

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ABROAD: THOSE IN TROUBLE LAST YEAR

The information below has to do specifically with Communist officials serving their governments in the West who, between January 1970 and January 1971, were declared persona non grata (PNG) and expelled from the countries to which they had been assigned. A total of 31 Communist officials were PNG'd during the period. For every PNG case that is documented as public knowledge, there are countless instances of officials whose PNG cases remain unpublicized for political reasons, of officials who leave quietly before action can be taken against them, or of officials who through public exposure become identified as intelligence officers operating under the guise of commercial or other representation but against whom no action is taken.

For example, during the summer 1970 trial in Bonn, West Germany, of confessed spy Joseph Eitzenberger, he named Ivan Semenovitch MOSKALENKO, Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Vienna as the recipient of classified NATO and West European scientific information. Vienna newspaper accounts of late June said the Austrian Foreign Office had requested a report on MOSKALENKO from the Interior Ministry and that if the report should indicate that MOSKALENKO were operating against the interests of Austria, "something will be done." MOSKALENKO remained in Vienna.

Similarly, in Mexico during March 1970 Soviet intelligence officers were identified by Raya KISELNIKOVA during press conferences held after her escape from the Soviet embassy where she had been a secretary in the Soviet Trade Mission. According to accounts in El Universal, Excelsior, and other major Mexican newspapers, KISELNIKOVA told the Mexican secret police that four members of the consular section, whose names she revealed in secret, spent only eight hours weekly on their jobs of issuing visas, and the rest of their time in secret operations involving Mexican workers and student organizations. She publicly identified Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, embassy Second Secretary and Chief of the Consular Section, as the "watchdog" of Soviet personnel stationed in Mexico. She also publicly identified embassy First Secretary Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV as active in espionage work. No actions were taken against these Soviets.

The Second Secretary of the Rumanian Embassy in Switzerland Ion CROITORU, left suddenly for home when he was identified as the contact of an arrested Swiss spy whose case broke last February.

**Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8**

The case involved a Swiss female employee of the Zurich city administration who was charged with having supplied both Rumanian and Soviet officials with blank personal identity cards, residence permits, and other documents. A former Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy who had left Switzerland the year before, Aleksandr Fedorovich GRACHEV, was also identified as the KGB contact of the accused.

Two Soviet commercial representatives were recalled to the USSR following publicity given them in the West German press during January 1970. They were Viktor BAKUNOV who represented Avtoeksport in East Germany and Vladimir Denisovich PAVLOV who was a commercial counselor in the Soviet Trade Mission in East Germany. Both BAKUNOV and PAVLOV were exposed as having tried to recruit stewardesses on international airlines flying into West Berlin to serve as couriers between Berlin and Western countries and to bring "espionage mail" and other secret material over the border without inspection.

In Sweden, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Ivan Pavlovich KISELEV, was the subject of a two-part feature story which ran in the August-September 1970 issues of the magazine Lektyr. The articles were authored by an East German, Swedish-based free lance journalist whom KISELEV had previously recruited. One of the articles carried photographs of actual agent meetings between KISELEV and the journalist. KISELEV, who was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Sweden as of July 1967, had been one of the 20 Soviet officials declared PNG and expelled from Ghana during March 1966 in the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah.

The names mentioned above represent a mere handful of the examples which could be cited. The listings which follow concern PNG actions taken during 1970.



COMMUNIST OFFICIALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG) DURING 1970:

A total of 31 Communist officials were declared PNG by Free World countries during 1970.

<u>Country of Origin and Name:</u>	<u>Type of Assignment:</u>	<u>Country from which expelled:</u>
<u>ALBANIA</u> Foto SOFRONI	Diplomatic	Italy
<u>CUBA</u> Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Diplomatic Diplomatic	United Nations United Nations
<u>EAST GERMANY</u> Siegfried BUETTNER	Diplomatic	Zanzibar
<u>HUNGARY</u> Janos HEGEDUS	Diplomatic	Canada
<u>POLAND</u> Albert BALAWENDER Wlodzimierz KWIATKOWSKI Janusz PRYSTROM Jan RODAK Czeslaw TANANA	Diplomatic Diplomatic Diplomatic Diplomatic Diplomatic	Belgium Belgium United Kingdom France United Kingdom
<u>USSR</u> ALEKSANDROV, Vladimir Ivanovich BOROVINSKIY, Petr Fedorovich LEBEDEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich MAMONTOV, Yuriy Leonidovich MESROPOV, Valeriy Moiseyevich NETREBSKIY, Boris Pavlovich OREKHOV, Boris Mikhailovich PODKILZIN, Boris RYABOV, Yuriy Ivanovich SAVICH, Boris Trofimovich	Embassy employee Diplomatic Diplomatic Trade mission Commercial <u>Novosti</u> and Diplomatic <u>Pravda</u> Diplomatic <u>Inturist</u> Commercial	Italy West Germany Norway Argentina Norway Netherlands United States Congo (Kinshasa) Argentina Belgium

USSR (Cont.)

SAVIN, Nikolay Andreyevich	Diplomatic	Switzerland
SHAROVATOV, Vladimir Semonovich	Embassy employee	Netherlands
SIMANTOVSKIY, Oleg Vladimirovich	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)
STERLIKOV, Aleksey Petrovich	Diplomatic	Switzerland
STUDENIKOV, Igor	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)
TIKHOMIROV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	Translator	United Nations
TUMANOV, Boris G.	TASS	Congo (Kinshasa)
UTKIN, Stanislav Grigoryevich	Diplomatic	Norway
VALYALIN, Fedor Fedorovich	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)
ZAMOYSKIY, Lolly Petrovich	Izvestiya	Italy
ZHEGALOV, Leonid Nikolayevich	Press corps	United States.

COMMUNIST OFFICIALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG) DURING 1970

(By case, within geographic areas where the action was taken.)

AFRICA

Congo (Kinshasa)

On 16 May 1970, the Kinshasa daily Le Progres reported the expulsion of four Soviets as the result of the Congo (Kinshasa) Government's discovery of a Russian spy network operating within the Congolese army, Ministry of Information, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet diplomats were accused of holding frequent meetings with student elements to spread "false rumors." The press cited a reciprocal agreement made between the governments of Congo (Kinshasa) and the USSR to limit to seven the number of diplomats in the embassies of each country and noted that the USSR had upped the number of Soviets in the Kinshasa diplomatic community to 42. Kinshasa, meanwhile, had four diplomats in Moscow. The 20 May issue of La Tribune Africain identified the expellees and named three additional Soviets whose nefarious activities had been revealed during government investigations.

The Soviet diplomats expelled were: Oleg Vladimirovich SIMANTOVSKIY, KGB official and embassy attaché; Igor STUDENIKOV, KGB official and interpreter; Boris PODKILZIN, KGB official in the embassy consular office; and Fedor Fedorovich VALYALIN, long-term embassy visitor. VALYALIN first arrived in Kinshasa as an escort officer for a Soviet football team which visited the Congo in December 1969. He carried a diplomatic passport with a visitor's visa. When the football team left, VALYALIN stayed. He moved into the Soviet embassy and a few weeks later quietly asked for a permanent visa and a diplomatic identity card, both of which he got.

The other Soviets implicated by the article in La Tribune Africain were: Vitaliy Grigoryevich NOVIKOV, embassy Counselor and KGB official; Ivan Ignatyevich STOVBUN, press attaché and GRU official who had been previously expelled from Israel; and Boris G. TUMANOV, TASS representative. By late July, TUMANOV too had been expelled. The 6 June issue of the government-controlled newspaper, Tribune Diplomatique, had charged that TUMANOV was in reality an officer in the Soviet GRU intelligence organization who disguised himself as a newspaperman. The article called for TUMANOV to leave the country; he ignored the suggestion.

TUMANOV, a prominent member of the Soviet group in Kinshasa who often posed as a Frenchman during his assignments as TASS man in the Congo, was formally invited to leave on 28 July. The Congolese Ministry of Information announced that "TUMANOV was ordered to leave the former Belgian Congo within 48 hours" and noted that "the Ministry had informed TUMANOV that the measure was taken against him personally."

### Zanzibar

Following investigations of charges that East German aid officials, including some teachers, had been actively "meddling in internal affairs," the Zanzibar government announced PNG action taken against East German Counselor Siegfried BUETTNER as of mid-June 1970.

## WESTERN EUROPE

### Belgium

On 31 March 1970, Brussels daily La Lanterne reported the arrest of Boris Trofimovich SAVICH, a Soviet employee at the joint Soviet-Belgian motor vehicle business corporation, Scaldia-Volga. SAVICH was arrested in a Brussels restaurant where he was caught attempting to get Western military data. The Belgian Justice Ministry charged SAVICH with trying to set up "a spy network inside the NATO military nerve center in southern Belgium." SAVICH was also accused of showing undue interest in the French Mirage-5. A few days later, he was declared PNG and expelled from Belgium.

In mid-December 1970, the Belgian Security Service apprehended Assistant Polish Military Attaché, Lt. Col. Wlodzimierz KWIATKOWSKI, "in the act of taking possession of NATO documents," according to press reports. KWIATKOWSKI and his chauffeur, Albert BALAWENDER, were subsequently expelled. In describing the incident, The Hague's Haagsche Courant noted, 28 December, that the Polish military attaché had returned home "for reasons of health."

### France

AP and Reuters Paris dispatches, of 23 July 1970, revealed that a Polish diplomat, Jan RODAK, had been caught "red handed" spying and that the French Foreign Office had demanded his immediate recall to Warsaw. RODAK was described as Second Secretary of the Polish Embassy, posted to Paris since 26 June 1970 and apprehended on 4 July 1970.

### Italy

On 13 February 1970, Rome's La Stampa, Il Messaggero, and other

big dailies reported PNG action taken against two Soviets earlier that month. Vladimir Ivanovich ALEKSANDROV, an employee in the Soviet Military Attaché's office in Rome since mid-1968, was expelled on the charge that he had obtained military information involving the security of Italy from an Italian Air Force sergeant. Lolly Petrovich ZAMOYSKIY, Izvestiya representative in Rome since March 1968, was expelled for "infringing the rule governing the residence of Soviet journalists in Italy." The Zamoyskiy case was actually in retaliation for the USSR's earlier expulsion of Ennio Caretto, Moscow correspondent for Rome's La Stampa.

On 10 March 1970, the Italian Government took formal PNG action against Albanian Foto SOFRONI, embassy Second Secretary. SOFRONI had been involved in the collection of military intelligence through an Italian Air Force soldier based at the Italian Air Base, Foggia. The Italian Security Service decided to roll up the case when the Albanian sought detailed information on Italian Air Force radio frequencies. SOFRONI was also interested in NATO strength, NATO classified documents, and U.S. air bases in Italy.

#### Netherlands

The Dutch Government, on 6 May 1970, named as spies Soviets Boris Pavlovich NETREBSKIY, who acted as both Novosti representative and embassy Second Secretary, and Vladimir Semenovich SHAROVATOV, a Soviet embassy employee without diplomatic status. Stories in De Volkskrant and Algemeen Dagblad of 8-11 May said the pair had come to official attention after a 17 February auto accident near Schipol airfield where their Volga car ran off the road and sank into a canal. Both were unhurt but were unable to get their belongings out of the car. The Foreign Ministry announcement said police had found a map of Dutch military installations and other incriminating documents in the vehicle. At the time of the announcement, SHAROVATOV was in the USSR; he was refused re-entry. NETREBSKIY was given 48 hours to leave. (See attached reprint from Algemeen Dagblad, "Novosti: Cover for Spies.")

#### Norway

On 29 January, stories broke in the Norwegian press regarding two Soviet diplomats who had been quietly expelled during 1968 as a result of two separate unpublicized military espionage cases. The officials were Sergey Mikhaylovich LEBEDEV, embassy Third Secretary, and Stanislav Grigoryevich UTKIN, embassy Second Secretary. The Norwegian Defense Association had recently issued a resolution calling for greater openness on the part of the authorities with respect to matters of a military or politico-military character. The resolution also indicated that "active intelligence agents having diplomatic status had been expelled from the country." Articles in Oslo's Morgenbladet of 29 and 31 January expressed Nor-



wegian concern over the growing Soviet representation which totaled 80 members of the diplomatic community, and asked why the Soviets had been so quietly expelled and why the Norwegian people had not been previously informed of the cases.

In mid-May 1970, a Soviet engineer who had been living in Oslo since about October 1968 was declared PNG on charges of espionage. The engineer, Valeriy Moiseyevich MESROPOV, was an employee in the joint Soviet-Norwegian commercial venture, Koneisto-Norge A/S in Drammen. The Norwegian press reported 15 September that "a Soviet engineer was arrested after the authorities felt they had proof he had used his stay in Norway to recruit contacts who might be useful in illegal intelligence work." (See also the attached reprint from Morgenbladet of 22 September concerning the affairs of Koneisto-Norge and the MESROPOV case.)

#### Switzerland

An espionage case in Switzerland during early 1970 resulted in the departure from that country of two Soviet officials and the identification of an additional Soviet intelligence officer. On 3 February 1970, Marcel Buttex, a Swiss official in charge of immigration and residence permits in Lausanne, was arrested as a Soviet spy. Buttex was responsible for supplying Soviet diplomats with large quantities of Swiss identity papers and other material that would enable Soviets to smuggle illegals using Swiss documents into Switzerland and other countries.

The case of Marcel Buttex resulted in the expulsion from Switzerland of Soviet diplomats Nikolay Andreyevich SAVIN, Second Secretary, and of Aleksey Petrovich STERLIKOV, First Secretary. Former Second Secretary Aleksandr Fedorovich GRACHEV, who had returned to the USSR in July 1969, was also exposed for his role in the Buttex case.

#### United Kingdom

In October 1969 Polish Ambassador DOBROSTIELSKI in London was called to the British Foreign Office and told that four members of his staff had been involved in "inadmissible activities" and that he should draw his own conclusions. Colonel Czeslaw TANANA, Assistant Military Attaché, departed in early December 1969. When the other three Poles, Second Secretary Janusz PRYSTROM and two clerks in the Military Attaché's Office, had not left by 16 January 1970 they were ordered to leave the country. (See the attached reprint from The Daily Telegraph of 28 January 1970, concerning this case and retaliatory PNG action against British diplomats taken by the Polish government.)

West Germany

On 19 December 1970, Die Welt and Bild Zeitung carried stories of an espionage case involving an un-named Soviet diplomat. At about the same time, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR, Petr Fedorovich BOROVIANSKIY, went home for the Christmas holidays. By 7 January 1971, the Bonn Government let it be known that BOROVIANSKIY had been asked to leave the country and a Die Welt article asserted that BOROVIANSKIY was a leading figure in the Soviet intelligence service and that two West Germans who had been working with him, a Daniel Walczak and his son, had been arrested. The 20 January 1971 issue of Quick describes the Soviet diplomat as "GRU Colonel Petr Fedorovich BOROVIANSKIY, legal resident and chief of an approximately 20-man GRU spy group in the Soviet embassy." Through his contacts with the West Germans, the article said, BOROVIANSKIY had acquired infrared and other electronic gear from a West German Leopard-type tank, an ABC gas mask, NATO troop maneuver maps, and other classified military data.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Argentina

After Soviets Yuriy Ivanovich RYABOV and Yuriy Leonidovich MAMONTOV were arrested on 4 November 1970, and expelled three days later, the Argentine Government issued an official statement to the effect that the two had been discovered carrying out activities "incompatible with their positions." According to articles in El Universal and other Buenos Aires papers of 6-8 November, RYABOV had arrived in Argentina in May as a representative of the Soviet travel bureau, Inturist, and MAMONTOV represented two Soviet commercial trade organizations, Medeksport and Soveksportfilm. As employees of the Soviet trade mission, neither had diplomatic immunity. Press reports at the time of their arrest said both men had been under police surveillance for several weeks and suspicion that they were KGB agents was confirmed to the government's satisfaction when, upon arrest, one was found to be carrying a metal tube which authorities said contained microfilmed data on military and industrial complexes. At the time of their arrest, RYABOV threw himself on the ground in an effort to injure himself and thus prove mistreatment, and MAMONTOV tried to swallow a page of writing from his notebook.

Canada

Janos HEGEDUS, First Secretary in the Hungarian Embassy in Ottawa was declared PNG on 7 January 1970. HEGEDUS was involved in an intelligence operation with a naturalized Canadian of Hungarian origin who fled Hungary in 1956 and was employed by a

Canadian Government department. In retaliation, Canadian Consul S.G. Noble was PNG'd and left Budapest on 31 January 1970.

United Nations

In February 1970, Aleksandr Vasilyevich TIKHOMIROV, a Russian translator with the United Nations Secretariat since June 1965, was arrested in Seattle, Washington, and charged with conspiring with an un-named U.S. Air Force sergeant to get secret materials concerning the air defense system of the Pacific Northwest. TIKHOMIROV was declared PNG on 16 February and expelled on 17 February. The Soviets attempted to claim diplomatic immunity for TIKHOMIROV. Their claim was rejected on the basis that he was an employee of an international organization and had "functional immunity only when performing duties of an official capacity."

Two members of the Cuban mission to the United Nations were asked to leave in October 1970 on charges they had used a female employee of a "friendly embassy" in Washington to collect political intelligence about the Americas. The officials were Counselor Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and First Secretary Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez.

United States

In retaliatory measures, two Soviet correspondents were declared PNG by the United States in 1970. Pravda correspondent in New York, Boris Mikhaylovich OREKHOV, was declared PNG on 26 June for having engaged in "non-journalistic activities." OREKHOV was also charged with having twice violated travel restrictions. Washington press corps member, Leonid Nikolayevich ZHEGALOV, was declared PNG in November. (See the attached reprints from the 23 December 1970 Newsweek concerning Moscow's actions against U.S. correspondents in the USSR.)

LA MEUSE-LA LANTERNE, Brussels  
1 April 1970

THE TWO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:

THE KGB AND THE GRU

The Soviet Union has two large intelligence services: the KGB, which is the state security committee, and the GRU, which is the intelligence command of the Soviet general staff. The KGB is the more powerful of the two. It is directly under the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, while the GRU comes under the Ministry of Defense.

The GRU is connected with the KGB in many areas, particularly with regard to the central files, which are kept by the KGB. All intelligence is kept there, regardless of subject or origin (even if it is from the GRU). In addition, the KGB has two missions: one offensive (espionage) and one defensive (counter-espionage). The GRU has only one, principally: offensive intelligence, specifically related to the military domain. The KGB carries out its defensive role even inside the army and the GRU.

CPYRGHT

## Les deux services russes de renseignements : le K.G.B. et le G.R.U.

L'Union soviétique dispose de deux grands services de renseignement : le K.G.B., qui est le comité de sécurité de l'Etat, et le G.R.U., qui est la direction principale du renseignement de l'état-major général soviétique. Le K.G.B. est le plus puissant des deux. Il dépend directement du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique : le G.R.U. relève, lui, du ministère de la Défense.

Le G.R.U. est lié au K.G.B. à bien des titres, notamment en ce qui concerne les

archives centrales qui sont aux mains du K.G.B. Tous les renseignements, quelle qu'en soit la teneur ou l'origine (donc le G.R.U. également) y sont classés. Le K.G.B. a, en outre, deux missions, l'une offensive (espionnage), et l'autre défensive (contre-espionnage). Le G.R.U. n'en a qu'une principalement : le renseignement offensif, qui relève plus particulièrement du domaine militaire. L'aspect défensif du rôle du K.G.B. s'exerce même au sein de l'armée et du G.R.U.

LA MEUSE-LA LANTERNE, Brussels  
1 April 1970

SOVIET SPY IN BELGIUM FOR THREE YEARS

Boris Savitch, an intelligence agent for the GRU (the chief intelligence unit of the Soviet General Staff), who had been working in Belgium since October 1967 under the cover of the Scaldia-Volga automobile company in Diegem (Brussels) was arrested by State Security last week as he was finishing a meal with a "contact" in a Linkebeek (Brussels) restaurant. Savitch was carrying a Minox miniature camera, a large amount of film and a great deal of money. He was interested in the activities of NATO-SHAP and in the Mirage 5, the French fighter-bomber ordered by the Belgian army.

At the moment of his arrest, the spy attempted to escape. Both Savitch and his contact were taken into custody. They are still being interrogated by the Belgian Security forces, which is continuing its investigation throughout the country. Other Soviets ostensibly working in Belgium may be implicated in the affair. Savitch is the eighth Soviet agent whose activities have been discovered in Belgium in the past three years.

Boris Savitch was born in Zhitmir, a city in the Ukraine (USSR) in 1934. He is 36 years old. Small, broad-backed, with wavy black hair, he is very talkative. He is married and has two sons. His apartment is located in the Scaldia-Volga building in Diegem, near the offices of the secretary-general of NATO, located in the commune of Evere. Savitch was sent to Belgium by the company in October 1967 as an engineering specialist. He obtained a work permit for Belgium, stating his official occupation as selling Scaldia-Volga trucks. This cover gave him great freedom of movement.

Truck Salesman

Savitch began his clandestine activities by first attempting to utilize radical left-wing anti-NATO groups to achieve his purposes in SHAP. He was looking for collaborators. During a routine operation, the State Security became interested in him and began a close surveillance, shadowing him constantly.

Shadowing is one of the techniques utilized by the counter-espionage services. It is not an absolutely reliable technique, but at least it helps determine whether or not the subject is a professional spy. In this matter, his behavior during movements is very significant.

This surveillance led to the arrest of the "truck salesman" on Wednesday, March 25. On that day, Savitch and a contact were in a restaurant in the Linkebeek suburb of Brussels. It is a fine, well-run place; the owner prepares the meals and the wife waits on the table. "Open-air dining in a private and quiet location," the restaurant's advertisements say. It is the perfect spot for a rendezvous! A large parking lot surrounds the house. The property forms an enclave in the surrounding property. An access road is big enough for one car at a time to pass. It is an ideal spot: 1. for the location; 2. for its respectability; 3. for its reputation; 4. for its food.

Savitch was able to appreciate all this. In fact, he had reportedly gone there several times before with a guest: a "contact" or a "truck salesman" or even a comrade from the Soviet Embassy, which he visited frequently and where he enjoyed certain privileges.

On this particular day, Savitch and his guest were eating in the inside dining room of the restaurant. They were just finishing their meal. It was near 1500 hours. At that moment, a car entered the grounds. Four State Security agents got out. The two diners were confronted. Savitch, obviously panic-stricken, started to run, abandoning his guest, who stood rooted to the spot. The agents caught the fugitive. The two men were searched and taken into custody.

#### A Miniature Camera

When they searched Savitch, the Security Force found he was carrying a Minox miniature camera, a large supply of film, a great sum of money, and a map of a clandestine rendezvous. At the time of his arrest, the "truck salesman" was trying to obtain information about Belgian military bases and about SHAPE-NATO. Savitch was especially interested in the Mirage, the French-made fighter-bomber which has been ordered by the Belgian army. Pilot training courses for the aircraft have already been set up. The Soviets wanted information concerning the manufacturing of the Mirages.

Other Soviets may be involved in the affair. An investigation is underway in Brussels and in the provinces. The Minister of Justice announced yesterday that he had issued a deportation order against Savitch. The order had not yet been carried out.

With this new affair, Soviet espionage again reveals the multiplicity of its "cover" activities, and shows that it does not hesitate to utilize all the machinery of the Soviet Union, but in the USSR and in Soviet enterprises abroad. Thus, another of its covers has been unmasked. There have been other cases where a Communist "private" enterprise was serving as a cover for intelligence agents. Notably, there was the case of Aeroflot in 1967.

