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REPRINT

Vietnamization, Can It Succeed?

By DAVID REID



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Vietnamization, Can It Succeed?

BY DAVID REED

AT 3 A.M. last December 3, some 500 well-armed North Vietnamese troops slipped out of their sanctuary in Cambodia and crossed the border into the

desolate Plain of Reeds in South Vietnam's Mekong Delta. Their mission was to seize a district headquarters at Long Khot, a small town just half a mile from the border, and thus strike a blow at confidence in the Saigon government's ability to take over the combat burden of the war.

At one time it would have been an easy task. Long Khot was defended by fewer than 300 members of South Vietnam's Regional and Popular Forces. In the past, these "territorial" troops, armed only with worn-out

All the years of fighting come down now to a single question: Can the South Vietnamese army—rearmed and retrained—stand alone? Experts on the scene think the chances are good, and getting better

had been hopelessly outgunned by the communists, who are equipped with AK-47 automatic rifles supplied by Communist China. As a result, many territorial units had been cut to pieces, or else they had simply bolted in panic.

But when the North Vietnamese tried to storm Long Khot, they were greeted with devastating fire from new American M-16 automatic rifles and M-60 machine guns. Although the communists quickly blew three pathways through the barbed-wire perimeter, the territorials stood firm,

the attackers. At daylight, when the North Vietnamese tried to withdraw across the plain to Cambodia, many were mowed down by American and South Vietnamese helicopters and jets. When this reporter visited Long Khot soon afterward, some 160 North Vietnamese lay dead in and around the town. Only 12 of the defenders had been killed.

Long Khot was more than a victory for the once-despised territorials. It is a promising sign for the future of the war in Vietnam, and a prime example of what is being accomplished under "Vietnamization"—the series of programs designed to enable the South Vietnamese to fight the war on their own.

Cautious Hope. Vietnamization is going on in a spectacular way all over Vietnam, from the chilly, wind-swept hills along the Demilitarized Zone in the north to the steaming mangrove swamps at the southernmost tip of the country. All troops, including all the territorials in thousands of small communities like Long Khot, have been rearmed with up-to-date weapons. Far-reaching training programs, involving almost everyone in the armed forces, have also been launched. Indeed, seldom in modern times has an entire army been so drastically overhauled in so short a time.

The aim of Vietnamization is to make it possible for the United States to extricate itself from Vietnam without ignominiously abandoning the country to the communists. In the first two rounds of

American troop withdrawals, 60,000 men were sent home. Another 50,000 are to have left Vietnam by April 15. Further withdrawals, says Washington, will depend on the level of enemy activity, continued improvement of the Vietnamese armed forces, and progress, if any, at the Paris peace talks. But some officials have voiced a cautious hope that the bulk of American combat troops will have been sent home by the end of this year. U.S. troop strength thus might be cut to around half the peak force of 543,000. The remaining Americans would provide air, artillery and logistical support for the South Vietnamese. Eventually, these troops would also be pulled out, leaving behind only a relatively small advisory force.

Thus, while the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) can probably count on American backing of one kind or another for some time to come, the day is nearing when it will have to fight the ground battles on its own. Will it be able to handle the job?

Years of Heartbreak. With 930,000 men under arms (including territorials), South Vietnam has the fifth-largest military establishment in the world (after the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China and India). Yet despite its formidable size, the ARVN has problems.

The key to this force's future performance—the typical South Vietnamese soldier—is a man about five feet tall, weighing 140 to 150

pounds. He is in his late teens or early 20s, comes from a rural area, is barely literate, if that. As a private with less than three years' service and no dependents, he earns the free-market equivalent of \$12 a month. (An American private in Vietnam gets \$200.80 a month—more than senior Vietnamese officers.) He is serving for the duration of the war, and his casualty rate is high, his margin for survival not overly good.

Losses have been staggering. Since 1960, nearly 100,000 ARVN soldiers have been killed. Relative to the population, this is as if the United States had lost almost 1,200,000 men in Vietnam. Some 32,000 ARVN soldiers are listed as missing in action.

Despite this, the South Vietnamese soldier continues to fight and, at times, to fight superbly. In more than ten years of war, not one ARVN unit has gone over to the enemy. The individual desertion rate is high—12 men per thousand per month for all the armed forces and as high as 25 men per thousand per month in combat elements—but American advisers say that a majority desert to visit their families or because of a crisis at home, then either rejoin units closer to their village or sign up for elite units such as the Airborne, where the pay is somewhat better. All units are happy to get recruits, no questions asked. And if the ARVN has a desertion problem, so too has the Vietcong. Last year 20,000 Vietcong soldiers deserted

to the government side, more than twice as many as in 1968.

Why does the ARVN soldier continue to fight? Not because he feels any particular loyalty to either government or country; his only allegiance is to his family and village. He fights simply because he hates the communists. Hardly a day goes by in Vietnam during which the Reds do not throw grenades into crowded buses or marketplaces, or fire rockets or mortars at random into towns, killing men, women and children. During the Tet offensive in 1968, they killed nearly 3000 civilians in the city of Hue. Some were buried alive. In all, the communists have murdered nearly 27,000 civilians in ten years and kidnaped some 60,000 others, most of whom are presumed dead. In all of this they have sought to terrorize the population into submission; but they have also succeeded in stiffening the resistance of many.

Inferiority Complex. More than anything else, the performance of ARVN units depends on the caliber of its officers. American advisers who live and fight with ARVN troops insist that there are excellent officers throughout the army. But there are problems, too.

Until recently, the typical ARVN officer came from a special world. Only young men who had successfully completed their secondary education were accepted for officer training. As only the upper classes could afford such an education, the officer corps became a monopoly of

those classes—high government officials, large landowners and wealthy businessmen and merchants. Talent in the ranks was wasted. Also, after more than ten years of war many of the bravest officers have fallen in combat. Some of those remaining avoid combat whenever possible; some—in part, probably, because of abysmally low pay—are dishonest.

Along with its other problems, the ARVN has labored in the past under a monumental inferiority complex. In the early 1960s, it was very much on the defensive against mounting Vietcong attacks. When ARVN units ventured into rural areas, they were often annihilated in communist ambushes. The situation worsened in 1964 when North Vietnamese divisions invaded the South.

The first U.S. troops landed in early 1965. Partly because there was no time to reorganize the ARVN, partly because of characteristic American impatience, the Americans pushed aside the ARVN and made the war an American war. ARVN officers felt humiliated, and many concluded that there was no need to risk their lives if strangers were not only willing but insistent on doing the fighting alone.

But the Tet offensive of early 1968 jolted the ARVN out of its lackadaisical approach to the war and its near-total reliance on the Americans. Faced with a countrywide communist onslaught—more than 100 cities and towns were attacked simultaneously—both regulars and territo-

surprised the Americans. The country was put on a full war footing, and the armed forces were expanded by one third. American advisers report that the announcement in 1969 of the first American troop withdrawals also had a healthy psychological effect, in that it further galvanized the ARVN's determination and led to a rise in self-respect and confidence among the officers.

New Look. In overhauling the ARVN under the Vietnamization program, the first task was to provide it with modern weapons. To increase firepower, some 760,000 M-16 rifles, 37,000 M-79 grenade launchers, 12,000 M-60 machine guns, 1300 heavy mortars and 1000 howitzers were shipped to Vietnam. To give the ARVN a mobility it never had before, it was equipped with 1350 tanks and armored personnel carriers and 31,000 jeeps and trucks. To remedy inadequate field communications, 29,000 tactical radios were distributed.

In addition, the Vietnamese air force was given 60 A37 jets, and 80 UH1 (Huey) helicopters. Eventually there may be 400 choppers, still a relatively small number compared with the 2000 U.S. Army helicopters now in Vietnam; the communists, on the other hand, have no combat helicopters there.

The U.S. Navy is turning over its fleet of 500 high-speed riverboats to the Vietnamese. These boats, operating in the labyrinth of waterways in the Mekong Delta, have proved most successful in impeding the

infiltration of North Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. By June, all of the boats will be operated by South Vietnamese crews; American officers and sailors will function only as advisers and in shoreside logistical and training roles.

With deliveries of military hardware almost completed, the major emphasis now is on training South Vietnamese armed forces. The prerequisite of a secondary education for all officer candidates has been abolished. Last year, 20 percent of the nearly 10,000 men who graduated from officer training schools were sergeants who had proved themselves in battle. This year it is hoped that the number will jump to 40 percent, and next year to a majority. Steps are also being taken to remove incompetent ARVN officers from command.

Under new programs, all Vietnamese troops are getting up to six weeks of refresher training. Nearly 100,000 men were graduated from advanced military schools last year—more than twice the number of two years earlier. And more than 1000 men a year are taking specialized training in the United States.

In training helicopter pilots, the U.S. command discovered that it was virtually impossible to translate all the hundreds of thousands of pieces of technical literature into Vietnamese. So six schools were set up in Vietnam, where American instructors are currently giving 5000 students courses in helicopter flying and speaking English. Some grad-

uates are sent to the United States for 34 weeks of helicopter pilot training—there were 527 of them in the United States at recent count. Others are trained as mechanics or as communications experts. Says one American: "There's not a piece of equipment, even the most sophisticated ones, that the Vietnamese haven't been able to learn to handle with proficiency."

Of equal importance to the build-up of the ARVN has been the strengthening of the Regional and Popular Forces. These men fight in their home areas and usually have a stronger motivation than regular troops from remote provinces. The victory at Long Khot was only one of many such battles; the territorials, fighting small-unit actions that go virtually unnoticed in the press, accounted for nearly one half of all enemy casualties last year.

Glowing Future? While the performance of some ARVN units still makes American advisers wince, many are showing a new aggressiveness. At a time when American casualties have declined, those of the ARVN have risen and in recent months have been running at three and four times the American rate. In the past, many ARVN units ventured out of their base camps only by day and only in force. Now they are conducting more and more small-unit night actions. And Vietnamese pilots now fly more than half of all tactical air strikes by fixed-wing planes in the Delta. Still, at this writing, the new

A QUESTION OF BALANCE

By Sir Robert Thompson

Noted for the key role he played in the defeat of the communist guerrillas in Malaya during the 1950s, Sir Robert is now an adviser to President Nixon on Vietnam. His article, "On the Road to a Just Peace," was published in The Reader's Digest last month. Here he offers some cautionary thoughts on the process of Vietnamization.

I AM convinced that Vietnamization is the road to a just peace in Vietnam. But this does not mean simply re-equipping and retraining the South Vietnamese army. We must do that, of course, but in the process we must be sure that we create an army that will not become a bottomless drain on the revenues and skilled manpower of the country—and which, at the same time, will be closely identified with the people.

In carrying out Vietnamization, therefore, it seems to me that a number of balances have to be preserved. First, American troop withdrawals must be balanced against a declining enemy capability and a rising South Vietnamese capability: they must not be so fast that they allow the North Vietnamese army to stage an all-out offensive before the South Vietnamese are ready to cope with it; they must not be so slow that they encourage the South Vietnamese to think that American combat forces will be around forever.

A second balance concerns the composition of the remaining United States forces as they are reduced. Obviously, the situation will require that they should be weighted toward air and artillery support and logistic units. But if the force is to be reduced to a level of 200,000 men, as has been suggested, there must be *some* combat-infantry support for its own protection.

A third, and quite the most difficult, balance to preserve is the size and composition of South Vietnam's armed forces in relation to its total resources. During the next few years the test in South Vietnam is likely to be as much in the political, administrative and economic fields as in the military field. Thus, there is a great need for a rational direction of manpower to avoid a situation in which the whole talent of the country—its best-educated, most highly qualified citizens—is consumed by the military.

Which raises some interesting questions. For example, who is more important at this stage of the war, a helicopter pilot or, say, a good teacher in a village primary school? Which of the two has to be a South Vietnamese? If South Vietnam cannot provide both, which can the United States more easily provide, and withdraw when the time comes?

These questions must be answered, for as soon as a country is overloaded militarily, it becomes unbalanced politically, economically and financially.

The army inevitably becomes the source of political power, the economy declines and expenditures soar. Because revenue is depressed, pay scales are kept at the lowest possible level. In an inflationary war situation this leads straight to corruption, because no government officials, including the police, can live on their pay.

Or consider a future situation in which the ARVN, all highly modernized, are in occupation of former American bases like Phu Bai and Chu Lai, and are then kept just sufficiently occupied by North Vietnamese army probes to justify their continued existence. Meanwhile, remnants of the Vietcong put all their effort into reviving communist influence in rural areas. There will be no Vietcong in jets, helicopters and tanks; they will be right in among the population in the towns and villages. If Vietnamization were to develop in this way, it could lead the country straight back to the situation that existed at the end of the 1950s, when the war started. At that point the South Vietnamese had a large, American-equipped army with a sizable strength superiority over the Vietcong. And look what happened.

All this means that problems of revenue, taxation, salaries, the training of civilian staff and so on must be as much a part of the Vietnamization program as any improvement or increase in the forces. It is not enough that ARVN should be able to deal with the North Vietnamese army. The war must be won on both fronts—military and civilian—at the same time.

ARVN has not yet been put to a major test. The enemy did not stage a single large-scale offensive in 1969. In part this may be because he has been badly mauled, but some American officers feel that he may simply be biding his time until more American troops are withdrawn.

In summing up, American officers point to the fact that the ARVN of 1970 is a vastly improved army. The Regionals and Populars have emerged as formidable units in their own right. And while the ARVN in 1964 controlled little of the countryside, 92.5 percent of the population now is rated as living under "reasonably" secure conditions.

ditions about the outcome of the war stand like the hulks of so many burnt-out tanks along a five-year road. As a result, Americans on the scene are notably reluctant to make *any* kind of prediction. The consensus is that some major tests lie ahead and that the ARVN may lose some battles. Yet, though no one will say so with certainty, the feeling in South Vietnam is that there is a very good chance that the ARVN will manage on its own in the long run.

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HOW COMMUNISTS TOOK POWER IN CHILE

Red strategy for Chile was to take "the peaceful road"—a far cry from Castro's guerrilla warfare. Story of how it worked is related by some of Latin America's newest exiles.

Since early November, Chile has been ruled by a Marxist Government, dominated by Communists dedicated to turning the country into a socialist state in the Soviet style.

This development, which has rocked the Hemisphere as well as the rest of the Western world, came about not through violent revolution but in a free election.

Why did it happen in Chile, a nation with the oldest democracy in South America? And how did it happen? Is Chile lost to the free world? What does this portend for other nations of the Hemisphere?

To get at the answers, talk with business and professional people among an estimated 17,000 Chileans who have fled their country since the September vote.

A grim picture. What emerges from such talks is a chilling picture of how the Communists, through a combination of circumstances, organization and skillful maneuvering, gained power as they have in no other nation of the Americas except Castro's Cuba.

Says a prominent Chilean lawyer:

"It is now clear that we have been playing Russian roulette every six years with our presidential elections.

"In each, we permitted the Reds to run in a left-wing coalition in spite of the Communist vow to destroy free institutions and implant an authoritarian system.

"Every six years, the Reds became more powerful in that coalition, from being weak, junior members 18 years ago until they gained the dominant voice.

"Yet, in the name of democracy, we winked at their creed and the threat it presented—only to watch them squeak into office."

The Communist-Socialist coalition led by Salvador Allende came out on top in a three-way race last September with 36 per cent of the vote.

In other democratic countries, two or more anti-Communist candidates gaining nearly two thirds of the total vote often have joined forces to win congressional approval for one as President. But that did not happen in Chile.

Instead, the opposition majority in Congress gave Allende and his Marxist allies the votes they needed to gain the Presidency.

"Allende and the Communists had people anesthetized," says an engineer who fled to Argentina. "They made many Chileans feel it would not be as bad as they might fear under those Reds.

"People told each other: 'Chile, after all, is a democracy. We've always worked this way. Why, I've got a cousin whose brother-in-law is one of them, and he's nobody to be afraid of.' That's just how people talked."

In spite of such talk, many Chilean refugees declare that there was a real feeling of fear, following the election, as to what the Communists and their array of left-wing allies might do if denied power.

Strength of Reds. A former security official says:

"The Communist Party in Chile is the strongest and most disciplined in all of Latin America outside Cuba. It has at least 50,000 members, and they hold control over a network of so-called 'Popular Unity Committees' that reach into every walk of Chilean life.

"There are more than 8,000 of these political-action groups. They work for the Socialist cause in factories, offices, on newspapers and radio and television stations and in the universities and

neighborhoods."

A Chilean doctor says:

"The Reds are so well-organized that Allende was able to put thousands of his followers into the streets of many cities at short notice during the election campaign.

"And on election night, they massed in the streets once again to 'defend' Allende's victory—even before the votes were counted.

"All this was not lost on the Chileans, or on the Chilean Army that some anti-Communists were urging to break its long tradition of keeping hands off politics, and to move in.

"Red propaganda said: 'Watch it, brother, because, if you move, we'll take to the streets with arms. Then we'll occupy the factories. Besides that, we've got you penetrated so that you can't trust your noncommissioned officers.' And so on."

Background of take-over. Actually, many of the Chilean refugees explain, the stage for a Communist take-over had been set a long time before the 1970 election.

"As far back as the 1940s," a lawyer recalls, "the Chilean Communist Party made a decision to follow the Moscow

line in seeking to win power through quiet penetration and membership in popular-front movements, as against the fire-brand revolutionary approach taken by Castro and many other Latin-American left-wingers.

"The Communists in Chile called it *la vía pacífica*—the peaceful road to power."

This Communist strat-

ogy, as described in practice by many Chilean refugees, called for moving at all possible levels into certain key fields—education, labor, the press and agriculture.

"The situation in labor is a prime example of how well the Communists have succeeded," says a former industrialist.

"Today, some 70 per cent of organized labor belongs to the CUT—the Chilean Labor Center—the leadership of which is dominated by Communists and Socialists."

Another businessman cites his own experience in dealing with Reds in his labor force.

"I had a machine-tool plant," he says, "and all the operators and technicians were Communist. They were great workers—the best we had. But if they walked out and said they weren't going back to work, you knew damn well nothing could make them go back to work. You could offer them 200 per cent more in wages and fringes, but they wouldn't go back.

"Actually, the only reason they were out, on most occasions, was for political reasons. To protest some Government policy, for example. And if the order from on high called for a strike, they'd strike. Period."

An editor's story. A former city editor of a newspaper in Chile tells of what it was like to work in the press under heavy Communist infiltration.

"Some years ago," the editor recalls, "many of us decided it was time to do something to improve the ethics and professional standards of journalism in Chile.

"There were too many people running around calling themselves newsmen. They were cadging free tickets for everything, even trying to blackmail news sources. So we decided to form an association of journalists, with set standards of admission, and issue cards.

"Well, first thing we knew, the Communists controlled that association. They started issuing cards all over the place, using the association as a political pressure group.

"When non-Communist newsmen protested this, the Reds replied: 'O.K., let's change the association rules to say nobody can be a member unless he's a graduate of a school of journalism.'

"We reminded them that there wasn't any school of journalism in Chile. 'Very well, then,' they said, 'Let's found one.' We did, and of course the Communists moved in on that, too—the deanship of the school and four or five professors.

"That doesn't mean that everybody who goes through the school of journalism will be a Communist. But it does mean that everybody who goes there will be exposed to four years of concentrated Communist ideology—tied in, in many cases, with side trips to such places as Cuba, Russia, Eastern Europe and maybe even Red China.

"In the long run, you can see what that will mean for press, radio and television in Chile. There may be no need for the Allende regime to take over or censor the press, with so many journalists as active sympathizers."

Infiltrating farmers. Much the same pattern of Communist infiltration and subversion has been present in the rich farming country, among the peasant farmers, according to refugee landowners.

Says one: "Of the 150,000 to 175,000 farm workers employed on private estates, about 100,000 are members of peasant federations. And about half of these federations are dominated by the Communists and Socialists.

"Our last Government, under the Christian Democrats, launched a land-reform program that seemed promising at the time. It called for the take-over of unused lands, at fair prices, for redistribution to landless farm workers at terms they could meet.

"But the program ran into all sorts of problems. Squatter movements plagued it, instigated by Communist agitators. And it was badly mismanaged.

"Significantly, the man who ran the program, Jacques Chonchol, has turned up as Minister of Agriculture under Allende's Communist-Socialist regime. Chonchol previously spent three years in Cuba advising Castro on land reform."

Reshaping education. A former school administrator from Chile, now living in Argentina, describes Communist activity in recent years in the field of education.

"The Communists concentrated on the teachers' school," she says. "They were not at all conspicuous there, but they were working quietly and patiently among the student teachers.

"A special concern of the Reds in the teaching field was the choice of course material, particularly in history and the

social sciences.

"One of the first actions taken under the new Minister of Education in the Allende Government was to launch a program of evaluation and revision of textbooks.

"Shortly afterward, the chairman of the textbook committee at the university of engineering was quoted as saying that the science and mathematics textbooks now in use will do for the immediate future, but that social science and Spanish texts must be revised quickly.

"Needless to say, the revisions will be designed to make these textbooks conform to the Marxist ideology."

Taking over business. The legal profession in Chile long has been another target for concentration by the Communists. Says a lawyer who took his family and left the country within days of the Communist-Socialist victory:

"A friend of mine who is a labor lawyer and has dealt with labor problems all his life sent me an interesting document just before I decided to leave, a sort of Red manual on business take-over.

"It was produced by an organization composed of Communist lawyers and it set forth five different ways in which a government might take over a business without being illegal in doing so.

"No sooner did the Marxists gain power, than they put this manual into effect. They invoked a labor law authorizing federal 'interveners' to take over the management of two companies which were partly owned by U. S. firms.

"What happened is that these companies had laid off some workers because production was slack with sales off sharply. The Marxist officials now running the Ministry of Labor claimed the right to oust the top officials on these two firms under a 1945 Chilean labor law calling for such action if any business firm with foreign ownership should 'deprive Chilean nationals of jobs.'

"Actually, the intent of the 1945 law was to prevent the replacement of Chilean nationals by foreigners. But its wording is so broad that the local labor court may well uphold its application in other

ways—particularly under a Ministry of Justice now controlled by Marxists.”

Role of Russians. A number of self-exiled Chileans talk of the role of Soviet diplomatic officials and intelligence agents in assisting local Reds in penetrating so many walks of Chilean life.

Says a book publisher:

“The Soviet Ambassador before last appeared to be the mastermind for much of this subversive activity. His name was Anikin and he previously had been Moscow’s Ambassador in Cambodia. There, I understand, he supervised the take-over by Prince Sihanouk of the whole situation, practically delivering the country into Communist hands.

“Whatever Anikin’s background, he impressed me as a very, very able guy, a very smooth, pleasant fellow. His replacement, incidentally, took a leave of absence about a month before the September election.

“One thing I know is that plenty of money was poured into Chile from Moscow to finance propaganda and subversive activities.

“Expensive books and periodicals flooded the market, peddling the party line on everything. And the Communists serving as union agitators and neighborhood agents appeared to be well financed to do their work. They obviously couldn’t have found that money in the local party treasury.”

What’s ahead? Refugee Chileans differ among themselves on the outlook for their country now that the Communists and Socialists are in the saddle.

