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CASTRO'S BROKEN PLEDGES

Fidel Castro—Promises and Performance

I. CASTRO'S POLITICAL PROMISES TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA REGARDING RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL LIBERTY

GENERAL STATEMENTS

"Is it that we rebels of the Sierra Maestra do not want free elections, a democratic regime, a constitutional government? It is because they deprived us of those rights that we have fought since the 10th of March. It is because we want them more than anyone else that we are here. To prove it, there are our fighters dead in the Sierra and our companions assassinated on the streets or locked up in the dungeons of the prisons; fighting for the beautiful ideal of a free Cuba, democratic and just."¹

"The single word most expressive of our aim and spirit is simply—freedom. First of all and most of all, we are fighting to do away with dictatorship in Cuba and to establish the foundations of genuine representative government."²

"What are our procedures? Absolute respect for liberty, absolute respect for human rights, absolute respect for the human being. Regardless of how revolutionary the laws we propose to enact may be, they will be enacted without violating one single right, without suppressing even one public liberty, without beating anyone, and without even insulting anyone."³

ELECTIONS

"We want elections; but with one condition: truly free, democratic, impartial elections. * * * The elections should be presided over by a provisional, neutral, government with the support of all, which replaces the dictatorship in order to propitiate peace and to lead the country to democratic and constitutional normality."⁴

(Point 7 of the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra:) "To declare under formal promise that the provisional government will hold general elections for all offices of the state, the provinces and the municipalities at the end of one year under the norms of the Constitution of 1940 and the Electoral Code of 1943 and will deliver the power immediately to the candidates elected."⁵

"I want to assure the people that the laws of the land will be respected * * * Should the men who form today's government prove

¹ Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra, July 12, 1957, quoted in: Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro: Rebel-Liberator or Dictator?* Indianapolis, Ind., Doubleday Co., Inc., 1960, p. 108.
² "Why We Fight," *Coronet Magazine*, February 1958, quoted in: Lorea Wilkerson, *Fidel Castro's Political Programs from Reformist to Marxist-Leninist*, Gainesville, Fl. of Florida Press, 1965, p. 40.
³ Fidel Castro, television address, February 1959, quoted in: Lorea Wilkerson, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
⁴ Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra, July 12, 1957 quoted in: Jules Dubois, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.
⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

unequal to their task the people will be able to replace them by others in free elections * * * Public opinion will decide everything—it is an enormous force where there is real freedom. * * *⁶

POLITICAL PARTIES

“Political parties will have one and one right only during the provisional government, namely: freedom to defend their program before the people, to mobilize and organize the citizens within the broad framework of our Constitution and to participate in the general elections to be held.”⁷

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

(Point 8 of the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra) “To declare that the provisional government will have to adjust its mission to the following program: * * * Absolute guarantee of freedom of information, of the spoken and written press and of all the individual and political rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”⁸

“If one begins to close down one newspaper no other newspaper will feel safe—and if one begins to persecute one person because of his political views nobody else can feel safe.”⁹

ROLE OF THE ARMY IN POLITICS

(Point 6 of the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra) “To declare that the Civilian Revolutionary Front plans to divorce the army from politics and to guarantee the nonpolitical status, exempt from reprisal, of the armed forces. * * *¹⁰

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

“We will not establish military service because it is not right to force a man to put on a uniform and a helmet, to give him a rifle and force him to march.”¹¹

LABOR

(Point 8 of the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra) “To declare that the provisional government will have to adjust its mission to the following program: * * * Democratization of labor policy, promoting free elections in all unions and federations of industries.”¹²

CASTRO'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS

“Personally I do not aspire to any post and I consider that there is sufficient proof that I fight for the good of my people, without any personal or egotistic ambition soiling my conduct. After the revolution we will convert the Movement into a political party, and we will fight

⁶ Castro's victory speech in Havana, January 8, 1959, quoted in Boris Goldenberg, *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 177.
⁷ Castro's letter to the Cuban exiles in Miami, December 14, 1957, quoted in Jules Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
⁸ Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra quoted in Jules Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
⁹ Fidel Castro, television address, April 26, 1959, quoted in Boris Goldenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
¹⁰ Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra, quoted in Jules Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
¹¹ Fidel Castro, January 14, 1959, quoted in Theodore Draper, *Castroism: Theory and Practice* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 174.
¹² Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra, quoted in Jules Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

Concerning the legal system, Castro has stated since coming to power:

What was civil law concerned with, anyway? Usually something that did not affect the people: mortgages, terminations of contracts, * * * legal quarrels between employers, land owners, financiers * * * And today? Is one co-operative likely to sue another? Are tenants going to be sentenced to move out if there are no tenants but only owners? There is no reason why all the courts and judges should exist today.¹⁸

ELECTIONS

Under Castro there have been no elections, and no national parliament or other publicly elected representative body exists. In place of a system of elections and organized political opposition, Castro has substituted what he terms "direct democracy," through which sanction for the regime's policies is to come from "a constant meeting with the people." In practice, the meetings have taken the form of massive open-air rallies at which Castro announces government policies. Concerning the national, provincial, and municipal elections faithfully pledged by Castro as a revolutionary, he later stated:

A revolution expressing the will of the people is an election every day, not every four years * * * The revolution has changed the conception of pseudo-democracy for direct government by the people * * *. Why should democracy be the pedantic, false democracy of the others, rather than this direct expression of the will of the people? The people go to die fighting instead of going to a poll to scratch names on paper * * *. Some fool comes along to ask if, since we have a majority why don't we hold elections? Because the people do not care to please fools and fine little gentlemen! The people are interested in moving forward.¹⁹

POLITICAL PARTIES

As a revolutionary, Castro had repeatedly assured the Cuban people of his commitment to the free functioning of political parties. However, when the first signs of opposition to his regime began to organize around Major Hubert Matos, a popular guerrilla hero, Castro moved quickly and ruthlessly to destroy the movement. Matos was arrested, tried and sentenced to prison as a traitor to the revolution. The Matos affair signalled the end of the right to public dissent with the policies of the Castro regime. Castro followed this initial act of repression with measures which, within one year, effectively eliminated all organized political opposition in Cuba. The regime granted legal recognition only to the Communist Party, and it was subsequently incorporated into the government party. In his 1961 May Day speech, Castro called political parties "just an expression of class interests," and in December of that year, Castro justified his single-party government:

¹⁸ Fidel Castro, December 16, 1960, quoted in: Boris Goldenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

¹⁹ Fidel Castro, May Day address, May 1, 1961, quoted in: Loren Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

with the arms of the Constitution and of the law. Not even then will I be able to aspire to the presidency of the republic because I am only thirty-one years old. * * *¹³

"Everybody knows how much I respect the civilian institutions of the Republic. Everybody knows that I have not interfered nor shall interfere in the activities of the President of the Republic * * *. Should the President forbid me to speak in public or tell me not to give even one interview I would unconditionally obey this order."¹⁴

CASTRO AND COMMUNISM

"I never have been or am I a Communist. If I were I would have sufficient courage to proclaim it."¹⁵

¹³ Fidel Castro, interview with Jules Dubois, May 1958, quoted in: Jules Dubois, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

¹⁴ Fidel Castro, January 21, 1959, quoted in: Boris Goldenberg, op. cit., p. 177.

¹⁵ Fidel Castro, interview with Jules Dubois, May 1958, quoted in: Jules Dubois, op. cit., p. 202.

II. THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT'S RECORD OF FULFILLMENT OF CASTRO'S POLITICAL PROMISES TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

GENERAL

By the end of the first two years of Castro's regime, basic concepts of democratic action had been abandoned, and in its place, Castro had developed a government based on the power of one man, virtually unchecked by constitutional restraints. The Fundamental Law of the new regime, decreed on February 7, 1959, effectively emasculated the elective system of the Constitution by vesting all powers of government in an appointed Council of Ministers and granting them unchecked legislative powers. A single government party was installed in power under the complete control of Castro.

In his third year of power, Castro publicly rejected the democratic political system as embodied in the 1940 Constitution, a system which he never attempted to put into effect.

Concerning the 1940 Constitution, which had formed an integral part of Castro's political program, invoked in every public statement of policy during the revolutionary period, Castro later stated:

To those who talk to us about the 1940 Constitution, we say that the 1940 Constitution is already too outdated and old for us. We have advanced too far for that short section of the 1940 Constitution that was good for its time * * *. That Constitution has been left behind by this revolution, which as we have said, is a Socialist revolution. We must talk of a new constitution, yes, * * * but not a bourgeois constitution, not a constitution corresponding to the domination of certain classes by exploiting classes, but a constitution corresponding to a new social system without the exploitation of man by man. The new social system is called Socialism, and this constitution will therefore be a Socialist constitution.¹⁶

Concerning the court system and legal justice, expressly guaranteed by the 1940 Constitution, the Fundamental Law of Cuba, proclaimed by Castro in February 1959, afforded regular courts jurisdiction over all legal and criminal matters except crimes in the armed services. However, in October 1959, the rights of appeal and of habeas corpus were abolished; and in May 1962, "Revolutionary Tribunals," made up of politically trustworthy appointees and possessing considerable powers (including the right to levy the death penalty), were established to try a new category of "counterrevolutionary crime." Since that time, the competence of ordinary courts has been severely restricted and most legal action has fallen in the area of the politicized Revolutionary Tribunals.¹⁷

¹⁶ Castro's May Day Speech, May 1, 1961, quoted in: Loren Wilkerson, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

¹⁷ In 1965, Castro admitted to having had 20,000 persons imprisoned, convicted of political crimes. Official U.S. sources put the number of political prisoners in Cuba now at nearly 40,000.

What has given rise to this necessity [for a single party]? Above all, the fact that it is impossible to carry on, and especially to carry forward, a revolution without a solid and disciplined revolutionary organization. This becomes increasingly evident as the revolutionary process meets with more and more difficult tasks in the course of its normal development.²⁰

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Freedom of the press and public information was reinstated at the beginning of Castro's regime, but when editorial criticism of some of his policies began to occur in the latter half of 1959, the Castro government responded by imposing strict regulations which severely curtailed press and broadcasting freedom. By the end of 1960, a government-controlled Cuban news service was in operation, and radio and television stations had been organized into a state-controlled network.

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

The Compulsory Military Service Law was officially enacted on November 12, 1963. It provided for a compulsory three-year service period for all Cuban youth, who were divided into two classifications: those who would and who would not be permitted to bear arms. The latter category was made up of youths whom Castro referred to as "undesirables, the uneducated, ignorant, parasitical element, the potential lumpen of tomorrow."

The compulsory military service requirement, especially as regards Cuban youth in the second category, provided the Castro regime with a cheap, militarized labor corps which has been utilized extensively in the sugarcane and coffee fields.²¹

LABOR

In the first year of his regime, Castro called for the inclusion of Communists in the executive committee of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba. In response to substantial opposition by Confederation leaders, Castro established a committee which, although its ostensible purpose was to purge "Batista-collaborators" among the union leaders, actually acted to remove all union leaders opposed to Communist participation in labor leadership. Those purged included leaders of the tobacco, maritime, metal, agricultural, construction, and electrical workers unions, as well as the musicians, actors and artists unions.

At the same time, the government by decree suspended the right to strike, postponed wage increases indefinitely, and took control of all hiring throughout the nation. Law 647, decreed in the spring of 1960, vested in the Ministry of Labor the right to intervene in all concerns of labor including the unions, and charged it with removing all undesirable union leaders. By 1961, the independent labor union movement in Cuba no longer existed in any meaningful sense. The Law of Labor Justice (Law No. 1166 of January 1, 1965) determined "viola-

²⁰ Castro's speech commemorating the 1963 attack on the Moncada Barracks, July 26, 1961, quoted in Loreo Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 74.

²¹ According to a 1970 estimate by the U.S. Government, the Cuban armed services comprise 210,000 men. Of that total, it is estimated that 100,000 are now employed cutting sugar cane for the 1970 "40-million ton" harvest. (U.S. News and World Report, March 9, 1970, p. 49.)

tions of labor discipline" and affixed penalties for such acts. Administration of the law was entrusted to Work Councils established in every place of work whose election was based on a "good socialist attitude toward work."

In Cuba today, free unions have disappeared and workers are called upon to perform "voluntary" extra-hours labor without compensatory pay. City workers are often transported to the countryside for "voluntary" weekend labor on Cuban farms without remuneration.

CASTRO'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS

Since February 1959 when Fidel Castro assumed the role of Premier of the Cuban revolutionary government, he has remained the absolute governing power in Cuba. In an address to the nation on March 14, 1960, Castro asked: "And what is the good of a party where everything revolves around one man?" The man who asked that question is Prime Minister of his government, First Secretary of the Party, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President of the Central Planning Board and Director of the National Agrarian Reform Institute.²²

CASTRO AND COMMUNISM

In December 1961, Castro announced:

Do I believe in Marxism? I believe absolutely in Marxism! Did I believe in it on 1 January [1959]? I believed on the 1 January. Did I believe in it on 26 July [1953—attack on the Moncada Barracks]? I believed in it on 26 July * * * We believe in Marxism, * * * we believe that it is the most correct, most scientific, the only true theory, the only true revolutionary theory. Yes, I state it here, with complete satisfaction and with full confidence. I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life.²³

²² Joseph Clark, "Thus Spoke Fidel Castro," *Democrat*, Jan.-Feb. 1970, p. 47.
²³ Fidel Castro, speech of December 2, 1961, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, "Latin America,"* December 4, 1961, pp. 1111114, 1111115.

By the summer of 1960, the regime's agrarian reform was in full swing. All land worth confiscating was confiscated, including the houses, livestock and possessions of the prior owners. In most cases, confiscation was carried out with no attempt at valuation of property or inventory; no compensatory bonds were issued, and the proposed tribunals were never established. In 1960, cooperatives were established, but contrary to the declaration in Castro's program that the land, tools, and profits be collectively owned and shared, their management and regulation was vested totally in the state-run INRA. Finally, in 1962, the cooperatives were abolished through their merger with state-owned granjas, people's farms, which had been created in 1960.²⁶

As for private land ownership, between 1960 and 1963 the small farmers were incorporated in the Cuban Association of Private Farmers [ANAP] under the direction of the INRA, which set strict regulations for their operations. A primary requirement provided that the private owners sell a certain portion of their crop to the state procurement agency at fixed prices (below the market price). Failure to comply resulted in the termination of their supply of seed, fertilizer, credit, and state aid. All private farms were included in the nationwide development plans and regulated by such plans.

By 1963, the proportion of state-owned to privately-owned land was approximately 40-60. On October 2, 1963, Castro proclaimed the Second Agrarian Reform which, by means of a new wave of mass expropriations of land owned by Cuban farmers, reapportioned land ownership to 70 percent state-owned and 30 percent privately owned. Further, no provisions were made for additional distribution of property to private owners, and the remaining 30 percent was to be ceded to the state as the small farmers disappeared.

Thus, Castro's promises of ownership of land for those who worked it became in practice the integration of the entire agrarian structure under the dictatorship of the Cuban State.

FREE ENTERPRISE

Concerning free enterprise, Castro stated as a revolutionary in the Sierra Maestra:

Never has the 26th of July Movement talked about socializing or nationalizing the industries * * * We have proclaimed from the first day that we fight for the full enforcement of the Constitution of 1940, whose norms establish guarantees, rights and obligations for all the elements that have a part in production. Comprised therein is free enterprise and invested capital as well as many other economic, civic and political rights.²⁷

In his 1961 May Day address, Castro reaffirmed the safety of small private businesses under his regime:

The little industrialist and the little businessman can co-exist with the revolution. The revolution has always cared for the interests of small owners. A Socialist revolution does not mean that interests of certain sectors are eliminated without consideration * * * No social interest of the lesser

²⁶ Originally, workers on the state farms were permitted to retain small plots of land for private cultivation. However, in 1967, this practice was abolished and the farmers' labors were totally on behalf of the state.

²⁷ Fidel Castro, interview with Jules Dubois, May 1968, quoted in: Jules Dubois, op. cit., p. 263.

III. CASTRO'S AGRARIAN AND FREE ENTERPRISE POLICIES: PROMISES TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND RECORD OF FULFILLMENT

Agrarian Reform

Agrarian reform was a fundamental element in the reform demands of Castro's 26th of July revolutionary movement. Castro, in his Moncada trial defense of July 1953, proclaimed the need for a restructuring of the Cuban agrarian system based on the principle that those who cultivate the land should own it. At that time Castro called for wide redistribution of land then held by the large plantations through grants to small planters and peasant farmers, with indemnification to the former owners. Point 8 of the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra included a provision for "Establishment of the foundations of an agrarian reform that tends to the distribution of barren lands and to convert into proprietors all the lessee-planters, partners and squatters who possess small parcels of land, be it property of the state or of private persons, with prior indemnification to the former owners."²⁴ The first Land Reform Law of the new regime, signed on May 17, 1959, proposed a six-point program for remedying Cuba's agricultural injustices.

- (1) The prohibition of latifundia: in general, private estates would not be allowed to exceed 30 caballerias [1 caballeria = 33.16 acres]. The former owners would receive compensation in the form of long-term bonds. Agricultural tribunals would be set up to decide disputed questions.
- (2) Abolition of the tenancy system: all small tenant farmers, including those who had no title deeds, would become owners.
- (3) Land distribution: all small tenant farmers, including squatters—those without title deeds—would be entitled to a piece of land not less than two caballerias per family. This minimum would be distributed free. In addition, the new smallholder would be able to buy a further three caballerias at a low price. The distribution would start with state-owned land, followed by unproductive private estates and only then by the remainder of the confiscated land.
- (4) * * *
- (5) * * *
- (6) Co-operatives would be set up with the assistance and under the direction of INRA [National Agrarian Reform Institute—a new state agricultural administration agency]. The land and the tools would become the collective property of the members of the co-operative, who would farm the land and share the profits.²⁶

²⁴ Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra, quoted in Jules Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
²⁶ Boris Goldenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

levels of society is to be condemned. The revolution will adhere to its word * * * Little businessmen and industrialists have credit today. The revolution has no interest in nationalizing them * * * The revolution feels that there can be collaboration from the little businessman and little industrialist.²⁸

Two months later, Castro made the following statement in an address to the nation:

Small businesses will disappear as the revolution progresses. At the end of the revolutionary process, this type of business, which employs workers, will have disappeared. This must be understood by small businessmen * * * We tell them that your business, your small industry will not be eternal; they will disappear as the revolution progresses. * * *²⁹

Beginning in July 1960, the Castro regime, even while ensuring the Cuban owners of private businesses that their investments would be safe, instituted a series of measures designed to transform the economy into a state-operated, centralized structure paralleling that of the Soviet Union. By October of that year, all foreign-owned enterprises, as well as Cuban-owned business of any consequence, had been confiscated and placed under state management. As the gradual process of collectivization and nationalization continued, by 1968 the Castro regime had placed itself in complete control of the industrial, construction, transportation, retail trade, wholesale and foreign trade, and banking sectors of the economy.

