this?

AMALRIK: (Speak in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): If the regime is to make itself look attractive in the eyes of its own people, it must constantly depict in the most repulsive light all other countries, especially the economically advanced ones. And it has to be said that for a considerable time now, this - this approach, this method, has been effective. For example, I have had occasion to hear Russian farm workers saying something like this: "Oh, well, life's very bad for us, but we are at least able to eat potatoes every day, and sometimes they bring us some kerosine. But how on earth do people live in the capitalist countries? There's probably nothing at all to eat there."

COLE: What did the average Russian think when Americans landed on the moon?

AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): I think people reacted in different ways, various ways. Some rejoiced at it, as a great victory, not just for the Americans but for the whole of mankind. Others took it rather badly, because for ten years the Soviet people had had it drummed into them that the first man to set foot on the moon would be a Soviet man and that this would be final, complete proof of the superiority of the socialist system.

COLE: Is it true that opponents of the regime here are put into mental hospitals to get rid of them?

AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): Yes, it's true. I think it's the most disgusting thing that this regime does. At the same time, it seems to me this is a clear indication of the complete ideological capitulation of the regime in the face of its opponents, if the regime can't find anything else to do with them but to declare them to be out of their minds. I am very well acquainted with a number of people who have been put into psychiatric hospitals and certified as being not responsible for their actions. There's General Grigorenko, then there's Ivan Yakhimovich. The same fate now threatens Natalia Gorbanyevskaya. And I want to say that these are perfectly normal, clear-thinking people, and they have been meted out a terrible fate. They have to live there among genuinely deranged people, and moreover for an utterly undefined period, since the period of detention in a psychiatric hospital is not laid down in the sentence of the court.

But I consider that no system of rule by force can exist without people who are ready to submit to that rule. And if we don't want the rule of force to prevail, we must all fight against it, and not just say the regime is bad, that we have to suffer, and so forth. It - it is a bad system, but that doesn't absolve us of blame for it's being bad.

COLE: You seem rather dissatisfied. Would you like to leave the Soviet Union?

AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD (INTERPRETING): I'm dissatisfied with this political system, but this is the country in which I was born, and I hope that in due course everything will change. No, I don't want to leave this country. It's another question whether if I'd been able to make a choice before my birth, then I would have preferred to be born in another country.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

REASONER: Andre Amalrik, the author, the second of the three Russians that we're watching tonight, spoke of the use of mental hospitals as a kind of a prison for dissenters. We've heard about that in this country. Is it fairly common?

COLE: It's widespread in the Soviet Union, and actually, the man you're about to see is a man who knows insane asylums very well. He's a young dissident, 27 years old. He spent six of those 27 years in insane asylums, prisons, concentration camps. His name is Vladimir Bukovsky.



REASONER: What was his offense?

COLE: Well, his crimes were poetry readings - the first time he was sent to an insane asylum was because he was found to possess a book, an anti-Communist book written by a well-known Communist of the time, a book called "The New Class" by the Yugoslav, Milovan Djilas.

REASONER: He went to prison for that?

COLE: Yes.

REASONER: You interviewed him outdoors. Why, Bill?

COLE: Well, by that time the secret police knew that I was filming, and I was under close surveillance, as Bukovsky is right now, as he's been for - ever since last January, when he got out of his last stretch of prison. So we found a secluded wood outside Moscow, screened in by - brush, and we filmed there.

REASONER: Let's go to the Moscow woods and Mr. Bukovsky.

COLE: What is life like for a dissident like yourself inside an insane asylum?

BUKOVSKY: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD (INTERPRETING): Imagine to yourself a prison - an old prison, which was a prison even before the Revolution - in which there are something like a thousand prisoners, more than half of them murderers, people who've committed serious crimes at a time when they were out of their minds, people who are genuinely sick, and the remainder who are political prisoners, dissidents, for whom no article could be found in the criminal code, whom they could find no other way of treating but in such a place.

The fact is that the inmates, the patients in that hospital, the prisoners, are people who have done such things which from the point of view of the authorities are crimes, but which are not criminal from the point of view of the law. And in order in some way to isolate them, to punish them in some way, such people are declared to be insane and are detained as patients in these mental prison hospitals. Some time passed before I understood this and before I got to know my fellow prisoners. I believe this is the usual fate for a person who wishes to be himself, who wants to say what he thinks, to act in accordance with his convictions and his ideas. Events of recent years confirm my supposition. Many people, tens, hundreds of people, have been declared insane and committed to various hospitals, mainly special ones, like those in Kazan, Leningrad, Chernikovsk, Sechyovka, and so forth.

It's very much more difficult to get out of that place than it is to get into it. Firstly, in order to get out you must declare openly and officially to the doctors that you admit that you are sick - "Yes, I was - I'm ill. I didn't know what I was doing." And the second condition is to admit you were wrong, to disavow what you did. I know of several cases of people who refused to say that they had done wrong and spent many long years in the hospital.

Nikolai Samsonov, for example, a geophysicist from Leningrad, who was kept there simply because he refused to admit he was a sick man. Another of my friends in the madhouse was, for example, a French Communist of Rumanian origin who had

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lived for more than ten years in Marseille and who came to the Soviet Union to learn, to see what Communism was like in practice. He went to work in a footwear factory in Moldavia, and worked there for a long time. But he was displeased that the workers there received such low wages. He told his workmates that they ought to fight for better pay. They went on strike. He was arrested and declared insane. In the hospital he just couldn't understand what had happened to him, how Communists could do such things. For him, Communism and the struggle for a better life were more or less the same thing. He just couldn't understand, and towards the end of his stay he really began to go out of his mind, it seems to me, because he was telling everybody that the Soviet government was under the influence of the Vatican.

I had a lot of friends there and their fate, all of their cases, were proof for me that the people who landed up in that hospital were those who had done things for which they couldn't be brought to court, who had committed no offense, and the hospital was simply a means of getting rid of them, of putting them out of sight. The hospital regime was similar to any prison regime. An hour's exercise a day, locked cells, outside visitors once a month, one letter a month to relatives, one parcel a month, exactly the same as in a prison. The doctors themselves realized that it was not a hospital but a prison, and sometimes they said so openly. If a patient misbehaved, he could be punished.

COLE: How are dissidents treated in an insane asylum?

BUKOVSKY: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD (INTERPRETING): It was very easy to get into trouble in that hospital, and the punishments were very severe. There are three kinds of punishment which are most commonly applied there. The first type is carried out by medical means. I think people know about a preparation known as Sulfazine, which is used if one of the patients, one of the prisoners in the hospital committed some offense, gave a doctor a rude answer to some question or declared that a doctor in the hospital was no better than an executioner in a white smock. Such a remark would be sufficient to involve punishment. Sulfazine is a pretty painful form of punishment. It causes your temperature to rise to about 40 degrees Centigrade, you feel you have a fever, can't get out of bed or move about, and it goes on for a day or two. If the treatment is repeated, then the effects can last a whole week or - or even ten days.

A second form of punishment involves the use of the preparation Aminozine, used in psychotherapy, also known, probably, in other countries. It causes the patient to feel drowsy, sleepy. He may sleep several days on end, and if the treatment is given regularly he may go on sleeping for as long as it is continued. The third form of punishment we used to call - to call the "roll-up". It involves the use of wet canvas, long - long pieces of it, in which the patient is rolled up from head to foot so tightly that it was difficult for him to breathe, and as the canvas began to dry out it would get tighter and tighter and make the patient feel even worse. But that punishment was applied with some caution. There were medical men present while it was taking place who made sure that the patient did not lose consciousness, and if his pulse began to weaken then the canvas would be released.

Altogether, the medical forms of punishment were pretty widely used, and it was sufficient for a patient to appear cheerful or, on the contrary, miserable, show dissatisfaction or too calm - any deviation which might appear suspicious to the psychiatrists - to give them grounds for believing that he was ill - that would be sufficient for them to start using those treatments.

COLE: Well, what is life like for you here now? Are you harassed by the secret police?