The many-armed structure of the Soviets' specialized organizations involved in espionage covers many areas: diplomacy, the press, tourism, scientific exchanges, and even commerce.

LA MEUSE-LA LANTERNE du mercredi, 1<sup>er</sup>-4-1970



CPYRGHT

Boris Savitch, officier de renseignement du G.R.U. (direction principale du renseignement de l'état-major général soviétique), travaillant en Belgique depuis octobre 1967 sous le couvert de la firme automobile « Scaldia-Volga », à Diegem (Bruxelles), a été arrêté, la semaine dernière, par la Sûreté de l'Etat alors qu'il terminait de dîner en compagnie d'un « contact » dans un restaurant de Linkebeek (Bruxelles). Il avait sur lui un « Minox » (appareil photographique miniature), une importante réserve de films et une grosse somme d'argent. Il s'intéressait aux activités O.T.A.N.-Shape et au « Mirage 5 », avion chasseur-bombardier français dont l'armée belge a passé commande.

Au moment de son arrestation, l'espion a tenté de fuir. Savitch et son contact ont été emmenés. Ils sont encore interrogés par la Sûreté belge, qui poursuit son enquête dans tout le pays. D'autres Soviétiques « travaillant » en Belgique pourraient être impliqués dans l'affaire. Savitch est le huitième agent soviétique connu pour ses activités en Belgique durant les trois dernières années.

Boris Savitch est né à Jitomir, ville d'Ukraine (U.R.S.S.), en 1934. Il a donc 36 ans. Petit, râblé, cheveux noirs ondulés, l'homme est volubile. Il est marié et a 2 garçons. Son logement est situé dans le complexe Scaldia-Volga, à Diegem, à proximité des installations du secrétariat général de l'O.T.A.N., installé sur le territoire de la

commune d'Evere. En octobre 1967, il est envoyé en Belgique par la firme comme ingénieur-spécialiste. Il obtient ainsi un permis de travail dans notre pays, ses occupations officielles consistant à vendre des camions de la marque. Cette couverture lui assure de grandes libertés de déplacement.

### Marchand de camions

Savitch commence ses activités clandestines en tentant tout d'abord d'utiliser des mouvements anti-O.T.A.N. d'extrême gauche pour arriver à ses fins au Shape. Il cherche des agents complaisants. Lors d'un travail de routine, la Sûreté de l'Etat s'intéresse à lui et commence une surveillance serrée, filature sur filature.

La filature est une des techniques utilisées par les services de contre-espionnage. Ce n'est pas une technique de tout repos. Elle permet au moins de déterminer si le « filé » est ou non un professionnel de l'espionnage. Son comportement en cours de déplacement est très significatif pour cela.

Cette surveillance a abouti, le mercredi 25 mars dernier, à l'arrestation du « vendeur de camions ». Ce jour-là, Boris Savitch et un « contact » étaient dans un restaurant de la banlieue de Bruxelles, à Linkebeek. Endroit coquet et bien tenu : le patron prépare les repas, sa femme sert à table. « Le grand air dans un site retiré et tranquille », dit la publicité de l'éta-

blissement. N'est-ce pas là le lieu rêvé pour une rencontre ! Un vaste parking entoure la maison. La propriété constitue une enclave dans les propriétés voisines. Un sentier permet le passage d'une seule voiture à la fois. C'est un endroit idéal : 1) pour sa situation ; 2) pour son sérieux ; 3) pour son cadre de standing ; 4) par sa « table ».

Savitch a su apprécier tout cela. Il s'y serait, en effet, rendu plusieurs fois précédemment avec un invité, « Contact » ou « acheteur de camions » ou encore camarade soviétique de l'ambassade, ambassade où il se rendait fréquemment et où il bénéficiait de certaines faveurs.

Ce mercredi-là, Savitch et son invité du jour étaient à table dans la salle intérieure du restaurant. Ils terminaient le repas. Il était près de 15 heures. Une voiture pénétra à ce moment dans la propriété. Quatre inspecteurs de la Sûreté de l'Etat, en descendant, Les deux convives furent interpellés, Savitch, manifestement affolé, prit la fuite, abandonnant à son invité, qui resta figé sur place. Les inspecteurs rattrapèrent le fugitif. Les deux hommes furent fouillés et emmenés.

### Un appareil photo miniature

Au cours de la fouille, la Sûreté trouva sur Savitch un « Minox » (appareil photographique miniature), une réserve importante de films, une grosse somme d'argent et un schéma d'un rendez-vous clandestin. Au moment où il fut surpris, le « ven-

deur de camions » essayait d'obtenir des renseignements sur les bases militaires belges et sur le Shape-O.T.A.N. Savitch s'intéressait tout spécialement au « Mirage », avion chasseur-bombardier de fabrication française dont l'armée belge a passé commande, des cours de pilotage de ces avions étant déjà organisés. Le Soviétique voulait réunir tous les renseignements concernant ces cours, mais aussi ceux relatifs à la fabrication du « Mirage ».

D'autres Soviétiques pourraient être mêlés à l'affaire. L'enquête se poursuit tant à Bruxelles qu'en province. Le ministre de la Justice annonçait hier qu'il avait pris un arrêté de renvoi à l'égard de l'intéressé. Cette décision n'était pas encore exécutée.

Avec cette nouvelle affaire, l'espionnage soviétique prouve une fois de plus la multiplicité de ses « couvertures » d'activités, et qu'il n'hésite pas à employer pour cela tous les rouages de l'Union soviétique tant sur son territoire que dans les entreprises soviétiques à l'étranger. Une de ses nouvelles couvertures est ainsi révélée. On a connu d'autres cas où une entreprise « privée » communiste servait de couverture à des officiers de renseignement. Ce fut notamment le cas de l'Aeroflot, en 1967.

Chez les soviets, la nature tentaculaire des organisations spécialisées dans l'espionnage couvre de nombreux domaines : la diplomatie, la presse, le tourisme, les échanges scientifiques, et même le commerce.

ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD, Rotterdam  
9 May 1970 CPYRGHT

NOVOSTI: COVER FOR SOVIET SPIES

"SCOUTS FOR PEACE"

by M.W. van Eijk

Novosti is the name of the newest Russian move in the espionage chess game. Its full name is Agentsvo Pechati Novosti, which means Press News Agency, and is normally shortened to APN. It should not be confused with our good press agency, which is called ANP.

Russian press attaché Boris Netrebski, who has now been expelled, was the Novosti representative in our country. Both functions provide an excellent cover for a spy. It can be said to be certain that Netrebski was an officer of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence and security service which covers the world and, which, for many years, denied that it is also an espionage service. Important agents of the KGB operate mostly as information officers and press attachés of the Russian embassies in non-communist countries. As security against police proceedings in their country of residence they also take on the function of second secretary of their embassy. In that way they have diplomatic immunity. How effective this defense is is shown when such a press attaché has been tracked down and asked to go to the police station to explain his conduct.

At that moment he has only to show his diplomatic identity card and the police officer can do nothing but offer his apologies and let the "diplomat" go. When the German spy Sorge was rolled up by the Japanese and after his death was made a Hero of the Soviet Union, this was an acknowledgement of what foreigners had already known for years: Sorge had also been a Russian spy. A speech on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the KGB also included the acknowledgement from the Russian side that the KGB is an espionage service. As far as Novosti is concerned, however, this was still denied. Also, Novosti is not a part of the Soviet governmental structure. The initiative in forming it in 1961 was taken by the Union of Soviet Journalists, the Union of Soviet Writers, the Union of Soviet Organizations for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the Association for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge. Novosti took the place of the earlier Sovinformbureau.

The security services in the West are certain that half of the employees of Novosti are officers in the KGB or the GRU, the military intelligence services of the Soviet Union working in foreign countries. In Russian jargon the employees of the espionage services are "scouts for peace." In the United States the establishment of a Novosti office has been forbidden. Nevertheless, not long ago a Russian spy was unmasked as a Novosti man. This organization has three kinds of offices: a. one that is housed in the Russian Embassy, as in The Hague; b. so-called independent offices which has the advantage of providing another establishment in a foreign country; and c. secret establishments in countries where this sort of Russian organization has been refused admittance.



Novosti provides informational material about the Soviet Union - articles, films, photos, tapes and other propaganda material. Information is also given to students and progressive youth. The representatives gladly form friendships. They are mostly pleasant and intelligent men. Boris Netrebski was no exception. Moreover, he is not the first Novosti employee who has been unmasked as a spy. On 23 November 1963, Novosti correspondent B. Kegnazar-Jouzbachev, with two other Russian diplomats, was expelled from Congo-Brazzaville on suspicion of espionage. This incident was even the reason that diplomatic relations were broken.

In April 1966 four Russians were expelled from Kenya on suspicion of espionage. One of them was Iory Kouritsine, the Novosti representative who, while in Nairobi, had put leftist student clubs up to revolutionary activities and had gathered secret information.

On 6 June 1967 Ghana expelled correspondent A. Kazansev because of espionage activities. He had also been active in different groups to help Nkrumah return to power.

An especially strong indication of the espionage activities of Novosti functionaries was the cropping-up of G.N. Soekachev as correspondent in Cairo in 1964. This spy had already been unmasked in our country in 1958 as an officer of the GRU, the military espionage service. In 1958 Soekachev was interpreter and assistant to the Russian Naval Attaché in our country, naval Captain K.S. Zenin who, together with Soekachev and Colonel L.J. Chernov was expelled from our country charged with espionage.

Through his auto accident, it came to light at an early stage that Boris Netrebski was also a spy. He came to The Hague last June. He already had friendly relations in many circles. In the espionage field he was only in the beginning stages. The Internal Security Service (BVD), which naturally also follows developments and events in foreign countries, quickly drew a bead on him and on his colleague Sharavatov.

ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD, Rotterdam  
9 May 1970

Novosti:

# dekmantel voor Russische spionnen

## „Verkenners voor de vrede”

door  
M. W. VAN EIJK

NOVOSTI heet de nieuwste Russische zet in het schaakspel met spionnen. Voluit heet het bureau Agentsvo Pechati Novosti wat betekent Agentschap Persnieuws, ook wel aangeduid met APN, niet te verwarren met ons brave persbureau ANP.

De thans uitgezonden Russische persattaché Boris Neterbski was vertegenwoordiger van Novosti in ons land. Beide functies zijn een uitstekende dekmantel voor een spion. Als zeker kan worden aangenomen dat Neterbski officier was van de KGB, de wereldomspannende inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst van de Sowjetunie waarvan jarenlang is ontkend dat het ook een spionagedienst was.

Belangrijke agenten van de KGB opereerden meestal als voorlichtingsambtenaren en persattachés van de Russische ambassades in niet-communistische landen. Als beveiliging tegen het politieke optreden van het gastland kregen zij ook de functie van tweede secretaris der ambassade. Daardoor waren zij diplomatiek onschendbaar. Hoe effectief dat afweermiddel is bleek vaak wanneer zo'n speurende en verzamelende persattaché's gevraagd werd even mee naar het bureau te gaan om bepaalde gedragingen nader te verklaren.

Hij hoefde dan slechts zijn diplomatieke identiteitskaart te laten zien en de politiefunctionaris kon dan niet anders doen dan zijn verontschuldiging aanbieden en de „diplomaat” laten gaan.

TOEN de Duitse spion Sorge

door de Japanners was opgeknoopt en na zijn dood tot held van de Sowjetunie werd verklaard was dit een erkenning van wat het buitenland allang wist: Sorge was ook een Russische spion geweest. Een redevoering bij gelegenheid van het vijftigjarig bestaan van de KGB bevatte eveneens de erkenning van Russische zijde dat de KGB ook een spionagedienst is.

En aanzien van Novosti wordt dit nog steeds ontkend. Novosti is ook niet door de Sowjetregering opgericht. Initiatiefnemers in februari 1961 waren de Bond van Sowjetjournalisten, de Unie van Sowjetschrijvers, de Unie van Sowjetorganisaties voor vriendschap en culturele betrekkingen met het buitenland en het genootschap voor het verspreiden van wetenschappelijke en politieke kennis. Novosti kwam in de plaats van het vroegere Sovinformbureau.

DE veiligheidsdiensten in het Westen zijn er zeker van dat de helft van de medewerkers van Novosti-officiëren van de KGB of van de GRU zijn, de militaire inlichtingsdiensten van de Sowjetunie die in het buitenland werken. In het Russische jargon worden de medewerkers van de spionagediensten de „verkenners voor de vrede” genoemd. In de Verenigde Staten is de vestiging van Novosti verboden. Niettemin is daar nog niet lang geleden een Russische spion als man van Novosti ontmaskerd. Er zijn drie soorten kantoren van deze organisatie: a. die zijn gehuisvest in de Russische ambassade, zoals in Den Haag, b. ze zelf-

standige kantoren wat het voordeel heeft dat men in het buitenland weer een eigen vestiging erbij heeft en c. geheime vestigingen in landen waar men deze soort Russische organisaties weert.

Novosti levert voorlichtingsmateriaal over de Sowjetunie, artikelen, films, foto's, geluidsbanden en ander propagandamateriaal ook wordt voorlichting gegeven aan studenten en progressieve jongeren. De vertegenwoordigers sluiten graag vriendschappen. Het zijn meestal aardige en intelligente mensen. Boris Neterbski is daar geen uitzondering op.

Hij is overigens niet de eerste medewerker van Novosti die als spion is ontmaskerd. Op 23 november 1963 werd in Kongo-Brazzaville de correspondent van Novosti, B. Keknazar-Joubachev, met twee andere Russische diplomaten op verdenking van spionage uitgezonden. Dit incident was er zelfs oorzaak van dat de betrekkingen met de Sowjetunie werden verbroken.

In april 1966 werden vier Russen uit Kenia gezet op verdenking van spionage. Daarbij was Ioury Kouritsine, de vertegenwoordiger van Novosti die in Nairobi linkse studentenclubs tot opstandige activiteiten had aangezet en geheime inlichtingen had verzameld.

Op 6 juni 1967 wees Ghana de correspondent A. Kazanov het land uit wegens spionageactiviteiten. Hij had ook actie gevoerd in bepaalde groepen om Nkrumah weer aan de macht te helpen.

Een bijzondere sterke aanwijzing voor de spionageactiviteiten van medewerkers van Novosti was het opduiken van G.N. Soekachev als correspondent in Kairo in 1964. Deze spion was reeds in 1958 in ons land ontmaskerd als officier van de GRU, de militaire spionagedienst. In 1958 was Soekachev tolk en assistent van de Russische marineattaché in ons land de kapitein ter zee K. S. Zenin die samen met Soekachev en de kolonel L. J. Chernov op beschuldiging van spionage ons land werden uitgezet.

BIJ Boris Neterbski kwam door het ongeluk met zijn auto in een vroeg stadium aan het licht dat ook hij spioneerde. Hij was vorig jaar juni naar Den Haag gekomen. In vele kringen had hij reeds vriendschappelijke relaties. Op spionagegebied was hij pas in het beginstadium. De Binnenlandse veiligheidsdienst, die uiteraard ook de ontwikkelingen en gebeurtenissen in het buitenland volgt, had hem en zijn medewerker Sharovarov al spoedig op de korrel.

MORGENBLADET, Oslo <sup>CPYRGHT</sup>  
22 September 1970

SPY RECRUITER WITH KONEISTO TRAVELED FREELY HERE

Saturday afternoon at 1:05, an Aeroflot passenger plane bound for Moscow took off from Fornebo. On board was spy recruiter Valery M. Mesropov who did not have a return ticket. One question-- during a dance to a woman working for one of the Bodo offices of the Defense Department meant the end of the 31-year-old engineer's career in Norway. Instead, it led to arrest, a trial, and expulsion. In November he would have worked for 2 years for the Russian branch company Koneisto Norge, Inc. in Drammen.

Valery Mesropov is said to have carried out a very dubious activity during those 2 years. As an employee of Koneisto Norge he was able to make himself known to Norwegian industrial concerns -- fishing and trapping equipment for the fishing industry are Koneisto's specialties.

"Our people are always available whenever and wherever somebody needs us to install or service our equipment," said a representative of the firm at a press conference last summer. There are many fishing industries -- both large and small -- especially in northern Norway. There is one in Bodo. Some time ago, this firm was asked by Koneisto if they would make salting machines with rights granted them by the Russians. As far as this paper could discover, they did not enter into serious negotiations on this because the market basis for those machines was unstable. The matter was dropped, but the Bodo firm still has good trade connections with Koneisto.

Besides selling its own products, Koneisto is an important middleman in arranging sales and purchases between Soviet export organizations and large Norwegian concerns.

These are some of the largest Soviet deliveries to Norway that were arranged through Koneisto -- 2 tubular rolling mills to Raufoss Ammunition Factory, 2 pipe aggregates with a capacity of 10,600 kilowatts to Union, 3 bulk carriers, each 35,800 dead weight, to Gerrard's Ship Company and Skjelbred's Ship Company in Kristiansand.

A considerable number of metal-working machines, presses and forges have been bought by: Sverre Munck, Inc., Borregaard, Inc., Saugbrugsforeningen, Tenfjord, Stavanger Machine Workshop and Haugesund Machine Workshop.

With the direct assistance of Koneisto, the following deliveries were made to the Soviet Union by: Alnor and Ardol and Sunndal factories, anodes in bulk, Trio factories in Stavanger, an automatic line for processing fish.

In truth, mechanical engineer Valery M. Mesropov had great opportunities in Norway.

MORGENBLADET, Oslo

22 September 1970

CPYRGHT

# Spionververen ved Koneisto reiste fritt rundt i Norge

Lørdag klokken 13.05 tok et Aeroflot passasjerfly av fra Førnebo med kurs for Moskva. Ombord befant seg spionververen Valerij M. Mesropov uten returbillett. Et spørsmål — under en dans — til en kvinne som arbeidet ved et av Forsvarets kontorer i Bodø, betydde slutten for den 31-årige ingeniørens karriere i Norge. Istedet ble det innledningen til arrestasjon, rettssak, og utvisning. I november ville han ha feiret 2 års tjeneste i det russiske datterselskap Koneisto Norge A/S i Drammen.

Valerij Mesropov skal i løpet av disse to årene ha drevet en ganske utstrakt reisevirksomhet. Som ansatt i Koneisto Norge har han hatt god anledning til å gjøre seg kjent i norske industribedrifter — fiske- og fangstutstyr for fiskeindustrien er Koneistos spesialitet.

— Våre folk er alltid til rådighet, overalt og når som helst det er behov for montering og service av vårt utstyr, uttalte en av firmaets representanter på en pressekonferanse i sommer. Fiskeindustribedrifter — både store og små — finnes det mange av.

spesielt i Nord-Norge. Bl.a. ligger det én bedrift i Bodø. For noen tid tilbake ble dette firma forespurt av Koneisto, om de ville lave saltemaskiner på lisens fra russerne. Etter det Morgenbladet erfarer, kom det ikke så langt som til seriøse forhandlinger fordi markedsgrunnet for disse maskinene var sviktende. Saken ble stilt i bero, men fremdeles har Bodø-firmaet gode handelsforbindelser med Koneisto.

Foruten å selge sine egne produkter, står Koneisto som en betydelig formidler av kjøp og

salg mellom sovjetiske eksportorganisasjoner og norske storbedrifter.

Vi skal her nevne noen av de største sovjetiske leveranser til Norge som er blitt gjennomført i Koneistos regi: 2 rørvalseverk til Raufoss Ammunisjonsfabrikk, 2 røraggregater med 10,6 tusen kilowatts kapasitet til Union, 3 bulkcarriere — hver på 35 800 dvt til Gerrards Rederi og Skjelbreds Rederi i Kristiansand.

Et betydelig antall metallbearbeidelsesmaskiner, presser og smimaskiner er innkjøpt av:

Sverre Munck A/S, A/S Borregaard, Saugbrugsforeningen, Tenfjord, Stavanger Mek. Verksted, og Haugesund Mek. Verksted.

Ved direkte medvirkning av Koneisto, er følgende leveranser til Sovjet gjennomført fra: Anor og Ardal og Sunndal Verk — anodemasse, Trio Fabrikk i Stavanger — en automatisk linje for fiskebearbeidelse.

Maskiningeniør Valerij M. Mesropov hadde i sannhet store muligheter i Norge.

Ast—

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
14 January 1971

## Soviet diplomat stole German tank secrets

By DAVID SHEARS in Bonn

SECRETS of the West German Leopard tank and of a newly developed gas mask to protect troops against nuclear fall-out as well as chemical and germ weapons, were stolen by a Russian diplomat who left Bonn at Christmas, it is revealed.

Bonn police and counter-espionage officials are piecing together the still incomplete record of Piotr Boroyinsky former First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy.

His informants, a German father and son, used a simple warning system when Borowinski went to their house in Bad Godesberg, a Bonn suburb. When the coast was clear, they put a watering can on the window sill. When they suspected danger they put a red vase on the sill.

On the night of Nov. 23, when Boroyinsky entered the house, security men were waiting for him. He had apparently failed to see the red vase.

### All smiles

He showed his diplomatic pass and the Germans stepped aside, all smiles and courtesy.

Boroyinsky was unmasked, but the Bonn Government decided, possibly for diplomatic reasons, not to demand his recall. It was obvious that the Russians would bring him home.

His alleged informants were arrested. The father is described as a Communist, head of a metal-working firm in Bad Godesberg. The son was until recently in the army.

Boroyinsky is said to have been a colonel in the espionage organisation specialising in military secrets. Under the code name Peter he operated for

four years from the Soviet Embassy.

**Panzer secrets**

The younger German, as a sergeant technician, had access to secret weapons in a panzer division. He is said by West German counter-intelligence to have handed to Boroyinsky:

- 1—A complete radio, standard equipment in the Leopard tank used by several Nato armies. This was dismantled and sent by Borowinski to Moscow in a diplomatic bag.
- 2—An infra-red night direction-finder developed for the Leopard tank.

3—Details of the unique chain-link technique used in the tank's tracks.

4—A gas mask of a new and top-secret type, designed to give protection against atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons.

5—Plans for a military exercise close to the East-West German border.

6—A small rocket used by the West German forces to shoot propaganda leaflets to East German border guards.

The rocket led to Boroyinsky's downfall. He asked the younger German to get it for him, but the man was no longer in the army.

**Trap laid**

Another young soldier was asked, but he tipped off his superiors and a trap was laid for Boroyinsky. The rocket, which had no real military value, was allowed to go to Russia.

The elder German, aged 47, has been released on bail pending trial, but his son is being kept in custody.

Boroyinsky is the 22nd Russian diplomat, trade representative or journalist to have been caught spying by West German counter intelligence since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1955.

CPYRIGHT

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
28 January 1971

# Poland expels three British diplomats

By VINCENT RYDER, Diplomatic Correspondent

POLAND expelled three British diplomats last night, including Mr Michael Pakenham, 26, son of Lord Longford, the former Labour Leader in the House of Lords. Mr Pakenham is a Second Secretary in the Warsaw Embassy.

The expulsions were in retaliation for the expulsion of three Polish diplomats from London for what the Foreign Office described last night as "engaging in inadmissible activities." This is the usual diplomatic language for spying.

**Quiet move**

He was invited to draw his own conclusions, meaning they should be sent home quietly instead of waiting to be ordered out. One of the four, Col Tanana, Assistant Military Attaché, left early in December.

The Ambassador was told a few days later that the other three ought to leave by the end of the year. They were Mr Pryston, a Second Secretary, and two clerks in the office of Col. Lokuciewski, the Military Attaché.

When they had not left by Jan. 16 they were ordered out, and returned to Warsaw by Tuesday last week.