In two speeches on March 13 and 15, 1968, Castro ordered the immediate expropriation of all remaining private business enterprises. By the end of that month, 55,000 privately owned Cuban establishments, most of which had sprung up after the 1959 revolution to enter to needs neglected by state-owned industry and trade, had been confiscated and either closed or placed under new managers selected from the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, a state organization.³⁰

²⁸ Fidel Castro, May 1, 1961, quoted in: Loreo Wilkerson, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

²⁹ Fidel Castro, May Day Address commemorating the 1953 attack on the Moncada Barracks, July 26, 1961, quoted in Loreo Wilkerson, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

³⁰ Ernst Jialperin, "The Cuban Revolution in 1968," *Current History*, January 1969, pp. 43-44; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Revolutionary Offensive," *Trans-Action*, April 1969, p. 22.

~~BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY~~

October 1970

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

October 2	India	Conclusion of Gandhi Centennary marking Gandhi's birth Oct. 2, 1869. While Gandhi was leading India's independence movement, he was the object of Soviet villification -- most notably, he is called a "traitor to the Indian people" by the Soviet Encyclopedia, 2nd edition. The new edition of the Encyclopedia, which is now in publication, may correct this outrage. However, the first volume to appear has already raised a storm of controversy in India by showing parts of Indian territory in China.
October 3	Paris	25th anniversary of World Federation of Trade Unions founded at end of WWII to promote international cooperation, but subverted within 4 years by its Communist members and turned into a Soviet front. The Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 caused serious dissensions within WFTU, about which the present WFTU leadership is silent.
October 9	Latin America	In 1967 in Bolivia Che Guevara met his death in guerrilla warfare which he was attempting to spread through Latin America according to Castro's doctrine of armed revolution.
October 9 - 14	Lima	International Seminar on the Problems and Struggles of Latin American Peoples sponsored by the (Communist) World Peace Council.
October 19	Japan	Anniversary of the signing in 1956 by USSR and Japan of a protocol ending their technical state of war, in lieu of a peace treaty. The lack of a peace treaty has left unresolved the disposition of the

		Kurile Islands, which the USSR seized from Japan in the last days of WW II.
October 23	Hungary	Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.
October 24	New York	United Nations Day and 25th anniversary of the UN. The UN celebrations will run 14 - 24 October, with many heads-of-state expected to speak to the General Assembly.
October 24	Berlin	20th anniversary of the dedication in West Berlin City Hall of the Freedom Bell, given to the people of West Berlin by Radio Free Europe. The Bell was accompanied by Freedom Scrolls signed by more than 16 million Americans. Over 400,000 Berliners, about 100,000 from East Berlin, were in City Hall Square to hear General Clay give the dedication.
October 24	Santiago	The Chilean National Congress meets to elect the next president of Chile, choosing between the two candidates who won the highest pluralities in the national elections on 4 September, Salvadore Allende and Jorge Alessandri.
October 26 - November 4	Budapest	8th General Assembly of the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

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October 1970

THE COMMUNIST SCENEAlbanian Exposé Ten Years After the Fact

Ever since Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders from Khrushchev on have tried to divest themselves of the Stalinist image of arbitrary, ruthless dictators not only in domestic affairs, but in the leadership of the international Communist movement. Thus, they have tried to create the impression of a willingness to permit free discussion of all points of view at international Communist conferences, and a mutual respect for the independence of all parties. The growing number of Communist parties and leaders who express points of view diverging from those of the CPSU has seemed at times to bear witness to a more relaxed attitude on the part of the Soviets toward dissent. But the fact is that this dissent is growing precisely because the Soviet leadership is "stalinistically" incapable of acknowledging the validity of any point of view except its own and because it has never ceased trying to force its will on other parties in the international movement's private councils.

A revealing reminder of the continuing Soviet practice of dictating to the international movement was given recently by the Albanian Workers' Party. About June 1970, the third volume of a history of the Albanian Workers' Party [Communist] was issued. It contained the hitherto unpublished speech which Enver Hoxha, then as now First Secretary of the Albanian Workers' Party, delivered to the all-important meeting of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. (Attached are excerpts from this speech as broadcast in English by Tirana radio in June and July of this year. It was also published in the August issue of the Albanian Party journal, *Rruga e Partisë*.)

The speech represents the Albanian party's official reaction to the Soviet initiative undertaken at the Rumanian Communist Party Congress the previous June to bludgeon the world's CP's into condemning the Chinese Communist Party for the latter's refusal to adopt the Soviet international line. Hoxha's speech minces no words in describing the arbitrariness of the Soviet leadership in pushing through its own line without the slightest regard to the views of their so-called "equal, fraternal" parties.

In view of the bluntness of Hoxha's attack, it may be that this was a watershed in Soviet-Albanian relations. It is hard to imagine the Soviets' being able to overlook Hoxha's insult, though the open, no-holds-barred, name-calling polemics did not break out until some two years later.

Outside observers of international Communist conferences are usually obliged to engage in speculation and guess-work on relations among CP's, and particularly the Soviet attitude, in such conferences. This they do by careful reading and analysis of the official noncommittal handouts from such conferences, more rarely on the basis of what some dissenting Communist participating in the conference wishes to reveal for his own purposes. Here is the rare opportunity of seeing directly what actually happens, to watch the efforts of the Soviets to dominate world Communism. It is instructive not only concerning Soviet attitudes and behavior to the present day, but perhaps equally so concerning the curious conspiracy by which so many of the free world CP's kept silent about the bombshell Enver Hoxha dropped ten years ago.

Excerpts from a Speech by Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Workers' Party to the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, 16 November 1960. Published in The Albanian Workers' Party, Principal Documents, Volume III, Tirana, Albania, [announced] June, 1970.

On the Condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party

"...on the occasion of the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party on 24 June 1960, the Bucharest Conference was suddenly organized on the initiative of the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union without any previous warning, at least as far as our party was concerned. Instead of exchanging opinions and setting the date for this conference we are holding today [i.e. 16 November 1960], which was agreed upon by the representatives, they took up another topic, namely the ideological and political accusations directed against the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of the Soviet information material. On the basis of this material, entirely unknown up to a few hours before the meeting of the conference, the delegations of the fraternal communist and workers' parties were supposed to pronounce themselves in favor of the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at a time when they had come to Bucharest for another purpose....

"The fact is that the overriding concern of the Soviet leadership was to have its accusations against the Chinese Communist Party passed over quickly and to have the Chinese Communist Party condemned at all costs.

"Our party would have been in full agreement with an international conference of the communist and workers parties...provided that those conferences were in order, had the approval of all the parties, had a clear agenda set in advance.... They should be conducted in complete equality among parties in accordance with communist and internationalist spirit and with lofty norms.

"We think that the Bucharest Conference did a great disservice to the cause of the international communist movement.... The blame for this falls on the shoulders of the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.... The [Soviet aim] is to have the Chinese Communist Party condemned by the international communist movement for faults which do not exist and are baseless.... The whole Albanian Workers' Party holds the unanimous view that the Soviet comrades made a grave mistake in Bucharest by unjustly condemning the Chinese Communist Party for having allegedly deviated from Marxism-Leninism, for having allegedly violated and abandoned the 1957 Moscow Declaration. They have accused the Chinese Communist Party of being dogmatic, sectarian, of being an opposer of law, of being opposed to peaceful coexistence, of wanting a privileged position in the camp and in the international communist movement, etc....they tried to impose their incorrect

views towards the Chinese Communist Party on the other communist and workers' parties.

"...when the Soviet comrades began their feverish and impermissible work of inveigling the comrades of our delegation in Bucharest, it became clear to the Albanian Workers' Party that the Soviet comrades wanted, by means of groundless arguments and pressures, to lure the Albanian Workers' Party into the trap they had prepared, to bring it into line with the distorted views of the Soviet comrades. What was of importance to Khrushchev -- and Andropov said as much to Comrade Hysni Kapo -- was whether we would line up with the Soviet side or not.... What was important for the comrades of the Soviet leadership was not the views of a Marxist-Leninist party such as ours, but only that we would maintain the same attitude in Bucharest as the Central Committee of the Soviet Union.

"...now we hear that, excepting the Albanian Workers' Party, the Chinese Communist Party, the Korean Workers' Party, the Vietnam Workers' Party, the other parties of the camp had been acquainted with the fact that a conference would be organized in Bucharest to accuse China. If this is so, then it is very clear that the question becomes very much more serious and assumes the form of a faction of an international character. Nevertheless, our party has not been taken unawares and it did not lack vigilance....

"Some leaders of fraternal parties called us neutralists, some others reproached us with deviation from the correct Marxist-Leninist line and these leaders went so far as to try to discredit us before their own parties.

"Has a party the right to express its opinion freely on matters as it views them?.... We did not accept to pass judgment on the mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party and even less to condemn the Chinese Communist Party on the problems raised in such a distorted, hasty and anti-Marxist way against it. We counseled caution, calm and a comradely spirit in treating this matter so vital and exceptionally serious for international communism. This was the whole crime for which stones were thrown at us.... Why did.... Soviet comrades make such great haste to accuse the Chinese Communist party groundlessly and without facts?.... The Albanian Workers' Party is of the opinion that the Bucharest meeting was not only a gross mistake but also a mistake which was deliberately aggravated.

"...[ideological differences between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party] could have been settled in due time and in a Marxist-Leninist way between the two parties concerned. According to the Chinese Document, the Chinese Communist Party says that these differences of principle cropped up immediately following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and were raised by the Chinese comrades.... The Albanian Workers' Party thinks that if these differences could not be settled between the two parties concerned, a meeting should have been sought of the communist and workers' parties at which these matters could be brought up and discussed, and a stand taken towards them. It is not right that these

matters should have been left unsettled, and the blame for this must fall on the Soviet comrades, who had knowledge of these differences and disregarded them because they were certain of their line and its inviolability.

"In order to condemn the Chinese Communist Party for imagined insults and sins, Nikita Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders were very concerned to present the case as if the divergences existed between China and the whole international communist movement. But when it came to problems like those I've mentioned, judgment on them had been passed by Khrushchev and his companions alone, thinking that there was no need for them to be discussed collectively at a meeting of the representatives of all the parties, although these were major international problems in character. The Hungarian counterrevolution occurred, but matters were hushed up. Why this tactic of hushing things up when they are not to the advantage of the Soviet comrades while now, when it is to their advantage the Soviet comrades not only call meetings like that at Bucharest but do their utmost to force on others the view that China is in opposition to the line of all the communist and workers' parties of the world? The Soviet comrades made a similar attempt towards us also. In August 1960 the Soviet leadership addressed a letter to our party in which it proposed that with a view to preventing the spark of divergences from flaring up, the representatives of our two parties should meet so that our party would align itself with the Soviet Union against the Chinese Communist Party and that our two parties present a united front at this present meeting. Of course, the central committee of our party refused such a thing and its official reply described this as an entirely non-Marxist deed, a factional act directed against a fraternal third party, against the Communist Party of China. Of course this correct principled stand of our party was not to the liking of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"At the [Bucharest] meeting, the Chinese Communist Party was accused of many sins. This should have figured in the communiqué. Why was it not done? If the accusations were well grounded, why all this hesitation and why issue a communiqué which does not respond to the purpose for which the conference was called? Why was there no reference in it to the great danger of dogmatism allegedly threatening international communism? [The Bucharest Conference] was not based on principle, it was a biased one to achieve certain objectives of which the main one was that of accusing the Chinese Communist Party of dogmatism, to cover up some grave mistakes of line which the Soviet leading comrades have allowed themselves to make.

"The Soviet comrades stood in need of the support of the other parties on this matter. This is why they tried openly to catch them unawares.... The unanimous condemnation of China in Bucharest was reported in an effort to create opinion in the parties and among the people in this direction.

"Immediately following the Bucharest meeting, an unexpected, unprincipled attack was launched. Brutal intervention and all-round pressure was undertaken against the Albanian party and its central committee. The attack was

begun by Khrushchev in Bucharest and was continued by Kozlov in Moscow. Comrade Kozlov has even put to us Albanians these alternatives: either coexistence as he conceives it or an atomic bomb from the imperialists which will turn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave no Albanian alive. Until now, no representative of United States imperialism has made such an atomic threat against the Albanian people. But here it is and from a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union....

"But attempts to arouse suspicion about the correct stand of our party in Bucharest were not confined to Moscow alone, they were made with even more fervor in Tirana by the employees of the Soviet embassy with the Soviet ambassador to Tirana himself in the lead.... They began feverishly and intensively to attack the Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Workers' Party to split the party, to create panic and confusion in its ranks, to alienate the leadership from the party, and the Soviet ambassador to Tirana went so far as to attempt to incite the generals of our army to raise the peoples' army against the leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party and the Albanian state....

"It is clear that these contemptible acts of these Soviet comrades were aimed at splitting the leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party, at alienating it from the masses and from the party, and this as a punishment for the alleged crimes we had committed in Bucharest, for having the courage to express our views freely as we saw fit.

"Our only crime is that in Bucharest we did not agree that a fraternal communist party like the Chinese Communist Party should be unjustly condemned. Our only crime is that we had the courage to oppose openly, at an international communist meeting and not in the market place, the unjust action of Nikita Khrushchev. Our only alleged crime is that we are a small party of a small and poor country, which...should merely applaud and approve but express no opinion of its own.

"This year [1960] our country has suffered many natural calamities [including earthquake, flood and drought, followed by crop failures.] The people were threatened with starvation.... Our government urgently sought to buy grain from the Soviet Union, explaining the very critical situation that we were faced with. This happened after the Bucharest meeting.... During these critical days we got wise to many things. Did the Soviet Union, which sells grain to the whole world, not have 50,000 tons to give the Albanian people who are loyal brothers of the Soviet people, loyal to Marxism-Leninism and to the socialist camp, at a time when, through no fault of their own, they were threatened with starvation? Comrade Khrushchev had once said to us: 'Do not worry about grain, for all that you consume in a whole year is eaten by mice in our country.' The mice in the Soviet Union might eat, but the Albanian people could be left to die of starvation until the leaders of the Albanian Workers' Party submit to the will of the Soviet leaders.... This is terrible, comrades, but it is true.... Nor is it a friendly act not

to accept our [credit] for buying grain in the Soviet Union but oblige us to draw on the limited gold reserves from our national bank in order to buy maize from the Soviet Union for the people's bread.

"They [the Soviet leaders] have become swollen-headed over the colossal successes attained by the Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ...considering themselves infallible, consider every decision, every act, every word they say and every gesture they make infallible and irrevocable. Others may err, others may be condemned, while they are above such reproach. 'Our decisions are sacred. They are inviolable. We can make no concession to, no compromise with the Chinese Communist Party,' the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said to our people.

"Then why did they call us together in Bucharest? Of course, to vote with our eye blindfolded for the views of the Soviet leaders. Is this the Marxist way? Is it a normal procedure? Is it permissible for one party to engage in subversive acts, to cause a split, to overthrow the leadership of another party or of another state? Never!

On the Yugoslav Revisionists

"The Albanian Workers' Party considers the decisions taken against Tito's renegade group by the Information Bureau [Cominform decision in 1948 to expel the League of Yugoslav Communist Parties] not as decisions taken by Comrade Stalin personally, but as decisions taken by all the parties that made up the Information Bureau, and not only by these parties alone, but also by the communist and workers' parties which did not take part in the Information Bureau. Since this was a matter that concerned all the communist and workers' parties it also concerned the Albanian Workers' Party which, having received and studied a copy of the letter Comrades Stalin and Molotov had written to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, endorsed in full both the letter and the decision of the Information Bureau.

"Why then was the change of attitude towards the Yugoslav revisionists adopted by Comrade Khrushchev and the Central Committee of the Soviet Union in 1955 not made an issue for consultation in the normal way with the other communist and workers parties, that was conceived and carried out so hastily and in a unilateral way? This was a matter that concerned us all. The Yugoslav revisionists had either opposed Marxism-Leninism and the communist workers parties of the world or they had not. Either they were wrong or we, not only Stalin, had erred against them. It was not up to Comrade Khrushchev to settle this affair at his own discretion. That is what he did! And this change of attitude in the relations with the Yugoslav revisionists is connected with his visit to Belgrade. This was a bombshell to the Albanian Workers' Party which immediately opposed it categorically.

"[We stressed] that the Yugoslav issue could not be settled in a unilateral way, but that a meeting of the Information Bureau should be called

This matter should have been settled after a correct and lengthy discussion.... And time has confirmed that the Yugoslav issue should not be settled in this precipitate way. The slogan of overriding interests was lodged. The second resolution of the Information Bureau was speedily revoked. The epoch of reconciliation with the Yugoslav comrades began. The conspirators, wherever they were, were re-examined and rehabilitated, and the Yugoslav comrades came out unscathed, strutted like peacocks, trumpeted abroad that their just cause had triumphed, and that criminal Stalin had trumped up all these things and a situation was created under which whoever refused to take this course was dubbed as a Stalinist who should be done away with.

On Condemnation of Stalin

"Just as it pleased him [Khrushchev] to say that the decisions of the 20th and 21st Congresses were adopted by all the communist and workers parties in the same way, he should also be magnanimous and consistent in passing judgment on Stalin's work so that the communist and workers parties of the world could adopt it with a clear conscience.

"There cannot be two yardsticks nor two measures of weight for this matter. Then why was Comrade Stalin condemned at the 20th Congress without prior consultation with the other communist and workers parties of the world and why did many sister parties learn of it only when the imperialist press published Comrade Khrushchev's secret report far and wide? The condemnation of Comrade Stalin was imposed on the communist and progressive world by Khrushchev.

"Much has been said about our unity. This is essential and we should fight to strengthen and temper it but the fact is that on many important issues of principle we have no unity."

~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

October 1970

Mounting Disaffection in the French Communist Party

Ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, there have been rumblings of dissent in the large and conservative French Communist Party (PCF). Initially condemning the Soviet action in 1968, the PCF has since been notably unenthusiastic about continuing its criticism and even less intent on examining the various reasons that have been suggested for the Soviet overrunning of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, numbers of individual French Communists have made inquiries about the invasion and the subsequent Soviet-directed "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. Foremost among French Communists who persisted in seeking the causes of the Soviet crime is Roger Garaudy, long-time theoretician of PCF, successively deprived of his posts as member of the Politburo of the Party, of its Central Committee, and finally of his cell. Since the invasion he has used articles, books, and personal appearances to point out the degeneracy of the Soviet system of Communism, passionately arguing that other parties should not be obliged to follow the Soviet "road to socialism." His plea to reject the Soviet model in favor of a model appropriate to specific national conditions with no necessary relation to the Soviet experience, ultimately led the PCF to purge him from the party. Outside the party, Garaudy has pursued his crusade. In the attachment, we reproduce some of his latest appeals to French Communists to seek their own independent road. Other attachments include views of dedicated, old time French Communists who now have given voice to long suppressed doubts over the course their party has been taking.¹

The importance of these selections lies in their universal applicability to Communist movements throughout the world, almost all of which suffer from the same dilemma: recognition of the alien nature of Russian Communism, versus the habit of giving uncritical praise to the "first socialist state in the world" combined with the necessity of flattering the Soviet Union in order to assure continued Soviet financial subsidy.