“It’s too late to do anything to save Chile,” declares the wife of a prominent banker. “Chile is gone.”

“Not yet,” a businessman says. “I say that as long as the press remains in private hands and free, as long as opposition parties hold a majority in Congress, and as long as people in the armed forces and other institutions stay on guard, there’s hope for Chile.”

But the consensus of the refugees is that there’s a very real danger that their country will, over the years ahead, systematically be converted into a police state subservient to Moscow.

What is more, these Chileans see the distinct possibility that the pattern of Communist take-over now displayed in their homeland could be repeated in neighboring countries of South America—Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Peru.

“A Communist Chile would be a hell of a lot more worrisome than Communist Cuba ever has or can be,” says one man.

“Unlike Cuba, Chile is not an island. We’ve got 5,000 kilometers [about 3,100 miles] of border with Argentina and it’s practically a sieve. It is very hard to stop people from crossing that border.

“Chile could export subversion all over this continent, and do it more efficiently than the Cubans ever could. Unlike the Cubans, we are not a Caribbean people but of European origin like so many of our neighbors.

“Most of all, however, Chile’s Communists have shown to all the scoffers—all the revolutionaries who insist on guerrilla activity and violence as the sole means to power—the efficacy of *la via pacifica*. It’s a strategy that could work anywhere.”

THE SUNDAY STAR
Washington, D. C., November 22, 1970

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Allende Reported Using Castro Tactics in Chile

Evidence is mounting that President Salvador Allende of Chile intends to impose a Cuban-style regime and attempt to emulate Fidel Castro by both exporting subversion to other Latin countries and providing refuge for fugitive guerrilla leaders.

Despite the Marxist president's promises to use his Unidad Popular coalition of Socialists, Communists, Radicals and dissident Christian Democrats democratically over the next six years, sources say his actions in the first month of his presidency indicate otherwise.

They cite these examples, based on information reaching Washington and other hemisphere capitals from Santiago:

o Allende has begun setting up an internal security service similar to the Directorio General de Inteligencia of Cuba with the assistance of at least 10 DGI agents now living in Chile.

o Allende has informed the Chilean National Liberation Army, a leftist group created with Cuban help to support Bolivian revolutionaries, that Chile now can provide revolutionary organizations with guerrilla training, bases, funds and havens.

o Allende has begun welcoming Marxist revolutionaries captured in Bolivia and Ecuador and sent to exile in Chile.

o Allende's government has begun releasing local terrorists of the Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario (MIR) who had been jailed for sedition under the previous regime of President Eduardo Frei.

Meanwhile, the government has taken over administration of two companies controlled by U.S. interests, charging they had intentionally deprived Chilean citizens of jobs. They were the first foreign businesses hit

by the Allende regime, but more and much larger interests have been earmarked for nationalization soon.

The companies placed under government control were a plumbing and heating fixture firm controlled by Northern Indiana Brass Co. of Elkhart, and the feed and chicken subsidiary of Ralston Purina.

Informant System

The new internal security service will be basically a counter-espionage organization, backed up by thousands of local action committees within the Unidad Popular coalition. These are block, neighborhood and housing project committees similar to those installed in Cuba by Castro. The system provides vigilant watchers in every inhibited area, ready to report the presence of strangers or unusual activities.

In Chile, the Communist Party and leftist labor unions have provided most of the cadres for the local action committees. They are so well organized that Allende was able to put thousands of his followers into the streets quickly during the campaign and on election night to "defend" his victory even before the votes were counted.

Allende reportedly has informed leaders of the MIR, who were deadly and violent enemies of the Frei government, that he is freeing arrested Miristas because he wants to form a private force of revolutionaries. He has already abolished the Grupo Movil, or riot squad, of the Chilean carabineros (national police) who used to battle the MIR in the streets.

Charges Quashed

Earlier this month a judge accepted a petition from Allende's Interior Ministry to drop all charges against two of eight MIR prisoners accused of sedition and to limit the charges

against six others to common crimes such as bank robbery. Charges have also been dropped against four of 15 MIR fugitives sought by the previous regime.

There are 10 Cuban DGI officials in the 50-man Cuban diplomatic mission in Chile and they are experienced revolutionaries. Among the Cuban agents is Luis Fernandez Ona, 30, a high-ranking aide to DGI chief Manuel Pinoiro Losada. Fernandez ran the Havana end of Ernesto "Che" Guevara's ill-fated attempt to spur a revolt in Bolivia in 1967.

It is reported that he met Allende's daughter, Beatriz, last year when she spent six months in Havana and personally instructed her in guerrilla tactics.

Revolutionary Base

In a recent meeting with the Chilean National Liberation Army, Allende is said to have declared Chile will become the southern equivalent of Cuba as a center of assistance and training for Latin American revolutionary organizations. The CNLA was the backup organization for the recently defeated forces of Osvaldo "Chato" Peredo in Bolivia.

Peredo and his brothers were the allies of Guevara in the losing battle against President Rene Barrientos in Bolivia in 1967 and "Chato" is the sole survivor. Peredo's ELN guerrilla organization recently was crushed by the Bolivian Army in the Beni region of the Andes and Peredo with seven survivors was shipped to Chile by the new government of President Juan Jose Torres on Nov. 11.

They were given heroes' welcomes when they arrived in Chile.

JAPAN TIMES
11 November 1970

CPYRGHT

The Case of Allende

By Max Lerner

NEW YORK—Nov. 3, 1970, is likely to be a crucial day in the history of the Americas, the day when a Left-Socialist-Communist coalition took over power in Chile, the No. 3 country in South America after Brazil and Argentina.

It may prove even more crucial than Fidel Castro's takeover, for Cuba is a small island, not part of the Latin-American mainland, and Castro came to power by violence, while Salvador Allende Gossens, whom the Communists have used for years as their ally and front, won by getting a little more than a third of the votes in a legal election. He was confirmed by Congress and has taken power in a low-key way, by constitutional means.

If he lasts—if his regime is not overthrown, or rejected in the next election (provided there will be a next election)—Chile will be a Communist showcase. If the Communists can take and hold control in relatively stable Chile, then they can expect to do it more surely in the unstable countries.

This at any rate is the nightmare that hangs not only over the U.S. State Department but over non-Communist Latin-American political leaders and thinkers. Thus Allende's inauguration, which took place the same day as the U.S. elections, may outlive them in importance for the whole hemisphere.

Chile is no isolated case. It is part of a larger leftward tilt, including leftist military regimes in Peru and Bolivia and a general leftward movement in the Army and the clergy, which I want to discuss in another piece. But Chile is a case history of what happens when anti-U.S. nationalism, Marxism, and left-Catholicism converge in the minds of Latin-American intellectuals, and when the resulting melange of ideas and emotions seeps down to the mass of the people. Not only are ideas weapons. They also have consequences—if only those holding them knew how disastrously at times!

In a sense, the Christian Democrats, with all the idealism in the world, eased Allende's path to power. In 1964 when he and the Communists showed a real chance of winning, the right-of-center parties shifted their support to the left-of-center Christian Democrats, and Eduardo Frei was elected.

If the Christian Democrats had been willing to repeat the tactic of 1964 in reverse, and support Alessandri in 1970 as a centrist Independent, Allende's Communist front could easily have been defeated. But the center did not hold—it splintered—and the Christian Democratic candidate, who ran considerably to the left of Frei's positions, finished a poor third. After the election, the Christian Democrats in Congress voted to make Allende President, in exchange for a pledge that he would preserve the Constitution.

Will the pledge be kept by a Communist-dominated regime? Perhaps. But I am deeply skeptical. By its inherent nature, communism is a one-way street. It doesn't surrender power.

Allende has started on a muted key because he faces a flight of capital from Chile. But he has given the Communists the Treasury post, the Labor post (which will enable them to entrench themselves in the trade unions beyond being pried loose), the Public Works post (which is the great patronage dispenser) and the undersecretaryship of the Interior, which gives them day-to-day control over police and security forces.

Beyond the establishing of ties with other Communist countries, and beyond the expropriation and nationalizing of basic industries, there will be two real tests of whether Allende means to keep his constitutional pledge.

Will he move to take over the press and establish a thought-control state? Will he move to purge the Army? Both are not only possible, but probable.

The ultimate question is whether a tough Marxism and democracy can mix and fuse into a going regime. There have been social democracies—the Swedish, British, Israeli, the current West German regime—but they are not Marxist.

Allende's own Socialist Party is not reformist or gradualist. It has Maoist and anarchist elements to the left of the Moscow-oriented Communists. Chances that the regime will leave the press uncontrolled and the police and Army politically neutral seem pretty slight to me. I pray fervently that I will prove a wretched prophet.

MS, OCTOBER 19, 1970

The Fretful Neighbors

MORE than a few Latin Americans harbor the suspicion that Salvador Allende's presidency may be unexpectedly brief. A Mexican television worker described one popularly held belief last week: "If Allende chooses to be a thoroughgoing Socialist, the Chilean army will decide, with a big wink from the U.S., that its sacred duty is to oust the man." There is no doubt that Washington is deeply distressed by the prospect of a Communist Chile. Ranking Administration advisers predict that a Communist country on the South American mainland would have far more influence throughout the hemisphere than Castro's Communist island could ever hope to have. For all that, however, the U.S. is in no position to do anything about the Allende phenomenon—not even wink.

Direct intervention, on the order of the Dominican Republic operation of 1965, would seriously undermine the U.S.'s already low prestige in the hemisphere. In any case, it would probably be ruled out by geography. Santiago is 2,000 air miles from Washington; the country as a whole is cordoned off from the world by the Andes on one side and the Pacific on the other. Direct action is out, and the U.S. has little indirect leverage to apply. Cut off aid? This year's total \$2,500,000 in loans, would scarcely be missed. Tighten the economic screws? Chile sells little of its copper in the U.S.; 90% of it goes to Japan and Western Europe. In the end, says Sol Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, "the U.S. role in this entirely Chilean affair is to keep hands off—entirely." After all, Linowitz notes, "Chile is in this hemisphere, and we should be no more disturbed about Allende in Chile than about the military dictatorships of Argentina and Brazil. What kind of a double standard do we have?"

Some analysts predict, however, that if a Santiago-Havana Communist axis were to emerge by the 1972 elections, the Administration might well feel impelled to take action. But the question remains: what could it do? Chile's neighbors are facing the same puzzle:

ARGENTINA. Increasingly, the country's right-wing junta feels surrounded by sources of political contagion—the terrorist movement in Uruguay, the leftist military junta in Bolivia, and now a Communist threat on the other side of Argen-

tina's rugged Andean frontier. The Argentines have no plans to charge into Chile, but they are keeping in close touch with Peru's generals in an effort to make ready for anything. One military man in Buenos Aires predicts that clashes will break out on the Argentine-Chilean border within 15 months. A former Argentine foreign minister says that it is "absurd" to think that Allende will not attempt to "stir up subversion and revolution outside Chile." The near-panic in the Argentine junta is such that the generals are preparing a special amnesty which would allow Dictator Juan Perón to end his 15-year Madrid exile and return to Argentina. The generals' theory is that Catholic Peronism, still strong among Argentina's working classes, would act as a buffer against atheistic Communism from Chile.

PERU. Like the Argentines, Peru's generals fully expect a Communist-dominated Chile to become a sanctuary for all manner of subversives. With an unimportant Communist movement at home and an easily patrolled 120-mile border with Chile, Junta President Juan Velasco Alvarado is less worried about Communist infiltration than the possibility that the Allende phenomenon could somehow taint his own leftist but determinedly non-Communist regime.

Velasco also frets that Moscow will bankroll Allende's army, forcing Peru into a costly and unwanted arms race. Above all, Velasco fears that Allende might pull Chile out of the Andean Group, a year-old five-nation trade organization on which Velasco pins his hopes for substantial economic progress. In such circumstances, Peru is unlikely to seek a struggle with the Allende regime.

BOLIVIA. At least seven Chileans were among a band of guerrillas crushed by government troops recently in jungles 160 miles northeast of La Paz. Nevertheless, Bolivians seem remarkably unconcerned by the prospects that their country's currently manageable guerrilla problems might well multiply after Allende takes power. Bolivia's new leftist junta expects to get along well with the Allende regime, and there is every chance that La Paz and Santiago will resume diplomatic relations, which were broken in 1967 over a border dispute. Over the long term, Bolivians are less concerned about Communism than the possibility that the Soviets will arm Chile, the U.S. will arm the Argentines, and Bolivia will be caught in an Andean version of the Middle East.

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CPYRGHT

ALL IN THE FAMILY

Chile's new President Salvador Allende will get more than a son-in-law in the planned marriage of his daughter Beatriz to Cuban Luis Fernandez. Nominally a veterinarian, Fernandez is a top agent in Fidel Castro's secret police. In Santiago he will organize personal security arrangements for Allende as well as a new security-police setup.

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Speculation surrounds Polish Moscow visit

By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Will Poland's new leaders ask the Russians for economic help during their current visit here?

In the light of the deteriorating Polish economy and the damage and loss of public confidence caused by the Baltic port riots, political observers wonder if the Soviet Union will not step in to bolster Warsaw's new leadership with assistance of some kind.

Poland's economic difficulties have been well aired. Not least of them is the fact that farm harvest in 1970 was below the 1969 level and, because of a fodder shortage, the number of livestock and consequently of meat supplies declined. The huge price increases in Poland that touched off the riots were in fact designed in part to avert shortages of farm products.

The Soviet Union, for its part, last year harvested a record-high grain crop. However, it, too, has chronic difficulties on the farm front.

Plans to be reexamined

Poland's Communist Party chief, Edward Gierek, a pragmatist who has a wealth of managerial experience, has said Poland's new five-year plans for 1971-1975, as well as the 1971 plan, will be reexamined and possibly altered. Since the Comecon countries have been coordinating their plans, a part of Mr. Gierek's mission here may have to do with a readjustment of the Polish and Soviet plans.

A new five-year Polish-Soviet trade agreement was signed Dec. 29. But it is doubtful it could have taken account of the changed economic picture. So bilateral talks are likely to continue.

Foreign-policy questions would also logically be discussed. Mr. Gierek indicated in Warsaw he approves the previous leadership's rapprochement with Bonn. His assurances on this score would please the Russians, who launched the policy of Soviet-bloc détente with West Germany.

Question asked

One question that intrigues observers is Poland's status in the Warsaw Pact. It is felt the events in Poland are bound to have political repercussions in the Warsaw alliance. Some analysts suggest that the hand of East German leader Walter Ulbricht may be strengthened now—something the Russians may want to forestall.

Above all, of course, the Soviet leadership will want to hear from Mr. Gierek and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz the reasons for the Polish rebellion, which represents the biggest setback for the Soviet bloc since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It will also want to know the current mood in Poland and the steps being taken to improve the situation.

Both the Poles and the Russians have been treating the events publicly with considerable frankness, laying the blame for the disorders on the Polish Party.

Reticence noted

The Soviet press has been uncharacteristically reticent in its comments, preferring to reprint materials from the Polish press. But Pravda recently attributed the events to the "objective difficulties" in Poland and the "consequences of the ungrounded concepts in economic policy," at the same time assailing the West for exploiting the riots for its own propaganda purposes.

The Soviet leadership, which once gave strong backing to former leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, may wish to be reassured by the new Polish leaders that this will not happen again.

Meanwhile, this is not the first visit for either man. Mr. Gierek has been in Moscow many times, and Premier Jaroszewicz represented Poland in Comecon here.

Polish labor bypasses unions

By Paul Wohl

Written for *The Christian Science Monitor*

Grass-roots activity among Polish workers, which bypasses official channels, is alarming the establishment.

A workers' underground is the new force making itself felt in Poland.

Factory workers are sending couriers from one factory to another to consult directly with each other over the head of party-controlled factory committees.

The Baltic shipyard workers are in contact with the workers of the big Ursus tractor factory, with the textile plants in Zyrardow, with the Polish Fiat works, and with the rolling-stock works in Poznan where the 1956 strikes started. Factories in Warsaw and Praga also are in the circuit.

'Credibility gap' seen

Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, trade-union president, has admitted that the trade unions are being bypassed. The workers have long ceased to think of them as their representatives.

The reason why the workers of major factories have taken up contact with each other is precisely because they no longer trust the party and the trade unions, a recently returned French trade unionist was told. The press openly discusses the communications or, as we would say, credibility gap.

Edward Gierek, party leader, on Jan. 1 called for "honest, direct conversations with the working class, with the whole nation," because the party-sponsored double-think has virtually broken down.

On Dec. 30, the country's largest daily, *Zycie Warszawy*, wrote that the "communications gap" between the Communist establishment and the people can be overcome only "in an atmosphere of truth and presenting all matters in a clear-cut manner."

Problem grows acute

The problem of double standards exists in all Communist-ruled countries, but in Poland it always has been especially acute. "Language which should tell the truth about our reality has become a means of falsification," wrote the well-known essayist Jozef Janusz in *Profilu* in July, 1969.

What seemed to be hinted in Mr. Gierek's recent utterances was the danger of Warsaw Pact intervention in case of further work stoppages and riots.

Significantly, a session of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers which was to take place in Budapest between Dec. 21 and 23 was postponed to a later date.

The economic situation continues to be

tense. In the black market the zloty has dropped to an all-time low (200 zlotys for one American dollar).

Moscow naturally wants Poland to remain a going concern.

On Dec. 29, a trade protocol for 1971 was signed in Warsaw under which the Soviet Union promised to deliver this year 2 million tons of grain and large quantities of industrial raw material. This may help the Polish Government to regain control, but it will take time until the economy picks up.

The cardinal-primate of Poland would not be the consummate politician which he always has proved himself to be if he had not advantage of the critical situation to present a table of demands. The demands of the Council of the Episcopate were read on Jan. 1 to massed congregations in all of Poland's Roman Catholic churches.

Cardinal comments

Demanded among other things were "truth of information and freedom of expression." While insisting on the rights of the church (implied are educational and financial privileges), the Council of the Episcopate seemed to embrace many of the workers' demands.

Describing the recent events as "tragic, exceptional, almost without precedent in our history," Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski added that they "have filled us with anxiety for the future of our nation."

If the government cannot stabilize the situation it will have to give in to the hierarchy.

Warsaw's best hope lies in the negotiations which representatives of the Central Committee now are conducting in all major factories. The workers' objectives are not only higher wages, but also a revamping of the bonus system and more effective workers' representation.

The government, in turn, is trying to speed up the pace of work.

'Unuttered concern'

The Poles are an intensely patriotic people and politically too subtle not to understand that behind Mr. Gierek's and Cardinal Wyszynski's appeals was the unuttered concern about the country's national independence. The precedent of Czechoslovakia is fresh in people's minds.

Everything depends upon Warsaw's ability to cast off double-talk and to gain the confidence of the workers. Until this has been achieved, the apparently nationwide workers' underground casts a shadow over the political scene.

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January 1971

EAST-WEST AFFAIRS: MUCH DIPLOMACY - FEW RESULTS

The past year has been an active one in detente diplomacy and matters of European security: the United States and the Soviet Union devoted one-half of the year to continuing their crucial talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT) with four months of discussions in Vienna and two in Helsinki; West Germany's Chancellor Brandt went to Moscow and Warsaw where he signed, respectively, treaties of "non-aggression" and of "normalization" and now he looks for a similar visit to Prague; Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed their talks aimed at improving transport and communication links with and within Berlin, holding a total of 12 sessions between March and mid-December; during both Warsaw Pact and NATO foreign ministers' meetings each group focused, in its own fashion, on the security aspects of East-West relations; and once again, the Soviet Union dusted off its old proposal for a European security conference.

Despite all these appearances of forward diplomatic movement, the central issues of European security, which have divided East and West for over two decades, remain stalemated. In December both the four-power talks on Berlin and the SALT talks wound up their inconclusive discussions to recess until after the New Year and the other until after the CPSU Congress scheduled for March, 1971.

SALT Talks

On SALT, Moscow has limited its public comments to accusations that the American military-industrial complex, as the Communists see it, is trying to prevent agreement. At the working level, chief Soviet delegate Vladimir Semionov has proved to be a highly serious negotiator and it is widely believed that the Soviets are keenly interested in an agreement even though the Soviet delegation continues to drag its feet on specifics. The American side has concluded that the delay is being caused by Kremlin failure to reach a consensus on what the Soviet proposal will be and on how far the Soviets are willing to go, if anywhere. The Americans believe that SALT is one of the many issues the Kremlin will have to decide in closed-door sessions before their party congress is convened and that some of their decisions will be made public at the congress.

Berlin Talks

In Berlin, the Soviets and their East German allies have again resorted to using road and air access disruptions as a tactic to bring pressure on the Western allies. These tactics have backfired

by again making Berlin a symbol of the Cold War and by re-stimulating Western solidarity. Chancellor Brandt has made it clear that the West German treaties with Moscow and Warsaw will not be ratified until a satisfactory solution is found to the Berlin problem. For political reasons, Leonid Brezhnev appears to be seeking a treaty ratification from the West German Bundestag before his own party congress in March. For economic reasons, Brezhnev wants to start getting West German financial and technical aid for projects like the Kama truck plant, a scheme that could be endangered by over-prolonging ratification of the treaty. In general, the Kremlin must be trying to decide whether it is worth imposing a Berlin settlement on East Germany for the sake of securing larger objectives.

The Conference Concept

For several years, one of Moscow's top-priority diplomatic projects has been the convening of a European security conference designed to affirm the status quo on the Continent. Timothy W. Stanley has noted that a review of Soviet foreign policy since World War II shows that the "conference" note has been played in a variety of different chord combinations, from atonal anti-German revanchism or anti-Americanism to a harmonious pan-European peace and disarmament motif. It has simultaneously been directed outwardly at the West, as a siren call of detente, and inwardly at the Communist world's own counterpoint.* Stanley sees the conference concept as a useful variety of carrot which alternates with the stick in the East's "Westpolitik," and possibly also in a preemptive role vis-a-vis Brandt's "Ostpolitik." Certainly, Moscow seems to revive, repaint, and relaunch the concept in whatever direction seems most useful at the time.

Security Conference: Diplomatic

After a seven-month hiatus and immediately after the Moscow-Bonn treaty was signed last August, the conference concept was relaunched. In a 12 August speech, Soviet Premier Kosygin put the new treaty in the context of the Warsaw Pact's renewed pressure for a European conference, saying that the agreement would take its place alongside the European governments' other efforts aimed at creating a basis for security in Europe. On 20 August the Soviet Union invited the leaders of the Warsaw Pact allies to a summit designed in part to reassure Walter Ulbricht and in part to lay the groundwork for a conference promotion campaign. The post-summit communique approved the new Soviet-West German treaty, calling it a major step towards normalizing the situation in Europe, and said that the summit participants agreed on the need to take active measures to convene an all-European security conference.

*Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, Detente Diplomacy, 1970.