For a week the Polish Government refused to confirm or deny that any of their diplomats had been ordered out of London. Until last night's abrupt expulsion order there were hopes in London that it would not engage in "tit for tat" retaliation.

A fourth Polish diplomat, similarly accused, had left London before the three were ordered out earlier this month.

The others expelled were Gp Capt. R. J. H. Uprichard, Defence Attaché, and Mr Andrew Titchener, a clerical officer who works in Gp Capt. Uprichard's office.

Mr J. N. Henderson, the British Ambassador, was told by the Polish Foreign Ministry that they must leave by Saturday. No charge of improper conduct was made against them.

Officials in London are puzzled that the Polish Government allowed the affair to develop into an open quarrel when it was given the chance to play it down in the interests of good relations.

Mr Dobrosielski, the Polish Ambassador, was called to the Foreign Office last October and told that four members of his staff had been involved in "inadmissible activities."

NEWSWEEK  
28 December 1970

### Crackdown

Traditionally, the Soviet Government has tried to handle the problem of dissenting intellectuals by combining harsh repression of the dissidents with a public pretense that they don't exist. Thus, the Kremlin tried and sentenced such critics of the regime as writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky behind closed doors and refrained from publishing more than the briefest summaries of the proceedings. Last week, however, in a radical shift in tactics, Moscow resorted to a slashing public attack on the dissidents and on the foreign journalists who have been reporting their activities.

The blast came in a long, vituperative



© Herblock in The Washington Post

'Effete, Elite, Intellectual Snobs!'

Pravda article signed by Igor Aleksandrov—a *nom de plume* occasionally attached to major pronouncements by the Pravda editorial board. In it, the Kremlin leadership threatened to "sweep aside" the "wretched handful of renegades" who "slander Soviet life" and declared that "the Soviet people will not allow anyone to trample on their historical achievements." Naming names, the article let Pravda readers in on the news that Andrei Amalrik, author of "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" had been sentenced to three years in a labor camp for "slandering" the state (NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23), and for the first time officially linked Russia's new Nobel Prize winner, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, with other dissidents who, said Pravda, "hang around foreign press centers ... begging for whisky and cigarettes in exchange for dirty fabrications." In the strongest per-

... hostile to the whole life of the Soviet people."

Pravda had equally harsh and threatening words for Western newsmen who write about the dissidents. These "enemies of the Soviet people," the article declared, "rummage about the dregs of society to look for prey among decadent individualists who are prepared to sell everyone and everything for a foreign mess of pottage."

Restrictions on Western reporters in Russia have always been severe (following story). Of the three U.S. correspondents formally expelled this year—William Cole of CBS, Stanley Cloud of Time and NEWSWEEK's John Dornberg—both Cole and Dornberg had reported extensively on the dissidents. But recently the campaign has gotten worse. The correspondents for The Washington Post, the London Times, France Soir, the BBC and The New York Times, plus NEWSWEEK's remaining Moscow correspondent, Jay Axelbank, have been called into the Foreign Ministry press department and sternly warned about "hostile acts" such as stories about the publication of the Khrushchev "memoirs" or reporting on dissent.

'Abnormal': According to The New York Times's James Reston who was present when the Times correspondent was lectured, Foreign Ministry press chief Yur Chernyakov claimed that it was "abnormal" and an "unfriendly distortion" for Western correspondents to write about the Soviet artists and writers who are seeking more freedom. At the same time, added Reston, Chernyakov "regarded it as quite 'normal' that Soviet correspondents should muckrake the United States."

Aside from such "comradely warnings," Western correspondents who dare to meet with the dissidents are subject to more direct harassment. Last summer, the AP's Holger Jensen, whose exclusive interview relating the torture of a dissident had been front-paged around the world, was framed on a drunk-driving charge and eventually had to leave Russia (although he was not formally expelled). Recently, Soviet authorities have tightened their watch on known dissidents and when one of them meets a Western newsmen the police whip out flash cameras and ostentatiously record the event.

Soviet leaders have invariably been quick to move against anyone who threatens their system or even questions it too sharply. By publicizing the latest crackdown and warning its ideologically apathetic subjects not to be led astray by the voices of dissent, the Kremlin seemed to reveal a fear that those voices could find a significant number of sympathetic listeners among the Soviet people.

NEWSWEEK  
28 December 1970

CPYRGHT

## In the Soviet Isolation Ward

by John Dornberg

So far this year, three American correspondents have been expelled from the Soviet Union. The most recent was John Dornberg, who served as NEWSWEEK's Moscow bureau chief for almost three years. Below, Dornberg describes how the Soviet authorities restrict the news-gathering activities of Western correspondents.

Across Red Square from the Kremlin, in the shadow of Moscow's mammoth steel-and-glass Rossiya Hotel, masons and carpenters are faithfully restoring a strange relic from Russia's imperial past: the Old English Court. Built during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, this squat, two-story stone building served in the days of the czars to house English diplomats and merchants and to give them a place to show their wares. More than that, it provided Russia's rulers with an isolation ward in which to place potentially dangerous foreign visitors and prevent them from mixing with the people.

The reconstruction of the Old English Court is a fitting symbol of the xenophobia and penchant for secrecy that govern the modern Soviet Union as much as they did the Russia of yesteryear. Foreigners in the U.S.S.R.—diplomats, merchants, tourists, and, of course, Western correspondents—are as suspect as the itinerant traders of Czar Ivan's days. And just as in Ivan's time, foreigners in Moscow are kept in almost total isolation. In fact, 32 months of living and working in Moscow have convinced me that Communism and technological progress have perfected those traditional means of segregation beyond any czar's wildest dreams.

**Secrecy:** A cordon sanitaire of surveillance, crippling travel restrictions, tapped telephones, bugged apartment walls, bureaucratic obstacle courses, life in special foreigners' compounds, secrecy and the deliberate withholding of even the most elementary information—all this surrounds diplomats and correspondents in the Soviet capital. It shuts them off from direct knowledge of the U.S.S.R. and prevents Soviet citizens from gaining access to, or learning too much about, the foreigners in their midst. The curtain of

secrecy goes so far that to date only two Westerners have ever seen the Soviet rocket and space exploration center at Baikonur: French Presidents Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. And when Pompidou was taken there earlier this year, during his state visit to the U.S.S.R., it was in a special train with windows shut and blinds drawn tight.

Not only are hundreds of thousands of square miles of Soviet territory off limits to foreigners, but it is forbidden to photograph virtually anything except architectural monuments and happy folk festivals in those regions that are open. It is not permitted, for example, to photograph from planes or trains, to take pictures of airports, railway stations, railway track, bridges, dams, factories and, naturally enough, military installations. But who would ever think that it would also be illegal to take a camera up to the revolving restaurant of Moscow's Seventh Heaven TV tower, presumably because it has such a sweeping view of the city?

**'No':** The extent of Soviet secrecy raises the question of the effectiveness of reporting—diplomatic and journalistic—from Moscow. Are foreign governments and peoples getting a reliable picture of what is happening in the Kremlin? To me, the answer is obvious: no.

The conditions of secrecy, distrust and isolation under which diplomats and newsmen must work in Moscow force the majority of them to spend most of their time reading the official Soviet press and interviewing each other in the hope of eliciting information which neither group has. For correspondents, it is next to impossible to gain access to officials in order to discuss Soviet Government policies. Diplomats find it only slightly easier, and there are countless senior diplomats—ambassadors and minister-counselors—who are forced to spend their tours in Moscow without ever getting to talk to a high-ranking government or party representative except in formal situations such as when they present their credentials, hand over memoranda from their governments or hold their national day receptions.

As a result, most foreigners are compelled to search for hidden meanings in

the party and government press, to sift truth from fiction out of the myriad rumors that make up the gossip of the daily cocktail party circuit and to evaluate the leaks planted by "semi-official" sources whose veracity and identity no one can check. It is generally assumed that these shadowy tipsters are agents of the infamous "Department of Misinformation" of the KGB, the secret police.

**Speculation:** Thus, the best any foreigner in Moscow can say with certainty is what he does *not* know. To this day, for example, no correspondent or diplomat knows how the Politburo divided on the question of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia or whether it was divided at all. The inside story of that event remains a matter of speculation and rumor coupled with a few tidbits of information from East European sources—which may or may not be correct.

One reason for this widespread ignorance of Soviet decision making lies in the sheer physical isolation forced upon all foreigners in Moscow. Uniformed policemen stand guard at the entrances of foreign residences 24 hours a day, ostensibly to protect the property but actually to keep "unauthorized" Russians away. Unauthorized Russians are all those who are not cleared to work in the foreigners' "golden ghettos" or who are not on official business. All others who come into the compounds run the risk of being stopped at the gateway and being lectured on the dangers of consorting with foreigners. Sometimes they are even arrested, as was the case recently with a Russian Jew claiming U.S. citizenship who was barred from entering the U.S. Embassy. And needless to say, the Soviet cops keep a sharp eye out for dissenters who might try to contact a correspondent or diplomat.

There have been many instances, moreover, in which the apartments of diplomats and correspondents were entered, searched and rewired for more efficient electronic surveillance while their occupants were away on vacation. It goes without saying that telephones are

CPYRGHT

tapped, that foreigners are periodically tailed by the KGB and that their living, dining, bedroom and bathroom walls and even automobiles are bugged. Like all newcomers, I refused to believe this when I first arrived in Moscow. But it did not take me long to realize that these stories were no exaggeration. I not only found evidence that my apartment was bugged but learned how to detect the presence of miniature transmitters in the walls by tuning in on their wave length with an FM radio which immediately piped out the feedback effect. This taught me to engage in "written conversations"—the use of scratch pads and pencils when one is having a potentially dangerous "talk."

And, as might be expected, the mail of foreign residents is read. To prove that this was the case—though it is easy enough to tell from the way in which envelopes are resealed with thick Soviet glue—a Latin American diplomat recently used his diplomatic pouch to instruct his former secretary back home to send him a passionate "love letter" via regular mail. He told her to say in the letter that she was enclosing a hair from her head as a token of her love—but instructed her to be sure not to put the hair in the letter. She did as told, but when the letter arrived, there was a blond hair in it. As it happens, the diplomat's former secretary has black hair.

**Perimeter:** When they leave their residences, newsmen and diplomats are restricted to a 25-mile radius from the Kremlin, and even within this magic circle about one-third of the area is off-limits. Permanent police patrols guard the roads and to go beyond the permissible perimeter requires a special travel permit, written application for which must be made well in advance. No permit, of course, is issued unless a definite destination and route, purpose of the journey and mode of travel are specified. Even then it is up to the Foreign Ministry to

decide—and more often than not decisions are deliberately delayed and frequently requests are turned down.

All personnel in the employ of foreigners—translators, secretaries, chauffeurs, maids, clerks, handymen and all the others who make a large diplomatic community tick—are assigned by the Soviet Government and it is generally accepted that they serve two masters: the one who pays their salaries and the secret police. Technically speaking, no reporter is allowed to have any contact, for direct or indirect reporting purposes, with any Soviet citizen unless he first obtains permission from the Foreign Ministry's press department. It is a regulation that newcomers are informed of on their arrival and reminded of repeatedly thereafter. Since permission of any kind is hard to obtain, and in some cases would jeopardize the source involved, most reporters break this rule and risk expulsion—when it seems important enough. But such Western newspaper techniques as man-on-the-street interviews are out. As a poor substitute correspondents walk around with their ears open, hoping to overhear a meaningful word or two on the subway or in a queue.

**Golden Era:** Contacts with politicians and government officials are next to impossible or are channeled into such restrictive situations that they become meaningless. Most of the time the leadership can be heard and viewed only via television, from a distance on ceremonial occasions or at a Kremlin reception. Interviews with high-ranking officials are rare exceptions and when they do take place they usually degenerate into rote recitation of worn-out platitudes by the Russian being interviewed. In more than six years in office Leonid Brezhnev has not held a single press conference and Aleksei Kosygin has held only one. By contrast, the days of Nikita Khrushchev seem like a golden era—even though secrecy was the guiding principle then, too.

The present Kremlin leadership is not only rehabilitating the image of Stalin and returning to many Stalinist principles and practices, it is also returning to the Stalin-era technique of disseminating its views, decisions and decrees in secret circulars which contain progressively less information the lower the party echelon to which they are directed. Non-party people, of course, learn nothing. As one former Moscow correspondent said after his departure: "No journalist can really be honest in Russia; he must pretend to have knowledge that he does not have." It is an axiom that applies to both the newsmen and the diplomat, for neither can ever say, at any moment, whether what he has reported to his home office or government is pure speculation, simple rumor or something akin to fact. In this, reporting from Moscow is like trying to report what goes on in a jungle. The only thing one can do is observe the rustling in the underbrush, the half-visible movement in the branches overhead and the occasional cry of pain.



FIGHT IS ON AMONG VENEZUELAN COMMUNISTS

The Venezuelan CP finally split on 16 December 1970 into two organizations, the pro-Moscow regular party led by Jesus Faria, and the Petkoff group, formally headed by Pompeyo Marquez, which rejects Moscow direction. This latter group initially called itself the Popular Socialist Alliance, but subsequently decided to call itself Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo - MAS). Formation of the MAS represents a Latin American repetition of an increasingly familiar European pattern of organized opposition to Moscow domination of CP's and as such should be given maximum publicity as an example to be emulated by other CP's, particularly in Latin America. There are certain areas however where encouragement of a split may not be desirable in the long run; for example where the split would result in a conservative faction beholden to Moscow and an extreme radical faction which might get itself involved with terrorism.

~~SECRET~~

February 1971

FIGHT IS ON AMONG VENEZUELAN COMMUNISTS

Following the well-publicized split of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) in mid-December on the eve of the first Party Congress in ten years, the rebel group called Movement for Socialism\* (Movimiento al Socialismo - MAS) claimed the allegiance of the majority of delegates to the Congress, which was postponed to 23 January. The old-line Central Committee loyalists have become, say the rebels, a ridiculous minority trying to purge the majority. The new party has already announced its own organizational policies which include building a mass Communist party of diverse elements and independence of "dogmatist rule" by the pro-Moscow group which, according to the Chilean Party, has not been "shaken by a new idea for years."

In the maneuvering for strength which is taking place in this pre-Congress period, differences between the two factions are couched in ideological terms but two issues are fundamental to their fight: relationships with Moscow and control of Party power positions. Not surprisingly, the dissenters' criticisms of PCV leadership are nearly identical to those of dissenters in other Parties from Austria to Australia. They arise inevitably wherever bureaucratic, Moscow-style elites hold Party reins.

The rebels, whom the orthodox faction calls the "renovators,"

--demand Venezuelan Party autonomy, depicting the loyalists' support of "proletarian internationalism" as untenable subservience to Moscow;

--reject the Soviet Union as a model for developing Venezuelan Communism, which they insist should follow a pattern cut to its own measure, its own needs;

--accuse the orthodox group, whose "leaders are Stalinists," of requiring all PCV members to "think as they do," of running the Party without free exchange of ideas;

--demand democratic procedures including "recognition of the rank and file's right to nominate their leaders" and "the right to vote for leadership with no veto of any leader;"

--demand a return to pure Marxism-Leninism which was betrayed by "Stalinist distortions" which continue to rule Soviet and Venezuelan Communism;

\*] Formerly known as Popular Socialist Alliance.

--argue that Venezuelan Communism should confront the nation as a revolutionary party, not as "passive reformers" seeking popular front alliances (which is Soviet strategy for most Latin American parties, as it is for most minority parties around the world). The MAS' "revolution," however, rules out armed attacks on the Venezuelan government.

The loyalist group, called "reformers" by the rebels, are the same old-line, well entrenched hierarchs whose inflexible, pro-Moscow positions are the bane of youthful Communist revolutionaries and intellectuals from France to Japan. In Venezuela, they

--decry actions of the "ultras" and "liberals" and uphold a monolithic Party structure as Brezhnev dictated. They call rebels not only "anti-Soviet" but "anti-socialist" and "neo-anti-Communist" and therefore enemies of "true socialism;"

--insist that they alone are the Leninists and that they want to "transform the Party on Marxist-Leninist lines" and that they have failed in their efforts only because of "paralysis imposed by factional fights;"

--call for PCV members to "continue to be faithful to proletarian internationalism..." i.e. to Soviet domination;

--are fighting a final Party split which would leave them in the minority despite Moscow's obvious determination to rid the PCV of the dissenters, whatever the cost in numbers.

The MAS held its Congress 14-16 January, but withheld issuance of its program until 28 January, a date undoubtedly chosen because it follows the regular PCV Congress on 23 January. Thus, the PCV would not have a chance to study and attack it during its own Congress, and the MAS calculates its program and the PCV program resulting from the Congress will appear at about the same time, with any public comparison of the two redounding to MAS advantage.

(Attached are definitive statements of position by the two opposing factions: Marquez' statement in El Nacional of 18 December and a speech by Faria appearing in the regular Party newspaper Tribuna Popular of 23 December. Also attached is a newspaper account of an interview with Teodoro Petkoff, who is the focus of the ideological controversy.)

EL NACIONAL, Caracas  
18 December 1970  
CPYRGHT

TO CONSTRUCT A SOCIALIST VENEZUELA

Resolute Opposition to the Caldera Government

Message to the People

Communist Party Division

A split has occurred in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Venezuela between those of us who maintain our respect for the Party's sovereign will to which expression was to be given by holding the 4th Congress in December 1970, and those who are obstinately opposed to this.

This event has done nothing if it has not shown up the ideological boundaries which have developed in our ranks and which led to the defeat, during the discussion process, of old-fashioned ideas held by a minority which viewed the Party as an end in itself, as a narrow and dogmatic sect, under an autocratic system of control fearing theoretical debate and glued in its subservience to a stereotyped form of "Marxism" as though to some catechism. It is a minority sown confusion about proletarian internationalism, in this way threatening the Party's independence, a minority which, through its rigid positions, has made itself incapable of fully understanding the changing nature of international problems in our time and which, for this reason, has turned its back on the country, endlessly reciting outworn formulae.

It was not without a deep and painful wrench that we had to witness our differences in the ideological field. There is no doubt that it is painful to have to take up positions of categorical opposition to comrades who have shared with us many years of struggle, of successes and reverses, persecution and troubles and toward whom we, in any event, continue to feel the respect and warmth that these comrades merit through the clean and honorable life they have devoted to the service of the Party and of the people. We have had to place our consciences as revolutionaries, our supreme commitment, above everything else.

For the time being, the signatories of this message are taking upon themselves the responsibility of forming themselves into a preparatory committee for the Communist Congress which is to take place in January.

Our Problem Is the Country

We have no intention of allowing ourselves to waste away in an interminable and sterile discussion with those who used to be our Party comrades.

Our problem is the country.

And we say: Let us view the Party as a force which uses its energies in the construction of the people's power, in opposition to the imperialists and socialism, with the support of the confidence shown by the people and of their participation in a situation where the working class and the masses in general were not mere spectators but the creators of a new society which, by freeing itself, will also free man.

To this end, we must reestablish effective links between the revolutionary movement and the country's decision making political processes, struggling against those tendencies which would convert it into a marginal sector, overturning the obstacles which lie in the way of bringing the revolutionary vanguard together, the working class and the people in general.

#### We Are a National Force

To move in this direction, we are determined to increase our position as a national force which works to prepare for the Venezuelan Revolution, which bases its policies and its operational activities on a recognition of our national reality, in reality, in such a way that this reality should generate its own revolution, in keeping with our country's characteristics.

The examples of a socialist Cuba, the victory of the Popular Unity in Chile which brought a socialist to the Presidency and where the communists are playing an important role, the patriotic and popular measures taken by the military government of Peru, the events which occurred in Bolivia and Panama, the expansion of liberation struggles in the Arab world which are causing the imperialist power system to tremble -- especially the oil monopolies which operate in Algeria, Libya, Iraq among other countries in the Middle East and Africa -- all these events are an inspiration to us at this time, in spite of negative factors which, in our country, have found their expression mainly in the dispersion of the people's forces and through the domination of a reformist officialist and boss oriented leadership in the labor movement.

#### We Are an Internationalist Force

It is urgent for us to reaffirm our position as an internationalist force, in solidarity with all fighters in whatever part of the world who have made the struggle for national liberation and socialism the objective of their lives. The cause of the Vietnamese is our cause. We support the fight of the socialist world against imperialism with all the firmness we can muster. Positive feelings are our inspiration. We appreciate the efforts of the Soviets, the

Chinese, the Cubans, of all peoples constructing socialism and communism and which have thus placed themselves in a leadership position over progressive humanity, in all their magnitude. We believe, yes indeed, that the independence and sovereignty of the Party are basic conditions in any victorious revolutionary strategy.

#### Resolute Opposition to the Government

We believe that the Party must implement a policy of facing the people, stripped of any ultraleftist mythology, avoiding self adulatory revolutionary activity in little groups. We are convinced of our duty to think and to act in terms of the masses.

We are the determined supporters of the need to move toward the working class, we are persuaded that, unless this class is the decisive force, there can be no possible victory. The working class must be the main bulwark of the struggle against imperialism and against the governments in its service, for national liberation and for socialism. To exercise reformism at the roots and to contribute to the development of a class and socialist awareness is a challenge we have accepted.

We repeat to the country that we are a resolute force opposing the Caldera element. We are not just a political wheeling and dealing opposition. We want to renew faith in the Revolution. We reject that lamentable view which sees politics as the art of misleading, of opportunistic acrobatic acts. We want to cooperate with all those who want to resist the exploitative roots of our society, the falsification of democracy, who favor the supremacy of hypocrisy, the constant manipulation of the popular will and the generalized practice of violating the conscience of man through the institutional machinery of the system and the colossal propagandistic and advertising apparatus working in the service of a conformist, reformist and individualistic view of life.

We assert that the Social Christian Government has demonstrated through its political orientation and its achievements in practice that it is basically incapable of solving the country's fundamental problems and of overcoming the structural crisis which is causing such upheaval in its life at all levels. The Social Christian regime initially claimed to raise the banner of change. But they have now abandoned this idea and, in the final analysis, this government has not done nor can it do anything other than strengthen our dependence on large foreign monopolies and accentuate even further the domination by a handful of large capitalists associated to antinationalist interests. The Christian Democrats have proved that they stand for nothing more than a variation on frustrated reformism, and they have now discredited "representative democracy."

To Construct a Socialist Venezuela

The Party must undertake to construct a popular instrument which, in its confrontation of the government, will know how to demonstrate to the masses the inability of the present system of domination to produce regimes very different from the present one, whatever the political label it happens to wear.

In Latin America, the various forms of bourgeois reformism and their institutional expression, representative democracy, have been a total historical failure. This system is now already an anachronism. It has not been capable of showing the "virtues it claims." It remains nothing more than a dressed up version of the former exploitative society. Behind this facade, the only interests and desires taken into account are those of powerful economic sectors, both domestic and foreign.

There is need to carry out the gigantic task of liberating Venezuela and constructing a new society in its midst. In order to achieve this, we feel the creation absolutely necessary of a powerful and efficient social and political force capable of overthrowing the domination of the United States and the Venezuelan oligarchy. This force must be the outcome of the convergence and unity of aims of various currents, organizations, sectors and personalities struggling today or which will be capable of waging a struggle tomorrow for these great objectives and which genuinely assume or are capable of assuming revolutionary positions. We form part of this network which has so much potential to bring about transformation. We aim to play an important part within it but we have never felt at any time that we held a monopoly on truth, on patriotism and in revolutionary activity. We propose to make our fundamental contribution to the fight for the liberation of our people. But we recognize the legitimate presence of other social and political, civil and military, and religious contingents and the undoubted contribution made by others to the common battle.