The attached citations are, respectively, from:

- a) Roger Garaudy's preface to his publication of the "Varga Testament," a "samizdat" typescript smuggled out of the USSR, written by the brilliant but unorthodox (deceased) Soviet economist Eugen Varga;
- b) Charles Tillon's criticism of the PCF leadership in the non-

1. Full translations, as well as the original French text, can be provided, if desired, along with some of the official PCF reactions.

Communist magazine Le Nouvel Observateur. Tillon, formerly a prominent PCF leader who was earlier (in 1952) castigated and relegated to the sidelines by the party for his violations of the party line;

- c) Laurent Navès' open letter in Le Nouvel Observateur to his cell leader, recounting his disappointment with Soviet appointee, Georges Marchais, to the leadership of the PCF and with the purging of Garaudy and Tillon.

All are eloquent testimonials to disaffection of thinking Communists in France and elsewhere.

(Attached also is a French analysis of the current status of the PCF, suggesting that the current dissent, unlike the various "deviations" erupting in recent years past, is widespread and likely to have far-reaching consequences.)

Excerpts from "Why I Do Not Accept Marchais" by Laurent Navès in Le Nouvel Observateur, 24-30 August 1970.

[Prefatory remarks by the editors of Le Nouvel Observateur]:

The testimony which we have agreed to publish here is not anonymous. It was signed by Laurent Navès, a 71-year old retired school teacher, 9 rue de la Rachoune, in Albi. Furthermore, it would be difficult to assert that Mr. Navès is anti-Communist. He has been a member of the French Communist Party since 1945. The number of his membership card is 92413. In Tarn, everyone knows the family of this militant. His father, a Socialist shoemaker, was a close friend of Jaures. His son, Robert, left the Lyceum in Albi in order to join the "Fabian Army," and was killed by the Germans. Laurent Navès asked us to publish an open letter, which he addresses to his long-time comrade, the Secretary of the Communist Federation of Tarn. We will not pass judgment -- it is not up to us to do so -- on the charges expressed at the beginning of this letter against the posture of Mr. Marchais. But we do respect the sensitivity of this militant.

Once more Communists will speak of "intrigue." Once more we say to them that, if they would like to reply, they may do so here, in the same place, in the same manner. French Communists are doing something that is significant, and some of them feel they should let us know. If l'Humanité had agreed to publish the testimony of these militants, we would not have to do so.

* * * *

"Dear Henry, I believe that I am doing the right thing by expressing to you the feelings of several comrades at the base, who recently paid me a visit and who share my strong feeling with respect to the Marchais affair. That doubtless was not an isolated source of dissatisfaction, but an indication of deep trouble which is disturbing the whole Party....

"George Marchais agreed to go to Germany during the war as an STO. [Service du Travail Obligatoire - Compulsory Labor Service]. For my part, I cannot bear, without anguish as well as rebellion, the idea that a high-level leader of my Party worked in Hitler's factories, while my son, a schoolboy, a member of the Communist Youth, fell in combat, as many others did, for the liberation of our country....

"While Marchais was not yet a member of the Party, he nevertheless was French, and, as such, his duty dictated that he go into hiding, as many others did, from all classes of society -- one out every two, according to estimates. They did not hesitate, for the most part, to join the maquis, as a matter of simple patriotic reflex, rather than contribute to the war effort of the enemy.

"And when I think of the very careful and the very strict procedures used by the Party when it chooses its cadres, the attention it gives to the biographies which the militants at the base must scrupulously fill out, in most minute detail, to attain the most modest posts of responsibility, I cannot understand how Marchais was able to climb, without any checking, one by one, the various Party rungs, until he reached the highest-level functions, unless he concealed this episode in his life -- which would be even more serious....

"He said that he later escaped. But then the question is: What did he do in the Resistance upon his return to Paris? His strange silence in this regard, when he talks, makes one think that he was not a part of the ardent, patriotic movement which at that time stirred the young people and which led them, in greater and greater numbers, into the fight for freedom....

"Charles Tillon, one of the most illustrious personalities of the Party, recently referred, during an interview granted a journalist of France-Inter, to these verses of Aragon, written at the very time when the menace of their enrollment in the STO weighed heavily on the young French people:

'Do not go to the enemy;
Do not go, it is felony.
Do not go; take a gun!'

"Well, Marchais went and, after his escape, he did not take a gun. And yet he was in the prime of life and this at a period when others were falling, without political considerations -- and some were no more than children....

"I do not intend at this point to overcriticize those who allowed themselves to be marched off to the STO at that time, nor those who did not respond to the call to fight for freedom. Some later joined the Party and I do not find fault with that. But while certain misjudgments and weaknesses may be excusable in the case of an obscure militant at the base, they are not tolerable in the case of a high-level leader, whose past must be an example of uprightness....

"Georges Marchais, in my opinion, does not meet this requirement....

"If the young people of today, who did not experience these events, can look on them with a certain detachment, I am certainly convinced, on the other hand, that our old militants, who have suffered so much, and all those who have been battered by the sacrifices of the Resistance, cannot accept them with the same lightness....

"The memory of my son, who fell so young in a maquis group, and also the thought of all the other martyrs of Hitler's barbarity, who were shot down or who died in deportation, no longer make it possible for me to accept without protest the presence at the head of the Party of a man whose posture, in my eyes, distorts the pure image that I had of it, of a man whose past does not

embody heroism or the blood of the Communist Party in the Resistance....

"I had hoped that, after a reasonable lapse of time, Marchais would have the dignity to resign from his functions, or that he would be invited to do so by the political bureau. That was not the case at all....

"My initial impulse was to leave the Party. But I flinch before such an extreme, which would be a veritable wrench for me. And I still hope that this can be avoided by forthcoming changes in the leadership of the Party....

"It was not before a long inner debate had taken place that I came to a decision. In my confused dismay, I sorrowfully sought the step I should take. For several days, I was torn between my attachment to the Party and the cruel reverberations that this affair aroused deep down within me. First, I expected a categorical denial. L'Humanité, alas, presented me with only vague explanations, through which an embarrassed, furtive acknowledgment was hinted. Facts, as one says, are not to be denied, and it does no good to try to drown them in useless polemics....

"In the spare time that I have as an inactive person, I thought that I would be doing a good thing, Henry, to write two letters to you in your capacity as a federation secretary, one the same day that this affair broke out, the other the following day, to tell you of my anguish. You did not feel it necessary to answer me -- not even with a short note. Thus I collided futilely against the leader of my federation and I realize that additional protests, in any form, would be useless. The relentlessness of the organization, at the various echelons of its hierarchy, quickly neutralized any personal attempt at appraisal....

"And since, on the other hand, I am not so naive as to believe that a Party organ would be likely to publish this text, I must therefore regretfully present it through some other means, if I wish to freely make known to my comrades these few reflections on some serious matters concerning which they cannot be indifferent....

"A few more words. In my opinion, the best Communists are not those who docilely accept, in all circumstances, the directives of a higher level when, according to their conscience, they seem to call for reservations. Such submission is the result of a system of authoritarian dominance which completely dries up the source of a spirit of criticism and of initiative. In fact, the excesses of centralism, depending on the character of a federation secretary, for example, permit him to assume a power which he too often has a tendency to abuse. He can cleverly, during conferences when the maintenance or renewal of cadres are decided, cause the removal from a leadership post of a comrade who has ceased to please him and to surround himself with persons who are at his disposal....

"And one can thus impose, from top to bottom, a subtle and rigorous mechanism of authority which reduces the militants at the base to the simple

role of carrying out orders. That also explains the choice of delegates who assure a surprising unanimity in our congresses....

"In looking back on the federation headquarters that I frequented every day for so long, I see that certain comrades fear being 'battered', or being treated with other ill-sounding epithets, as a result of having expressed mild criticism. Who knows how many excellent comrades have become suspect and have been harshly rebuked for taking the liberty, one day, of presenting a personal point of view which did not agree with such and such an article in l'Humanité or with the peremptory statements of a federation leader! Faced with this state of affairs, some began, little by little, to remain silent, while others, and often some of the best ones, discreetly left on tiptoe -- never to return....

"The only thing that I reproach myself with now is that, in the long run, I too easily acquiesced in the harshness of the Party, as well as the rigidity of its internal operation....

"Instead of currently unleashing against an always latent anti-Communism explosion in the bourgeoisie, the Party would have done better not to have furnished a pretext for it. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent normalization had already done us the greatest harm. And then, through a confused combination of ideas, the stir that was created among us by the Garaudy affair -- a Garaudy, whose pathetic face on television, at the time of the last congress, remains impressed on everyone's memory -- and then his exclusion, soon followed by that of Charles Tillon, have left French opinion with the unfortunate impression of a revival of Stalinist methods -- that one had thought had been eradicated. I certainly want to believe that [Artur] London-type trials would not be tolerated by us. And yet, people are beginning to get this idea. When one goes outside the Party circle, one perceives, as one mingles with others, their feelings and their reactions to the brutal exclusion of two men who were among the best known and the most respected in the Party. Also, it is useless to conceal to what degree these events have awakened distrust, and sometimes even a violent disapproval, among the majority of the democrats in our country, who again are turning away from the Party, and this at a time when a regrouping of all the forces of the left is imperative. And then the Marchais affair took place, and caused concern among the ranks this time, and provided food here and there for most severe commentaries....

"The Party also is not infallible or irreproachable. It is indeed too easy to throw onto others the consequences of its own errors or blunders. First of all, are not those who feed anti-Communism in the leadership itself of the Party -- a Party which will not again refind its esteem and a greater audience in French opinion until it finally adapts itself to the democratic traditions of our country, in short, when it appears in a new light....

"It is my dearest wish, because the future of Socialism in our country depends on it. And I hope that the development even of the history that

we are in the process of living will soon lead the Party to this necessary adaptation....

"I am a Communist -- and I will continue to be one, no matter what happens -- in heart and thought -- still always firmly attached to all that molded, even before I reached the age of manhood, the bases of my conscience.

Fraternally,

Laurent Navés "

Excerpts from the Preface by Roger Garaudy to Le Testament de Varga (The Varga Testament), Paris, Editions Bernard Grasset, 1970.

"Following the excommunication of Yugoslavia in 1948, the Chinese schism 10 years later, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the problem of the plurality of socialist forms became the central problem for the communist and workers' movement. On the international level, crisis and the dislocation of the movement would result from the solution to the problem if the fiction of the single form were maintained, as well as the decline of the communist party in each nation, or on the other hand, if the problem were correctly resolved, this would lead to the possibility of uniting and rallying all of the forces of the future around the joint project of a socialist form answering the needs of our era and the specific conditions in each country. The description of the Russian model for socialism by the great Soviet economist Varga is a key document for consideration of this problem, its timeliness and its development in the near future....

"...[The Varga Testament] is neither a book nor an article, but a "konspekt," that is to say, a draft for a book, a summary, or theses, published for the first time in the clandestine mimeographed review Phoenix, under the authority of Galanskov, who played a notable role during the Ginsburg trial in January 1968. The authenticity of this text, which is widely known in the Soviet Union as the Testament of Varga, and which was found among the effects of General Grigorenko, has never been challenged by the Soviet leaders....

"...The successive incidents which occurred in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union give us a rather dark picture of its leaders. If one is to believe Stalin, almost all of the leading companions of Lenin, whether it be Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Piatakov, or the others, were traitors. If one is to believe Khrushchev, Stalin himself and his team, from Beria to Kaganovich and Molotov, were criminals. If one is to believe his successors, Khrushchev himself was but a puppet. And adding it all up, what part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party in the past 50 years remains valid?

"The problem thus must be reapproached at the base, at the very point where Lenin left it, before the degeneration of the system which, beginning with Stalin, led up to Brezhnev.

"One of the most evil aspects of this degeneration was the confusion, which Lenin always expressly avoided, between that which in the October Revolution derived from the principles of Marxism (and which has universal value), and that which is specific in the Russian path to socialism.

"The excommunication and the economic boycott of Yugoslavia in 1948, the Chinese schism which occurred between 1959 and 1960, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 marked the stages in the rejection of Leninism

and the advance toward a concept of the single form of socialism which divides the communist and workers' movement and condemns it to isolation and sterility.

"The bases of this perversion were analyzed by those of the communist parties which were able to break away from the official dogmas fabricated in the Soviet Union, that is to say, in the party in which the theoretical degeneration of the leadership has been the most profound. At the end of a major public debate in the theoretical review of the Italian Communist Party, Rinascita, the root of the error was revealed: it involves a change in the very concept of socialism by Stalin and his successors. For Marx and Lenin, socialism was not an autonomous economic and social structure such as slavery, serfdom, capitalism or communism. It was a transition between capitalism and communism. And if it is a form of transition, this implies that one finds therein both the seeds or the premises of a future system -- communism, and elements from the past -- from a developed or backward capitalist system, or a feudal one. The differences between the various forms of socialism can thus be very great, as a function of the economic and social structure of each country. On the other hand, if socialism were an autonomous economic and social structure, as Stalin taught, and as Walter Ulbricht said again recently, there would be no different "models" of socialism but simply variations on a single system, diversified solely as a function of political and cultural traditions, and the situation within which revolution comes about. There would be only differences in forms or paths based on a single model.

"The rejection of the plurality of forms of socialism derives thus from a theoretical distortion of the very definition of socialism, which had its origins with Stalin, and which was maintained by his successors and imitators....

"...The recognition of ...diversity alone can, in each country, liberate the movement from a heavy burden: to pose the problem of a single form of socialism, for example, for France, means first of all making it clear that what is required is not a choice between capitalism and socialism based on the Soviet model, for some, and on the Chinese model, for others. To do this it is not enough to stress that socialism in France can be established along other "paths" and may take other "forms," because it is a matter of a basically different model. This requires that we study the Soviet model in an objective and not apologetic fashion, that we analyze, as in the example Varga has set for us, the earlier social structure which led to the development of such a form. This requires that we not keep silent concerning the efforts to export this model and to impose it upon countries whose social structure is drastically different and in which the application of this foreign model leads to catastrophe and to crime, as was the case in Czechoslovakia....

"...Without going back into the problem of the overall concept and realization of a "French form of socialism" here (see Roger Garaudy, for a French model of Socialism, Gallimard, 1968), we can accept, from the analysis made by Varga of the bureaucratization and the repressive form assumed by the Russian model, that in France and in our time none

of the objective historic conditions which led the USSR to these distortions and these bureaucratic and repressive perversions exist.

"The debate on the prospects for socialism in France, and also the joint drafting of a French version and the common struggle to implement it, can also be liberated from the heavy burden and the confusions engendered by deadly silence concerning the threat to and crime against socialism represented by the export of an unsuitable model, most recently to Czechoslovakia, with the fears which this may arouse concerning the future.

"If we are able, unhesitatingly and publicly, to make this objective analysis of the conditions for the formation and deformation of a given model, and a lucid and merciless criticism of any effort to export it, then it will only be dishonest people who can extrapolate and direct criticism in advance against French socialism on the basis of facts borrowed from a foreign version.

"This drafting of a French model for socialism and of the strategy needed to establish it can only be the work of all of those in France who truly want socialism: the communists first of all, but not them alone, for this party plays so great and so decisive a role in the French left, that its problem has become those of the whole country...."

Claude Angeli, "Charles Tillon Accuses...", Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 20-26 July 1970. (excerpts)

"After 51 years of party membership, Charles Tillon, whose life story is interwoven with that of the French Communist Party, has been ousted from that party. Nevertheless, he has not turned anti-communist. Neither have we. But he is trying to understand, and asking for explanations: he is not the only one who will be interested in hearing them....

"On 3 July, his 73rd birthday, Charles Tillon learned that his Aix en Provence cell had voted to oust him. 'By 8 votes for, 4 votes against, and one abstention' -- Charles and Raymond Tillon being absent -- the Provencale rank and file made the decision Paris headquarters had demanded it make....

"...Last April, the cell to which Charles Tillon and his wife, Raymonde, herself a heroic member of the Resistance and a Ravensbruck deportee, met. They read a letter from 'Comrade Colomb,' secretary of the Aix section and registrar of deeds at the local courthouse. In essence, this is what the letter ordered the members of his cell to do: 'Start proceedings for exclusion, and we shall back you to the hilt.' One of the charges against Tillon was that he, along with other communists and ex-communists, had signed a petition asking that the party condemn the 'normalization' of Czechoslovakia. He was accused of joining with non-communists and ousted communists to found 'Secours Rouge.' Even more serious, he is charged with having taken the floor at a Paris protest meeting against the repression, along with 'leftist' leaders....

"In Saint Malo, where he was vacationing, Charles Tillon remembered: 'They were very careful not to give Raymonde and me our party cards for 1970. I told them:

"I did not go to prison in 1919 because I had fought against those who were attacking the infant Soviet Union, only to stand by silently today while the USSR occupies Czechoslovakia. And I decided to stand up against the repression in France because I know, from 7 terms in prison under the 'villainous laws' of those days, what might be waiting for us in the future. Maybe I am just ahead of my time? I was ahead of my time back in June 1940, in Bordeaux, when I spoke out against the fascism that was taking over in France with Hitler and Petain, while the party leadership up in Paris was asking the Germans for permission to start publishing Humanite again.' And I insisted again: 'Take careful note of what I am saying and inform those who have decided to open new proceedings against me: I shall answer no more questions until the party publicly agrees to reopen my 1952 trial.'

"On 3 June, Tillon joined with Roger Garaudy, Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, and Jean Pronteau, both of them former party leaders like himself, in signing a statement entitled 'We Shall Be Silent No longer.' Then, in reply to a letter from Daniele Beltrach, a communist reader living in Aix, Tillon wrote us: 'Since your correspondent is also concerned with what I do as an 'old man' in retirement, I am ready, after 51 years as a member of the communist party, to render an account of my public and private life as a militant, hiding nothing of all that my conscience burdens me with because I was a Stalinist until 1950....'

"On 26 June, Tillon was summoned to another meeting of his cell. 'You hit upon a fine day to call me before you,' he said. 'It was just 51 years ago, at this same hour, that I was driven with whips into a cell after the Guichen mutiny.' And some idiot answered, 'That was before the Flood!' Then Tillon scornfully raised his voice: 'You are acting under orders from those who were behind my 1952 trial. You know nothing about the history of the party, or about the history of the Resistance!' And Raymonde Tillon added, 'Nor about the history of the deportations.'....

"The Tillons left the meeting before it ended, and their expulsion was not voted upon until several days later....