In spring 1969, Finland had formally offered to sponsor an East-West security conference, an offer which was repeated in November last year. The government proposed that heads of missions or other representatives in Helsinki should hold multilateral consultations on the organization of a conference on European security. At a 25 November 1970 press conference, Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen made public his government's memorandum advancing the proposal, noting that it had been sent to the same governments (including the United States and Canada) which had received the May 1969 Finnish memorandum offering Helsinki as the site for a European security conference. While the Soviet press lauded the Finnish proposal, Western Europe's reaction was cool. By early December, the West European foreign ministers of the European Community and of NATO had made it quite clear that without a settlement on Berlin, there would be no consideration of a Conference on European Security.

The Soviet security conference concept got another setback in the closing days of the 25th United Nations General Assembly when the UN's Political Committee almost unanimously passed a resolution which was essentially an indirect criticism of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The topic of "Strengthening International Security" was first introduced by the USSR at the 24th General Assembly in 1969 in a version so counter to the meaning of the UN Charter that it was found to be unacceptable. The 1970 Soviet draft was an improvement, but still unacceptable. The resolution which finally passed the UN Political Committee on 14 December by a vote of 106-1, stressed that states must refrain from the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, must not intervene in matters within domestic jurisdiction and must respect the principle of sovereign equality. Thus, instead of sanctioning wars of liberation and indirectly rebuking Israel as the Moscow version originally sought, the new resolution was a thinly disguised condemnation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

A measure of the Soviet setback is the fact that last year and again at the opening of this year's session, Soviet diplomats cited the international security item as a major objective during the 25th anniversary of the UN General Assembly. The resolution was intended to set the background for a European security conference.

Security Conference: Agitprop

At the beginning of the 1970 season, the Soviets had for the first time dropped the theme on an all-European conference (only to revive it mid-year, after the signing of the Moscow-Bonn treaty) and the urgency of holding a major East-West conference faded into 1971. At the same time, dispatches from Eastern capitals began to reflect earlier references to a "peoples' congress for peace," a theme more closely associated with communist party affairs and

agitprop than with interstate diplomacy. Pro-Communist organizations and movements began setting dates for their own conferences on "European Security." The World Federation of Democratic Youth, for example, set 1971 as the year for "a grand assembly on the issues of collective security."

In Helsinki, the Finnish National Committee for European Security, a private lobby group dedicated to advancing the Finnish initiative for a Conference on European Security, sponsored a 3 day session in late November under the title of "Security Days." Since no Western government disagrees in principle with the idea of a Conference on European Security the Helsinki meeting was another of the pressure tactics aimed at influencing Western governments to move on from the agreement-in-principle stage to setting a precise date in 1971. Although organized primarily by the far left --- including World Peace Council Secretary General Romesh Chandra --- a strong effort was made to give the session an aura of respectability. An effort was made to achieve balance in the selection of the five main foreign speakers: ECE Executive Secretary Janez Stanovnik, Dr. Eberhard Schulz from West Germany, Prof. Gerhard Hahn from East Germany, Dr. Christopher Bertram from the London-based Institute of Strategic Studies, and Professor Dmitri Tomashevski of the Moscow Institute of World Economy. Even the Communist representatives were described as speaking with surprising moderation. The conference got scant coverage in the non-Communist press while in the Communist press it was heralded as a major event. The main thing is that it was a deceptively quiet, non-polemic event.

On the labor front, the Soviet trade union chief Alexander Shelepin has been making so far unsuccessful sales pitches in Western Europe for a "European Trade Union Security Conference." Communist members of the International Labor Organization have been trying to convert that body's oft postponed regional European conference on trade union matters into a forum for European security. These moves, again, are designed to bring pressures on the West Europeans. There is, thus far, general agreement that a European trade union conference might concern itself primarily with pollution problems, social effects of automation, and other employment-related social and economic problems --- but not with affairs of security.

**DETENTE DIPLOMACY: United States
and European Security in the 1970's**

The Evolution of Security Diplomacy

The newest Russian invitation to discuss the issues which divide the Continent reminds many observers of the recurring pattern of postwar crises, conferences, and maneuvering; so that the recent series of Soviet proposals for a European security conference is often regarded with a sense of déjà vu.

On the other hand, this new appeal to "progressive and peace-loving forces" inevitably strikes a responsive chord in the citizens of America and Europe who pay the bills for maintaining the military forces to balance the large standing Soviet military capability, even though the conference idea does not yet appear to have become a major public issue in the West. In addition to the sensible approach to problem solving which conference diplomacy implies to the layman, he recalls from history that Waterloo and the Marne were followed by Vienna and Versailles. Soviet efforts to convene "a peace conference to mark the end of World War II" seem to be the long-delayed sequel to Stalingrad and Normandy.¹

The Communist approach grows quite naturally out of a history of party congresses and ideological conclaves, such as those which have traditionally assembled workers, intellectuals, and other "progressive elements" in the three Internationals, in the Soviets themselves, and in the public gatherings which are preferred for demonstrating solidarity in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

From the initial session of the First International in London in 1864 to the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969,

Communists have preferred to appear to conduct their politics within the conference framework, in order to inspire the faithful and ratify the decisions already made by the few who comprise the "revolutionary vanguard" and determine the "correct line." Conferences are thus major events of historical consequence, where difficult problems are solved dialectically and new directions are charted. Aside from these psychopolitical aspects of Communist "conferencemanship," considerations of international status are involved in attending a major conference and in shaping diplomatic events—especially where the subject of discussion is Europe's future. In that regard, the Soviet proposal for a new East-West conference on European security is related to the origins and modern trends of Russian diplomacy toward the West.

Early Postwar Diplomacy

It has been noted that World War II brought a new distribution of power in Europe, and accordingly the European security problem assumed new proportions:

The result of the war was to bring into prominence the two great continental powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and to place these two super-powers in a position of proximity which they might otherwise never have known. Between them lay Germany, and by that fact alone—far more than by its defeat—Germany acquired a totally different aspect. Germany became in fact like Poland of the eighteenth century, and its partition was equally inevitable. Germany united on either side of the new balance of power would destroy the balance; while an independent middle power would be a constant threat to its neighbors on each side.³

The substance of the German problem—including Berlin—as the dominant issue of European security is reviewed in greater detail in the next chapter. What is of special interest here, however, is the role of conference politics in cold war diplomacy and the various peace plans which have marked the postwar debate over the future of Europe.

Russian diplomacy since 1945 has been a mixture of threats and promises, inducements and harassments—a panoply of tactics which have ranged from Khrushchev's threats to incinerate the Acropolis and to forcibly remove the

Berlin "bone" from his throat to the euphoric spirit of Geneva and of Camp David, to shoe-pounding exercises at the United Nations and "controlled hysteria" after the abortive 1960 summit meeting. The Berlin Wall has been opened during the Christmas season, yet periodic harassment of the access routes to Berlin has continued into 1970. Soviet tactics to achieve their foreign policy goals in Europe have included the use of trade blandishments, general strikes by Communist workers in Western Europe, and threats of nuclear blackmail.

But there has also been the conference strategy, with which the Western allies first became familiar in the negotiations during and after World War II. The summit meetings at Yalta and Potsdam established the machinery for the temporary government of Germany—the four-power Allied Control Council and the Reparations Commission.⁴ During the next two years, the major questions of European security were discussed in the repeated sessions of the four-power Council of Foreign Ministers. One of the first items they considered was a proposal for a twenty-five year four-power guarantee treaty against the recurrence of German aggression. The provisions of this plan called for the complete neutralization and demilitarization of a reunified Germany. At Soviet request, the Western allies agreed to extend the term of the proposed treaty to forty years, and in the meetings of the Ministers during the spring and fall of 1947, Secretary Marshall pushed for its acceptance. But Molotov's opposition brought failure to the negotiations in the context of a general hardening of Soviet policy.⁵

A new meeting of the four-power Foreign Ministers took place at the end of the Berlin blockade. At that meeting Secretary Acheson called for the reunification of Germany on the basis of four-power control. But the withdrawal of occupation forces was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and by the fall of 1949 two German republics were established, constituting the status quo for the next two decades.

During 1950 and 1951, conference politics gave way to Western preoccupation over Korea and the buildup of Western defenses in NATO. The Soviets countered the growing West German military integration with Western Europe by a diplomatic offensive initiated on March 10, 1952, with the proclamation of a Soviet outline of the foundations for a German peace treaty. This démarche went the farthest of any yet seen, calling for German reunification on the basis of neutralization and the mutual withdrawal of foreign troops and bases. But the most daring innovation was its direct appeal to German national sentiments.

national land, air, and sea forces essential to the defense of the country,
without restrictions on the production of armaments for those forces.

Furthermore, and as a major attraction to veterans, all former members of the German army and former Nazis would be granted "civil and political rights on a par with all other German citizens to participate in building a peace-loving and democratic Germany." And finally, German membership in the United Nations was to be supported by states signing the peace treaty.⁴

These concessions—remarkable when compared with the preceding Soviet attitudes—were aimed at devaluing the Western call for German rearmament within an integrated European army. Meanwhile, the Russian initiative also appealed to fears of Germany as well as to the inclinations of those who wanted to "solve" the German problem. To Germans it offered reunification without the indignities of international control, as well as the restoration of national forces as a major attribute of sovereignty.

The Soviet note of 1952 opened a three-year offensive aimed at preventing or delaying the consolidation of the Western defensive position on the basis of German rearmament. The Russian omnibus proposal was greeted coolly in the West: Chancellor Adenauer declined to accept neutralization and the loss of Germany's eastern territories. Western Europeans saw endangered their budding efforts to build a united Europe which included the critical West German economy. And Americans, concerned with a global Communist threat, had been counting on a West German military contribution. The Western reply took the form of a call for free elections supervised by a commission from the United Nations, with which the East refused to treat at all.

One year later, the death of Stalin sparked renewed interest by the Western allies in probing the attitudes of the new Soviet leadership about European issues. This led to a Western proposal in late 1953 for a four-power conference on Germany, against the background of an "agonizing reap-praisal" of American foreign policy if the proposed European Defense Community fell through. The outcome of these developments was a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held in Berlin in January 1954.

The First Eden Plan

At the January 1954 conference, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, proposed what has since been called the First Eden Plan for German reunification—a five-stage proposal, to be initiated by free elections throughout Germany. The reunified state would be given full sovereignty regarding acceptance or rejection of future diplomatic and military alignments. Yet it was apparent from the premises of the proposal that such a reunited state would incline toward partnership with the West. This, of course, made Soviet

rejection inevitable. But in order to avoid the onus for failure at the Berlin conference, Molotov offered the "Soviet proposal of European security," which, in effect, added a fifty-year collective security pact to the Soviet treaty outline of March 1952. Since they were by then fully committed to the objective of free elections in Germany, the Western powers were unable to agree to the enforced limitations of self-determination which were implied by Soviet demands for a neutral Germany.

After the final failure of Soviet policy to prevent West German integration with the West, represented by the special NATO-Western European Union accords in London and Paris in the fall of 1954, the Russians opened a new

spring offensive. This called, for the first time, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland as well as mutual force reductions. On the eve of the Federal Republic's official entry into NATO, the Soviet Union recommended "free, all-German elections in accordance with the Eden Plan." But, in his final appearance as Prime Minister, Malenkov also threatened countermeasures if Germany entered NATO. And the countermeasures proved to be the establishment of the Warsaw Pact less than a week after the formal admission of the Federal Republic to the Western alliance.

The Geneva Summit

Reassured by this diplomatic defeat of the Soviet political offensive, the West moved to negotiate from strength. The meeting took place in Geneva in mid-1955—just a decade after the last summit meeting—and this assembly of the four-power heads of government had important implications for the next ten to fifteen years of European politics. Eden, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, offered his second plan, a proposal which called for a demilitarized area between East and West on the eastern frontier of Germany as "a practical experiment in the operative control of armaments." Eden continued to insist that a reunified Germany have the "freedom to associate with countries of her choice." But since "the Berlin Conference failed . . . because one of the Powers there believed that a united Germany, rearmed and exercising its choice to join the NATO alliance, would constitute an increased threat to its safety and security," Eden proposed a security pact.

Speaking for the Soviet side, Marshal Bulganin picked up the idea of a collective security pact and advocated it as a replacement for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. And in a theme which relates directly to the current Soviet proposals for a European security conference, Bulganin spoke of a mutual renunciation of force as well as a freeze on existing levels of armed forces.

In addition, he called for the "withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European states and the reestablishment of the situation which existed prior to the Second World War," namely, the unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Finally, he emphasized a new and growing theme in Soviet diplomatic pronouncements—one now familiar to observers of current events in Germany—the necessity of a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany.

The product of the Geneva summit meeting was the "Directive of the Heads of Governments to Their Foreign Ministers," requesting the examination of these major items: a security pact for Europe or for part of Europe; limitations, control, and inspection of armaments and armed forces; the establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces would be subject to mutual agreement; and an all-German council to deal with matters of free elections and German political development.

These proposals are important, for they foretold the proliferation of disengagement plans and arms-limitation-zone schemes, which reached their high watermark in the late 1950's. Furthermore, the Geneva summit marked a major turning point in postwar diplomacy—some writers have even called it the "Versailles of the Cold War."⁷ From these meetings there emerged the main lines of mutually opposing East-West policies which persisted for the next fifteen years.

For the East this took the form of the familiar policy of "two Germanies," based on a consolidation of the Communist position in the German Democratic Republic. The doctrine of two Germanies now involved a Soviet recognition of the status quo by the extension of diplomatic recognition to the Federal Republic and an invitation to its Chancellor to visit Moscow.

Since 1955, Russian diplomacy has consistently demanded reciprocity from the West—diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic and acceptance of the impossibility of finding a mutually acceptable alternative to German partition.

For its part, the West adopted an equal and opposite reaction to the Soviet stand. Under the firm policy of Adenauer and Dulles, NATO declined to recognize the legitimacy of the GDR or to acknowledge the de facto existence of a divided Europe with mutually exclusive spheres of control. However, in an unusual preview of the *Ostpolitik* of today, Secretary Dulles said in 1955:

The problem of German reunification can be solved at present only gradually, step by step, through bringing closer together the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic and through their co-operation.⁸

Not surprisingly, the Council of Foreign Ministers struggled vainly to reach agreement on the issues given them by the Geneva summit directive. The Soviets raised the price of troop withdrawals from East Germany by demanding withdrawals from the territories of European countries. And Molotov demanded an all-German council as the alternative to free elections.

However, the proposal for a zone of controlled armaments—a Geneva agenda item largely avoided by the Foreign Ministers in late 1955—whetted the imaginations of a number of commentators. During 1955 through 1958, there were numerous variants to the disengagement thesis of Eden's second plan. And regional arms-control measures were discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. There were private plans and official proposals that called for mutual force reductions, zones of inspection, exchanges of observers, observation posts, and the dismantling of foreign bases. Furthermore, there were several efforts to reduce the risks of miscalculations, such as the proposals for safeguards against surprise attack.⁹

By the fall of 1957 there was increasing interest in a much publicized suggestion of the Polish Foreign Minister. The Rapacki Plan called for a denuclearized zone in central Europe, and a simultaneous reduction of forces in both Germanies, as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Similarly, the Reith lectures of George Kennan and the publications of Denis Healey called for reunification based on withdrawal of foreign troops from Central Europe, restraints on united Germany's arms and political orientation, and a European security pact as part of a guarantee by the superpowers. The Soviet Union joined in this call for disengagement and repeated the appeal for the signing of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Many of these ideas of the 1950's have been recycled through the literature of the 1960's, especially by some of the revisionist and anti-establishment writers, who rarely seem to concern themselves with the reasons why all the ideas have proved unworkable in practice.¹⁰

The Berlin Crisis

As the debate over disengagement proceeded through 1958, there was little indication that the Russian leadership was preparing to reopen the Berlin question until the famous Soviet ultimatum of Thanksgiving Day in November 1958. Khrushchev's demand for troop withdrawal, demilitarization, and neutralization was confined to only one zone—West Berlin. The quid pro quo which he offered consisted solely of relinquishment of Russian occupation rights in East Germany. Perhaps the Russians were trying to impress upon the peoples of Eastern Europe the "fact" of permanent Communist rule and the necessity to "build socialism," and thereby

discourage new uprisings such as those which had occurred in East Berlin, Poznan, and Budapest. Nevertheless, the key to this objective was the need to shore up Russia's weak German client by two means: the acceptance by the

West of the Soviet policy of two Germanies, to be demonstrated by formal Western diplomatic recognition of the GDR; and Western cooperation in the building of Berlin as the point of escape for the youthful, highly skilled workers from East Germany.

The previous enthusiasm for disengagement plans and neutral belts in Europe faded as Soviet pressure intensified during the second Berlin crisis. However, a number of proposals endorsed Khrushchev's "free-city" idea and related it to such schemes as the transfer of the United Nations headquarters from New York to Berlin. In their rejection of the Soviet ultimatum, the Western powers expressed a willingness to negotiate about Germany's future, but not under duress. Within two weeks Russia replied with a new version of its draft German peace treaty, along with the old demands for foreign-troop withdrawal, German renunciation of nuclear weapons, recognition of current territorial borders, and a neutral united Germany. Then, on the occasion of NATO's tenth anniversary, the Soviet Union repeated the proposal for a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty members. Shortly thereafter, the four-power Council of Foreign Ministers resumed talks after an interlude of nearly four years.

Geneva Revisited

At the Geneva meetings of foreign ministers in mid-1959, Secretary of State Herter amalgamated the previous Western proposals (mainly those from the two Eden plans) into a "Western Peace Plan," which softened some aspects of the provisions concerning a mixed German committee yet maintained the demand that a future all-German government must have freedom of choice in military alignments. The Soviet reaction took the form of a number of speeches by Khrushchev during the summer and fall of 1959. His principal declaration took place in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, following his meetings with President Eisenhower at Camp David. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet policy on foreign troops in Europe and the need for an atom-free zone in central Europe. His emphasis, however, lay in the drive for "general and complete disarmament." Hence, the ultimatum on Berlin faded into a grandiose scheme for world disarmament and a trip to the ill-fated summit of 1960.

Nevertheless, the concentration on Berlin as the target for Soviet policy aims in East Germany and East Europe did establish the belief in many minds that the Berlin situation was indeed an "abnormality." The flood of refugees continued through the free city, and the psychological and economic effects, against which the 1958 ultimatum was directed, not only remained but also were intensified as tensions mounted in Europe.

Khrushchev raised the issue again as he tested the will of newly elected President Kennedy in Vienna in 1961. But the "final solution" to the second Berlin crisis occurred with the construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. Some commentators add an epilogue to this chapter in the history of the Berlin question by linking the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In retrospect, it seems probable that Khrushchev's Cuban gamble was related to a desire to obtain political leverage on the German problem by a publicized shift in the strategic balance.¹¹

Incidents on the access routes took place in 1963 and 1964, reminding the West that the Berlin issue was still warm, albeit on the back burner. Yet the high point of tension in the diplomacy of European security had been passed, at least insofar as the era of bold plans and conference politics.

In reviewing this period, one author observes that American spokesmen during the Kennedy years emphasized:

The only sensible course was to accept the division as an enforced reality, which only war could undo, and encourage increased contacts with the eastern zone to better the lot and maintain the hopes of those denied their political rights by the Soviet system No agreement remotely satisfactory was possible, none was really even necessary, since the situation was finally stable if admittedly imperfect.

The Gaullist Initiative

Political observers in the mid-1960's spoke of "small steps," and West Germany cautiously edged toward a "policy of movement." But the most dramatic initiatives were made by the President of France—moves which were symbolized and accentuated in 1966 by France's withdrawal from the military side of NATO and de Gaulle's visit to Moscow.

Curiously enough, the de Gaulle visit proved to be the high point of the brief Franco-Russian "affair," and grandiose projects of technological and space cooperation dwindled away in their execution. Apparently, the Soviets found de Gaulle useful up to a point but were unwilling to treat with him on major security issues, where he lacked the power "to do business." This implied a devaluation of French grandeur that could hardly have been pleasing to the General.

The sequence and substance of the Gaullist approach seems related to the current Soviet call for a conference on European security; for in a February 1965 press conference, President de Gaulle noted:

... this matter will not be settled by the direct confrontation of ideologies and forces of the two camps What must be done will

not be done, one day, except by the understanding and combined action of the peoples who have always been, who are, and who will remain principally concerned by the fate of the German neighbor—in short, the European peoples.¹³

In this program to "make a new equilibrium possible on our continent," de Gaulle appealed to national sentiments, East and West, even those "satellitized" by the Soviet Union.

French efforts to loosen up the European political environment occurred at a time when the leadership of the Soviet Union was less imaginative, dramatic, or perhaps not even as confidently installed in power as Khrushchev. These efforts also occurred at a time when the two superpowers were preoccupied with their respective Asian problems. Nevertheless, the European security issues, which had remained largely dormant for nearly five years gradually began to resume importance in East-West politics.

In March 1966—just at the time of the Gaullist initiatives in France, the formation of the Grand Coalition in the Federal Republic, and the deepening involvement of the United States in Vietnam—three events occurred to highlight the new crescendo. First, de Gaulle formally ended French participation in the integrated defense system of NATO. Second, the West German Grand Coalition extended a "peace note" to the East European countries, calling for a series of bilateral and mutual renunciations of force.¹⁴ And finally, the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a general proposal for a European security conference.¹⁵

Speaking on behalf of the Central Committee, Party leader Brezhnev called for

negotiations on matters of European security . . . [to include] the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous ties among all European states . . . [in] an appropriate international conference.

Foreign Minister Gromyko picked up the theme of superpower prevention of the just national aspirations of Europeans and imperialist intervention in European affairs; yet, as might have been expected, he stressed only one side of that Gaullist theme (as well as agreeing with the General's geographic definition of "Europe") when he condemned "the influence wielded by a large non-European power." Hence, the conference idea was frankly aimed at appealing to "pan-European resentment" of America's military presence.

From Bucharest to Karlovy Vary

The anti-intervention theme was repeated in a statement by the political leaders of the seven active members of the Warsaw Pact, following a meeting in Bucharest in July 1966. (See Appendix C.) In deference to the hosts,

however, the "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe" stressed an Eastern Europe interest in "noninterference in internal affairs." By calling for the simultaneous liquidation of military organizations, the Rumanians at the conference implied a curtailment of Soviet military activities in Eastern Europe. In its pan-European appeal, the Bucharest statement emphasized a broadening of the anti-American front in order to encourage "neutral European countries . . . [to] play a positive role in the convocation of such a conference." Furthermore, nonmilitary cooperation was suggested in a plea for an increase in European-wide scientific, technological, and cultural relations and in the idea that the European Common Market should be replaced by all-European trade arrangements.

Anti-West German themes, familiar in Soviet rhetoric of the 1950's, returned in the form of demands for formal recognition of the Soviet Union's two-Germanies policy--diplomatic and territorial recognition in talks with the GDR, renunciation of force (although there was no direct response to the Federal Republic's peace note issued only four months earlier), and disavowal of nuclear arms (with no acknowledgment of West Germany's 1954 self-prohibition or emphasis on the nonproliferation treaty, then under discussion). Although hopeful that West Germany's new Grand Coalition would show more flexibility and movement toward acceptance of the GDR, the Soviet leadership apparently joined East German leader Ulbricht in suspicions that West Germany's trade and credit policies with the East would undermine the "solidarity of the antifascist socialist camp," particularly in the GDR, as they had tended to do in the 1950's.