Free from Hatreds and Rancor

The Central Committee members issuing this message to our Venezuelan patriots have wanted to reaffirm these purposes to which we have devoted our lives and for which we have made and continue making every kind of sacrifice. We are aware of the great difficulties that await us, especially at this time when ideological and organizational separation from a group of former comrades forces us to march separately. We shall have to face these difficulties full of confidence and free of any hatred or underlying rancor. We give you our complete assurance that our condition as communists, as fighters for the beautiful cause of a

new society in which man's exploitation of man will be liquidated is the supreme motive force that inspires us in the attitudes which we have adopted in relation to the Party collectivity, Party youth, Venezuela and the world revolutionary movement.

When the Communist Congress is held next January, we shall be submitting our views of Venezuela today, of the Venezuela for which we are fighting, in greater detail and we shall complete this message of struggle. It is our firm desire that all this should make a contribution to the discovery of the alternative sought by our people to the formulae proposed by the AD /Accion Democratica; Democratic Action/, the Social Christians and reformists of all other kinds.

We hope that we should be stimulated and helped in this effort by the best our people has to offer. The following Central Committee members have signed the message:

Pompeyo Marquez, National Secretariat member and Organization Secretary; Eloy Torres, National Secretariat member and Labor Secretary; Hector Rodriguez Bauza, Politburo member and University Secretary; German Lairer, Politburo member and PCV General Secretary in the State of Bolivar; Freddy Munoz, Politburo member and PCV General Secretary in the State of Zulia; Antonio Jose Urbina, Communist Youth General Secretary; Carlos Arturo Pardo, Politburo alternate and Disciplinary Committee member; Rafael Guerra Ramos, Politburo alternate and PCV General Secretary in the State of Lara; Argelia Laya, Politburo alternate and alternate on the Caracas Regional Committee; Hector Marcano Coello, Politburo alternate and Caracas Regional Committee alternate; Teodoro Petkoff, PCV General Secretary for Miranda; Alejandro Aguirre, PCV General Secretary for the State of Aragua; Rafael Elinio Martinez, PCV General Secretary in the Litoral; Alexis Adam, Communist Youth National Secretariat member; Luis Bayardo Sardi, Communist Youth National Secretariat member; Eleazar Diaz Rangel, PCV National Press Office member; Francisco Mierés, in charge of the PCV Economic Studies Committee; Carlos Augusto Leon, of the PCV Intellectuals Group; Luis Evaristo Ramirez, of the PCV Newsmen's Group; Benigno Rodriguez, Regional Committee member from Yaracuy.

Signed by  
Pompeyo Marquez

\* \* \* \* \*



Explanation to Communists

Comrades: As Central Committee members of the Communist Party of Venezuela, we find ourselves obligated to direct this public message of explanation to you to give you the basic reasons for which we feel that the remaining members of the Central Committee have proceeded to carry out a virtual coup d'etat against the overwhelming majority of the Party, as expressed in the cell and regional conferences held throughout the whole country.

The last Central Committee Plenum completely altered the plans outlined by the 18th Plenum for the holding of the Party Congress during the first days of this month.

The objections we formulated relating to irregularities in the vote count in the Caracas and Miranda regions were reviewed by a Special Voting Committee appointed by the Central Committee. The efforts of this committee praised by this entity which in an expressly worded resolution recognized that the majority of the irregularities had been removed. The legitimacy of the cell conferences was determined as the result of an investigation, nationally, carried out and in which almost all Politburo members and other Central Committee comrades who acted as Voting Committee delegates took part.

But when a group of comrades opposed to the holding of the Congress -- and who showed their disagreement with its position of "under the banners of Congress unity in December" -- heard the result of certain regional conferences and of the Caracas cell conferences, they chose once again to question the procedures and to submit additional objections which were aimed at preventing the meeting of the highest communist leadership organization from being held at all costs. They rose up against the proposition of "Arriving at the Congress United and Leaving it United" under the pretext that this was only a deal and that the only way of arriving united and of leaving this event united was after so-called "antiparty" or "Petkoffist" elements "had been purged."

It was under these circumstances that an article by Comrade Mosinev appeared in the daily Pravda of Moscow. This same group of comrades took this article as a reason for resubmitting the need to discuss the "Teodoro Petkoff problem," to prevent the Party Congress from being able to appoint him a member of the Central Committee and previously to that, to prevent the Miranda Regional Conference from appointing him political Party leader for that region. The "Petkoff problem" was placed on the agenda in dilemmatic form and without any prior political agreement.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

It was argued that this was a "matter of principle." The position adopted by Comrades Garcia Ponce and Eduardo Machado in relation to conflicting antagonisms within the Party again made their appearance. It was again said that it was necessary to seek monolithism at the Congress, especially as the Party was suffering under the impact of ideological disagreements and of currents which had developed as a result of these disagreements, and which currents were to be brought into harmony there, as the first step and would then disappear in the heat generated by the implementation of and support for the resolutions and leadership positions which would develop out of the Congress.

It could be seen at the 19 regional conferences that the dogmatic current was in a minority in the delegations, overall, without counting those at Caracas and Miranda which, it nevertheless appeared, would also be unfavorable to them.

This group of dogmatic comrades did not want to hear mention of the word compromise and far less to think in terms of the need to reach agreements making it possible to change the Party's action and direction and to preserve its unity, changes that would not break its unity and a unity that would not impede change that the wealth accumulated over these 10 years of activity imposed on our leadership organization and teams.

Under the banner of the struggle against "Petkoffism," they subsequently raised the question in an article by Comrade Mosinev in dramatic terms: if Petkoff is elected to the Central Committee, they would resign. As regards the Caracas Conference, they threatened not to take part if it was held when planned.

As one can see, the "Petkoff problem" only served as a smoke screen to hide their anti-Congress purposes and to ignore the will of the majority of the Party collectivity.

By a majority vote, the Politburo succumbed to this blackmail. And from that point on, the process for the Congress was interrupted and there appeared the resolutions submitted by comrade Jesus Faria, ardently supported by this group of anti-Congress comrades. These resolutions and the proposal to give special powers to the Secretary General, as the proposer of the resolution himself told the Politburo and the Central Committee, were a coup d'etat. And in the face of this situation, there were only two alternatives: To submit to the violence implied by this coup or to rebel against it. Those of us signing this message chose the latter course. These resolutions were withdrawn only when the crisis had acquired vast proportions, when in effect the Party had split, when necessity forced the Central Committee members who supported the Congress to join together in their effort to mobilize all Party forces

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

and Communist Youth against this attack against the Party majority. As this process unfurled, in practice two leadership centers developed, at different levels, one at the Central Committee level and the other especially in the Caracas Regional Committee. A new situation had developed in the Party: Forces supporting the Congress had demonstrated their vitality, their majority and their determination to prevent an accidental majority of the Central Committee to take over the Party and Communist Youth.

In spite of all these incidents, the signatories to this message voted in favor of the original resolutions that resulted from the agreement between Comrades Jesus Faria, Gustavo Machado, Pompeyo Marquez and Eloy Torres. There was a new truce, a new effort to seek compromise that would make it possible to hold the Caracas and Miranda conferences and, subsequently, the Congress.

Two days after this agreement had appeared in the press, a communique was issued signed by Comrades Faria and Garcia Ponce, cancelling the resolutions approved. On Monday 7, Comrade Antonio Garcia Ponce, Political Chief for Caracas, opened fire against the Caracas Conference in the La Pastora zone. On Tuesday 8, a majority of the Politburo met to hold discussions, but simultaneously with these discussions, Comrade Faria ordered the drawing up of a report of his own to the Party, in which he made accusations of every kind and had recourse to calumnies with his suggestions that we were "coniving with the government...." That night, these materials were distributed in the El Valle and Santa Rosalia zones by Guillermo Garcia Ponce and two members of the regional conference who supported the Garcia Ponce brothers and Eduardo Machado movement. Garcia Ponce and Del Vecchio urged militants to follow them and abandon the building, but they met with the repudiation of almost all of those present. On Wednesday 9, a Politburo Plenum was held. The atmosphere was highly charged. Previously, there had been talk of issuing an edition of Tribuna Popular devoted to Party unity. We were all surprised on Thursday 10 by its content, the way in which the internal situation was described and how the Communist Party of Venezuela's main organ avoided any mention of the above events and the way they had been used by a group within the Party.

In view of this situation, Party Politburo members Pompeyo, Eloy Torres, German Lairat, Hector Rodriguez Bauza, Freddy Munoz and Communist Youth General Secretary and original member of the Politburo, Antonio Jose Urbina, decided to hold a press conference and to inform the Party of what had happened.

Support for this position from the Communist Youth Central Council was immediate. Similarly, the Sucre, Monagas, Tachira, Trujillo, Aragua, Miranda, Litoral, UCV /Universidad Central Venezuela; Central University of Vene-

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

suela/ regional committees, a number of regional squads from the Caracas, Bolivar, Zulia, Lara, Merida, Barinas and Central University of Venezuela regional committees also gave their support. The Lara and Bolivar regional committees voted unanimously to fulfill the agreements reached by the Central Committee and to defend Party unity.

Comrades: We have reached a situation in which we the undersigned Central Committee members see ourselves forced to take upon ourselves the responsibility for calling the Caracas, Miranda and Zulia conferences for the 18, 19 and 20 /December/, as approved by the Central Committee and to move ahead with preparations for the holding of the IV Congress during January.

With this in mind, we have set ourselves up as a preparatory committee for this Congress and we shall submit an accounting of our actuation to it. We are confident that the delegations elected by the regional conferences will attend this event, and will give us their support in the historical decision which we took to safeguard the revolutionary vanguard, in a situation where discussion would be a practical means of demonstrating the internal democracy of our Party without damaging the need for centralism, for a single policy and form of discipline and for a single leadership.

Starting Friday 18 of this week, we shall reissue Deslinde as an organ of discussion, in accordance with the Party Central Committee.

We call upon the communist feelings of each Party militant and have confidence that each individual will continue to move ahead in his efforts to make preparations for the Venezuelan Communist Congress, to give our people an instrument of combat, a clearly anti-imperialist message of revolutionary opposition to the Caldera Government, quite different from those reformist, developmentist and neo-colonialist solutions offered by others.

Forward toward the Venezuelan Communist Congress!

Forward toward a strengthening of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary instrument in service of the working class and of the people, of a socialist Venezuela!

Some Guidance to the Majority in Favor of the IV Congress

1. Avoid any degrading spectacle. For example, there should be no disputes in any locale which is not ours.
2. Avoid offensive action of a personal nature and similarly avoid useless discussions with comrades who have adopted firm positions. Division does not mean the failure

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

to recognize the merit of those who have earned it from among our comrades in the anti-Congress minority. Our conduct must not reflect the pettiness normal in political schisms in Venezuela.

3. Behave in a manner in line with our position as a majority. Continuously assert this situation in all our statements.

4. Once the initial moment of necessary internal explanation has passed, our problem will be the country and not merely sterile discussions with minority anti-Congress comrades.

5. Do not divulge secrets concerning the struggle between ourselves and our former comrades which are part of our battle waged together in previous years.

6. It is fairly probable that some of our comrades in the anti-Congress minority will try to act in a manner intended to provoke us. Such behavior would be suggested, for example, by the most recent copy of Tribuna Popular and especially by the contents of a text signed by Comrade Jesus Faria, as well as in his report to the militants. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that we should not respond in kind, as this would not only damage our movement but would also have very negative repercussions for the whole peoples' movement.

Signed by the Central Committee of the  
Communist Party of Venezuela  
Pompeyo Marquez

CPYRGHT

# Construir una Venezuela Socialista Resuelta Oposición al Gobierno de Caldera

## MENSAJE AL PUEBLO:

- Nuestro problema es el país
- Somos una fuerza nacional
- Una política de cara al pueblo
- Somos una fuerza internacionalista
- Contra toda la mitología ultraizquierdista
- Exentos de odios y rencores

## MENSAJE AL PUEBLO

— I —

### LA DIVISION DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA

En el Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Venezuela ha tenido lugar una división entre los que sostenemos el respeto a la voluntad soberana del Partido, que debía expresarse en la realización de su IV Congreso en diciembre de 1970, y quienes tercamente se han opuesto a ello.

Este hecho no hace sino reflejar el deslinde ideológico que se está produciendo en el seno del Partido Comunista.

a la derrota, en el proceso de discusión, de las viejas concepciones sustentadas por una minoría que concibe al Partido como fin en sí mismo, como una secta estrecha y dogmática, gobernada autocráticamente, temerosa del debate teórico, apegada a un "marxismo" estereotipado, de catecismo. Una minoría que mistifica el internacionalismo proletario, comprometiendo de este modo la independencia del Partido. Una minoría que por sus posiciones rígidas se ha hecho incapaz de comprender cabalmente la cambiante problemática internacional de nuestro tiempo. Y que por lo mismo se ha ido quedando de espaldas al país, recitando incansablemente fórmulas gastadas.

No es sin profundo y doloroso desgarramiento como hemos llegado a la comprobación de este deslinde en el campo ideológico. Duele, sin duda, tener que oponernos categóricamente a camaradas que han compartido con nosotros, en los últimos meses, de per-

secución y sinsabores, y para quienes mantenemos, en todo caso, el respeto y el cariño que se merecen por una vida limpia y honesta, al servicio del partido y del pueblo. Hemos tenido que colocar por encima de todo nuestra conciencia de revolucionarios, compromiso supremo.

Por el momento, quienes firmamos este mensaje asumimos la responsabilidad de convertirnos en Comisión Preparatoria del Congreso de los Comunistas que habrá de realizarse en el mes de enero.

— II —

### NUESTRO PROBLEMA ES EL PAIS

No tenemos la intención de consumirnos en una interminable y estéril polémica con quienes han sido nuestros camaradas de partido.

Nuestro problema es el país.

Y declinamos: Concebimos al Partido como una fuerza que entregue sus energías a la construcción de un poder popular, antiimperialista y socialista, apoyado en la confianza y en la participación del pueblo, en el cual la clase obrera y las masas en general no sean espectadoras sino creadoras de una nueva sociedad que, liberándose a sí misma, libera también al Hombre.

A tal fin es necesario restablecer el vínculo efectivo entre el movimiento revolucionario y los procesos políticos decisivos de la nación, luchando contra las tendencias a convertir aquí en un sector marginal, derribando las barreras que obstaculizan el acercamiento entre las vanguardias revolucionarias y la clase obrera y el pueblo en general.

— III —

### SOMOS UNA FUERZA NACIONAL

Para avanzar en esta dirección estamos decididos a afirmarnos cada vez más como una fuerza nacional, que trabaje por elaborar una teoría venezolana de la revolución venezolana, que fundamente su política y su acción práctica en el conocimiento de la realidad nacional, de manera que de esta realidad nazca una revolución propia y característica de nuestro país.

Los ejemplos de Cuba socialista, la victoria de la Unidad Popular en Chile, que llevó a la Presidencia a un socialista y donde los comunistas desempeñan un papel importante, las medidas patrióticas y populares del gobierno militar del Perú, lo que sucede en Bolivia y Panamá, el ascenso de las luchas liberadoras en el Mundo Árabe, que hacen temblar el poderío del imperialismo, en particular de los monopolios petroleros que operan en Argelia, Libia, Irak, entre otros países del Medio Oriente y Africa, nos inspiran en esta hora, a pesar de los factores negativos que en nuestro país se expresan principalmente en la dispersión de las fuerzas populares y en el predominio de una dirección reformista, oficialista y patronal en el movimiento sindical.

— IV —

### SOMOS UNA FUERZA INTERNACIONALISTA

Es imprescindible reafirmar que somos una fuerza internacionalista, solidaria de todos los combatientes que en cualquier lugar del mundo hacen de la lucha por la liberación nacional y el socialismo el objetivo de su vida. La causa de Vietnam es nuestra causa. Respal damos con toda la firmeza de la cual somos capaces el combate del mundo socialista contra el imperialismo. Nos animan sentimientos positivos; valoramos en toda su magnitud los esfuerzos de los soviéticos, de los chinos, de los cubanos, de todos los pueblos que construyen el socialismo y el comunismo y que por ello se encuentran a la cabeza de la humanidad progresista. Creemos, eso sí, que la independencia y la soberanía del partido son condiciones esenciales para una estrategia revolucionaria triunfante.

— V —

### RESUELTA OPOSICION AL GOBIERNO

Creemos que el partido debe realizar una política de cara al pueblo, deslastrada de toda la mitología ultrazquierdista, más allá del ejercicio narcisista de la revolución en pequeños cenáculos. Estamos convencidos de la obligación de pensar y actuar en términos de masas.

Somos partidarios decididos de ir hacia la clase obrera, persuadidos de que sin ella como fuerza decisiva no hay victoria posible. La clase obrera tiene que ser el soporte principal de la lucha contra el imperialismo y los gobiernos a su servicio, por la liberación nacional y el socialismo. Romper en su seno el reformismo y contribuir al desarrollo de su conciencia clasista, socialista, es un desafío que aceptamos.

Reiteramos ante el país que somos una fuerza de resuelta oposición al gobierno de Caldera. No hacemos oposición politiquera. Queremos renovar la fe en la revolución. Rechazamos esa visión tan lamentablemente extendida de la política como arte del engaño, como acrobacia oportunista. Queremos cooperar con todos aquellos que resisten al fundamento explotador de la sociedad, a la falsificación de la democracia, al imperio de la hipocresía, a la manipulación constante de las voluntades y a la violación generalizada de las conciencias a través de los mecanismos institucionales del sistema y del colosal aparato propagandístico y publicitario al servicio de una visión conformista, reformista e individualista de la vida.

Afirmamos que el gobierno copcyano ha demostrado con su orientación política y sus realizaciones prácticas, que es esencialmente incapaz de resolver los problemas fundamentales del país y de superar la crisis estructural que sacude la vida del mismo en todas las esferas. El régimen socialcristiano pretendió inicialmente levantar las banderas de un cambio; pero éstas ya han sido abandonadas y aquél, en fin de cuentas, no ha hecho, ni puede hacer, otra cosa que reforzar la dependencia respecto a los grandes monopolios extranjeros y acentuar aún más la dominación de un puñado de grandes capitalistas asociados a los intereses antinacionales. La democracia cristiana y su gobierno han demostrado ser tan sólo una variante del reformismo frustrado y de la fallida "democracia representativa".

— VI —

### CONSTRUIR UNA VENEZUELA SOCIALISTA

El partido debe empeñarse en construir un instrumento popular que en el enfrentamiento al gobierno sepa demostrar ante las masas la incapacidad del actual sistema de dominación para producir regímenes diferentes al actual, cualquiera que sea la etiqueta política que los distinga.

En América Latina se ha producido el fracaso histórico de las diferentes formas del reformismo burgués y de su expresión institucional: la democracia representativa. Esta ya resulta anacrónica. No ha sido capaz de demostrar sus "virtudes". Permanece como el maquillaje de la vieja sociedad explotadora. Detrás de la fachada sólo cuentan el interés y la voluntad de los poderosos sectores económicos nacionales y extranjeros.

Está planteada la tarea gigantesca de liberar a Venezuela y construir en ella una nueva sociedad. Para lograrlo, consideramos imprescindible la creación de una poderosa y eficaz fuerza social y política, capaz de derrocar la dominación norteamericana y de la oligarquía venezolana. Esta fuerza debe resultar de la convergencia y la unidad de propósitos de las diversas corrientes, organizaciones, sectores y personalidades que luchan hoy o son capaces de luchar mañana por estos grandes objetivos y que legítimamente asumen o pueden asumir posiciones revolucionarias. Nosotros formamos parte de ese conjunto, que está lleno de potencialidades transformadoras. Aspiramos a tener dentro de él un importante papel, pero no nos consideramos en ningún momento con el monopolio de la verdad, del patriotismo y de la acción.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

revolucionaria. Nos proponemos dar una contribución fundamental a los combates liberadores de nuestro pueblo; más reconocemos la legítima presencia de otros contingentes sociales y políticos, civiles y militares, religiosos, y el aporte indudable que ellos han de dar a un combate común.

-- VII --

## EXENTOS DE ODIOS Y RENCORES

Los miembros del Comité Central que presentamos este Mensaje a los patriotas venezolanos hemos querido reafirmar estos propósitos a los cuales hemos consagrado nuestras vidas y por los cuales hemos hecho, y estamos dispuestos a seguir haciendo, todo género de sacrificios. Tenemos conciencia de las grandes dificultades que nos esperan, sobre todo en esta hora cuando el deslinde ideológico y organizativo con un grupo de viejos camaradas nos obliga a marchar por separado. Tales dificultades las enfrentaremos llenos de confianza y exentos de odios y rencores subalternos. Podemos prometer con absoluta seguridad que nuestra condición de comunistas, de combatientes por la hermosa causa de una nueva sociedad donde sea liquidada la explotación del hombre por el hombre, es la razón suprema que nos inspira en las actitudes que estamos adoptando ante el colectivo del Partido y de la Juventud, ante Venezuela y ante el movimiento revolucionario mundial.

Al celebrar el Congreso de los Comunistas en el mes de enero próximo podremos presentar más extensamente nuestra visión de la Venezuela actual y de la Venezuela por la cual combatimos, y completar nuestro mensaje de lucha. Todo ello ha de ser, así lo aspiramos firmemente, una contribución al encuentro de la alternativa que nuestro pueblo busca frente a las fórmulas adecas, copeyanas o reformistas de cualquier otra índole.

Esperamos que lo mejor de nuestro pueblo nos estimule y acompañe en esta labor.

Firman este Mensaje los siguientes miembros del Comité Central:

POMPEYO MARQUEZ, Miembro del Secretariado Nacional y Secretario de Organización.

ELOY TORRES, Miembro del Secretariado Nacional y Secretario Sindical.

HECTOR RODRIGUEZ BAUZA, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario de Universidades.

GERMAN LAIRET, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario General del PCV en el Estado Bolívar.

FREDDY MUÑOZ, Miembro del Buró Político y Secretario General del PCV en el Estado Zulia.

ANTONIO JOSE URBINA, Secretario General de la Juventud Comunista.

CARLOS ARTURO PARDO, Suplente del Buró Político y Miembro Comisión de Disciplina.

RAFAEL GUERRA RAMOS, Suplente del Buró Político y Secretario General del PCV en el Estado Lara.

ARGELIA LAYA, Suplente del Buró Político y del Secretariado del Comité Regional de Caracas.

HECTOR MARCANO COELLO, Suplente del Buró Político y del CR de Caracas.

TEODORO PETKOFF, Secretario General del PCV en Miranda.

ALEJANDRO AGUIRRE, Secretario General del PCV Estado Aragua.

RAFAEL ELINO MARTINEZ, Secretario General del PCV en el Litoral.

ALEXIS ADAM, Miembro del Secretariado Nacional de la J.C.

LUIS BAYARDO SARDI, Miembro del Secretariado Nacional de la J.C.

ELEAZAR DIAZ RANGEL, Miembro del Buró Nacional de Prensa del PCV.

FRANCISCO MIERES, Responsable de la Comisión de Estudios Económicos del PCV.

CARLOS AUGUSTO LEON, De la Fracción de Intelectuales del PCV.

LUIS EVARISTO RAMIREZ, De la Fracción de Periodistas del PCV.

BENIGNO RODRIGUEZ, Miembro del Comité Regional de Yaracuy.

Es auténtico,  
POMPEYO MARQUEZ

## EXPLICACION A LOS COMUNISTAS

Comaradas:

En nuestra condición de miembros del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Venezuela nos hemos visto obligados a dirigir este mensaje público para explicar ante ustedes las razones fundamentales por las cuales consideramos que el resto de camaradas del Comité Central ha procedido a dar un virtual golpe de Estado contra la mayoría abrumadora del Partido expresada en las conferencias de células y regionales celebradas en todo el país.