"Tillon knew that this could not last. He did not speak out without certain knowledge of the reaction of the Political Bureau and of Georges Marchais, who is 'number one' in the French CP since Waldeck Rochet's illness. Because Tillon can hardly stand Marchais....

"He went to work in Germany during the occupation as a laborer requisitioned by the STO [Service du Travail Obligatoire = Compulsory Labor Service]. A lot of other people did the same; they were neither refractory nor resisters. When Liberation came, some of them joined the CP, and there was nothing shocking about that. But what is shocking is that Marchais hid his past from the party, that he swore he had been in France throughout the entire occupation period, and that in spite of this he has become the top leader in the party whose entire history is stamped with the mark of the Resistance and those who were shot for their part in it."

Josette Alia, "The 'Party Secrets,'" Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 July - 2 August 1970, Paris.

The Tillon affair has only just begun and, this time, no taboos will be respected.

"What with those who have been expelled, who are dissidents, who have resigned, who have been asked to resign, or who are simply weary, today there are 800,000 persons in France who used to belong to the Communist Party and who have left it -- either in the burst of excommunications or on tiptoe. Nevertheless, this great group of 'former members' had never, up to now, excited the Communist Party machine or caused the old fortress to totter....

"It sufficed to christen each internal crisis an 'affair', to focus the unrest on one or two culprits, to brandish threats of expulsion, to denounce the 'vile slander' of the enemies of the working class... Then, cleansed, purged, the Party continued along its path, merely leaving some names and dates along the wayside: the 'Marty-Tillon affair,' in 1952, the 'Lecoq affair,' in 1954, the 'Casanova-Servin affair,' in 1961, the 'Garaudy affair,' in 1969, the 'Tillon affair,' in July 1970....

Irritation and Bitterness

"But this time the multitude is disturbed and there is a strange splitting. First, one sees Jacques Duclos on television; he is reading a revengeful official communication: This whole affair is 'a concoction' of anti-Communists on the outside 'who are quietly plotting against our Party.' This is after the Garaudy affair. 'Garaudy miscarried; bring out Tillon...' And who supposedly made this attack? As usual, at one and the same time, those who have money, the bourgeois 'neo-centrists', and the 'leftists,' who have a mutual supreme fear: a union of the left. Having denounced 'the maneuver,' Duclos utters the anathema, the condemnation of Marty and of Tillon: Tillon, this renegade, this 'vicious, quarrelsome fellow', will remain, as in the case of the others, an isolated opponent. The virulence of Duclos' remarks is explained by the preponderant part that he took, in 1952, in the absence of Maurice Thorez, in the condemnation of Marty and of Tillon. The Party, Duclos angrily concludes, scoffs at these vile attacks!...

"But, at the same time, the leaders of the Communist Party are greatly disturbed and react with a vehemence which can be explained only by a real concern. On television, in the Party press, on radio microphones, Duclos and Marchais give this 'little affair' very great publicity. Counter-fires are kindled at all Party echelons, and emissaries of the Central Committee are immediately sent to the departments that are susceptible of being 'contaminated.' An irreverent wind is blowing about even among the staff of l'Humanité. 'How

should one counter the campaigns of the bourgeoisie against Comrade Marchais?' innocently, it seems, asks Laurent Salini. 'We must explain that Comrade Marchais was a work deportee,' flings back Fajon in an arrogant tone....

"In the brief silence which follows, no one, of course, points out that the Communists for years combatted the very idea of 'work deportees.' Everyone knows that, when things are bad, one must close ranks. Well, things are serious now. The proof: When he finally appears on television, to give the official and studied Party reply, Georges Marchais makes some sacrifices in order to attain his ends. And not concerning trifles, but concerning an essential point: 'We have said that we disapproved of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia...I reaffirm this again today.'

"And the normalization that is taking place there?" asks an ORTF journalist.

"Steps have been taken which do not please us, steps which we would not take," replies Georges Marchais.

"To speak out against the Czechoslovak 'normalization,' desired by the USSR, when one is Georges Marchais, Deputy Secretary General of the French Communist Party, is significant; it is serious. Is not this the very thing that Garaudy desired -- and which he was persistently denied? Well, then, why yield now? What keeps Marchais in check, Marchais who is visibly irritated by the personal attacks that have been flung against him, and who nevertheless restrains himself, moderates his voice, does not gesticulate, instead of following the line of using the abusive language of the very fiery Duclos? Does the Tillon affair, coming after so many other apparently more serious crises, conceal a more real danger?...

"The Communist Party does not yet believe this. Tillon accuses? Well, so what? They know that once more the good old reflex of Communist defense will work, that the impact of this opposition is relatively weak 'at the base,' even if only because the men who now are revolting have been on the sidelines for a long time. Who are they, these 'Thirty' who have just signed an 'appeal to the Communists' and who support Tillon? They belong to the 1936-1947 generation: a good decade, a period of great Communist growth, which originated in Spain, matured in the Resistance, was frozen by the cold war and definitively ruined in the Stalinist debacle. A 'duped generation,' writes Annie Kriegel, the product of a great misunderstanding, for a long time put 'on ice,' but in spite of everything, completely loyal; in short -- a group of former valiant fighters who for years were confined to a discreet opposition of his Majesty [Stalin?] The Communist Party does not believe that they will provide the decisive attack....

Three elements

"Nevertheless, they are uneasy. Because the Tillon affair brings together, for the first time perhaps, three elements of a serious crisis: poor timing, an unfavorable outlook, a man who is perhaps dangerous....

The Timing

"The affair broke too soon. Subsequent to Charles Tillon's reply, published in Le Nouvel Observateur, 29 June, to a letter in which he had been called to account -- a violent reply in which Tillon for the first time attacked the posture of Georges Marchais during the occupation -- his cell precipitated his expulsion. The Tillon affair materialized three weeks too soon: instead of occurring during the slack vacation period, it will now create a stir. Tillon, an obstinate Breton, overstepped discipline when he did not wait, as one should, for his expulsion to be approved by the Central Committee before talking about it on the outside....

The Unfavorable outlook

"It must be said that, since 1968, internal crises in the Party are no longer easily digested. For two obvious reasons: first, the May crisis -- which converted a diffuse opposition into a real opposition; then, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and especially Waldeck Rochet's condemnation of it, which marked the first official, acknowledged break in relations between the French Communist Party and Moscow. From this original sin on, one can no longer say, as before, that there is always, on the one hand the correct Moscow line, and, on the other hand, a 'handful of disappointed, ambitious men' who 'play a reactionary game.' Because these men, from now on, are no longer willing to allow themselves to be condemned without reacting. The period of 'confessions' is over. They no longer feel guilty. Suddenly, and for the first time, they are becoming organized....

"Garaudy is very quickly supported by two currents. One, on the outside: Well known personalities, like Pronteau, Kriegel-Valrimont, Tillon, are the first to take the initiative, by publishing a manifesto: 'We no longer wish to remain silent.' The other current, a clandestine one, is that of the mysterious group, 'Unir,' (Unite), about which almost no one knows anything, except that it was formed in 1952 by about ten important Communists, that it has since remained completely clandestine, within the Party, and that its objectives are -- roughly -- those of the 'Prague Spring:' to reform the Party, but from within; to introduce free discussion; to get rid of the restrictive stays of democratic centralism, 'which may have been useful, but is now outmoded,' an anonymous militant told me in a discreet printing establishment where everything seems to have remained frozen since 1942....

"The underground currents, more than Tillon or Pronteau perhaps, are causing the Party leaders to be greatly concerned. Because the latter fear the imminent consequences of an operation which they sense from the beginning and which they want to stop at all costs. They know that, next to the Tillon affair -- the first wave -- they owe the recent stand of the thirty well-known militants to 'Unir.' They know above all that a third, far-reaching wave of protests (it reportedly would group some 400 signers, including some present members of the Central Committee) is expected next autumn against the present leadership of the Party, which senses it, is preparing for it, and fears it....

The men

"Tillon, Garaudy, Pronteau (he too, is in the course of being expelled) are no longer -- as in 1956, as in 1961 --, intellectual men of good will lost for a moment within the Communist ranks, who emerge only to issue some confidential, innocuous critical studies. Tillon is an old fighter. He is above all an 'apparatchik', one of the old hands, who knows the machine well and knows where to put sand in the gears. In short, one is now dealing with professionals and no longer with amateurs, and the 'pros' know the blows that hurt. One became aware of this this week, from the first parries: through a 'non-resistant' Marchais -- when the whole subject of relations between the USSR and the French Resistance was thus -- for the first time -- publicly, politically set forth. Was this only a tiff among school boys or choir boys...shades of the good old days? Actually, everything connected with the Resistance now keenly interests young people. And Tillon is directing his remarks to these young people when he later says 'that, if there is an extreme left, it is because the Party is no longer fulfilling its role.' So, we have come full circle from the FTP / Franc Tireur Partisans - World War II Communist resistance organization / to the Maoists, from 1941 to 1970....

"But anyone who knows the Party realizes that there are much more serious prospects. Garaudy, and especially Tillon, one time the repositories of formidable secrets: the famous 'Party secrets' dealing with internal purges, the utilization of Soviet 'referendums' at the time of 'trials,' or, again, mysterious financial operations which Garaudy attributes to a 'certain Mr. Jerome.' Are they ready to reveal them? They have not yet, it seems, come to any decision on that. Because, in fact, it is a serious decision. The secret --- it is the ability of Communists to close ranks. They want to be Communists; they are Communists. But secrecy was also what abetted Stalinism most. And now they want to 'de-Stalinize' the Communist Party. Will they be able to prove that only truth is revolutionary."

LES "SECRETS DE PARTI"

CPYRGHT

L'affaire Tillon ne fait que commencer
et, cette fois, aucun tabou ne sera respecté



Exclus, dissidents, démissionnaires, démissionnés ou simplement fatigués, ils sont huit cent mille aujourd'hui en France qui ont appartenu au parti communiste et qui, ensuite, l'ont quitté — que ce soit dans l'éclat des excommunications ou sur la pointe des pieds. Pourtant, ce grand parti des « ex » — le plus grand parti de France, de loin — n'avait jamais, jusqu'à présent, ému l'appareil du P.C. ni ébranlé la vieille forteresse.

Il suffisait de baptiser chaque crise intérieure « affaire », de cristalliser le malaise sur un ou deux coupables, de brandir les foudres de l'exclusion, de dénoncer les « basses calomnies » des ennemis de la classe ouvrière... Puis, nettoyé, purgé, le Parti poursuivait son chemin en laissant simplement quelques noms et quelques dates sur les rives du fleuve : « affaire Marty-Tillon » en 1952, « affaire Lecœur » en 1954, « affaire Casanova-Servin » en 1961, « affaire Garaudy » en 1969, « affaire Tillon » en juillet 1970...

Hargne et fiel

Mais, cette fois, le flot se trouble et les images, curieusement, se dédoublent. D'abord on voit à la télévision Jacques Duclos lire un communiqué vengeur : toute cette affaire est « manigancée » de l'extérieur par des « anticommunistes qui comptent en douce contre notre Parti ». C'est la suite de l'affaire Garaudy. « Garaudy a échoué, on ressort Tillon... » Et cette attaque, par qui est-elle menée ? Comme d'habitude, à la fois par les puissances d'argent, par les « néo-centristes » bourgeois et par les « gauchistes » qui ont en commun une crainte suprême : l'union de la gauche. Une fois dénoncée « la manœuvre », Duclos jette l'anathème : Tillon, ce renégat, ce « méchant, hargneux, condamnation de Marty et de Tillon. restera comme les autres un opposant isolé. La virulence des propos de Duclos s'explique par la part prépondérante qu'il a prise, en 1952, en l'absence de Maurice Thorez, à la condamnation de Marty et de Tillon. Le Parti, termine rageusement Duclos, se rit de ces basses attaques !

Mais, dans le même temps, les

dirigeants du P.C. s'agitent beaucoup et réagissent avec une véhémence qui ne peut s'expliquer que par une réelle inquiétude. A la télévision, dans la presse du Parti, aux micros des radios, Duclos et Marchais donnent à cette « petite affaire » une très grande publicité. A tous les échelons du Parti, on allume des contrefeux et des émissaires du Comité central sont envoyés d'urgence dans les départements susceptibles d'être « contaminés ». A la rédaction de « l'Humanité » elle-même, souffle un vent d'irrévérence. « Que faut-il faire pour répondre aux campagnes de la bourgeoisie contre le camarade Marchais ? » demande, innocemment semble-t-il, Laurent Salini. « Il faut expliquer que le camarade Marchais a été un déporté du travail », lance Fajon d'une voix rogue.

Dans le bref silence qui suit, personne ne relève, bien sûr, que les communistes se sont, pendant des années, battus contre la notion même de « déportés du travail ». Tout le monde sait qu'aux moments graves il faut serrer les rangs... Or le moment est grave. La preuve : quand il apparaît enfin à la télévision, pour donner la réponse officielle et concertée du Parti, Georges Marchais jette du lest. Et pas sur des brouilleries, sur un point essentiel : « Nous avons dit que nous étions en désaccord avec l'intervention soviétique en Tchécoslovaquie... Je le réaffirme encore aujourd'hui. »

« Et la normalisation qui se déroule là-bas ? interroge le journaliste de l'O.R.T.F.

— Il y a des mesures qui sont prises et qui ne nous plaisent pas, des mesures que nous ne prendrions pas, nous », répond Georges Marchais.

Se prononcer contre la « normalisation » tchèque voulue par l'U.R.S.S. quand on est Georges Marchais, secrétaire général adjoint du Parti communiste français, c'est important, c'est grave. N'est-ce pas, très exactement, ce que demandait Garaudy et ce qu'on lui a obstinément refusé ? Alors, pourquoi céder aujourd'hui ? Qu'est-ce qui retient Marchais, visiblement irrité par les attaques personnelles lancées contre lui, et qui pourtant se modère, baisse le ton, mesure ses gestes au lieu de suivre sur la voie des injures le très

bouillant Duclos ? L'affaire Tillon, venant après tant d'autres crises apparemment plus graves, recèlerait-elle un danger plus réel ?

Au P.C., on ne le croit pas encore. Tillon accuse ? Bon, et alors ? On sait qu'une fois de plus le bon vieux réflexe de défense communiste jouera, que l'impact de cette opposition est relativement faible « à la base », ne serait-ce que parce que les hommes qui aujourd'hui se révoltent sont depuis longtemps sur la touche. Qui sont-ils, ces « trente » qui viennent de signer un « appel aux communistes » et qui soutiennent Tillon ? Ils appartiennent à la génération 1936-1947 : une bonne décennie, un grand cru communiste, né en Espagne, mûri dans la Résistance, gelé par la guerre froide et définitivement gâché par le glacié stalinien. « Génération dupée », écrit Annie Kriegel, produit d'un grand malentendu, depuis longtemps en veilleuse, malgré tout fidèle, bref : une amicale d'anciens et valeureux combattants cantonnés depuis des années dans une discrète opposition de Sa Majesté. Ce n'est pas d'eux, pense-t-on au P.C., que viendra l'attaque décisive.

Trois éléments

Pourtant, on s'inquiète. Car l'affaire Tillon réunit, pour la première fois peut-être, trois éléments de crise grave : un moment mal choisi, une conjoncture défavorable, un homme peut-être dangereux.

① Le moment. — L'affaire a démarré trop tôt. A la suite de la réponse, publiée dans « le Nouvel Observateur » du 29 juin, de Charles Tillon à une lettre qui l'avait mis en cause — réponse violente dans laquelle Tillon s'en prenait pour la première fois à l'attitude de Georges Marchais sous l'occupation —, sa cellule précipite son exclusion. L'affaire Tillon est née trois semaines trop tôt : au lieu de tomber dans le creux des vacances, elle fera des remous ! Tillon, breton et cabochard, a manqué de discipline en n'attendant pas, comme il se doit, que son exclusion soit approuvée par le Comité central avant d'en parler à l'extérieur...

② **La conjoncture.** — Il faut bien dire que, depuis 1968, dans le Parti, les crises intérieures ne se digèrent plus aussi aisément. Pour deux raisons évidentes : d'abord la crise de Mai — qui a transformé l'opposition diffuse en une opposition réelle. Ensuite l'intervention soviétique en Tchécoslovaquie et surtout sa condamnation par Waldeck Rochet, qui a marqué la première faille officielle et reconnue dans les relations entre le P.C.F. et Moscou. A partir de ce péché originel, on ne peut plus dire comme auparavant qu'il y a toujours d'un côté la ligne juste de Moscou, de l'autre côté une « poignée d'hommes déçus et ambitieux » qui « font le jeu de la réaction ». Car ces hommes, désormais, ne sont plus disposés à se laisser condamner sans réagir. La période des « aveux » est passée. Ils ne se sentent plus coupables. Du coup, et pour la première fois, ils s'organisent.

Très vite, Garaudy est soutenu par deux courants. L'un, extérieur : ce sont les personnalités connues, comme Pronteau, Kriegel-Valrimont, Tillon, qui prennent une première initiative en publiant un manifeste à quatre : « Nous ne voulons plus nous taire ». L'autre courant, clandestin, c'est celui du mystérieux groupe « Unir », dont presque personne ne sait rien, sinon qu'il a été créé en 1952 par une dizaine de communistes importants, qu'il est resté depuis complètement clandestin, intérieur au Parti, et que ses objectifs sont — en gros — ceux du « Printemps de Prague » : réformer le Parti, mais du dedans, y réintroduire la libre discussion, faire sauter l'étroit corset du centralisme démocratique « qui a pu être utile, mais est maintenant dépassé », me dit un anonyme militant dans une imprimerie discrète où tout semble être resté figé depuis 1942...

Ces courants souterrains, plus que Tillon ou Pronteau peut-être, inquiètent fort les dirigeants du Parti. Car ceux-ci redoutent les suites prochaines d'une opération qu'ils devinent à ses débuts et qu'ils veulent à tout prix enrayer. Ils savent qu'après l'affaire Tillon, première vague, c'est à « Unir » qu'ils doivent la récente prise de position de trente militants connus. Ils savent surtout qu'une troisième vague de protestation, de grande envergure celle-là (elle devrait grouper environ 400 signataires dont quelques membres actuels du Comité central), est prévue pour l'automne

prochain contre la direction actuelle du Parti qui la devine, s'y prépare et la craint.