The next round in conference politics came as an Eastern reaction to the "bridge-building" policy of the United States and the *Ostpolitik* of the Federal Republic, which, by then, had established diplomatic relations with Rumania. Following the signature of a series of bilateral treaties with the GDR (not only to shore up Ulbricht once again but also, perhaps, in anticipation of the distant possibility of mutual pact dissolution), the Warsaw Pact nations sent Party representatives to the Czech spa of Karlovy Vary for a meeting in April of 1967. The Rumanians, doubtless feeling themselves in line for some Party discipline, stayed home.

This conference was somewhat pan-European as well as pan-Communist, in that sixteen Communist parties from East and West Europe attended. Acting again on the Gaullist premise that Europe should settle its own affairs, the conferees agreed to mobilize mass support in Europe to dissolve NATO (though not the Warsaw Pact as well)* and accelerate American troop

*The Preamble to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance states that the parties reaffirm "their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states

withdrawing (with no mention of Russian troops).¹ By doing, the Russians "corrected" the notion in the Bucharest statement that troop withdrawals applied to all armed forces; only foreign troops were stipulated, recalling the earlier definition of "Europe" and thereby exempting Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

The Karlovy Vary communique (see Appendix C) widened the call of the Bucharest statement for a conference of European states to an appeal for "a congress of the peoples of Europe on the broadest popular basis." By broadening the appeal to include Europe's social democrats, the Soviet Union hoped to quicken the socialist transformation of Western Europe on the basis of "peaceful coexistence between states of different social systems." In Brezhnev's view, detente politics would serve progressive purposes; he declared, "... in conditions of relaxed international tensions the arrow of the political barometer moves to the left." The events of 1968 were to prove that Brezhnev was looking at his barometer without regard to its accurate indications of change in Eastern Europe.

While NATO brought a variety of bilateral diplomatic efforts at detente into multilateral harness by way of the Harmel exercise (named for the Belgian Foreign Minister but reflecting Alliance agreement), which was followed in mid-1968 by NATO's proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (see Appendix B)—the Soviet Union watched with increasing alarm as the pace of liberalization quickened in Czechoslovakia. The change of American policy in Vietnam and the June 1967 war in the Middle East led to the "mini-summit" at Glassboro in July 1967 and tentative plans for strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). But the necessity for a Soviet invasion as a police action in Prague and the promulgation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" within the Communist camp, placed Soviet diplomacy on the defensive.

The Budapest Appeal

The "Message from the Warsaw Pact States to All European Countries," following a meeting in Budapest in March 1969 (see Appendix C), attempted to divert attention from the Eastern aspect of the European security problem, including the increasingly serious issue of Sino-Soviet relations. Although the tone was less polemical than previous statements, the meeting's communique

irrespective of their social and political systems." Article 11 provides for automatic dissolution of the Warsaw Pact when such a general European system enters into force. While this automaticity is doubtful and the Soviet Union has an extensive network of bilateral treaties in Eastern Europe anyway, this provision seems worth bearing in mind; for it is an important element in the Soviet propaganda drive for "dissolution of blocs."

was once again focused on pressure for American troop withdrawals, West German recognition of the two-Germanies program, including the dissociation of Bonn from West Berlin, and the convocation of a general European conference to discuss problems of European security and peaceful cooperation. The anti-American focus was probably linked to the rising domestic demand in the United States for withdrawal from Vietnam and "the urgent necessity to reorder America's national priorities," meaning contraction of American foreign commitments and increased action on domestic problems. The anti-German aspect of the Budapest appeal was no doubt related to the oncoming West German election campaign. In both instances the goal was to encourage European nationalism toward a more neutralist (that is, anti-American and, if possible, pro-Soviet) position in East-West relations.

Following the twentieth anniversary meeting of NATO in Washington in April 1969, the Soviet Union succeeded in obtaining neutral sponsorship for the conference. Finland sent a memorandum to all European states and to the

United States and Canada calling for an assembly in early 1970. Statements by Soviet officials during mid-1969 repeated their emphasis on "a common front against imperialism," to be expressed in "a broad congress of European peoples." And Brezhnev outlined the Soviet objective that this policy should be carried out by the creation of collective security systems in Europe and Asia.

Meanwhile, the next major development in the fast-moving European security problem came as part of the formation of a left-center coalition in West Germany in October 1969. Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was enunciated in his policy statement of October 28. Reminiscent of some of the statements made earlier by Secretary Dulles, Kennedy Administration spokesman, and General de Gaulle, Brandt's statement called for expanding the relationship between the two parts of Germany. As for "two Germanies," he declared:

... negotiations at Government level without discrimination on either side ... should lead to contractually agreed cooperation. International recognition of the GDR by the Federal Republic is out of the question. Even if there are two states in Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other; their relations with each other can only be of a special nature.¹⁶

Parenthetically, Brandt's formulation of the two-state declaration was repeated in his State of the Nation speech of mid-January 1970, in which he spoke of "two states within one German nation." From these two declarations, it can be argued that despite any legal ambiguities, his statements, coupled with pledges to respect the territorial integrity of the GDR—meaning its eastern border on the Oder-Neisse—amount to de facto recognition that two Germanies exist, at least as "an enforced reality."

The Prague Agenda

Given the opportunity to negotiate force renunciations and trade credits, the Eastern states acted within two days of Brandt's October 1969 speech. They met, ironically, in Prague and proposed two items in an open-ended agenda for the proposed East-West European security conference:

1. The ensuring of European security and renunciation of the use of force or threat of its use in the mutual relations among states in Europe.
2. Expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technical relations on the principle of equal rights [*read*: recognition of the GDR] aimed at the development of political cooperation among European states. [See Appendix C.]

This appeal from Prague on October 31, 1969, called for "The strengthening of peace in Europe ... as it has been constituted and exists today," meaning a divided Europe and two Germanies. Preparatory work among interested states would include discussion of "other suggestions" for the advancement of "mutually beneficial cooperation among the European states."

As the Brandt government moved toward bilateral exploratory talks with Russia and Poland, a summit meeting of the Pact members took place in early December 1969. The communique from that meeting in Moscow took the form of reassurances to Ulbricht that "equal relations" between the two Germanies required legal recognition of the GDR—heretofore the precondition for talks. However, the thesis that Brandt's two policy statements would be accepted as de facto recognition was apparently confirmed by the rapid initiation of Soviet-West German contacts on a bilateral nonaggression pact, and similar discussions have been explored in Polish-West German notes and in the exchange of press releases between Bonn and Pankow.

Meanwhile, in the United States there were new developments affecting American policy on European security. The Mansfield Resolution for reduction of American forces in Europe was reintroduced in the United States Senate on December 1, 1969.¹⁷ (The identical resolution had been

introduced early in 1967. On August 20, 1968, the day of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the NATO Foreign Ministers then in Europe, had concluded that NATO had outlived its usefulness because the Soviets were ^{not} likely to employ military force.)

The number of Senators who called for "substantial reductions" of American troop strength grew during 1969 as President Nixon spoke of the need to fight inflation in the economy and pollution in the environment. Despite growing debate over the Mansfield proposal and references to "Europeanizing" European defense, American officials pledged to maintain current force levels in Europe through mid-1971. Administration leaders voiced apprehension over the implications if American forces in Europe were

immediately reduced, in view of the "unravelling" effect which such a move would likely have in NATO, and because of possible effects on strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and German negotiations.

The Western Response

The official American reply to the Soviet proposal to convene a European security conference came in a speech by Secretary Rogers in Brussels on December 6, 1969, at the time of the NATO Ministerial Meeting. He asserted that the agenda suggested by the Warsaw Pact at Prague was "nebulous and imprecise." He added:

... we must be careful not to confuse the process of negotiation with real progress toward agreements, and we must not lull ourselves into a false sense of detente . . . The Warsaw Pact proposals do not deal with . . . fundamental questions. What is proposed cannot properly be described as a security conference at all. The Warsaw Pact countries have suggested merely, one, that a conference discuss the East-West agreement on the principle of non-use of force—which has been a basic principle of the United Nations Charter for over twenty years, so that another pronouncement of non-use of force would have no meaning; and, two, increased trade and technical exchanges for which regular diplomatic channels are always available.

We are opposed in practice to an unrealistic and premature exercise which could lead to disappointment and quite possible a deterioration in East-West relations.

The Secretary also outlined the three "tests of sincerity," in terms of three issues on which progress must be visible in other forums:

First, "constructive responses" in the *bilateral* efforts toward German reconciliation led by Chancellor Brandt;

Second, "A demonstration of Soviet willingness toward improving the situation in and around Berlin," for which Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union have *quadrilateral* responsibility; and

Third, "A positive Warsaw Pact response to our repeated proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions," a *multilateral* undertaking. Mr. Rogers concluded by stating:

We should favor a negotiation that holds out realistic hope for a reduction of tensions in Europe. But we will not participate in a conference which has the effect of ratifying or acquiescing in the Brezhnev Doctrine.

In their December meeting in Brussels, the NATO Foreign Ministers took a similarly reserved position toward the Soviet proposal and articulated their view in a declaration which was attached to the final communique of their deliberations. (See Appendix B.) The NATO Declaration drew on the principles of deterrence and detente adopted in 1967 by the Harmel report

on the future tasks of the Alliance. And it registered again the basic cleavage between the Western view of sovereign equality and nonintervention in internal affairs, on the one hand, and the Soviet concepts of "limited

sovereignty" and "preservation of the gains of socialism," on the other. The declaration repeated NATO's formal offer, made at Reykjavik in June 1968, for mutual and balanced force reductions and noted that there had been no response to this proposal for reducing tensions in Europe.

The Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik*, including West Germany's willingness to enter into bilateral agreements on the non-use of force or the threat of force, was endorsed by the NATO Ministers, and once again the West called for economic, technical, and cultural exchanges as part of what should be the "freer movement of people, ideas and information between the countries of East and West." This invitation to the East was broadened to include a suggestion for cooperation in the field of "human environment." Added to these provisions of Western policy was a section, "Perspectives for Negotiation," in which the NATO Ministers encouraged the continuation and intensification of "contacts, discussions or negotiations through all appropriate channels, bilateral or multilateral, believing that progress [toward solution of the concrete issues concerning European security] is most likely to be achieved by discussing in each instance the means most suitable for the subject."

As for the Soviet proposal and the possibility of holding an early conference on European security, the Ministers agreed that "careful advance preparations and prospects of concrete results would in any case be essential." In a muted reference to the caution articulated by Secretary Rogers, the North Atlantic Council stated that progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions toward resolving the "fundamental questions" would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe. In summary, it is clear from the NATO Declaration that Western diplomacy would not endorse the Eastern conference proposal if that meant ratifying the present division of Europe rather than reducing tensions as part of realistic agreement by the East on approaches to the problems of Berlin, inter-German relations, and mutual force reductions.

In the face of this attitude by the United States and in view of general, though by no means unanimous, support in NATO, the Soviet Union opened the 1970 season by an unusual announcement in an unusual press conference by Foreign Ministry spokesman Leonid Zamyatin.¹⁹ For the first time it became official that the Soviets anticipated American and Canadian participation from the outset of the conference, thus in effect dropping the all-European emphasis. (This had been widely mentioned in numerous "authorized discussions" by East European leaders and informally by the Russians but had not been made public previously.) Secondly, the reference to convening the conference in the first half of 1970—a special note of urgency which first appeared at Budapest—was changed to the latter half of the year.

Reports from Moscow and from Eastern Europe also revealed an unpublicized Party meeting in Moscow in mid-January at which there was strong opposition to Russian attempts to control preparations for the conference and at which there were efforts by the East Europeans to obtain a modification of the Brezhnev Doctrine.²⁰ Partly because of this internal disarray and partly because of the lack of support by Western governments, there are now increasing references to a peoples' congress as an alternative to a conference of government representatives and as the next stage of development. In the spring of 1970 it is unclear which way the questions of modalities and timing will turn. But it is safe to assume that the drive for an East-West European security conference will be raised again whenever the Soviets find the timing and balance of advantage suitable.

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Détente, a two-way street

Champagne and chandeliers were laid on in Warsaw this week for the signing by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz of a treaty intended to open the way for normalization of the two countries' relations. But Berlin remained the central issue in the question of how far and how fast East-West détente in Europe can progress.

The future of Berlin was also a major issue at the conference of the Warsaw Pact powers which ended last Wednesday and of the meeting of the Nato Council in Brussels on Thursday and Friday.

The Nato ministers made it clear that they regarded the "satisfactory conclusion" of the Big Four talks and the favourable progress of "other

ongoing talks" as a necessary preliminary to Western agreement to a European security conference.

A communiqué issued after the Warsaw Pact meeting, in East Berlin itself, made it clear that Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had imposed his policy on the recalcitrant East German leader, Walter Ulbricht. It failed to support Mr. Ulbricht's long-standing demand for de jure recognition of his government by Bonn and reiterated Mr. Brezhnev's recent reference to a Berlin settlement which would correspond to the "requirements of the population of West Berlin." But it added that there was "no reason" to delay the convening of a conference on European security.

The whole future course of détente in Europe may depend on the decisions taken by the Warsaw Pact leaders. The ball is decidedly in their court, for West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has for his part done everything possible to create improved relations with Eastern Europe.

He signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which in effect condemns his country to the status of a second-class military power. He made the pilgrimage to Erfurt to meet the prime minister of a state whose existence until then Bonn had assiduously ignored. And he went to Moscow, and has just gone to Warsaw, to sign treaties that sanction boundaries which previous West German governments had refused to recognize—except in exchange for the East's acceptance of German reunification.

There are several reasons for thinking that Mr. Brandt may not have paid as high a price as appears at first glance. He succeeded in avoiding the de jure recognition sought by East Germany that would make the separation of Germany definitive, and his recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was made in the name of the Federal Republic, not that of an eventually reunified Germany. In addition, East Germany continues to be kept out of the various bodies of the United Nations and these treaties have thrown wide the door to trade with Eastern Europe.

Despite all this, it remains true that so far it has been Bonn that has been making all the concessions, and now it is up to Moscow and its allies to decide how far they are willing to go in exchange.

Package deal

Both Mr. Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel have stated

By ANDRÉ FONTAINE

that these various agreements—the Non-Proliferation Treaty, "normalization" treaties with Moscow and Warsaw and eventually Prague, the modus vivendi to be negotiated with East Germany, and the Big Four settlement—will not be submitted separately to the Bundestag for ratification.

On the contrary, they intend to present them as a package deal, which means that if any one clause is not accepted the whole of Mr. Brandt's Ostpolitik will be jeopardized.

The Socialist-Liberal coalition has yet to define the limits

beyond which it would have to admit that its policy had failed. Since this is a question of interpretation, the government may be tempted to accept a pro forma arrangement on Berlin rather than admit a failure which could lead to its downfall.

This was certainly Moscow's hope. And it has undoubtedly been the fear in Washington and other Western capitals. But recent declarations by official West German spokesmen have unequivocally stated that a Berlin settlement is the sine qua non for any implementation of their Ostpolitik.

But why Berlin? As last week's slowdown on West Berlin access roads or recent disruptions of air traffic once again revealed, the Soviets and their East German allies have used access to West Berlin as a means of exerting pressure on the Western allies. Although these tactics may have been a good source of foreign currency, they have backfired politically by making Berlin a symbol of the Cold War and by restoring Western solidarity at the very

falling apart.

The presence of American, British and French forces in West Berlin is based on the very general terms of the 1944-1945 agreements which have since been disputed by the Soviets. What is needed, therefore, is a binding settlement which would prevent the East Germans from closing road traffic and the Russians from disrupting air traffic on the pretext of military manoeuvres.

To the extent that the declared aim of Soviet policy is to make the status quo definitive, Moscow cannot deny that West Berlin's attachment to the Western system is an integral part of that status quo. Official Soviet recognition of this fact is little enough to expect in exchange for agreement on frontiers and the division of Germany.

Too often in the past twenty years the Russians have tried to rid themselves of this Western outpost by resorting to blockade or even the threat of a world war. It would be a fatal mistake for the West not to insist on such a settlement.

After all, the West succeeded in holding on to Berlin even under the worst stresses of the Cold War and there is no reason why it should run the risk of losing it in a time of détente.

General de Gaulle understood this better than any one else. It is clear from his memoirs that, to the end of his life, he was convinced that he was right to have stood firm against Nikita Khrushchev's blusterings. Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann have made it abundantly clear that they are following the path that De Gaulle set out.

The East Germans, however, have not given up their long-

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cherished dream of making reunified Berlin their capital. This means that they will do their best to keep Soviet concessions to a minimum. History shows, however, that when it comes to the crunch the Soviets usually manage to resign themselves to the necessary compromise, especially when it can be made at the expense of one of their allies.

Assurances in order

The Western allies, on the other hand, could well afford to give certain assurances in exchange, especially since the West Germans have shown themselves to be rather high-handed with the statutes of West Berlin by holding Bundestag sessions or electing their president there.

What matters is that they are uncompromising on the question of free access and Soviet responsibility for guaranteeing it. It would be too easy for the Russians, once sovereignty over access routes had been given to East Germany, to merely wash their hands of the whole affair whenever a new incident cropped up.

out some hope for an improvement in the Berlin situation in his speech delivered ten days ago in Armenia. According to him, all that is needed is a show of goodwill by all interested parties, and that they work out solutions which satisfy the needs of West Berlin's inhabitants while at the same time respecting the rightful interests and sovereignty of East Germany.

It would take an inveterate optimist to conclude from this that the Soviets are ready to pay the price of détente. If Mr. Brezhnev is serious about respecting the hopes of the West Berliners, he has only to consult their voting record over the past twenty years. The candidates of the East German Communist Party, who are authorized in West Berlin, have never obtained more

than a handful of votes, while the vast majority have always gone to the parties firmly attached to Western democracy.

It would be too much to hope, two years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that Mr. Brezhnev

Berlin Wall.

But the West can at least demand of the man who has raised the division of the world to an absolute principle that he carry his reasoning to its logical conclusion, that is, that he accept certain facts unfavourable to Moscow.

Bonn, London, Paris and Washington must make it clear to him that, unless he does so, the diplomatic triumph of last summer's Bonn-Moscow treaty, which he prides himself on, may well prove to be illusory.

Détente can never be a one-way street. Otherwise, instead of slowly breaking down the barriers that separate the two Europes, it could tempt the temporary victor to exploit his advantage and the loser to prepare his revenge.

ANDRÉ FONTAINE

After the Helsinki Arms Talks, New Complications

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23—

Soviet negotiators at the recently recessed arms talks in Helsinki reportedly proposed that an arms agreement permit both sides to deploy mobile land-based intercontinental missiles, a development opposed by the United States.

In the American view, this would complicate procedures for checking on whether an arms agreement was being honored by Moscow because it would be difficult to keep track of the numbers and locations of Soviet missiles.

Moreover, arms controllers contend that this would provide another loophole for the arms race to continue through refinements of existing armaments systems, rather than imposing an effective freeze. Some critics have already charged that the arms parley—formally, the Strategic Arms-Limitation Talks—are a sham because they will allow multiple warheads and other technological improvements to go ahead.

The Soviet Union, believed to be ahead of the United States in developing advanced weapons, reportedly argued at Helsinki that, as a land power, it needed

such missiles to offset the preponderance of American missiles on submarines, whose mobility helps them elude detection.

Several Complications Arise

The dispute over mobile missiles was one of several complications that arose during seven weeks of negotiations at Helsinki, which ended Friday with less progress than the Nixon Administration had hoped for.

At his news conference today, Secretary of State William P. Rogers reported that the arms talks had "not proceeded as fast as we hoped they would" and conceded that "it may take a little more time than we wished" to get an agreement. But he insisted that he was "neither optimistic nor pessimistic" about the over-all prospects for an agreement.

One knowledgeable informant said that the negotiators at Helsinki "passed like ships in the night, sparring rather than coming together on issues." The long recess until the talks resume in March leaves specialists doubtful that an agreement can be concluded before late 1971, at best.

The limited movement at Helsinki, forecast, is likely to re-

vive pressures within the Nixon Administration for more rapid development of new strategic armaments systems, such as the B-1 bomber, a new generation of submarines and their long-range missiles known as ULMS, or underwater launch missile system, and even a new anti-missile defense system for American land-based missiles.

The cost of each of these programs, already in the research stage, is estimated in the billions of dollars. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has said publicly that he must make major decisions on them during 1971.

American officials attribute the discouraging results of the

Helsinki talks primarily to hard-bargaining tactics by Moscow and the general rise of Soviet-American tensions in the Middle East, Cuba and Berlin.

Two minority views heard in Washington are that either Moscow is trying to use the arms talks to drive a wedge between the United States and its Western European allies or that the Soviet is too preoccupied by internal political maneuvering for the 24th Soviet Communist party congress next March 30 to make the deal for a new arms agreement.

All American officials assert that the issues at stake in the arms talks are so complicated and so delicate that it is not surprising that no agreement has emerged after 13 months of negotiating. But most point out

that increased confrontations with Moscow in other areas have worsened the climate for the arms talks.

"Tensions with the U.S.S.R. in other areas cannot fail to have a negative influence," Gerard C. Smith, the chief American arms negotiator, said in an interview with U. S. News & World Report published on Dec. 14.

Another explanation offered by some American officials, is that each side at Helsinki was probing the other for concessions without giving any ground itself. "The Soviets were playing chicken, to some degree," said one American official, "and maybe we were, too."

The Soviet negotiators, led by Vladimir S. Semyonov, disappointed Washington by refusing to provide a package in

response to the American proposal of July 24, until the United States accepted the Soviet definition of "strategic" arms systems. The critical deadlock

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on this issue involves about 500 American planes based in Europe and in the Mediterranean, capable of delivering about 700 nuclear warheads against the Soviet Union.

Moscow insists that these are strategic weapons because they can strike the Soviet Union. The United States excludes them, arguing that they are part of the defense of Western Europe — a counterpoise to about 700 Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range missiles aimed at Western Europe. Washington refuses to discuss them for fear of undermining the confidence of its North Atlantic allies.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
15 DECEMBER 1970

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Rebuke Move By Soviets in U.N. Rebounds

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 14

By Robert H. Estabrook
Washington Post Foreign Service

—A high-priority Soviet effort to obtain endorsement of its views on international security boomeranged in the General Assembly political committee tonight.

Instead of sanctioning wars of liberation and indirectly rebuking Israel as the Moscow version originally sought, the new resolution, passed 106-1, is a thinly disguised criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia

It stresses that states must refrain from the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, must not intervene in matters within domestic jurisdiction and must respect the principle of sovereign equality.

This is clearly aimed at the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in Eastern Europe to prevent changes in the Socialist system. It was promulgated after the intervention in Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Resolution's Backers

Principal credit for the new version is given to Yugoslavia, which negotiated extensively behind the scenes, as well as to Brazil, which introduced

the resolution in the political committee and to Italy. Yugoslavia and Romania felt particularly menaced by the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Paradoxically, two countries, which participated in the intervention in Czechoslovakia—Bulgaria and Poland—sponsored the new resolution. Belgium, Ecuador, India and Zambia also joined in sponsorship.