El último Pleno del Comité Central alteró por completo los planes trazados por el XVIII Pleno dirigidos a la celebración del Congreso en los primeros días de este mes de diciembre.

Las objeciones que se habían formulado sobre irregularidades en el recenso en las regiones de Caracas y Miranda fueron examinadas por una Comisión Especial de recenso designada por el Comité Central. Los labores adelantados por dicha comisión merecieron el voto de aplauso de este organismo que reconoció en resolución expresa que la mayoría de las irregularidades habían sido superadas. La legitimidad de las conferencias de células surgía de la revisión nacional que al efecto se hizo con la participación de la casi totalidad de los miembros del Buró Político y de otros camaradas del CC que sirvieron como delegados de la Comisión de Recenso.

Más un grupo de camaradas que se oponía a la celebración del Congreso, que demostró su desacuerdo con la orientación de BAJO LAS BANDERAS DE LA UNIDAD CONGRESO EN DICIEMBRE, al conocer los resultados de algunas conferencias regionales y de las conferencias de células de Caracas optó por cuestionar de nuevo el proceso y presentar objeciones adicionales que impedirían a toda costa la reunión del máximo organismo de dirección de los comunistas. Se levantaron contra la consigna de LLEGAR UNIDOS Y SALIR UNIDOS DEL CONGRESO bajo el pretexto de que ello era una composición y de que la única forma de llegar unidos y salir unidos de este evento era mediante UNA PURGA PREVIA de los elementos llamados "antipartido" o "teodoristas".

En estas condiciones aparece el artículo del c. Mosinev en el diario "PRAVDA" de Moscú. Este mismo grupo de camaradas toma dicho artículo como bandera para replantear la necesidad de discutir el "problema Teodoro Petkoff", para impedir que el Congreso del Partido pudiera designar miembro del CC y, previamente, que la conferencia regional de Miranda lo nombrara Responsable político del partido en esa región. El "problema Petkoff" se coloca a la orden del día, en forma dilemática y previo a todo tipo de acuerdo político.

Se argumentó que ello constituía una "cuestión de principios", apareció de nuevo la posición de los camaradas García Ponce y Eduardo Machado sobre las contradicciones antagónicas en el seno del Partido, se levantó la necesidad de buscar el monolitismo en este Congreso, precisamente cuando el Partido se conmueve en un debate ideológico y en corrientes que como consecuencia de él se habían formado y cuyas posiciones debían dirimirse en él, primero, y luego disolverse al calor de la aplicación y acatamiento de las resoluciones y dirección surgidos del Congreso.

La celebración de 19 conferencias regionales demostraba que la corriente dogmática tenía minoría en el conjunto de las delegaciones, sin contar las de Caracas y Miranda, que a todas luces les iban a ser desfavorables.

Este grupo de camaradas dogmáticos no quería oír hablar de la palabra compromisos y mucho menos pensar en la necesidad de arribar a acuerdos que hicieran posible introducir cambios en la actuación y en la dirección del Partido y conservar la unidad. Unos cambios que no rompieran la unidad y una unidad que no impidiera los cambios que estos ricos diez años de actividad imponían a nuestra organización y equipos dirigentes.

Bajo el lema de la lucha contra el "teodorismo" plantearon, después del artículo del c. Mosinev, la cuestión en términos dramáticos: si Teodoro era elegido en el CC ellos

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8



Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

renunciarian a dicho organismo. En cuanto a la conferencia de Caracas, amenazaron con no asistir a ella si se convocaba para la fecha fijada.

Como se puede deducir, el "problema Teodoro" sólo servía de cortina de humo para ocultar los verdaderos propósitos anti-Congreso y desconocer la voluntad mayoritaria del colectivo del Partido.

El Buró Político, por mayoría de votos, sucumbió ante este chantaje. Y a partir de entonces se interrumpió el proceso del Congreso y aparecieron las proposiciones del c. Jesús Faría, ardorosamente respaldadas por este grupo de camaradas anti-Congreso. Esas proposiciones y la petición de poderes especiales para el Secretario General, como el mismo proponente lo dijo ante el Buró Político y el Comité Central, constituirían un golpe de Estado. Y ante ello sólo quedaban dos alternativas: someterse a la violencia que implica todo golpe de Estado o rebelarse ante él. Quienes suscribimos este Mensaje optamos por lo segundo.

El retiro de dichas proposiciones se hizo luego de que la crisis había galopado, cuando en la práctica el Partido se había escindido, cuando la necesidad obligó a unificar los esfuerzos de todos los miembros del CC partidarios del Congreso, a movilizarse a las fuerzas del Partido y de la Juventud contra semejante atropello a la voluntad mayoritaria del Partido. Al desatarse esta dinámica se crearon, en la práctica dos centros de dirección a diversos niveles, en particular a nivel de Comité Central y Comité Regional de Caracas. Había nacido una nueva situación en el Partido: las fuerzas partidarias del Congreso habían demostrado su vitalidad, su mayoría y su decisión de impedir que una circunstancial mayoría del Comité Central se burlara del Partido y de la Juventud.

A pesar de todos estos incidentes, quienes suscribimos este mensaje votamos por las proposiciones originales surgidas de un acuerdo entre los camaradas Jesús Faría, Gustavo Machado, Pompeyo Márquez y Eloy Torres. Era una nueva tregua, un nuevo esfuerzo en la búsqueda de compromisos que permitieran la celebración de las conferencias de Caracas y de Miranda y posteriormente del Congreso.

A los dos días de dicho acuerdo aparece en la prensa un comunicado firmado por los cs. Faría y García Ponce que adultera las proposiciones aprobadas; el lunes 7 el c. Antonio García Ponce, Responsable Político de Caracas abre fuego contra la conferencia de Caracas en la zona de La Pastora. El martes 8 se reúne una mayoría del BP para conversar, pero simultáneamente con estas conversaciones el c. Faría ordena editar un informe suyo para el Partido en el cual se hacen acusaciones de todo genero y se apela a la calumnia al señalar que estamos en "connivencia con el gobierno..." Esa noche dicho material es repartido y leído en las zonas de El Valle y Santa Rosalía por Guillermo García Ponce y dos miembros del Regional adictos a la corriente de los hermanos García Ponce y Eduardo Machado, García Ponce y Del Vecchio instan a los militantes a seguirlos, después de abandonar los locales encontrando el repudio de la casi totalidad de los asistentes. El miércoles 9 se reúne en plenaria del Buró Político. El ambiente era sumamente tenso. Antes se había hablado de hacer un número de "Tribuna Popular" dedicado a la unidad del Partido. Todos fuimos sorprendidos el jueves 10 por el contenido y la forma cómo se presentaba la situación interna y cómo el órgano central del PCV rebasaba todo lo anterior en cuanto a su uso por parte de un grupo del Partido.

Ante semejante situación los miembros del Buró Político del Partido Pompeyo, Eloy Torres, Germán Lairé, Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, Freddy Muñoz y el Secretario General de la JC, miembro nato del BP, Antonio José Urbina, optaron por dar una rueda de prensa e informar al Partido lo que estaba sucediendo.

La adhesión a esta posición surgió inmediatamente por parte del Consejo Central de la Juventud Comunista. Igualmente de los Comités Regionales de Sucre, Monagas, Táchira, Trujillo, Aragua, Miranda, Litoral, UCV, de numerosos cuadros regionales de los CR de Caracas, Bolívar, Zulia, Lara, Mérida, Barinas y UCV. Los Comités Regionales de Lara y de Bolívar votan acuerdos unánimes sobre la necesidad de cumplir los acuerdos del CC y defender la unidad del Partido.

CAMARADAS:

Hemos llegado a una situación en que los miembros del Comité Central que suscribimos este Mensaje nos vemos obligados a asumir la responsabilidad de convocar a las conferencias de Caracas, Miranda y Zulia para los días 18, 19 y 20 tal cual como fue aprobado por el CC y adelantar los preparativos para la realización del IV Congreso en el mes de enero.

En tal sentido nos constituimos en Comisión Preparatoria del Congreso y ante él rendiremos cuenta de nuestra actuación. Confiamos en que las delegaciones electas por las conferencias regionales asistan a este evento, nos den su respaldo en la histórica decisión que hemos adoptado de salvaguardar a una vanguardia revolucionaria donde la discusión sea la manera práctica de expresarse la democracia interna de nuestro Partido sin menoscabo del necesario centralismo, de una política única de una disciplina única y de un centro de dirección única.

A partir del viernes 18 de esta semana reiniciamos la edición de "DESLINDE", uno de los órganos de la discusión según el Comité Central del Partido.

Apelamos a la condición de comunista de cada militante del Partido y confiando en ello seguiremos adelante en nuestras labores preparatorias del Congreso de los comunistas venezolanos para dotar a nuestro pueblo de un instrumento para el combate, de un mensaje claramente antimperialista y socialista, de oposición revolucionaria al gobierno de Caldera y diferente a las soluciones reformistas, desarrollistas y neocoloniales.

**¡ADELANTE HACIA EL CONGRESO DE LOS COMUNISTAS VENEZOLANOS!**

**¡ADELANTE HACIA EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE UN INSTRUMENTO REVOLUCIONARIO, MARXISTA-LENINISTA, AL SERVICIO DE LA CLASE OBRERA Y DEL PUEBLO, DE UNA VENEZUELA SOCIALISTA!**

## ALGUNAS ORIENTACIONES A LA MAYORIA PRO IV CONGRESO

1.—Evitar todo espectáculo bochornoso. Por ejemplo, donde el local no sea nuestro no debe ser disputado.

2.—Evitar ofensas de tipo personal y asimismo evitar discusiones inútiles con camaradas cuyas posiciones están definitivamente tomadas. La separación no significa el desconocimiento de los méritos de quien los tenga entre los camaradas de la minoría anti-Congreso. Nuestra conducta no debe recordar la mezquindad propia de las escisiones políticas en Venezuela.

3.—Tener una conducta propia de nuestra condición de mayoría. Reivindicar continuamente tal condición en toda declaración.

4.—Pasado el momento inicial de necesaria explicación interna, nuestro problema pasa a ser el País y no la polémica estéril con los camaradas de la minoría anti-Congreso.

5.—No difundir secretos de la lucha compartidos por nosotros y nuestros antiguos camaradas y que son patrimonio del combate conjunto de los años anteriores.

6.—Es bastante probable que algunos de los camaradas de la minoría anti-Congreso intenten actuar de manera provocadora contra nosotros. Indicio de ello sería, por ejemplo, la última "Tribuna Popular" y en particular el texto firmado por el camarada Jesús Faría, así como su informe a la militancia. En este sentido es necesario, a toda costa, que no respondamos de igual manera, pues ello no sólo dañaría a nuestro movimiento sino también repercutiría muy negativamente sobre todo el movimiento popular.

COMITE CENTRAL DEL P.C.V.

Es auténtico.

POMPEYO MARQUEZ.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

Speech by Comrade Jesus Faria Opening the Caracas Regional Conference

NO FUTURE FOR THOSE WHO DESERT

Dear comrades:

We are fewer in number than we were a month ago, but we are the same people. We have not abandoned the Party of the Communists. We are where we have always been, and where we shall always be.

Unfair comparisons are frequently made between Communists. The remark is often made: "What a great comrade so-and-so is! If everyone were like him, what a great Party this would be." I had this experience with some of the leaders who resigned from their positions as leaders of the Communist Party. To be sure, some were terrific comrades, but others who may not have seemed to be turned out better, because the former deserted the Party, and the latter remained steadfast at the barricades of the Communist revolution! Those who deserted have had a commendable past, but they have no future outside the ranks of the Communist Party.

Ideological Demarcation?

One of these former labor leaders tells me that he left the Communist Party ranks because it was essential to make a demarcation between the ideological camps. A statement of this kind reveals a great deal about the thinking of this comrade.

Why make an ideological distinction between Eloy Torres and Jesus Faria? Ideological differences are based upon the class origins of individuals, on how they live at home. And I believe that, at least until yesterday, both Eloy and I, totally dedicated as we were to building the Communist Party, lived in the austerity that the social class to which we belong imposes and demands. I never suspected that there were ideological differences separating us. But, there is something that I regard as extremely serious in connection with this imaginary demarcation: the fact that Eloy Torres has used the columns of a well-known magazine, edited by a well-known Trotskyite leader to express his ideas which differ from mine. To be frank, comrades, events are proceeding at top speed.

Other Instances

The indifference which has cropped up within the PCV /Partido Comunista de Venezuela; Communist Party of Venezuela / leadership has caused a confrontation between the Party and those who were its leaders only yesterday. Let us see who these individuals are, whose "unity of purpose" required horizons wider than the unlimited scope of this glorious Party of Venezuela's working class: Carlos Augusto Leon, Francisco Mieres, Hector Rodriguez Bauza, Rafael Guerra Ramos, Antonio Jose Urbina, Alexis Adam, German Lairret Freddy Manoz, Luis Bayardo Sardi, Orlando Aleman, Alonso Palacios, Eduardo Pozo, Luis Correa, Argelia Laya, Teodoro Petkoff and others with the same social origin and the same professional training who were of

value to the revolutionary cause so long as they were in the Communist Party and were helping the working class in its struggles for liberation.

#### A Waterless Cloud

Outside the PCV, and in confrontation with it, these former comrades are like a waterless cloud, an ill-fated hope that will never really materialize. They may come to power, but they will not make the revolution that the exploited, down-trodden masses are seeking.

In their explanatory documentation, they say that they will continue to be Communists, but such a thing is impossible. Outside the Communist Party, Communists expire like fish out of water. There is only one place for Communists: the Communist Party! There are not two Communist Parties, nor can there be. Revolutionaries seek out their Party just as naturally as plants seek the sun.

#### Their International Relations

This group of leaders who gave up their high-ranking posts as Party heads claim that they intend to continue championing proletarian internationalism, and to maintain the best of relations with the Communist Parties in other countries. Such assumptions are likewise impossible. The new Party, whose chief ideologist is Teodoro Petkoff, will have to be guided by his ideology, as expressed in his books which gratuitously attack the fellow Parties. No good relations can be maintained with other Communist Parties by the Venezuelan Party which has begun by attacking, by causing tremendous harm and by using the great written and oral press to combat the Communist Party of Venezuela.

Those who abandoned the PCV leadership to organize another Party that "would not scare" those in power, as is Petkoff's desire, claim that they intend to create a movement like the one which brought Doctor Allende to victory; but such intentions were only possible in Chile because they were based upon the unity, the might and the generosity of the Communist Party of Chile. In order to repeat in Venezuela what happened in Chile, the first prerequisite is to strengthen the unity of the PCV, but by no means desert the PCV nor lure unaware militants with bait promising renewal.

#### An Unjustified Desertion

A local newspaper contained the statement that "no discussion could be opened" in the PCV; and, five lines later, Pompeyo Marquez himself said: "For 2 years, we all had an opportunity to converse with the PCV base and leadership."

Comrades, I believe that no other Party in the world has had so much discussion as the PCV, over the past 3 years. In any event, even if other Parties may have held more discussions than the PCV, this is no reason to split the Communist Party, as has been the intention of those who gave up the leadership positions to which they were elected by the Party Congress.

Autocracy?

Another phantasy that has been summoned to explain the desertion is my alleged arrogance and mythical autocracy. In other words, Jesus Paria is the Party boss. I have faults, to be sure; I have always had them. When I was elected Secretary General of the PCV, I had many more faults than I do now. Nevertheless, comrades, when one joins the Party, he already has his own ideals, but he is not yet a proven Communist. Furthermore, the Communist Party is a noble school of wisdom, in which the workers and we other common people learn many good things, although we never stop learning. Besides, no matter how much one learns, he will always continue making mistakes which other comrades help us to correct. Our comrades' mistakes and shortcomings cannot be a reason for abandoning our positions of responsibility, for we are not going to meet up with perfect people anywhere. Whoever exchanges the Communist Party for some other political entity, fleeing from his problems, is pursuing a mirage. There is no place on earth where one can live without some kind of problem. Moreover, those who join the Communist Party are not looking for a peaceful spot, a retreat with peace and contentment; they are seeking a barricade from which to fight in the front lines against all oppressors and exploiters.

That is why those who suppose that, if they leave the Party all their "friends" will go with them are usually mistaken. No-one has approached this Party dazzled by the personality of any caudillo. The men and women who joined long after the Party was founded did so out of their Communist ideals, and have remained in the Party despite the fact that there have been some leaders who, after preaching for 30 years about the need for Communist unity, suddenly decided to separate the Party from the working class and accuse those still in the Communist Party of being mere "dogmatists," "sectarianists," "Stalinists," and foes of the congresses and discussions held in the other PCV entities.

If we were to pursue the course marked out for us by the deserters, to be a good Communist one would have to wander hither and yon, following the caudillos, and hailing their sudden, inexplicable turnabouts.

No-one Destroys This Party

I have been a member of this party for many years, but I have never told any of my comrades to support my recommendations. I have told them, and I repeat it again: Follow the Communist Party, for it is, as the great Russian poet said: "The youth of the world."

I tell you, dear comrades, that I deplore having lost terrific comrades for the revolutionary struggle. But, I must confess that I never thought any of those comrades would reach the point of leaving the Communist Party, much less of promising villas and castles to other comrades if they, too, would leave the ranks of the Party of the working class. But, just as I forcefully proclaim what I have just said, I also declare that no-one is going to destroy this Party. No enemy, either from within or without, can mortally wound it. They have harmed us, to be sure, but they have met their downfall as revolutionary leaders. From Vietnam to Chile, it will be the Communist Party as it exists today that will fly the banners of proletarian internationalism. This is an historic fact, not the kind

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

of catechetical statement that has always been made by the bourgeoisie and is now being repeated by those who were our comrades up until yesterday.

Comrades: We have not yet taken an inventory on the damage that the splinter groups have caused, for there have been various types. However, all is not lost. The departure of certain individuals who instigated fraudulent elections is the Party's gain, rather than loss. Those who have left the Party after long years of Communist militancy know what they have done, as do those of us who are still Party members. Who would not regret the desertion of a comrade? But it is not the nature of Communists to beg those who do not wish to be Communists to continue as such.

This is the Party of the workers of town and country, the Party of revolutionary intellectuals wherein the latter can place their skills at the disposal of a social class that is different from their own, but more revolutionary. The farmers and workers will remain in this Party, because they need it as an instrument for their battles, just as the guerrilla fighter needs his gun. The Communist Party will staunch its wounds, and rebuild what has been destroyed. It will emerge from this crisis more united and more powerful, as the only hope for liberation among the oppressed masses of Venezuelan people.

#### The PCV Harbors No Ill-Will

In the case of professionals and other individuals who have left the Party, on the assumption that they may have been duped and might wish to return to their positions as combatants in the Communist Party, their records will be studied individually, without any ill-will or retaliation. This Party, as always, belongs to all revolutionaries. No-one here is denied an opportunity to fight for a just cause. In this Party, as in no other, one can disagree with the views of the majority within any of the entities which comprise the Communist Party structure.

#### The Style Will Pass

At the moment, the splinter groups are in style, both on TV and radio and in the big newspapers. It suits both the imperialists and the bourgeoisie to show those willing to desert that they will be well received and incorporated into the system. Any force which dissociates itself from a Communist Party, whether large, small or miniscule, will be built up by the advertising media in the service of the enemies of the people, at least for awhile. That is how it has always been, and always will be. The functions of the new Party will be attended, as proof that, in order to succeed, one need only cease to be a Communist.

#### Their Fate

Sooner or later, these splinter groups which have been harming the PCV organization for years, will be confronted with internal problems. For the time being, they are united by the mutual desire to bring the greatest possible harm to the Communist Party; but this "vein" will soon give out. Before the New Year's sun has warmed, disputes will crop out, and those who had illusions of principles outside the Communist ranks will get a taste of hours of endless bitterness.

Recovery Has Begun

Today, the Communist Party can claim a slight recovery. Whole regions have remained loyal to the Party. Individuals who differ markedly from me have remained in the Party, upholding their point of view. Encouraging news has arrived from all parts of the country, about individuals, both old and young, who have expressed their loyalty to the Communist cause. Our fellow Parties the world over give us their handclasp of solidarity. Comrades, we are not alone! The working class and the working farmers are on our side. These social classes do not believe in fairy tales. The working people have faith in their Communist Party; and, even though they may sometimes seem indifferent or aloof, they are on the side of the Communists, because it is we who are the best interpreters of their age-old desires for liberation and progress.

No Whining!

At this time of tremendous problems, when even those who were our comrades and brothers are trying to cause us the greatest possible amount of harm, the reaction from our comrades has been formidable: No whining! Upright, to a man, working for the Party! From today on, we are going to put in working days such as we have not seen in years. We shall hold our 4th Congress, and we shall proceed from one victory to the next. Tribuna Popular will once again be the Communist paper with the large circulation, beloved and assisted by our working people.

It is our destiny to struggle! Forward, comrades, to execute the complex tasks which the new situation has demanded of us. Friend and foe alike will be amazed to see how we have improved our mass endeavor. Long live the Communist Party!

TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas  
 Diciembre 23 de 1970

Discurso del c. Jesús Faría en la instalación de la Conferencia Regional de Caracas

# Quienes Desertaron No Tienen Porvenir

Queridos camaradas:

Hoy somos menos que hace un mes, pero somos los mismos. No hemos abandonado el Partido de los comunistas. Estamos donde siempre estuvimos. Donde siempre estaremos.

Muy a menudo se hacen comparaciones injustas entre los comunistas. Suele decirse: ¿Qué gran camarada es fulano! Si todos fueran como él, que grande sería este Partido. Esto me aconteció con algunos de los dirigen-

tes que desertaron de sus cargos de Dirección al frente del Partido Comunista. Ciertamente que eran estupendos camaradas algunos, pero otros que no lo parecían resultaron mejores, porque aquéllos desertaron y éstos se mantienen firmes en las barricadas de la revolución comunista! Quienes desertaron tienen un pasado meritorio, pero no tienen porvenir fuera de las filas del Partido Comunista.

**¿DESLINDE IDEOLÓGICO?**

Uno de estos viejos dirigentes

obreros nos informa que emigro de las filas del Partido Comunista porque era indispensable deslindar campos ideológicos. Tal afirmación dice mucho de lo que se imagina este camarada.

¿Qué deslinde ideológico era necesario entre Eloy Torres y Jesús Faría? Las distintas ideologías provienen del origen de clase de las personas, de la manera cómo viven en sus casas. Y creo que tanto Eloy como yo, dedicados por entero a la construcción del Partido Comunista, vivíamos bas-

ta ayer no... que impone y reclama la clase social a la cual pertenecemos. Nunca sospeché que entre nosotros hubiera ideologías en pugna. Pero hay algo que considero extremadamente grave en cuanto este imaginario deslinda: Eloy Torres utiliza las páginas de una conocida revista dirigida por un conocido dirigente trotskista para dar a conocer sus ideas distintas a las mías. Francamente, camaradas, los acontecimientos van al galope.

**OTROS CASOS**

El desprendimiento que se produjo en la Dirección del PCV ha enfrentado al Partido Comunista con quienes hasta ayer fueron sus dirigentes. Veamos quienes son estas personalidades "cuya unidad de propósitos" necesitó más amplios horizontes que los ilimitados de este glorioso Partido de la clase obrera venezolana: Carlos Augusto León, Francisco Mieres, Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, Rafael Guerra Ramos, Antonio José Urbina, Alexis Adam, Germán Lairret, Freddy Muñoz, Luis Bayardo Sardi, Orlando Alemán, Alonso Palacios, Eduardo Pozo, Luis Correa, Argelia Laya, Teodoro Petkoff y otros del mismo origen social y de la misma formación profesional fueron de utilidad para la causa revolucionaria mientras estuvieron en el Partido Comunista, mientras ayudaron a la clase obrera en sus luchas liberadoras.