③ **Les hommes.** — Tillon, Garaudy, Pronteau (lui aussi en cours d'exclusion) ne sont plus — comme en 1956, comme en 1961 — des intellectuels de bonne volonté un moment égarés dans les rangs du communisme et qui n'en sortent que pour publier de confidentielles et inoffensives études critiques. Tillon, c'est un vieux lutteur. C'est surtout un homme de l'appareil, un « permanent », qui connaît bien la machine et sait où mettre le sable pour que grincent les engrenages. Bref, on a affaire à des professionnels et non plus à des amateurs, et ces « pro » connaissent les coups qui font mal. On l'a senti, cette semaine, dès les premières passes : à travers Marchais non résistant, c'est toute la question des relations entre l'U.R.S.S. et la Résistance française qui est ainsi — pour la première fois — publiquement, politiquement posée. Querelle d'école, de chapelle, vieilles lunes ? Voire... Tout ce qui touche à la Résistance retrouve en ce moment, auprès des jeunes, un intérêt aigu. Et ce sont les jeunes que Tillon « vise » lorsqu'il déclare, dans un deuxième temps, « que, s'il y a une extrême-gauche, c'est que le Parti ne joue plus son rôle ». Ainsi la boucle est bouclée, des F.T.P. aux maoïstes, de 1941 à 1970.

Mais il y a, pour qui connaît le Parti, de bien plus graves perspectives. Garaudy, Tillon surtout, ont été un moment dépositaires de redoutables secrets : les fameux « secrets de Parti » — qu'il s'agisse des épurations intérieures, de l'utilisation de « référends » soviétiques au moment des « procès » ou encore des mystérieuses opérations financières que Garaudy attribue à un « certain M. Jérôme ». Sont-ils prêts à les dévoiler ? Ils n'ont pas encore, semble-t-il, pris de décision là-dessus. Car, en effet, la décision est grave. Le secret, c'est la solidarité communiste. Or, ils se veulent, ils sont communistes. Mais le secret est aussi ce qui a le plus aidé la stalinisation. Or ils veulent « déstaliniser » le P.C. Pourront-ils prouver que seule la vérité est révolutionnaire ?

JOSETTE ALIA

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CAPITALISTS RESCUE SOVIET SOCIALISM

During the past 10 years the Soviets have purchased substantial amounts of machinery and equipment from Western countries. In the last three years, for just the automotive and chemical industries alone, they have spent approximately three quarters of a billion dollars. The net result, as observed by an Italian Communist who was given a special tour of advanced Soviet plants during April of this year, is that Western-made equipment has played a prominent, even indispensable, role in the industries the Soviets have chosen to modernize. In recent years the new Soviet automobile plant at Tolyatti has attracted worldwide attention; currently the Soviets are conducting negotiations in Western countries for a new truck plant. These projects are discussed below. Also discussed briefly are some financial aspects which indicate that the Soviets are using their exports of run-of-the-mill equipment and machinery to underdeveloped countries as an indirect means of paying for the technologically advanced products which their own industry is unable to provide.

In their latest move towards industrial modernization, the Soviets are now seeking help from West Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands in the construction of a billion-dollar truck plant. The plant, which will be located on the Kama River, is to have a yearly production of 150,000 diesel-powered trucks capable of carrying 10 to 20 tons each. The major foreign firm is Daimler-Benz, from West Germany. The Soviets have only reached preliminary agreements on "technical cooperation" thus far; there is no clear indication as to when final contracts will be signed. The attached newspaper articles provide further details on the nature of the truck plant project, as well as some analysis of the political aspects.

The reasons behind the Soviets' decision are not hard to discern. They need modern trucks, but are short of the kind of technology required for the design of a modern truck, as well as for the design, construction, and equipping of an efficient plant. The Soviets undoubtedly realize that they could by themselves build a plant with a yearly capacity of 150,000 large trucks; but Soviet experience shows that such a plant would probably be far more costly, would take considerably longer to build, and would produce trucks of markedly inferior quality. The Soviet truck plant at Ulyanovsk, for example, took about 10 years to build in the postwar period, and its products are still considered unsatisfactory.

The present status of the Soviet truck industry presents clear evidence of the kinds of deficiencies the Soviets hope to amend. In 1968 the Soviets believed they could boost production from their existing plants to 750,000 trucks in 1970; however, even if the current 1970 plan of 527,300 trucks is fulfilled, production will fall 30 per-

cent short of the earlier goal. Well over half of Soviet truck output comes from two plants, in Gorky and Moscow, both of which were built in the 1930's, the one at Gorky with massive assistance from the Ford Motor Company. These plants are still producing gasoline-powered trucks; in the other relatively small plants only a small share of production is of diesel trucks. Whereas the Soviets have relentlessly pursued research and development on advanced technology in the aircraft and other defense industries, they have virtually neglected the truck industry. Moreover, in spite of being the world's largest producer of general-purpose machine tools, the Soviets are weak in the capability to produce the reliable, durable automated and specialized machine tools (lathes, grinders, bevel gear machines, etc.) needed in the mass production of precise parts for automotive equipment. Thus, the Soviets' technological lag shows up in the truck industry, and demonstrates why the Soviets must swallow their pride and for economic reasons call on help from outside their system.

Automobile Plant at Tolyatti

Heretofore the largest single Western-assisted project in the USSR has been the automobile plant at Tolyatti.¹ This plant when completed, will cost about \$1.5 billion, over a third of which will go for the purchase of Western equipment. It will have an eventual yearly capacity of 600,000 cars almost identical to the Fiat 124. Construction was started in 1966 and although it has fallen behind schedule, under the management and direction of the Italians it has progressed at a rate significantly more rapid than the usual Soviet project. The production goal for 1970 has been trimmed to 20,000 cars -- far fewer than initial expectations and down from the year's plan of 30,000 cars, yet much higher than the Soviets could normally have hoped for if they had undertaken the project themselves. Through 1970, assembly line production at the Tolyatti Plant, which began in early September, will be helped by the import of assembled motors and several thousand complete sets of parts from Italy.

The Tolyatti Plant has undoubtedly been a very advantageous proposition for the Soviets. In automobile production, to an even greater extent than in truck production, they were hopelessly unprepared to enter the modern industrial world. Acknowledging their gap in technological competence, the Soviets contracted with the Italians in 1966 for a turnkey project under terms similar to those the Soviets offer to underdeveloped countries.

1. The new name for the city of Stavropol; named after the deceased chief of the Italian CP, Palmiro Togliatti.

Financing of Western Technological Assistance

The Soviets' need for Western equipment was discussed by Luca Pavolini, editor of the Italian CP's theoretical journal Rinascita, after his visit to the USSR in April 1970. He remarks on "the very large numbers of installations and equipment of Western manufacture I saw in the newest Soviet establishments," and goes on to say that "there is no 'scandal' about going to the West to buy machinery, or even whole factories. The problem is not 'ideological', but practical: it is a matter of finance."

Besides selling abroad all they can, including vodka and caviar to such an extent that there are domestic shortages, the Soviets are making every effort to minimize the drain of their carefully husbanded hard currency as they attempt to expand their purchases of Western technology. They exploit the eagerness of Western firms to compete for the Soviet market and they take advantage of the willingness of Western governments to extend credit at low interest rates and on favorable terms. Moreover, the Soviets plan to pay for part of their new truck plant with deliveries of raw materials such as oil, gas and lumber.

The Soviets appear to have an additional means of financing their purchases from the West. In their foreign aid program with underdeveloped countries the Soviets have been shipping mainly machinery and equipment, little of which has been of sufficient quality to compete in world markets. (In 1968 the Soviets sold a half billion dollars worth of machinery and equipment to the underdeveloped countries, or more than half of the value of the machinery and equipment they imported from the developed countries.) In return, the Soviets receive either goods which fill some needs in the USSR, or, eventually, monetary payments to cover trade deficits. Obviously, whatever the Soviets receive for their own low-standard products can be used as a means of paying for the West's high-standard products.

The Soviets appear to have benefited from being treated in a way like an underdeveloped country. And they have also benefited indirectly by exploiting their foreign aid program. Yet in time it may be that Soviet technological development will be retarded as a result of the infusions of ready-made Western technology into Soviet industry and the Soviets' continuing illusion that they can sell mediocre goods to developing countries.

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October 1970

YOU CAN'T TELL THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CHIEFS WITHOUT A SCORECARD

Six top Soviet propaganda information officials were replaced between April and September 1970. The Soviet press and radio buried announcement of these shifts and, predictably, failed to analyze them in any depth. Foreign commentators have attempted to fill this vacuum.

One theory is that Soviet information policy (read: propaganda strategy and tactics) has misfired badly during the past several years and that Soviet citizens are continuing to doubt the accuracy and fullness of news reporting. Moreover, dissidents such as Andrey Sakharov and Petr Grigorenko have focused attention on the suppression of information and free discussion as a block to progress and justice in the USSR. The timing of most of these personnel changes, around April 1970, can be interpreted to mean that the Soviets realized that the propaganda campaign for Lenin's Centenary had been a colossal failure: in fact, the saturation of the media with child-level and thinly varnished propaganda on Lenin was ridiculed and resented by the people, and opened many eyes to the fact that mind-manipulation is the purpose of Soviet media. So, the propaganda chiefs were sacrificed in order to help their top Soviet leadership save face.

Another possibility for consideration is that the personnel changes reflect Kremlin infighting. Analysis of the backgrounds of the new and replaced chiefs shows clearly that supporters of Trade Union boss Alexander Shelepin lost ground in the continuing battle for influence among top-drawer Soviet leaders. The probable gainer is CPSU chief Leonid Brezhnev, who is believed to feel threatened by the 52-year-old Shelepin. It's possible that other members of the ruling 11-man Politburo, whose average age is about 65, may have joined Brezhnev in beating back the challenges of the "younger" elements of the Soviet elite. At the same time, there is a missing piece in this puzzle: the replacements do not appear to be "Brezhnev men." Thus, Brezhnev may have been unable to muster the kind of clout necessary to demonstrate that he is the top man in the Soviet Union.

Several other avenues of speculation were opened up by the recent naming of Ivan Udaltsov as head of Novosti, the "unofficial" news agency whose major role is to provide material to foreign media. Because of Udaltsov's background, it is possible that this appointment signals a turn towards a hard propaganda line. Another is that the conspiratorial approach may be returning to fashion.

Ivan Udaltsov was a key figure in Prague before and during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was regarded as one of the Soviet Embassy's leading experts on Czechoslovakia having been in that country on and off during the past 20 years and continuously during the five years

or so before the invasion. His job was to inform the Soviet ambassador about the political climate in Czechoslovakia. His Czech associates were almost exclusively extreme hardliners such as Vilem Novy, Ludvik Askenazy, and Milos Jakes, who had little influence in the Dubcek regime and were opposed to its reforms. The result was that Udaltsov's information to the Soviet ambassador was hopelessly distorted and contributed to Moscow's erroneous conclusions that the Czech masses would welcome the Soviet invasion forces with open arms and that the Soviets would have no problems in setting up a puppet government.

Udaltsov remained in Czechoslovakia long enough to advise Soviet occupation authorities on setting up Zpravy, a Red Army sponsored newspaper. Zpravy was blatant propaganda favoring the occupation forces and endorsing the views of the extreme hardline Czechs.

How Udaltsov's experience will contribute to Novosti is an open question. Also in question is the whole series of earlier changes in propaganda positions.

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October 1970

CHANGES IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA APPARATUS

1. Vladimir Stepakov was removed as chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, according to a leak of Moscow correspondents on 1 April 1970. His replacement has not been revealed.

2. Sergey Lapin replaced Nikolay Mesyatsev as Chairman of the Government's Committee for Radio and TV, according to an official announcement of 21 April 1970. Mesyatsev's ouster had been mentioned in the leak of 1 April.

3. Boris Stukalin, according to a TASS dispatch of 24 July 1970, replaced Nikolay Mikhaylov as Chairman of the Government's Committee for Press and Publication. Mikhaylov's ouster had also been mentioned in the leak of 1 April.

4. Leonid Zamyatin on 21 April 1970 replaced Sergey Lapin as Director General of TASS.

5. Yury Chernyakov replaced Leonid Zamyatin as press spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6. Ivan Udaltsov on 10 September replaced Boris Burkov as head of Novosti, the "unofficial" Soviet news agency.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
1 October 1968

Russians at the Czechs' Elbow

CPYRGHT

BEHIND THE CURTAIN : By DAVID FLOYD

STEPAN CHERVONENKO is still the Soviet Ambassador in Prague and, formally, the person through whom all communications between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments are made. But he is now surrounded by men so much more influential in Soviet life that his word counts for relatively little.

This Communist party-official-turned-diplomat, who earned himself a reputation for arrogance in his three years as Ambassador in Prague, has been pushed into the background since the invasion. Reports from Prague suggest that he will not be in charge of the Embassy there much longer.

He will eventually have to bear the responsibility for having misled the Soviet leaders about the extent of opposition to Dubcek in the Czechoslovak Communist party. It was on the basis of Chervonenko's reports that Brezhnev and Kosygin believed it would be a simple matter to form a quisling government in Prague after the invasion. They are still looking for the quislings.

The man who presumably bears even more responsibility is Mr. Ivan Udaltsov since 1965 chief political counsellor in the Soviet Embassy. Udaltsov is the Soviet Communist party's top "expert" on Czechoslovakia and a very senior back-room man from the party apparatus in Moscow. Before going to Prague he was deputy head of the all-important "ideological" department in the Central Committee in Moscow.

Like many of the faceless party men who make policy behind the scenes in Russia, Udaltsov has had a very varied career, not only as a party official but also in the Foreign Ministry and in academic life. At one time he headed a department in the Foreign Ministry, and from 1959 to 1963 he was Director of the Institute for Slavic Studies in the Soviet Academy of Science. Among his written works is an introduction to a book on the Russian Revolution and its influence on Czechoslovakia. In it he wrote:

"He who does not support the Soviet Union stands on the side of the enemies of socialism and democracy, and is an agent and accomplice of imperialism. That is what Marxism teaches; that is what Stalin teaches; and that is what the facts prove."

Udaltsov wrote that in 1951. He does not seem to have changed his views.

Mission to Mao

NOTHING demonstrates more clearly the importance the Kremlin attaches to Czechoslovakia than the presence in Prague of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and the C-in-C of all the Soviet ground forces. These two men have left key positions in Moscow to try to resolve the Czechoslovak situation.

Mr. Vasil Kuznetsov, now 67, is the man, under Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, primarily responsible for the day-to-day running of the Foreign Ministry.

A member of the Central Committee in Stalin's day, Kuznetsov was for many years in charge of the Soviet trade union organisation and had frequent dealings with Western trade unionists. He learned to speak English as a student in America in the 'thirties.

But when Stalin died in 1953, and someone had to be sent to

appease Mao Tse-tung, Kuznetsov was made Ambassador in Peking. From that time he remained in diplomacy and has been involved in most major negotiations. He seems destined to play the role of senior "trouble-shooter" previously performed by Anastas Mikoyan, now in retirement.

No military leader in the world today commands a greater number of soldiers than Army-General Ivan Pavlovskiy, Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence and C-in-C of all Soviet ground forces—something like a million men. This is the man who was responsible for organising the occupation of Czechoslovakia last month, and who has set up his HQ in the former Russian School in the Prague suburb of Pankraz.

The Master

As commander of the occupation forces he is the master of Czechoslovakia. But he is used to responsibility. For three years he was commander of the Far Eastern military region of the USSR, an area bigger than the whole of Western Europe.

Slovakia is under the command of another senior general—Col.-Gen. Konstantin Provalov, who has already had some experience of occupying a foreign country. For the past two years he has been in command of what the Soviet Press calls the "Southern Group of Forces." This means in fact that he has been in command of the four Soviet divisions which are still stationed in Hungary. It was only a short move from Hungary to Slovakia, where he now has his HQ on the banks of the Danube in Bratislava.

Perhaps more powerful than Kuznetsov or Pavlovskiy is the mysterious "Col. Nazarev," said to be the representative of the Soviet secret police in Prague.

Czechs say he was in Budapest at the time of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and stayed there for six years, securing the Kadar régime by means of arrests and police persecution.

He then moved to Prague, where he sat as the senior Soviet adviser in the Ministry of the Interior until last April, when Mr. Dubcek at last managed to have him sent back to Moscow, along with 40 other "advisers." But he was among the first to return after the invasion, and he has a major say in all new appointments. He is now trying to have the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Peinar, removed.

Such top secret policemen seldom use their real names. "Nazarev" probably conceals the identity of a Deputy Minister in the Soviet Interior Ministry. Perhaps even Gen. Scrov himself?

Sporting Gesture

THE people of Prague have not quite lost their sense of humour despite their sufferings. Last week they were saying to the Russians: "All right, all right: we'll let you win the ice-hockey championship, if only you'll leave us in peace."

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October 1970

THE TREATY OF MOSCOW
SOVIET ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA: OFF AND ON AGAIN?

The Soviet-West German non-aggression treaty signed in Moscow on 12 August is one of those diplomatic papers whose actual provisions are less important than the atmosphere they create. In negotiating the treaty, the Soviets gave West Germany nothing much but a few token gestures such as reducing the flow of anti-German propaganda with which Soviet media has been increasingly preoccupied during the past years. Reportedly Mr. Brezhnev even assured Chancellor Brandt that efforts would be made to encourage the newspapers to help change people's attitudes toward West Germans within the Soviet Union. All of this was designed to foster an atmosphere of detente.

It must have come as quite a jolt to the Russian people, for years accustomed to hearing the shrill charges of "revanchism" and "militarism" hurled at their enemy, to suddenly find on their television screens heartwarming scenes of those two new pen pals, Chancellor Willy Brandt and Premier Aleksey Kosygin. While the vast majority of the Russian people probably took scant notice of Chancellor Brandt's visit to Moscow, the short treaty-signing ceremony itself was shown over Soviet television. This viewing has been followed by several weeks of pro-treaty articles appearing in both the Soviet government and party press. At this writing, Soviet media are still speaking of "detente with West Germany."

Theoretically, the treaty should go far toward eradicating the bogey of West Germany as the "imperialist threat" out to undo the Soviet Union and the Communist order in East Europe. Nevertheless, there still remains a vituperative hard core of propagandists who won't risk letting the Russian people stop thinking that "once a revanchist, always a revanchist." Despite the favorable treatment given the Moscow-Bonn accords by the Soviet press, West Germans remain suspect in the eyes of most ordinary citizens and probably in the eyes of many official Soviets as well.

A Western correspondent who, in late August, went to a public lecture at the Soviet Army Park in Moscow reports that the lecturer's whole point in speaking was to emphasize the continuing menace that West Germany supposedly represents to Soviet security. In a half-hour lecture devoted to the "Military Forces of NATO," the speaker first put his audience in the proper mood by citing facts and figures about NATO's "aggressive" military forces. He then launched into an anti-German tirade to establish his point that the "West German revanchists have always been and will continue to be governed by anti-Soviet motives." After the lecture, the speaker was surrounded by members of the audience, obviously agitated over the treaty, and

one heard the question repeated by several: "Why did we sign?"

Meanwhile, by late August and during early September, packed movie houses across the country were enjoying the first installments of two new film series on the KGB in action: "Spy's Mistake" (Oshibka Rezidenta) and "Spy's Fate" (Sud'ba Rezidenta). In one film the KGB uncovers a spy network being run by the West German Cultural Attache in Moscow. Both of the films go out of their way to depict the Germans as the main imperialist villains unmasked by KGB action. And, perhaps significantly, the action takes place within the Soviet Union in the late 1960's.