A measure of the Soviet setback is the fact that last year and again at the beginning of this session Soviet diplomats cited the international security item as a major objective during the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. It was intended to set the background for a European security conference, which has lost momentum in recent months.

Accordingly, the Soviet bloc resolution introduced last September included a paragraph aimed at Israel calling for full implementation of Security Council resolutions on settlement of conflicts and withdrawal of forces from territories occupied.

It also called for an end to all military and other action to suppress liberation move-

ments of peoples "still under colonial or racist domination," and proclaimed that instead it is necessary for states to assist such peoples.

Broader Scope

The new resolution is far broader in scope, striking a delicate balance and stressing the necessity for agreement on peacekeeping guidelines and the connection between security and development. But it is most explicit in upholding principles of the U.N. charter.

"The breach of these principles cannot be justified in any circumstance whatsoever," it declared. Under the resolution the General Assembly:

"Solemnly reaffirms that states must fully respect the sovereignty of other states and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention, coercion, or constraint, especially involving the threat or use of force, overt or covert, and refrain from any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country."

Other Applications

The new resolution could be interpreted as applying to the United States over such actions as Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Some smaller countries viewed it as a check on the big powers generally. But its main thrust was clearly against the previous Soviet effort, and Soviet support was privately grudging.

One Western diplomat noted that the new version "bears no resemblance whatever to the original Soviet draft." Another conjectured that "the Russians wish they had never started it rolling down the road. They lost control of it."

In other U.N. actions today, the General Assembly passed a series of resolutions backing up its colonialism committee on the 10th anniversary of the declaration calling for independence for colonial peoples. The United States voted against a resolution condemning foreign economic activities in territories under colonial domination.

Committee Chairman Davidson Nicol of Sierra Leone delivered the aphorism of the day. Decolonization, he said, is like love: it must be complete to be fully effective.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

9 December 1970

Europe-security prod Pollution may get big powers talking

By Carlyle Morgan
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Geneva

Concern over environmental problems could provide a means for getting the world powers to agree on a general European-security conference, diplomats are saying privately here.

Statesmen working for a European-security conference have in the past stressed such questions as German borders, possible East-West arms reductions, and other political matters.

These are still regarded as the major subjects for a European conference. But today diplomats working both in the political and environmental fields are wondering if the security conference should itself begin by tackling a common foe—pollution of the air, rivers, and oceans.

Change of stress

This change of stress may catch the public unawares. But experts point out that both of the two military blocs confronting each other in a future security conference have already adopted programs for improving the world environment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was first to do so. But this Western move was soon repeated by the Warsaw Pact.

And now comes further joint East-West stress on problems of the environment.

A meeting here of senior advisers to governments in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has just concluded an important stage of preparations for higher-level conferences to come.

Its work will be continued in the ECE's plenary session in April, 1971. Both these meetings are preludes to the Prague Conference on problems of the human environment scheduled for May, 1971.

The Prague meeting in turn will prepare the ground for the still larger international conference to include the whole UN membership at Stockholm in June, 1972.

The Geneva meeting just ended produced broad lines along which the Prague and Stockholm conferences can work. But no decisions were made here. These will be made at Prague.

Questions tackled include: What kind of body should be set up within ECE to deal

with environmental problems? Should such a body become permanent? Should ECE delegate its powers to the proposed new body in this particular field?

At present the ECE's work on this subject is spread over many groups within the organization. And the fact is typical of efforts to defend the environment whether these be among international bodies or national or private ones.

Coordination sought

An ECE body on environment would coordinate its work as the Organization for European Economic Development (OECD) has already done. In fact one of the major aims of all the conferences ahead must be to increase coordination, within govern-

ments, as well as between governments and private agencies in their own countries, among governments through the UN and among agencies in the UN.

But coordination presupposes access to information on the environment. Much of this is unknown except in limited circles. The Geneva group spent two whole days on this matter. Its members found that knowledge of what is going on, country by country is too little known internationally.

But even within countries, experts say, this lack of information hinders antipollution work. In the United States for example, Christian A. Herter Jr., heading the Geneva group, says, "We have no idea what private bodies are doing about the environment, and most countries don't."

One problem involving mercury poisoning of fish on the United States-Canadian borders was tackled recently without knowledge that it had been treated in a paper by a Swedish student 15 years ago. "If we had known this," Mr. Herter said, "We could have worked more intelligently instead of on an emergency basis."

The coming series of conferences must deal with matters of a semipolitical nature, too. For example, when antipollution measures are international who pays for them? Governments? Regional bodies? The UN? And how can such measures be kept from commercial abuse as in cases where they may be made the basis of trade discrimination or so-called "nontariff barriers" which already unduly interfere with international trade?

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THE WASHINGTON POST
16 August 1970

A new breed of Soviet citizen appears on the scene

INVOLUNTARY JOURNEY TO SIBERIA. By Andrei Amalrik. Translated by Manya Harari and Max Hayward. A Helen & Kurt Wolf Book/Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 297 pp. \$6.95.

By Merle Fainsod

On May 20 of this year the author of this remarkably objective and dispassionate account of his arrest, trial and exile to a collective farm in Siberia on a charge of "parasitism" was rearrested and accused of "spreading deliberately false fabrications, defaming the Soviet State and public order." Ironically, at about the same time, for reasons which do their propagators no credit, rumors still circulated in the West that Amalrik was a secret KGB agent. The poignancy of his plight needs no underlining.

Andrei Amalrik is best known outside the Soviet Union as the author of *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, an incisive essay which combines an acute if somewhat pessimistic analysis of Soviet society with an apocalyptic scenario of a Soviet-Chinese war which will lead to the break-up of the Russian Empire. Whether or not one accepts Amalrik's views, one can only respect the honesty and fearless independence with which he articulates them. Still in his early thirties, and a self-proclaimed individualist whose protest against the Soviet regime has always been a highly personal one, his alienation from the dominant values of Soviet life and his refusal to yield to the pressures for conformity inevitably spelled trouble. Expelled from Moscow University in 1963 for his unwillingness to modify the conclusions of his dissertation and for attempting to pass it on to a Western scholar, he worked spasmodically over the next years at various odd jobs while reserving his real energies for the writing of plays, verse, and essays which were destined "for the drawer" rather than for publication. His interest in Soviet underground art and his contacts with foreign diplomats and journalists attracted the attention of the KGB and led to his first arrest and subsequent exile to Siberia.

Amalrik's story of his arrest and exile holds particular interest for at least three reasons. First, while he makes it crystal clear that the Stalinist apparatus of security police surveillance continues to make life difficult for dissenters, he also indicates that its arbitrary power has been somewhat delimited. As one of its representatives put it to Amalrik, "The Committee [i.e., the KGB] isn't what it was. In the old days you would have disappeared for twenty years. . . ." Second, the effort to impose limits, however feeble, on the power of the security police and the bureaucratic rivalries which this has set in motion among the different branches of the police, the procur-

acy, and the courts have opened up opportunities for nonconformists like Amalrik to press the regime to abide by the legal norms which it professes. Third, and perhaps most important, Amalrik's narrative brings home the fact that a new breed of courageous and defiant young intellectuals has emerged on the Soviet scene. They are prepared to struggle for their rights despite imprisonment, deportation, or other sanctions invoked to restrain them.

Perhaps the most interesting part of Amalrik's fascinating book is the record of his experiences on the Siberian collective farm where he was consigned as an exiled "parasite." Amalrik tells the story in almost documentary form, with an unadorned simplicity which radiates veracity. The hardships which Amalrik and his artist wife, Gyuzel, had to endure through a bitter Siberian winter are described without self-pity. Amalrik's picture of village life is both somber and disillusioning. Women without husbands accounted for nearly half the village. Except for the exiles, who in effect constituted a pool of inefficient forced labor, most able-bodied young males utilized every opportunity to escape to the towns and

cities. The women and older men cursed their lot with its hard work, low pay, and lack of the most basic amenities, but when asked "how they would like to live, they would reply, 'What other life is there?'" The villagers "quarreled ceaselessly among themselves," drank to excess, and resented anyone who did not share their miseries. Taught to obey orders rather than to exercise initiative, they worked inefficiently because, says Amalrik, "their feeling is that even if they do think of some improvement, they will get no reward and may even get in trouble for doing something out of turn." What Amalrik found hardest to accept was the passivity and inertia of the villagers, the assumption which they apparently shared with their rulers that nothing could be accomplished except by force and coercion from above.

Given the sobering conclusions to which Amalrik was driven by his observations of village life, it is perhaps all the more remarkable that, even after his release from exile, he continued to struggle for civil right, and chose the path of defiance of authority. Perhaps the best explanation is his own answer, "I have no other possibility."

Merle Fainsod is Director of the University Libraries at Harvard University.

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WASHINGTON POST
10 December 1970

S. Vietnamese Survey Seeks Out Reluctant

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By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Dec. 9 — Gov-

ernment agents canvassed Vietnam's major cities and towns today in what is probably the largest effort in this country's history to find out who should be paying how much in taxes.

Armed with 11-page data sheets resembling American census forms, the agents are expected to reach some four million Vietnamese by the time the survey is completed in five weeks.

The house-to-house check is part of a program designed by a group of energetic young economists at the Finance Ministry here to do away with the time-honored and, until now, widely accepted practice of tax dodging.

Besides the survey, the campaign includes revision of an antiquated tax code written by the French, in French, and the creation of committees with authority to set taxes arbitrarily for individuals who refuse to calculate their own.

Swollen Budget

With an ever-increasing national budget swollen by war costs and inflation, the government has recognized it must squeeze taxes from those most able to afford them: professionals and businessmen.

One high-ranking Finance Ministry official pointed out today that last year these

groups paid less than half the taxes paid by the country's civil servants, military and salaried and persons.

Taxpayers

"Obviously something is very, very wrong," he said. "Professionals and businessmen are 10, maybe 1000 times richer. Many of the wealthy were able to juggle figures and paid virtually no income tax at all.

The ministry estimates that only 20,000 of some 80,000 businessmen in the Saigon area, paid taxes in 1969. And these, it is generally acknowledged, under-declared their incomes.

Urban Money-makers

The survey, said a ministry spokesman, is intended to locate these urban money-makers, especially those who have slipped off the tax rolls altogether in the confusion and population shifts of the war years.

Among the questions to be posed by the canvassers are sources of income, value of property and equipment owned, personal possessions and the number of wage earners per household.

Ministry officials have no illusions about the accuracy of the answers and where possible they intend to cross check with the help of an IBM 360-20 computer, another first for Vietnam's tax collectors.

To help enforce what the Finance Ministry decides would be paid, special taxation committees are being

set up (so far in Saigon, Cholon and surrounding Gia-dinh Province) to deal with

evaders.

'Much to Do'

"Since most people either don't declare or misdeclare," a ministry official observed, "the committees should have much to do." The primary job of the committees is to set tax rates based on what they believe is the person's true income.

In the case of doctors, for example, the committees have looked into the prevailing fees for visits and the number per year and are working out criteria for what physicians are likely to earn.

Outraged at the intrusion into their livelihoods, the entire board of the Vietnam

Medical Association resigned in protest.

To limit corruption, the committees are under constant supervision and report to the vice minister of finance every 15 days. Officials concede, that it is not a foolproof system.

'Baby Experts'

The vice minister of finance is Ha Xuan Trung, a 28-year-old Yale graduate. He is one of a group known as the "baby experts" who have been largely responsible for devising the domestic tax campaign.

The assistant to the finance minister is Vu Khac Dung, 27, a graduate of Harvard. The assistant to the vice-minister is 27-year-old Nguyen Tron Hien, a Pur-

due alumnus. At the Eco-

nomics Ministry, the vice minister is Nguyen Duc Cuong, 29, who attended the University of New Hampshire and MIT.

Besides an American education, what these young men seem to have in common is a hard-headed realism about the scope of tax evasion and corruption of other forms in their country. At the same time, they seem determined, apparently out of patriotism, to do something about the problem.

"Sooner or later, preferably sooner, we must be self sufficient," said Hien who sat in his modest office shirtsleeved and tieless as he explained the importance of the survey. "This is one of the measures being carried out to raise internal taxes and to bring social justice to this question."

American economics officials here hold the "baby experts" in high regard and place much of their hope for protecting Vietnam from an

economic catastrophe on the young men's motivation.

For the coming year, the goal is to raise domestic taxation from 37 billion piastres (about \$134 million) to 50 billion piastres (about \$185 million), still only a fraction of the 1971 national budget which calls for spending 235 billion piastres, or more than \$2 billion dollars.

The greatest portion of this national revenue comes from various kinds of direct

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and indirect American aid.

What the long-range target for domestic taxes should be, remains to be calculated. Just how far the South Vietnamese must go can be seen in the fact that some international economists say internal taxation in developing countries should amount to between 12 and 15 per cent of the Gross National Product.

In Vietnam, the current estimate is that taxes equal about 6 to 7 per cent of the GNP.

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January 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

January 4 - 9	Havana	7th Congress of the International Organization of Journalists; a Prague-based Soviet-controlled front.
January 11 - 13	London	The Communist Parties of Western Europe are to meet to discuss the role of the working class in Western Europe in relation to the development of multinational societies. The projected January meeting is an outgrowth of a meeting in London on September 21, 1969, attended by delegates from the Communist parties of Cyprus, West Germany, England, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain. The Soviet Communist Party was not represented, and never publicly expressed its attitude toward the September meeting.
January 15 - 16	USSR	36th anniversary of the first show trial of Stalin's Great Purge, 1935. The defendants were charged with counterrevolutionary activity and moral responsibility for the assassination of Sergey Kirov, the Soviet leader who was regarded as Stalin's heir-apparent. Among those convicted were Grigoriy Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, who were the initial members with Stalin of the triumvirate that ruled Russia during Lenin's illness. Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed in 1936. It is now widely believed that Stalin, himself, plotted Kirov's assassination.
January 16	Prague	In 1969 Jan Palach, a Czech student, set fire to himself in downtown Prague to protest the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

January 23	Venezuela	The Venezuelan Communist Party is to hold its 4th Congress, which was originally scheduled for December 4 and then postponed when long-standing factional differences surfaced openly between the majority pro-Soviet faction and a faction led by Teodoro Petkoff, who, in a recent book, advocated a Venezuelan national brand of communism and rejected the Soviet model. He earlier wrote a book criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Petkov, who was a member of the PCV Central Committee, was attacked by Moscow's Pravda on 20 October for his "anti-Sovietism"; and on 16 December the PCV newspaper, <u>Tribuna Popular</u> , announced that four members of the Politburo had been expelled as well as several members of the Central Committee, including Petkoff himself. Interest now centers on how much more purge of the Petkoff faction will be attempted by the pro-Soviet faction at the 4th Party Congress.
February 3 - 10	Bratislava	10th Congress of the (Communist) International Union of Students. This Prague-based front was so demoralized by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that the 10th Congress had to be postponed repeatedly during the past year.
February 10 - 14	USSR	5th anniversary of the trial and conviction of the dissident Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyavskiy and Yuli Daniel, in 1966, for publishing abroad books said to "slander" the Soviet Union. The trial provoked strong protests abroad at Soviet denial of intellectual freedom. The trial also proved to be a turning point in the development of dissidence in the Soviet Union according to Pyotr Yakir, a prominent Soviet

dissident, who has said: the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial caused many people in the Soviet Union to think "really, why should people be tried for their convictions? Why simply for what he thinks, does a man have to be arrested? ...So from that time on there were protests." (Statement by Yakir during an interview with CBS, televised 28 July 1970.) Daniel has completed his prison sentence and has been released, in poor health. Sinyavskiy is still serving a sentence in a Soviet forced labor camp.

February 14 - 25 USSR

15th anniversary of Khrushchev's secret speech, denouncing Stalin's brutal crimes, at the CPSU 20th Congress in Moscow in 1956.

February 23 USSR

50th anniversary of the Kronstadt uprising. In 1921 soldiers, sailors and workers of Kronstadt, who had fought for the Soviets in the October Revolution and were called heroes of the Revolution, revolted unsuccessfully against Soviet rule. They demanded free elections by secret ballot, freedom for all socialist parties, liberation of the political prisoners being held by the Bolsheviks, and recognition of workers' and peasants' rights.

March 30 Moscow

The 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which was supposed to meet in 1970, is now scheduled for March 30.

~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

JANUARY 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

NOVOSTI - NOTHING BUT THE NEWS. In February 1971 the Soviet press agency Novosti (Agentstvo Pechati Novosti - APN) will celebrate its 10th anniversary. Certain assets may wish to assist their local Novosti offices and staffers in celebrating the occasion by widening the holes in the fiction that this is a legitimate news mechanism -- nothing more. Debunking this enterprise's cover should be aided by the nature and background of the leader found to succeed Boris Burkov, the man who had headed the agency since its inception in 1961. He is Ivan Udaltsov and his qualifications for handling a large press agency include such diverse activities as Minister at the Soviet Embassy in Prague at the time of the Russian invasion, and deputy head of the Central Committee department dealing with relations with ruling communist parties. In short, he is a senior party and government official. His appointment serves to further erode Soviet claims that Novosti is a non-official enterprise sponsored by cultural organizations. Udaltsov, in his two months of stewardship, has given evidence that Soviet propaganda is adopting a tougher tone. For example, Novosti launched the first attack on writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, awarded the 1970 Nobel Prize for literature. On 15 October 1970, the agency denounced his work for its "literary and political insolvency" and claimed that the Swedish Academy had defamed the prize by the award.

* * * * *

EXTREMISTS FIND DISILLUSIONMENT IN CUBA. Stories which have begun to filter out of Cuba, on the harsh living and working conditions of most hijackers and kidnapers who have sought political asylum there, are highly exploitable, and may become increasingly important in deterring terrorists who might be tempted to take similar action. When the FLQ kidnapers arrived recently in Havana from Montreal, the Cuban government made clear that it had accepted them only as a favor to the government of Canada, which is one of Cuba's important trading partners.

Earlier, a Cuban representative at a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization also complained that the hijackings had brought to Cuba "common criminals, corrupt individuals, mentally unbalanced persons and socially unadapted persons..." Yet Cuba has continually refused to cooperate in international efforts to curb hijackings. There was no Cuban delegate at the

recent international conference on air law, co-sponsored by the Dutch government and the International Civil Aviation Organization, which requires signatory states to pass stiff anti-hijacking laws, i.e. preventing hijackers from claiming asylum on political grounds.

Indications of how dismal life is for the so-called "exiles" in Cuba, whether it involves standing trial, serving a long prison sentence or being forced to do long hours of field work, lie in the fact that six American hijackers returned voluntarily to face charges in the United States rather than remain in Cuba, and the forty Brazilian political prisoners, who were released in exchange for the West German ambassador to Brazil, chose to go on to exile in Algeria. The attached clippings give further insight into the life of exiled extremists in Cuba.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 December 1970

U.S. Hijackers in Cuba Facing Segregated and Unhappy Life

CPYRGHT

The following dispatch was written by James Reed, a Canadian freelance journalist who recently visited Cuba for five weeks.

Special to The New York Times

HAVANA, Dec. 7—United

States citizens who have hijacked airliners to Cuba are living here in segregated quarters because of antagonisms from hijackers of other nationalities.

According to their friends, most United States hijackers are unhappy, some to the point of extreme despondency, with their restricted life in a large residence known as Hijacker House in the Siboney district of Havana.

An 18-year-old high school dropout from Michigan, who risked life at Hijacker House, is believed by other hijackers to have plunged to his death Sept. 28 from a seventh-floor hotel room to which he had been permitted to move. His parents are reported to have tried in vain to have his body returned to the United States.

Friends of the hijackers here say that the death of this youth may not have been the only one among the scores of United States citizens who have forced planes to fly to Cuba.

Woman Reports Hanging

Among the residents of Hijacker House is a Chinese-American woman known only as Edna. She reportedly flew here in a plane hijacked by her husband, also a Chinese-American, from San Francisco. Edna is quoted as having said that he hanged himself in a prison cell in Havana about nine months ago.

The United States hijackers take their meals at the residence and are allowed to move about the capital. But they may not receive visitors at Hijacker House, and they have been advised not to tell Cubans who they are or what they are doing here.

A few United States hijackers have been allowed to enroll in Spanish-language courses, but they have not been incorporated into Cuba's economic or academic life in any permanent way.

Some have requested permission to go to Algeria, others to Sweden and one, a black Muslim, to the United Arab Republic. Some have been allowed to return, at their request, to the United States to face charges.

Suspicion of Americans

The Michigan youth's experience, as related by fellow hijackers to friends here, illustrates the suspicion that United States hijackers are dealt with by Cuban authorities and the depths of the unhappiness growing out of their lives here.

The youth, these informants say, went to Mexico City last year in the hope of obtaining a visa from the Cuban Embassy there to travel to Havana. After five weeks of waiting, he hijacked a Tampa-bound airliner.

On arrival here, he was reported to have spent a period in solitary confinement at a

prison, where he underwent prolonged interrogation to determine his political views. He was allowed five minutes of exercise a day.

He later told other United States hijackers that the night he arrived in jail, he heard a voice shouting in English: "I want freedom! I want freedom!" The shouting was soon drowned out as a radio's volume was turned up loud.

Attempt to Escape

He said he had not been physically abused by his jailers. At one point, he tried in vain to rush out of his cell when a guard was bringing him food.

About two months after his arrival here, he was released from prison and lodged, along with other Americans, in Hijacker House, where at the time hijackers from other countries also lived. But when brawls broke out between United States hijackers and others, particularly Brazilians, the Cuban authorities moved the others into different residences.

There is also reported to be a special residence for hijackers with what are described as

revolutionary convictions. No United States citizens, it is said, have been admitted to this group.

The Michigan youth is said to have requested early this year to be allowed to work at a regular job. Many of the hijackers have volunteered for work, and some have been assigned to seasonal farm jobs, such as picking coffee or planting sugar cane.

After several requests, the youth was assigned to a tool factory in central Cuba. A few days later, he was sent back to Havana, although he reportedly had obtained a letter from the plant manager saying his work was satisfactory.

His fall from the hotel window came 11 months after he landed here aboard the airliner he had hijacked.

Cuba Discourages Hijackers

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 — In the last 18 months the Cuban Government has become increasingly intolerant of air piracy. Since 1969 it has been promptly returning the hijacked planes, passengers and crews, and has generally toned down its welcome to hijackers.

Federal Aviation Administration figures show that in 1969 there were 31 successful hijackings of aircraft under United States registry, and that thus far this year there have been 14. In 1969, two pirated planes went to places other than Cuba, while in 1970 there have been five such flights, according to the agency.

Officials here are unsure how many hijackers are now in Cuba, but the F.A.A. lists 50 as having returned.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

7 December 1970

Canadian exiles hiding in Havana villa

By London Express Service

HAVANA — Acting on a tip, London Express correspondent Brian Vine, located the living quarters here of the FLQ kidnapers of British diplomat James Cross.

As a result he was taken into Castro's Foreign Ministry and told to leave Cuba.

Here's how Mr. Vine found the Canadian exiles living:

An hour before my invitation to leave Cuba I had driven up to a shabby villa, 6206 Fifth-Av and 50th-St in the Miramar diplomatic district of Havana, six miles from the ministry, to discover the hideout of James Cross's kidnapers — Jacques Lanctot, Marc Carbonneau, Jacques Cosette-Trudell and Pierre Sequin.

The two wives, Marie Bernadette Suzanne Lanctot and her 18-month-old son Manuel Boris Lanctot and Louise Marie Cosette-Trudell, were also in the ground-floor rooms of the villa. By the look of the washing line in the garden the women had worked while the men talked to military intelligence.

Outside the villa stood a lone soldier in olive green battledress. Blocking the avenue were six police cars abreast and a squad of high-ranking soldiers with side-arms and policemen carrying automatic rifles.

Mrs. Lanctot, expecting a baby imminently, will need one of those police cars at any hour now to get her to a hospital.

The onetime luxury house in pre-Castro days was guarded like a jail. Behind were mangrove swamps and orange trees with the blue waters of the Caribbean only 500 yards away.

To the side was an army target practice range with young recruits in fatigues cracking off towards cut-out figures on targets.

A group of children in coffee-colored shirts and grey skirts took inquisitive glances into the half-open door of the villa. A crowd of housewives in white blouses stood on the other side of the street gossiping at the scene — the only free pleasure for old women in Cuba.

The soldier gave the school girls a grimace. I pulled up, strode across the bald patch of green in front of a once proud lawn but was given the welcome of any intruder into military affairs in this fear-struck island.

The guard patted his holster and waved a hairy hand for me to leave the area or face arrest.

This hideout villa with its flaking paintwork and washing line is normally a guest house for Maoist, Russian and East German workers.

The kidnapers' wives and child are living on a poor diet of boiled rice and fish while intelligence officers and secret police interrogate them for the next few days.

Their future is still uncertain as the Castro regime's embarrassment at having to accept them may mean they will be asked to move out to Algeria or France.

Shortly after Mr. Vine's brush with Castro authorities, police yesterday arrested a three-man Canadian TV team. They were filming a revolutionary statue in Havana's City Square. They were taken to La Cabana fortress prison and questioned for three hours. Then their film was destroyed.

maintaining Moscow's right to sail its naval vessels at will in the Caribbean. Until recently, that sea amounted to being an American lake.

The United States has been tracking the Soviet flotilla as it has been approaching Cuba, enabling Washington to determine that the submarine appears to be diesel-powered. The vessel the Russians and Cubans termed an anti-submarine ship is listed as a frigate by the United States.

Both the Moscow and Havana announcements were short. Moscow said that the visit to Cuba was being made "under an agreement" without specifying with whom. Havana did not mention this. American officials said there was no such agreement with the United States, thus leaving the "agreement" one between Moscow and Havana.

The affair of Soviet submarines in Cuba began last Sept. 9 when a Russian submarine tender and tug along with two barges first turned up at Cienfuegos on Cuba's south shore.

This raised a public alarm here that Moscow might be trying to establish a base for a nuclear submarine strategic weapons system in Cuba.

The Soviet-American "understanding" came a month later but the Nixon administration has never stated publicly anything but its general substance and the fact that it is unwritten.

Moscow has made one public statement saying it was not constructing "its military base in Cuba" while stressing its right to make port-of-call visits there. Soviet sources have confirmed the existence of the "understanding," but the term has never been publicly used by Moscow.

Yesterday's administration reaction to the announcements from Moscow and Havana thus was seen as an effort to avoid another public uproar over Soviet ships using Cuban ports.

It was evident last night, however, that the underlying sense of unease in Washington about Soviet intentions remains. The Cuban affair is viewed here as one of a number of Soviet military and diplomatic moves, world-wide, directed against the United States.

The disposition was to wait and see what ports the ships use, what the ships do in port, how their presence relates, if it does, to the tender, tug and barges and, finally, whether the visit relates to other Soviet moves.

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January 1971

SOVIET ORTHODOXY vs. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DISSIDENCE

Home-Grown Dissidence

"Bourgeois propaganda is trying its hardest and using all methods to influence individual, unstable people to reshape them in an anti-Soviet, antisocialist spirit. Right and left revisionists are working as the underlinings of imperialist propaganda, perverting the essence of revolutionary theory and the principles of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook... The ideological training of the creative workers and all the intelligentsia is, in our days, acquiring ever greater significance. Soviet scientists, writers, and artists have a great role to play in further strengthening and developing socialist ideology and in the struggle against hostile influences."

In this way, Pravda on 23 November* expressed its apprehension over the more and more frequent challenges to the suppression of free circulation of ideas in the Soviet Union --- challenges based on free world principles and practices but voiced by leading Soviets. The "individual, unstable scientists, writers, and artists" who are asking the Soviet Party leadership to scrap its outmoded dictatorial practices and join the twentieth century, most certainly include physicist Andrei Sakharov, the writers Andrei Amalrik and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and the cellist-artist, Mstislav Rostropovich as recently publicized members of a growing roster of determined but loyal Soviet citizens who risk their lives --- if not now physically, then at the very least in terms of careers and well-being --- for the sake of freedom of expression.

Amalrik's contemptuous criticism of the suppression of ideas was reported by friends who attended the two-day (!) trial 10-12 November which ended in his sentencing to three years in a labor camp:

"But if one could at least partly explain the struggle

*Pravda felt compelled to confront the issue of dissidence again on 17 December in a major article signed by I. Alexandrov attacking Solzhenitsyn and Amalrik.

against heretic ideas in the Middle Ages as religious fanaticism, everything taking place now can be explained only as the cowardice of a regime that regards as a danger the spreading of any thought, any idea alien to its top bureaucrats.... Recognizing their ideological hopelessness, they cling in fear to criminal codes, prisons, camps and psychiatric hospitals....

"I also think that the truth or falsehood of any views put forward publicly can be established only by free and open discussion, not by legal proceedings. No criminal court has a moral right to sentence anyone for views he had put forward. To sentence ideas --- whether they are true or false --- by a criminal sentence seems to me to be a crime in itself....

"It seems to me that the main task for my country just now is to throw off its burden of the heavy past and, for this, my country needs first of all free critical discussion and not self-praise...."

In an open letter to Pravda on 31 October (not published, of course, by Pravda), Rostropovich spoke forthrightly:

"...why in our literature and art so often people absolutely incompetent in this field have the final word? Why are they given the right to discredit our art in the eyes of our people...?"

"Every man must have the right fearlessly to think independently and express his opinion about what he knows, what he has personally thought about, experienced and not merely to express with slightly different variations the opinion which has been inculcated in him....

"...Talent of which we are proud must not be submitted to the assaults of the past. I know many of the works of Solzhenitsyn. I like them. I consider he seeks the right through his suffering to write the truth as he saw it and I see no reason to hide my attitude toward him at a time when a campaign is being launched against him."

The evident discomfiture of the Soviet upper hierarchy could only have been increased when the once-upon-a-time "most equal" Soviet of all, Nikita Khrushchev, in his recently published memoirs described Stalin's cultural policies (the description applies precisely to the Brezhnev policy as well):

"I think Stalin's cultural policies were cruel and senseless. You can't regulate the development of literature, art and culture with a stick or by barking orders. You can't lay down a furrow

and then harness all your artists to make sure they don't deviate from the straight and narrow. If you try to control your artists too tightly, there will be no clashing of opinions, consequently no criticism, and consequently no truth. There will be just a gloomy stereotype, boring and useless."

It is a matter of speculation how much influence this widespread disaffection has or will have on Soviet society but it does seem a permanent, virtually ineradicable phenomenon on the Soviet scene. It is the contemporary Soviet dialectic, the dynamic conflict between the immovable doctrinaire bureaucracy of "apparatchiki" and the irresistible free-thinking community of artists and intellectuals. While there is little doubt that the pervasive secret police system of the Soviet Union could wipe out this dissidence, the present Soviet leadership has not invoked the drastic measures it would require, for to do so would mean resurrecting a monster from the darkest days of Stalinism in which their own very lives would also be placed in jeopardy (as the Khrushchev memoirs vividly remind everyone).

Foreign Dissidence - PCV and PCE

The Pravda call to ideological vigilance can equally as well be regarded as throwing down the gauntlet to various foreign Communist parties, as is illustrated by numbers of recent examples. Roger Garaudy, the French dissident who was for many years a member of the top hierarchy of the French Communist Party, with characteristic insight recently explained a basic Soviet technique (practiced not only by Brezhnev, but by Lenin and Stalin before him) for insuring conformity with Soviet policy on the part of rebellious CP's in the Western world: the technique is simply to create a schism in the offending Party and treat the pro-Soviet faction as the regular Party. (Financial support also goes to the faction that mouths Soviet platitudes faithfully.) Garaudy pointed out that in the immediate past, the CPSU has interfered in the affairs of the Greek, Spanish, Finnish, Austrian, British, Portuguese, and Australian parties.

He should have added the Venezuelan CP (PCV). Pravda decided to take a hand in splitting the PCV by writing (20 October) a scathing denunciation of PCV Central Committee member Teodoro Petkoff, whose two books criticize Soviet foreign and domestic policy, as leader of the dissident faction. The PCV had to postpone its Fourth Party Congress, which was to have convened on 4 December, in order to try to preserve Party unity --- against Soviet attempts to split the Party! Earlier local newspaper speculation that a split was actually taking place was confirmed by the PCV newspaper Tribuna Popular (December 16), which gives details of the expulsions

from the Politburo and Central Committee (in fact, the whole group voluntarily quit the party in protest). Tribuna Popular also admits that the Petkoff group will try to form a parallel party. Little matter to the Soviet manipulators of the whole affair --- they have achieved what they want: a smaller but completely dutiful party which will sing the Moscow tune without changing a note. Pravda on 17 December expressed its satisfaction with the action.

In another instance during the past fall, the Soviets organized a small pro-Soviet faction in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). The Party itself has been led and still is led by Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibarruri ("La Pasionaria"), both of whom have been persistently critical of the Soviet Union for its invasion of Czechoslovakia and for other failings. To head the new rump party, the Soviets have chosen a willing puppet, Enrique Lister, who was recently dismissed from the Central Committee by Carrillo and Ibarruri. In order to sow confusion among all as to which PCE is really speaking, Lister has been given the wherewithal to publish a party newspaper which carries the same name as the official party paper, Mundo Obrero.

The PCV and the PCE are simply two instances among others, of Soviet interference that could be cited.

International Conference of Dissident Communists

On November 26, an important event in the history of international Communist dissidence took place in Paris. A group known as the "Committee of 5 January" (the date in 1968 when Anton Novotny was dismissed as Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the way was paved for the "Prague Spring") organized an "International Meeting of Solidarity with the Czechoslovak People, Victims of Normalization" to protest the Soviet invasion and continued military occupation of Czechoslovakia as well as the Soviet-directed re-imposition of repressive controls over the Czechoslovak people. Attended by over 2,000 dissident Communists and other leftists, the group was addressed by an array of prominent European Communists, some still formally members of their national parties. Among the more prominent were exile Jiri Pelikan, head of Czechoslovak television and radio in the Dubcek regime and before that long-time head of the international Communist front, International Union of Students (IUS); Roger Garaudy; Charles Tillon, Chairman of the meeting, former member of the French Communist Party Politburo, and leader in the French resistance during World War II; Franz Marek, prominent Austrian Communist party leader; PCF member Armand Lanoux, President of the Franco-Czech and Franco-Soviet Friendship Associations; Livio Labor, Italian labor leader. Messages of solidarity were received from the Secretary General of the

Australian Communist Party Leslie Aarons, from the veteran Austrian Communist leader Ernst Fischer, and from the Il Manifesto dissident group in Italy.

For the first time in recent memory, Communists dissidents of all ranks and of many nations felt enough of a singleness of purpose to depart from their traditional form of individual protest to come together in one community to register their vigorous objections to the continuing Soviet effort to impose its will on foreign Communist regimes and parties and to neutralize any that do not conform, i.e. do not accept the Soviet "model." The initiative promises to have continuing impact with repercussions among the "homeless" Communists dissidents throughout the world. Texts of speeches, when and if they become available, may provide guideposts for a continuation of this organized dissidence, not only in Europe but in other areas where Soviet-controlled Communist movements exist.

PRAVDA
23 November 1970

IMPLACABILITY TOWARD BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY

With every day that brings us nearer to the 24th CPSU Congress the Soviet people's creative activity in their work and in the competition for prefulfillment of the 5-year plan is showing itself more and more clearly; and the cohesion around the party, ideological and political unity, and communist conviction becomes ever stronger.

High moral substance, a sense of patriotism and internationalism and a profound consciousness of the correctness and the invincibility of the great cause of communism are the main spiritual features which the Communist Party tirelessly and carefully fosters in all the workers of our country.

The fostering of these qualities and the formation of a communist world outlook and morality are taking place at the present stage in an atmosphere of the sharpest ideological war between socialism and imperialism. As was noted at the April 1969 CPSU plenum, imperialism and primarily U.S. imperialism, which is experiencing serious shocks and is meeting with great failures in foreign and domestic policy, is increasingly directing its efforts toward political and ideological diversion against the socialist countries, against the communist and the whole of the democratic movement.

This demands a firm and consistent class line in questions of education, clarity and clearness of ideological positions, further raising of vigilance and resolute struggle against bourgeois ideology and the penetration of views and morals inimical to socialism.

Of course, in our country, in conditions of a developed socialist society, there is no social case for the spreading of such views, but this should not give rise to complacency and carelessness. We must tirelessly fight against all sorts of bourgeois ideology, no matter what stylish and glittering uniform it wears.

This call by Lenin is valid in our times, when the ideological underlings of capital are resorting to the most refined methods of falsification to poison the consciousness of the working people, blacken the name of socialism and, at the same time, to embellish the decadent bourgeois way of life--the system of exploitation and violence.

Bourgeois propaganda is trying its hardest and using all methods to influence individual, unstable people to reshape them in an anti-Soviet, antisocialist spirit. Right and left revisionists are working as the underlings of imperialist propaganda, perverting the essence of revolutionary theory and the principles of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. It is inadmissible to underestimate the danger of bourgeois ideology or revisionism.

Stressing then in his report "The Cause of Lenin Lives and Triumphs," Comrade Brezhnev said" Experience shows that on the basis of such underestimation the seeds of ideological vacillation, apolitical attitudes, and lack of principles can grow.

Communists are obliged to learn from Lenin's conviction, ideological staunchness, and fearlessness in the struggle against any perversion of our revolutionary theory, implacability toward any manifestation of the vestiges of the old world, and the consciousness of a citizen of our socialist society.

In implementing the decisions of the 23d congress and the CPSU Central Committee plenums, our party has done and is doing much to raise the level of ideological work and to foster in communists and all Soviet people ideological staunchness and implacability toward hostile ideology. A great role in the process of their political hardening is played by the system of party teaching. The ideological growth of Soviet people was greatly assisted by the improvement of theoretical work and propaganda in connection with the celebration of the birth centenary of Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

The profound, creative study of revolutionary theory spiritually arms communists and enables them to ever more actively and effectively work against apolitical feelings, the vestiges of the ownership of private property, manifestations of nationalism, and a nihilistic attitude towards the gains of socialism.

Questions of ideological and political education are at the center of attention of party organizations, at the accountability and election meetings and the party conferences. They occupy an important place in all the many-sided work in preparations for the 24th CPSU Congress.

In examining these questions, party organizations are called upon to show great exactingness and principles, and not to allow even a shadow of liberalism when the matter concerns the clarity of ideological positions. It was precisely this type of party exactingness that was contained in the criticism of the shortcomings of certain theaters and studios at the recent plenum of the Moscow Gorkom, which noted the manifestation of ideologically immature work and the attempts to exclude the ideological-artistic meaning of the works of the classics under cover of a fresh presentation.

The ideological training of the creative workers and all the intelligentsia is, in our days, acquiring ever greater significance. The Soviet scientists, writers, and artists have a great role to play in further strengthening and developing socialist ideology and in the struggle against hostile influences.

In the recently adopted resolution on the work of the party committee of the Lebedev physics institute, the CPSU Central Committee stressed the necessity of systematically conducting among the scientists propaganda on the Marxist-Leninist understanding of political, social, economic, and philosophical problems of the present time, to foster an implacable attitude toward the ideological concepts of anticommunism and revisionism.

Particular concern is demanded in fostering implacability toward bourgeois ideology and morals in our youth. To bring up active and conscious citizens of a socialist society means that qualities of ideological fighters should be formed in young people, who are steadfastly stable in their convictions, always ready to give a resolute rebuff to hostile views and morals.

The struggle against manifestations and the influence of bourgeois ideology is a struggle for the spiritual purity and strength of the Soviet man. His moral makeup, honor and dignity as a patriot of the socialist motherland are incompatible with the slightest concessions in the ideological field. There can be no compromises or neutrality here.

In steadfastly attacking reactionary ideas and the morals of the exploiters and unmercifully imposing their antipopular essence, we more and more strengthen the positions of our socialist ideology, which raises and ennobles the man of labor and brings to the world the bright truth of communism.

PRAVDA
23 November 1970

IMPLACABILITY TOWARD BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY

CPYRGHT

НЕПРИМИРИМОСТЬ К БУРЖУАЗНОЙ ИДЕОЛОГИИ

С каждым днем, приближающим нас к XXIV съезду КПСС, все ярче проявляется творческая активность советских людей в труде, в соревновании за досрочное завершение пятилетки, все более крепнут их сплоченность вокруг партии, идейное и политическое единство, коммунистическая убежденность.

Высокая идейность, чувства патриотизма и интернационализма, глубокое сознание правоты и непобедимости великого дела коммунизма — главные духовные черты, которые неустанно и заботливо воспитывает у всех трудящихся нашей страны Коммунистическая партия.

Воспитание этих качеств, формирование коммунистического мировоззрения и нравственности происходят на современном этапе в обстановке острейшей идеологической борьбы между социализмом и империализмом. Как отмечал апрельский (1968 г.) Пленум ЦК КПСС, империализм, и прежде всего империализм США, испытывая серьезные потрясения и сталкиваясь с крупными провалами во внутренней и внешней политике, все больше усилий направляет на политические и идеологические диверсии против социалистических стран, коммунистического и всего демократического движения. Это требует твердого, последовательного продолжения вой линии в вопросах воспитания, четкости и ясности идейных

позиций, дальнейшего повышения бдительности и решительной борьбы против буржуазной идеологии, проникновения чуждых социализму взглядов и нравов.

Конечно, у нас, в условиях развитого социалистического общества, нет социальной базы для распространения таких взглядов. Но это не может породить благодушия и беспечности. «Мы должны неустанно бороться против всякой буржуазной идеологии, в какие бы модные и блестящие мундиры она ни рядилась». Этот призыв В. И. Ленина с особой силой и актуальностью звучит в наши дни, когда идеологические приемы капитала прибегают к самым изощренным приемам фальсификации, чтобы отравить сознание трудящихся, очернить социализм и вместе с тем приукрасить растлительный буржуазный образ жизни, строй эксплуатации и насилия. Буржуазная пропаганда всеми силами и средствами стремится повлиять на отдельных неустойчивых людей с целью «обработки» их в антисоветском, антисоциалистическом духе. Пособниками империалистической пропаганды выступают правые и «левые» ревизионисты, извращающие суть революционной теории, принципы марксистско-ленинского мировоззрения, принципы единства идеологии буржуазной идеологии и ревизионизма недопустима. Подчеркивая это в своем докладе «Дело

Ленина живёт и побеждает», тов. Л. И. Брежнев говорил: «Опыт показывает, что на почве такого рода недопонимки могут произрастать ядовитые семена идеинных шаталий, аполитичности и беспринципности. Коммунисты обязаны учиться у Ленина убежденности и идеинной стойкости, страстности в борьбе против любых извращений нашей революционной теории, непримиримости к любым проявлениям порошков старого мира в сознании граждан нашего социалистического общества».

Противоречия в жизнь решения XXIII съезда и Пленумов ЦК КПСС, наша партия много сделала и делает для повышения уровня идеологической работы, для воспитания у коммунистов, всех советских людей идеинной стойкости и непримиримости к враждебной идеологии. Огромную роль в процессе их политической закалки играет система партийной учебы. Идеинному росту советских людей во многом способствовало улучшение теоретической работы и пропаганды в связи с празднованием 100-летия со дня рождения В. И. Ленина. Глубокое творческое изучение революционной теории духовно вооружает коммунистов, позволяет им еще более активно и действительно выступать против аполитичности, частнособственнических порошков, проявлений национализма, нигилистического отношения к завоеваниям социализма.

Вопросы идеинно-политического воспитания стоят в центре внимания партийных организаций, их отчетно-выборных собраний и партийных конференций. Они занимают важное место во всей многообразной работе по подготовке к XXIV съезду КПСС. Рассматривая эти вопросы, партийные организации призваны проявлять высокую требовательность и принципиальность, не допускать и тени либерализма, когда речь идет о четкости идеинных позиций. Именно такой партийной требовательностью была проникнута критика недостатков некоторых театров и студий на недавнем пленуме Московского город-

ского комитета КПСС, где отмечались факты появления идеинно незрелых работ, попытки исказить идеинно-художественный смысл произведения.

Идеинная закалка творческих работников, всей интеллигенции приобретает в наши дни все большее значение. Советским ученым, писателям, художникам принадлежит огромная роль в дальнейшем укреплении и развитии социалистической идеологии и борьба против чуждых влияний. В принятом недавно постановлении о работе партийного комитета Физического института имени П. Н. Лебедева ЦК КПСС подчеркнул необходимость систематически проводить среди ученых пропаганду марксистско-ленинского понимания политических, социально-экономических, философских проблем современности, воспитывать непримиримое отношение к идеологическим концепциям антикоммунизма и ревизионизма.

Особой заботы требует воспитание непримиримости к буржуазной идеологии и морали у нашей молодежи. Растить активных и сознательных граждан социалистического общества — значит формировать у молодых людей качества идеинных борцов, непоколебимо стойких в своих убеждениях, всегда готовых дать решительный отпор чуждым взглядам и нравам.

Борьба против проявлений и влияний буржуазной идеологии — это борьба за духовную чистоту и силу советского человека. Его моральный облик, честь и достоинство патриота социалистической Родины несовместимы с малейшими уступками в идеологической области. Здесь не может быть компромисса, как и нейтралитета.

Неуклонно наступая на реакционные идеи и мораль эксплуататоров, беспощадно разоблачая их антинародную сущность, мы еще больше укрепляем позиции нашей социалистической идеологии, которая возвышает и облагораживает человека труда, несет миру светлую правду коммунизма.

GUARDIAN, 24 Nov, 70

'Toe the line' warning to Soviet liberals

By FRANK TAYLOR in Moscow

RUSSIAN scientists, writers and artists were warned yesterday that there could be no compromises in the battle to preserve true Communist ideology.

The warning came in a *Pravda* editorial demanding renewed vigilance in warding off the influence of Western thought and morals.

The editorial was seen by some observers as a signal that the ideological watchdogs of the Soviet Communist party are not relaxing at a time when some leading members of the Soviet intelligentsia appear to be becoming restless.

Three recent events have drawn attention to this restlessness.

The first was the trial and sentencing to a labour camp of Andrei Amalrik, the author, for allegedly slandering the Soviet state. He maintained that contrary to slander he was doing the country a service by offering constructive criticisms.

Then there was the still unpublished letter to four Soviet newspapers by Mstislav Rostropovich, the cellist, in which

der Solzhenitsyn and also criticised overall official control in literature and the arts.

The third event was the decision of Dr Andrei Sakharov, the nuclear scientist, and two colleagues to form a committee for the study of human rights. Dr Sakharov has in recent years

become a prominent spokesman for civil liberties in the Soviet Union.

The *Pravda* editorial did not go into specifics. But it declared that ideological work, must play a large part in the preparations for next year's 24th Party Congress.

Scientists, writers and artists it said, had a major role to play in the struggle against alien influences.

It cited recent public criticisms of the repertoire of certain Moscow theatres, and also referred to the rebuke given to the party committee in the Scientific Institute where Dr Sakharov is an associate.

The newspaper did not mention Dr Sakharov by name but said the decree on the Institute's party committee stressed "the necessity to systematically carry out among scientists propaganda for the Marxist-Leninist understanding of political, socio-economic and philosophical problems of the present day and to arouse irreconcilable attitudes to the ideological conceptions of anti-Communism and revisionism."

Party organisations, said *Pravda*, must not allow even a shadow of liberalism when the exactness of ideological positions was concerned.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 1970

CPYRGHT

Soviet Scientists Told Actions Independent of Party Line Aid 'the Enemy'

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 2— Soviet

scientists were warned today that they were aiding "the enemy" if they acted independently of the Communist party line.

The warning came from Dr. Viktor P. Silin, who heads the party cell at the prestigious Lebedev Institute of Physics. An interview with him was printed prominently in Pravda, the party newspaper.

Nonparty View Assailed

Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov, a physicist, and other scientists who have spoken out against limitations on freedom and for more contacts with the West, are associated with the Lebedev Institute.

The institute was criticized by the party's Central Committee in October for lax ideological discipline. Today's interview apparently represented an effort to make clear to scientists what the party expected of them. Dr. Silin won a prize this year for his work in metals at low temperatures.

In an apparent allusion to Dr. Sakharov's participation in the reported formation of a so-called committee for human rights from which party members are barred, Dr. Silin said that "we have no right even for a minute to forget the acute ideological struggle in the contemporary world."

"Anyone who trumpets his nonparty attitude plainly and simply makes himself useful to the enemy," he said. Dr. Sakharov is not a member of the party.

No publicity has been given in the controlled Soviet information organs either to the committee for human rights or to any of Dr. Sakharov's tracts calling for more ties between Russia and America and more communication of ideas within the Soviet Union.

In another development, Tikhon N. Khrennikov, the head of the Union of Composers, told a plenary meeting of the group today that "it is necessary to safeguard Soviet music in every way from alien ideological influences."

Civic Position Stressed

The meeting was one of several being held around the country in preparation for the 24th party congress next March. These meetings tend to affirm allegiance to the orthodox party view about the dangers to Soviet society from the West.

The Union of Composers, and Mr. Khrennikov personally, are known for their conservative positions opposing modernists, avant-garde trends.

Mr. Khrennikov said that "Soviet music is called upon to oppose the ideas of bourgeois society and to assert the socialist outlook and way of life."

"A composer's individuality is inseparable from his civic position," he said.

Although Western works have been performed in Soviet concert halls in recent years, officialdom generally prefers classical or melodious modern works.

Mr. Khrennikov accused the West of seeking to do away with national motifs and to develop "a kind of musical Esperanto."

"Ours is quite a different position," he said. "The very fact of the existence of nations of the national liberation struggle and of a popular culture theory and practice of cosmopolitanism in art."

"Cosmopolitanism" is a pejorative term used in Stalin's time to describe those who were accused of writing and creating from nonclass positions. It was used against Jews who were arrested in Stalin's purge of 1948. The term has reappeared in the last two years, without any necessarily Jewish connotation.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 December 1970

Dissidents in Soviet Union Are Facing a Crackdown

MOSCOW, Dec. 17—The Soviet leadership threatened today to crack down on a small group of political dissidents who have become increasingly outspoken in the last two years and have attracted considerable attention in the West.

"The Soviet people will not allow anyone to trample on their historical achievements," said an authoritative article in Pravda, the Communist party newspaper.

Among the dissidents named in the article were the Nobel laureate Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. The novelist was described as an "internal emigrant" and equated with lesser dissident figures who, the article said, "hang around foreign press centers begging for whisky and cigarettes in exchange for dirty fabrications."

The article also named several other prominent dissident figures and said the Soviet people were "increasing their vigilance" to sweep them away.

Pravda issued a warning to Western correspondents who get "rumors and gossip" from these "dregs of society" for their "dirty anti-Soviet fabrications." The article called such correspondents "enemies of the Soviet people." A Foreign Ministry spokesman said this phrase applied to only a few Western correspondents, but he did not name them.

The article bore the name I. Aleksandrov, a pseudonym known to be used by Pravda's editorial board on important pronouncements. It was the first time the Soviet press had acknowledged the existence of the political dissident movement now active in Moscow.

In connection with the article, a five-minute statement was broadcast on Moscow tele-

vision tonight assailing Mr. Solzhenitsyn and other critics of the regime.

The statement, by Arkady Perventsev, a hard-line author, said the Solzhenitsyn case must be brought out into the open "because he is being used as armament by our ideological enemies."

"We are proud of our country," Mr. Perventsev said, "and our achievements will never be taken away from us. We will deliver an angry rebuff to any slander, any provocation and any infringement of the real freedom that we have established and that we love so much."

The statement appeared to be part of what is likely to be a tough propaganda campaign against Mr. Solzhenitsyn and the others, apparently aimed at silencing them. Pravda also included scientists in the group under attack.

"A number of Western newspapers seek to condition their readers to the thought that some 'dissident intellectuals' supposedly exist among Moscow's 'scientific and literary circles' and are acting as 'reliable sources,'" the article said.

"It has never occurred to the unsophisticated reader that vena ignoramuses are concealed by this disguise."

Among these "ignoramuses," the article said, are Andrei Amalrik, a Soviet historian who was sentenced Nov. 12 to three years in a labor camp for slandering the Soviet Union, and Vladimir I. Bukovsky, a young writer and prominent dissident figure who has spent time in Soviet camps.

But "having failed with such rascals," the article went on, "the heralds of anti-communism resolved to use provocations in a bigger scale and to raise a clamor around the name of Solzhenitsyn."

Books Termed 'Lampoons'

His "lampoons on the Soviet Union, such as 'The First Circle' and 'Cancer Ward,' which blacken the achievements of the heroic victories of our motherland and the dignity of the Soviet people, turned out to be suitable material for the latest anti-Soviet campaign fanned up in the West," Pravda asserted.

But this "wretched handful of renegades," the article said, "is counterposed by hundreds of thousands of devoted Soviet citizens who have built a truly great society, and nobody will succeed in either ignoring or belittling this."

The beginning of the current phase of Soviet protest activity can be traced to the trial in 1966 of two writers, Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel, who were both sentenced to terms in labor camps for sending works abroad to be published.

It gained momentum in 1968 with the trial of several other intellectuals, including Aleksandr I. Ginzburg, Yuri T. Galanskov and Pavel M. Litvinov, grandson of the late Maxim M. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister from 1930 to 1939.

The trials generated a series of protest documents, small-scale demonstrations and an underground publication called the "Chronicle of Current Events," which publishes in an understated, matter-of-fact tone news of arrests, sentences, prison conditions and other items of interest to the small dissident community.

The dissidents acknowledge that this sort of activity would have been unthinkable 10 years ago and they have been expecting suppressive action by the Government.

TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas
16 December 1970

DECLARATION OF THE XXTH PLENUM OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PCV

To All the Workers and Other Progressive Social Strata!

A group of regular and alternate Central Committee members out of a total of 68 have deserted the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party.

Pompeyo Marquez, Eloy Torres, Hector Rodriguez Bauza, German Lairer, and Freddy Munoz have been removed from the Central Committee's Political Bureau.

The Central Committee has also removed Rafael Guerra Ramos, German Lairer, Freddy Munoz, Alejandro Aguirre, Hector Marcano Coello, Rafael Martinez, Teodoro Petkoff, Benigno Rodriguez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, Antonio Jose Urbina, and Eleazar Diaz Rangel from the posts they held.

Judging by their virulent attacks upon our leaders, these persons, by their own statements and practical deeds, plan to create a party parallel and opposed to the PCV.

Together with communist party members with a worthy past, persons who for some time carried out activities to undermine proletarian internationalism and to split the party leadership and the very integrity of our organization have also left our ranks.

The Venezuelan Communist Party will surmount this crisis as it has previous crises; it will regroup its cadres and will rebuild those rank and file organizations that were affected by the divisionist operations.

The Venezuelan Communist Party -- the indestructible communist party which is impervious to everything -- will continue to lead the masses in the struggle toward the goals established by the Venezuelan revolution during the present historic period.

With our usual firmness we shall continue the struggle against imperialism and the Venezuelan reactionaries to wrest our petroleum and iron from the clutches of the monopolies for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. We shall continue the struggle against unemployment; for a reduction in the price of basic commodities and medicines; for bread, housing, and education for all children; for the distribution of land among those who till it and financial assistance to poor farmers; and for the autonomy of the university. We shall fight to satisfy the just desires of Venezuelan youth and to defend the rights of working women and unmarried mothers.

The Venezuelan Communist Party will continue to be loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism and will be invariably guided by the victorious doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, together with the socialist world and with the national liberation movement.

The Venezuelan Communist Party will hold the Caracas and Miranda Regional Conferences on 18, 19, and 20 December 1970, and the Zulia Regional Conference before 23 January, the date set for the Fourth Venezuelan Communist Party Congress.

The Venezuelan Communist Party will rebuild the Communist Youth Organizations at all levels on the basis of young people's loyalty to the party. The communist youth must play its vanguard role both in the universities and secondary schools as well as at the work centers and on the neighborhood level. It must fight tirelessly to improve the awareness of the masses of young people in the struggle for national liberation, for socialism, and for communism.

Caracas, 14 December 1970.

Signed for the 20th plenary meeting of the Venezuelan Communist Party's Central Committee by:

Jesus Faria, Secretary General of the Venezuelan Communist Party;

Gustavo Machado, member of the Political Bureau of the Venezuelan Communist Party Central Committee and Director of Tribuna Popular;

Guillermo Garcia Ponce, member of the national secretariat of the Central Committee's Political Bureau and Central Committee Propaganda Secretary;

Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, member of the national secretariat of the Central Committee's Political Bureau and Agrarian Secretary;

Eduardo Gallegos Mancera, Political Bureau member and Foreign Relations Secretary;

Antonio Garcia Ponce, Political Bureau member and Secretary General of the Communist Party for Caracas;

Radames Larrazabal, Political Bureau member and Secretary for Parliamentary Affairs;

Eduardo Machado, Political Bureau member and Secretary of the Professional Unions;

Pedro Ortega Diaz, Political Bureau and Education member;

Rafael Jose Cortes, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of Finances;

Nicomedes Abreu, Central Committ member and Secretary General of the party for Yaracuy;

Jesus Andrade, Central Committee member, and Secretary General of the party for Barquisimeto;

Henny Croes, Central Committee member, and member of the National Trade Union Commission;

Carlos Delvecchio, member of the Central Committee and Secretary for Party organization in Caracas;

Pedro Gutierrez, Central Committee member and Secretary for Party organization in Bolivar;

Alcides Hurtado, Central Committee member and Secretary General for the Party in Falcon;

Facundo Lopez, Central Committee member and member of the Regional Committee for Anzoategui;

Olga Luzardo, member of the Central Committee and of the Regional Committee in Caracas;

Victor Martinez, member of the Central Committee and of the Regional Committee in Falcon;

Trino Melean, Central Committee member and Secretary General of the Party in Portuguesa;

Lino Perez Loyo, member of the Central Committee and of the Regional Committee in Lara;

Rodolfo Quintero, Central Committee member;

Jose Felix Ramirez, Central Committee member, and member of the Regional Committee in Carabobo;

Luis Ramiro Valero, member of the Central Committee and of the Regional Committee in Yaracuy;

Oswaldo Rivas, Central Committee member and Secretary General of the Party for Anzoategui;

Alcides Rodriguez, Central Committee member and Secretary General of the Party in Carabobo;

Manuel Rodriguez, member of the Central Committee and of the Zulia Regional Committee;

Federico Rondon, Central Committee member;

Jorge Santana, member of the Central Committee and the National Agrarian Commission;

Manuel Taborda, member of the Central Committee and of the Zulia Regional Committee;

Laureano Torrealba, member of the Central Committee and of the National Trade Union Commission;

Ramon Antonio Villarroel, Central Committee member;

Cruz Villegas, Central Committee member, and President of CUTV (Unified Workers Federation of Venezuela).

Pedro Alastre, member of the Central Committee and of the Zulia Regional Committee;

Demetrio Jimenez, member of the Central Committee and of the Protuguesa Regional Committee;

Natalio Castillo, member of the Central Committee and of the Aragua Regional Committee;

Froilan Espinosa, member of the Central Committee and of the Miranda Regional Committee;

Servando Garcia Ponce, Central Committee member;

Fernando Key Sanchez, Central Committee member;

Hipolito Perez Mendoza, member of the Central Committee and of the Portuguesa Regional Committee;

Raquel Reyes, member of the Central Committee and of the National Solidarity Commission;

Gustavo Villaparedes, member of the Central Committee and of the Miranda Regional Committee.

TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas
16 December 1970

CPYRGHT

DECLARACION DEL XX PLENO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PCV

**¡A todos los trabajadores y demás
capas sociales progresistas!**

Un grupo de 22 miembros del Comité Central, principales y suplentes, de un total de 68, ha desertado de las filas del PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA.

Han sido separados del Buró Político del Comité Central los camaradas Pompeyo Márquez, Eloy Torres, Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, Germán Lairé y Freddy Muñoz.

Han sido separados asimismo por el XX Pleno del Comité Central de los cargos que ocupaban, los camaradas Rafael Guerra Ramos, Germán Lairé, Freddy Muñoz, Alejandro Aguirre, Héctor Marciano Coello, Rafael Martínez, Teodoro Petkoff, Benigno Rodríguez, Argelia Laya de Martínez, Antonio José Urbina y Eleazar Díaz Rangel.

Estas personas, según sus propias declaraciones y actuaciones prácticas, se proponen fundar otro partido paralelo y enfrentado al PCV, a juzgar por sus virulentos ataques contra nuestros dirigentes.

Junto con militantes comunistas de un pasado meritorio se han ido también de nuestras filas quienes durante algún tiempo realizaron un trabajo de zapa contra el internacionalismo proletario y una labor fraccional contra la Dirección del Partido y contra la integridad misma de nuestra Organización.

El Partido Comunista de Venezuela superará esta crisis como superó otras anteriores, reagrupará sus cuadros y reconstruirá aquellas organizaciones de base que fueron dañadas por el trabajo fraccional.

El Partido Comunista de Venezuela —el indestructible Partido Comunista de todas las resistencias—, continuará la lucha al frente de las masas por los objetivos programáticos de la revolución venezolana en la presente etapa histórica.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300150001-7

Continuaremos con la firmeza de siempre nuestra lucha contra el imperialismo y la reacción criolla, por el rescate del petróleo y del hierro de las garras de los monopolos para disfrute del pueblo venezolano, contra el desempleo, por la rebaja de los precios de los artículos de primera necesidad y de las medicinas, por pan, techo y escuela para todos los niños, por el

reparto de la tierra entre quienes la trabajan y ayuda material efectiva para los campesinos pobres, por la autonomía universitaria, por satisfacer las justas aspiraciones de la juventud venezolana, por la defensa de los derechos de la mujer trabajadora y de las madres solteras.

El Partido Comunista de Venezuela seguirá fiel a los principios del internacionalismo proletario y se guiará invariablemente por la victoriosa doctrina del marxismo-leninismo, en solidaridad con el mundo socialista y con el movimiento de liberación nacional.

El Partido Comunista de Venezuela celebrará las Conferencias Regionales en Caracas y Miranda los días 18, 19 y 20 de diciembre de 1970 y la del Zulia antes del 23 de enero, fecha fijada para la celebración del IV Congreso del Partido Comunista de Venezuela.

El Partido Comunista de Venezuela reconstruirá las organizaciones de la Juventud Comunista en todos los niveles, sobre la base de la fidelidad de la Juventud al Partido. La Juventud Comunista deberá jugar su rol de vanguardia tanto en las Universidades y Liceos como en los centros de trabajo y barrios populares, deberá luchar infatigablemente por elevar la conciencia de

las masas juveniles en la lucha por la liberación nacional, por el socialismo y por el comunismo.

Caracas, 14 de diciembre de 1970.

Por El XX PLENO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA, firman:

JESUS FARIA, Secretario General del Partido Comunista de Venezuela.

GUSTAVO MACHADO, Miembro del Buró Político del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Venezuela y Director de Tribuna Pópular.

GUILLERMO GARCIA PONCE, Miembro del Secretariado Nacional del Buró Político del Comité Central y Secretario de Propaganda del CC.

ALONSO OJEDA OLACHEA, Miembro del Secretariado Nacional del Buró Político del Comité Central y Secretario Agrario.

EDUARDO GALLEGOS

MANCERA, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario de Relaciones Internacionales.

ANTONIO GARCIA PONCE, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario General del Partido Comunista en Caracas.

RADAMES LARRAZA-BAL, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario de Asuntos Parlamentarios.

EDUARDO MACHADO, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario de los Gremios Profesionales.

PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ, Miembro del Buró Político y de Educación.

RAFAEL JOSE CORTES, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario de Finanzas.

NICCOMEDES ABREU, Miembro del CC. y Secretario General del Partido en Yarecu.

JESUS ANDRADE, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario General del Partido en Barquisimeto.

HEMMY CROES, Miembro del Comité Central y de la Comisión Sindical Nacional.

CARLOS DELVECCHIO, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario de Organización del Partido en Caracas.

PEDRO GUTIERREZ, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario de Organización del Partido en Bolívar.

ALCIDES HURTADO, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario General del Partido en Falcón.

FACUNDO LOPEZ, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Anzoátegui.

OLGA LUZARDO, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Caracas.

VICTOR MARTINEZ, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Falcón.

TRINO MELEAN, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario General del Partido en Portuguesa.

LINO PEREZ LOYO, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Lara.

RODOLFO QUINTERO, Miembro del Comité Central.

JOSE FELIX RAMIREZ, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Carabobo.

LUIS RAMIRO VALERO, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Yaracuy.

OSWALDO RIVAS, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario General del Partido en Anzoátegui.

ALCIDES RODRIGUEZ, Miembro del Comité Central y Secretario General del Partido en Carabobo.

MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional del Zulia.

FEDERICO RONDON, Miembro del Comité Central.

JORGE SANTANA, Miembro del Comité Central y de la Comisión Nacional Agraria.

MANUEL TAFORDA, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional del Zulia.

LAUREANO TORREALBA, Miembro del Comité Central y de la Comisión Sindical Nacional.

RAMON ANTONIO VILLARROEL, Miembro del Comité Central.

CRUZ VILLEGAS, Miembro del Comité Central y Presidente de la CUTV.

PEDRO ALASTRE, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional del Zulia.

DEMETRIO JIMENEZ, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Portuguesa.

NATALIO CASTILLO, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Aragua.

FROILAN ESPINOSA, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Miranda.

SERVANDO GARCIA PONCE, Miembro del Comité Central.

FERNANDO KEY SANCHEZ, Miembro del Comité Central.

HIPOLITO PEREZ MENDOZA, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Portuguesa.

RAQUEL REYES, Miembro del Comité Central y de la Comisión Nacional de Solidaridad.

GUSTAVO VILLAPAREDES, Miembro del Comité Central y del Comité Regional de Miranda.

EL NACIONAL, Caracas
4 December 1970

Virtual Split

Postponement of the Congress of
the PCV to be Decided Today

Pompeyo Marquez and a Group of
Leaders Accompanying Him are not Disposed
to Respect the Measure

Pompeyo Marquez and other leaders who stand with him have termed the postponement of the Fourth Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) Congress as a coup d'etat against the majority. An atmosphere of expectancy surrounded the close of yesterday's Central Committee deliberations.

Circles close to the Central Committee said that Pompeyo Marquez and those who are aligned with him will not obey a decision which ignores the majority of the party.

Delegate Hector Marcano Coello took the floor to present some proposals in a last effort to surmount the crisis. He said that the Central Committee is obliged to respect and to recognize the delegates elected by the 19th Regional Conferences which represent the PCV majority feeling.

He added that the PCV Congress has not met for 10 years, and that "this is an opportunity to re-establish party unity." He made several proposals demanding a prompt meeting of the Congress.

Despite his arguments it is certain that the Congress will be postponed upon the approval of a narrow Central Committee majority.

Guillermo Garcia Ponce made a lively speech against Pompeyo Marquez, the Venezuelan Communist Youth, and Teodoro Petkoff. He voiced his opposition to a meeting of the Congress in the name of preserving a monolithic structure, and he mentioned Brezhnev's statements on monolithic structure. He said that Pompeyo Marquez had tolerated and supported the actions of the Communist Youth and Teodoro Petkoff. He accused the latter of being anti-Soviet and antisocialist. In conclusion, he said that the PCV Congress should be held with true communists and not in an atmosphere of ideological liberalism.

Teodoro Petkoff pointed out that Guillermo Garcia Ponce was in a ridiculous minority.

"My name is a scarecrow which is raised as a last resort. Garcia Ponce has not written a single ideological line against my ideas. On the contrary, Pompeyo Marquez is the man who has argued most with me at forums, conferences, debates, in press articles, and so forth. However, these were arguments of ideas and not of labels. Discussion inside the Communist Party did not bring about the victory of any particular group. It was the defeat of stalinism, and this is what Garcia Ponce cannot tolerate, because he is the incarnation of stalinism. The Communist Party has won the right to argue without the arguers being sent to the disciplinary commission."

"Formerly," he went on to say, "it was my head that was at stake. When I wanted to withdraw, it was those of Pompeyo Marquez, German Lairer, Freddy Munoz, and Bayardo Sardi that were at stake. I am not working for an anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese, or anti-Cuban party but for an unaligned party. That is why I have sounded the alarm against the loss of independence, and for the right to vote for the leadership without the veto of any leader."

In conclusion, he said: "The ultraleft and its variations have no future. They are tiny sectarian and marginal groups. The stalinists of the Communist Party, led by Guillermo Garcia Ponce, want to do the same thing with the PCV. They want a party that contemplates its navel rather than one that looks at the country. The Communist Party will never be what it has been. This is my last speech in this Central Committee."

Pedro Ortega Diaz requested an alliance of all against the Venezuelan Communist Youth and against Teodoro Petkoff. German Lairer replied that this proposal was "a delayed attack; today this is not possible."

Eloy Torres said: "We are looking at the incredible spectacle of a minority which, thanks to the use of power, is getting ready to undertake the biggest purge in the history of communist parties."

"This will execute the divisionist plans of Guillermo Garcia Ponce and Eduardo Machado. Times have changed," he went on to say. "Formerly, we communist party leaders were treated like demigods. We became accustomed to it. Had we reacted, many errors could have been avoided."

The first foreign guests to attend the Fourth Congress began to arrive last evening. Many Central Committee members said the decision to postpone the meeting made the PCV look ridiculous in the eyes of the world.

Those who stand with Pompeyo Marquez are: Eloy Torres; Freddy Munoz, Zulia State Secretary General; Teodora Petkoff, Miranda State Secretary General; German Lairer, Bolivar State Secretary General; Hector Marcano Coello, Federal District Delegate; Carlos Arturo Pardo, CUTV [Unified Workers Federation of Venezuela] leader; Rafael Guerra Romos, Lara State Secretary General; Hector Rodriguez Bauza, Political Bureau member; Arelia Laya, National Women's Secretary; Antonio Jose Urbina, Secretary General of the Venezuelan Communist

Youth; Alexis Adam, President of the Federation of University Centers; Eleazar Diaz Rangel, President of the Venezuelan Press Association; the poet Carlos Augusto Leon; Francisco Mieres; and Rafael Martinez, Litoral Secretary General.

It is believed that Eduardo Gallegos Mancera, Hector Mujica, and Ramon Antonio Vallarroel will vote against postponing the Fourth Congress.

A telegram was read today stating that Tirso Pinto is voting against postponing the Congress.

EL NACIONAL, Caracas
4 December 1970

CPYRGHT

Virtual División

Hoy se Decide Aplazamiento del Congreso del PCV

Pompeyo Márquez y un grupo de dirigentes que lo acompañan, no están dispuestos a acatar la medida

Pompeyo Márquez y otros dirigentes que lo acompañan, calificaron el aplazamiento del IV Congreso del PCV como un golpe de estado contra la mayoría. Antes de que se suspendiera la reunión de ayer del Comité Central, un clima de tensión y expectativa dominó las deliberaciones.

En medios allegados al C.C. se dijo que Pompeyo Márquez y quienes lo acompañan no acatarán una decisión que desconoce la voluntad mayoritaria del PC.

El Concejal Héctor Marcano Coello intervino para presentar unas proposiciones en un último intento por superar la crisis planteada.

—El Comité Central está obligado a respetar y reconocer los delegados elegidos por las 19 Conferencias Regionales que expresan el sentimiento mayoritario del PC, dijo.

Agregó que el Congreso del PC hace 10 años que no se reúne: "esta es la oportunidad para el restablecimiento de la unidad partidista". Hizo una serie de proposiciones donde exigía la pronta realización del Congreso.

A pesar de sus argumentos, se da por seguro la posposición del Congreso, aprobada por una ma-

yoría apretada del Comité Central. Guillermo García Ponce pronunció un enérgico discurso contra Pompeyo Márquez, la Juventud Comunista y Teodoro Petkoff. Su oposición a la realización del Congreso la hizo en nombre del monolitismo e invocó las proposiciones sobre monolitismo de Breznev. Dijo que Pompeyo Márquez había tolerado y apoyado las acciones de la JC y Teodoro Petkoff. Acusó a éste de antisoviético y antisocialista. Por último, dijo que el Congreso del PCV tenía que hacerse con verdaderos comunistas y no en un clima de liberalismo ideológico.

Teodoro Petkoff señaló que Guillermo García Ponce había quedado en una irrisoria minoría.

—Mi nombre es un espantajo que se levanta como recurso fiscal. García Ponce no ha escrito una sola línea ideológica contra mis ideas. Por el contrario, el hombre que más ha polemizado conmigo en foros, conferencias, debates, artículos de prensa, etc.,

ha sido Pompeyo Márquez. Pero esa ha sido una discusión entre ideas y no entre etiquetas. La discusión en el PC no ha producido la victoria de ningún grupo en particular. Ha sido la derrota del stalinismo, y esto García Ponce no lo soporta, porque él encarna el stalinismo. El PC ha conquistado el derecho a discutir sin que los discutidores sean pasados a la Comisión de disciplina.

—Antes —continuó— se pedía mi cabeza, cuando quise retirarme se pidieron las de Pompeyo Márquez, Germán Lairret, Freddy Muñoz, Bayardo Sardí.

—No trabajo por un partido antisoviético, antichino, anticubano, sino por un partido antialineado. Por eso he alertado contra la pérdida de independencia y por el derecho a elegir los dirigentes sin el veto de ningún dirigente.

Por último, dijo:

—El ultraizquierdismo y sus variedades no tienen porvenir, son grupúsculos sectarios y marginales. Los stalinistas del PC encabezados por Guillermo García Ponce, quieren hacer del PC lo mismo. Ellos quieren un partido que se mire el ombligo, en vez de mirar al país. El PC. Jamás volverá a ser lo que ha sido. Este es mi último discurso en este Comité Central.

PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ

Pidió una alianza de todos contra la Juventud Comunista y Teodoro Petkoff. Germán Lairret le contestó que esa proposición era "una cayapa atrasada, hoy eso no es posible".

Eloy Torres, dijo: "Estamos ante el increíble espectáculo de que una minoría, gracias al uso

del poder, se dispone a efectuar la purga más grande de la historia de los partidos Comunistas".

—De esta forma se cumplen los planes divisionistas de Guillermo García Ponce y Eduardo Machado.

—Los tiempos han cambiado —continuó—, antes, los dirigentes del PC éramos tratados como semidioses. Nos acostumbramos. De haber reaccionado, muchos errores se hubieran podido evitar.

Los primeros invitados extranjeros para asistir al IV Congreso del PC, empezaron a llegar anoche. Muchos miembros del Comité Central dijeron que la decisión de aplazamiento ponía en ridículo al PC, a los ojos del mundo.

MIEMBROS DEL CC QUE ACOMPAÑAN A POMPEYO MARQUEZ

Eloy Torres, Freddy Muñoz, Secretario General del Zulia; Teodoro Petkoff, Secretario General de Miranda; Germán Lairret, Secretario General de Bolívar; Héctor Marcano Coello, Concejal del Distrito Federal; Carlos Arturo Pardo, dirigente de la CUTV; Rafael Guerra Ramos, Secretario General de Lara; Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, miembro del Buró Político; Argelia Laya, Secretaria Nacional Femenina; Antonio José Urbina, Secretario General de la JC; Alexis Adam, Presidente de la FCU; Eleazar Díaz Rangel, Presidente de la AVP; Bayardo Sardí, dirigente de la JC; el poeta Carlos Augusto León; Francisco Mieres; Rafael Martínez, Secretario General del Litoral.

Se estima que Eduardo Callegos Mancera, Héctor Mujica y Ramón Antonio Villarroel, votarán contra el aplazamiento del IV Congreso.

Hoy se leyó un cable en el cual se anuncia que el aplazamiento del Congreso.

LE MONDE, Paris
28 November 1970

Mr. Garaudy Calls for the Establishment of a "Center of Impetus

On the call of the Committee of 5 January, a meeting in favor of a "free and socialist" Czechoslovakia was held Thursday evening at the Mutualite. This committee, established at the beginning of the year by a certain number of communist militants, members or former members of the PCF (French Communist Party), derives its name from the session of the PCT (Czechoslovak Communist Party) on 5 January 1968, which was marked by the eviction of Mr. Novotny from the leadership and the adoption of the first measures of what was later to be the "Prague springtime."

Held under the chairmanship of Mr. Charles Tillon, former minister, this meeting was supported by various organizations, including the PSU (Unified Socialist Party) and the Communist League (Trotskyite). A number of speakers succeeded each other at the podium: Messrs. Vercors, Armand Lanoux, Livio Labor, national coordinator of the MTI (Italian Workers Movement), Franz Marek, former member of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party, as well as a young unnamed Czechoslovak and a representative of the Bertrand Russell Foundation.

Speaking in his turn, Mr. Jiri Pelikan, former member of the Central Committee of the PCT and former director of television, considered that the meeting constituted "a gesture that was even more important because in Czechoslovakia the government is trying to break the resistance of the people's masses by asserting that they are isolated."

A New Type of Party

For his part, Mr. Roger Garaudy, former member of the Political Bureau of the PCF, pointed out: "We must speak since others are silent. It would be playing the game of all the anticommunists to guarantee normalization by our silence. We did not come here this evening as mourners of history to bemoan the past but to reflect on the significance of their 'springtime' and to make it relieve here with everyone, without exclusion, who believes in socialism." Once again developing his analysis of the "new historical bloc," Mr. Garaudy wished for the birth of a new type of party. Nevertheless, he specified: "For us this does not mean establishing a dissident sect that would increase farther the division of the movement. This does not mean a center of opposition

to the PCF or to any other force of socialism in France, but on the contrary, a center of impetus that neither claims to substitute itself for any political group nor to establish a new one, nor to demand any kind of leadership role whatsoever." Its purpose is to seek the conditions for unity for all those who want to build a socialism in France that responds to the needs of a developed country.

(Committee of 5 January: Mr. Rene Dazy, 25, rue d'Hauteville, Paris, 10).

L'Humanite: A Very Meager Participation

L'Humanite of this Friday stressed that the organizers of the meeting had announced that a number of former leaders of European Communist Parties would be present. The organ of the PCF wrote: "In the end, the participation thus announced with a great deal of noise proved to be very meager."

LE MONDE, Paris
28 November 1970

CPYRGHT

M. Garaudy appelle à la constitution d'un « centre d'impulsion »

A l'appel du Comité du 5 Janvier, un meeting en faveur d'une Tchécoslovaquie « libre et socialiste » s'est déroulé jeudi soir à la Mutualité. Ce comité, créé au début de l'année par un certain nombre de militants communistes, membres ou anciens membres du P.C.F., tire son nom de la session du parti communiste tchécoslovaque du 5 janvier 1968, marquée par l'éviction de M. Novotny de la direction et par l'adoption des premières mesures de ce qui allait être le « printemps de Prague ».

Placée sous la présidence de M. Charles Tillon, ancien ministre, cette réunion était appuyée par diverses organisations, dont le P.S.U. et la Ligue communiste (trotskiste). De nombreux orateurs se succédèrent à la tribune : MM. Vercors, Armand Lanoux, Livio Labor, coordinateur national du Mouvement des travailleurs italiens, Franz Marek, ancien membre du comité central du P.C. autrichien, ainsi qu'un jeune Tchéque anonyme et un représentant de la Fondation Bertrand-Russell.

Prenant la parole à son tour, M. Jiri Pelikan, ancien membre du comité central du P.C. tchécoslovaque et ancien directeur de la télévision, a estimé que le meeting constituait « un geste d'autant plus important qu'en Tchécoslovaquie le pouvoir essaye de briser la résistance des masses populaires en affirmant qu'elles sont isolées ».

Un parti de type nouveau

M. Roger Garaudy, ancien membre du bureau politique du P.C.F., a, pour sa part, indiqué : « Nous devons parler puisque d'autres se taisent. Ce serait faire le jeu de tous les anticomunistes que de cautionner par notre silence la normalisation. Nous ne sommes pas venus ce soir en pleureuse de l'histoire gémir sur le passé, mais pour réfléchir sur la signification de leur « printemps » et le faire revivre ici avec tous ceux, sans exclusive, qui se réclament du socialisme. » Développant une nouvelle fois son analyse du « bloc historique nouveau », M. Garaudy a souhaité la

naissance d'un parti de type nouveau. Il a néanmoins précisé : « Il ne s'agit pas pour nous de créer une secte dissidente aggravant encore la division du mouvement, il ne s'agit pas d'un centre d'opposition au P.C.F. ou à toute autre force du socialisme en France, mais au contraire d'un centre d'impulsion qui ne prétend se substituer à aucune formation politique ni en constituer une nouvelle, ni revendiquer un quelconque rôle dirigeant. » Son but est de rechercher les conditions de l'unité de tous ceux qui veulent construire en France un socialisme répondant aux besoins d'un pays développé.

(Comité du 5 janvier : M. René Dazy, 25, rue d'Hauteville, Paris - 10^e.)

« L'HUMANITÉ » : une participation fort maigre.

L'Humanité de ce vendredi souligne que les organisateurs du meeting avaient annoncé la présence de nombreux anciens responsables des P.C. européens. L'organe du P.C.F. écrit :

« En fin de compte, la participation ainsi annoncée à grand bruit s'est avérée fort maigre. »

L'Humanite, Paris
27 November 1970

Regarding a Meeting on the Situation
in Czechoslovakia

The organizers of the meeting held yesterday evening in Paris on the situation in Czechoslovakia did not hide their ambition to gather around Garaudy and Tillon persons who have broken off with numerous Communist parites (and nevertheless are presented in many posters and publicity articles as "Communists").

In the final analysis, the participation thus loudly announced, has proved to be very insignificant.

Concerning the Austrians Fischer (who excused himself) and Marek, the Austrian Communist Party published a statement declaring that "these two ex-communists did not represent anyone but themselves."

On the Italian side, the only speaker was a former leader of a Catholic organization, who had never been a Communist. As for the leaders of the "Manifesto" group, who were expelled from the Italian Communist Party, they were announced but did not participate. France Nouvelle will soon publish an article by comrade Renzo Trivelli, a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, stating the true position about their attitude towards our fraternal party.

As for the Spanish Communist Party, it indicated in a letter of its Executive Committee addressed to the Central Committee of the French Communist Party regarding the attendance of J. Semprun at an announced event (who also did not speak) that the latter was not a member of the Spanish Communist Party. The letter of the Executive Committee of the Spanish Communist Party adds: "Any speculation about a supposed participation meeting, which tends to pit the Spanish Communist Party against the French Communist Party, is false and does not correspond to our well-known positions."

Some press organs also reported British Communist participation. It was equally invisible. In any case, our comrades in the Communist Party of Great Britain have declared that the report was a fabrication.

L'Humanite, Paris
27 November 1970

CPYRGHT

A propos d'un meeting sur la situation en Tchécoslovaquie

Les organisateurs du meeting, tenu hier soir à Paris sur la situation en Tchécoslovaquie, ne cachaient pas leur ambition de rassembler, autour de Garaudy et de Tillon, des personnages en rupture avec de nombreux Partis Communistes (et toutefois présentés, dans de multiples placards et articles publicitaires, comme des « communistes »).

En fin de compte, la participation ainsi annoncée à grand bruit s'est avérée fort maigre.

S'agissant des Autrichiens Fischer (qui se fit excuser) et Marek, le Parti Communiste Autrichien a publié une mise au point précisant que « ces deux ex-communistes » « ne représentaient personne d'autre qu'eux-mêmes ».

Du côté italien, le seul orateur a été un ancien dirigeant d'une organisation catholique, qui n'a jamais été communiste. Quant aux dirigeants du groupe « Manifesto », exclus du Parti Communiste Italien, ils furent annoncés, mais ne participèrent pas. « France Nouvelle » publiera prochainement un article du camarade Renzo Trivelli, membre du Comité Central du Parti Communiste Italien,

faisant le point sur leur comportement dirigé contre notre Parti frère.

En ce qui concerne le Parti Communiste d'Espagne, il a indiqué dans une lettre de son Comité Exécutif adressée au Comité Central du Parti Communiste Français à propos de la présence un moment annoncée de J. Semprun (qui, en définitive, n'a pas lui non plus pris la parole), que celui-ci n'était pas membre du Parti Communiste d'Espagne. La lettre du Comité Exécutif du Parti Communiste d'Espagne ajoute : « Toute spéculation sur une prétendue participation du Parti Communiste d'Espagne à ce meeting, et tendant à opposer le Parti Communiste d'Espagne au Parti Communiste Français, est fautive et ne correspond pas à nos positions bien connues. »

Des organes de presse avaient fait aussi état d'une participation communiste anglaise. Elle fut également invisible. En tout état de cause, nos camarades du Parti Communiste de Grande-Bretagne, consultés à ce sujet, ont fait savoir qu'il s'agissait d'une information fabriquée de toutes pièces.

Combat, Paris
28-29 November, 1970

From the Bastille to
la Mutualité

By a coincidence which is not purely accidental, two events on Thursday evening called on Parisians to express their support for martyr peoples. One organized by various leftist and trade union groups, including the Communist Party, assembled in a long procession from the Bastille to Republic Square about 50,000 persons who thus expressed their protest against repression by the bombarding of North Vietnam. The other at la Mutualité brought together about 2,000 persons to hear various French and foreign personalities denounce "normalization" in Czechoslovakia.

Naive persons and idealists regretted that these protests against two forms of imperialism could not result in a single demonstration. However, Charles Tillon, who presided over the meeting for solidarity with the Czechoslovak people, was careful to point out at the beginning of the event that the various speakers had just come from participating beside members of the PCF and the CGT in the demonstration against U.S. intervention in Vietnam. And as if to show symbolically the close and profound relationship between the revolt against the war in Vietnam and "normalization" in Czechoslovakia, a representative of the Bertrand Russell Association announced that the "Russell Tribunal" will hold hearings as soon as some political trials start in Prague.

Jiri Pelikan, legally a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia summarized the situation in his country two years after the entrance of Soviet tanks in Prague. He also spoke about the future. After having affirmed that socialism cannot develop into anything important on the basis of a foreign model, he stated that the Czechoslovak people do not have the means to liberate themselves alone, even if this must not lead to passively waiting for a change in the relationship of forces in Eastern Europe: "The movement for the renewal of socialism," he declared, "in particular cannot prevail in isolation but only through a joint effort of all the progressive, democratic and socialist forces in the world." In short, he confronted the French left with its responsibilities, at the very moment when Western opinion is becoming accustomed to the daily scandal of Czechoslovakia and forgets it.

Roger Garaudy also denounced with the most extreme effectiveness the "occupation" which Czechoslovakia is experiencing and affirmed in turn that any party that became a propagandist for an imported model

of socialism was doomed to sterility. Nevertheless, he took the greatest care to act in such a way that the fight being conducted in France for freedom in Czechoslovakia should never appear as an anticommunist plot.

He declared, "It is not a question for us of creating an opposition center to the French Communist Party, but to develop centers of research and joint action to establish conditions for the effectiveness and unity of those who want to establish socialism in France." He concluded, "We will know how to choose, as Rosa Luxembourg said, between barbarism and socialism."

The concern of Roger Garaudy is obvious: he does not want to divide, but to unite. Socialism "with a human face" which he dreams of must be developed by drawing from the lessons of Lenin, Trotsky, Castro, Gramsci, Mao, Camillo Torres, etc. The former leader of the PCF imparted this conviction and this will to the room full of people, where order was kept by members of the Communist League. It is a symbol.

However, in spite of these fine words 50,000 persons marched from the Bastille to Republic Square. Only a small minority of them then went to la Mutualité. As long as it will be thus, "normalization" will continue in Prague and the French Left will be powerless to organize to develop an effective opposition and also incapable of proposing a credible model of socialism.

J.M.B.

COMBAT, Paris
28 - 29 November 1970

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DE LA BASTILLE A LA MUTUALITE

Par une coïncidence qui n'est pas seulement fortuite, deux manifestations ont appelé jeudi soir les Parisiens à exprimer leur soutien à des peuples martyrs. L'une, organisé par diverses formations politiques et syndicales de gauche dont le parti communiste, a réuni en un long cortège de la Bastille à la République près de 50.000 personnes qui ont exprimé ainsi leur protestation contre la répression des bombardements sur le Nord-Vietnam. L'autre, à la Mutualité, a rassemblé 2.000 personnes pour entendre dénoncer par différentes personnalités françaises et étrangères la « normalisation » en Tchécoslovaquie.

Les naïfs et les idéalistes ont regretté que ces protestations contre 2 formes d'impérialisme n'aient pu donner lieu à une seule manifestation... Cependant, Charles Tillon, qui présidait le meeting de solidarité avec le peuple tchécoslovaque, a pris soin au début de la réunion de signaler que les différents orateurs venaient de participer aux côtés des militants du PCF et de la CGT à la manifestation contre l'intervention des Etats-Unis au Vietnam. Et comme pour montrer symboliquement le lien étroit et profond existant entre la révolte contre la guerre au Vietnam et la « normalisation » en Tchécoslovaquie, un représentant de l'association Bertrand Russell a annoncé que le « tribunal Russell » siégerait à nouveau dès que s'ouvriraient à Prague des procès politiques.

M. Jiri Pelikan, membre de droit du comité central du parti communiste de Tchécoslovaquie, a fait le bilan de la situation dans son pays deux ans après l'entrée des chars soviétiques à Prague. Il a aussi parlé de l'avenir. Après avoir affirmé sa conviction que le socialisme ne peut se construire en important tel quel un modèle étranger, il a constaté que le peuple tchécoslovaque n'a pas les moyens de se libérer seul, même si cela ne doit pas le conduire à attendre passivement un changement des rapports de forces en Europe de l'Est : « Le mouvement pour le renouveau du socialisme, a-t-il notamment déclaré, ne peut pas l'emporter isolément,

mais seulement par un effort commun de toutes les forces progressives, démocratiques et socialistes dans le monde ». En somme il a mis la gauche française devant ses responsabilités, au moment même où l'opinion occidentale s'habitue au scandale quotidien de la Tchécoslovaquie, et l'oublie.

M. Roger Garaudy a lui aussi dénoncé avec la plus extrême vigueur « l'occupation » que subit la Tchécoslovaquie et affirmé à son tour que tout parti qui se faisait le propagandiste d'un modèle de socialisme importé de l'étranger se condamnait à la stérilité. Cependant il a pris le plus grand soin pour faire en sorte que le combat mené en France pour la liberté en Tchécoslovaquie n'apparaisse jamais comme une menée anticommuniste.

« Il ne s'agit pas pour nous, a-t-il déclaré, de créer un centre d'opposition au parti communiste français, mais de susciter des centres de recherche et d'action communes, pour recréer les conditions de l'efficacité et de l'unité de ceux qui veulent créer le socialisme en France. Nous saurons choisir, comme le disait Rosa Luxembourg, a-t-il conclu, entre la barbarie et le socialisme ».

La préoccupation de Roger Garaudy est évidente : il ne veut pas diviser, mais rassembler. Le « socialisme à visage humain » dont il rêve doit se construire en tirant les leçons de Lénine, Trotsky, Castro, Gramsci, Mao, Camillo Torres... Cette conviction et cette volonté, il les a confiées, lui l'ancien dirigeant du PCF, à une salle où l'ordre était assuré par les militants de la Ligue communiste. C'est un symbole.

Mais en dépit de ces belles paroles, 50.000 personnes ont défilé de la Bastille à la République dont une petite minorité seulement s'est rendue ensuite à la Mutualité. Tant qu'il en sera ainsi, la « normalisation » se poursuivra à Prague, et la gauche française sera impuissante à se réunir pour constituer une opposition efficace, incapable aussi de proposer un modèle crédible du socialisme.

J.-M. B.

Sam. 28 et Dim. 29 Novembre 1970 — COMBAT

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