**UNA NUBE SIN AGUA**

Fuera del PCV y enfrentados al PCV estos ex-camaradas son como una nube sin agua, una pobre esperanza que jamás cuajará en realidad: Podrán llegar al poder, pero no harán la revolución que las masas explotadas y oprimidas buscan.

En sus documentos explicativos dicen que seguirán siendo comunistas, pero tal cosa no es posible. Fuera del Partido Comunista los comunistas fallecen como los peces fuera del agua. Sólo hay un lugar para los comunistas: ¡El Partido Comunista! No hay dos Partidos Comunistas ni puede haberlos. Los revolucionarios buscan su Partido con la misma naturalidad con que las plantas buscan el sol.

**SUS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES**

Este grupo de dirigentes que desertó de sus elevados cargos de Dirección afirman que se proponen mantener en alto las banderas del internacionalismo proletario y que mantendrán las mejores relaciones con los Partidos Comunistas de los otros países. Tales postulados tampoco serán posibles. El nuevo Partido, donde Teodoro Petkoff es el principal ideólogo, tendrá que guiarse por la ideología de éste, expresada en sus libros, donde agrade gratuitamente a los Partidos hermanos

con otros Partidos Comunistas el partido venezolano que empieza por agredir, por causar tremendos daños y por combatir desde la gran prensa escrita y hablada, al Partido Comunista de Venezuela.

Dicen quienes desertaron de la Dirección del PCV, para organizar otro partido, "que no asuste" a los poderosos, como le gusta a Petkoff, que se proponen ayudar a forjar un movimiento igual al que le dio la victoria al doctor Allende, pero tales propósitos fueron imposibles en Chile porque se basaron en la unidad, en el poderío y en la generosidad del Partido Comunista de Chile. Para repetir en Venezuela lo acontecido en Chile, la primera condición es fortalecer la unidad del PCV, pero en ningún caso desertar del PCV y sonsacar con señuelos renovadores a militantes desprevedidos.

**UNA DESERCIÓN INJUSTIFICADA**

En un diario local se afirma que en el PCV "No se podía abrir un debate" y cinco líneas más adelante el mismo Pompeyo Márquez dice que: "Todos tuvimos oportunidad de hablar durante dos años con la base y la dirigencia del PCV".

Camaradas: creo que no hay otro Partido en el mundo que haya discutido tanto como lo ha hecho el PCV durante los últimos tres años. En todo caso, aunque pudiera haber otros Partidos donde se discutiera más que en el PCV, éste no es motivo para dividir al Partido Comunista, como han pretendido hacer quienes abandonaron cargos de Dirección para los cuales fueron electos por el Congreso del Partido.

**¿AUTOCRACIA?**

Otro fantasma que se esgrime para explicar la deserción sería mi supuesta arrogancia y una mítica autocracia. Es decir, que Jesús Faria es el amo del Partido. Por supuesto que tengo defectos. Siempre los he tenido. Cuando fui electo Secretario General del PCV tenía muchos más defectos que ahora mismo. Sin embargo, camaradas, cuando uno ingresa al Partido, tiene ya sus ideales, pero todavía no es comunista probado. Más aún: el Partido Comunista es una noble escuela de sabiduría donde los obreros y demás gentes humildes del pueblo aprendemos muchas cosas buenas, aunque nunca terminamos de aprender. Además, por mucho que uno aprenda, siempre suele cometer errores, que otros camaradas nos ayudan a corregir. Los errores y defectos de nuestros camaradas no pueden ser motivo para desertar de nuestros cargos de responsabilidad, porque en ninguna parte vamos a toparnos con gentes perfectas. Quien se muda del Partido Comunista para otra formación política huyéndole a las dificultades, va detrás de un espe-

jo. No existe lugar en el mundo donde se pueda vivir sin alguna clase de problemas. Por lo demás, quienes ingresan al Partido Comunista, no vienen en pos de un lugar tranquilo, de un remanso de paz y sosiego, sino que vienen en busca de una barricada desde donde combatir en las primeras filas contra todos los opresores y explotadores.

Por esta razón suelen equivocarse quienes se imaginan que si ellos se van del Partido se irán con ellos todos sus "amigos". A este Partido nadie ha venido deslumbrado por la figura de ningún caudillo. Los hombres y mujeres que han ingresado mucho después de fundado el Partido lo han hecho por sus ideales comunistas y se quedan en el Partido aunque haya dirigentes que, después de haber predicado durante treinta años la necesidad de la unidad comunista, repentinamente resuelve dividir al Partido de la clase obrera y pretenden que aquellos camaradas que se quedan en el Partido Comunista son simples "dogmáticos", "sectarios", "stalinistas", enemigos de los congresos y de las discusiones en los otros organismos del PCV.

Siguiendo por el camino que nos señalan los desertores, para ser buen comunista, uno tendría que andar de seca en meca, detrás de los caudillos, aplaudiendo sus bruscos e inexplicables virajes.

**A ESTE PARTIDO NO LO DESTRUYE NADIE**

Tengo muchos años en este Partido, pero jamás le he dicho a ninguno de mis camaradas que respalde mis proposiciones. Les he dicho y les repito una vez más: sigan al Partido Comunista que este es, como dijo el gran poeta ruso: "La Juventud del Mundo".

Declaro ante ustedes, queridos camaradas, que deploro el haber perdido a estupendos camaradas para la lucha revolucionaria. Más todavía, confieso que jamás pensé que algunos de estos camaradas llegarían a dejar al Partido Comunista y mucho menos a prometer villas y castillos a otros camaradas para que también abandonen las filas del Partido de la clase obrera. Pero así como de claro rotundamente lo que acabo de afirmar, digo también que a este Partido nadie lo destruye. Ningún enemigo puede herirlo de muerte, ni desde afuera ni desde adentro. Nos han causado daño, es verdad, pero ellos se hundieron en su calidad de dirigentes revolucionarios. Desde Viet-Nam hasta Chile será el Partido Comunista, como lo ha sido hasta hoy, el que mantiene en alto las banderas del internacionalismo proletario. Esta es una verdad histórica, no es ningún catecismo como siempre lo dijo la burguesía y como ahora repiten quienes hasta ayer fueron nuestros camaradas.

Camaradas: Todavía no hemos hecho el inventario de los daños causados por los grupos fraccionales, puesto que son varios. Sin embargo, no todo son pérdidas. Con la salida de algunas personas, autores de fraudes electorales, el Partido no pierde sino que gana. Quiénes se van del Partido, después de largos años de militancia comunista, saben lo que hacen, como lo sabemos quienes nos quedamos en el Partido. ¿Quién no lamenta la deserción de un camarada? Pero no es propio de comunistas implorar a quienes no quieren ser comunistas, para que lo sigan siendo.

Este es el Partido de los trabajadores de la ciudad y del campo, el partido de los intelectuales, revolucionarios, donde éstos pueden poner sus facultades al servicio de una clase social distinta a la suya propia, más revolucionaria. Los campesinos y los trabajadores seguirán en este Partido, porque lo necesitan como instrumento para sus luchas, como el guerrillero necesita el fusil. El Partido Comunista restañará las heridas, reconstruirá lo que ha sido destruido y emergerá de esta crisis más unido y poderoso, como la única esperanza de liberación para las masas oprimidas del pueblo venezolano.

#### NO HAY RENCORES EN EL PCV

En cuanto a los profesionales y otras personas que se han marchado, en el supuesto que hayan sido engañados y quisieran ocupar de nuevo sus puestos de combate en el Partido Comunista, sus casos serán examinados uno por uno sin rencores ni retaliaciones. Este Partido es de todos los revolucionarios, como siempre lo fue. Aquí a nadie se le niega la oportunidad de luchar por una causa justa. En este Partido, como en ninguno, se puede discrepar de la opinión de la mayoría dentro de los organismos que forman la estructura del Partido Comunista.

#### LA MODA PASARÁ

Por los momentos, los grupos fraccionales están de moda tanto en la TV como en la radio y en la gran prensa. Tanto al imperialismo como a la burguesía les conviene mostrar a quienes, quieran desertar que éstos serán bien recibidos e integrados al sistema. Toda fuerza que se desprenda de un Partido Comunista, grande, pequeña o minúscula, será inflada por los medios de publicidad al servicio de los enemigos del pueblo, por un tiempo al menos. Así fue y así será. Los actos del nuevo partido se verán concurridos, como demostración de que, para tener buen éxito, basta con dejar de ser comunista.

#### SU DESTINO

Estos grupos fraccionales que durante años causaron daño a la organización del PCV, tropezarán más temprano que tarde con problemas internos. Por ahora los unifica el deseo común de causar el mayor daño posible al Partido Comunista; pero este "filón" se agotará muy pronto. Antes de que el sol del nuevo año haya calentado, tomarán cuerpo las querellas y, quienes soñaron con los principios fuera de las filas comunistas, van a paladear horas de interminable argüra.

#### COMENZO LA RECUPERACION

El Partido Comunista ya hoy puede afirmar pequeñas recuperaciones. Regiones enteras se mantienen leales al Partido. Personalidades que tienen firmes discrepancias conmigo, se mantienen dentro del Partido, defendiendo sus puntos de vista. De todos los confines de la patria llegan noticias alentadoras sobre personas, viejas y jóvenes, que manifiestan su lealtad a la causa del comunismo.

Los Partidos hermanos del mundo entero nos tienden su recia mano solidaria. ¡No estamos solos, camaradas! Con nosotros está la clase obrera y están los campesinos trabajadores. Estas clases sociales no creen en cuentos. El pueblo trabajador tiene fe en su Partido Comunista y, aunque a veces parece indiferente y ausente, está con los comunistas, porque somos quienes mejor interpretamos sus seculares anhelos de liberación y progreso.

#### ¡NADA DE LLORIQUEOS!

En esta hora de tremendas dificultades, cuando hasta quienes eran nuestros camaradas y hermanos tratan de causarnos el mayor daño posible, la reacción de nuestros camaradas ha sido formidable: ¡Nada de lloriqueos! ¡De pie, como un solo hombre, a trabajar por el Partido! Jornadas que hacía muchos años no se realizaban, las vamos a realizar desde hoy mismo. Haremos nuestro IV Congreso y marcharemos de victoria en victoria. "Tribuna Popular" será de nuevo el periódico comunista de gran circulación, querido y ayudado por nuestro pueblo trabajador.

¡Nuestro destino es luchar! Adelante, camaradas, a cumplir las complejas tareas que la nueva situación nos impone. Amigos y enemigos se quedarán asombrados cuando vean cómo mejoramos nuestro trabajo de masas. ¡El Partido Comunista!



LA VERDAD, Caracas

18 December 1970

CPYRGHT

Teodoro Petkoff:

MARXISTS MUST STUDY

THE DEGENERATION OF THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS BUREAUCRACY AND POLICE

Teodoro Petkoff, leader of the Venezuelan Communist Party's Renovation Group, said on the television program "Buenos Dias" yesterday that the publication of his book "Czechoslovakia," was not a decisive factor in the division of the Communist Party, but rather a symptom of an international socialist problem which led to the confrontation of two positions on the party, the country and its definition, and on the kind of structural and revolutionary change that should be possible along a non-stalinist democratic socialist path.

The debate on the book served to bring out the debate on two opposed ideas of socialism. However, even without my book the Venezuelan Communist Party would not have been able to go on ignoring the facts as revealed by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU of the Czechslovak tragedy.

For the present, we must avoid the dangers of dissidence. But it must be said that the reason I wrote this book and started the debate is because I thought that the intervention in Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries could not be looked upon as a secondary matter, but that it led to a questioning of the values which had been associated with socialism during the course of 50 years; and because this was an opportunity for a country like ours to begin examining the problems inherent in our organization and in our concept of the society we desire and its application to the structural changes required by Venezuela. If we propose to build socialism in Venezuela we must review all the negative and positive features of socialism as it actually exists and has been established in some parts of the world in the past 50 years.

I believe that along side certain spectacular achievements in matters of economic development, the socialism that emerged in undeveloped countries that had not known capitalist development and that had not passed through the state of bourgeois democracy suffers from several serious imperfections. I believe that "stalinism" and the legal violations which Stalin incurred, were not the product of one leader's paranoia, but that they were the necessary product of a definite social and political structure operating in a backward and feudal peasant country.

Those of us who have in mind a positive social change for our country will have to make a most careful study of the kind of imperfection and bureaucratic and police degeneration the Soviet Union has experienced, and the suitability of attempting to set up machinery that would prevent the emergence of a bureaucracy and of repressive mechanisms which after a while would go against the masses themselves.

Experience is demonstrating that there exists no split in socialism, but that there exists a worldwide effort to rediscover true socialism and to return to the sources by means of a critical analysis of the very socialist societies that were not able to attain the ideal. It is obvious -- and this can be seen everywhere -- that it is not only the communist parties, but that there are numerous forces in several countries, such as priests, young people from Europe and the United States, Social-Christian groups, and so forth, that take a social change of socialist content as their point of reference. There is a return to the socialism of 1848 and its studies on alienation which remain very valid.

Far from a Marxist division, there is a revival, a renewed interest in Marxist thought in the world. Of course, there are pseudomarxist, dogmatic, and orthodox groups wedded to hopelessly rigid interpretations. However, there are other groups that seek solutions, not in a Marxism corrupted by Stalin, but in a renewed concept of true Marxism.

The entire stalinist concept is nothing but Marxism without debate. The Marxism of Marx and Lenin is the product of a gigantic controversy, of an endless debate.

As is the case with all divisions, the case of our party's recent division also has its amusing side. The division arose over the question of whether or not to call the party Congress which we would easily have won. Of the two resulting groups, one as a majority and the other as a minority group led by the Garcia Ponce brothers and Eduardo Machado seeks to oppose the Congress or to make it conditional upon a party purge. We, who represent the party majority on the basis of the Regional Conferences, are, therefore, the true Communist Party.

This is a summary of yesterday's interview on the program "Buenos Dias" which is televised Mondays through Fridays at 7:00 a.m. on CVTV, Channel 8.

CPYRGHT

LA VERDAD, Caracas  
18 December 1970

*Teodoro Petkoff:*

# MARXISTAS DEBEN ESTUDIAR LA DEGENERACION BUROCRATICA Y POLICIACA EN LA UNION SOVIETICA

TEODORO PETKOFF, dirigente del Grupo Renovador del Partido Comunista de Venezuela, dijo ayer en el programa "Buenos Días" que la aparición de su libro "Checoslovaquia" no fue decisiva en la escisión del comunismo venezolano, sino apenas un síntoma de un problema mundial del socialismo, que llevó a enfrentar dos posiciones

bio estructural, revolucionario que debería ser posible por una vía socialista no stalinista sino democrática. El debate sobre el libro sirvió para poner de bulto el debate sobre dos concepciones contrapuestas del socialismo, pero aún sin mi libro, el Partido Comunista, Venezolano no hubiera podido seguir ignorando las realidades reveladas por Khrushchev en el XX Congreso del Partido Comunista Soviético, ni el drama de Checoslovaquia.

CPYRGHT

-Por lo pronto es necesario para nosotros eludir los peligros de la disidencia. Pero no puedo dejar de decir que la razón por la cual escribí este libro y suscitó el debate es porque pensé que la intervención de los ejércitos soviéticos y de otros países socialistas en Checoslovaquia no podía verse como un asunto secundario, sino que a través de ella se ponían en tela de juicio los valores que a través de 50 años se han ido asociando con el Socialismo, y que era la oportunidad para que un partido como el nuestro empezara a examinar los problemas inherentes a nuestra organización y nuestra concepción de la sociedad que queremos, así como de su aplicación a los cambios estructurales que reclama Venezuela. Si nosotros nos proponemos construir el socialismo en Venezuela, es indispensable hacer una revisión de todos los rasgos negativos y positivos que han marcado el socialismo concreto, que ya existe y se ha instaurado en algunos lugares del mundo en los últimos 50 años.

-Pienso que al lado de ciertos logros espectacu-

lares en materia de desarrollo económico, el socialismo que nació en países atrasados que no conocieron antes un desarrollo capitalista, que no pasaron por la etapa de la democracia burguesa, viene marcado por una serie de graves imperfecciones. Creo que el "stalinismo" y las violaciones legales en que incurrió Stalin no fueron producto de una paranoia del líder, sino que fueron producto necesario de una estructura social y política determinada. Funcionando en un país campesino, atrasado y feudal.

-Quiénes tenemos en mente un cambio social positivo en nuestro país, tendríamos que estudiar con sumo cuidado el tipo de imperfección y degeneración burocrática y policíaca experimentada en la Unión Soviética, y la conveniencia de tratar de crear mecanismos que impidan el nacimiento de una burocracia y de mecanismos represivos que al cabo de algún tiempo se oponen a las masas mismas.

La experiencia está demostrando que no hay una quiebra del Socialismo, sino que hay todo un intento mundial de redescubrimiento del verdadero so-

cialismo, de retorno a las fuentes, incluso mediante el análisis crítico de las mismas sociedades socialistas que no han podido alcanzar el ideal trazado. Es evidente, -y esto se puede comprobar en todas partes- que no sólo son los partidos comunistas, sino que hay una cantidad de fuerzas en diversos países, entre ellos, sacerdotes, jóvenes de Europa y Estados Unidos, sectores social-cristianos, etc., que se fijan como punto de referencia un cambio social de sentido socialismo. Incluso hay un retorno al de 1848 y sus estudios sobre la alienación, que permanecen inmensamente válidos.

Lejos de haber una quiebra del marxismo, hay un refrescamiento, un interés renovado por el pensamiento marxista en el mundo. Desde luego, que hay sectores pseudomarxistas, dogmáticos, ortodoxos, aterrorizados a interpretaciones enquistadas, que no tienen remedio; pero hay otros grupos que buscan soluciones no en el marxismo bastardeado por Stalin, sino en una concepción renovada, del marxismo auténtico.

- Toda la concepción sta-

linista, no es sino el marxismo sin debate. El marxismo de Lenin y Marx es el producto de una polémica gigantesca, de un debate interminable.

-Como todas las escisiones, en el caso de la división reciente de nuestro partido, esta también tienen su aspecto anecdótico que tomar en cuenta. La división se produce sobre la base de convocar o no al Congreso del Partido, que nosotros hubiéramos ganado fácilmente. De los dos grupos que resultan, uno como mayoría y otro como minoritario. El minoritario, encabezado por los hermanos García Ponce y Eduardo Machado, intenta oponerse al Congreso, o condicionarlo a una depuración partidista. Nosotros, que representamos la mayoría del partido, en Conferencias Regionales realizadas, somos, pues, el verdadero Partido Comunista.

Este es un resumen de la entrevista realizada ayer en el programa Buenos Días que se transmite de lunes a viernes a las 7 am., por CTV, Canal 8.

25X1C10b

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

Excerpts from press  
and radio reports  
concerning Viet Cong  
terrorism.

1970

VIET CONG TERRORISM

One of the Viet Cong's principal aims in South Vietnam is to disrupt the Saigon Government's pacification program and local administration, presumably to ensure that the Communists control as much of the population as possible in the event of a cease-fire. The Viet Cong Liberation Press Agency reported on October 27 that "the people's security forces within the nine months beginning January this year repeatedly attacked the 'pacification' forces and punished cruel agents and spies, wiping out tens of thousands of them. Many local governors were among those disposed of by the liberation security forces in accordance with the policies of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government." Liberation Radio reported on October 28 that there was also a campaign to disrupt the government's land reform program.

On September 4, Viet Cong troops attacked a Civil Self Defense Training Center in Binh Dinh Province. It was reported by local officials that 14 Vietnamese were killed, including one child; 26 were wounded, including two children and a woman.

Terrorist attacks have not been confined to local officials and pacification teams. At the end of August a hospital, a temple and an orphanage near Danang were shelled, as well as four polling stations, in an attempt to disrupt the Senate elections. In 24 hours 42 South Vietnamese were said to have been killed and 114 injured, many of them children. Survivors claimed that the attackers were uniformed North Vietnamese soldiers.

On September 10, a Chinese high school principal, Koang Trung Vinh, who had been a candidate for the Senate, was shot dead as he walked into his office. On October 5, Viet Cong guerrillas attacked a refugee resettlement area in Binh Dinh province killing 20 civilians and wounding 40 others with mortar fire. Several other acts of terrorism occurred during the week-end of October 3-4. In the Mekong Delta the Viet Cong tossed a grenade into a funeral procession, killing 12 mourners and wounding ten. Near Thu Duc, north of Saigon, a plastic bomb, detonated in a restaurant, killed six civilians, a policeman and three soldiers and wounded five other people. Five more civilians were killed and two wounded when the Communists fired a rocket-propelled grenade into a house near Duc Hoa, west of Saigon.

Two journalists killed in Cambodia on October 28, Frank Frosch of United Press, and Kyochi Suwada, his Japanese photographer, are believed to have been murdered by Vietnamese Communists. Seven foreign journalists have now been killed in Cambodia, while another 17 are still missing.

**25X1C10b**

**Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8**

**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

**Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8**

# Behind the Facade: Life in Castro's Communist Cuba

By **PAUL D. BETHEL**

## **HOW** does the worker fare in Communist Cuba?

This question was answered on October 16, when the official Communist organ of the country, Granma, announced the promulgation of Government Resolution No. 425. Twice each year, every Cuban worker will be evaluated according to a dossier kept on his work performance. He will receive "merits" or "demerits" according to how "revolutionary" he is in his work performance.

If you really want to get along with Castro's Communist regime, here is what you must do: "Continue working after you have already completed, efficiently, your normal day of work; complete studies [after hours, ed.] which lead to cultural or technical advancement; serve as an instructor to your comrades after you have completed your normal work day; participate in agricultural work."

If you don't do these things, demerits are entered into your government-held dossier. It is as simple as that.

Cuba's Communist regime singles out those "addicted to absenteeism, disapproval of volunteer work performance [without pay, ed.], excessive use of electricity, indiscipline and disrespect for fellow workers [Communists informers, ed.], etc., etc." These people are really in trouble and subject to being hauled before Labor Tribunals composed of Communist "vanguard workers." Punishment ranges from admonition, severe fines, loss of food or clothing ration card to imprisonment, or the firing squad right on the spot. Resistance to his regime, Castro said: "An infinite number of faults, acts of negligence,

The enforcers are Fidel Castro's informers, called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Speaking to representatives of these groups (who have spies in every work shop, office and agricultural enterprise in the country), Castro urged them on September 29 "to increase your vigilance of thieves, counter-revolutionaries" within the labor force. Speaking of Cuban workers' laziness, neglect and other factors are beginning to come to light . . . and they will be dealt with right down the line."

More than 400,000 Cuban youths refuse to go to school or work. This is a very large number, considering that total youth enrollment in school is about 1.6 million. Moreover, according to Fidel Castro's own words, those who do attend classes are two years

Paul D. Bethel, executive director of the U.S. Citizens Committee for Cuba, served in the U.S. diplomatic service for 12 years, and was the press attache to the U.S. Embassy in Havana from 1958 to 1961.

behind in grade. And the poor Cuban laborer is the one who suffers for that, too. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution haul parents into the street and accuse them of refusing to send their children to school, threaten to revoke their ration cards and see to it that "demerits" are entered into their labor dossiers.