Neither lecturer nor film producer is going out of his way to prime the Russian public for an open-arms welcome to be given any West Germans arriving in the Motherland.

Text of Soviet-West German Treaty and 2 Annexes

Special to The New York Times
BONN, Aug. 11—Following

is a translation of the texts, as printed in two West German newspapers, of the Soviet-West German treaty on improved relations and of an accompanying West German letter to Moscow and of a note from Bonn to the Western allies.

Text of Treaty

The high contracting parties have agreed, in the endeavor to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and the world, in the conviction that peaceful cooperation between states on the foundation of the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations corresponds to the most ardent desires of the nations and the general interests of international peace, in appreciation of the fact that previously realized agreed measures, particularly the conclusion of the treaty of Sept. 13, 1955, concerning the assumption of diplomatic relations, have created favorable conditions for new important steps for the further development and strengthening of their mutual relations. In the desire to give expression in contractual form to their determination toward improvement and expansion of cooperation between them, including economic relations as well as scientific, technical and cultural ties, in the interest of both states, as follows:

Nations, from the threat of force or the use of force in questions which affect security in Europe and international security.

ARTICLE THREE

In accordance with the aforementioned aims and principles, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are agreed in the recognition that peace in Europe can only be maintained when no one infringes the present frontiers.

They oblige themselves to respect unreservedly the territorial integrity of all states in Europe in their present frontiers.

They declare that they have no territorial demands against anyone, nor will they have such in the future.

They regard the frontiers of all the states in Europe today and in future as inviolable, as they stand on the day of the signing of this treaty, including the Oder-Neisse line, which forms the western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland, and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

ARTICLE FOUR

This treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not affect bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements previously concluded by them.

ARTICLE FIVE

This treaty requires ratification and takes effect on the day of ratification documents which is to take place in . . .

Done at . . . on . . . 1970 in two originals, one each in the German and Russian languages, whereby the text of each is equally binding.

ARTICLE ONE

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regard it as an important goal of their policy to maintain international peace and to attain relaxation of tension. They declare their endeavor to foster the normalization of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations between all European states, and proceed thereby from the existing real situation in this region.

ARTICLE TWO

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be guided in their mutual relations as well as in questions of the guaranteeing of European and international peace by the aims and principles which are laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

Accordingly, they will solve their disputes exclusively with peaceful means and assume the obligation to refrain, pursuant to Article 2 of the Charter of the United

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to impart the following:

The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs has elaborated in connection with the negotiations the standpoint of the Federal Government with regard to the rights and responsibilities of the four powers concerning Germany as a whole and Berlin.

Since a peace treaty remains outstanding, both sides have concluded therefrom that the intended treaty does not affect the rights and responsibilities of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs has declared in this connection: The question of the rights

Letter to Gromyko

In connection with today's signing of the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is honored to ascertain that this treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a condition of peace in Europe in which the German nation attains its unity again in free self-determination.

Note to Western Powers

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is honored, in connection with the impending signature of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany

of the four powers does not have any connection with the treaty which the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intend to conclude and will not be affected by it.

The Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has declared in this connection:

The question of the rights of the four powers was not a subject of the negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Government concluded therefrom that this question should not be discussed.

The question of the rights of the four powers will not be affected, either, by the treaty which the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany intend to conclude. This is the position of the Soviet Government on this question.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1970

FRENCH GET ROLE ON SOVIET TRUCKS

Agreement Assigns Renault
a Major Participation in
Big Automotive Complex

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Sept. 11 — France and the Soviet Union today signed an agreement for French participation in construction of a truck plant to rank among the world's largest, on the Kama River, a tributary of the Volga, in central Russia.

Although a formal contract has yet to be signed, today's agreement envisages a major role in development of the facility for the Renault Company, the state-owned French auto and truck manufacturer.

Renault would also help the Soviet Union modernize and expand existing automobile production facilities. The value of the two contracts is placed at \$126-million — one half to two-thirds of this sum going into the truck plant.

Discussions With Germans

The Russians have been carrying on parallel discussions with the West German Government, which is promoting the Mercedes Benz Company's efforts to participate in the giant truck complex.

What was expected to be a rivalry between the French and German companies is now more likely to be a partnership. The two companies announced tonight they will examine ways of working together on the contract.

The Kama River plant, near the town of Kazan on the Russian plains, would turn out 150,000 trucks a year. The cost of building the plant has been estimated at up to \$1-billion. The job is considered too big for one European manufacturer to handle alone.

Ford Rejected Offer

The Russians had originally approached the Ford Motor Company with an offer to build the plant. Ford turned the proposition down, reportedly because of pressure from Washington.

One of the French worries is that Renault would be relegated to the role of a subcontractor in a consortium led by Mercedes Benz. With its highly reputed engineering know-how, Renault is demanding a role as equal partner with the Germans.

Questioned on this point at a press conference today, Vladimir Kirillin, Soviet Deputy Premier, said diplomatically it will be the Soviet Union that is the prime contractor and that among the companies that participate in the project, "Renault will be in the first rank."

Besides the precise French-German industrial relationship, still to be worked out are the credit terms in the Renault contract.

The Russians demand credits for most of their purchases in the West because of their shortage of hard currency.

Normally, the French give the Russians eight years to pay. The interest rate in recent deals has ranged between 5 and 6 per cent. Exactly what

rate within this band is the subject of present negotiations.

Today's agreement, signed by Mr. Kirillin and French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was seen by both men as further evidence of deepening Soviet-French economic cooperation.

It comes just a few weeks before a visit to the Soviet Union by French President Georges Pompidou.

Lesser Trading Partner

Actually, however, France is well down the list as a trading partner with the Soviet Union; in fifth place after West Germany, Japan, Britain and Italy.

Last year, France and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to double their commercial exchanges by 1974.

French sales to the Soviet Union quadrupled from 1965 to 1969 but at \$264-million last year they represented less than 2 per cent of France's total exports.

French imports from the Soviet Union have grown much more slowly, giving France a \$60-million surplus in Soviet trade last year.

Asked at today's news conference whether last month's Soviet-West German treaty on renunciation of the use of force might have an unfavorable impact on French-Soviet exchanges, Mr. Kirillin said:

"Policies which tend towards bettering and extending our relations with France are policies that are permanent and will never change."

He added, pointedly, that cooperation with France, however, did not prevent the Soviet Union from "consolidating" its relations with other countries.

A French official said later: "The Russians talk to us as if the Germans don't exist, and I'm sure they talk to the Germans as if we don't exist."

CPYRGHT

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 August 1970

CPYRGHT

Soviet truck complex

West Germans to help with plant

By Harry B. Ellis

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

A billion-dollar truck plant centering on Daimler-Benz may be the economic first fruits of the recently signed Soviet-West German treaty of cooperation.

The German automotive firm, maker of Mercedes cars and trucks, for months has been discussing with Soviet officials construction of a giant factory complex in the Soviet Union.

The projected plant, according to press reports, would turn out 150,000 heavy trucks yearly, each with a payload capacity of 10 to 20 tons. The plant would be built on the Kama River, a major tributary of the Volga.

Ford turned down

Daimler-Benz, according to present thinking, would be the focal point of a European consortium, including Fiat of Italy, Renault of France, and Daf of Holland.

This is the same project Henry Ford turned down, following a study trip to the Soviet Union. Mr. Ford told stockholders the project was beyond Ford's financial capacity.

The U.S. Defense Department is known to have opposed American participation, on grounds that the huge truck plant would increase the Soviet Union's military potential.

"It certainly will," declared a knowledgeable source. "But wasn't it realized in Washington that the Soviets would get their plant anyway? The difference is, European firms now will have the business, not American companies."

West German Government officials have confirmed the lively interest of Chancellor Willy Brandt's government in the massive truck project.

Project called huge

The likelihood is that the government will guarantee at least part of the risk undertaken by Daimler-Benz and other West German supplier firms.

The project is so huge that it will draw in, not only the major European truck manufacturers, but dozens of smaller suppliers of parts suppliers.

Economics Minister Karl Schiller will "with certainty discuss this project with his Soviet hosts" during the Minister's forthcoming visit to Moscow, a government spokesman declared.

West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko had broached the subject during their recent political talks in Moscow leading up to the Soviet-West German treaty signed Aug. 12.

Raw materials to be supplied

The Soviet Government, informed sources say, hopes to pay for this and similar undertakings partly through the delivery of raw materials — oil, timber, natural gas, and others — to Western Europe.

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin is said to have stressed to Chancellor Brandt the ability of the Soviet Union to supply a varied list of raw materials.

A good deal of negotiation lies ahead before the Soviet and Western governments, the truck-manufacturing firms, and European banks have the project ready for signing.

Even at this stage, however, two things are clear:

1. The West Germans continue to move strongly to reinforce their trade and technical position east of the Iron Curtain.
2. The Soviet Union is demonstrably eager for western help — focusing on West Germany — to modernize its backward economy.

Bonn-Moscow aims

CPYRGHT

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Behind friendship treaty looms risky rivalry for gaining—or holding—sway in East Europe

By Harry B. Ellis

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

"The future shape of Eastern Europe," declared a knowledgeable source, "is the prize for which Moscow and Bonn are contending."

And, ironically, they are doing it through a friendship treaty. But West Germany and the Soviet Union each hopes to gain very different things from that treaty.

Communist economies generally are faltering, with the result that consumer unrest ultimately might threaten the Soviet system of control in Eastern Europe.

An infusion of West German technical aid, Soviet leaders are thought to reason, might help to stabilize the status quo in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

This assessment comes from an official in close touch with the thinking of Chancellor Willy Brandt's government and aware of what the Germans have gleaned from their months of negotiation in Moscow which led up to the signing of the treaty Aug. 12.

Interpretations differ

"In a sense," the source continued, "the Soviets have elected to control Eastern Europe through West German help, and at the same time to improve their own Soviet economy."

"The Brandt government," the official said, "looks at it differently. Without giving technical and economic help to Eastern Europe, West Germany could have no influence there at all.

"By working patiently through the Soviets, therefore, then with the satellites, the Germans hope eventually the systems over there might be loosened up."

The treaty with the Soviets had been fundamental in this regard, for without it Moscow would not have given other Communist governments a go-ahead to work out their own relationships with Bonn.

The Brandt leadership, the source went on, fully understood the danger that West Germany might end up helping to maintain the Soviet system of control in Eastern Europe.

Risk for Reds also seen

"But the Soviets, too, run a risk," the official declared. "It was, after all, West German influence in Czechoslovakia which

the Soviets wanted to stamp out through their 1968 invasion."

Moscow now was courting the same kind of German influence, extended through technological help, which the Alexander Dubcek regime in Prague openly had sought.

The difference over the past two years, the official continued, was the urgency of Communist-bloc economic problems and the frankness with which the leadership admitted them.

Ordinarily the Soviet military hierarchy might be thought to fear the liberalizing tendencies inherent in the Bonn-Moscow treaty.

But in this case, Brandt officials assert, Soviet military leaders argued in favor of the treaty "because they wanted peace in

the West to concentrate on the Chinese [Communist] threat."

Berlin and ratification

Already the West Germans and Poles are discussing trade, aid, and politics, with the Hungarians and Czechs expected to follow.

But the Soviet-West German treaty itself formally comes into force only after its ratification by both parliaments. Mr. Brandt demands improvements in the Berlin situation before asking the Bundestag to ratify the pact.

Bonn officials express confidence the Soviets will grant something in Berlin, because of their eagerness to have the Bonn-Moscow treaty ratified before next year's congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

Bonn Pact a Soviet Coup

By Edward Crankshaw

London Observer

LONDON—The Soviet-German non-aggression pact is not a nine-day wonder in a vacuum; it is part of a large movement on the Soviet side. It is a movement designed, above all, to achieve detente with the West without giving up any of the Soviet gains which were won at the cost of the tension the Kremlin now seeks to relieve.

It had become a matter of urgency in Soviet eyes because of the potential threat from China and the continuing weakness of the Soviet economy. The movement was under way when it was set back by the panic invasion of Czechoslovakia two years ago.

The Russians were reluctant to invade because they dimly perceived the necessity for some reform in that unfortunate country's system if its rich resources and skills were to be developed and exploited to Soviet advantage. But the reforms went too far too quickly. For fear of infection, they had to be stopped.

Today, there is a lot of talk in the West to the general effect that we allowed ourselves to be frightened unnecessarily by the use of violence in Czechoslovakia. Two years later, it is being said, how silly those fears look. Instead of moving from one aggression to another, the Russians are cooperating with America over the Middle East, cease-fire and the SALT conversations, signing a treaty with Bonn, tolerating Romania's gestures of limited independence, allowing Hungary to embark on a reform program of her own and refraining from trying and executing Czech reform leader Alexander Dubcek.

Russia's Chestnuts

I WAS NOT aware that anyone in his senses outside the Soviet bloc had been frightened by the crime in Czechoslovakia. We did not feel fear; we felt disgust. It is not we who should thank the Kremlin; the Kremlin should thank us for recognizing a fait accompli and, after a very short interval, allowing it to carry on as though nothing had happened.

From the Soviet point of view, the pact with Germany is a great achievement. By securing recognition of the existing frontiers of Europe — above all, of course, the Oder-Neisse Line — and opening up a broad vista of future cooperation with German industry, the Soviet leaders can present themselves as the liquidators of a German problem which they deliberately built up until it came to weigh too heavily on their own actions and on the minds of their people.

At the same time, nothing is better calculated to keep the Poles, the Czechs and the East Germans on their best behavior than the uneasy knowledge that Moscow is talking over their heads with Bonn on terms of amity.

All this does not preclude a resurrection of the German "revanchist" scare should it at any time appear expedient. It would be easy enough to find a pretext for accusing the West Germans of violating the spirit of the treaty, if not its letter. And, for good measure, a Russo-German understanding might, in certain circumstances, be employed as an instrument for loosening the cohesion of the Common Market and/or putting a heavy strain on German-American relations.

The foregoing is not an argument for refusing to come to terms with the Soviet Union, but we should understand the limitations of those terms. Our aim must be to neutralize the danger of atomic war — coexistence, in a word — while hoping that over the years a closer association with the Rus-

sians, and the coming of age of a new generation, will bring the Soviet leadership to a radical re-examination of the aims, fears, suspicions and doctrines which are institutionalized in its oppressive machinery of government.

Soviet aims (the aims of the present leadership, that is) are, quite simply, coexistence while sitting firmly on past gains, and a certain measure of desperately necessary economic reform, ruthlessly controlled. For too long the Soviet leadership has been deadlocked to the point of sterility. Now, six years after the fall of Khrushchev, his successors are beginning to pick up at the point he had reached in the autumn of 1964.

CPYRGHT

PACT, From Page C1

There were signs that they were beginning to do this three years ago. Indeed, they never reversed Khrushchev's general foreign policy line—his highly personal overtures to West Germany excepted. They simply marked time.

After they had tried to ease relations with China and been snubbed, and after Washington had conceived the brilliant notion of starting to bomb North Vietnam while Premier Alexei Kosygin was actually in Hanoi, they seem to have found the idea of developing a coherent foreign policy too painful to be endured and to have given up all pretense of having one — apart from exploiting the opening in the Middle East, which even a child could have seen.

It was not until this activity culminated, much to their surprise and alarm, in the fiasco of the Six-Day War that they pulled themselves together and started to think. The first tentative moves resulting from this thinking were roughly interrupted by the Czechoslovak invasion. And the aftermath of the invasion evidently produced a renewed conflict of opinion between those who wanted to turn their backs on the West and those who believed it imperative to bring Russia out into the world.

Because of this conflict, the Communist Party congress in Moscow scheduled for this autumn had to be postponed. Before it could take place, there had to be high-level agreement on the general lines of policy at home

and abroad. The events of the last few weeks indicate that the deadlock has been resolved, and if things go reasonably well, the Soviet leadership will be able to face the congress next year with the first coherent declaration of achievement and intent since Khrushchev's fall.

As long as we remember that all the Soviet leaders started their careers under Stalin in the Stalinist manner and have owed their advancement to one or another of Stalin's closest aides, there should be nothing to worry about — apart from the nasty little fact that the Soviet army, which advanced into Czechoslovakia "to protect it from the Germans," shows no signs of moving out now that the Germans have promised to honor the frontier.

As far as the Middle East is concerned, the chief Soviet objective is not Israel but the Persian Gulf and the freedom of the Indian Ocean. Even if the Russians do choose to behave in a 19th century way in the nuclear age, there is no need for us to follow their example. Israel has to be protected and reassured, but this is all that matters.

As far as Europe is concerned, she needs Russia just as Russia needs her. But Europe, the Common Market notwithstanding, cannot be said to exist as long as a great part of it is ruled from Moscow. This is a point to be made again and again, however painfully, until the day when those Russians (Who are they?) who can see it for themselves begin to make their voices heard.

Bonn's price

CPYRGHT

Berlin concessions tied to Soviet treaty

By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

Chancellor Willy Brandt appears to have defined the price he wants the Soviets to pay in Berlin to gain ratification of their newly signed treaty with West Germany.

Mr. Brandt insists he will not ask the West German Parliament to ratify the Moscow-Bonn pact until the Soviets have improved the living conditions of isolated West Berliners.

Klaus Schütz, Lord Mayor of West Berlin, now has disclosed what improvements Mr. Brandt appears to have in mind—and what counterconcessions he would make to the Soviets.

A satisfactory Berlin settlement, Mr. Schütz declared, should contain the following elements:

1. West Berliners must have the same right as West German citizens to travel to East Berlin and the (East) German Democratic Republic. As things now stand, West Berliners can cross the Berlin wall only in hardship cases involving relatives in East Germany.
2. Land and water routes from West Germany to West Berlin, running across East German territory, must be free of interference.
3. The Soviets and East Germans must concede that West Berlin belongs to the monetary, economic, and legal systems of the Federal Republic and is represented in

foreign relations by Bonn. The official Communist view is that West Berlin, lying 110 miles inside East Germany, forms an independent political entity, with no links to the Federal Republic.

'Federal presence'

In return for such concessions, Mr. Schütz argues, Bonn might show willingness to dismantle what he called "demonstrative forms of the federal presence" in West Berlin.

Such demonstrative forms the Mayor defined as Bundestag (parliamentary) sessions in West Berlin and meetings of the federal Cabinet there. He also questioned whether the federal President should continue to transact business in West Berlin.

The bulk of federal civil servants now in West Berlin would remain there, Mr. Schütz stressed, because they administered the economic and legal links between Berlin and Bonn.

The Lord Mayor was speaking for himself, in an interview with the nationally circulated *Welt am Sonntag*. But a spokesman for Mr. Brandt confirmed that the government had had prior knowledge of Mr. Schütz's program and that it coincided with that of Bonn.