BUKOVSKY: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD (INTERPRETING): I was released from the camp in January 1970, but I did not change my opinions, and I did not give up my activity. I continue to do what I was doing before, and therefore it's possible that I shall be arrested any day. I can be arrested at any moment, when I meet foreign correspondents, when I am distributing written material forbidden in the Soviet Union, and in other circumstances. It doesn't matter what excuse the authorities find for arresting me. The reason is unimportant for them. There's a saying in the camps so long as they've got the man, they'll always find the law to fix him. Of course, I know I am being followed, my telephone is always tapped. I feel that I am constantly under observation by the authorities. When I have to do something that I don't want the authorities to know about I manage to get away from them. But it's pretty difficult in general. I am unable to get the sort of work I like doing, if only because I am sufficiently well known, or because in my identity card there is a mark which tells anyone that I've been in prison.

I am often asked about the prospects for change in this country, what we hope to get from our activity, how many supporters we have and these are understandable, legitimate questions. But they are very difficult to answer. You have to understand first of all what's the essence of our struggle. The essence of it is, in my view, the struggle against fear, the fear which has gripped the people since the time of Stalin, which has still not left people, and thanks to which this system continues to exist, the system of dictatorship, of pressure, of oppression. It's into the struggle against fear that we put our greatest efforts, and in that struggle great importance attaches to personal example, the example which we give people. I personally did what I considered right, spoke out on those occasions when I wanted to, and I'm alive, I am now sitting here and not in prison. I'm alive, I can get about, I can live. For me and for many people that's very important - it shows that it's possible to fight, and that it is necessary to fight.

REASONER: Bill, we've seen three Russians who willingly put themselves into hazard to make these films. What's apt to happen to them?

COLE: Harry, I think these three men are in serious trouble. The Soviet state simply does not permit criticism. Of course, the authorities might wait six months, maybe a year; they'll wait until the furor dies down, and these men will be picked up. They'll go back to the mental hospitals or to the concentration camps where they were before.

REASONER: They knew that was going to - it was a possibility, when they agreed to and urged the interviews?

COLE: Actually, a couple of times I said, look, let's - let's throw this film away. They said, no, regardless of the consequences, we want it shown.

REASONER: Bill, you brought out a message from a man who went through something like this, didn't you?

COLE: Yes, Harry. When I was expelled from Moscow I brought out on my person a small tape that came from the labor camps in the far north. It was a tape made by a very celebrated Russian writer, Alexander Ginzburg, who was imprisoned in

1967 for protesting other trials of other writers. And you asked me what these three Russians you saw tonight can expect. I think that this message tells what they can expect.

REASONER: How did you know this was Ginzburg on the tape?

COLE: I played it for friends of his in Moscow who verified, who confirmed that it was his voice.

REASONER: And the first voice we hear is another - another prisoner, a Lithuanian?

COLE: Yes. A Lithuanian who spoke a little bit of English, who introduced Ginzburg.

REASONER: Let's hear some of this message from inside.

VOICE: This recording was made under complicated camp conditions.

GINZBURG: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD (INTERPRETING): In this concentration camp, for lack of medical aid, sixteen political prisoners have perished recently. Here there is only one doctor from among the prisoners, the rights of man are violated, thousands of people are deprived of their freedom, and everyone goes in danger of his life.

I have just accompanied on his last journey my friend Jan Matusha. Three months ago the Estonian Ans Frants died.

For six months now have been languishing in the Vladimir prison - that living grave - my friends Yuri Daniel and Valeri Ronkin. Several dozen of our friends were arrested in Moscow recently. Camps, prisons, and the death of those near to us - that is what we are surrounded by, and nevertheless we hope to hold out. We are sustained, not by the so-called decisive stand of the Soviet Union, nor by the good will of the governments of the great powers, but by the wrath, protest and solidarity of all honest people, of all who hold dear the dignity of man, democracy and peace. In decisive resistance to modern barbarism I see the only real guarantee that the rights of man will be observed, here and throughout the world.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

REASONER: Any of us who have seen a Chekov play know that understanding Russia and the Russians is not always easy. Here to try to help us understand better are two authorities on Soviet politics and literature who bring a special knowledge of the voices of dissent that we've heard tonight. Patricia Blake is an authority on Russian literature. She has written extensively on Soviet dissent, and is the author of several books, including "Dissident Voices in Soviet Literature." She is a contributing editor to Time Magazine. Abraham Brumberg probably is as familiar as any American with the dissident movement in Soviet Russia, and he is now writing a book on political opposition in the Soviet Union. For many years editor of the journal, Problems of Communism, he most recently edited a collection of Russian documents entitled "In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today." We asked the official Soviet news agency in New York to send a representative to comment on these interviews. They declined.

One thing that interests me, with two people who know about as much about Russia as you can from this far away. What was the - what was the impact of those interviews? Miss Blake?

BLAKE: Shattering, really. One has the impression of such nobility and purity and heroism. I felt that viewing and hearing them speak was an ennobling experience, I think, for Americans.

REASONER: Who are the people that we're talking about? What do the three people that we saw and the one that we heard represent? Mr. Brumberg?

BRUMBERG: Well, I think we saw three representatives of what I would call the free, untrammelled spirits of Russia. It is a phenomenon which is as characteristic of the Soviet Union as it was of pre-Revolutionary Russia. These are people who are fired by a passion against injustice. They may endure injustices for a long time; they may be silent, but when they do finally speak out, nothing is going to stop them. They will court arrest, imprisonment, exile, possibly even execution, for their beliefs. I think this is a very, I think, as Pat said, a very ennobling phenomenon, and a very moving and a very typical Russian type that we saw.

REASONER: Well, now, if they're characteristic of a type of Russian, what about the reaction of the regime to them? Is that characteristically Russian?

BRUMBERG: Well, I would say that too is characteristically Russian, yes. Of course, we have to distinguish between the reaction of the regime in Stalin's days, and the reaction to - of the regime since Stalin's days. Understand, any dissent would have been absolutely unthinkable; even the slightest flare of skepticism or disagreement would be suppressed, so that speaking up was unthinkable. Since Stalin's death, we have seen the rise of what might be called a public opinion in the Soviet Union. It is still very small. These people still are very much persecuted by the regime. In fact, if anything, there has been a reversal from a relatively lenient policy that existed in the last years of Khrushchev's reign, to more - more repression. It is not the kind of repression that was practiced by Stalin, but it is - has still very grievous effects.

REASONER: They spread the word among themselves by means of this underground newspaper. How many of them are there, would you guess, in percentage terms. If there were an election, a free election, in Russia today, would they be a major third party, or second party?

BLAKE: You know, it's very hard to judge - incalculable, even if there were sociology, even if there were polls in Russia, it's really hard to measure the thrust and influence of ideas on people. And sometimes ideas take a long time to mature. But in the words of Leo Tolstoy: "A word is an act," and will cause reverberations and resonances which will not be seen immediately. But later on, and we've seen this movement develop in an extraordinary way. The numbers - it's hard to say - you can have numbers from a hundred to ten thousand, just hard core people engaged in an active way in this democratic movement.

BRUMBERG: May I, perhaps, add one other thing, that we ought to distinguish between the active dissenters and their passive collaborators. I think that the very existence of a newspaper such as the Chronicle of Current Events attests to the fact that there are people who, while they may not be necessarily willing to put their signatures on some of the petitions printed, nevertheless will help

out a great deal in circulating, informing the editors of this newspaper of reprisals, of what has been going on in the camps, which is one of the most fascinating items that we read in this Chronicle, are hunger strikes, political protests within the labor camps in the Soviet Union. How do these items get out from the camps? We don't know. But I think it's safe to assume that there are quite a few people who are willing to collaborate with the dissenters in making their word known throughout the world.

REASONER: How typical is a - is a fairly harsh punishment? Mr. Ginzburg spoke, in the tape from the labor camp, of dozens of his friends, of more than a dozen deaths in recent months. Does a Soviet intellectual stand a fair chance of winding up in jail?

BLAKE: A Soviet dissident intellectual, certainly.

REASONER: Part of what the people we heard from tonight are saying is that they are merely demanding the freedoms that they technically have. Is that correct? There's nothing unconstitutional about what they did?

BRUMBERG: They do - some see as their main - their strongest weapon, the existence on paper of legal rights. The constitution of the Soviet Union is one of the most democratic and liberal constitutions in the world. It promises freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and when these dissenters speak up, they point to the fact that what they are demanding is in effect the observance of Soviet laws. They know very well that these Soviet laws are not observed, are violated and abused continuously.

BLAKE: This, by the way, is a completely new element in Russian dissent. I say Russian, not only Soviet dissent. In the absence of any institutions, any democratic institutions, pressure groups and so on, in which you can make yourself heard, what you - since you're helpless to do anything else, you take these existing institutions and try and make them fulfill their ideal original function. And this is the strategy.

REASONER: They - they also don't seem to be internationalists, particularly, are they? They're very Russian.

BRUMBERG: Well, in a lot of the major areas of dissent, not the most, but one of the causes the dissenters have taken up is the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This is - this was very important about a year ago. We have quite a few documents protesting, and cases of individuals and groups, and even a demonstration in Red Square. Small, to be sure, but typical of the passion.

REASONER: What do you make so far of the reaction of the government? Do you - how do you judge which way they will go? Will they tolerate more dissent or less?

BLAKE: You know, these do leave us in a terrible dilemma. What - what we see in the last year suggests that without far greater doses of power, the influence of these people cannot be controlled. It's not sufficient to arrest two or three. As Yakir said himself: "They will kill us, they will beat us, but people will go on thinking differently." But if they choose to re-institute the whole machinery of mass police power that we had under Stalin, then they would pay a very high price for it. And I think they are very much aware of that. For one thing, those people who are living in the Kremlin today know full well that if

they re-institute this machine of power, they may be among the first to be devoured by it. And secondly, the whole thrust of Soviet policy in the '50s and '60s has been to try and give Soviet citizens some incentives for creative technology, in the sciences, for the worker, and if you re-impose power, then you have a - a submissiveness which lacks any sort of dynamic. You cannot rule without an internal dynamic of some sort.

REASONER: What about the Russian man on the street, if there is such a thing? What would - what would these interviews mean to him? Would he sympathize, or is he - is he happy with a generally better material lot?

BRUMBERG: Well, it's very difficult to answer this question. I'm sure there are those who would regard some of these people as - just as intellectuals, which means the ordinary people have very little in common. On the other hand, I think we have to remember that there exists a vast reservoir of grievances and dissatisfaction - Amalrik spoke about it. The peasants are dissatisfied, the workers are dissatisfied. And not only because of economic grievances, but also because of social and political repressions that are practiced against them. And I think the future, in my opinion, of this whole movement of dissent, the democratic movement, will depend very largely on the links that the intellectuals will or will not be able to establish with the ordinary people.

REASONER: If you could put yourself into somebody else's shoes; suppose an official and believing member of the Soviet regime was in our group tonight. What would his reaction be? How would he explain those films?

BLAKE: I think the refusal of Soviet officials to come here suggests that they would be unable to cope with the questions raised so eloquently by those three dissenters and by Ginzburg in prison.

REASONER: What will the - what will the reaction be, officially and in the Soviet Union, to this broadcast, and to other television use which will probably be made of it?

BRUMBERG: Oh, I think the Soviet authorities are going to be very displeased. They usually tend to dismiss the dissenters more or less as psychiatrically - more or less as misfits, as social misfits, and as representing nobody but themselves. This is their usual way of coping. But they are very well aware that these people are not misfits, but on the contrary they are the most - they are the most articulate, perhaps the most intelligent of the Soviet intellectuals today, and that they are faced with a very serious ferment within Soviet society. And this is why they are going to be quite displeased with bringing that ferment out on the television screen.

REASONER: Will the - will wide attention for these men help them? I mean, will it protect them?

BLAKE: Well, who knows, it will probably protect them for a time. Certainly people like Pasternak, for example, who was protected by his winning the Nobel Prize, by publicity in the West. But sooner or later, the KGB, which operates in some ways independently from the political leadership, that prepares its cases, and it waits until the political time is right for them to move.

BRUMBERG: I would say this, that the more formidable the stature of the dissenter, the greater the chances of an outcry in the West as a deterrent to further reprisals. A man like Solzhenytsin, though deprived of any possibility of publishing, and making himself known within the Soviet Union, nevertheless because of his worldwide reputation, and also because of his reputation inside the Soviet Union, has thus far been left relatively alone. The smaller, the less significant the dissenter, the greater will be the weight of the police apparatus upon him.

BLAKE: It hasn't saved Amalrik, has it?

REASONER: Amalrik charged his government with a kind of a senility which is a strange thing for a revolutionary movement to be in - in half a century. Is this a characteristic of communism, do you think, or a characteristic of Russia?

BRUMBERG: Oh, that's a very difficult question to answer. I think it's a characteristic of Russian communism.

REASONER: Thank you very much.

ANNOUNCER: Voices From The Russian Underground will continue.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

REASONER: We have seen three unique interviews with Russian dissenters filmed in Russia, filmed by William Cole before his expulsion from Moscow - CBS NEWS Correspondent who makes rather a good photographer. Thank you, Bill.

The Russians have compressed whole eras of national development into their half century of communism, from the rough, new enthusiasm of revolution through the terror of psychotic dictatorship to a period of great pride in material achievement, and now, these Russian critics of the government say, to a kind of old age of communism, a stultification of bureaucracy and repression. The critics obviously hate to see it happen. They spoke their risky pieces to Bill Cole's camera out of patriotism and love, not enmity. Even though some of the sentiments of these dissenters sound like a highly intensified version of what our dissenters say about the United States, it's difficult for Americans to understand a society where criticism of the government is a crime. But in the next few years, how well America understands Russia could make all the difference to the world. Tonight, Comrades Yakir, Amalrik, Bukovsky and Ginzburg have helped.

ANNOUNCER: This has been a CBS NEWS Special Report: Voices From The Russian Underground.



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September 1970

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~YULI DANIEL DUE TO BE RELEASED

On 20 September 1965 Yuli Daniel was arrested in Moscow by the KGB while at the same approximate time Andrey Sinyavsky was arrested in Novosibirsk. The two authors were given a rigged trial for "slandering" the Soviet system and sentenced in February 1966, Sinyavsky to seven years at hard labor and Daniel to five years at hard labor. Inasmuch as terms in Soviet labor camp or prison customarily start from the time of arrest, Daniel's term should be up on 20 September, 1970.

Daniel was sent to the Potma Camps in the Mordvinian Republic, to join thousands of other political prisoners. He withstood the efforts of his keepers to break him with heavy work that overtaxed his war-wounded shoulder, and with shop work under such noise conditions that he was deafened. According to Anatoly Marchenko, a fellow prisoner, Daniel maintained such high spirit that he earned the respect and admiration of even the hardest, most anti-intellectual of the other prisoners. The Soviet authorities, evidently frustrated by their inability to break Daniel in the labor camp, transferred him in September 1969 to the Vladimir Prison where he is believed to be presently.

The Free World's press unanimously and spontaneously charged the USSR with reverting to Stalinism. Intellectuals at all levels and in large numbers petitioned for the immediate release or, alternatively, a fair trial of the two. The media of twelve Communist Parties in Free World countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, UK, France, Italy, Austria, Uruguay, US, Iceland, Chile) protested (albeit belatedly) that the Sinyavsky-Daniel case was hurting their image.

Within the USSR the treatment of Sinyavsky and Daniel was regarded, according to Pyotr Yakir, one of the articulate voices of the Russian underground, as "the most important turning point" in the thinking of the Soviet people. Why, they asked, should people such as Sinyavsky and Daniel be arrested for speaking about what they thought. However, in practical terms, there were only weak forces able to oppose the oppression of persons for their convictions. For example, samizdat, or self-published writings distributed from hand to hand, was effective in raising and spreading indignation but totally without influence on Soviet policy-makers who persevered in tightening up their control over the Soviet people during the following years.

Also with the passage of the years less and less concern has been voiced for Daniel and Sinyavsky as the Soviets have made every effort to keep information on them to a minimum. The Soviet authorities are undoubtedly deluding themselves, however, if they think that the two jailed authors have faded from the memories of freedom lovers in the

USSR and around the world. For, as another Soviet protester, Alexander Ginzburg, said on a tape smuggled out of his concentration camp, "We are sustained...by the wrath, protest and solidarity of all honest people, of all who hold dear the dignity of man, democracy and peace." Whereas it's difficult and risky (but not impossible) for Soviet citizens to note that Daniel ought to be released when his term is up, there is no obstacle hindering the Free World press from going on record that it is vigilantly watching for solid evidence that Yuli Daniel will regain his freedom.

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
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September 1970

SOVIET CARTOGRAPHIC INDISCRETIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD

CPYRGHT



Earlier this year the Western press carried stories about West European and American cartographers having discovered how their opposite numbers in the USSR were keeping the Soviet Union on the move by falsifying all official maps available to the general public. According to the specialists, Soviet charts and atlases published in recent years have been designed to move coastlines, towns, rivers, and other map features at random by as much as 25 miles. (A sampling of those press clips is attached.)


Since the first articles appeared, it has been noted that other towns sometimes disappear for years and then suddenly pop up again -- as in the case of Sarova. It is not only Western cartographers who are alarmed by the Soviet mappers' callous disregard for accuracy, the Estonians too are complaining of short shrift given them in the newest maps of the Estonian Republic. When the Soviets consider it politically expedient, international borders can be shifted with equal callousness -- and not only Soviet borders: in 1954 the USSR cartographically gave China some 50,000 square miles of territory belonging to India.

To date, the Soviets refuse to give this territory back to India. Simultaneously, though generous with Indian territory, the Soviets have no qualms about arrogantly laying claim to some of the disputed islands along the Sino-Soviet border, as they did just last month.

#### The Mystery of Sarova

About 300 miles east of Moscow in the Mordvinian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is the mysterious little town of Sarova -- mysterious because after 1958 it vanished and in 1969, reappeared. Sarova is a famous old landmark. According to Baedeker's Russia of 1914, on an excursion from Moscow to Kazan one might well stop off at Arzamas, enjoy its railroad restaurant, and make a short side trip to the Sarov Convent. The following description is given: "About 50 versts (33 miles) southwest of Arzamas lies the Sarov Convent (Sarovskaya Pustyn) founded in the 17th century and containing the wonder-working remains of Seraphim, who died in 1833 and was canonized in 1903." Things have changed. Undoubtedly the convent still stands, but today the entire Mordvinian Autonomous Republic is "off limits" to all foreigners and the area around the Sarov Convent is a Natural Reserve and as such is "off limits" to all but a handful of Soviet scientists, none of whom would concern themselves with the "wonder-working remains of Seraphim."

The desecration of the Sarov Convent is cited by many older-generation Russians as typifying the way in which the Soviets wage propaganda against religion of any kind. In 1935 the Soviet government officially designated the area surrounding the Sarov Convent as the Mordvinian Natural Reserve (Mordovski Zapovednik) "for protection of particular kinds of landscape for the southern forest belt." The area is over 95 percent forested. According to a 1969 publication, the USSR has some 91 Natural Reserves set aside to preserve nature and open only to scientists.

But why did the Soviet map makers bother to take Sarova off the map -- and then last year put it back again? The Sarovka River, which crosses the Natural Reserve area, has now disappeared too. In Soviet atlases and on Soviet Territorial Administrative maps published in 1939 Sarova appears as a town with a population of approximately 500 and nearby roads and a rail line are depicted as is the Sarovka River; no indication is given of the boundary area for the Natural Reserve. In both the Atlas Mira of 1954 and a Territorial Administrative map of 1958 Sarova is a town with a population of less than 10,000 located within the approximately 80,000 acre area (indicated by  lines; see the attached map insert illustrations) designated for the first time as the "Mordovski Zapovednik." There is no Sarova in the Soviet atlases published in 1962 and 1967 or on Territorial Administrative maps issued in 1959 and 1966. On the 1966 map the area incorporating the Natural Reserve has been expanded and the Sarovka River has dis-

appeared. A Territorial Administrative map published in 1969, however, puts Sarova back in its previous location and shows it again to be a town with a population of slightly under 10,000; the Sarovka is still missing.

#### The Sovietization of Estonia

In the attached article reprinted from the 7 February 1970 issue of Sovetski Estonii, an outraged Estonian Docent at Tartus State University takes Soviet cartographers to task for their callous disregard for accuracy in a series of newly published Administrative maps of the Estonian SSR. Without coming right out and saying it, the author's chief complaint is that the map makers have Sovietized Estonia. This they accomplished through misspellings, erroneous transliterations of Estonian names, and by omission of the names of some 98 populated places which are centuries old. Errors in drafting the drainage network, the appearance of a "mythical gulf which has 'flooded' two villages," and the unfortunate selection of insignificant hamlets to list as secondary populated areas are among the many other shortcomings scored by the author.

#### "Cartographic Aggression" Against India

The USSR's reissuance again four months ago of an official map of Asia which continues to cede some 50,000 square miles of the Sino-Indian boundary to China caused indignant walkouts this summer from both houses of India's Parliament. The attached clips from Indian and other news media tell how this Soviet provocation, which many Indian Members of Parliament view as "blatant Soviet cartographic aggression," has rankled India for the past 15 years.

The objecting Members of Parliament charged the Government with failing to make the Soviet Union revise its maps containing the erroneous delineations of India's northern territories and walked out after they in turn failed to get any assurances from the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Swaran Singh, that the Government would ask the Soviet Union to issue a corrigendum to its newest map. The Minister told Parliament that the USSR had assured India that the wrong depiction of India's boundaries did not "in any way affect or reflect the Soviet Government's understanding of and respect for India's frontiers." As one correspondent points out, however, all East European countries, including Yugoslavia, use official Soviet maps.

During the last few years the Indian Government has come across several official Soviet publications, all of them corroborating Chinese claims to regions along India's northeastern and northwestern frontier. These publications included all editions of Atlas Mira since 1954, a map of India published by the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1956, educational atlases published in 1967 and 1969, and a wall map based on a Soviet cartographic survey issued in 1967. Also during the last few

years, Indian representations failed to elicit from Moscow anything more than a standard reply that matters "would be looked into." The final affront came in May this year with the publication of Volume I of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia which includes an official map of Asia that shows the same 50,000 square-mile area still cartographically ceded to China.

"Cartographic Imperialism" Against China


Last month the Soviets announced plans to develop two of the many islands along the disputed Sino-Soviet border. An announcement which in effect signals Peking that these particular islands are incontestably Soviet territory and that they are not to be negotiated. The island area, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, is by far the most important of the more than 700 border islands claimed by both China and the Soviet Union. It lies just opposite the strategic city of Khabarovsk, Headquarters of the USSR Far East Military District. Soviet maps depict the area as including two islands, the Tarabarov and Big Ussuri. The two are separated by a narrow channel. So narrow is the channel that on Chinese maps the island is one, Hei-hsia-tzu or "Blindman's Alley."

The Soviet development plans were published in an article in the 2 August issue of an important Party newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossiya, in which Soviet planners proposed extensive agricultural development of the area through the establishment of three large collective farms to produce milk, meat, potatoes and vegetables for Khabarovsk. The article describes the projected plan as an outgrowth of decisions taken at the July plenum of the Party's Central Committee, thereby reinforcing Soviet claims to ownership of the territory. The article also alludes to the area as important for the defense of Khabarovsk and refers to Chinese use of the island area as an operational base for Red Guard detachments, thereby reinforcing the impression that the area is of more strategic than economic value to the USSR. A translation of the Soviet article is attached. To date, Chinese media have not reacted to the Soviet announcement.


Note: Comparison of the attached reprints from four Soviet maps depicting the area of the Mordvinian Natural Reserve illustrates paucity of data given on maps and map legends in the later series.



CPYRGHT



SAROVA IN 1958




0 5 10 15 KM

Legend:

- Populated places ○
- Chief roads ══════════
- Other roads ══════════
- Zapovednik (Natural Reserve) ▨▨▨▨▨▨▨▨▨▨
- ASSR and Oblast Boundary ══════════

Source: Mordovskaya ASSR Administrativnaya Karta, Glavnoye upravlenye geodezii i kartografii, 1958.

CPYRGHT




SARDOVA IN 1969



Legend:

- Less than 10,000 persons
- Roads
- Roads with bus service
- Zapovednik (Natural Reserve)
- ASSR and Oblast boundary



Source: Mordovskaya ASSR Administrativnaya Karta, Glavnoye upravlenye geodezii i kartografii, 1969.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 January 1970

CPYRGHT

# New Soviet Maps Give Distortion

## National Security Is Believed Reason for Altered Features

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 17

Government cartographers have discovered puzzling locational shifts in recent official atlases that seem to indicate distortion of the entire map or the Soviet Union for national security.

According to the specialists, the Russian charts and atlases, once renowned for their standards of excellence, have been designed in the last few years to move coastlines, towns, rivers and other map features at random by as much as 25 miles in an apparent attempt at deception.

In one of the most unusual cases of such deformations, which have also been detected by West European analysts, a transport center in Western Russia was moved 10 miles from its true location on a lake shore, and converging railroad lines were twisted out of alignment to conform.



The possibility that the revised map locations are based on new surveys is ruled out by United States analysts on the ground that most of the Soviet Union, particularly the European section, had already been surveyed with a high degree of accuracy.

### Information Omitted

The Soviet authorities, reputed to be among the most security minded in the world, have traditionally omitted sensitive defense information from their published general maps and have altogether prohibited the dissemination of detailed topographic sheets.

A further tightening of security sometime after 1964 has now affected the published maps.

United States analysts say they wonder why the Russians should have undertaken an intricate program of distortion at what was evidently a heavy cost in time and money. If the intention was to mislead Western strategic planners in the guidance and targeting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Americans say, an expensive effort was wasted because the



The New York Times Jan. 18, 1970  
Map above shows deformed Soviet coastline (broken), as it appears on current official maps, compared with correct line (solid). Finnish coast (heavy line) remained unchanged. Map at left shows shift of the rail town of Nevel (white dot) from its correct lakeside location (black dot).

United States can use older, unaltered maps and modern techniques, presumably intelligence-gathering earth satellites, if necessary.

The speculation in Government circles is that the Soviet deception program may have been directed at another potential adversary, such as Communist China, with less advanced information and means to obtain it.

In the view of officials here the tightened Soviet map controls may have been prompted by what the Russians regarded as breaches of their security. These could have included high-altitude aerial photography by American U-2 planes, one of which was shot down in 1960, and information supplied by Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet official who spied for the West and was tried and executed in Moscow in 1963.

Decision Between '64 and '67  
The decision to alter the maps is believed to have been made some time between 1964, when the last Soviet atlas with true locations was printed, and 1967, when Moscow published the second edition of its World Atlas.

The first edition was regarded as one of the finest typographic products when it appeared in 1954. The maps of the Soviet Union in the second edition turned out to be distorted although foreign areas remained unchanged.

The distortion program involved two steps, according to Government analysts. The first was the scrapping of a well-known Soviet map projection, the network of geographical coordinate lines by which the earth's surface can be mapped.

### Random Mislocations

The map grid, called Kavraisky's Conic Projection, for its designer, was replaced by one that is unidentified and is unfamiliar to United States specialists. They contend that the new system is mathematically inconsistent and is not a true projection at all.

The second step is described as further deformation by random mislocation of map features with respect to the new grid. These small shifts, which would be of little practical significance to the casual map user, were detected by American and West European experts when they used a Soviet

atlas in their own map compilation work.

Although the deformation effort is believed here to be inspired by security considerations, it affects not only strategic places but all parts of the Soviet Union, even to the most remote uninhabited areas of Siberia.

The mislocation of the West Russian rail town of Nevel is cited by the Government specialists as probably one of the most extreme cases. The town, together with the new grid system, was shifted 10 miles to the northwest, but for an unexplained reason the small lake on which Nevel is situated was not moved along with the other map features.

According to the analysts, the discovery of such discrepancies led to the detection of the entire series of map deformations.

NEW YORK TIMES  
25 January 1970

## Distorted Soviet Maps

To the Editor:

Your Jan. 18 news article on Soviet cartographic deformations, particularly in northern European Russia, prompted me to recall an experience I had while in the U.S.S.R. in 1966.

Of the largest European Russian cities I visited, Leningrad was the only place where it was impossible to obtain a map of the city and its environs. On the other hand, maps of Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, et al., were easy to come by. Other visitors to Leningrad report the same problem.

The deformations you reproduced in the map are also found in "Geograficheskii Atlas" (1967), which I purchased in the United States. The town of Nevel is ten miles northwest of its true position, while the Leningrad shore line facing the Gulf of Finland is ten miles inland from where it actually is.

If a hostile power were employing these Soviet maps in order to target its ICBM's on the known Soviet silos dotting the area of extreme deformation (along the Gulf of Finland coast line east of Tallinn to Leningrad), the hostile ICBM's would crash down uselessly on dairy farms and marshes which are common in this region.

And that may be precisely what motivated the Soviets' cartographic fakery.

ALBERT L. WEEKS  
New York, Jan. 18, 1970

NEWSWEEK

2 February 1970


## SOVIET UNION:

## Atlas Shrugged

The Russians almost got away with it. If it hadn't been for a team of sharp-eyed U.S. Government experts, the latest edition of Moscow's famed World Atlas would still be considered the best. But during a routine review, the Americans stumbled upon some glaring inaccuracies in the otherwise impeccable maps. And last week they revealed that, in their judgment, those distortions were no accident but part of a conscious Soviet attempt at deception.

What led the U.S. experts to this conclusion was the fact that the Russians are hardly neophyte cartographers. On the contrary, they have long enjoyed a worldwide reputation for their pinpoint precision. Yet, in the second edition of the World Atlas, which was published in 1967, several Soviet towns, railroad lines, lakes and rivers have been moved from their true locations, in some cases by as much as 25 miles. The vital rail junction of Nevel in western Russia, for example, was shifted 10 miles away from its lakeshore location. Stretches of Soviet coastline bordering the icy Gulf of Finland were extensively distorted. And in remote Siberia, Bratsk, a city of 300,000 people, underwent a major cartographic transformation (map). The site of the world's largest hydroelectric plant, Bratsk is a key outpost in Moscow's attempt to develop its Siberian resources. It also, presumably, is important enough to be targeted for an intercontinental-ballistic-missile strike should the U.S. or China go to war with Russia in the future.

There was little doubt that the security-conscious Russians had distorted the maps in an effort to mislead strategic planners in Washington and Peking. Work on the new maps began sometime in the mid-1960s, a time when Moscow knew little about the sophisticated techniques of U.S. satellite photography. By now, of course, spy satellites have made it virtually impossible for Russian cartographers to pull the wool over the eyes of their counterparts in the U.S. As for the Chinese, they presumably possess old—but perfectly accurate—Soviet maps of their own. Thus, in order to deceive anyone, the Russians will have to move their cities rather than simply tinker with their maps.



**Soviets change the map: Red line traces shifts in Moscow**

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 24, 1970

## Map reference 1984

Stands Leningrad where it did? Not on the latest Soviet maps it doesn't. Undoing all Peter the Great's labours, these maps appear to shift the whole city eastward and let the waters of the Gulf of Finland cover the site on which it was once so painfully built out of the sea.

As Leningrad goes, so goes the whole nation. Sharp-eyed cartographers in other countries have detected apparently deliberate distortions of up to 25 miles applied to the positions of towns, rivers, coastlines, railways, hills and other features on the new maps—for which the Academy of Sciences in Moscow is responsible.

Russia, tsarist and communist, has a long tradition of the building of "Potemkin villages"—impressive façades, usually erected along a route to be travelled by some gullible but important personage, with the aim of concealing the dreary reality that lies behind them. But this is something different. The new maps do not seem to show fictitious towns or villages; they merely juggle with existing ones. The only explanation that has been suggested relates to another old Russian tradition, an obsessive preoccupation with military secrecy.

But, though it was understandable that wartime Britain should remove its signposts to ensure the benighting of all those nuns who might be disguised German parachutists, the military value of the Soviet ploy is far from clear. It is true that, whereas in Stalin's time nobody in Russia could ever see a detailed map without military permission, the atlases published in the Khrushchev period were quite accurate. The accuracy attained between 1954 and 1964 may well have frightened the defence authorities. But their nervous tinkering with geographical facts now seems quite pointless. Neither the Americans nor the Chinese can be fooled into pointing their missiles in the wrong direction, for both have had ample time to obtain the earlier unfalsified maps. The only result that this bit of apparent military madness looks like having is that it may leave a big dent in the reputation of the Academy of Sciences among international scholars.

SHORTCOMINGS OF A NEW MAP

From the mail of "Soviet Estoniya"

After more than a ten-year interval, a new administrative map of the Estonian SSR has finally appeared. 1/

A total of 92,00 copies have been issued, of which 40,000 have appeared on the book market and were quickly sold out. One might conclude that the new map has fully satisfied its customers. However, there is no basis for such complacency.

It is true that the first impression of the map design is favorable. A dense network of highways, a large number of populated places, rayon boundaries, and a schematic depiction of the rivers and large lakes are all found on the map.

However, in the course of working with the map mistakes and defects come to light, deficiencies which should be corrected in the next edition. Names are distorted, as in Cape Purekkari and Kassare Island, and also errors have been made in the transliteration of Latvian names into the Estonian language. There are mistakes in the drafting of the drainage network: the basin of Lake Vyrts'yarv is shown connected in two places (along the rivers Ykhne and Tyanassil'ma) with the rivers of the Riga Gulf basin, which does not correspond to the truth in either case. On the western shore of Lake Vyrts'yarv is shown a mythical gulf which has "flooded" two villages (Kivilyppe and Yarve).

There are also inaccuracies in the spelling of populated places. In Valgaskiy rayon, Igaste is given instead of the correct Iygaste. In Vyruskiy rayon, Obiniste is given in place of Obinitza; in Ygevaskiy rayon, Pudukyula instead of Pudevire; in Kokhtla-Yarveskiy rayon, Viluze instead of the correct Viluzi, and in place of Tarumaa--Taruma. In Pyl'vaskiy rayon, Maritsa is shown instead of the correct Maaritsa, and Maekyula instead of Myaekyula; in Pyarnuskiy rayon, Yukhasel'ya is given instead of Yukhassel'ya. In Tartuskiy rayon, the Tyakhtvereskiy sel'soviet is located not in Rakhinge, but in Il'matsalu. On Mukhu Island, the Kuyvastu settlement and landing for ferry boats plying the strait is represented as the unknown hamlet of Vyykyula. But all these errors are insignificant in comparison with the absurd choice of populated places to be represented on the map.

The most annoying shortcoming of the map is the fact that, out of 237 sel'soviets, only 139 are named on the map. The vast majority (90%) of the Estonian sel'soviets carry the names of centuries-old populated places. These

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1/ The Estonian SSR Administrative Map. Scale: 1:600,000. Editor: N.N. Timofeyev. Technical editor: N.V. Khvedcheniya. Issue: 20,000. Moscow 1968.  
The Estonian SSR Administrative Map. Issue: 52,000. Moscow 1969.  
The Estonian SSR Administrative Map (in the Estonian Language). Issue: 20,000. Moscow 1969.

are ancient villages and towns, whose names were later used by churches and parishes, then by volosts, and finally by the sel'soviets. Under the names of these sel'soviets (parishes) have been organized the valuable collections of many of the Estonian SSR's institutions: the State Historical Archives, and treasures of the Ethnographic Museum, the collections on dialects and phonetics of the Institute of Language and Literature, and the materials of the Commission on Regional Studies of the Academy of Sciences and of other institutions.

Why, then, do we not see on the map the names of such well-known populated places, for which sel'soviets are named, as Alatskivi, Val'yals, Kaarma, Karksi, Myniste, Paystu, Rannu, Ridala, Khummuli, Emmaste, and at least 80 others? The "secret" lies in the fact that these sel'soviets are "encoded" under the little-known names of Lakhepere, Kiriku, Kaysvere, Kaali, Rooksoo, Aydu, Valla-Palu, Kyabla, Soe, Viyterna, and others. As it happened, however, the executive committees of the rural soviets, about which we are speaking, are located not in the well-known settlements mentioned above, but in their outskirts, where there were vacant houses. The map, however, denotes only their addresses--that is, the names of farmsteads, hamlets, and crossroads where these buildings stand. Thus, in order to find the true names of the sel'soviets, one has to refer to the handbook of administrative-territorial divisions, and, from the addresses written on the map, reconstruct their names.

The second major shortcoming of the map is the unfortunate selection of "other" (secondary) populated points. For the most part, these are completely insignificant hamlets, places where the finger of the compiler happened to stop in his perusal of the source materials. To make matters worse, his approach has turned up names which have nothing at all in common with the socialist transformation in the republic's rural economy, although it would seem to be time to consider carrying on the map the names of the new, well-established central settlements of sovkhoses and kolkhoses.

Near Tallinn, there is a suburban sel'soviet bearing the name of the ardent revolutionary A. Sommerling. More than 500 people are already residing in the central settlement of this sovkhos. The sovkhos is the place of pilgrimage for numerous foreign delegations and is well-known abroad. However, neither the sel'soviet nor the settlement is designated on the map; only the sel'soviet's location is given--the settlement of Lekhm'ya.

In designating populated places on the map one ought to take into consideration their economic significance as well as their population size. To do so, it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the geography of the republic and to use various sources of information. The cartographer who compiled this map is evidently not well versed in the subtleties of the republic's geography and economy.

One cannot help but conclude that the preparation of such maps requires the aid of persons well versed in the geography of the republic. There are sufficient numbers of such specialists in Estonia. Furthermore, they should participate in the initial compilation of the map, not after the completion of the proof when only minor corrections are permitted. For this, the cartographic enterprise ought to send a copy of the original draft, as well as a list of specific features, to other geographers for review and revision



(for example, to Tartu State University or the editorial board of the Encyclopedia of the Estonian SSR); a copy should also be sent--for checking the transliteration--to the linguists in the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the ESSR. The administrative map is necessary as a reference aid for the organization of workers in the most diverse professions. The improvement of its quality requires the joint efforts of cartographers, geographers and management personnel.

L. Vasilyev  
Docent of Tartus State University

HINDUSTAN TIMES, New Delhi  
7 August 1970

# Walk-out in Rajya Sabha on Soviet maps

## Minister's explanation fails to satisfy MPs

Hindustan Times Correspondent

New Delhi, Aug. 6—The External Affairs Minister, Mr Swaran Singh, today faced a furious Rajya Sabha when members from the Opposition as well as Congress (N) benches made a scathing attack on the Government for its failure to make the Soviet Union revise its maps containing wrong delineation of India's northern boundaries.

The issue was raised through a calling-attention motion, notice for which was given by Mr M. K. Mohta (Swa) and 15 others who pointed out that the Soviet map had shown large chunks of Indian territory as Chinese.

Having failed to secure an assurance from the Minister that the Government of India would ask the Soviet Union to bring out a corrigendum, almost the entire Opposition walked out. Several members took notice of an "otherwise so vocal" CPI group leader, Mr Bhupesh Gupta, who remained behind, completely indifferent to the question.

Sharing the members' sentiments, Mr Swaran Singh expressed his "disappointment" with the Soviet authorities who had not fulfilled their earlier promises and reproduced faulty maps even in the latest edition of the "Great Soviet Encyclopaedia." But he pleaded with the members not to be unduly exercised over it since the USSR representatives had explained that the matter had been dealt with in a "technical manner by their cartographers and specialists."

The Soviet Union had further assured India that "this has no political significance" inasmuch as the USSR continued to "respect" India's territorial integrity and that wrong depiction of India's boundaries in such maps did not "in any way affect or reflect the Soviet Government's understanding of and respect for India's frontiers."

"We hope and trust," said the

subservient the Government had become to the Soviets, according to Mr Mishra.

Mr Mohta was surprised that the External Affairs Minister had accepted the explanation given by the Soviet authorities when the publication itself said that the contents had the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Russian Government. He also wanted to know why in reply to an earlier question, the Government had not included the latest Soviet map in the list of maps named in the statement.

Mr Swaran Singh refuted the charge that the Government had shown any softness towards the Soviets, but the acts of friendly countries could not be equated with unfriendly countries since motivation was a material factor. All the same, the Government of India had taken strong objection to it. He was "sorry" that the latest map was not mentioned in the Government statement referred to by Mr Mohta. But there was no intention to hide anything. The list given was not exhaustive.

He repeatedly asked the members not to reject the Soviet explanation which admittedly was in favour of India.

Mr K. P. Mallikarjundu (Cong.—O), Mr Niranjan Verma and Mr Jagdambhi Prasad (Jan Sangh), Mr Bhanu Bihari Das (PSP), Mr Bal Krishna Gupta (SSP), Mr Chitta Basu (FB) and Mr Krishna Kant (Cong.—N) were among the members who demanded more precise action to rectify the mistake. In particular, they asked why the Government was shying from a written protest on the issue. As regards the oral assurances, it was pointed out that at one time the Chinese were also forthright. But ultimately they backed out, grabbing the Indian territory.

Mr Swaran Singh saw nothing wrong in the "usual practice" of conducting diplomacy through oral negotiations. It was unfortunate that even after so many years the mistake had not been corrected. There was no desire on the part of New Delhi to condone it. But he did not want to call it an "unfriendly act of a friendly country" as stated by some members. However, fresh efforts would be made to get the maps revised by the Soviet authorities. He agreed with the questioners that the wrong delineation of the Indian territory in the USSR maps had long range implications.

The External Affairs Minister promised to consider the suggestion of Mr Krishna Kant that the Soviet Union should be asked to clarify its position in regard to these maps through their newspapers and other publicity media.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050001-7

THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, New Delhi

6 August 1970

# Russians to Farm

## China-Border Isles

By Holger Jensen  
Associated Press

MOSCOW, Aug. 2—The Soviet Union has embarked on a high-risk policy of "island reclamation" in Far Eastern rivers bordering China. Its announced purpose is agriculture, but it could spark a confrontation between the Communist powers.

The Amur and Ussuri rivers, which wind 2,000 miles between Chinese Manchurian rivers change course, and the Soviet maritimes, are flooding old islands and forming new ones.

The crunch would come if the Russians tried to "reclaim" an island that had both a Chinese and a Russian name.

Even if the Russians scrupulously avoid disputed territory, their presence on previously uninhabited islands is bound to be viewed as a provocation by the Chinese. It would also goad them into claiming islands in which China has had no interest up to now.

Soviet agricultural workers would not be sent to border islands without protection. This means troop movements and a new array of military installations under the noses of the Chinese.

Russian and Chinese frontier troops have fought over less than that.

Both sides acknowledged four major skirmishes last year, three of them on a disputed island that the Russians call Damansky and the Chinese Chinpaio. Moscow and Peking accused each other of starting the hostilities, and both claimed many dead and wounded.

Hundreds of minor clashes apparently go unreported. The Soviet Union recently accused China of staging 488 border provocations between June and August last year.

Talks to resolve the border disputes and territorial claims are stalled. In an apparent effort to get them off the ground, Moscow and Peking are reported ready to exchange ambassadors after three years at the charge d'affaires level.

The Chinese say they do not recognize the old czarist treaties that established present boundaries and cost them large chunks of territory. Nature also plays tricks by mak-

# Indian areas given to China in Soviet map

By Prithvis Chakravarti

Hindustan Times Correspondent

New Delhi, Aug. 5—The Foreign Office here is baffled

by the Soviet Union's latest official map of Asia where an estimated 50,000 square miles of territory in India's north-east and north-west frontier regions has been cartographically gifted away to the Chinese.

The territories include Aksai Chin, Demchok and Nilang Jhadang in Ladakh and the whole of the North-East Frontier Agency.

The map is included in the First Volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia published in May this year under the authority of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet map was brought to the notice of the Foreign Office by Swatantra MPs, Mr Dahyabhai Patel and Mr M. K. Mohta. Experts in the Foreign Office devoted several hours today to get a clue to this display of unfriendliness by Moscow but seemingly failed to get one.

The Moscow action has been particularly shocking as New Delhi had been led to believe that the Soviet Union would no longer try to please China, its professed adversary in the larger ideological and territorial conflict, at India's expense.

### US paper's comment

A surprising side issue is the failure of the Indian mission in Moscow to furnish the Foreign Office with a copy of the Soviet publication, although the First Volume of the "epoch making" Great Soviet Encyclopaedia was officially released in Moscow three months ago. It is epoch making because the First Volume of the current third edition has been published 27 years after the second edition.

Some journals in the United States have already reviewed the First Volume—the series to be completed in 30 volumes by 1974—and, at least one of them, the Christian Science Monitor, has specifically pointed out the Moscow endorsement of the Chinese claims to Indian territory.

A passage in the Monitor's review in praise of the First Volume should cause genuine anxiety in New Delhi. It says: "Throughout the volume the emphasis is laid on

ideology and more on practical accomplishments. The characterisation of bourgeois public figures no longer contains all the former vitriolic denunciations." Rather ominously this healthy non-ideological judgment of men and matters did not take into account India's interests and susceptibilities despite repeated official representations by New Delhi to the Soviet Union during the last seven years.

The Soviet Union's official maps concerning the Sino-Indian boundary were delineated to China's advantage (at India's expense) for the first time about 15 years ago, in the halcyon days of "unbreakable friendship and brotherhood" between Moscow and Peking. India became uncannily conscious of these Soviet publications in 1963, in the wake of the October 1962 Chinese aggression.

The Government during the last seven years has come across five different official Soviet publications which corroborated the Chinese claims to Aksai Chin, Demchok and Nilang Jhadang in India's north-western frontier region and the entire NEFA territory in the north-east. These include (i) all the editions of the Atlas Mira (World Atlas) since 1954, (ii) Map of India published by the Institute of the Academy of Sciences in 1956, (iii) Atlas for Middle School children published in 1968, (iv) a wall map based on a survey by Russian cartographers in 1961 and (v) Atlas for the use of teachers, prepared in 1967.

Indian representations hitherto failed to elicit from Moscow anything more than a standard non-committal reply to the effect that the matter would be "looked into." All the East European Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, use the Soviet maps as the standard for their official publications. India, took up the issue with some of these Governments, too, but without any result.

SOVIET RUSSIA, Moscow  
2 August 1970

TEXT OF SOVIET RUSSIA ARTICLE ON AMUR ISLANDS

[Article by Far East Agricultural Scientific Research Institute Director, Doctor of Agricultural Sciences S. Kazmin and USSR Geographical Society full member, USSR Geographical Society Priamurskiy (Khabarovsk) Branch Scientific Secretary A. Stepanov: "The Orbit of the Large City"]

[Excerpts] Khabarovsk has a great history, it is filled with strikes and bitter class battles before the revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention the city suffered heavy destruction, but it was built anew and became even more beautiful. The free labor of Soviet people and the enormous help of the Communist Party and the entire country created in the same, but greatly expanded region, where, once single-story huts huddled together, a new Khabarovsk, which conceded nothing in appearance to the newly constructed cities that had risen up in the country in the years of socialist building.

It is necessary to begin in 1922, when the occupiers were driven into the ocean. The Khabarovsk inhabitants were at that time 30,000 strong; whereas now the city's population is approaching the half-million mark.

Modern Khabarovsk is a city with a highly developed industry and the cradle of Far Eastern machine building, which is represented by machine-tool building, electrical machine building, diesel production shipbuilding, and other branches. The industrial output of the city, which has about 100 combines, plants, and factories, includes the most varied products, a part of which is exported to over 20 foreign countries.

However, the city is not only the chief worker of Priamurskiy but is also a mighty generator of Soviet culture. Suffice it to say that a considerable section of the Far Eastern intelligentsia received training in Khabarovsk. Here there is now an extensive network of higher and specialized secondary academic institutions providing specialists not only for the district but also for other regions. The resonance of the scientific work and the sphere of interests of the integrated academic and industrial scientific research institutes that have been created in Khabarovsk extends far beyond the district's confines.

The present-day Khabarovsk reality is a true road to a still more glorious future. No matter how wide the Amur is as it flows around the city, from the bank opposite Khabarovsk one cannot completely view this 40-kilometer right-bank city lined with high buildings, masses of 5-story apartments, and splashes of park. The intermittent clearings in this line represent reserved areas for erecting new industrial enterprises and housing and green zones. The dotted fencing of the tower cranes on the left signifies the construction of the new northern microrayon where thousands of new settlers have already moved. The groups of accumulated cranes on the right signify the sites of the enterprises of the southern, industrial area, which are being expanded and reconstructed. Khabarovsk is also creating its own academgorodok. The USSR Academy of Sciences' Far East Center intends to open several scientific research institutes on the Amur.

The development of Khabarovsk has changed man's age-old attitude toward the Amur and has included the river's left bank and particularly the islands within the orbit of immediate urban plans. They are a place of relaxation and an important link in the suburban agricultural base which feeds the residents.

The fact that the river has been creating the soil for thousands of years and feeding it makes the floodlands especially valuable for the city. It remains only to protect the most valuable portion from the advance of the highflood waters. Age-old experience tells us where it is necessary to do this....

Above Khabarovsk the great Far Eastern river divides into two branches, as if preparing a gift for the city by its path. On its right channel, the Amur receives the blue waters of the Ussuri at the Kazakevichev settlement. The left channel washes the islands--suburbs of Khabarovsk--on the western and northern sides.

A garland of flood islands, Khabarovsk's distinctive suburb is spread between the channels. The largest of them are called Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriysk. Their total area is more than 30,000 hectares.

These islands are particularly important as a part of the city's "lungs" and its outside green zone. Here are the summer and winter fishing places which the residents love, the golden beaches filled with thousands of bathers in summer, and the highly popular winter ski runs. The first settlers of Khabarovsk recognized the islands as an agricultural suburban base because of their fertile lands. The best hay and pasture lands in the area are found here. The young animals and the dairy herds of the "Garovskiy," "Druzhba," and "Krasnorechenskiy" Sovkhozes are kept on the islands in summer camps. The heights, covered by floodwaters only in rare years, are covered with kitchen-garden crops. The kolkhoz fishermen also have their interests on the islands--their fisheries, which yield quintals of large small-mesh fish [chastik], are located here.

Industrial shops and city quarters have long since crossed the Amur channel and settled in part of Bolshoy Ussuriysk Island. The settlement, which is an island suburb of Khabarovsk and was created as a result of the development of shipping on the Amur, was named Ussuriyskiy. Mechanics, metalworkers, woodworkers, boilermakers, and people with dozens of other specialities, the "healers" of the Amur River fleet, live there.

Senior engineer of the cadres section of the Khabarovsk Technical Communications Sector Zoya Ivanovna Ivanova says:

Ship-repair shops are located here which give new life to the entire communications fleet of our sector: motor launches and dredgers. Good quality welding, carpentry, and boiler shops have been built. There is everything for work. Of course we in the settlement have a full range of cultural, everyday, and educational establishments without which city life is inconceivable: a school, club, library, kindergarten and day nursery, and canteen, radio, television, asphalted streets all are common here. We are even building more. Recently, two brick apartment houses were commissioned and a third begun.

Some of the settlement's inhabitants work in Khabarovsk, and the journey there by launch is short and pleasant. But the majority find work locally. The settlement quarries sand and other local building materials for Khabarovsk construction sites. The settlement gives hospitable anchorage to and undertakes repair work on many dozens of Amur ships wintering in the creeks and canals of the island. The river workers' heavy crane operations are done here.

The Khabarovsk people love their islands just as the Leningrad people love theirs; this love has endured much suffering, for the islands have a military history of glory as well as a working history.

During the Civil War and the struggle against foreign interventionists, the revolutionaries' underground communication lines passed through here, and Red raiding detachments operated here. A monument in the Kazakevichevo settlement recalls the immortal feat of communists and Komsomol members who barred the White Guards' path to Khabarovsk.

The islands have played their part in repulsing aggression. In 1931 Japanese imperialists seized northeast China-Manchuria. They broke through from the Chinese left bank of the Ussuri to the Soviet right bank in order to create a bridgehead on it for new provocations. Particularly attractive to the invaders were Taraborov and the Bolshoy Ussuriysk Islands, which faced the waterfront of the hated Khabarovsk, which was one of the main organizers of Soviet aid to the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist struggle.

Many times in those years the sacred blood of Soviet people was shed on the islands, blood of the Border Guards fighting enemy landing forces on the ice or in the water. Border Guards hero Mikhail Zhidkov gave his life in battles with Japanese brigands on the Ussuri in 1939.

At the same time, seven border guards at a neighboring outpost put to flight an armed band of 22 men. Machinegunner Ivan Telegeyenko was awarded the medal "for valor" for bravery and resourcefulness.

The realistic plans of the city's working people are linked with the Taraborov and Bolshoy Ussuriysk islands now, when every region of the country is so widely and practically discussing specific ways to implement the CPSU Central Committee July Plenum decisions on the further development of agriculture. In accordance with the plenum's materials, an extension of reclamation work in the Far East is envisaged. The Khabarovsk people see this as the prerequisite for strengthening the islands' role in supplying the city with provisions.

The Far East State Institute for Planning Water Resources Projects [Dalgiprovodkhoz] has proposed for implementation a detailed general project for further assimilating the Taraborov and Bolshoy Ussuriysk Islands by building on them three large highly-intensive sovkhoses. Dairy and potato-vegetable production will be the main trend of their work. Of the 30,000 hectares of the islands' agricultural pastureland planned for utilization, some 7,000 hectares will be used as arable land, and the rest of the area will remain as meadows and pastures.

The Khabarovsk citizens' increase in health and cheerfulness cannot be measured numerically. The possible increase of agricultural potential in connection with the creation of sovkhoses on islands would be decisive for satisfying the city's requirements. Island sovkhoses will be able to satisfy 50 percent of the city population's requirements for potatoes, even if it grows considerably, and a large proportion of the city's requirements for vegetables. The "Pioneer" strain of potato which is cultivated in the island's light soils is distinguished by its fine-tasting qualities and its starch content of up to 18 percent. With the building of local repositories, no additional transshipments are needed. Any place in the city--restaurant, dining room, store--will always have fresh potatoes only 15 minutes away by motor vehicle in winter. The island fodder base will permit the upkeep of an additional 5,600 head of livestock, including about 3,000 cows. An annual increase of about 10,000 tons of milk, and 700 tons of meat--produce so essential for Khabarovsk--is expected.

The practicability of the planned "Dalgiprovdkhov" project is confirmed by the data of the Far East Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture, which over a number of years has conducted experimental work on assimilation of lands on the islands for mowing-grass, long-term pastureland, sow fodder crops, potatoes, and vegetables. Apart from the advantages in the grain of the soil and fertility, island soils, compared with those of the mainland, receive somewhat more warmth during the vegetative period. The annual norm for precipitation is about 760 millimeters. The heat resources and moisture supplies of the islands, as confirmed by many years of experience, permit the growing of tomatoes, cucumbers, aubergines, marrows, watermelons, and melons, not to mention crops in lesser demand. The proximity of water insures good irrigation in the dry half of the summer, while the light composition of the soil provides for draining away excess moisture in the second half of the summer, which is accompanied by the monsoon rains.

The favorable conditions in combination with the application of ridge-and-bed [grebne-gryadkovaya] agrotechnology which has been devised by the agricultural institute permits potato and vegetable harvests that are at least twice as large as the present harvests gathered throughout the kray. As has already been noted, it is advantageous to use a large proportion of the island territory for fodder-growing land. A system of agrotechnical and improvement measures for the radical and surface improvement of meadows has been worked out and a technology for creating highly productive mowing-grass lands and pastureland has been proposed. In the conditions of a rainy summer it is extremely farsighted to utilize the island grasses to prepare valuable albumin, vitamin grass meal, cured hay, and early silage. In our view it would be advisable for this purpose to envisage the construction on the islands of a plant for grass meal production. In such a case the procurement of fodder would cease to be restricted by the unfavorable climatic conditions taking shape on the kray precisely at this time. Part of the fodder will be obtained from the now unutilized aftergrowth.

On these islands sown fodder crops, primarily corn, are beneficial in the long term.

Naturally, the assimilation of the island land tracts demands additional capital investments. But would it really cost little now to assimilate the heavy taiga soils which, moreover, are situated at a great distance from the kray center? One can say that generations of Khabarovsk dwellers have dreamed about large-scale agriculture on the Tarabarov and Bolshoy Usiriysk Islands. Now the inhabitants of the Far East have at their disposal equipment which is capable of lifting them out of the flood zone relatively cheaply. The islands of nature's treasure house will become shops of health and produce for the great Far East city.