Just last September 2, government spokesman Guido Garcia Inclan spoke over Radio Progreso in Havana, excoriating Cuban youth in these terms: "Dissension, failure to get to work on time, difficulties raised by them when they are of military age, doing things they should not be doing during class hours. . . . Youths always have a derisive joke to make about our revolution. . . ." Journalism students burned down their newspaper, El Mundo, and have been attacked by Castro's military magazine, Verde Olivo, for tearing down posters of the late and unlamented "Che" Guevara.

With all this abuse, the Cubans have little to eat and very little in the way of entertainment. Rice is a staple in Cuba, and the average per capita consumption, pre-Castro, of 134.22 pounds yearly has been cut to about 34 pounds. Cubans who consumed an average of 73 pounds of meat each year are now lucky to receive 6 ounces a week. In interior towns and cities, the ration falls below that.

Milk is available to children only under two years of age, and is rationed at two cans of condensed milk per month. Coffee-drinking Cubans may only receive 1½ ounces of coffee per week in Castro's Communist paradise. Split peas and kidney or soya beans are rationed at six ounces per week, while only ¼ pound of butter or margarine is available every four months.

Imagine trying to keep yourself clean on a bar of soap measuring no larger than those tiny slivers of soap available in hotels—and then only one such bar once each month. One tube of toothpaste which solidifies in about ten days. One roll of toilet tissue every two months. Add to this that water is not available for days on end, and one gets a pretty good idea of life in Communist Cuba.

The lack of sanitary facilities was underscored the week of October 19, when the

government announced that due to an electrical breakdown five out of Cuba's six provinces were without light and water. Indeed, the lack of water is a common occurrence in Castro's Cuba and has led to epidemics which the government, up until 1966, didn't even attempt to hide.

Gastroenteritis is the most common, and deaths from it rose from 14 in 1958 to 1,662 in 1966. Deaths by hepatitis for the same period jumped from 26 to 8,977 while the incidence of syphilis, an indicator of social promiscuity, rose from 26 cases in 1958 to 1,863 in 1964. All these figures are taken directly from data published by Cuba's Ministry of Public Health and from statements made by leaders of the Castro regime. Since 1966, the government has held back on issuing any further information on Cuba's public health.

Medical tourists come and go in Cuba, usually issuing statements on the "progress" in public health under Castro's Communist regime. In some instances, the medical doctors are unaware of the excellent medical conditions prevailing in pre-Castro Cuba, ac-

cept the regime's assessment that it was terrible and conclude that no matter how bad it is today it had to be better than it was in 1958. Many doctors neither speak nor read Spanish and are taken on a guided tour of one or two medical centers (built before Castro, by the way).

For example, Dr. Albert Sabin visited Cuba in 1967 and later spoke of the declining infant mortality rate under the Castro regime. When questioned, he candidly admitted that he had not even checked the figures given him by government authorities for accuracy. In point of fact, in 1957 Cuba's infant mortality rate was 32.3. By 1966, the last year in which figures were issued, infant mortality had risen to 37.6 deaths per 1,000 births, a precipitate rise which reversed the steady downward trend in pre-Castro years.

There we have it. If you can eat and live propaganda, have a liver that is impervious to hepatitis and don't particularly care about life, then Cuba is the place for you. If, on the other hand, you like freedom and a decent family life, stay away from that pestilent island.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 December 1970

# Cuban Economy Is Strained Because Sugar Falls Short of Goal

The following dispatch was written by James Reed and his wife, Beverley. They are Canadian free-lance journalists who recently visited Cuba for five weeks.

Special to The New York Times

HAVANA, Dec. 7 — Cubans have begun their great annual effort to harvest sugar, the island's main crop, but this time in a grim mood.

The failure to reach Premier Fidel Castro's goal of 10 million tons from the last crop has left many people depressed and suffering economic privation.

The failure to reach Premier Fidel Castro's goal of 10-million tons in the last crop, the harvesting of which ended in July, has resulted in much economic privation.

While the final output of 8.5 million tons fell short of the goal, it did set a Cuban record. But in the effort to reach 10 million, other industries and services suffered production losses because of a diversion of labor and materials to the sugar harvest.

As a result, shortages can be observed in every area of the consumer economy.

## Milk Production Down

Few people in this capital have seen fresh fruits or vegetables in stores in recent months. In addition, the efforts concentrated in the last harvest are said to have contributed to a 25 per cent drop in milk production, and no fresh milk is available to anyone over 7 years of age.

The current meat ration for each person stands at three-quarters of a pound a week. The Cuban housewife relieves the monotony of the basic ration of rice and beans by putting these in a casserole with bits of beef left over from a Sunday meat loaf.

The current meat ration per person stands at three-quarters of a pound a week. The Cuban housewife relieves the monotony of the basic ration of rice and beans by putting these in a casserole with bits of beef left over from a Sunday meat loaf.

Thick soups with meat bones and whatever vegetables can be found are common.

Birthdays for small children are a particularly welcome event, because families sign up to get a cake from the state bakery. This is delivered along with a photographer, who snaps free pictures of the birthday child. At one such party for 10-year-old Alexy Gonzalez, the cake provided dessert for at least 30 neighborhood mothers whose children went to the party.

In contrast to such joys, a young revolutionary artist sat in his Havana apartment apologizing to adult visitors for his empty refrigerator.

Despite the current difficulties, he said, many people, probably a majority, "still believe in Fidel."

People here talk about the recent night when Premier Castro drove up in a jeep to Coppelia, the huge open-air ice cream parlor in the center of town. On jumping out of his vehicle, he was urged to go to the head of the line, but he insisted on waiting his turn for ice cream, one of the few items that are not rationed in Cuba.

All the while, witnesses said, he asked questions, sought opinions and encouraged people to ask him questions about national affairs.

The Premier, however, is reported to have experienced a different sort of confrontation recently with some university students. Among radical students there is a strong current of criticism of economic management by the Cuban Communist party and the government bureaucracy.

There are reports of an angry assemblage of students at Oriente University in Santiago at which Premier Castro brought a heated discussion to a halt by saying, "If you don't want me, get somebody else."

In the wake of the last sugar harvest, the results of which were announced in July, the Government has set a goal of seven million tons for the current one. Sugar mills started grinding last month with the first of the current crop.

With the green cane standing tall under the scorching Caribbean sun, it is back to the dusty



Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

fields for thousands of cane-cutters.

But it is expected that fewer "volunteer" cane cutters will be called away from their work in factories and urban services. The aim is to keep a better national economic balance this year.

In a speech here, Premier Castro hinted that the harvest was already behind schedule. He said Cuba would suspend celebration of Christmas and the New Year because Cuba could "not afford the luxury of having fiestas" during the sugar harvest.

Scarcities of consumer goods appear to be helping Premier Castro push ahead with such ideas as creating a moneyless economy. Money already seems to be downgraded by the many shortages.

Clothing is increasingly difficult to obtain and Premier Castro has warned of even more serious shortages in textiles. Cigarettes are rationed at two packages per person each week. For those who cut down on their smoking, cigarettes become a good trading item for other articles.

Also in short supply are costume jewelry, women's stockings and plastic hair curlers, and so a girl working behind the desk at a hotel wears earrings made of colored paper-mâché hung by a thread from her pierced ear lobes. Cores taken from rolls of toilet tissue become hair curlers, and the short-skirted girls crochet stockings from bits of yarn.

One young man, recently married, fashioned two wedding rings from bits of silver and ceramic for himself and his wife.

But for such vexations as the chronic water shortages there is no easy solution for the ordinary Cuban.

It is not difficult for a visitor to find Cubans with revolutionary convictions who grumble that times are indeed hard. They do not make comparisons, however, with the situation before the Castro Revolution overthrew the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batist in 1959, but rather with the supply and distribution situation last year.

In a relatively new development, Cubans loyal to Mr. Castro guardedly express unhappiness with the rise of what they call the "new class" of government bureaucrats. Complaints may be heard about Cuban party officials, army commanders and government administrators who are considered to enjoy privileges.

Those Cubans who still own cars are rare, since imports of private automobiles in Cuba have been suspended since 1961. A common sight in Havana is the 1959 Plymouth or Ford abandoned in the street either for want of gasoline, or perhaps because the owner simply cannot solve the problem of repairing it again.

In contrast to such vehicles are the new Alfa Romeos imported by the Government from Italy. These are the largest and most easily observed manifestation of the "new class."

One young revolutionary film maker said bitterly that his son, who is away all week at a state boarding school, now wants to become an army major when he grows up.

"The boy wants to be important so he can have an Alfa," the film maker said.

"How does that make us feel, wa the generation who have been educated for another kind of system? We've made the most difficult adjustment of all in fighting and working for this revolution, and here our leaders are already corrupting our sons with ideas of material reward and personal profit."

Another manifestation of the new class, less easily seen, is an army commander whose household was supplied with water by a private line connected to the local main. Even when his neighbors must carry their drinking water from distant sources of supply, he has plenty through the tap.

The commander has an Alfa, and he gets a special delivery of groceries each week. Thus his wife need not line up for the family's food at the local state store.

When goods and services are available, they are likely to be inexpensive. Besides ice cream, almost the only items not rationed are yogurt and, when they are available, newspapers and books.

Public telephones, when they are working, are free. Rents cannot exceed 10 per cent of a person's monthly income and if Mr. Castro carries out his promise of two years ago, no one in Cuba will pay any rent after next January.

Education is free for everyone, but, it is said, a student must be politically integrated to receive a final degree in the key professions such as medicine and law. One medical student who stood in the top 10 per cent of his class, reportedly was stopped short of receiving

his certificate to practice because it was felt that his political commitment was weak.

His case, however, was said to have been complicated by the fact that his father is on the list of Cubans who have applied to leave the country. As of May 31, no new applications to leave have been accepted.

While goods are in short supply, many Cubans are finding money increasingly available. This has given rise to a lively black market in smuggled foreign goods.

#### Black Market Active

A pair of nylon stockings on the black market is priced up to \$150. A package of chiclets from Mexico will bring \$5.00. And the black market value of the Cuban peso, pegged at \$1, is approximately 10 American cents.

Rum, though produced in Cuba is virtually unavailable to Cubans and is almost beyond price. A bottle of good Cuban rum can be traded for such scarce goods as automobile tires, batteries, clothing and even food.

One resident of Havana told of refusing 10,000 pesos for a motorbike that was not in running order.

Another told of a recent burglary of his home in which a pair of trousers was the only item stolen. The thief had left a note on the bed stating that he was in greater need of the trousers than the owner. Pinned to the note were 20 pesos, the approximate value of the clothing in American dollars.

Cuban children cluster around certain hotels where they know they will encounter foreign tourists and technicians, begging not for money but for chewing gum, razor blades, pens, cigarettes and even shoes and socks. They tell you that these things are not for themselves, but for their mother or father.

There is a drabness about Havana, where buildings, drains and sewers, built before the Castro revolution, continue to deteriorate.

Despite a recent program of renovation and reconstruction undertaken by the Government, most buildings appear to be in a state of disrepair. Occasionally small groups of workers can be seen plastering or doing brickwork.

The unavailability of paint means that there is an almost total absence of color in the city.

Housing is in increasingly

tion is hampered by the non-delivery of building materials. It is not uncommon for as many as four families to be crowded into a two-story, single-family dwelling.

#### Soviet Sends Crude Oil

Every 72 hours at least one Soviet tanker docks in Cuba with fuel for the nation's energy needs. This lifeline is tenuous and reportedly has been used as a means of pressuring Mr. Castro to exercise economic discipline and, some say, to restrain Cuba's tendencies to export revolution.

At the same time, Cuba is much dependent as well on Western technology and expertise. Ships arriving come loaded with trucks from France, cattle and farm machinery from Canada, tractors and automobiles from Italy, buses from Britain, electronic equipment and computers from Japan.

A segment of the student population is now calling for a "cultural revolution" against what they see as opportunistic officialdom. Premier Castro is reported to be currently engaged in a series of meetings with groups of dissident students, intellectuals and party members.

Ultimately, Mr. Castro remains the pivot for everything that happens in Cuba. Besides being Premier, he is First Secretary of the party, commander in chief of the armed forces, and Minister of Agriculture. He is also a father figure and a kind of folk hero.

#### Dabbles in Genetics

One of his favorite fields is genetics. Although he studied law in Havana University, he has become an amateur agronomist and animal breeder. Lately, he is reported to have been crossbreeding German shepherd dogs with wolves, and Shetland ponies from Canada with Cuban horses. The object of these two projects are unclear, but they take up a good deal of the Premier's attention.

At the same time, Cuba is said to be making great strides toward the development of tropical cattle that will thrive in a Caribbean climate on a diet consisting almost exclusively of molasses, a readily available resource.

The director of the Cuban Institute for Animal Sciences, Dr. Reginald Preston, a British livestock expert, is unstinting in his praise for Mr. Castro's personal drive in support of the cattle plan. According to Dr. Preston, who has championed the controversial idea of intensive molasses feeding to beef will have doubled in Cuba by early next year.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8

THE ECONOMIST, London.  
COPYRIGHT September 1970

*Cuba*

## Hogmaharvestmas

Spare a thought this week for the Cubans, who for the second year running have had Christmas and the New Year holiday postponed. Since this is a country where sugar is king, the celebrations will have to wait until the sugar harvest is completed in July and the whole thing—Christmas, New Year, harvest home, the lot—can be wrapped up in one great wingding with fireworks, dancing, extra rum and cigars. Fidel Castro, in announcing the postponement, admitted that Christmas was “very beautiful and very poetical.” Compulsory atheism is not a feature of Castro’s Cuba. But the snag is that traditional Christmas comes right in the best time of year for cutting sugar cane; in Cuba’s wet season, July and after, little can be done in the sugar fields. So with Castro and sugar at the helm, it could be a long time before the Cubans celebrate another December Christmas.

Though December 25th will be just another working day, Cubans are free to celebrate out of hours as best they can. All goods are rationed; but they may be given an extra quota of rum and cigars. No groaning boards, maybe, but then no one will be groaning with starvation. There will be toys in the shops, for once; children under 12 are to get three each. Under a new

system to avoid queueing—something which chronic shortages have made a permanent feature of Cuban life—Cubans are advised to book their toys early. For the first five days the toy shops will be open to those who have booked. After that there will be queues again.

Dr Castro has now set the sugar target for 1971 at 7 million tons. This is well below the 10 million tons aimed at this year, when in fact only 8½ millions were actually harvested. Those 8½ million tons were cut with enormous trouble, over an abnormally long period, with inefficient “voluntary” help from everyone including housewives and foreign diplomats. There were also problems in transporting and processing this amount of cane. Seven million tons is a far more reasonable target.

But even that may not be reached. There are fewer people to do the job this year—including 100,000 fewer volunteers. And Dr Castro mentioned this month that the new harvest was late in getting started. People have gone on celebrating this year’s abortive super-harvest much longer than they should have done. They have been slow in getting the replanting of cane under way, and a lot of essential maintenance work at the sugar mills has been neglected.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

6 January 1971

CPYRIGHT

## Cuban Census Shows Decline In Births and Population Growth

By JUAN de ONIS  
Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, Jan. 5—A sharp decline in births has begun to slow Cuba's population growth significantly, according to the first published results of Cuba's 1970 census.

The population counted during the census in September was 8,573,395. Of this total, there were 196,000 more men than women. Sixty per cent of the population was found to be living in urban centers of 2,000 or more people.

These figures appeared in Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist party, which began publishing the results on Thursday.

The island-wide population and housing count in September was the first carried out by Premier Fidel Castro's Government since he came to power in 1959. The last national census was in 1953.

The results show that a baby boom lasted from 1962 to 1966 but that there has been a sharp decline in births since then.

### Breakdown by Ages

Children of less than 1 year of age through 14 make up 3,140,700, or 36.7 per cent of the total. Persons from 15 to 64—the working population—constitute 57.5 per cent of the total. And people 65 and older make up just less than 6 per cent.

The 5-year-olds—the largest single age group among the children — total 256,176. By comparison, there are 188,670 children 10 years old.

The evidence of the decline in birth rates since 1965 is that the 2-year-old age group now totals 232,316 and the 1-year-olds number only 218,757.

This means that Cuba's pop-

ulation growth rate has dropped since the mid-sixties from close to a 2.5 per cent annual increase to just above 2 per cent a year.

The census results confirm the downward birth trend that Cuban demographers reported during the last two years to international organizations, such as the United Nations demographic centers for Latin America. However, the reasons for the decline are not entirely clear to population analysts.

### Birth Control Assisted

Birth-control information and contraceptives are available without charge in Cuba through the public health service hospitals and rural centers, which cover most of the population.

But Mr. Castro has not promoted a national publicity campaign for family planning, and there are no limitations on family size in the food rationing

system.

In a paper delivered at an international conference on population problems here in August, two University of Havana demographers, Juan Pérez de la Riva and Blanca A. Morjón, attributed the decline in births, particularly in rural areas, to more educational opportunities for girls and more jobs for women in the socialist economy.

They predicted, however, that with "development of productivity" in the economy, an increase in baby day-care centers and better housing conditions there would be a new upturn in the birth rate.

One factor in Cuba's present population level is the exodus of some 500,000 Cubans since Mr. Castro came to power. In 1959, Cuba's population was estimated at 6,669,000.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

12 January 1971

CPYRIGHT

# Even hope is gone from Castro's Cuba

By JAMES R. WHELAN  
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

LIKE a legion of avenging angels, the follies and failures of 12 years appear to be closing in on an increasingly brooding, moody Fidel Castro.

Out of a welter of statements and sources, the evidence is unmistakable of crisis in Cuba's economy. Castro himself—now 43, paunchy and captive of his own egomania — has emerged in the past six months as the foremost prophet of this economic gloom.

Evidence also is mounting that the Russians, tired of bankrolling Castro's economic misadventures, are tightening their grip on Cuba's internal affairs.

Neither Castro nor his regime is in danger of overthrow. The apparatus of repression in communist Cuba, one of the world's authentic police states, is too formidable.

For the average Cuban — who Castro himself now concedes neither wanted nor liked his brand of revolution — life is a worsening cycle of privations, hardships, and postponed promises. Castro calls it the hard road, paved with good intention, to the promised land of socialism.

Rene Dumont, a leftist French writer, frequent adviser and self-proclaimed admirer of Castro, put it somewhat differently in a recently published book (Cuba: Est Il Socialiste?) which was recently excerpted in the leftist U. S. magazine Dissent.

"... As difficulties accumulate ("Mr. Dumont wrote, "Castro asks his fellow citizens not to linger over the present but to turn their eyes toward a more and more distant horizon — 1980 for example. And he draws an ever more idyllic picture of that future — on condition that his people accept a program of work that becomes more and more extravagant...")

"However," Mr. Dumont added in another passage of the book, "sacrifices that have been prolonged since 1961 have become unbearable for the people today."

### Apologies and warnings

IN his July 26, 1970, speech on the 17th anniversary of the battle launching his revolution, Castro gave an amazingly itemized inventory of the revolution's failures. It was the first of a series by Castro in the same tenor in which the buoyant optimism of the past has given way to tortured apologies for errors, coupled with forecasts of bleaker times ahead.

The dam of optimism broke with the dismal failure of the Cubans to achieve a 10-million-ton sugar harvest last year, a goal on which Castro had staked the honor of the revolution. What he had planned as a monument to the superiority of socialist planning became instead an incinerator consuming both hopes and precious economic resources.

Stubbornly pursuing a 10-million-ton goal, Castro doubled the length of the harvest, diverted tens of thousands of workers from other jobs, students from other jobs, students from their classrooms. Scarce fuel and supplies were siphoned off from other purposes.

The harvest finally reached 8.5 million tons, an all-time Cuban record. But it cost twice the time, and twice the manpower, and left deep political, psychological and economic scars. And it was the first time since Castro came to power on Jan. 1, 1959, that he managed to surpass the pre-revolution record of a 7.2 million ton harvest.

One of the new breed of "Cuba watchers," professionals sifting information coming from Cuba, believes the effect of that failure has plunged Castro into "the longest period of doldrums" since the revolution. How much of that gloom stems from possible other factors, such as apparent Russian pressures, is not known.

### No hope any more

THE Cuban reality is, however, much gloomier than even Castro admits. And his promises do not seem to fire new hopes.

"When he begins 'to promise the moon,'" wrote Mr. Dumont, "many Cuban listeners flick off their radios; they no longer believe."

Part of the reason, Mr. Dumont believes, is that "it is now more than 10 years that Cuba has been making mistakes and not very many lessons have been learned from them..."

Even Castro is promising less — except hardship. In his New Year's Eve speech, Castro said 1971 would be a year of increased production, but he offered no hope of a better life for ordinary citizens.

What is that life now like?

- Since 1962, Cubans have watched shortages spread, until last year practically everything they used or consumed was rationed — even sugar, in the world's second sugar producing country (Russia is first), and cigars, in a country which made them famous.

- In 1968, Castro nationalized 58,000 businesses then still in private hands, down to the "ma and pa" type corner grocery store. About the only industry not nationalized is the taxi business, a collection of rickety relics using cannibalized spare parts and coping with shortages of fuel. Except for taxi drivers and a handful of private farmers, practically everyone works for the state.

- Because of rationing and shortages of goods, per capita consumption of goods and services in Cuba declined by 25 per cent between 1957 and 1969. The average worker now can buy everything rationing entitles him to for a month with the equivalent of three weeks' work. This disincentive to work has fostered the absenteeism that Castro frequently deplores in speeches.

- In the early days of the revolution, Castro promised free housing for city dwellers, and free land for peasants. He recently reported that 268,089 families in Cuba's urban centers — where 60 per cent of the country's 8.5 million people live — were given use of houses and apartments. And 100,000 former rent-paying peasants got free use of state-owned land, but not title to the land.

- Illiteracy, 30 per cent on the eve of revolution, has been eradicated. School enrollment went up from 936,723 in 1958 to 2,289,464 last year. But 1,560,193 were in grammar schools, which still show high dropout rates in the early grades. Castro recently referred to 400,000 children between the ages of 6 and 16 neither working nor in school.

Other reports back up the statistics:

Mr. Dumont contrasts the "radiant" look of the town of Bayamo in early 1960 with the "empty shops and haggard passersby" of July, 1969: "Children are sometimes dressed in odds and ends of old sacks, and young girls are ashamed of their rags..."

In Havana, "you queue up for the films, queue up to make a cab drive around Holquin, queue up to sit on the terrace of a cafe, which sells neither coffee nor beer, but lemonade and fruit juices that are more sugared than fruited. You queue up for the too infrequent bus..."

### Nightly brownouts

The list goes on. It took Castro nearly half an hour of his July 26 days speech just to list the major shortages and shortfalls in production goals. He spoke of seeing workers in one plant "in tattered clothes and wornout shoes..."

"Granma," organ of the revolution and only surviving newspaper in Cuba, publishes a daily notice of areas to be browned out that night because of energy shortages.

"The road is difficult," Castro said. "It is more difficult than what we expected . . . It is a lot easier to win 20 wars than to win the development battle . . ."

Only army officers, higher-ups in Cuba's 400,000-member Communist Party, government bigwigs, and visiting foreigners live splendidly.

Cuba's economy actually is going backward. Gross national product is up 10 per cent since 1961, but the population — even with the declining birth rate revealed in a new census — increased 17 per cent in that period.

Cuba's transportation system is a shambles. Inefficiency, incompetence and incredibly inept planning hobble efforts to industrialize. Agricultural output, other than sugar, is declining.

Cuba owes \$400 million to non-communist western trading partners, suppliers of food, machinery and other goods essential for Cuba's survival. There are signs that Cuba's lines of credit with these nations are nearing their limit.

According to Mr. Dumont, communist country diplomats in Cuba believe "The Cuban economy is moving toward imminent catastrophe."