The above conditions, then, are what Mr. Brandt apparently expects the Western ambassadors to exact from the Soviets, when their ambassadorial meetings resume in September.

Powerless to negotiate

Sovereignty in Berlin rests with the Big Four victor powers—the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Brandt is powerless to negotiate directly with the Soviets on the future of the divided city.

So far, in the series of ambassadorial talks which unfolded during the spring and summer, the Soviets showed little readiness to accede to what Bonn wants. This, however, was before the conclusion of the Soviet-West German political treaty, climaxed by Mr. Brandt's presence in Moscow, cast relations between Bonn and Moscow in a new light.

An allied diplomat confirmed that what Mr. Schütz had outlined was "not out of step" with improvements the American, British, and French Governments would like to see transpire in West Berlin.

The next move is up to the Soviets, who seem to set great store by the treaty which Mr. Brandt and Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin signed in Moscow Aug. 12.

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
29 August 1970

West Berlin Mayor Is Hopeful on Curbs

Special to The New York Times

BERLIN, Aug. 28 — Mayor Klaus Schütz of West Berlin said today that the new Soviet-West German pact had for the first time in years, created conditions under which improvements for West Berlin "have moved into the range of possibility."

He spoke at a news conference called to deal with reports and speculations about possible East German moves to ease restrictions on West Berlin.

The Mayor said he had had no official word from the East Germans and did not want to "speculate about rumors." But his other remarks indicated the importance the city administration and Bonn attach to the Moscow pact.

The Mayor listed as major points free access to West Berlin, 110 miles within East Germany, "without unilateral controls" and a lifting of the ban barring West Berliners from entering the eastern half of the city.

Travel May Be Eased

Reports from East Germany said the East Germans intended to move on the last of Mr. Schütz's points to ease the intracity travel restrictions. Unlike West Germans or foreign nationals, West Berliners are not normally allowed into East Berlin.

The Mayor made it clear that travel restriction were not the only problem.

"Only when the basis of our existence is no longer drawn into doubt, when the Soviet Union and her allies no longer deny that West Berlin is part of the economic, financial and legal system of the Federal Republic, only then will we have a truly new situation — normalization," he said.

Reports of East German plans spread in Berlin and Bonn by eastern newsmen and "contacts," were published this morning by two West German newspapers, Die Welt of Hamburg, a publication of the Axel Springer concern, and West Berlin's Telegraf, closely associated with Bonn's Social Democrats. The Springer publishing house has been sharply critical of Bonn's Eastern policy.

According to the Telegraf, East Germany is planning to make an overture next Tuesday, Sept. 1, Peace Day in the East Bloc.

Die Welt said West Berliners would be given permission to cross into the eastern half of the city on day passes.

The paper also said the East Germans intended to restore telephone communications between the two halves of the city, cut off since 1952. Only a handful of special lines, one of them between Russian headquarters in East Berlin and British Headquarters in the west, are now in operation.

The next round of four-power talks on Berlin is scheduled for Sept. 21, when the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union expect to resume their discussion of the future of the former German capital and their own roles in this city.

The talks, which opened in March, were recessed in July after six meetings without any tangible success.

EUROPE'S HEART

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The top government and party leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries met in Moscow yesterday for the first time since December. Ostensibly the purpose of their visit was to take a fresh look at Europe in the light of the recent treaty between Russia and west Germany, but the timing of the meeting cannot have been fortuitous. This, they imply, is the right way in which to spend August 20—in constructive consideration of Europe's peace and security, rather than in laments over what happened two years ago.

The Russians and their orthodox allies have continually insisted that the invasion of Czechoslovakia must be taken as an accomplished fact. It should not, they say, be used as a matter for discussion by their friends or reproach by their enemies. They have much resented suggestions by the West that the continued presence of Russian troops in Czechoslovakia complicates questions of general European security and ought, therefore, to come up at any future East-West conference on the subject. No doubt a great deal will be made of the argument that, if west Germany feels Czechoslovakia no obstacle to better relations with Warsaw Pact countries, no other Nato governments have any excuse for tender scruples.

The argument works both ways. If Russia has now signed a treaty with west Germany whereby both sides eschew the use of force and recognize the existing borders in Europe as inviolable, what are the Russian troops up to in Czechoslovakia? It was always said in the East that they had to be sent in to forestall an attack from west Germany. Nobody anywhere can pretend there is any risk of that today. Can it really be, after all, that the Russian garrison of Czechoslovakia is purely punitive, to prevent the Czechs and Slovaks from expressing themselves politically, intellectually, economically, or in any other way?

Of course it is. But the continued Russian pretence that it is not complicates the affairs of Europe as a whole. The invasion of Czechoslovakia held up such measures of détente as the S.A.L.T. talks and the German treaty. It continues to hold up the security conference which the Russians themselves so ardently desire. It is because of the bad faith over Czechoslovakia that the West feels obliged to scrutinize Russia's words so closely.

The "Brezhnev doctrine" of

limited sovereignty was aimed at consolidating the Warsaw Pact states. Consolidation was again emphasized by the World Communist Conference in Moscow in June last year and by the series of bilateral treaties which Russia has since signed with countries in east Europe. Czechoslovakia's turn for such a treaty of friendship came in May. This document enshrined the new doctrine. The treaty laid down officially that it was the "joint international duty of the socialist countries" to defend "socialist achievements". As far as its relations with the outside world goes, including western Europe, Czechoslovakia has been reduced to the status of an automaton. This does not make any easier the negotiation of new and less suspicious relations between the states which belong to the Warsaw Pact and those which belong to Nato.

In fact the Russian leaders themselves are well aware that the occupation of Czechoslovakia cannot be forgotten. They failed to prevent the subject's being raised at the World Communist Conference, and a number of communist parties continue to deplore it. Each action which Moscow regards as a further step towards "normalization" within the country is seen outside as an example of abnormality. The progressive degradation of Mr. Dubcek is watched everywhere with dismay. Arrests of intellectuals and trade unionists are deplored. The possibility that some of those involved in the spring of 1968 will be tried is still, with good reason feared.

Czechoslovakia is today a profoundly unhappy country. There is an enormous gulf between government and people, and an absolute conflict of interests between the people and the Russians. Yet Czechoslovakia remains a test case for Europe. If, as must be hoped, the treaty between Russia and west Germany is followed up by similar measures affecting other countries in east Europe, including Czechoslovakia, a formal détente will ensue. This could have its values. But a true détente, as understood by most governments and peoples in east and west Europe, is something more than the fossilization of frontiers. It involves travel as well as trade; the exchange of ideas as well as a truce to threats. This sort of détente cannot be attained so long as Czechoslovakia is kept in a mould which her peoples almost unanimously reject.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES

CPYRGHT

30 August 1970

Ulbricht Mixes Bullying

CPYRGHT

With Flexibility

BONN—Ever since the reign of Frederick the Great, 300 years ago, the rulers of the sandy Brandenburg Plain that used to be called Prussia have preferred to bully concessions out of neighbors rather than to negotiate them. Walter Ulbricht, the chieftain of Prussia's successor state, Communist East Germany, is no exception to this rule. Over the last 25 years he has proved to be a master of *abtrotzen*—literally "to spite" something out of an opponent, in the sense of bullying.

In terms of geopolitics the men who ruled from Berlin may well have felt compelled to adopt bullying as a means of survival, sitting as they did astride the north-south and east-west communication lines of Europe and having virtually no natural defenses on their frontiers. But Mr. Ulbricht has another strength lacking in most bullies. At critical moments he can be infinitely flexible.

His ability to be both obstinate and flexible undoubtedly contributes to an explanation why his German Democratic Republic has become as secure and strong as it is today.

There is no question that Mr. Ulbricht is bitterly upset by the turn of events in Europe signaled by the treaty of "cooperation" signed Aug. 12 between his biggest ally, the Soviet Union, and his biggest foe, West Germany.

His dissatisfactions with the Moscow treaty are manifold. He regards it as a compact with the capitalist enemy at the expense of the Communist cause. He sees that it opens the gate for West German penetration of East Europe—the gate which he personally succeeded in keeping closed all these years—and creates competition for most of his foreign trade. Finally, "normalization of relations" between Bonn and East Berlin would subject East Germany to far more "subversive" West German influence than at any time since he built the Berlin Wall nine years ago.

Mr. Ulbricht showed this dissatisfaction by remaining silent before, during and after the Moscow negotiations, by playing down the event to the allowable minimum in his party press and later by instructing his ministerial council to issue a declaration interpreting the treaty as a call for diplomatic recognition of his own Government by West Germany and the other Western powers. Tass, the official Soviet press agency, rapped Mr. Ulbricht's knuckles immediately by deleting those very passages of the ministerial declaration which ran counter to the Bonn-Moscow accord. Shortly thereafter the Soviet party paper, Pravda, editorially criticized Mr. Ulbricht's view of Bonn.

The Russians followed up this almost unprecedented rebuff to their strongest ally by summoning Mr. Ulbricht to Moscow along with the other European Communist rulers allied in the Warsaw Pact to issue a seal of approval for the Bonn-Moscow pact in the form of a joint communiqué. Mr. Ulbricht came to Moscow, characteristically, with the largest delegation.

And, Mr. Ulbricht promptly demonstrated his continued dissatisfaction with the Moscow treaty and the Warsaw pact communiqué on the day of his return, Aug. 22, through an editorial attacking West Germany. It was published in the youth organization paper, *Junge Welt* (Young World).

Yet for the moment Mr. Ulbricht appears to be almost alone in bucking the trend of Central European affairs toward compromise and cooperation. His consistent policies of keeping West Germany at arm's length, of demanding nothing less than fullscale diplomatic recognition from Bonn, of demonstrating the strength of his hand by harassing isolated West Berlin—all are in peril.

Moreover, he seems for the moment to have lost the position of primacy in East Europe and of even setting the tone of Soviet policy in Germany which he enjoyed during and after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

If the optimists in Bonn and Moscow are right, Mr. Ulbricht will have to give ground on some or all of his policies in the coming months. But past practice shows that 77-year-old Walter Ulbricht will have a last word, or perhaps even two or three last words on the settlements now pending for the access routes and frontiers that curl in and around the Plain of Brandenburg and Berlin.

—DAVID BINDER

CPYRGHT

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 August 1970

CPYRGHT

Long-term agreement expected**Bonn, Moscow near trade pact?**By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

West Germany soon may join its major Common Market partners in having a long-term trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

Soviet-West German trade has grown steadily in recent years, though shorn of the benefits of a formal trade pact, which the Kremlin refused to renew after expiration of the last agreement in 1963.

A primary reason was the sticky problem of West Berlin, which Moscow insists is an independent political entity. Bonn says the isolated city is linked economically to the federal republic.

Successive West German governments have declined to sign trade agreements that

did not include West Berlin within the scope of the pact.

Meanwhile, Moscow negotiated five-year trade agreements, each to run from 1970 through 1974, with France and Italy. The Benelux powers of the Common Market have one-year trade pacts with the Soviets, renewable yearly.

Now, in the wake of the newly signed political treaty between Moscow and Bonn, Soviet leaders appear eager to conclude a trade agreement with West Germany, and to be willing to accept a "Berlin clause" to get it.

City not named

This clause would not name the city, but would specify that the trade agreement was valid within the territory of the D-mark West, or West German currency.

Such a clause was accepted by Poland, Romania, and other Communist powers, when they negotiated formal trade agreements with the federal republic.

The 1961 Soviet-West German trade pact, which ended in 1963, simply said that the pact covered the same territory as an earlier 1958 agreement. The Soviets claim there was no specific inclusion of West Berlin in the 1958 pact.

Now the climate has so improved that West German Economics Minister Karl Schiller and Minister for Science and Education Hans Leussink will fly to Moscow in September for trade and technical talks.

Chancellor Willy Brandt's government would like to get a Soviet-West German trade agreement tucked away before the end of 1972, when Common Market members lose the right to negotiate bilateral trade treaties with third countries that do not recognize the European Economic Community (EEC).

Negotiations scheduled

Beginning in 1973, the Commission of the European Communities is scheduled to negotiate trade treaties with such third parties, on behalf of member states of the six-nation Common Market.

Once that deadline is past, Moscow would have to extend formal recognition to the EEC in order to negotiate a trade agreement with Bonn, through the commission. (Most major non-Communist powers maintain two embassies in Brussels—one accredited to the Belgian Government and the other to the EEC.)

As matters now stand, West Germany simply needs the approval of the Council of Ministers of the EEC to negotiate a bilateral trade treaty with the Soviets, within guidelines laid down by the Common Market.

Growing EEC stressed

West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, during his recent political negotiations in Moscow, stressed to Kremlin leaders the need for Moscow to recognize the "reality" of an integrated and growing EEC.

Soviet-West German trade, meanwhile, jumped 57 percent between 1967 and 1969, due partly to a major pipeline-natural gas deal.

The Soviets will deliver Siberian natural gas to West Germany through a pipeline to be furnished by German steelmakers. Lengths of giant pipe already are being shipped east under aegis of this deal.

In 1969, West Germany sold to the Soviets goods worth 1.5 billion marks (\$410 million) and bought Soviet products worth 1.3 billion marks (nearly \$360 million) in return.

In 1958, when the Common Market came into being, the Soviet Union bought only 5 percent of its total imports from EEC members. Today that share has risen to almost 10 percent.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 August 1970

Soviet truck complex

West Germans to help with plant

By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

A billion-dollar truck plant centering on Daimler-Benz may be the economic first fruits of the recently signed Soviet-West German treaty of cooperation.

The German automotive firm, maker of Mercedes cars and trucks, for months has been discussing with Soviet officials construction of a giant factory complex in the Soviet Union.

The projected plant, according to press reports, would turn out 150,000 heavy trucks yearly, each with a payload capacity of 10 to 20 tons. The plant would be built on the Kama River, a major tributary of the Volga.

Ford turned down

Daimler-Benz, according to present thinking, would be the focal point of a European consortium, including Fiat of Italy, Renault of France, and Daf of Holland.

This is the same project Henry Ford turned down, following a study trip to the Soviet Union. Mr. Ford told stockholders the project was beyond Ford's financial capacity.

The U.S. Defense Department is known to have opposed American participation, on grounds that the huge truck plant would increase the Soviet Union's military potential.

"It certainly will," declared a knowledgeable source. "But wasn't it realized in Washington that the Soviets would get their plant anyway? The difference is, European firms now will have the business, not American companies."

West German Government officials have confirmed the lively interest of Chancellor Willy Brandt's government in the massive truck project.

Project called huge

The likelihood is that the government will guarantee at least part of the risk undertaken by Daimler-Benz and other West German supplier firms.

The project is so huge that it will draw in, not only the major European truck manufacturers, but dozens of smaller suppliers of parts suppliers.

Economics Minister Karl Schiller will "with certainty discuss this project with his Soviet hosts" during the Minister's forthcoming visit to Moscow, a government spokesman declared.

West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko had broached the subject during their recent political talks in Moscow, leading up to the Soviet-West German treaty signed Aug. 12.

Raw materials to be supplied

The Soviet Government, informed sources say, hopes to pay for this and similar undertakings partly through the delivery of raw materials — oil, timber, natural gas, and others — to Western Europe.

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin is said to have stressed to Chancellor Brandt the ability of the Soviet Union to supply a varied list of raw materials.

A good deal of negotiation lies ahead before the Soviet and Western governments, the truck-manufacturing firms, and European banks have the project ready for signing.

Even at this stage, however, two things are clear:

1. The West Germans continue to move strongly to reinforce their trade and technical position east of the Iron Curtain.

2. The Soviet Union is demonstrably eager for western help — focusing on West Germany — to modernize its backward economy.

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Chilean Rightists Refuse to Concede Defeat in Election

By JOSEPH NOVITSKI
Special to The New York Times
SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 6—

The conservative supporters of Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, the runner-up in Friday's presidential election in Chile, made it clear today that they did not accept the Marxist candidate's top place as final.

A statement made on behalf of the political parties and independent organizations that supported Mr. Alessandri, a former President running as an independent, noted that the process of electing the next President of Chile had not been completed.

Dr. Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate of a leftist coalition, won a plurality of 39,338 votes in the three-candidate election, but for direct election under Chile's Constitution, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes. Thus the Chilean Congress, in a joint session on Oct. 24, will decide between Dr. Allende and Mr. Alessandri, the top two candidates.

Mr. Allende has at least 80 votes in the 200-member Congress, possibly outnumbering Mr. Alessandri's votes by almost 2 to 1. Radimiro Tomic Romero, the candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic party, finished a poor third in the election and has publicly congratulated Dr. Allende on his victory.

The statement today was the first by Mr. Alessandri's supporters since the election. The statement — read by Enrique Ortuza Escobar, a former Cabinet minister under Mr. Alessandri — did not commit the conservative parties to any definite course of action. However, it indicated that they would fight in Congress to prevent the election of Dr. Allende to the six-year presidential term beginning Nov. 4.

The statement was not

signed by Mr. Alessandri and had his approval. It said:

"We appeal to democratic forces, to their representatives and to the free men and women of Chile, who make up the immense majority, to unite to defend the constitutional right to designate the President of the country."

Mr. Ortuza refused to answer any questions after reading the statement.

Meanwhile, the residents of this capital appeared to be accepting the election results as normal. In other countries of Latin America, the outcome has been interpreted as the first time that a Latin electorate has voted to exchange a capitalist society for a socialist one.

At a country club outside Santiago, well-to-do Chileans enjoyed their slightly English version of the good life. On downtown streets, smiling, strolling crowds watched young supporters of the losing candidates pay off election bets.

Country Club Is Calm

Young men and women leapt into the shallow, cold waters of a reflecting pool in the downtown Plaza Bulnes. A young man wearing a sign saying "I supported Alessandri" walked around several downtown blocks trailing a long tail made of a torn sheet with a tin can rattling at the end.

By 10 this morning golfers in a tournament at the Prince of Wales Country Club in suburban Las Condes were starting their rounds among blooming fruit trees. Five tennis courts were full, and families with small children were wandering slowly around the grounds that have the snow-capped Andes as a backdrop.

One of Mr. Allende's campaign promises was to expropriate the club and turn it into a popular park. But few of the Chilean members were willing to comment today on the election results. "We'll wait and see," said one.

Young rugby players greeted each other jokingly as Comrade before a game got under way on the club grounds.

"Perhaps they're hoping the Congress will elect someone else," said the referee, after the game. "If the club's going to be expropriated, they might as well enjoy it while they can."

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THE EVENING STAR
 Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 10, 1970

Alessandri Offers New Chile Election

By MERWIN K. SIGALE
 Special to The Star

SANTIAGO — A new rightist move aimed at denying the presidency of Chile to Marxist Salvador Allende produced cries of foul play from the left today.

And Allende forces called a mass rally for this weekend to "reaffirm victory and repudiate the maneuvers of the right."

The stop-Allende campaign, fighting an uphill battle, entered a significant phase late yesterday when former President Jorge Alessandri, the runnerup in Friday's election, announced that if congress named him president over the popular-vote winner, Allende, he would resign to set the stage for new elections.

Congress is scheduled to choose Oct. 24 between the top two candidates, since no one received an absolute majority in the three-way race. On three previous occasions when Congress had to elect the president, it always picked the man who had gotten the highest popular vote.

Party Holds Balance

A source close to Alessandri said the candidate's statement "puts the entire ball game in the

hands of the Christian Democrats," whose 75-vote bloc in the 200-seat Congress holds the balance of power.

Allende's Popular Unity coalition has about 80 seats. Alessandri's backers have 45.

The incentive for the Christian Democrats, as Alessandri backers see it, is the chance to win a new election, as well as to prevent a Marxist government from taking power for the first time anywhere in South America.

Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democrats' candidate, placed third in the balloting. President Eduardo Frei could not carry the Christian Democratic standard because the constitution forbids anyone from being elected twice in succession.

Frei Might Run

In a new election, however, it is presumed that Frei could run, since Alessandri would have served an intervening term, even if it lasted but a day. Frei trounced Allende in the 1964 election and still is regarded as the most popular political figure in Chile.

The reformist views of the Christian Democrats are closer to Allende's than to Alessandri's, and the party's congressmen

have been expected to put Allende in office.

But Alessandri now has moved to guarantee that a vote for him would not put him in power but would mean new elections.

Communists Angry

If congress elects him he said, "I would resign the post, which would pave the way for a new election."

He would not be a candidate himself in such an election "for any reason," he said.

The reaction from the left today was quick and sharp. Communist party Senator Volodia Teitelboim called the move "moral suicide" which will end tragically.

The Communist party newspaper, *El Siglo* headlined, "Criminal Mummies Seek Civil War." *Puro Chile*, an Allende organ, called it a "dirty maneuver."

The Allende camp began organizing a huge weekend rally as a show of popular support.

Meanwhile, a period of intensive political maneuvering is under way, and some hard bargaining is expected.

The Christian Democrats, who have masked their intentions so far, named a five-man committee to study the situation and report to the party's national council.

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
16 September 1970

FREI PARTY SEEKS CHARTER CHANGES

**Wants to Assure Democracy
If Allende Takes Office**

By JOSEPH NOVITSKI
Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 25—

The Christian Democratic party, defeated in a Presidential election Sept. 4 after six years in power, is under pressure to decide quickly whether it will give Dr. Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate, the support he needs to become President.

Last night the party leadership took some important steps in preparation for negotiations with Dr. Allende, who won a plurality—but not the majority required by the Constitution—in a three-way race in which the Christian Democratic Candidate finished last.

The election is to be decided by Congress, which has scheduled a joint session for Oct. 24 to choose between Dr. Allende and the runner-up, former President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez.

In such run-offs the candidate with the popular plurality has traditionally been chosen by Congress, although the Constitution does not require this.

To Assure Democracy

The Christian Democrats, according to party members, are trying to satisfy themselves on the question whether Dr. Allende could and would govern within Chile's democratic framework or whether his Government might become a dictatorship of the left.

"Our party knows that the danger is real," said one member, who insisted on remaining anonymous. The Christian Democratic leadership has given or-

ders that no member involved in the party decision can make his views known publicly.

In an attempt to obtain iron-clad guarantees that the next Presidential election, in 1976, would be a free one, the party leadership was understood to have approved last night a series of proposed constitutional amendments embodying such guarantees, which might be adopted before Oct. 24.

Talks Start This Week

Negotiations with Dr. Allende are expected to start this week and the results are to be submitted to a Christian Democratic party congress about the end of September.

The Christian Democrats have identified the press, the police and armed forces, and the educational system as three areas of national life that would have to remain untouched under Dr. Allende's coalition government.

By means of a Communist party deputy and sympathetic journalists unions, the Allende coalition has already begun to put pressure on independent or opposing radio stations and newspapers to recognize the 62-year-old physician as President-elect before Oct. 24. Some have yielded. Others have refused.

"If we vote for Allende and his government turns to doctrinaire Marxism, we could go down in history as having delivered Chile to the Communists," said one Christian Democrat. "If we vote for Alessandri, we'll be blamed for supporting the right against the people, who had freely chosen a more rapid process of social change."

Dr. Allende's coalition, based on the Socialist and Communist parties, controls 80 of the 200 votes in the two houses of Congress. He needs at least some of the votes of the 75 Christian Democratic Senators and Deputies at the joint session of Oct. 24 to become President on Nov. 4.

Thursday, Sept. 17, 1970

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Chile's Powerful Publishing Family Fighting Marxist

By Lewis H. Dluguid

Washington Post Foreign Service
SANTIAGO—One of the

Chilean institutions most directly affected by the electoral victory of Socialist Salvador Allende is the news paper that tried so hard to defeat him, El Mercurio.

Allende has vowed to see the daily wrested from the Edwards family that has wiclded it for 143 years, during which time the paper has earned an international reputation.

A day after Allende was placed first in the popular vote for the presidency, the fat morning Mercurio fell to half the weight that it carried lightly through years of battle against the political left.

It hesitated a couple of objective editions, then Publisher Agustin S. Edwards III made his decision: "We will stay and fight," said a spokesman. "We will stay until freedom ceases to exist."

The program of the Popular Unity Front backing Marxist Allende says: "Communications media are fundamental aids in the formation of a new culture and a new man. They must be imprinted with an educational orientation, liberating them from their commercial character . . . eliminating the sad presence of monopolies."

No Chilean could doubt that the monopoly referred to is the Edwards chain of papers, of which Santiago's Mercurio is the most formidable.

All major Chilean cities have their own Mercurios, which take most of their news and all of their opinion from the capital edition. Edwards also owns a major afternoon paper here.

While the capital endures about ten dailies, most are owned or dominated by a political party or the government.

Among this melange of low-circulation sheets, Mercurio looks quite disinterested despite its unabashed plumping of a free-enterprise system that somehow never caught on in Chile.

Mercurio, which dominates the advertising market, is also unique in that it attempts to offer a fairly balanced report of news from abroad.

Publisher Edwards—namesake of the British sailor who jumped ship to take the hand of a fair Chilean in Valparaiso in the 19th century—is immediate past president of the Inter-American Press Association. He is a founder of LATIN, a joint effort by major Latin American newspapers to create an alternative to North American and European wire services.

Other Edwards family interests are less controversial, and often more profitable, than the newspapers: the Edwards Bank and the Chilean Consolidated Insurance Co., specializing in fire and accident insurance.

The family provides the management and holds large percentages of shares in a brewing monopoly, a foodstuffs complex, several high-output farms (according to the spokesman, one was lost to the state under President Eduardo Frei's agrarian reform—which Mercurio bitterly fought).

The Edwardses hold half the shares in a joint venture with Lever Bros., that dominates detergent sales.

Various planks of Allende's platform are aimed at state takeover of these interests also. "All of our investments are in Chile," said the company spokesman. "We are going to try to make them break the law to take us. If we leave with dignity, we will be able to come back."

Sources outside the Edwards organization say he reinvested his profits so diligently in Chile that a large portion of his assets are tied up—reducing his maneuverability and raising the question of how long he can even meet payrolls in an economy now drum-tight because of the election results.

Chile's political future is so confused that it is not certain even that Allende will be president, much less that he will have parliamentary support sufficient to pass legislation taking over the Edwards holdings.

But assuming Allende does take power, he probably will be able to divide his opposition on this issue. Defeated Christian Democratic candidate Radomiro Tomic hinted that he, too, would move against Edwards, though now the party is championing press freedom. And every businessman ever bettered by Edwards—probably a majority of the small entrepreneurial class here—could find some retribution in the takeover.

Perhaps the secret of the Edwards success was his capital and willingness to invest it. This found expression in a high quality of employees.

The Communist newspaper El Siglo tried to show the completeness of Allende's victory the night of Sept. 4 by running a story about how Mercurio employees danced on the editorial room floor.

If someone danced, he was unaccompanied. Mercurio wages are low by international standards but atop the prevailing Santiago scale. Top management people are well paid by any standard. Employees are loyal.

If Mercurio carries out the decision to stay and wage a legal fight against expropriation, it will have as a model the classic case of the Buenos Aires La Prensa in neighboring Argentina.

La Prensa stood off dictator Juan Peron until he forced out the owners. When Peron was thrown out 15 years ago, the paper was returned to its owners.

Sources within Allende's front foresee no problem in finding a pretext to move, such as a craft union strike "requiring" national intervention. Then Allende might put into effect the plan he has alluded to in speeches, a workers' cooperative to displace management along the lines of a takeover recently in Peru.

There is already a Chilean precedent in a Valparaiso paper, in receivership, that was reopened by its workers.

Should the Mercurio papers be taken over by workers loyal to Allende, he could move into a near monopoly of the press even as he would almost surely control all television—one channel belongs to the state, another to the Marxist-dominated National University and the third, the Catholic University station, is in the hands of the Christian Democratic dissidents who jumped over to Allende's front.

The only unaffiliated daily of importance outside the Mercurio chain is Clarin, a sensationalist tabloid with an editor whose professed ideology is aligned with Fidel Castro's. Clarin shifts loyalties occasionally, but came on so strongly for Allende that its immediate future is probably assured.

Agustin Edwards is out of the country. The company says he is abroad to hold up delivery of the last of the heavy equipment for the new plant, and to avoid efforts to link him with any possible coup efforts in coming days.

It is to some extent a measure of the power of El Mercurio that its candidate, Jorge Alessandri, 72 and without effective political backing, came within less than 2 percentage points of

beating Allende. While Mercurio has carried out campaigns before in its news columns, there is no precedent for this perhaps final effort.

"We gambled and we lost," said the spokesman.

The Edwardses were modernizing capitalists in the North American mold, but Chile is a long way from the United States and quite a different economy.

If Mercurio disappears the country will have lost an imperfect voice that may prove difficult to replace. Communist-led students will have lost a favorite target of their frustrations. The climax of most rallies was a march on the U.S. consulate by the park, or on El Mercurio downtown—a wait at the corner for the green light and then shouting and uproar, into the dignified marble foyer of the newspaper many hated and most everyone read.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 September 1970

Chile's Leading Marxist

Salvador Allende

By JUAN de ONIS

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 6

—As a medical student 40 years ago, Salvador Allende discovered in Marxist-Leninist criticism of capitalist society a revolutionary response to the social and economic ills of Chile.

Dr. Allende, who won a plurality in Chile's presidential election Friday,

Man
in the
News

at the age of 62 still calls himself a Marxist, but he is quite a different type of revolutionary from Fidel Castro or Ho Chi Minh. He is an ambitious and sometimes angry man, but he does not believe in violence. His long political career, from student activist to the threshold of Chile's presidency, has been within Chile's democratic parliamentary and party system.

The Best Way for Chile

There are many Latin Americans who do not believe that the electoral process of bourgeois democracy can produce good government," he said before last week's election. "They would favor power achieved only by a revolution of the masses, by the armed struggle. A victory by the electoral route will be difficult for us, but it is the best way by far for Chile."

Dr. Allende has a reputation of being tolerant of the political views of others. "You can disagree with Allende and still be his friend," said a Christian Democrat recently.

However, Dr. Allende heads a leftist coalition that has as its core the strong Chilean Communist party. He has proposed an "anti-imperialist" and "anti-oligarchic" program that would dissolve the present Congress, nationalize all major foreign companies, and develop close ties between Chile and Communist countries, including North Vietnam, China and Cuba.

Attacks Power of Wealth

By nationalizing the banking system and carrying out a drastic agrarian reform, also called for in his program, Dr. Allende would destroy the political and economic power of Chile's few wealthy families, which has been a constant theme in his long political career.

In this, Dr. Allende reflects a deep political resentment of the middle-class leftists against the few rich families that form the only private economic power group in this country, where the state already controls most basic enterprise, including oil, railroads, steel and power.

This next government will open the door to the establishment of socialism in Chile," said Dr. Allende last week. According to the coalition program, Chile's fundamental problems of poverty, housing, and hunger, are the result of the privileges of "a bourgeoisie structurally dependent on foreign capital."

The new government will end this "domination" and begin "the construction of socialism," he said.

"We recognize that socialism cannot be achieved overnight," he said. "You cannot bring about socialism by decree. It is a lengthy social process, and each country must find its own way."

He said that a socialist Chile would not be modeled after Cuba or any other nation. "Chile is different," he said. "For one thing, we are much better off industrially than Cuba was at the start of her revolution. We don't have to import shoes or all the other things that Cuba lacked so completely."

Rejects One-Party System

One of the key steps in Dr. Allende's program is the replacement of the present constitutional system, which places legislative power in two houses—a Senate and

Member of Deputies—by an "assembly of the people," an elected body that would select new judges for the supreme court.

When asked at a news conference yesterday if the left-wing coalition he headed planned to establish a one-party system, Dr. Allende replied: "never!" Dr. Allende, a Socialist Senator, has the support of the Communist and Radical parties.

In his campaign he sought to assure voters that his government would be hard on foreign imperialists but gentle and cautious in bringing about changes in the texture of Chilean life, always with the agreement of the people and their elected representatives.

But some critics doubt that his Government would be gentle.

"Allende is not himself a Communist, but the strongest single group behind his candidacy is the Communist party," one said. "He will seem to be gentle, but it will be the iron fist in the velvet glove. If he is elected it will just be a matter of time before most of Latin America becomes Marxist."

Headed Health Ministry

He entered politics as a medical student at the University of Chile during the dictatorship of Gen. Carlos Ibanez, who ruled from 1927 to 1931. Student agitation activities landed Mr. Allende in jail, but he also was elected vice president of the student federation the year he received his medical degree in 1932.

A year later, Dr. Allende and a group of other former student leaders and Marxist intellectuals founded the Chilean Socialist party. He was elected a national deputy in 1937, after having practiced medicine for a few years in provincial cities. In

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1939, he became Minister of Health in the "popular front" Government of President Pedro Aguirre Cerda.

A major earthquake that year tested Dr. Allende's administrative abilities. His direction of relief efforts in the disaster, in which 20,000 persons died, earned him a national reputation.

Shortly afterward, he published "Socio-Medical Problems of Chile," a book that attacked Chile's capitalist social structure as a cause of nutritional and other illnesses among the poor.

In 1939, Mr. Allende married Hortensia Bussi, a statistician. They have three daughters, all of whom are now university graduates.

Lost 3 Times

Dr. Allende first sought the Presidency in 1952 with Socialist and Communist support. He ran again in 1958 and barely lost by 30,000 votes to Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, his major opponent this year. He was unsuccessful again in 1964.

Dr. Allende is a stocky man, ABOUT A FEET 7 INCHES tall. His gray hair, neatly trimmed moustache and thick-rimmed glasses give him a studious appearance. But he talks with vigorous gestures, sharply chopping the air with his hands to make a point, and he is a tough parliamentary debater. With his long tenure in the

Chamber of Deputies and Senate, he has a prolific record of initiating legislation. He is credited with more than 100 bills, mainly dealing with social security, health measures and women's rights.

Dr. Allende was born July 26, 1908, in Valparaiso. His father, a provincial lawyer, was at one time a deputy for the Radical party and was Serene Grand Master of Freemasons in Chile.

Dr. Allende is also an active Mason, which provides him with wide contacts in the social and political world of the capital.

23 September 1970

Chile's Papers Exercise Caution Following Election

By JOSEPH NOVITSKI

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 20—

A distinct caution has marked all but the most partisan newspapers and radio stations in Chile's capital since a Marxist won the presidential election.

The press has been the first to reflect the economic and political uncertainties that followed Dr. Salvador Allende's victory at the polls 16 days ago. Now, there are doubts, expressed notably by the governing Christian Democratic party, that freedom of the press as Chileans have understood it can survive if an Allende government is installed. Since Dr. Allende did not win a majority of votes in the election, he must win an election in Congress on Oct. 24.

The Chilean news media, singled out for comment by Dr. Allende in practically every speech, have been operating since the election in a polarized political atmosphere. The leftist coalition supporting Dr. Allende has appeared to leave little middle ground for an independent point of view.

Initial pressures on newspapers and radio stations to swing into Dr. Allende's camp after the elections have eased, according to journalists here. But the economic squeeze brought on by falling advertising revenues has tightened on all media.

'Economic Asphyxiation' Seen

"They won't have to appropriate the media," said the manager of a large, independent Santiago radio station. "The media will die of economic asphyxiation and fall to the Government."

The Allende coalition has guaranteed financial support for the Chilean press, radio and television. Speaking through the daily newspaper of the Communist party here, the coalition also recently said that the present major difficulty in Chilean mass communications was their "defense of the capitalist regime and the consolidation of the control over the country exercised by imperialism and the oligarchy."

Guarantees Sought

In the same press program the Allende coalition guaranteed freedom of the press, which it defined as "the right to be informed loyally and truthfully through the communications media, without prior censorship." The coalition said communications media would be considered a public utility, to be used for the free expression of differing points of view, but also to contribute "to the creation of a new culture and the rise of a new man."

Despite the coalition's promise, the Christian Democratic party has asserted that it will

ask Dr. Allende for unshakable legal guarantees of effective press freedom in return for its support. Dr. Allende needs some Christian Democratic votes to win in the election in Congress.

Right after the election, Dr. Allende's coalition sent a Communist deputy, Jorge Insunza to visit some radio stations that had not supported his candidacy. Mr. Insunza has denied he was putting pressure on the stations.

"Their argument was that we should use commentators who would be able to calm the country," said one station owner. Radio Portales, the station with the largest audience in the area, hired Eduardo Larraín, a Communist commentator, on the day of Mr. Insunza's visit.

Santiago has 11 daily newspapers and more than six radio stations. There is a Government television network, and two private stations, one belonging to the Catholic University and one to the Marxist-controlled University of Chile.

Observers here assert that the majority of young working journalists were graduated from the University of Chile's journalism school while it was under Marxist control in recent years.

A Threat to Press Is Seen

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 —

The Inter-American Press Association has charged that freedom of the press is being jeopardized in Chile as a result of a concerted campaign of harassment and intimidation "by the Communists and their Marxist allies."

The association said in a statement made public yesterday that the campaign had caused the resignation of news executives of newspaper and radio and television stations, and the sale of some of the media, as well as the dismissal of "anti-Marxist editors and reporters."

The statement was signed by James S. Copley of the Copley newspapers and news service, president of the association; George Beebe, senior managing editor of The Miami Herald, and chairman of the association's freedom of the press committee; Lee Hills, president of the Knight newspapers and past president of the association; Manoel F. Do Nascimento Brito, publisher of the Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, and Alberto Gainza Paz, publisher of La Prensa, Buenos Aires.

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