### Improvised solutions

How does Castro meet these problems?

In one of his speeches, Castro recounted how a shortage of containers paralyzed a brewery's production of beer. He solved the problem by ordering a fleet of refrigerated tank trucks to be made available. Beer then flowed, but what of the other needs to which those trucks had been assigned?

Such improvisation, coupled with a strong reliance on intuition and scorn for statistics, seem typical of Castro's administration.

"This," Mr. Dumont commented, "would be quite acceptable in a chief of state if he did not insist on directing everything himself" — an interesting observation, since in one of his speeches Castro noted the "impossibility" of "directing and coordinating all this apparatus."

"He is no longer content with his military and political claims to glory," M. Dumont wrote, "or his unquestioned human value. It is essential to him that he also be recognized as first in scientific research and in agricultural education. He is the one who knows everything. . ."

But there are no visible rivals to Castro in Cuba, nor does it appear that any would want to challenge him.

The Russians pick up the tab for Cuba's trade deficit which hit a high of \$600 million in 1969. In addition, they subsidize Cuba's sugar output to the extent of another \$165 million annually. Tho their numbers in Cuba — military and civilian — appear to have remained at a fairly constant 2,000 to 3,000, the recent missile submarine base flap and other signs indicate the Russians intend to make expanded military use of their investment in Cuba.

### Control commission

On the heels of a new trade agreement negotiated recently, the Russians also announced formation of a joint commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation. Such commissions — believed unprecedented outside the Iron Curtain bloc — usually serve as economic control mechanisms for the Russians.

Castro's words frequently bear little resemblance to reality, and in his rambling style, he often lapses into self-contradictions. But in one of his appraisals, he probably meant exactly what he said:

"Our enemies rejoice," he said, "and they base their hopes on our problems. We were saying that our enemies were right in this in that, and in that other, in all that they want; but in one thing only they were mistaken: to believe that there is an alternative for revolution here, to believe that people when faced with the difficulties of the revolution, no matter what these difficulties were, would choose the path of counter-revolution."

In the same speech, he cited the 3,222,000 members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, a nationwide network of neighbor-spying-on-neighbor groups. However inflated that figure may be, this network stands as a powerful deterrent to uprising in Fidel Castro's Cuba.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
 COPYRIGHT  
 18 January 1971

## STRONGER VOICE NOW FOR RUSSIA IN CUBA

**Outlook for Castro's Cuba in 1971 is bleak. The economy has gone from bad to worse. Upshot: Moscow is getting a bigger role in running the island.**

As Fidel Castro begins his thirteenth year in power, two important factors indicate that 1971 may be the toughest year yet for Cuba's Communist leader.

- Continuing economic failures are getting Castro deeper and deeper into trouble.

- There are signs that the Russians, impatient with the Cuban Government's inefficiency, may try to take over some of Castro's decision-making powers.

What the Soviets want right now, say the experts, is to protect their investment in Cuba, which amounts to about 1.25 million dollars a day.

After a recent series of high-level conferences, the Cubans signed an agreement with the Russians for joint planning and organization in all major fields of the Cuban economy: oil, electric power, sugar, nickel, farm equipment, port development and industrial automation.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez—an old-line Cuban Communist who is now a Cabinet Minister without portfolio—says Soviet-Cuban co-operation is entering a "new phase" that will permit joint long-range planning at top levels.

Some American analysts see the situation differently. One put it this way: "This sounds as though the Soviets are fed up with Castro's economic failures and so now are trying to move in as efficiency experts to make the economy work better."

**Chile's influence.** A new element that may make Moscow increase its demands on Castro is the recent establishment of the Communist-oriented Government of President Salvador Allende in Chile.

One U. S. official declared:

"Now that Castro is not the only Marxist running a Latin-American country, he loses some of his importance to the Soviets.



—Craig in "Columbus Dispatch"  
 "CUBA LIBRE"

"The Russians have another political foothold in the Hemisphere—and in many ways it is a better one than Cuba. So they are in position to take more risks in demanding that Castro toe the line."

Some American authorities note that the Russians may not find the task easy. This comment, for instance:

"The big question, of course, is whether Fidel, with his ego, will let the Soviets or anybody else take over even a part of his decision-making powers for very long."

Nevertheless, Castro himself admits that he's in trouble economically. The year ahead looks bleak, he says.

Avoiding celebrations, parades and even his usual talk to the nation, the Cuban leader expressed his views on the New Year's week-end in a private speech he gave to selected representatives of laborers from 1,800 work centers in the Havana area.

Castro let his people know that—despite his previous promises—their efforts to produce 10 million tons of sugar last year will not bring better times in 1971.

Even harder work and more discipline are needed, he said.

**The woes.** Here are some problems that Castro and the Cuban people face:

- The country failed to meet its 1970 sugar goal and is behind schedule for the 1971 goal of 7 million tons.

- Cane-harvesting machinery that was promised has not been bought—so back-breaking labor must continue. Some 15,000 workers from Havana alone must leave their regular jobs to cut cane during the first three months of 1971.

- Many people are avoiding work. A tough law against "vagrancy" is planned.

- Production of tobacco, a traditional foreign-currency earner for Cuba, suffered last year from the diversion of labor and fertilizer to the canefields. An important curing shed burned down.

- Sabotage continues. A match factory and a multimillion-dollar fish-freezing plant were destroyed by fire in recent months. Arson was suspected.

- Train and truck accidents are rising rapidly. There were 195 rail accidents in Cuba in the first 11 months of 1970. The Government blames negligence and says "drastic disciplinary measures" are planned.

- Rationing is stricter than ever.

- Some 300,000 to 400,000 children under 16 have dropped out of school. Castro "suggested" that schoolwork centers be set up for those who "neither study nor work." This flight from school is regarded as a blow to Castro, who has put much emphasis on education.

**What next?** Castro has designated 1971 as "the year of productivity." But experts doubt that even Soviet direction can bring an early upturn in the Cuban economy. They say Castro is still seeking panaceas or instant solutions.

Said one U. S. official who is an authority on Cuba:

"The kind of thing that has to be done in Cuba is so basic that there can be no quick improvement—no effect that will be noticeable to the average Cuban for several years." [END]

DATES WORTH NOTING

February 3 - 10	Bratislava	10th Congress of the (Communist) International Union of Students. This Prague-based front was so demoralized by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that the 10th Congress had to be postponed repeatedly during the past year.
February 10-14	USSR	5th anniversary of the trial and conviction of the dissident Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyavskiy and Yuli Daniel, in 1966, for publishing abroad books said to "slander" the Soviet Union. The trial provoked strong protests abroad at Soviet denial of intellectual freedom. The trial also proved to be turning point in the development of dissidence in the Soviet Union according to Pyotr Yakir, a prominent Soviet dissident, who has said: the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial caused many people in the Soviet Union to think "really, why should people be tried for their convictions? Why simply for what he thinks, does a man have to be arrested? ...So from that time on there were protests." (Statement by Yakir during an interview with CBS, televised 28 July 1970.) Daniel has completed his prison sentence and has been released, in poor health. Sinyavskiy is still serving a sentence in a Soviet forced labor camp.
February 14 - 25	USSR	15th anniversary of Khrushchev's secret speech, denouncing Stalin's brutal crimes, at the CPSU 20th Congress in Moscow in 1956.

February 23	USSR	50th anniversary of the Kronstadt uprising. In 1921 soldiers, sailors and workers of Kronstadt, who had fought for the Soviets in the October Revolution and were called heroes of the Revolution, revolted unsuccessfully against Soviet rule. They demanded free elections by secret ballot, freedom for all socialist parties, liberation of the political prisoners being held by the Bolsheviks, and recognition of workers' and peasants' rights.
March 5	USSR	Anniversary of Stalin's death, 1953. It can be expected that many observers inside and outside the USSR will be watching to see how the present Soviet regime treats this anniversary, especially in light of the appearance of <u>Khrushchev Remembers</u> .
March 18	Paris	100th anniversary of Paris Commune, 18 March - 29 May 1871.
March 27	USSR	Anniversary of Khrushchev's succession to Soviet premiership in 1958, consolidating his one-man control of Party and State. (Removed by coup 14 October 1964)
March 30	Moscow	The 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which was supposed to meet in 1970, is now scheduled for March 30.
April 3	USSR	18th anniversary of exposure of Stalin's trumped-up "Doctor Plot," which had anti-Semitic overtones: 3 April 1953, one month after Stalin's death, <u>Pravda</u> announced the release of nine doctors, six of them Jewish, who had been arrested for murdering Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. <u>Pravda</u> admitted their arrests were a "miscarriage of justice."



April 13

Japan

20th anniversary of Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact signed during World War II and broken by Soviet Union one week before the end of war, 8 August 1945, when Japan was on the verge of surrender. It was during the last week of war that the Soviets captured the Kurile Islands, which many Japanese today believe should be returned to Japan.

~~TOP BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

February 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

TO BEAT RETIREMENT: BREZHNEV'S INGENIOUS TIME MACHINE.

In Communist-run governments, retirement by crisis, usually accompanied by excesses of denunciation and demotion, has pretty much been accepted as a fact of life. In Poland, however, the Party has been holding nationwide meetings looking for ways to avoid crises such as the one that toppled Wladyslaw Gomulka two months ago. These meetings have been characterized by sharp attacks on the ossified system of rule under Gomulka and by many proposals for changes. In the most ingenious proposal to have surfaced so far, two Politburo members have said that the Party must consider setting up a system in which leaders would assume and leave their positions "normally" rather than under crisis situations.

This proposal from Poland should also be seriously considered in Moscow as those immobile and aging leaders of the Kremlin gather next month for the XXIVth Party Congress. The eleven men of the Soviet Politburo have been of the establishment for a long time: generally, they were born before 1910 and joined the Party before 1932. Seven of the men on the Politburo are over 60 and one is beyond 70. The two youngest, Dmitri Polyansky and Alexander Shelepin are 54 and 53, respectively. Of the three top leaders, Premier Alexei Kosygin is 67, President Nikolai Podgorny will be 69 on his next birthday, and Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev is 65. Or is he?

It was learned in December that Soviet desk calendars published for 1971 had shifted Brezhnev's birthday from 19 December 1906 to 1 January 1907. This shift should have indicated that Mr. Brezhnev had been using the pre-Revolutionary Julian calendar date all this time. However, a very thorough researcher into Kremlinology has come up with an old encyclopedia reference which indicates that Brezhnev has changed his birthday before. Anybody born in Russia before the official calendar change is entitled to shift his birthday by 13 days --- but only once. The encyclopedia reference says that Brezhnev was born on 6 December, old style, or 19 December, new style. As far as is known, Brezhnev has shed 26 days instead of the 13 to which he is entitled. But he may have been doing this for years.

Brezhnev and his ruling group, with their unimaginative and plodding immobility, are certainly credited with having turned back the clock for all those Russians who may have had

their hopes stirred during the erratic but comparatively benevolent rule of Khrushchev. Maybe Brezhnev is in possession of greater shrewdness than his daily conduct of national affairs would indicate, at least in the matter of turning back his own clock. Simple arithmetic shows that all Brezhnev has to do is step up the frequency with which he sheds his days and months in order to postpone retirement indefinitely. If he were to start now to advance his birthday by thirteen days once a week, claiming each time that he had forgotten to subtract anything back in 1918 --- and who would dare contradict the Party chief? --- he could regress to 40 by the end of this century. However, he must take care not to continue the process indefinitely; sometime around the middle of the 2000's Brezhnev would reach the age of zero and simply vanish.

USSR GAINS FOOTHOLD IN CHAD. The recent announcement by the government of Chad, of the signing of a renewable five-year treaty between Chad and the Soviet Union, providing for establishment in Chad of a "joint research station" for photographing space objects, represents a two-fold gain for the Soviet Union: It now has a foothold in a country which had previously carefully avoided receiving excessive economic aid from the USSR or engaging in other than routine diplomatic relations. The agreement also gives the Soviets another link in their global network of such research stations, thereby increasing their capability to determine trajectories of missiles and orbits of satellites and other space objects. Under terms of the agreement, the Soviets are authorized to install the necessary equipment, and the Soviet Ambassador to Chad has revealed that two Soviet scientists are already at work on surveys for the station which he said would probably be located near Fort Lamy.

CASTRO CRITICIZES VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS. Castro may have thrown some light on at least one reason for the decline of the rural guerrillas in Latin America recently when he was interviewed by a group of journalists who were in Havana to attend the congress of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). According to a report appearing in the 20 January issue of the Caracas daily, Ultimas Noticias, the Prime Minister admitted having helped the Venezuelan guerrillas with instructors, weapons and money "in gratitude to the people of Venezuela..." but the guerrilla leaders were so "disorganized and irresponsible" that "many of the men who went to Venezuela to train the guerrillas had to return to Cuba."

"KHRUSHCHEVISM" BECOMING A MAJOR SOVIET ISSUE? Reactions in the USSR to the publication of Khrushchev Remembers are starting

to come to the surface, and there is some indication that the book may be an issue at the forthcoming CPSU XXIVth Congress starting 30 March. Mr. Starikov, a Soviet Embassy official stationed in Czechoslovakia, is reported to have delivered a speech on a private occasion to a group of Czech hardliners in which he promises that "the poison of Khrushchevism" will be cleaned out of the "blood-stream of the international Communist movement" at the Congress. Inasmuch as the subject of Khrushchev has become a sensitive issue in the Soviet Union since publication of his damaging memoirs, Starikov's speech must have had prior approval from a hardline Stalinist group; it is most unlikely that it was simply his personal prediction.

Curiously, the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister and full member of the CPSU Central Committee, Marshal Ivan Bagramiyan, praised Khrushchev in his just published memoirs. As in the case of Starikov, Bagramiyan's mention of Khrushchev points to high level approval or permission, but obviously, in his case, backing of an anti-Stalin faction. It may be that these two individuals are spokesmen for two opposing Central Committee and Politburo factions. Which faction is to dominate may become evident in connection with the Congress. (See attached news accounts.)

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
 CPYRCH January 1971

Hard-line speech reaches West

# Stalin era comeback due

By ANTONY BUZEK  
 London Express Service

The Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, due to start on March 30, may reintroduce Stalinism and do away with the last remnants of Krushchev's ideas about liberalization in all spheres of Russian life.

This startling forecast was made in a speech to Czech Stalinists in Prague by Yuri Starikov, secretary of the Soviet Embassy. The details of the speech have just reached the West by an undisclosed route.

"Kruschev's ideas, that cancer on the body of Communism, will be eradicated by the 24th congress of the Soviet Communist Party," Mr. Starikov told a dinner meeting of about 40 hard-liners in Vinohrady, on the outskirts of Prague.

## TURNING POINT

"In the past 14 years, (since the 1956 party congress at which Krushchev denounced Stalin) Stalin's thesis about the sharpening of the class-battle and penetration of class enemies into the party has been proved right," Mr. Starikov declared.

He continued: "The 24th party congress will be a turning point. Afterwards we will again build bridges across to our Chinese comrades."

The speech was made at the end of November, at the time when the Czech hard-liners tried to topple moderate party leader Gustav Husak.

Western analysts of Soviet affairs regard Mr. Starikov's strange remarks as deliberately made in behalf of a strong group of Russian Politburo members and some high Russian army officers who have been pressing in the background for Stalin's full rehabilitation.

## TOUGH LINE

Among them are reported to be Politburo members such as Aleksander Shelepin, former chief of the secret police, Dmitri Polvanski, a young neo-Stalinist opposed to economic reforms, and some marshals of the Soviet army, who in the past years publicly extolled Stalin as a great military leader.

Some Western analysts are inclined to regard the latest crisis in the relations between Moscow and Washington as another proof of the coming re-Stalinization.

In their view, the tough Russian line against the United States has been forced on a reluctant Brezhnev and Kosygin by the neo-Stalinist group which is apparently gaining the upper hand.

LE MONDE, Paris  
 Weekly English Edition  
 13 January 1971

## Will the Soviet Party rehabilitate Stalin?

The XXIV Soviet Communist Party Congress, due to open in Moscow on March 30, is highly likely to set the party seal on "re-Stalinization," according to a Soviet Embassy official in Prague. Mr. Starikov believed the next Congress would ring in a new era in the USSR by rescinding the 1956 XX Congress's condemnation of Stalinism and finally extirpating "the poison of Khrushchevism."

The statement, just revealed, was made by Mr. Starikov on November 18 at a function attended by forty ultra-conservative Czechoslovak Communists.

Events in Czechoslovakia, the diplomat said, should be assessed in the broadest context taking

into consideration developments since the XX Soviet Communist Party Congress. The extent to which the struggle against the personality cult had harmed the international Communist movement in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had yet to be realized, Mr. Starikov added.

He charged that former Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev's attack on Stalin had paved the way for this and said: "Kruschevism is a poison in the bloodstream of the international Communist movement, and if the movement is to regain its health this poison must be eliminated. The past fourteen years have proved the rightness of Stalin's thesis on the aggravation of the

class struggle in conditions of socialism, and the penetration of the class enemy into the party. When the XX Congress rejected this thesis it was opening the way for enemy penetration into the ranks of Communist parties. The XXIV Congress must repair this damage."

Earlier the same day Mr. Starikov attended a rally organized by the "Internationalists" group at which the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society awarded decorations to seven factory workers. The seven were being commended for having drafted a letter, signed by ninety-nine of their factory's personnel and sent to *Pravda*, daily organ of the Soviet Communist Party in July 1968. The

letter protested the policies of former Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek, and his liberal colleagues. But none of the conservative members of the present leadership attended.

Josef Plojhar, leader of the Catholic People's Party, and main speaker at the rally, stressed the need for the Left Wing Front (neo-Stalinist) to take the initiative at the next central committee session to maintain the hard-liners' influence. Mr. Plojhar, a former Roman Catholic priest who was excommunicated after the campaign against the Church in 1949 and 1950, criticized the Dubcek regime and some supporters of the Czechoslovak par-

ty's current first secretary, Gustav Husak. Though Mr. Plojhar was not promoted in this month's government reshuffle, he was introduced at the rally as a future first vice-premier.

### Conservative demands

The Starikov and the Plojhar speeches came almost immediately after Mr. Husak left for Moscow to consult Soviet leaders about the activities of ultra-conservative factions in Czechoslovakia. The "Leftists" are believed to have made some exacting demands at party praesidium meetings on November 16 and November 17. Mr. Husak travelled to the Soviet capital the following day.

This further underlined Mr. Husak's apparent feeling that a speedy solution to the problems posed by the new Left was vital,

for he could have met his Soviet opposite number Leonid Brezhnev only a few days later in Budapest and discussed it all with him personally, had he been willing to wait. Mr. Brezhnev was due there on November 22 for the Hungarian Communist Party Congress. And the plenary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague was not scheduled until December 10.

Exactly how much weight do Mr. Starkov's statements carry? Are they merely his own personal opinions, those of a Soviet splinter-group or do they represent the official policy of the Soviet leadership? His remarks appear closely related to another problem which must be settled before the XXIV Soviet Congress convenes. This involves the by now celebrated appeal for help from Prague which Moscow still

invokes to justify the Soviet-led invasion of its Warsaw Pact ally and which was referred to in the Pact countries' communiqué published during the night of August 21, 1968, as the tanks rolled in.

Czechoslovakia has so far refused officially to acknowledge any such appeal. But a leading ultra-conservative member of the Central Committee and the Federal Assembly Praesidium, Vasil Bilak, brought up the question at the December 10 plenum and demanded a debate on the appeal which was signed by some forty hard-liners.

It is Mr. Bilak's stated hope that Czechoslovakia will finally acknowledge "having called for our Soviet friends' help."

He may have been acting on an understanding with his Left Wing Front colleagues in asking for the debate, while not having the

specific go-ahead from Moscow. At all events, the Central Committee has decided, for the sake of unity, to study the question at a future session, probably in February or March.

The Soviet Union would probably welcome acknowledgment that Czechoslovakia "asked for help." It would certainly smooth over Moscow's relations with foreign Communist parties, among these, the Italian and French parties, which have still not withdrawn their condemnation of the invasion. The recent Polish riots might, however, persuade the Soviet Union to forego this statement from Prague. Things in Czechoslovakia appear to have calmed down and Moscow, at least on the face of it, would have little to gain by embarrassing Husak at this stage.

AMBER BOUSGLOU

THE NEW YORK TIMES  
19 January 1971

## General's Memoirs Praise Khrushchev

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 18 — Nikita S. Khrushchev, who has gone unpraised in the Soviet Union since his fall from power six years ago, is described as a hard-working and sensitive wartime leader by an old associate, Marshal Ivan K. Bagramyan, in a book of memoirs just published.

Marshal Bagramyan, who was deputy chief of staff for operations in the Southwestern army group, at the start of World War II, worked closely with Mr. Khrushchev, who was the party leader in the Ukraine and the Politburo's representative on the military council for the area.

As long as Mr. Khrushchev was the Soviet Union's leader, Marshal Bagramyan was lavish in his praise of Mr. Khrushchev. The latest book, "That Is How the War Started," is more reserved in its comments but nevertheless breaks with the practice begun after Mr. Khrushchev's fall in 1964 of not praising him in print.

Up to now, military and party histories have simply listed Mr. Khrushchev as holding a certain position without any description of his work.

### Some Color Included

But Marshal Bagramyan, at 73 a Deputy Defense Minister and full member of the party's Central Committee, evidently was permitted to include some color about Mr. Khrushchev. Military memoirs in the Soviet Union tend to be more personal and open than more official writings.

Mr. Khrushchev also appears to have been favorably inclined toward Marshal Bagramyan. In oral reminiscences, published abroad as "Khrushchev Remembers," the former Soviet leader said of the marshal:

"He is a rational, even-handed man. I like him. I can even say I am very fond of him. I have always admired him for his sober mind, his party spirit, his wide-ranging knowledge of military affairs, and his uncorruptible integrity and straight forwardness."

Marshal Bagramyan, in his memoirs, tries to convey the sense of disorder in the Ukraine at the start of the war when German troops smashed through Soviet lines on their way to Kiev.

In one scene, he describes the scene at headquarters:

"Only N. S. Khrushchev did not abandon his office. Without interruption messages arrived there from Kiev and district centers dealing with further mobilization of the whole population to rebuff the enemy."

Mr. Khrushchev is described as having taken part in policy conferences with military commanders. He is singled out as having prepared Kiev for the Nazi attack, which proved successful.

### Suicide of Commissar

Once, Marshal Bagramyan recalls, he was ordered by the Southwestern army group commander, Lieut. Gen. Mikhail P. Kirponos, to report to members of the military council on some recent decisions:

"I went with my operational map and notes to N.S. Khrushchev. He was unusually sad. He listened to my report and without hesitation approved it. Learning that I was going to Vashugin [another member of the council (Nikita Sergeyevich said bitterly:

"Don't go. No one needs to report to him any more.

Nikolai Nilolayevich has ended his war."

Marshal Bagramyan explained that Lieut. Gen. Vashugin, the political commissar, had committed suicide because of the setbacks in the first days of the German advance.

The memoirs also discuss one of the more controversial aspects of Soviet military history: Why Stalin insisted on trying to defend Kiev in September, 1941, when his military advisers urged him to evacuate the city to avoid encirclement and to set up defenses on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. Eventually the city had to be surrendered and large Red army forces were trapped. General Kirponos was among those killed. Marshal Bagramyan was with a group that succeeded in breaking out and rejoicing the Soviet lines.

Marshal Bagramyan says the decision to try and hold Kiev "at any price" was taken because Stalin told Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's envoy, in August that the Red Army would hold the lines west of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev.