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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1971

THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS

The Main Issues

In the five-year interval between the 23rd CPSU Congress March 1966 and the forthcoming 24th Congress, the essentially unchanged Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has presided over a steadily deteriorating internal situation and a severe erosion of its authority in the international Communist movement, while continuing to pursue its expansionist foreign policy.

Whatever Brezhnev strikes as the keynote on domestic developments in his main address to the Congress, the real keynote is "stagnation." The economy has been steadily slowing down, falling further and further behind that of its chief rival, the U.S.. The ever expanding technological gap is severe and a matter of special distress to Soviet scientists. The Soviet consumer has long since been convinced that improvement of his lot is at best mere oratory. Even the members of the Soviet privileged class, the Communist Party, knowing the meaninglessness of the Party's ideological slogans, reserve their best efforts for in-fighting for personal position in the Party bureaucracy. The only place the Soviet leaders see any significant and positive movement is in the demands for change made by the scientific and literary-artistic intelligentsia. And here the leadership's only concern is to snuff out this small sign of life in the Soviet body politic.

In 1966, the Soviet leaders were just beginning to face the phenomenon of serious, open challenge to their leadership of the world Communist movement, occasioned by the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. In the intervening years, they have seen this situation deteriorate to a shooting war on the Sino-Soviet border. By August 1968 they were frightened into mounting a full-scale invasion of Czechoslovakia, provoking condemnation by the so-called "capitalist" world, and by important Communist parties and individuals from France to Venezuela to Australia. As in the case of internal dissent, international Communist dissent provided some of the most telling criticism of the essential weaknesses of the Soviet system.

In the 1966 Congress, the leadership was still able to speak plausibly (but just barely so) about the solidarity of the world Communist movement and Soviet leadership of it. It will be interesting to see the verbal gymnastics required to maintain the fiction in 1971.

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership pursues a foreign policy of cautious expansionism, employing a variegated arsenal of tools -- smiling diplomacy here, gunboat diplomacy there, offering "innocuous" trade and aid deals here, stepping up KGB agent infiltration there -- all the while protesting its desire for peace, but doing nothing visible to advance it, as it might in Vietnam and the Middle East. Even in a case like West Germany, where the Soviets seemed to negotiate détente seriously (as a step to dislodge the U.S. from Europe and to tap West Germany's valuable economic and technological resources), they permit (or urge) East German boss Walter Ulbricht to keep the pot boiling by harassment of access to Berlin.

Expansion of its worldly dominion has been an essential ingredient of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since the beginnings -- not least because Marxist-Leninist dialectic ideology poses neverending conflict in some form with non-Communist entities as the natural way of international life. The forthcoming Congress will clothe the usual Communist prophecy of victory for Communism and defeat for "capitalism" in typical verbiage for those who would believe it. More knowledgeable observers will be searching behind the rhetoric for signs that the Soviet Union intends to make a genuine contribution to world peace.

March 1971

Party Congresses - What Are They?

Congresses are technically the Soviet Communist Party's supreme ratifying body, but in actuality they have become purely ceremonial gatherings to give the rubber stamp of approval to previously agreed upon decisions. Party statutes require that a Congress be held every four years, but they seldom are. They are large affairs. The 23rd Congress, for example, was attended by 4,942 voting delegates and 323 consultative delegates and by delegations from 36 foreign parties, in all a gathering of about 6,000 persons. At the forthcoming Congress, as at the 23rd Congress, the assemblage will approve General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's report on Party stewardship, will approve Premier Alexei Kosygin's report on the new five-year economic development plan for the years 1971 through 1975, and will elect the leading party organs -- the Central Committee, the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Anything else? Whether or not any important changes in policy are to emerge remains to be seen. Given the present leadership's unimaginative conservatism, the 24th Congress is likely to be a pretty dull affair.

By way of contrast, some quite significant and often spectacular policy pronouncements have come out of some of the more recent congresses:

20th Party Congress - February 1956: Khrushchev's "secret" denunciation of Stalin on the Congress's closing day was the most far-reaching and shattering exposé of the dictator's political leadership ever made and set off reverberations which eventually led to the Hungarian uprising of that fall. In a development closely linked with his rejection of much of the Stalinist legacy, Khrushchev announced doctrinal changes which promised more flexibility for Soviet diplomacy. Specifically, he declared that Lenin's dictum on the inevitability of war with the imperialists no longer applied. The Chinese Communists, with some justification, call the 20th Congress the "revisionist" Congress, and the seeds of Sino-Soviet discord were certainly well fertilized at this gathering. The 20th Congress also breathed new life into the old Stalinist concept of "peaceful coexistence" by emphasizing the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, and by discovering a "zone of peace" in the Third World where Moscow could seek

to expand its influence through more flexible diplomacy and cooperation with neutralist forces.

21st Party Congress - January-February 1959: Khrushchev had survived the major political attack on his stewardship in June 1957 and managed to rout his opponents, who henceforth were called the "Anti-Party Group" (Molotov, Malenkov, et al). The political castigation of members of the Anti-Party Group continued at the 21st Congress, but calls to expel some of the group's leaders were fruitless. In many respects, the Congress was a propaganda triumph for Khrushchev, who delivered the main report and outlined an ambitious program to overtake the U.S. in the production of certain key commodities at the end of the Seven-Year Plan, 1959-1965.

22nd Party Congress - October 1961: By this time there were definite signs that Khrushchev had already passed the peak of his rule in some respects. Problems were mounting in agriculture, which began to stagnate in 1958 after five years of rising output; proposals for further reorganization of the countryside had been rebuffed despite Khrushchev's apparent sponsorship. However, Khrushchev vigorously resumed the offensive at the Congress against his internal political opposition and mounted a ringing attack against Stalin's excesses. (That was the Congress during which Stalin's body was removed from the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum and reburied in the Kremlin wall.) The Anti-Party Group was heavily condemned at the Congress, but variations in leadership attitudes toward Group members cropped up during the Congress speeches. Khrushchev reaffirmed the 1956 planks of peaceful coexistence, non-inevitability of war, and the possibility of a peaceful "parliamentary" transition to socialism. The Sino-Soviet dispute flared up publicly when Chou En-lai walked out at mid-Congress and went home, but not without first having laid a wreath on Stalin's grave, just before the body was moved.

23rd Party Congress - March-April 1966: The ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 was followed by the repeal of many of his innovations in agriculture and his system of regional economic councils was replaced by recentralization of economic administration. The de-Stalinization campaign was halted and actually reversed as a gradual and selective campaign for his rehabilitation was initiated--i.e. Stalin's "excesses" were ignored while his record as a wartime leader was refurbished. Otherwise, the 23rd Congress, the first under the Brezhnev-Kosygin team, was marked by few surprises. Brezhnev stressed coexistence with

the West, and orthodoxy in the face of allegedly anti-Soviet literary and cultural tendencies within the USSR. Kosygin presented the 5-year plan for 1966-1970 and reported that the program of industrial reorganization reform, which Kosygin had launched in October 1965, was burgeoning. A bland gathering.

24th Party Congress - March-April 1971: A hint of what form the impending 24th Congress might take was given by a political writer, N. Kuzmin, in an article he authored for Kommunist (the main CPSU theoretical journal), May 1970. Kuzmin suggested that the 9th Congress of 1920 -- when Lenin defeated all the groups opposed to the existing leadership -- would be the model for 1971. What Kuzmin overlooked was that at the 10th Party Congress, only a year later, Lenin was compelled by events to introduce a market economy in the form of the "New Economic Policy." Could history repeat itself?

The statutory requirement for quadrennial party congresses has not been observed during the last quarter century, and 1970 was no exception. The March-April 1970 deadline for the 24th Congress was apparently overshadowed by the Lenin centennial celebration in April. But the primary cause for the 12-month postponement of this impending Congress is probably accounted for by difficulties in formulating the new 5-year economic development plan, and its unveiling promises to be the main event of this Congress.

LE MONDE, Paris
29 January 1971

PREPARATIONS FOR 24TH CPSU CONGRESS REACH DECISIVE PHASE

Preparations for the Soviet CP's 24th Congress moved into their most important phase this week with the start of the party's regional conferences. These assemblies will choose the delegates who will attend the Congress, and it is here that the real issues that will be debated in Moscow will get their first airing.

The party's regional conference is itself the culmination of a lengthy process. It all begins with meetings of the rank-and-file "base organizations," meaning the party sections in the factories, on the collective farms, the institutes, etc. On this level, the party structure is based on vocational groupings. The members of a "base organization" hear a report on the work of their leadership committee, elect a new bureau, and appoint their delegates to a district conference. The district conference is a geographical grouping. It too hears a report from its leaders, elects new ones, and names its delegates to the regional conference.

The same pattern continues at the regional conference, which elects delegates to the Congress. According to the Central Committee directives published after the Plenum of 13 July 1969, there will be one voting delegate for every 2,900 party members, and one non-voting delegate for every 2,900 "trainees," or candidates for party membership. This makes around 5,000 people who will be coming together on 30 March in the Congress Palace in Moscow.

The general pattern allows for a number of exceptions. It applies to the entire Federation of Russia, as is. It is somewhat modified in the other federated republics. Each of them -- but not the RSFSR -- actually holds its own congress a few weeks prior to the Union Congress. Sometimes the delegates to the Moscow conference are chosen by these congresses. Delegates for the party members in the Ukraine, in Byelorussia, in Uzbekstan, and in Kazakistan, however, are elected by the regional conferences, but this does not prevent each of these republics from holding their own congresses to elect their new leaders. In addition, some cities have special status equivalent to that of districts or even regions. Moscow and Leningrad are two such. With its 300 or so delegates, the capital's regional representation at the Congress will be second in size only to the one from the Ukraine.

Waiting for the 5-Year Plan Directives

Getting this gigantic machinery into motion was not achieved without some grinding of gears. Last year, on 13 April, Mr Brezhnev announced that the Congress would be held before the end of 1970, and on several occasions thereafter he repeated that pledge. Then on 13 July the Central Committee decided that the Congress would be held "in March 1071." The 30 March date was not set until the last Plenum of the CC on 7 December.

Delay in drafting the outline for the next 5-year Plan undoubtedly had something to do with the delay in preparations for the Congress. In December, authoritative and reliable sources said that the directives would be published in January, but today there is talk of possible further delay.

There would be nothing exceptional, for that matter, about such a delay. The directives for the 8th Plan (1966-1970) were not approved by the CC until 19 February 1966, when the 5-Year Plan was already being implemented, and less than 40 days before the opening of the 23rd Party Congress on 29 March.

Preparing for a Congress is like building a pyramid in which the summit governs the position of every element in the base. It is in this sense that some have claimed that democracy operates in reverse within the party, since a regional conference is shaped and oriented primarily by the objectives laid down by the political bureau and the Central Committee office in Moscow.

There is a good deal of truth in this image, but it fails to take sufficient account of the diversity of undercurrents within the party, all of which find a prime opportunity for expressing their views during preparations for a Congress. Furthermore, no matter how monolithic the Soviet leadership may be, it is no less reasonable to assume that it does contain conflicting ambitions, and that each leader hopes to get his men into the party apparatus.

Recruiting of "Intellectuals" Suspended

Symptoms of a behind-the-scenes struggle are still not very visible, it is true, at least according to what we know about the meetings that have been held thus far.

There is, however, one sign that the advantage at present lies with what might be termed the "conservatives:" the instructions handed out several months ago in connection with party recruiting. We would point out that no "intellectual," in the broad sense of the term, has been permitted to join the party since last summer. The primary purpose of this move is to increase the percentage of factory workers, laborers, anc collective farm people in the organization. In 1966 the Soviet CP's rolls showed 37.3 percent laborers and 16.5 percent collective farm workers. It would also appear that this was an effort to bar party membership, at least for a while, to such elements as might be least likely to go along quietly with orders from the top.

The first impression one gets from what is known of the results of the preliminary meetings is one of great stability. Here and there, a first secretary was ousted. This is what happened to the first secretary of the party for the city of Sverdlovsk, who was "retired" at the age of 60, a move which leaves little doubt that he was actually fired.

At the regional conferences, the changes in leadership changes were infrequent, most of them understandable on the bases of administrative considerations (creation of new organizations, a shift from one office to another, and the like). The same sort of stability was also apparent in the rank and file organizations. The Central Committee magazine Partinaya Jizn reports that in 145 of these groups the work of the bureau was deemed unsatisfactory, and that 464 secretaries were not re-elected. These figures are very low, when you consider that there are more than 300,000 "base" organizations in the party (312,000 in 1966 just before the 23rd Congress).

What kind of delegates will be sent to the Congress? According to the statutes, they are elected by secret ballot. It goes without saying that the election will faithfully reflect the choices made previously by the higher-ups. But this choice is itself the subject of considerable discussion within the apparatus. The regional conference actually amounts to a committee chosen to draw up the list of candidates. It is here, in this commission, that the decisions are made. Sitting on it are not only the party bosses for the region, but also a number of leading non-political figures -- the heads of big industrial concerns, directors of the various institutes, chairman of leading collective farms, etc. -- whose opinions are taken into consideration. The list drawn up by these notables is then approved by the conference. Sometimes there is some sharp bargaining, not to mention shrewd horse-trading. And so it is at this level that the Congress is "made," and this is where whatever small shifts in the incumbent apparatus the notables feel desirable are performed.

Economic Issues and the Stalin Matter

Reports in the Soviet press give the impression that economic issues loom very large in the current debates. Each organization's performance is assessed primarily on the basis of the way it has implemented the directions and resolutions of the Central Committee as handed down in December 1969 and July 1970. There is much talk of productivity, labor discipline, and even of the use of fertilizer and the quality of seed. At the same time, though, there is talk of "ideological work" and of relations within the party. Sometimes "shortcomings" are reported, or there are complaints about the "inertia" of organizations that pass a great many resolutions but show very little concern with implementing them. On the whole, though, these criticisms are merely rehashes of those that appear regularly in the editorial columns of Pravda and other party organs.

Nevertheless, the signs of a deeper debate are beginning to emerge, however indirectly. As it did on the eve of the 23rd Congress, the use of Stalin's name is the touchstone by which we can distinguish between what might be called the conservatives and the progressives. The name cropped up in 1966 in several reports from the meetings of the party in Georgia. This year, the Moldavian CP

newspaper, in its 16 January issue, opened fire by stating that in his article on "Marxism and the National Question" Stalin had provided a definition amounting to "a generalization of all Karl Marx, Frederich Engels, and V.I. Lenin ever said about the fundamental features of the nation." The reference is an important one, because it tends to restore to Stalin the role of THE communist theoretician which the 20th Congress had taken away from him.

This is not surprising in Moldavia, where the first party secretary, Mr I.I. Bodioul, has a long-standing reputation as a Stalinist. Such language, for the time being, at least, would be unthinkable in the central party press, but it is beyond any doubt that serious pressure is being brought to bear within the party, perhaps not so much for a return to Stalinist concepts -- which are in any case too outmoded for use under present-day conditions -- as for a rejection of the more or less liberal experiments tried since the death of the dictator under Mr Khrushchev's regime. This is the issue that is going to dominate the 24th Congress. It is still to early to assess the balance of forces that will clash on this ground, or to distinguish the positions on which the men and factions classified perhaps too summarily as "Stalinists" and "anti-Stalinists" will actually cross swords.

LE MONDE, Paris
29 January 1971

La préparation du 24e congrès du P.C. soviétique est entrée dans sa phase décisive

De notre correspondant ALAIN JACOB

Moscou. — La préparation du vingt-quatrième congrès du P.C. soviétique est entrée, ces derniers jours, dans sa phase la plus importante, avec le début des conférences régionales du parti. C'est au sein de ces assemblées, en effet, que sont désignés les délégués qui assisteront au congrès et que commencent à être abordés les thèmes véritables qui seront débattus à Moscou.

La conférence régionale du parti est elle-même l'aboutissement d'un long processus. Tout commence avec les réunions des « organisations de base », c'est-à-dire des sections d'usines, de kolkhozes, d'instituts, etc. A ce niveau, la structure du parti a une base professionnelle. Les membres d'une « organisation de base » entendent un compte rendu d'activité de leur direction, élisent un nouveau bureau et désignent leurs délégués à une conférence de district. Celle-ci est formée sur une base géographique ; elle entend elle aussi un compte rendu de sa direction, élit de nouveaux dirigeants et désigne les délégués qui se rendront à la conférence régionale.

Le même schéma se reproduit à la conférence régionale, qui élit les délégués au congrès. D'après les directives du comité central publiées après le plénum du 13 juillet 1969, on comptera un délégué avec voix délibérative pour deux mille neuf cents membres du parti, et un délégué avec voix consultative pour deux mille neuf cents « stagiaires » ou candidats adhérant au parti. Environ cinq mille personnes devraient donc se réunir le 30 mars à Moscou au Palais des congrès.

Le schéma général comporte une série d'exceptions. Il vaut pour l'ensemble de la Fédération de Russie. Il est plus ou moins modifié dans les autres républiques fédérées. Chacune d'elles — mais non la R.S.F.S.R. — tient en effet son propre congrès quelques semaines avant celui de l'Union. Parfois les délégués au congrès de Moscou sont désignés par ces congrès. En revanche, les délégués des communistes d'Ukraine, de Biélorussie, d'Ouzbékistan et du Kazakhstan sont élus dans les régions, ce qui n'empêche pas chacune de ces républiques de tenir son congrès pour renouveler les organismes dirigeants. D'autre part certaines villes ont des statuts particuliers équivalant à celui de district ou même de région, comme Moscou et Leningrad. Avec quelque trois cents délégués, la capitale constituera au congrès le groupe régional le plus important après celui de l'Ukraine.

Dans l'attente des directives pour le plan

L'ensemble de cette énorme machine ne s'est pas mis en route sans quelques ratés. Le 13 avril dernier, M. Brejnev annonçait que le congrès se tiendrait avant la fin de 1970, et à plusieurs reprises il avait confirmé la nouvelle. Or, le 13 juillet, le comité central décida que le congrès aurait lieu « en mars 1971 ». La date du 30 mars n'a été fixée qu'au dernier plénum du comité central le 7 décembre.

L'attente des directives pour le prochain plan quinquennal a sans doute pesé quelque peu sur la préparation du congrès. Au mois de décembre des sources concordantes [illegible] pensaient que ces directives seraient

publiées en janvier, mais on parle aujourd'hui d'un retard possible.

Un tel retard n'aurait d'ailleurs rien d'exceptionnel. Les directives du huitième plan (1966-1970) n'ont, en effet, été approuvées par le comité central que le 19 février 1966, alors que le plan quinquennal était déjà entamé et moins de quarante jours avant l'ouverture, le 29 mars, du vingt-troisième congrès du parti.

La préparation du congrès ressemble à la construction d'une pyramide dans laquelle le sommet détermine la mise en place à la base de chaque élément. C'est en ce sens que l'on a pu prétendre qu'au sein du parti la démocratie fonctionnait à l'envers, une conférence régionale étant avant tout conditionnée par les objectifs que définissent le bureau politique et le secrétariat du comité central à Moscou.

Cette image comporte une bonne part de vérité, mais elle ne tient pas suffisamment compte de la diversité des courants à l'intérieur du parti, qui trouvent justement dans la préparation du congrès une occasion exceptionnelle de se manifester. Si monolithique d'autre part que soit la direction soviétique, il n'en est pas moins raisonnable de penser que des ambitions s'y opposent, et que chacun souhaite placer dans l'appareil du parti des hommes qui lui sont acquis.

Le recrutement des « intellectuels » suspendu

Les signes d'un débat intérieur sont encore peu apparents, il est vrai, du moins, d'après ce que l'on sait des réunions qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à présent.

On relève cependant un premier indice à l'avantage de ce que l'on pourrait appeler les « conservateurs » : les consignes données il y a déjà plusieurs mois en ce qui concerne le recrutement. Précisons qu'aucun « intellectuel », au sens large du terme, n'a été admis à entrer au parti depuis l'été dernier. L'objectif premier est ici d'augmenter le pourcentage des travailleurs, ouvriers et kolkhoziens au sein de l'organisation (en 1966 le P.C. soviétique comprenait 37,3 % d'ouvriers et 16,5 % de kolkhoziens). Il semble bien que l'on ait aussi voulu tenir à l'écart, au moins pour quelque temps, les éléments les moins enclins par nature à suivre sans discussion les directives de l'appareil.

La première impression, d'autre part, que donnent les résultats connus des réunions est celle d'une grande stabilité. Çà et là, un premier secrétaire est évincé. Ce fut le cas par exemple du premier secrétaire du parti pour la ville de Sverdlosk, « mis à la retraite » à l'âge de soixante ans, ce qui ne laisse aucun doute sur le fait qu'il s'agit bien d'un limogeage.

Dans les conférences de région, les changements de personnel sont assez rares ou explicables par des raisons purement administratives (création d'organisations nouvelles, mutation du titulaire à d'autres fonctions, etc...). La même stabilité s'était déjà manifestée dans les organisations de base. La revue du comité central *Partinaia Jizn* indique que dans cent quarante-cinq d'entre elles le travail des bureaux a été jugé insatisfaisant et que quatre cent soixante-quatre secrétaires n'ont pas été réélus. Ces chiffres sont très modestes car il y a plus de trois cent mille « organisations de base » au sein du parti (trois cent douze mille en 1966 à la veille du vingt-troisième congrès).

Quels délégués seront envoyés au congrès ? D'après les statuts, ils sont élus au scrutin secret. Il va de soi que l'élection correspond fidèlement au choix fait préalablement par les instances supérieures. Mais ce choix est lui-même l'objet d'une discussion au sein de l'appareil. La conférence de région forme, en effet, une commission chargée de dresser la liste des candidats. C'est dans cette commission que les décisions sont prises. Y siègent non seulement les permanents du parti pour la région, mais aussi un certain nombre de personnalités — patrons de grandes entreprises industrielles, directeurs d'instituts, présidents de kolkhozes d'avant-garde, etc. — dont l'avis est pris en considération. La liste établie par ces notables sera approuvée par la conférence. Parfois elle résulte de marchandages serrés. C'est donc à ce niveau que se « fait » le congrès et que sa physionomie peut être légèrement corrigée par rapport à celle de l'appareil en place.

Les questions économiques et le cas Staline

Les comptes rendus de la presse soviétique donnent l'impression que les questions économiques tiennent une très large place dans les débats en cours. Le travail de chaque organisation est apprécié avant tout suivant la manière dont elle a appliqué les directives et résolutions du comité central en décembre 1969 et juillet 1970. Il est donc beaucoup question de productivité, de discipline du travail et même de fertilisation des sols et de qualité des semences. A l'occasion, toutefois, on parle aussi de « travail idéologique » et des relations à l'intérieur du parti. Des « insuffisances » sont parfois signalées, l' « inertie » par exemple d'organisations qui prennent quantité de résolutions et se préoccupent peu de leur application. Dans l'ensemble, ces critiques ne font que reprendre celles que formulent périodiquement les éditoriaux de la *Pravda* et les autres organes du parti.

Pourtant, de manière indirecte, commencent à percer les signes d'un débat plus profond. Comme à la veille du XXIII[e] congrès, la référence au nom de Staline joue le rôle de pierre de touche entre ce que l'on pourrait appeler conservateurs et progressistes. On l'avait vu apparaître en 1966 dans certains comptes rendus de réunions du parti en Géorgie. Cette année, c'est l'organe du P.C. de Moldavie qui, dans son numéro du 16 janvier, a pour ainsi dire ouvert le feu en écrivant que Staline avait donné, dans son article « Le marxisme et la question nationale », une définition représentant « *une généralisation de tout ce qui a été dit par Karl Marx, Frédéric Engels et V. I. Lénine à propos de l'essence et des traits fondamentaux de la nation* ». La référence est importante, car elle tend à restaurer Staline dans le rôle de théoricien du communisme que lui avait ôté le XX[e] congrès.

Ce n'est pas surprenant en Moldavie, où le premier secrétaire du parti, M. I. I. Bodioul, a une réputation bien établie de « stalinien ». Pareil langage, pour l'instant au moins, serait inconcevable dans la presse centrale, mais il est incontestable que des pressions sérieuses au sein du parti, moins peut-être en faveur d'un retour à des conceptions staliniennes — de toute manière trop décalées par rapport aux conditions contemporaines — que pour un rejet des expériences plus ou moins libérales tentées depuis la mort du dictateur sous le règne de M. Khrouchtchev. C'est le débat qui devrait dominer le XXIV[e] congrès. Il est encore trop tôt pour apprécier le rapport des forces qui vont s'opposer sur ce terrain, voire pour distinguer les positions sur lesquelles vont se définir des hommes ou des groupes d'influence que, trop sommairement peut-être, on qualifie aujourd'hui de « staliniens » et d' « antistaliniens ».

ALAIN JACOB.

March 1971

Today's Leadership and Prospects of the Soviet System

A remarkable consensus prevails among the better qualified observers of Soviet affairs concerning the leadership of the country and the trend of development (or more precisely, the non-development) in the Soviet system. Many have noted the advanced age of the 11-man committee known as the Politburo which collectively determines every major policy of the country (see the attached list of Politburo members which shows all but three in their 60's or over). Along with their advanced age, the leaders suffer from what these observers variously describe as cautiousness, conservatism, narrowness, spiritual "sclerosis," intellectual mediocrity, colorlessness, immobility, fearfulness, and other such infirmities. Ironically, there may be some comfort for the rest of the world in the thought that these very characteristics may be a blessing in terms of peace -- for all their lack of imagination, the Soviet leaders apparently appreciate the fact that a head-on military clash with Western military power would mean that they themselves, as well as whatever they stand for or try to achieve in their own country, would be utterly destroyed. Apart from that, the future is a cheerless prospect for the Soviet peoples under such leadership.

After some seven years in power, the current leadership seems to have transmitted its own immobility to the society over which it rules. It is becoming more widely recognized throughout the world that, far from being the progressive, productive, modern system it claims to be, the whole Soviet system of economics, of politics, of ideology and intellectual life is obsolescent, has reached an impasse, and where it goes from here is the subject of considerable debate among informed scholars. Whether it will degenerate, reform, or suffer revolutionary upheaval are some of the alternatives. (A thoughtful essay reflecting on the nature of the Soviet system and its leadership by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" is attached.)

A balance sheet of Soviet domestic and foreign gains and losses would show a serious minus between 1966 and 1971. In fact, the minus is so plain that one wonders how the 11-man Politburo can go on endorsing the stewardship of Brezhnev and Kosygin. While signs are few that the Congress will produce any major change in leadership

alignments (i.e. purges or a palace coup), anything is possible in the conspiratorial world of high Soviet politics. The logic of the situation from the free world point of view would seem to require a change in the leadership to inject an innovative dynamism in some direction away from dead center. "Khrushchevism" would be one answer -- and some respectable Sovietologists have speculated that the appearance of the Khrushchev Remembers book in the West may have been a deliberate effort by one or more highly placed Soviets to force the issue and bring new movement into Soviet society.

However, the logic of the situation as seen from the outside world is not apt to matter. It is more likely that the "logic" prevalent in the leadership is that of self-preservation, which primarily means continuation of the "status quo." This fundamental attitude of increasing reliance upon and utilization of Stalinist norms holds little promise for progress in Soviet policies or leadership.

That Stalinism versus Khrushchevism may be an issue at this time is revealed by what could be the tip of a substantial iceberg of underlying contention within Party circles. The tip first showed itself in the semi-public statement of a Soviet diplomat in Prague deploring Khrushchevism and promising a revival of Stalinism, and then in the public praise of Khrushchev by the former Deputy Minister of Defense Grigoriy Bagramyan in his recently published memoirs (see the attached news accounts).

FOR [redacted] March 1971

WHO'S WHO IN THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU

Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich (born 1906)

A member of the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1950, Brezhnev was one of Khrushchev's close associates and rose to prominence as a Party leader in the Ukraine. By 1949 he had been elected a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In 1950, he took over in Moldavia as Party First Secretary when the Moldavian Party was under fire for its handling of agricultural production. In the mid 1950's, Brezhnev did much to promote Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Campaign while serving as First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party. By May 1960, Brezhnev replaced Voroshilov as President of the USSR and after Khrushchev's ouster, became Party General Secretary.

Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev has made agriculture his personal responsibility. He has promoted increased capital investments and financial incentives to stimulate above-plan production. Yet, he continues to favor the brigade system of farming although he acknowledges the important contribution of the farmers' private plots.

During the 1968 crisis over Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev was the central figure at all the meetings of the Soviet Politburo with the Czechoslovak leadership at which the Russians sought to dissuade Dubcek and his colleagues from carrying out their liberalization program. Reported to have had reservations about military intervention in Czechoslovakia, he eventually sanctioned the 21 August invasion.

In November, 1968, Brezhnev attended in Warsaw the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party, at which he expounded his "doctrine of limited sovereignty" (the "Brezhnev Doctrine") whereby the USSR reserves the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a Communist State where she considers "Socialism" to be "threatened." The doctrine lays down that the defense of "Socialism" is the common international duty of all "Socialist" countries, and that the sovereignty of the Socialist system takes precedence over State sovereignty. The doctrine was reflected in the new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin in Prague in May 1970.

In domestic affairs, Brezhnev has presided over the rehabilitation of Stalin as a war leader and "major theoretician." This has been accompanied by the introduction of repressive measures against dissident intellectuals and national minority groups, and a general tightening of party, State and labor discipline. He has built up Soviet military strength, and appealed to Soviet patriotic feelings.

Kirilenko, Andrei Pavlovich (born 1906)

Kirilenko worked with Khrushchev in the Ukraine as a Party organizer and owed his promotion to high party office to Khrushchev's patronage. He held high posts in the Ukrainian Party organization, was elected to the CPSU Central Committee in 1956 and by 1966, became the Central Committee Secretary. Kirilenko has headed state delegations throughout East Europe, visited Latin America, and attended both Italian and French Party Congresses. Kirilenko is often lined up with the more orthodox of the Politburo members such as Shelest, Polyansky, et al.

Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (born 1904)

Kosygin, who replaced Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in October 1964, has for many years been regarded as one of the most experienced and able economic administrators in the Soviet leadership. His connection with the Communist Party dates from 1927; his membership in the Politburo, from 1960. Kosygin went with Khrushchev on his 1960 state visit to France and since 1964 has headed nearly every significant Soviet delegation going abroad.

At the September 1965 party plenum, Kosygin introduced important reforms of the economic administration, seeking to combine central ministerial control of industry with fewer restrictions on factory managers. The whole of Soviet industry was to adopt the new system by the end of 1968. This target was not achieved, but by mid-1970 40,000 enterprises, accounting for 92 percent of industrial output, were said to have gone over to the new system. The reform has not brought the hoped-for results.

Kosygin is believed to have had reservations about military intervention by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, although he distrusted her liberal reforms on ideological grounds. According to some reports he even declared against intervention at the crucial CPSU meeting at which the signal for invasion was given.

In 1969, he paid a visit to Pakistan in an evident effort to counter-balance Chinese influence in Karachi. In May 1970, he called his first Moscow Press conference since succeeding Khrushchev in 1964 and, accusing the USA of wanting to become the "international gendarme," rejected a British initiative seeking a fresh Geneva conference on Indo-China. He also revealed his sensitivity to Western speculation about possible changes in the Soviet leadership.

Mazurov, Kirill Trofimovich (born 1914)

Mazurov, son of a peasant, worked his way up in Belorussian politics, in the Republic where he was born, and by 1956 had become Party First Secretary. He became a member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1956 and a full member of the Politburo in 1965. At the October 1965 Supreme Soviet session, Mazurov was the one who presented the plans for economic reform which Kosygin had spelled out for a Central Committee plenum a few days earlier. Mazurov has

travelled extensively in East Europe and has been to Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and New York.

Pelshe, Arvid Yanovich (born 1899)

Born a Latvian, Pelshe's formative years were spent in Russia. After Russian annexed Latvia in 1940, Pelshe went "home" and gradually became a leading figure in the Latvian Communist Party, chiefly because of his efforts in the "Russification" of Latvia. Pelshe is best known for his attacks on "bourgeoise nationalism" in Latvia, a subject on which he continues to be vocal. A Politburo member since 1966, Pelshe has most recently been involved with the "watchdog" body of the Czechoslovak Communist Party now engaged in the normalization of that country.

Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich (born 1903)

Soviet President since 1965, Podgorny is an experienced Party official who worked for many years in the Ukraine under Khrushchev. He has held various posts in the Ukrainian and Moscow Food Industry Ministries. He worked his way up in the Ukrainian Party to become its First Secretary in 1957; by 1960, he was a member of the CPSU Presidium (Politburo). At the November 1964 plenum, Podgorny reported on the dismantling of one of Khrushchev's more important reforms -- the merging of industrial and agricultural party organs which Khrushchev had divided in 1962. Podgorny's travels have been limited to East Europe and the Middle East.

Suslov, Mikhail Andreevich (born 1902)

Suslov is a leading Party theoretician and one of the most influential men in the Kremlin. He has been a permanent member of the CPSU Presidium (Politburo) since 1955 and is one of that bodies very few intellectuals. On the fringe of the leadership in Stalin's time, Suslov is still considered to be one of the most influential members of the Party leadership. He acts as the CPSU's top intermediary with Communist parties throughout the world. In all of his top political posts and as head of Agitprop and editor of Pravda, Suslov has acted as the custodian of the Party's conscience, the liquidator of "deviationists" both Right and Left. He is the only member of the post-Khrushchev leadership to have made an explicit public reference to an "error" committed by Stalin. In recent years, Suslov is said to have suffered from recurring tuberculosis and a kidney complaint and to have been hospitalized several times.

Voronov, Gennady Ivanovich (born 1910)

An agricultural expert, Voronov has been a CPSU Central Committee member since 1952 and a full member of the Presidium (Politburo) since 1961. His rise to power is attributed to his known support for Khrushchev's agricultural policies and to his proved efficiency in regional management affairs. Voronov has travelled to New Zealand, Britain, and in East Europe. He is Chairman of the RSFSR Council

Premier Kosygin. In July 1966, Voronov in a speech in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR openly supported the cause of specialist training in business management for everybody -- from Ministers to heads of workshops. In 1969, in another speech to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, he called for a greater role of the Soviets in local planning at the expense of Ministries.

Polyansky, Dmitri Stepanovich (born 1917)

Son of Ukrainian peasants, Polyansky had his early training in agriculture, was in the military in World War II, and then was selected for training at the higher Party School in Moscow, from which he was graduated in 1942. For 16 years Polyansky served in various regional party posts in Siberia, the Crimea, Chkalov, Krasnodar, and finally in the RSFSR. He has been a full member of the CPSU Presidium (Politburo) since 1960. Polyansky is often cited as the patron of some of the pro-Stalin, anti-intellectual Soviet authors.

Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikolaevich (born 1918)

Shelepin is one of the younger and more forceful members of the CPSU Politburo. He was one of the main beneficiaries of the coup which overthrew Khrushchev in October, 1964. He became a full member of the party Presidium (later renamed Politburo) without having been a candidate-member. Shelepin had earlier served the party as a youth leader and as chief of the security police (KGB).

From 1952-58, he was First Secretary of the Komsomol, responsible for moulding the rising generation in the party's image. He played a prominent part in reviving the anti-religious campaign among youth, becoming noted for his handling of "heretical" tendencies in the Komsomol -- "nihilism," hooliganism, drunkeness, etc. -- which reached their peak in 1956. "Nihilists" among students, young writers and intellectuals were expelled from the Komsomol on Shelepin's orders.

In May 1958, Shelepin was appointed head of the Department for Party Organs of the Party Central Committee. In December 1958, he was made Chairman of the Committee of State Security, taking over from General Serov.

At the December 1965 Central Committee plenum, Brezhnev announced that the Control Committee would be reorganized and its functions curtailed. The reorganized body, the People's Control Committee, was placed under one of Shelepin's former Deputies. Shelepin was also released from his post as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers "in order to concentrate on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU," in his capacity as a member of the Secretariat, in which he assumed responsibility for the light and food industries.

Shelepin's career received a further setback when in July 1967 he was made Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), a post of little political influence.

Shelepin formally relinquished his Central Committee secretaryship in September 1967. His political influence has also been undermined by the progressive removal of former associates of his from responsible posts.

In March 1970 Shelepin was reported to have been ill and for nearly two months he was absent from the public scene.

Shelest, Petr Efimovich (born 1908)

Another Ukrainian of peasant origin, Shelest is now First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, a post he has held since 1963. He has been a CPSU Central Committee member since 1961 and after Khrushchev's ouster, he became a full member of the CPSU Politburo. Shelest has never travelled outside East Europe.

He is an outspoken opponent of intellectual freedom at home and abroad and also of Ukrainian "bourgeois" nationalism. In 1969, he bitterly attacked China for her anti-Soviet propaganda and criticized the "aggressive" policies of the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany. In March 1970, in a report to the 21st Congress of the Ukrainian Komsomol he emphasized the dangers of foreign propaganda and what he stigmatized as "imperialist ideological pressure."

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM
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The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration:

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

EDITORS' NOTE: The essay below by Prof. Brzezinski represents a fundamental inquiry into the essential evolutionary processes of the Soviet political system. In our opinion, it deserves careful reading and discussion. Accordingly, we have asked a number of prominent scholars—historians, philosophers, sociologists, political analysts—to submit brief comments on Prof. Brzezinski's essay, as well as on the articles in our recent symposium, "Progress and Ideology in the USSR" (November-December 1965). Replies will appear in forthcoming issues of this journal.

The Soviet Union will soon celebrate its 50th anniversary. In this turbulent and rapidly changing world, for any political system to survive half a century is an accomplishment in its own right and obvious testimony to its durability. There are not many major political structures in the world today that can boast of such longevity. The approaching anniversary, however, provides an appropriate moment for a critical review of the changes that have taken place in the Soviet system, particularly in regard to such critical matters as the character of its top leadership, the methods by which its leaders acquire power, and the relationship of the Communist Party to society. Furthermore, the time is also ripe to inquire into the implications of these changes, especially in regard to the stability and vitality of the system.

The Leaders

Today Soviet spokesmen would have us believe that the quality of the top Communist leadership in the USSR has been abysmal. Of the 45 years since Lenin, according to official Soviet history, power was exercised for approximately five years by leaders subsequently unmasked as traitors (although later the charge of treason was retroactively reduced to that of deviation); for almost 20 years it was wielded by a paranoiac mass-murderer who irrationally slew his best comrades and ignorantly guided Soviet war strategy by pointing his finger at a globe; and, most recently, for almost ten years, by a "harebrained" schemer given to tantrums and with a propensity for wild organizational experimentation. On the basis of that record, the present leadership lays claim to representing a remarkable departure from a historical pattern of singular depravity.

While Soviet criticism of former party leaders is now abundant, little intellectual effort is expended on analyzing the implications of the changes in leadership. Yet that, clearly, is the important question insofar as the political system is concerned.

Lenin was a rare type of political leader, fusing in his person several functions of key importance to the working of a political system: he acted as the chief ideologist of the system, the principal organizer of the party (indeed, the founder of the movement), and the top administrator of the state. It may be added that such personal fusion is typical of early revolutionary leaderships, and today it is exemplified by Mao Tse-tung. To his followers, Lenin was clearly a charismatic leader, and his power (like Hitler's or Mao Tse-tung's) depended less on institutions than on the force of his personality and intellect. Even after the Revolution, it was his personal authority that gave him enormous power, while the progressive institutionalization of Lenin's rule (the Cheka, the appearance of the *apparat*, etc.) reflected more the transformation of a revolutionary party into a ruling one than any significant change in the character of his leadership.

Lenin's biographers[1] agree that here was a man characterized by total political commitment, by self-righteous conviction, by tenacious determination and by an outstanding ability to formulate intellectually appealing principles of political action as well as popular slogans suitable for mass consumption. He was a typically revolutionary figure, a man whose genius can be consummated only at that critical juncture in history when the new breaks off—and not just evolves—from the old. Had he lived a generation earlier, he probably would have died in a Siberian *taiga;* a generation later, he probably would have been shot by Stalin.

Under Stalin, the fusion of leadership functions was continued, but this was due less to his personal qualities as such than to the fact that, with the passage of time and the growing toll of victims, his power became nearly total and was gradually translated also into personal authority. Only a mediocre ideologist—and certainly inferior in that respect to his chief rivals for power—Stalin became institutionally the ideologue of the system. A dull speaker, he eventually acquired the "routinized charisma"[2] which, after Lenin's death, became invested in the Communist Party as a whole (much as the Pope at one time acquired the infallibility that for a long time had rested in the collective church). But his power was increasingly institutionalized bureaucratically, with decision-making centralized at the apex within his own secretariat, and its exercise involved a subtle balancing of the principal institutions of the political system: the secret police, the party, the state, and the army (roughly in that order of importance). Even the ostensibly principal organ of power, the Politburo, was split into minor groups, "the sextets," the "quartets," etc., with Stalin personally deciding who should participate in which subgroup and personally providing (and monopolizing) the function of integration.

If historical parallels for Lenin are to be found among the revolutionary tribunes, for Stalin they are to be sought among the Oriental despots.[3] Thriving on intrigue, shielded in mystery, and isolated from society, his immense power reflected the immense tasks he succeeded in imposing on his followers and subjects. Capitalizing on the revolutionary momentum and the ideological impetus inherited from Leninism, and wedding it to a systematic institutionalization of bureaucratic rule, he could set in motion a social and political revolution which weakened all existing institutions save Stalin's own secretariat and his chief executive arm, the secret police. His power grew in proportion to the degree to which the major established institutions declined in vitality and homogeneity.[4]

The war, however, as well as the postwar reconstruction, produced a paradox. While Stalin's personal prestige and authority were further enhanced, his institutional supremacy relatively declined. The military establishment naturally grew in importance; the enormous effort to transfer, reinstall, and later reconstruct the industrial economy invigorated the state machinery; the party apparat began to perform again the key functions of social mobilization and political integration. But the aging tyrant was neither unaware of this development nor apparently resigned to it. The Byzantine intrigues resulting in the liquidation of the Leningrad leadership and Voznesenski, the "doctors' plot" with its ominous implications for some top party, military and police chiefs, clearly augured an effort to weaken any institutional limits on Stalin's personal supremacy.

[1] Angelica Balabanoff, *Impressions of Lenin,* Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press, 1964. Louis Fischer, *Life of Lenin,* New York, Harper, 1964. S. Possony, *Lenin, the Compulsive Revolutionary,* Chicago, Regnery, 1964. Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution,* New York, Dial Press, 1948.

[2] For a discussion of "routinized charisma," see Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations,* Glencoe, Ill., Glencoe Free Press, 1961, pp. 26 ff.

[3] Compare the types discussed by J. L. Talmon in his *Political Messianism: the Romantic Phase,* New York, Praeger, 1960, with Barrington Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, especially Chapter 2 on "Totalitarian Elements in Pre-Industrial Societies," or Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957.

[4] It seems that these considerations are as important to the understanding of the Stalinist system as the psychopathological traits of Stalin that Robert C. Tucker rightly emphasizes in his "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics,* July 1965.

Khrushchev came to power ostensibly to save Stalinism, which he defined as safeguarding the traditional priority of heavy industry and restoring the primacy of the party. In fact, he presided over the dismantling of Stalinism. He rode to power by restoring the predominant position of the party apparat. But the complexities of governing (as contrasted to the priorities of the power struggle) caused him to dilute the party's position. While initially he succeeded in diminishing the political role of the secret police and in weakening the state machinery, the military establishment grew in importance with the continuing tensions of the cold war.[5] By the time Khrushchev was removed, the economic priorities had become blurred because of pressures in agriculture and the consumer sector, while his own reorganization of the party into two separate industrial and rural hierarchies in November 1962 went far toward undermining the party's homogeneity of outlook, apart from splitting it institutionally. Consequently, the state bureaucracy recouped, almost by default, some of its integrative and administrative functions. Khrushchev thus, perhaps inadvertently, restored much of the institutional balance that had existed under Stalin, but without ever acquiring the full powers of the balancer.

Khrushchev lacked the authority of Lenin to generate personal power, or the power of Stalin to create personal authority—and the Soviet leadership under him became increasingly differentiated. The top leader was no longer the top ideologist, in spite of occasional efforts to present Khrushchev's elaborations as "a creative contribution to Marxism-Leninism." The ruling body now contained at least one professional specialist in ideological matters, and it was no secret that the presence of the professional ideologue was required because someone had to give professional ideological advice to the party's top leader. Similarly, technical-administrative specialization differentiated some top leaders from others. Increasingly Khrushchev's function—and presumably the primary source of his still considerable power—was that of providing political integration and impetus for new domestic or foreign initiatives in a political system otherwise too complex to be directed and administered by one man.

The differentiation of functions also made it more difficult for the top leader to inherit even the "routinized charisma" that Stalin had eventually transferred to himself from the party as a whole. Acquiring charisma was more difficult for a leader who (even apart from a personal style and vulgar appearance that did not lend themselves to "image building") had neither the great "theoretical" flare valued by a movement that still prided itself on being the embodiment of a messianic ideology, nor the technical expertise highly regarded in a state which equated technological advance with human progress. Moreover, occupying the posts of First Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers was not enough to develop a charismatic appeal since neither post has been sufficiently institutionalized to endow its occupant with the special prestige and aura that, for example, the President of the United States automatically gains on assuming office.

Trying to cope with this lack of charismatic appeal, Khrushchev replaced Stalin's former colleagues. In the process, he gradually came to rely on a younger generation of bureaucratic leaders to whom orderliness of procedure was instinctively preferable to crash campaigns. Administratively, however, Khrushchev was a true product of the Stalinist school, with its marked proclivity for just such campaigns at the cost of all other considerations. In striving to develop his own style of leadership, Khrushchev tried to emulate Lenin in stimulating new fervor, and Stalin in mobilizing energies, but without the personal and institutional assets that each had commanded. By the time he was removed, Khrushchev had become an anachronism in the new political context he himself had helped to create.

Brezhnev and Kosygin mark the coming to power of a new generation of leaders, irrespective of whether they will for long retain their present positions.[6] Lenin's, Stalin's, and Khrushchev's formative experience was the unsettled period of conspiratorial activity, revolution, and —in Khrushchev's case—civil war and the early phase of communism. The new leaders, beneficiaries of the revolution but no longer revolutionaries themselves, have matured in an

[5] For a good treatment of Soviet military debates, see Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964.

[6] See S. Bialer, "An Unstable Leadership," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1965.

established political setting in which the truly large issues of policy and leadership have been decided. Aspiring young bureaucrats, initially promoted during the purges, they could observe —but not suffer from—the debilitating consequences of political extremism and unpredictable personal rule. To this new generation of clerks, bureaucratic stability—indeed, bureaucratic dictatorship—must seem to be the only solid foundation for effective government.

Differentiation of functions to these bureaucrats is a norm, while personal charisma is ground for suspicion. The new Soviet leadership, therefore, is both bureaucratic in style and essentially impersonal in form. The curious emphasis on *kollektivnost rukovodstva* (collectivity of leadership) instead of the traditional *kollektivnoe rukovodstvo* (collective leadership)—a change in formulation used immediately after Khrushchev's fall—suggests a deliberate effort at achieving not only a personal but also an institutional collective leadership, designed to prevent any one leader from using a particular institution as a vehicle for obtaining political supremacy.

The question arises, however, whether this kind of leadership can prove effective in guiding the destiny of a major state. The Soviet system is now led by a bureaucratic leadership from the very top to the bottom. In that respect, it is unique. Even political systems with highly developed and skillful professional political bureaucracies, such as the British, the French, or that of the Catholic Church, have reserved some top policy-making and hence power-wielding positions for non-bureaucratic professional politicians, presumably on the assumption that a free-wheeling, generalizing and competitive political experience is of decisive importance in shaping effective national leadership.

To be sure, some top Soviet leaders do acquire such experience, even in the course of rising up the bureaucratic party ladder, especially when assigned to provincial or republican executive responsibilities. There they acquire the skills of initiative, direction, integration, as well as accommodation, compromise, and delegation of authority, which are the basic prerequisites for executive management of any complex organization.

Nonetheless, even when occupying territorial positions of responsibility, the *apparatchiki* are still part of an extremely centralized and rigidly hierarchical bureaucratic organization, increasingly set in its ways, politically corrupted by years of unchallenged power, and made even more confined in its outlook than is normally the case with a ruling body by its lingering and increasingly ritualized doctrinaire tradition. It is relevant to note here (from observations made in Soviet universities) that the young men who become active in the Komsomol organization and are presumably embarking on a professional political career are generally the dull conformists. Clearly, in a highly bureaucratized political setting, conformity, caution and currying favor with superiors count for more in advancing a political career than personal courage and individual initiative.[7]

Such a condition poses a long-range danger to the vitality of any political system. Social evolution, it has been noted, depends not only on the availability of creative individuals, but on the existence of clusters of creators who collectively promote social innovation. "The ability of any gifted individual to exert leverage within a society . . . is partly a function of the exact composition of the group of those on whom he depends for day-to-day interaction and for the execution of his plans."[8] The revolutionary milieu of the 1920's and even the fanatical Stalinist commitment of the 1930's fostered such clusters of intellectual and political talent. It is doubtful that the CPSU party schools and the Central Committee personnel department encourage, in Margaret Mead's terms, the growth of clusters of creativity, and that is why the transition from Lenin to Stalin to Khrushchev to Brezhnev probably cannot be charted by an ascending line.

This has serious implications for the Soviet system as a whole. It is doubtful that any organization can long remain vital if it is so structured that in its personnel policy it becomes, almost unknowingly, inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation. Decay is bound to set in, while the stability of the political system may be endangered, if other social institutions succeed in attracting the society's talent and begin to chafe under the restraints imposed by the ruling but increasingly mediocre *apparatchiki*.

[7] Writing about modern bureaucracy, V. A. Thompson (*Modern Organization*, New York, 1961, p. 91) observed: "In the formally structured group, the idea man is doubly dangerous. He endangers the established distribution of power and status, and he is a competitive threat to his peers. Consequently, he has to be suppressed." For a breezy treatment of some analogous experience, see also E. G. Hegarty, *How to Succeed in Company Politics*, New York, 1963.

[8] Margaret Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 181. See also her introduction, especially p. xx.

The Struggle for Power

The struggle for power in the Soviet political system has certainly become less violent. The question is, however: Has it become less debilitating for the political system? Has it become a more regularized process, capable of infusing the leadership with fresh blood? A closer look at the changes in the character of the competition for power may guide us to the answer.

Both Stalin and Khrushchev rode to power by skillfully manipulating issues as well as by taking full advantage of the organizational opportunities arising from their tenure of the post of party First Secretary. It must be stressed that the manipulation of issues was at least as important to their success as the organizational factor, which generally tends to receive priority in Western historical treatments. In Stalin's time, the issues facing the party were, indeed, on a grand scale: world revolution *vs.* socialism in one country; domestic evolution *vs.* social revolution; a factionalized *vs.* a monolithic party. Stalin succeeded because he instinctively perceived that the new *apparatchiki* were not prepared to sacrifice themselves in futile efforts to promote foreign revolutions but—being for the most part genuinely committed to revolutionary ideals—were becoming eager to get on with the job of creating a socialist society. (Moreover, had the NEP endured another ten years, would the Soviet Union be a Communist dictatorship today?)

Stalin's choice of socialism in one country was a brilliant solution. It captivated, at least in part, the revolutionaries; and it satisfied, at least partially, the accommodators. It split the opposition, polarized it, and prepared the ground for the eventual liquidation of each segment with the other's support. The violence, the terror, and finally the Great Purges of 1936-1938 followed logically. Imbued with the Leninist tradition of intolerance for dissent, engaged in a vast undertaking of social revolution that taxed both the resources and the nerves of party members, guided by an unscrupulous and paranoiac but also reassuringly calm leader, governing a backward country surrounded by neighbors that were generally hostile to the Soviet experiment, and increasingly deriving its own membership strength from first-generation proletarians with all their susceptibility to simple explanations and dogmatic truths, the ruling party easily plunged down the path of increasing brutality. The leader bore the onus of that violence and controlled it. The terror never degenerated into simple anarchy, and Stalin's power grew immeasurably because he effectively practiced the art of leadership according to his own definition:

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to become isolated from the masses. But neither must one rush ahead, for to rush ahead is to lose contact with the masses. He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts—against those who lag behind and those who run ahead.[9]

Khrushchev, too, succeeded in becoming the top leader because he perceived the elite's predominant interests. Restoration of the primary position of the party, decapitation of the secret police, reduction of the privileges of the state bureaucrats while maintaining the traditional emphasis on heavy industrial development (which pleased both the industrial elite and the military establishment)—these were the issues which Khrushchev successfully utilized in the mid-1950's to mobilize the support of officials and accomplish the gradual isolation and eventual defeat of Malenkov.

But the analogy ends right there. The social and even the political system in which Khrushchev came to rule was relatively settled. Indeed, in some respects, it was stagnating, and Khrushchev's key problem, once he reached the political apex (but before he had had time to consolidate his position there) was how to get the country moving again. The effort to infuse new social and political dynamism into Soviet society, even while consolidating his power, led him to a public repudiation of Stalinism which certainly shocked some officials; to sweeping economic reforms which disgruntled many administrators; to a dramatic reorganization of the party which appalled the *apparatchiki;* and even to an attempt to circumvent the policy-making authority of the party Presidium by means of direct appeals to interested groups, which must have both outraged and frightened his colleagues. The elimination of violence as the decisive instrumentality of political competition—a move that was perhaps prompted by the greater institutional maturity of Soviet society, and which was in any case made inevitable by the downgrading of the secret police and the public disavowals of Stalinism—meant that Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, could not achieve

[9] The Bolshevik Party in Power, p. 338.

both social dynamism and the stability of his power. Stalin magnified his power as he strove to change society; to change society Khrushchev had to risk his power.

The range of domestic disagreement involved in the post-Stalin struggles has also narrowed with the maturing of social commitments made earlier. For the moment, the era of grand alternatives is over in Soviet society. Even though any struggle tends to exaggerate differences, the issues that divided Khrushchev from his opponents, though of great import, appear pedestrian in comparison to those over which Stalin and his enemies crossed swords. In Khrushchev's case, they pertained primarily to policy alternatives; in the case of Stalin, they involved basic conceptions of historical development. Compare the post-Stalin debates about the allocation of resources among different branches of the economy, for example, with the debates of the 1920's about the character and pace of Soviet industrialization; or Khrushchev's homilies on the merits of corn—and even his undeniably bold and controversial virgin lands campaign—with the dilemma of whether to collectivize a hundred million reticent peasants, at what pace, and with what intensity in terms of resort to violence.

It is only in the realm of foreign affairs that one can perhaps argue that grand dilemmas still impose themselves on the Soviet political scene. The nuclear-war-or-peace debate of the 1950's and early 1960's is comparable in many respects to the earlier conflict over "permanent revolution" or "socialism in one country." Molotov's removal and Kozlov's political demise were to a large extent related to disagreements concerning foreign affairs; nonetheless, in spite of such occasional rumblings, it would appear that on the peace-or-war issue there is today more of a consensus among the Soviet elite than there was on the issue of permanent revolution in the 1920's. Although a wide spectrum of opinion does indeed exist in the international Communist movement on the crucial questions of war and peace, this situation, as far as one can judge, obtains to a considerably lesser degree in the USSR itself. Bukharin *vs.* Trotsky can be compared to Togliatti *vs.* Mao Tse-tung, but hardly to Khrushchev *vs.* Kozlov.

The narrowing of the range of disagreement is reflected in the changing [illegible] In the earlier part of this discussion, some comparative comments were made about Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. It is even more revealing, however, to examine their principal rivals. Take the men who opposed Stalin: Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin. What a range of political, historical, economic, and intellectual creativity, what talent, what a diversity of personal characteristics and backgrounds! Compare this diversity with the strikingly uniform personal training, narrowness of perspective, and poverty of intellect of Malenkov, Kozlov and Suslov.[10] A regime of the clerks cannot help but clash over clerical issues.

The narrowing of the range of disagreement and the cooling of ideological passions mean also the wane of political violence. The struggle tends to become less a matter of life or death, and more one in which the price of defeat is simply retirement and some personal disgrace. In turn, with the routinization of conflict, the political system develops even a body of precedents for handling fallen leaders. By now there must be a regular procedure, probably even some office, for handling pensions and apartments for former Presidium members, as well as a developing social etiquette for dealing with them publicly and privately.[11]

[10] One could hardly expect a historian to work up any enthusiasm for undertaking to write, say, Malenkov's biography: *The Apparatchik Promoted, The Apparatchik Triumphant, The Apparatchik Pensioned!*

[11] Can Mikoyan, for example, invite Khrushchev to lunch? This is not a trivial question, for social mores and political style are interwoven. After all, Voroshilov, who had been publicly branded as a military idiot and a political sycophant, was subsequently invited to a Kremlin reception. Zhukov, against whom the Bonapartist charge still stands, appeared in full regalia at the 20th anniversary celebration of the Soviet victory in World War II.

More important is the apparent development in the Soviet system of something which might be described as a regularly available "counter-elite." After Khrushchev's fall, his successors moved quickly to restore to important positions a number of individuals whom Khrushchev had purged,[12] while some of Khrushchev's supporters were demoted and transferred. Already for a number of years now, it has been fairly common practice to appoint party officials demoted from high office either to diplomatic posts abroad or to some obscure, out-of-the-way assignments at home. The total effect of this has been to create a growing body of official "outs" who are biding their time on the sidelines and presumably hoping someday to become the "ins" again. Moreover, they may not only hope; if sufficiently numerous, young, and vigorous, they may gradually begin to resemble something of a political alternative to those in power, and eventually to think and even act as such. This could be the starting point of informal factional activity, of intrigues and conspiracies when things go badly for those in power, and of organized efforts to seduce some part of the ruling elite in order to stage an internal change of guard.[13] In addition, the availability of an increasingly secure "counter-elite" is likely to make it more difficult for a leader to consolidate his power. This in turn might tend to promote more frequent changes in the top leadership, with policy failures affecting the power of incumbents instead of affecting—only retroactively—the reputation of former leaders, as has hitherto been the case.

The cumulative effect of these developments has been wide-ranging. First of all, the reduced importance of both ideological issues and personalities and the increasing weight of institutional interests in the periodic struggles for power—a phenomenon which reflects the more structured quality of present-day Soviet life as compared with the situation under Stalin—tends to depersonalize political conflict and to make it a protracted bureaucratic struggle. Secondly, the curbing of violence makes it more likely that conflicts will be resolved by patched-up compromises rather than by drastic institutional redistributions of power and the reappearance of personal tyranny. Finally, the increasingly bureaucratic character of the struggle for power tends to transform it into a contest among high-level clerks and is therefore not conducive to attracting creative and innovating talent into the top leadership.

Khrushchev's fall provides a good illustration of the points made above, as well as an important precedent for the future. For the first time in Soviet history, the First Secretary has been toppled from power by his associates. This was done not in order to replace him with an alternative personal leader or to pursue genuinely alternative goals, but in order to depersonalize the leadership and to pursue more effectively many of the previous policies. In a word, the objectives were impersonal leadership and higher bureaucratic efficiency. Khrushchev's removal, however, also means that personal intrigues and cabals can work, that subordinate members of the leadership—or possibly, someday, a group of ex-leaders—can effectively conspire against a principal leader, with the result that any future First Secretary is bound to feel far less secure than Khrushchev must have felt at the beginning of October 1964.

The absence of an institutionalized top executive officer in the Soviet political system, in conjunction with the increased difficulties in the way of achieving personal dictatorship and the decreased personal cost of defeat in a political conflict, create a ready-made situation for group pressures and institutional clashes. In fact, although the range of disagreement may have narrowed, the scope of elite participation in power conflicts has already widened. Much of Khrushchev's exercise of power was preoccupied with mediating the demands of key institutions such as the army, or with overcoming the opposition of others, such as the objections of the administrators to economic decentralization or of the heavy industrial managers to non-industrial priorities. These interests were heavily involved in the Khrushchev-Malenkov conflict and in the "anti-party" episode of 1957.

At the present time, these pressures and clashes take place in an almost entirely amor-

[12] F. D. Kulakov, apparently blamed by Khrushchev in 1960 for agricultural failings in the RSFSR, was appointed in 1965 to direct the Soviet Union's new agricultural programs; V. V. Matskevich was restored as Minister of Agriculture and appointed Deputy Premier of the RSFSR in charge of agriculture; Marshal M. V. Zakharov was reappointed as Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces; even L. G. Melnikov reemerged from total obscurity as chairman of the industrial work safety committee of the RSFSR.

[13] Molotov's letter to the Central Committee on the eve of the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961, which bluntly and directly charged Khrushchev's program with revisionism, was presumably designed to stir up the *apparatchiki* against the First Secretary. It may be a portent of things to come.

and established procedures. The somewhat greater role played by the Central Committee in recent years still does not suffice to give this process of bureaucratic conflict a stable institutional expression. As far as we know from existing evidence, the Central Committee still acted during the 1957 and 1964 crises primarily as a ratifying body, giving formal sanction to decisions already fought out in the Kremlin's corridors of power.[14] It did not act as either the arbiter or the supreme legislative body.

The competition for power, then, is changing from a death struggle among the few into a contest played by many more. But the decline of violence does not, as is often assumed, automatically benefit the Soviet political system; something more effective and stable has to take the place of violence. The "game" of politics that has replaced the former mafia-style struggles for power is no longer murderous, but it is still not a stable game played within an established arena, according to accepted rules, and involving more or less formal teams. It resembles more the anarchistic free-for-all of the playground and therefore could become, in some respects, even more debilitating to the system. Stalin encouraged institutional conflict below him so that he could wield his power with less restraint. Institutional conflict combined with mediocre and unstable personal leadership makes for ineffective and precarious power.

Party and Group Interests

In a stimulating study of political development and decay, Samuel Huntington has argued that stable political growth requires a balance between political "institutionalization" and political "participation": that merely increasing popular mobilization and participation in politics without achieving a corresponding degree of "institutionalization of political organization and procedures" results not in political development but in political decay.[15] Commenting in passing on the Soviet system, he therefore noted that "a strong party is in the Soviet public interest" because it provides a stable institutional framework.[16]

The Soviet political system has certainly achieved a high index of institutionalization. For almost five decades the ruling party has maintained unquestioned supremacy over the society, imposing its ideology at will. Traditionally, the Communist system has combined its high institutionalization with high pseudo-participation of individuals.[17] But a difficulty could arise if division within the top leadership of the political system weakened political "institutionalization" while simultaneously stimulating genuine public participation by groups and institutions. Could this new condition be given an effective and stable institutional framework and, if so, with what implications for the "strong" party?

Today the Soviet political system is again oligarchic, but its socio-economic setting is now quite different. Soviet society is far more developed and stable, far less *malleable* and atomized. In the past, the key groups that had to be considered as potential political participants were relatively few. Today, in addition to the vastly more entrenched institutional interests, such as the police, the military, and the state bureaucracy, the youth could become a source of ferment, the consumers could become more restless, the collective farmers more recalcitrant, the scientists more outspoken, the non-Russian nationalities more demanding. Prolonged competition among the oligarchs would certainly accelerate the assertiveness of such groups.

[14] Roger Pethybridge, *A Key to Soviet Politics*, New York, Praeger, 1962. See also Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev*, Washington, DC, Public Affairs Press, 1958

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* (Princeton, N. J.) April 1965.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

[17] The massive campaigns launching "public discussions" that involve millions of people, the periodic "elections" that decide nothing, were designed to develop participation without threat to the institutionalized political organization and procedures. The official theory held that as Communist consciousness developed and new forms of social and public relations took root, political participation would become more meaningful and the public would come to

By now some of these groups have a degree of institutional cohesion, and occasionally they act in concert on some issues.[18] They certainly can lobby and, in turn, be courted by ambitious and opportunistic oligarchs. Some groups, because of institutional cohesion, advantageous location, easy access to the top leadership, and ability to articulate their goals and interests, can be quite influential.[19] Taken together they represent a wide spectrum of opinion, and in the setting of oligarchical rule there is bound to be some correspondence between their respective stances and those of the top leaders. This spectrum is represented in simplified fashion by the chart on this page, which takes cumulative account of the principal divisions, both on external and on domestic issues, that have perplexed Soviet political life during the last decade or so.[20] Obviously, the table is somewhat arbitrary and also highly speculative. Individuals and groups cannot be categorized so simply, and some, clearly, could be shifted left or right with equal cause, as indeed they often shift themselves. Nonetheless, the chart illustrates the range of opinion that exists in the Soviet system and suggests the kind of alliances, group competition, and political courtship that probably prevail, cutting vertically through the party organization.

Not just Western but also Communist (although not as yet Soviet) political thinkers are coming to recognize more and more openly the existence of group conflict even in a Communist-dominated society. A Slovak jurist recently observed:

The social interest in our society can be democratically formed only by the integration of group interests; in the process of this integration, the interest groups protect their own economic and other social interests; this is in no way altered by the fact that everything appears on the surface as a unity of interests.[21]

The author went on to stress that the key political problem facing the Communist system is that of achieving integration of group interests.

Traditionally, this function of integration has been monopolized by the party, resorting—since the discard of terror—to the means of *bureaucratic arbitration.* In the words of the author just cited, "the party as the leading and directing political force fulfills its functions by resolving intra-class and inter-class interests." In doing so, the party generally has preferred to deal with each group bilaterally, thereby preventing the formation of coalitions and informal group consensus. In this way the unity of political direction as well as the political supremacy of the ruling party have been maintained. The party has always been very jealous of its "integrative" prerogative, and the intrusion on the political scene of any other group has been strongly resented. The party's institutional primacy has thus depended on limiting the real participation of other groups.

If, for one reason or another, the party were to weaken in the performance of this function, the only alternative to anarchy would be some *institutionalized process of mediation,* replacing

[18] A schematic distribution of these groups is indicated by the following approximate figures: (A) amorphous social forces that in the main express passively broad social aspirations: workers and peasants, about 88 million; white collar and technical intelligentsia, about 24 million. (B) specific interest groups that promote their own particular interests: the literary and artistic community, about 75 thousand; higher-level scientists, about 150 thousand; physicians, about 380 thousand. (C) policy groups whose interests necessarily spill over into broad matters of national policy: industrial managers, about 200 thousand; state and collective farm chairmen, about 45 thousand; commanding military personnel, about 80 thousand; higher-level state bureaucrats, about 250 thousand. These groups are integrated by the professional *apparatchiki,* who number about 150-200 thousand. All of these groups in turn could be broken down into sub-units; *e.g.,* the literary community, institutionally built around several journals, can be divided into hard-liners, the centrists, and the progressives, etc. Similarly, the military. On some issues, there may be cross-interlocking of sub-groups, as well as more-or-less temporary coalitions of groups. See Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA-USSR,* New York, Viking Press, 1964, Ch. 4, for further discussion.

[19] An obvious example is the military command, bureaucratically cohesive and with a specific esprit de corps, located in Moscow, necessarily in frequent contact with the top leaders, and possessing its own journals of opinion. (where strategic and hence also—indirectly—budgetary, foreign, and other issues can be discussed).

[20] The categories "systemic left," etc., are adapted from R. R. Levine's book, *The Arms Debate* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963), which contains a suggestive chart of American opinion on international issues. By "systemic left" is meant here a radical reformist outlook, challenging the predominant values of the existing system; by "systemic right" is meant an almost reactionary return to past values; the other three categories designate differences of degree within a dominant "mainstream."

In the chart below (unlike Levine's), the center position serves as a dividing line, and hence no one is listed directly under it. Malenkov is listed as "systemic left" because his proposals represented at the time a drastic departure from established positions. Molotov is labeled "systemic right" because of his inclination to defend the essentials of the Stalinist system as he knew it. [illegible] since Stalin's death.

[21] M. Lakatos, "On Some Problems of the Structure of Our Political System," *Pravny obzor* (Bratislava), No. 1, 1965, as quoted in Gordon Skilling's illuminating paper, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," read to the Canadian Political Science Association in June 1965.

Policy Spectrum USSR



the party's bureaucratic arbitration. Since, as noted, group participation has become more widespread, while the party's effectiveness in achieving integration has been lessened by the decline in the vigor of Soviet leadership and by the persistent divisions in the top echelon, the creation and eventual formal institutionalization of some such process of mediation is gaining in urgency. Otherwise participation could outrun institutionalization and result in a challenge to the party's integrative function.

Khrushchev's practice of holding enlarged Central Committee plenums, with representatives of other groups present, seems to have been a step towards formalizing a more regular consultative procedure. (It also had the politically expedient effect of bypassing Khrushchev's opponents in the central leadership.) Such enlarged plenums provided a consultative forum, where policies could be debated, views articulated, and even some contradictory interests resolved. Although the device still remained essentially non-institutionalized and only *ad hoc*, consultative and not legislative, still subject to domination by the party *apparat*, it was nonetheless a response to the new quest for real participation that Soviet society has manifested and which the Soviet system badly needs. It was also a compromise solution, attempting to wed the party's primacy to a procedure allowing group articulation.

However, the problem has become much more complex and fundamental because of the organizational and ideological crisis in the party over its relevance to the evolving Soviet system. For many years the party's monopoly of power and hence its active intervention in all spheres of Soviet life could indeed be said to be "in the Soviet public interest." The party provided social mobilization, leadership, and a dominant outlook for a rapidly changing and developing society. But, in the main, that society has now taken shape. It is no longer malleable, subject to simple mobilization, or susceptible to doctrinaire ideological manipulation.

As a result, Soviet history in the last few years has been dominated by the spectacle of a party in search of a role. What is to be the function of an ideocratic party in a relatively complex and industrialized society, in which the structure of social relationships generally reflects the party's ideological preferences? To be sure, like any large sociopolitical system, the Soviet system needs an integrative organ. But the question is, What is the most socially desirable way of achieving such integration? Is a "strong" party one that dominates and interferes in everything, and is this interference conducive to continued

Soviet economic, political and intellectual growth?

In 1962 Khrushchev tried to provide a solution. The division of the party into two vertically parallel, functional organs was an attempt to make the party directly relevant to the economy and to wed the party's operations to production processes. It was a bold, dramatic and radical innovation, reflecting a recognition of the need to adapt the party's role to a new state of Soviet social development. But it was also a dangerous initiative; it carried within itself the potential of political disunity as well as the possibility that the party would become so absorbed in economic affairs that it would lose its political and ideological identity. That it was rapidly repudiated by Khrushchev's successors is testimony to the repugnance that the reorganization must have stimulated among the professional party bureaucrats.

His successors, having rejected Khrushchev's reorganization of the party, have been attempting a compromise solution—in effect, a policy of "muddling through." On the one hand, they recognize that the party can no longer direct the entire Soviet economy from the Kremlin and that major institutional reforms in the economic sphere, pointing towards more local autonomy and decision-making, are indispensable.[22] (Similar tendencies are apparent elsewhere—*e.g.*, the stress on professional self-management in the military establishment.) This constitutes a partial and implicit acknowledgment that in some respects a party of total control is today incompatible with the Soviet public interest.

On the other hand, since obviously inherent in the trend towards decentralization is the danger that the party will be gradually transformed from a directing, ideologically-oriented organization to a merely instrumental and pragmatic body specializing in adjustment and compromise of social group aspirations, the party functionaries, out of a sense of vested interest, have been attempting simultaneously to revive the ideological vitality of the CPSU. Hence the renewed stress on ideology and ideological training; hence the new importance attached to the work of the ideological commissions; and hence the categorical reminders that "Marxist education, Marxist-Leninist training, and the ideological tempering of CPSU members and candidate members is the primary concern of every party organization and committee."[23]

However, it is far from certain that economic decentralization and ideological "retempering" can be pushed forward hand in hand. The present leadership appears oblivious to the fact that established ideology remains vital only when ideologically motivated power is applied to achieve ideological goals. A gradual reduction in the directing role of the party cannot be compensated for by an increased emphasis on ideological semantics. Economic decentralization inescapably reduces the scope of the political-ideological and increases the realm of the pragmatic-instrumental. It strengthens the trend, publicly bemoaned by Soviet ideologists, toward depolitization of the Soviet elite.[24] A massive indoctrination campaign directed at the elite cannot operate in a "de-ideologized" socio-economic context, and major efforts to promote such a campaign could, indeed, prompt the social isolation of the party, making its dogmas even more irrelevant to the daily concerns of a Soviet scientist, factory director, or army general. That in turn would further reduce the ability of the party to provide effective integration in Soviet society, while underscoring the party *apparatchik's* functional irrelevance to the workings of Soviet administration and technology.

If the party rejects a return to ideological dogmas and renewed dogmatic indoctrination, it unavoidably faces the prospect of further internal change. It will gradually become a loose body, combining a vast variety of specialists, engineers, scientists, administrators, professional bureaucrats, agronomists, etc. Without a

[22] See the report delivered by A. Kosygin to the CC Plenum on Sept. 27, 1965, proposing the reorganization of the Soviet economy. Also his speech at a meeting of the USSR State Planning Committee, *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow) April 1965; and the frank discussion by A. E. Lunev, "Democratic Centralism in Soviet State Administration," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow) No. 4, 1965.

[23] "Ideological Hardening of Communists" (editorial), *Pravda*, June 28, 1965. There have been a whole series of articles in this vein, stressing the inseparability of ideological and organizational work. For details of a proposed large-scale indoctrination campaign, see V. Stepakov, head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "Master the Great Teaching of Marxism-Leninism," *Pravda*, Aug. 4, 1965.

[24] Stepakov, *ibid.*, explicitly states that in recent years "many comrades" who have assumed leading posts in the "directive aktivs" of the party have inadequate ideological knowledge, even though they have excellent technical backgrounds; and he urges steps against the "replacement" of party training "by professional-technical education."

common dogma and without an active program, what will hold these people together? The party at this stage will face the same dilemma that the fascist and falange parties faced, and that currently confronts the Yugoslav and Polish Communists: in the absence of a large-scale domestic program of change, in the execution of which other groups and institutions become subordinated to the party, the party's domestic primacy declines and its ability to provide social-political integration is negated.

Moreover, the Soviet party leaders would be wrong to assume complacently that the narrowed range of disagreement over domestic policy alternatives could not again widen. Persistent difficulties in agriculture could some day prompt a political aspirant to question the value of collectivization; or the dissatisfaction of some nationalities could impose a major strain on the Soviet constitutional structure; or foreign affairs could again become the source of bitter internal conflicts. The ability of the system to withstand the combined impact of such divisive issues and of greater group intrusion into politics would much depend on the adaptations that it makes in its organization of leadership and in its processes of decision-making. Unless alternative mechanisms of integration are created, a situation could arise in which some group other than the top *apparat*—a group that had continued to attract talent into its top ranks and had not been beset by bureaucratically debilitating conflict at the top—could step forth to seek power; invoking the Soviet public interest in the name of established Communist ideals, and offering itself (probably in coalition with some section of the party leadership) as the only alternative to chaos, it would attempt to provide a new balance between institutionalization and participation.

The Threat of Degeneration

The Soviet leaders have recognized the need of institutional reforms in the economic sector in order to revitalize the national economy. The fact is that institutional reforms are just as badly needed—and even more overdue—in the political sector. Indeed, the effort to maintain a doctrinaire dictatorship over an increasingly modern and industrial society has already contributed to a reopening of the gap that existed in prerevolutionary Russia between the political system and the society, thereby posing the threat of the degeneration of the Soviet system.

A political system can be said to degenerate when there is a perceptible decline in the quality of the social talent that the political leadership attracts to itself in competition with other groups; when there is persistent division within the ruling elite, accompanied by a decline in its commitment to shared beliefs; when there is protracted instability in the top leadership; when there is a decline in the capacity of the ruling elite to define the purposes of the political system in relationship to society and to express them in effective institutional terms; when there is a fuzzing of institutional and hierarchical lines of command, resulting in the uncontrolled and unchanneled intrusion into politics of hitherto politically uninvolved groupings.[25] All of these indicators were discernible in the political systems of Tsarist Russia, the French Third Republic, Chiang Kai-Shek's China and Rakosi's Hungary. Today, as already noted, at least several are apparent in the Soviet political system.

This is not to say, however, that the evolution of the Soviet system has inevitably turned into degeneration. Much still depends on how the ruling Soviet elite reacts. Policies of retrenchment, increasing dogmatism, and even violence, which—if now applied—would follow almost a decade of loosening up, could bring about a grave situation of tension, and the possibility of revolutionary outbreaks could not be discounted entirely. "Terror is indispensable to any dictatorship, but it cannot compensate for incompetent leaders and a defective organization of authority," observed a historian of the French revolution, writing of the Second Directory.[26] It is equally true of the Soviet political scene.

The threat of degeneration could be lessened through several adaptations designed to adjust the Soviet political system to the changes that have taken place in the now more mature society. First of all, the top policy-making organ of the Soviet system has been traditionally the exclusive preserve of the professional politician, and in many respects this has assured the Soviet political system of able and experienced leadership. However, since a professional bureaucracy is not prone to produce broad "generalizing" talents, and since the inherent differentiation of functions within it increases the likelihood of leaders with relatively much narrower specialization than hitherto was the case, the need for

[25] For a general discussion and a somewhat different formulation, see S. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," pp. 415-17.

[26] G. Lefebvre, *The Directory*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1965, Vol. II, p. 205.

somewhat broader representation of social talent within the top political leadership, and not merely on secondary levels as hitherto, is becoming urgent. If several outstanding scientists, professional economists, industrial managers, and others were to be co-opted by lateral entry into the ruling Presidium, the progressive transformation of the leadership into a regime of clerks could thereby be averted, and the alienation of other groups from the political system perhaps halted.

Secondly, the Soviet leaders would have to institutionalize a chief executive office and strive to endow it with legitimacy and stability. This would eventually require the creation of a formal and open process of leadership selection, as well—probably—as a time limit on the tenure of the chief executive position. The time limit, if honored, would depersonalize power, while an institutionalized process of selection geared to a specific date—and therefore also limited in time—would reduce the debilitating effects of unchecked and protracted conflict in the top echelons of power.

The CPSU continues to be an ideocratic party with a strong tradition of dogmatic intolerance and organizational discipline. Today less militant and more bureaucratic in outlook, it still requires a top catalyst, though no longer a personal tyrant, for effective operations. The example of the papacy, or perhaps of Mexico, where a ruling party has created a reasonably effective system of presidential succession, offers a demonstration of how one-man rule can be combined with a formal office of the chief executive, endowed with legitimacy, tenure and a formally established pattern of selection.

Any real institutionalization of power would have significant implications for the party. If its Central Committee were to become in effect an electoral college, selecting a ruler whom no one could threaten during his tenure, the process of selection would have to be endowed with considerable respectability. It would have to be much more than a mere ratification of an *a priori* decision reached by some bureaucratic cabal. The process would require tolerance for the expression of diverse opinions in a spirit free of dogmatism, a certain amount of open competition among rivals for power, and perhaps even the formation of informal coalitions—at least temporary ones. In a word, it would mean a break with the Leninist past, with consequences that would unavoidably spill over from the party into the entire system and society.

Thirdly, increased social participation in politics unavoidably creates the need for an institutionalized arena for the mediation of group interests, if tensions and conflicts, and eventually perhaps even anarchy, are to be avoided. The enlarged plenums of the Central Committee were a right beginning, but if the Committee is to mediate effectively among the variety of institutional and group interests that now exist in Soviet society, its membership will have to be made much more representative and the predominance of party bureaucrats watered down. Alternatively, the Soviet leaders might consider following the Yugoslav course of creating a new institution for the explicit purpose of providing group representation and reconciling different interests. In either case, an effective organ of mediation could not be merely a front for the party's continued bureaucratic arbitration of social interests, as that would simply perpetuate the present dilemmas.

Obviously, the implementation of such institutional reforms would eventually lead to a profound transformation of the Soviet system. But it is the absence of basic institutional development in the Soviet political system that has posed the danger of the system's degeneration. It is noteworthy that the Yugoslavs have been experimenting with political reforms, including new institutions, designed to meet precisely the problems and dangers discussed here. Indeed, in the long run, perhaps the ultimate contribution to Soviet political and social development that the CPSU can make is to adjust gracefully to the desirability, and perhaps even inevitability, of its own gradual withering away. In the meantime, the progressive transformation of the bureaucratic Communist dictatorship into a more pluralistic and institutionalized political system—even though still a system of one-party rule—seems essential if its degeneration is to be averted.

Mr. Brzezinski is Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University. His books include The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (*Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960*) *and* Alternative to Partition (*New York, McGraw Hill, 1965*).

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Feb. 6, 1971

Brezhnev Remains the Dominant Figure in Soviet Leadership

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Feb. 5—Leonid Brezhnev remains the dominant figure in the collective Soviet leadership as the Communist Party conducts final preparations for the 24th Party Congress, which begins March 30.

This is the virtually unanimous view of Western, neutral and Communist observers here. But as one ambassador remarked, "There are no degrees of knowledge about what goes on in the Kremlin—only degrees of ignorance." Nobody who remembers the surprise ouster of Nikta Khrushchev in October, 1964, will make confident predictions about how long Brezhnev will remain the chief beneficiary of the Kremlin balance of power.

Since surviving the last serious challenge to his dominance last July, the general secretary has garnered several harvests of publicity reminiscent of Khrushchev. They seemed efforts to add to his personal stature while mobilizing public support for the party congress.

He made three major speeches in republic capitals between the end of August and the end of November. Each included significant foreign policy pronouncements. Each got heavy press and television play, and one republic party leader referred to Brezhnev as "head of the politburo," a violation of collective protocol.

On New Year's Eve, Brezhnev broke precedent and delivered the traditional New Year message personally on radio and television as millions of Soviets tuned in to hear the Kremlin chimes usher in the new year.

No Soviet Party leader had ever done this before. In recent years, Yuri Levitan, a well-known and sonorous announcer, had read an anonymous address from the party and government.

Brezhnev said nothing significant in the speech. He portrayed 1970 as a year of Soviet triumphs at home and abroad and said 1971 would be even better. But the Soviet press ran the full text in all major papers on New Year's Day, and four more articles on it appeared in a variety of papers in the next three days.

Kosygin Interview

Premier Kosygin, whom Westerners often assume to differ from Brezhnev in politburo debates, gave an unusual interview to the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun Jan. 2, which was also printed in the Soviet press. He too made important foreign policy comments. Kosygin has also been the chief Soviet voice denouncing the invasion of Laos this week.

Some observers said this was a normal division of labor. Others thought it might have been arranged to remind Brezhnev and the party that he does not stand alone in the leadership. But none thought it a challenge to his position in the group.

Brezhnev, in fact, has shown his pre-eminence by intervening in functions that used to be thought of as governmental—i.e., Kosygin's.

In October, he played the leading Soviet role in the visit of French President Georges Pompidou, for instance.

In December, the central committee—of which Brezhnev is general secretary—decided to "instruct" the U.S.S.R. government to submit the draft plan and budget for 1971 to Supreme Soviet. The central committee always considers the plan and budget first, and party control is a basic fact of Soviet life, but this was the first time it openly asserted formal control of government actions in this way. Some observers saw in it another Brezhnev bid to expand his power.

This week, Brezhnev played a major role in the visit of Syrian leader Hafez Assad, who himself combines state and party jobs.

Dominance Continues

The general secretary's dominance in the party leadership has continued into the period before the party congress when political conflicts usually increase in scope and acerbity. In fact, there is little evidence of intensifying struggle this year, though the Kremlin pot has been simmering steadily since July.

The number of changes in regional and republic party jobs during the past year has been smaller than before previous congresses. As of today, 47 of the 147 regional committees have held pre-congress conferences—a small proportion for this stage—and only one of the 47 changed first secretaries at its conference.

Little change presumably means little challenge to the present leadership as a new central committee is formed for election at the party congress. Many of the changes that have taken place have benefited men previously associated with Brezhnev or reduced the power of men thought to belong to opposing camps.

Crisis in the major problem areas of Soviet life could always change this. But so far the Soviet leaders have preferred to muddle through economic troubles, political and cultural restrictions and national minority problems rather than make major changes and risk their jobs.

Not even publication of the Khrushchev memoirs in the West poses a serious danger to Brezhnev, in the Moscow view. Observers elsewhere have suggested that the memoir materials could get out only with the approval of a politburo member, who would thus be challenging Brezhnev. A few Muscovites think it possible that a politburo member was involved, but most observers agree that the materials could have been exported without the participation of any high-level protector.

Some faction may have seen the Khrushchev book as a tool to help stop the revival of Stalinism. That does not necessarily make it a tool to dislodge Brezhnev. He survived a more dangerous tool—a direct appeal from Soviet intellectuals to avoid rehabilitating Stalin at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966.

Mending Fences

The last real challenge to Brezhnev's leadership came in July, when some still undisclosed trauma compelled the holding of two central committee meetings in 11 days and the postponement of the party congress from last fall to next March. Brezhnev cancelled a scheduled trip to Romania between plenums to stay home and mend fences.

The two likeliest reasons, Moscow observers think, were opposition to Brezhnev's farm policy and to plans for changes in the leadership.

At the first July plenum, Brezhnev laid down farm policy for the new five-year plan, calling for a major increase in investment in agriculture and the diversion of some defense and heavy industry production to farm tools.

In one sense, this meant the same approach to agriculture as before—more money and bigger projects instead of better technology.

But the decision to put more money into farming suggested major changes in the allocation of Soviet resources. This may have stirred real opposition: the recurring battle over funds

for heavy industry, consumer goods, agriculture, defense and social services is as critical here as any Washington struggle such as those over Indochina, race and urban needs.

Brezhnev's presumable opponents on farm policy make an odd combination: military lobbyists and the "metal-eaters," who favor heavy industry, both hating to lose funds to farmers; reform-minded pragmatists who want to invest less in agriculture because it produces a smaller return on the investment ruble than any other sector of the Soviet economy, and party hacks in major regional and republic jobs, who hate any change in the status quo that they oversee.

Under Communist practice, the representatives of these pressure groups could not object to the farm policy once the central committee adopted it. But their cries that the policy demanded reconsideration of five-year plan guidelines could have forced Brezhnev to postpone the congress at which the plan would be adopted.

Replacements?

It is also possible that the party congress had to be postponed because the central committee could not agree on proposals to replace some of the top leaders placement that would have to be revealed at the congress.

Six of the 11 politburo members will be 65 or older this year, including Brezhnev. Some or all will die or retire in the five-year period for which the congress will set policy. The men at the top undoubtedly want to plan smooth transitions, but might encounter arguments one or two levels down.

It is possible that the July trauma occurred because Premier Kosygin actually wanted to retire and either the politburo could not agree on who should replace him, or the central committee would not accept a politburo choice.

Moscow speculation centered on two possibilities. One was that the central committee refused to accept politburo member and First Deputy Premier Dmitri Polyansky as Kosygin's successor. If this did happen, there is no guarantee it was a blow to Brezhnev.

The other possibility was that Brezhnev wanted to combine the top party and government jobs, as Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev did, and that either the politburo or the central committee refused to go along.

That would have been a real rebuff. But Brezhnev was still selected to deliver the r report at the party congress—a selection announced at the second July plenum. He appears to have strengthened his position since, within recognized limits. Only the party congress itself is likely to reveal whether his position has been significantly weakened behind the facade of increasing strength.

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 20, 1969

Mostly He Just Sits

If Marx went to Mr Brezhnev's Russia he would diagnose a classic case of a pre-revolutionary situation

here is a young man who claims he knows for sure which untry is today the sick man of Europe. According to ndrei Amalrik, the 31-year-old Russian historian who is present growing cucumbers and tomatoes in a little village ar Moscow, it is Mr Brezhnev's Russia. "I have no oubt," he writes in an essay whose full text is published the west this week, "that this great eastern Slav empire, eated by the Germans, Byzantines and Mongols, has entered e last decades of its existence." He is in fact prepared be quite precise: the downfall of the Soviet Union will ke place by 1984, and its cause will be war with China.

From outside Russia this prophecy might seem strange a year which has seen a number of successes for Soviet reign policy: a pacified Czechoslovakia; an acquiescent stern Europe; a western world once again ready to do siness with Russia; and, in the far east, a China down om its high horse and talking about the quarrel over e borders. Mr Brezhnev and his colleagues, who have pulled is off without actually falling out with one another, might el they are not doing too badly. Mr Amalrik's message that they would be wrong. He says that the Soviet regime, r all its success abroad, is growing steadily weaker and ay be destroyed by its inability to renew itself and to solve e country's internal problems.

The handful of men who run the Soviet Union today—o if you count the communist party's central committee, aybe only 25 or 30 if you take the presidium and those ho hold real power—are [illegible] rgely ageing men who rose in office under Stalin and are therefore, because he chose them as such mediocre conformists. They avoided the purge he was planning before is death in 1953; and the consequence is that there has een no process of renovation in the upper ranks of the arty for a generation. But the Soviet Union they govern as changed greatly since 1953. It is the growing tension etween a deeply conservative ruling class and a slowly modernising society that lies at the root of the Soviet Union's problem. The bulk of the new Soviet middle class is passive, but dissociated from the regime. The rest of the population—indoctrinated, disorientated and kept isolated from the world—hardly knows what it is missing, but is slowly beginning o learn. Mr Brezhnev has revived the apparatus of repression o keep this growing discontent under control. The rule of thumb the government is following is simple: do as much as necessary in the way of repression to keep things as they re. This is not a tyranny like Stalin's, which in the spirit of genuine totalitarianism tried to make everybody think as Stalin thought. It is the weight of the dead hand.

The really depressing conclusion that Mr Amalrik draws is that this situation could in theory go on for a very long time. But he reckons that the Chinese will arrange that it does not. He thinks that China will provoke Russia into attacking it, and the result will be a protracted war. And it will be that war which, according to Mr Amalrik, will lead to a revolt as the Russian-Japanese war did to that of 1905, and the first world war that of 1917. It is war [illegible] he says, not a slow march of the communist system towards greater rationality

the economy and ultimately in politics. This is the pe most people still cling to; he rejects it on the ound that liberalisation can occur only when there is a an to liberalise, or at least evidence of a systematic liberali- ation in practice. The past three years have made it plain hat there is no such plan or practice in Russia.

It is perhaps inevitable that Mr Amalrik should see the ltimate solution in terms of a Sino-Soviet war. Whether ich a war is likely is hotly debated in the west. On he whole, those who specialise in Chinese affairs tend to y it is not, because the Russians could not hope to impose new government on China and nothing less will really olve their problem. Other people see such a war as some- hing a divided Russian regime might embark on as a way ut of its internal and foreign dilemmas. But whatever the hances of war, it must be said that Mr Amalrik's analysis f the situation inside the Soviet Union itself rings depressingly ue. Russia's leaders are trapped in a kind of frozen immo- ility. They know that the country needs economic reform, f only to ensure continued economic growth and to narrow he technological gap between the communist and capitalist orlds. But they realise from the examples of Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia that economic reform almost inevitably leads o political reform. And that they will not countenance.

They have one hope. It is that their present system can omehow be made to work well enough to keep most people appy in a kind of socialist consumer society. This society night not be of a kind to appeal to people like Mr Amalrik— ie scornfully rejects the idea of a "socialism with bare nees" of mini-skirts, foreign tourists and jazz records—but o a lot of ordinary Russians it might provide just enough omfort and security to make them forget about politics. But Russia is far from achieving such a society. Even in housing, which has clearly been given high priority, the progress is still slow. From 1959 to 1965 it is reckoned that a third of the population obtained new or improved accommodation. Yet as recently as two years ago there were, on average, more than two persons per room in the Soviet Union, a ratio far worse than that in most west European countries. The Soviet Union's leaders need outside help to ensure the kind of growth that could help them to put these things right and make material life in their country more attractive to its citizens. That is perhaps one of the main factors behind the present drive for closer economic ties with the west. This is for Russia a political as much as an economic issue. The question is whether the Soviet economic system can make proper use of western economic aid even if it gets it.

And there is another great question about the stability of the Soviet Union. This is the growing demand from non-Russians in the Soviet Union for greater equality with the Russians. This may not be as pressing a problem at the moment as that of living standards. It may become so in a few years' time, when the Russians will lose their present numerical superiority. But to grant greater rights to the various nationalities would be even more difficult for the regime than to grant ordinary civil rights. To keep such a vast country together you probably do need a very strong government at the centre. To allow its component parts any degree of real autonomy would be to invite disintegration. Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin are not going to let that happen; and it is hard to see any of their likely successors risking it either. Wherever one looks in Russia, one sees a government sitting on the status quo, and lacking any mechanism for a peaceful and orderly adaptation to change. That is what Lenin's one-party system has led to. But how long can you just sit on your problems?

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
13 January 1971

Hard-line speech reaches West

Stalin era comeback due

BUZEK
London Express Service

The Congress of the Soviet Communist Par- , due to start on March 30, may reintroduce alinism and do away with the last remnants Krushchev's ideas about liberalization in all heres of Russian life.

This startling forecast was made in a speech Czech Stalinists in Prague by Yuri Starikov, ecretary of the Soviet Embassy. The details the speech have just reached the West by undisclosed route.

"Kruschev's ideas, that cancer on the body Communism, will be eradicated by the 24th ngress of the Soviet Communist Party," Mr. arikov told a dinner meeting of about 40 ard-liners in Vinohrady, on the outskirts of ague.

TURNING POINT

"In the past 14 years, (since the 1956 party ngress at which Krushchev denounced Sta- n) Stalin's thesis about the sharpening of the ass-battle and [illegible]

into the party has been proved right," Mr. Starikov declared.

He continued: "The 24th party congress will be a turnihg point. Afterwards we will again build bridges across to our Chinese comrades."

The speech was made at the end of November, at the time when the Czech hard-liners tried to topple moderate party leader Gustav Husak.

Western analysts of Soviet affairs regard Mr. Starikov's strange remarks as deliberately made in behalf of a strong group of Russian Politburo members and some high Russian army officers who have been pressing in the background for Stalin's full rehabilitation.

TOUGH LINE

Among them are reported to be Politburo members such as Aleksander Shelepin, former chief of the secret police, Dmitri Polyanski, a [illegible] opposed to economic re-

forms, and some marshals of the Soviet arm who in the past years publicly extolled Stali as a great military leader.

Some Western analysts are inclined to r gard the latest crisis in the relations betwe Moscow and Washington as another proof the coming re-Stalinization.

In their view, the tough Russian line again the United States has been forced on a relu tant Brezhnev and Kosygin by the neo-Stalini group which is apparently gaining the upp hand.

LE MONDE, Paris
Weekly
13 January 1971

Will the Soviet Party rehabilitate Stalin?

The XXIV Soviet Communist Party Congress, due to open in Moscow on March 30, is highly likely to set the party seal on "re-Stalinisation," according to a Soviet Embassy official in Prague. Mr. Starikov believed the next Congress would ring in a new era in the USSR by rescinding the 1956 XX Congress's condemnation of Stalinism and finally extirpating "the poison of Khrushchevism."

The statement, just revealed, was made by Mr. Starikov on November 18 at a function attended by forty ultra-conservative Czechoslovak Communists.

Events in Czechoslovakia, the diplomat said, should be assessed in the broadest context taking into consideration developments since the XX Soviet Communist Party Congress. The extent to which the struggle against the personality cult had harmed the international Communist movement in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia had yet to be realized, Mr. Starikov added.

He charged that former Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev's attack on Stalin had paved the way for this and said: "Krushchevism is a poison in the bloodstream of the international Communist movement, and if the movement is to regain its health this poison must be eliminated. The past fourteen years have proved the rightness of Stalin's thesis on the aggravation of the class struggle in conditions of socialism, and the penetration of the class enemy into the party. When the XX Congress rejected this thesis it was opening the way for enemy penetration into the ranks of Communist parties. The XXIV Congress must repair this damage."

Earlier the same day Mr. Starikov attended a rally organized by the "Internationalists" group at which the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society awarded decorations to seven factory workers. The seven were being commended for having drafted a letter, signed by ninety-nine of their factory's personnel and sent to *Pravda*, daily organ of the Soviet Communist Party in July 1968. The letter protested the policies of former Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek, and his liberal colleagues. But none of the conservative members of the present leadership attended.

Josef Plojhar, leader of the Catholic People's Party, and main spokesman for the need for the Left Wing Front (neo-Stalinist) to take the initiative at the next central committee session to maintain the hard-liners' influence, Mr. Plojhar, a former Roman Catholic priest who was excommunicated after the campaign against the Church in 1949 and 1950, criticized the Dubcek regime and some supporters of the Czechoslovak party's current first secretary, Gustav Husak. Though Mr. Plojhar was not promoted in this month's government reshuffle, he was introduced at the rally as a future first vice-premier.

Conservative demands

The Starikov and the Plojhar speeches came almost immediately after Mr. Husak left for Moscow to consult Soviet leaders about the activities of ultra-conservative factions in Czechoslovakia. The "Leftists" are believed to have made some exacting demands at party praesidium meetings on November 16 and November 17. Mr. Husak travelled to the Soviet capital the following day.

This futrher underlined Mr. Husak's apparent feeling that a speedy solution to the problems posed by the new Left was vital, for he could have met his Soviet opposite number Leonid Brezhnev only a few days later in Budapest and discussed it all with him personally, had he been willing to wait. Mr. Brezhnev was due there on November 22 for the Hungarian Communist Party Congress. And the plenary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague was not scheduled until December 10.

Exactly how much weight do Mr. Starkov's statements carry? Are they merely his own personal opinions, those of a Soviet splinter-group or do they represent the official policy of the Soviet leadership? His remarks appear closely related to another problem which must be settled before the XXIV Soviet Congress convenes. This involves the by now celebrated appeal for help from Prague which Moscow still invokes to justify the Soviet-led invasion of its Warsaw Pact ally and which was referred to in the Pact countries' communiqué published during the night of August 21, 1968, as the tanks rolled in.

Czechoslovakia has so far refused officially to acknowledge any such appeal. But a leading ultra-conservative member of the Central Committee and the Federal Assembly Praesidium, Vasil Bilak, brought up the question at the December 10 plenum and demanded a debate on the appeal which was signed by some forty hard-liners.

It is Mr. Bilak's stated hope that Czechoslovakia will finally acknowledge "having called for our Soviet friends' help."

He may have been acting on an understanding with his Left Wing Front colleagues in asking for the debate, while not having the specific go-ahead from Moscow. At all events, the Central Committee has decided, for the sake of unity, to study the question at a future session, probably in February or March.

The Soviet Union would probably welcome acknowledgement that Czechoslovakia "asked for help." It would certainly smooth over Moscow's relations with foreign Communist parties, among these, the Italian and French parties, which have still not withdrawn their condemnation of the invasion. The recent Polish riots might, however, persuade the Soviet Union to forego this statement from Prague. Things in Czechoslovakia appear to have calmed down and Moscow, at least on the face of it, would have little to gain by embarrassing Husak at this stage.

AMBER BOUSOGLOU

THE NEW YORK TIMES
19 January 1971

General's Memoirs Praise Khrushchev

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 18 — Nikita S. Khrushchev, who has gone unpraised in the Soviet Union since his fall from power six years ago, is described as a hard-working and sensitive wartime leader by an old associate, Marshal Ivan K. Bagramyan, in a book of memoirs just published.

Marshal Bagramyan, who was deputy chief of staff for operations in the Southwestern army group, at the start of World War II, worked closely with Mr. Khrushchev, who was the party leader in the Ukraine and the Politburo's representative on the military council for the area.

As long as Mr. Khrushchev was the Soviet Union's leader, Marshal Bagramyan was lavish in his praise of Mr. Khrushchev. The latest book, "That Is How the War Started," is more reserved in its comments but nevertheless breaks with the practice begun after Mr. Khrushchev's fall in 1964 of not praising him in print.

Up to now, military and party histories have simply listed Mr. Khrushchev as holding a certain position without any description of his work.

Some Color Included

But Marshal Bagramyan, at 73 a Deputy Defense Minister and full member of the party's Central Committee, evidently was permitted to include some color about Mr. Khrushchev. Military memoirs in the Soviet Union tend to be more personal and open than more official writings.

Mr. Khrushchev also appears to have been favorably inclined toward Marshal Bagramyan. In oral reminiscences, published abroad as "Khrushchev Remembers," the former Soviet leader said of the marshal:

"He is a rational, even-handed man. I like him. I can even say I am very fond of him. I have always admired him for his sober mind, his party spirit, his wide-ranging knowledge of military affairs, and his uncorruptible integrity and straight forwardness."

Marshal Bagramyan, in his memoris, tries to convey the sense of disorder in the Ukraine at the start of the war when German troops smashed through Soviet lines on their way to Kiev.

In one scene, he describes the scene at headquarters:

"Only N. S. Khrushchev did not abandon his office. Without interruption messages arrived there from Kiev and district centers dealing with further mobilization of the whole population to rebuff the enemy."

Mr. Khrushchev is described as having taken part in policy conferences with military commanders. He is singled out as having prepared Kiev for the Nazi attack, which proved successful.

Suicide of Commissar

Once, Marshal Bagramyan recalls, he was ordered by the Southwestern army group commander, Lieut. Gen. Mikhail P. Kirponos, to report to members of the military council on some recent decisions:

"I went with my operational map and notes to N.S. Khrushchev. He was unusually sad. He listened to my report and without hesitation approved it. Learning that I was going to Vashugin [another member of the council(Nikita Sergeyevich said bitterly:

"'Don't go. No one needs to report to him any more. Nikolai Nikolayevich has ended his war."

Marshal Bagramyan explained that Lieut. Gen. Vashugin, the political commissar, had committed suicide because of the setbacks in the first days of the German advance.

The memoirs also discuss one of the more controversial aspects of Soviet military history: Why Stalin insisted on trying to defend Kiev in September, 1941, when his military advisers urged him to evacuate the city to avoid encirclement and to set up defenses on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. Eventually the city had to be surrendered and large Red army forces were trapped. General Kirponos was among those killed. Marshal Bagramyan was with a group that succeeded in breaking out and rejoining the Soviet lines.

Marshal Bagramyan says the decision to try and hold Kiev "at any price" was taken because Stalin told Harry Hopkins, Peesident Roosevelt's envoy, in August that the Red Army would hold the lines west of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev.

March 1971

Soviet Domestic Dilemmas: Economic Crisis and Minority Dissent

As time for the 24th Party Congress approaches, the Soviet Politburo finds itself confronted by many domestic dilemmas, not the least of which is its future control of the state. The Politburo's main problem would seem to be the need to find a middle ground in economic reform processes where necessary liberalization can be balanced with maintaining control over the economy --- which in turn is viewed as crucial to holding on to political control. To date, the scales have tipped in favor of those party dogmatists who saw the Soviet economic reform program only as a means of improving existing planning mechanisms and against the "revisionist" group who viewed the reform as a means to liberalize the economy by restoring a genuine market mechanism. As a result, the Soviet Union faces an economic crisis brought on by the inability of its inhibited, party-hounded economic machine to respond to the demands of the scientific-technical revolution.

Any solution to the USSR's economic crisis hinges also on the extent to which the Soviet Politburo plans to crack down on scientific dissent. There is a growing awareness among Soviet scientists that the censorship and political orthodoxy which prohibit the free exchange of ideas between Soviet scientists and their non-Soviet counterparts are severely handicapping Soviet research and consequently, the country's technological capabilities. It is essentially the fear that the USSR's technological lag behind the industrial West will eventually confine their country to the status of a second-class power that has motivated many scientists to join the dissidents in calling for fundamental changes in Soviet life. This has resulted in the amalgamation of scientific and artistic dissent, in itself a major political event, the importance of which remains to be seen.

The dissident scientists and their artistic allies are not the only vocal protesters in the USSR. A whole spectrum of loosely organized nationalist and minority groups from among the Crimean Tatars, the Baltic and Ukranian separatists, Jews, Baptists, and Christian Socialists are arrayed against the government. In contrast to most of the so-called "intellectual dissidents" who hope to change Soviet society within the existing system, most of the minority groups are dedicated to the overthrow of the system --- or at least are opting to get out of the system. Apart from the Jews, the impact of these minorities is hardly felt beyond the confines of the double barbed-wire fences surrounding the USSR's 1,000 or more

slave labor camps. Nevertheless, these restless minorities represent yet another dilemma for the Soviet leadership. There is concern at the growth of nationalist feeling in the USSR and a fear that links may be forged between the "intellectual" dissidents and some of the underground opposition forces.

Briefly noted in the paragraphs that follow are some aspects of the weightier domestic dilemmas that might have a bearing on the course of events at the 24th Party Congress.

ECONOMIC CRISIS

"If the Soviet Union is to survive," wrote historian Andrey Amalrik, "it must undergo a total transformation. But if the present leadership is to survive, everything must remain exactly as it is." And therein lies the great dilemma. In economic terms, Amalrik's observation means that the inherited and continuing Stalinist command structure is inadequate for an increasingly mature, consumer-oriented economy. Decision-making should ideally be decentralized and delegated to local levels and enterprises, subject to planning of key products. Yet, Brezhnev plans to force "intensive growth" (which requires the continuing introduction of new technology) through strong centralization of decision-making with local supervision by the Party bureaucracy, directed from the center.

The economic reform toward decentralization and recognition of economic realities, launched in 1965 (the so-called "Liberman program"), has failed. Basic to this economic reform failure is the Soviets' refusal to admit the existence of such a thing as a "demand factor." To have succeeded, the reform should have been accompanied by more rational and flexible prices, less central control over the allocation of materials, and relief from the chronic shortages of raw materials. The leadership has given no indication that the necessary radical changes will be introduced any time in the near future.

Just about all the same economic problems preoccupy Soviet officials today as did in 1966: the volume of unfinished construction and of uninstalled machinery continues to mount; investment capital is "dissipated" among too many projects; central planners interfere in the operation of factories; enterprise plans are altered mid-stream; bureaucratic impediments frustrate procurement of supplies and sales of products; and in addition to a too high labor turnover, most Soviet industrial enterprises suffer from overstaffing and the underutilization of labor.

In the past two years, emphasis has been on management discipline as the cure-all for many economic problems. There

has been an attempt to correct by Government decrees such abuses as top-heavy staffs, squandering of funds, hiding of reserves, unofficial adjustment of prices, etc. Early last year chief planner Baibakov noted that management leaders who failed to fulfill plans had to be strictly punished "right up to removal from their posts." Obviously, however, no economy can flourish if its managers are too intimidated to take risks.

Continued lowering of production goals is another key to the sluggish state of the economy: steel production that was to have hit 130 million tons by 1970 is now targeted at 120 million tons for 1971; up to 850 billion kilowatts of electric power had been planned for 1970 and now the goal for 1971 is lowered to 790 billion kilowatts; in 1971 some 500,000 passenger automobiles are scheduled to be built, while original plans had called for 800,000 by 1970.

Plan fulfillment results for 1970 published early in February showed that it was not a bad year for the Soviet economy. After a powerful fourth quarter spurt, overall growth indices reflected a marked improvement over the poor returns of 1969. But the annual report also showed that growth rate fell short of most goals. National income was reported up 8.5 percent over 1969. And, although the lot of the consumer has improved by slow, steady gains, a continuing sharp growth in savings highlights the economy's failure to satisfy consumer demands.

Consumer shortages abound in every-day articles ranging from shoes, toilet paper and matches to electric lightbulbs. Last August, for example, Premier Kosygin's house organ, Izvestiya, ran an editorial deploring the shortages of "table knives and forks, blankets, bath towels, quilted jackets, thermos bottles, iron ware, drawing paper, pencils, and a number of other consumer goods."

The greatest qualitative change of benefit to the consumer was apparently in agriculture, which recovered from its crisis-level slump of 1969. Thanks to good weather and an increase in direct and indirect subsidies, the food grain problem is temporarily resolved. The main task of the 1970's will be to increase meat and animal product output. But without accompanying improvements in transportation, storage, and distribution facilities, output growth will mean little.

On the eve of the 24th Congress, however, the whole agricultural picture is muddied by the highly unorthodox procedures used in reporting last year's agricultural results. First, in mid-December Mikhail Suslov claimed the country had "reaped the biggest harvest in the history of agriculture." Then, two weeks later, chief Soviet planner Baibakov announced that agricultural

output had risen by only 6.5 percent against a planned 8.5 percent. However, the plan fulfillment report released early last month claims an 8.7 percent increase, which would mean that the 1970 plan had been overfulfilled. Statistical corrections of this magnitude are rare, even by Soviet standards. Also suspect is the continued failure of the agricultural report to publish any grain harvest figure.

One cause for the current Soviet labor shortage is the failure of the economy to free workers from the farms, where 35 percent of the population still labors. The priority growth areas of Siberia have failed to attract an adequate labor force. In the European part of the country, established plants have tended to overstaff, causing strained labor conditions particularly in the RSFSR.

Interestingly enough, Politburo member and Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Gennadiy Voronov, suggested in a November 1970 speech that consideration again be given to link farming. Voronov, an agriculturalist (and a proponent of specialist business management training for everybody) views the link system as beneficial to both industry and agriculture in that it would give greater leeway to individual farmers and should help free farm labor for industry.

Under the link farming system collective and state farms would be broken into smaller units, each of which would be the responsibility of a small group of farmers called a "link." The link groups would be fully responsible for the whole procurement and production process with rewards paid on the basis of output --- in short, a system in which individual or group incentives would be the motive force. Brezhnev and other Politburo members on the other hand prefer the old brigade system of farming, according to which all functions of farming (plowing, sowing, fertilizing, harvesting, etc.) are given to worker brigades which have no stake in the success of the overall effort. A plowing brigade, for example, is paid according to how many hectares it plowed, not how well or deeply the furrows were plowed. The doctrinaire Politburo apparently fears that the link system may engender a "dangerous" feeling of private ownership on the part of the farmers.

For the Soviet scientific, technical, and managerial intelligentsia, the most alarming failure of the Soviet leadership is its inertia in undertaking to bridge the huge technological gap between Soviet and Western achievements in all technological fields, except those that are military and space related. The reform was meant to raise efficiency by introducing new technology. But the regime permitted no grand new strategies; it merely tolerated experimentation with the present administrative apparatus. Furthermore, the free exchange

of scientific-technical information, on which scientific and technical progress depends, is denied the Soviet scientific-technical community.

The increasing complexity of a major industrial and economic system absolutely requires more and more sophisticated computerization. In this respect, the Soviet Union is computer "generations" behind the West and Soviet scientists point out that even now it may be too late to catch up. And still, the Soviet leadership has not seen fit to permit the freedom of information exchange necessary to raise the level of computerization or otherwise to stimulate this central feature of an advanced economy.

The Soviet leaders have been willing to only tinker with the administrative apparatus and make a beginning in establishing management principles. Thus, the so-called Shchekino experiment (at the Shchekino Chemical Combine in Tula) attempted to raise productivity by dismissing surplus labor and giving the wages of the fired workers to those remaining. This modest innovation is now hailed in the Soviet press as some sort of revolutionary example to be emulated throughout the country.

The West has for decades recognized the importance of management as an integral part of economic growth along with labor productivity, investment, and technology. It is representative of the backwardness of Soviet economic doctrine that the bureaucracy is just beginning to listen to those Soviet officials who have long been emphasizing that management training is essential if Soviet enterprise leadership is going to be capable of utilizing advanced technology. In early February, it was announced with great eclat that a New Institute for the Management of the National Economy, the brainchild of Premier Kosygin's son-in-law, Zherman Gvishiani, had been opened "as a first step towards training a more enlightened managerial elite."

Just as Amalrik put his finger on the political dilemma, Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov summed up the economic-technical failure when he wrote in his famous 1966 essay: "in the 1920s and 1930s...the slogan, 'Catch up with and surpass America' was launched, and we really were catching up for several decades. The second industrial revolution began, and now...rather than catching up...we are falling even farther behind. The gap is so wide that it is impossible to measure it. We simply live in another epoch."

MINORITY DISSENT

Long familiar to the West is the eloquent dissent of Soviet novelists, poets, musicians, historians, and other writers. We

may call them the creative intelligentsia -- the Solzhenitsyns, Amalriks, Sinyavskiys and Daniels, the underground "editors" of Chronicle of Events and other samizdat publications. No one knows what influence they exert on the various sectors of Soviet society but for the time being, anyway, that influence is limited. For this reason, perhaps, they are permitted to exist. Some are chosen for special punishment by exile, incarceration in prison, forced labor camps, or insane asylums.

It is one thing for Soviet authorities to squelch the voices of some of its artistic dissenters, of its lesser-known intellectuals or civil rights agitators. It is quite another matter when the voices of dissent belong to prominent and often internationally respected scientists among whose chief spokesmen are Andrey Sakharov, Pyotr Kapitsa, Zhores Medvedyev, and most recently the son of a hard-line Politburo member, Vitaliy Shelest.

Biologist and author Zhores Medvedyev, advocate of more contact with Western scientists and of free, decentralized research, was incarcerated in a mental hospital early last year and then released after a successful intervention by his fellow scientists, who included Sakharov and Mstislav Keldysh, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. On the other hand, later efforts by Sakharov and other colleagues to obtain a release for the imprisoned mathematician Revolt Pimenov, were unsuccessful.

The party and its press have been hard-hitting in criticizing the political initiatives of the Soviet scientists and their outspokenness in advocating the revitalization of Soivet science. A 23 November Pravda editorial called for "waging propaganda among scientists for the Marxist-Leninist understanding of contemporary political socio-economic and philosophical problems, and for uncompromising attitudes towards the ideological conceptions of anti-communism and revisionism."

In late November, a CPSU Central Committee resolution attacked the Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow, where Sakharov is a staff member. The resolution was also designed to chastize the Ukrainian scientific community, where a strong group led by Vitaliy Shelest is opposing additional party controls. Shelest has called for more advanced theoretical research and wider contacts with Western scientists.

It was during this same month that Andrey Sakharov and two scientific colleagues formed a non-political "creative association," whose aim is to develop the concept and practice of human rights in the Soviet Union "in accordance with the laws of the State." At his own request, in December Sakharov was allowed to attend the RSFSR Supreme Court session held to consider the appeal against the five-year sentence earlier meted out to Revolt Pimenov. The sentence was confirmed, but Sakharov's

presence is symptomatic of the quandary he poses for the regime.

Sakharov was also permitted to attend the RSFSR Supreme Court December session that rescinded the death sentence meted out to two of the eleven Leningrad highjacking defendants. By late December, Sakharov's Human Rights Committee had expanded and included in its membership Nobel Prize winner Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has increasingly become the focus of all crucial issues in Soviet literary life. Recent criticism of him by official media have been in effect an assault on practically all original writing presently created in the USSR. The confrontation of dogmatists and moderates has been building steadily during the past two to three years.

It is significant that two of the ablest dissidents, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, representing two such different spheres of Soviet intellectual life should join forces. Sakharov, a top technocratic scientist, argues for democracy in functional and practical terms: if the system doesn't democratize, it's doomed. Solzhenitsyn's arguments for democracy and freedom are ethical, preaching the absolute value of human freedom.

There has been little firm linkage or evidence of solidarity between the so-called "intellectual dissenters" and the opposition forces among the Soviet's oppressed national minorities and religious groups such as the Baptists, Jews, Crimean Tatars, or Ukrainian and Baltic separatists. However, the plight of the nationalist dissenters, most of whose leaders are safely behind barbed wire, evokes active sympathy among many of the intellectuals.

That even behind the barbed wire fences there may be some cross-fertilization of ideas is evident from the letter written by seven political prisoners, including writers Yuriy Galantsov and Aleksandr Ginzburg at the end of 1969. They wrote that "putting people into prison for spreading the idea of national self-determination leads only to the kindling of national hatred, enmity and the alienation of nations." And already some writers, including Ukrainian historian Valentin Moroz, have testified to the growth of national consciousness in some areas as a result of repressive policies. (For this testimony, Moroz was imprisoned.)

Although it would be unrealistic to think that meaningful solidarity could develop from sympathy, the leadership is not unmindful of the explosive potential. When the Action Group for the Protection of Civil Rights made its first protest in 1969, more than a quarter of the signers represented the minority races. Maybe that is why the group was so short-lived.

THE ECONOMIST, London
30 January 1971

In the above cited issue, The Economist posed eleven questions designed to measure the amount of freedom in any given country. The Economist also answers the questions for the Soviet Union. Comparisons of answers for almost any country in the world will show the USSR to be far in the lead in the matter of governing by evil and oppression:

Can you leave it if you don't like it ?

No : there is no right to emigration under Soviet law. Article 64 of the Soviet penal code makes an illegal attempt to leave the country a treasonable offence punishable by a minimum of ten years' imprisonment, and a maximum of death. A few people are allowed to emigrate, including about 1,300 Jews to Israel since June, 1967.

Is there a secret police ?

Yes ; the KGB, though no longer allowed to operate completely outside the law, as it did under Stalin, still has wide powers including the surveillance of all foreigners and all suspect Soviet citizens, and the running of labour camps and institutions like special psychological hospitals for political dissenters. Under "administrative regulations" the KGB is able to order Soviet citizens to move their place of residence for security and economic reasons.

How many political prisoners are there ?

It has recently been calculated that the labour camps run by the KGB, which are separate from the main prison system, may hold as many as a million people, of whom a substantial number are detained for political reasons. No one has claimed to have enough information to make a precise estimate.

Can you move and travel inside the country as you wish ?

Every Soviet citizen over the age of 16 must have an internal passport, which has to be exchanged periodically until he or she is 40. Younger people can be released from the obligation to have a passport if they hold office or are otherwise thought to merit it. To live permanently in a city or town, it is necessary to have the authorisation of the police or some other higher authority. For certain offences, the courts are empowered to sentence people to exile to, or banishment from, a particular place. The number of people currently in exile is thought to be considerable, and to include many released prisoners who are not allowed to return to Moscow.

Habeas corpus—does it exist ?

Yes, in theory, under the 1936 constitution—but the constitution is not observed. The procedure of "administrative" sentencing by the KGB has sent an unknown, but very large, number of people to imprisonment without trial. Wire tapping is widespread ; so is censorship of the mail.

How free is the judiciary ?

Courts at all levels are under the complete, if carefully concealed, domination of the government and communist party in all political matters—although less than 50 per cent of all judges are communist party members. The communist party holds that the separation of powers is a bourgeois doctrine.

How much political activity is possible ?

No public political activity is allowed except that organised and controlled by the communist party. The one-party elections offer only one candidate for each post. Other political parties than the communist party were abolished soon after the 1917 revolution. Factions within the communist party itself were forbidden in 1921.

What forms of discrimination do people suffer from ?

There is discrimination against the 2 million to 3 million Jews, who are not allowed their own schools or to be taught Jewish history. Of the estimated 1,650,000 people of 12 other nationalities whom Stalin uprooted and sent to other parts of the Soviet Union, the former Volga Germans and most of the Crimean Tartars are still in exile.

Is there freedom of worship ?

Churches are allowed to perform only religious services ; any form of religious instruction, or charitable or social activity, is forbidden. Religious believers cannot hope to be appointed to responsible posts.

How much freedom of the press is there ?

None. All papers, radio and television stations, publishing houses and similar institutions are owned and run by the state. Private citizens are not even allowed to own duplicating machines. All publications are subject to strict political control and therefore, sometimes, to long delays in publication. Those who illegally write and distribute the unofficial publications known as *samizdat*—" self-publications "—are subject to heavy penalties.

What restrictions are there on economic freedom ?

Article 10 of the 1936 constitution allows the private ownership of articles of use and consumption, but not things from which an income may be derived. The result is that the entire economy is controlled by the state, though there are a few private artisans and, in some remote areas, independent peasants. No one else can achieve economic independence.

FORTUNE
May 1970

Report from Moscow

Those Soviet economic troubles are deep-rooted.

by Jerrold L. Schecter

So many lies have been foretold us,
icy blue phantasmagorias.
The weather prophets lied,
the compass lied.

—EVGENY EVTUSHENKO
"Ballad of the False Beacons"

In the final year of a five-year plan that was supposed to bring about massive economic reforms, the Soviet Union's leaders and planners are realizing that they have fallen far short of the mark. The Soviet press has embarked on a campaign of national self-criticism and analysis that staggers the Western imagination. Since the December plenum of the Central Committee, the problems of waste, inefficiency, alcoholism among workers, faulty planning, and agricultural shortages have become an overriding concern of the Politburo.

Demands for improvement in the economy have become so widespread and insistent that they have led to recriminations among the top leadership and to speculation that changes in the Politburo are imminent. During the last few years Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, and President Nikolai Podgorny have spent much of their time "normalizing" Czechoslovakia and fighting off Chinese Communists along the Sino-Soviet border. Such external crises diverted their attention from the job of realigning personnel and power within the party and ministries so that they could bring about the much-touted economic reforms.

Without direction from the top, change doesn't happen in an authoritarian socialist society, and debate still rages over how to bring about economic reform. Now the trend seems to be away from the "liberals," who press for more local initiative and responsibility, and toward the "conservatives," who press for central control of the decision-making process.

Attack on bad management

One important indicator of the change was a speech given by Brezhnev at the Kharkov tractor factory last month. Brezhnev, a conservative in Soviet economic terms, appears to have taken the leadership initiative within the Politburo, and his speech marked a turn toward renewed party control of the economy. He promised "substantial corrective changes" and excoriated "bad management, wastefulness, and the violation of labor discipline." But he made no mention of new economic reforms; rather, he stressed the need to perfect the reforms that are already on the books. It is worth noting that Prime Minister Kosygin's name has been closely linked in the past with proposals for economic experimentation.

Communist leaders stress the need to develop a scientific and technological base for Soviet production, but centralized planning has hindered the advancement of technology. In other respects, too, the Soviet economy today presents a picture of unfulfilled development. One hears of insufficient and badly utilized transportation, duplication of service facilities in factories, poorly built buildings, and agricultural shortages, especially of meat. In brief, not much has changed in the Soviet economy since the bold proposals of the current five-year plan were first announced. (See "The Toughest Management Job in the World," FORTUNE, July 1, 1966, and "The Auspicious Rise of the Soviet Consumer," August, 1966.)

The chief job of the reforms was to put limits on party and ministerial control of factories. In theory the role of planners and ministries in Moscow was to be shifted to long-range planning and coordination of industry-wide production. As in major American corporations, there would be central planning groups but individual management of divisions. But in practice,

prices, capital allocations, and supplies all remain centrally controlled. Management functions continue to be blurred and full of duplications, which contributed to the failure of key ministries to fulfill their production plans last year in such vital areas as ferrous metals, petrochemicals, paper, cement, and machine tools.

Weather compounded the economic problems of 1969. Unseasonable cold waves and severe storms caused declines in the output of consumer goods and services estimated at four to five billion rubles. According to Soviet figures, gross agricultural output last year was 3 percent below 1968, but Western experts say the situation was worse than the figures indicate because some of the crops were of poor quality.

Psychological resistance to change has also slowed economic reform. Bureaucratic lethargy, or what the Soviets call "Oblomovism," and the reluctance of officials and managers to accept new methods have been serious stumbling blocks.

Computer technology would seem to lend itself readily to a centrally planned economy, but the Soviet Union has been slow to accept the idea that machines can play a part in the decision-making process.



This biting comment on the Soviet road system appeared in the humor magazine *Krokodil*, captioned: "On this bumpy road I built my house."

Vodka's the villain in this *Krokodil* cartoon, part of an unprecedented wave of Soviet self-criticism. Says the workman as he uses his bottle as a level: "Look, we're laying 'em down uneven."

Many bureaucrats find it hard to trust computer data. For example, the Ministry of Machine Tool Building Industry has come under strong criticism for its failure to use computers effectively. Every plant under the ministry's control has a computer, and the ministry has forty-three regional data centers, which have been in operation for eighteen months. Yet officials of the ministry continue to make personal phone calls every ten days to collect the information they need. "One of the main reasons for this is a psychological barrier of distrust, conservatism of traditions, and the habit of working in the old fashion," said *Pravda*.

Economic reforms touch the sensitive nerve of interrelated ministerial and Communist party interests. These delicately balanced power relationships will have to be readjusted if reforms are to succeed. But the aftermath of Czechoslovakia inhibits any innovation in Soviet society. Underlying the mood of caution is fear that loosening the restraints on economic decision making might lead to demands for political innovation and freedom.

The price of uneven progress

The Soviet Union has yet to attain the integrated economies of scale that make for smooth production and effective long-range planning. For example, there is plenty of crude steel, but a lack of specialized processing equipment limits output of high-quality steel products.

Other examples of uneven progress abound. Large investments have been made in lumbering and sawmills, but the manufacture of quality furniture has lagged. Automobile production has increased, but service facilities have not kept pace—motels and roadside garages remain rarities.

Economists talk of a fifteen-to-twenty-year over-all plan, and of directing the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) to quit concerning itself with details. But change means more than efficiency and the streamlining of production; it means elimination of jobs in the overseeing ministries as well. Top-heavy staffing and duplication of effort in the ministries are so apparent that the Central Committee of the Communist party and the Council of Ministers last October decreed measures to eliminate excess staff that will help save 1.7 billion rubles annually.

To break up the centralization of power, an experiment is under way in the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automatic Devices, and Control Systems. Under the terms of the experiment, which will be applied to the entire ministry, the planning power has been delegated to the department-chief level. Every department forms an industrial unit with the enterprises under its control to work out detailed production planning jointly—and the ministry has no veto power over the decisions. The staff of the department is paid from the pooled resources of the enterprises, with salaries dependent on the progress of the industry. Last year the automation industries that first applied this plan increased production by 19 percent.

200 cables, but no approval

Other ministries are less enlightened. Last year the Meat and Dairy Industry Ministry sent subordinate enterprises and organizations more than 40,000 orders, instructions, and telegrams, most of which had nothing to do with production. "Unfortunately, ministries are still engaged in issuing redundant orders, very often to the detriment of their duties," says Georgy Kalugin, manager of the Leningrad Machine Tool Building Consolidated Enterprises, and a frequent critic of overcentralized ministerial control. Kalugin cites receiving up to 200 cables and queries monthly from his ministry—"Yet we cannot get the ministry's approval for the plan of reconstruction of one of our plants."

Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the Communist party, noted in a recent issue that "to eliminate the redundant links in management" is a prime duty of Communists working in administrative bodies. "Regrettably," *Kommunist* added, "this is not carried out everywhere."

Merger and consolidation

The adoption of a new five-year-plan for the economy will be a major item on the agenda of the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, which is expected to meet late this year. One of the issues the Congress will have to deal with is a proposal to streamline the structure of Soviet industry through merger and consolidation. The aim will be to cut down the number of inefficient small factories, coordinate each industry's parts makers and suppliers, and eliminate the staggering waste that results when each factory has its own repair and toolmaking facilities. Most Soviet factories work according to the "closed-circuit system," striving for self-sufficiency in production of their products rather than integration into their industry. The result has been duplication of effort and high, uneven costs.

In Leningrad, a single combine is being set up to service 200 machine-building plants under sixteen different ministries with standard parts, tools, and auxiliary services. The first stage of operation is set for 1971 and the second by 1980. When the first stage goes into effect, an estimated 26,000 jobs will be eliminated. With this and other economies, the plants will save some 44 million rubles a year.

The Party Congress will also take up proposals for reducing the kind of inefficiency that is caused by the way the Soviet system itself operates. There are many self-defeating aspects of the economic system. Miners who are paid on the basis of quantity rather than quality have been mixing waste rock with iron ore to increase

their output. At one factory, workers damaged a freight car by overloading it; rather than face a penalty for the damage, they destroyed the car and crushed it into scrap.

The Party Congress must also decide how to adjust prices so that they reflect not only real costs but differences in quality as well. Under the proposed price reform, a system of flexible prices would be instituted. But just how this will be done, and what its impact will be, is one of the knottiest problems facing the planners.

It is not at all certain that the Soviet Union's renewed thrust toward a scientific-technological society will produce any more lasting results than earlier efforts at reform. Unless the Soviet leaders can accommodate political control to freedom for economic decision making, the reforms will never take hold, and the leadership still seems fearful that economic reform may lead to demands for political liberalization. Despite lofty phrases of reform, the "false beacons" continue to shine and, in the words of the ancient Russian song, "Yon sham lights confuse fishermen's souls, implanting false hopes . . ." END

LE MONDE — Weekly Selection, October 14, 1970

Poor organization plaguing good Soviet harvest

From our correspondent

MOSCOW—Favourable weather has given the Soviet Union reason to expect the 1970 grain harvest to surpass last year's. The unofficial estimate is placed at more than the 160 million tons reached last year, compared to the 180-million mark attained in 1968.

Considerable progress would have to be made to reach the annual goal of 195 million tons set up by Party Secretary-General Leonid I. Brezhnev last July for the forthcoming five-year plan.

Serious problems apparently continue to plague the organization of the actual grain gathering. Several newspapers, including *Pravda,* have pointed out the deplorable harvesting conditions in such regions as Omsk and Aktyubinsk.

Trucks, insufficient in number or poorly used, are unable to regularly transport the harvested grain to the delivery or storage centres. Grain has piled up by the sides of roads and fields, apparently loose and exposed to the elements. Elsewhere, the facilities are incapable of handling the inflow.

A recent issue of *Pravda* cited the case of a *sovkhoz* (1) where 3,000 tons of cut grain are even now out in the open awaiting shipment to the nearest grain elevator, which can only handle 35 to 55 tons a day. At that pace, the entire harvest will reach shelter only in mid-November—after a considerable portion has been destroyed or damaged by the seasonal rain or snow.

There are a number of reasons for these delays. Soviet newspapers place a major part of the blame on the large number of trucks laid up in repair shops. At the *sovkhoz* cited by *Pravda,* more than half of the vehicles were broken down.

Preventive measures

These difficulties are all the more disturbing in that they were foreseen well ahead of time and preventive measures were taken. The Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet Council of Ministers last June authorized the governments of the federated republics to mobilize all available transportation for the forthcoming harvest, including the drafting of industrial and management motor resources for *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz* use. Drivers were granted bonuses of as high as 50 per cent of their normal salaries.

A second Central Committee-Council of Ministers resolution in early August criticized the improper use of vehicle pools in a number of agricultural enterprises. The emphasis this time was on improved repair and technical service organization.

The most recent press criticisms are part of a year-old campaign aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, waste in all sectors of the Soviet economy.

The situation is all the more pressing in agriculture for two reasons: (1) this sector is in the priority position in the next five-year plan; and (2) grain production requires an added boost to compensate for last year's results.

The apparent ineffectiveness of the party and government directives highlights both the clumsy weight of the Soviet apparatus and the difficulties facing the managers of the Russian economy.

ALAIN JACOB

(1) A *sovkhoz* is a state farm differing from a *kolkhoz.* (collective farm) in that it is run like an industrial enterprise with hired labour paid regular wages.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
25 January 1971

WHY RUSSIA CAN'T CATCH UP WITHOUT WESTERN KNOW-HOW

Inefficiency, waste, bureaucratic bungling. . . . This is only part of the story behind Russia's lagging economy—and why Reds are turning, more and more, to capitalist West for help.

The extent of the profound failure of the Soviet Union's economic system is now coming into full view.

For a long time Russian leaders boasted they would catch up with and surpass the West.

The fact is established, instead, that Russia finds it impossible even to hold its own.

Years of economic bungling and inefficiency have forced the Soviets to turn more and more to the West for massive help to make up in some measure for their own shortcomings in industry and technology.

The Kremlin found it necessary in the 1960s to import 6.5 billion dollars' worth of machinery from smaller countries of the capitalist world—a great blow to Russian pride.

Lag in technology. In computers, automation, atomic energy—all fields essential in this technological era—Soviet progress is found to lag behind that of the West.

The Russian people, fed promises that products commonplace in the West were on the way, continue to find promises, not goods, on their shelves. Nor is the future much brighter. The five-year plan that started on Jan. 1, 1971, warns people not to expect any dramatic increases in consumer goods.

Industrial growth in Russia last year rose 8 per cent—above expectations—but failed to erase serious deficits plaguing key sectors, such as fertilizers, chemicals and construction.

One eminent Soviet physicist, Andrei Sakharov, in a candid mood of self-criticism, puts it this way:

"We are now catching up with the United States only in some of the old, traditional industries which are no longer as important as they used to be for the United States—for example, coal and steel. In some of the newer fields—for example, automation, computers, petrochemicals and especially in industrial research and development—we are not only lagging behind, but are also growing more slowly."

So, increasingly, Russia must rely on the West for assistance in overcoming its deficiencies. Moscow is counting on capitalism to supply the large-scale aid needed to exploit vast untapped natural resources, to build modern industrial plants and to develop new sources of hard currency to boost living standards.

Massive imports. The billions of dollars in machinery and equipment the Russians have imported from countries such as West Germany, Britain, Japan, Sweden, Italy and France have covered every industrial field—ships and marine goods, chemicals, timber and papermaking equipment, light industry and food. The chart on these pages gives details.

Broad objectives of Soviet planners are evident in these deals Russia has concluded or has in the works:

- Russia's auto industry is being revolutionized by construction of a mass-production plant at Togaliatti on the Volga River by Italy's Fiat Company.
- British firms are providing the technical aid, equipment and construction engineers for two huge chemical plants.
- West Germany and Italy have signed multibillion-dollar agreements to supply Russia with large-diameter pipes, compressors and other equipment in return for gas from new wells in Siberia.
- Japan will help Russia harvest its virgin forests in return for lumber.
- Other Western firms are negotiating to help Russia develop tremendous reserves of iron, copper and nickel in Siberia.

What Moscow is counting on is that industrial firms and banks in the West are anxious enough to get a toehold in the Communist market to provide much of their help on "painless" terms. That means terms that will relieve the Russians of any additional demands on their already limited reserves of foreign exchange.

Credit from capitalists. Up to now, Russia has obtained nearly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of credits from Western Europe and from Japan to finance the purchase of industrial equipment, know-how and management skills. Moscow currently is dickering for an additional 2 to 3 billion dollars in credit from these countries. Most deals involve the barter of goods rather than payment of cash.

Notably absent in the West's push to capitalize on Russia's needs: the United States. For political or strategic reasons, and under Government pressure, American firms have spurned "feelers" for construction of a truck factory and a computer-assembly plant in the Soviet Union. And American companies are conspicuously absent from other important negotiations.

Russia's reach for a Western hand in time of trouble is far from new. Almost from the time Communists took over they have sought capitalist help in trying to deal with an ailing economy.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, American industry played a major role in the first of Joseph Stalin's five-year plans. During this period—when Washington did not even recognize Moscow diplomatically—U. S. companies laid the foundations of basic Soviet industries—coal, iron, steel, petroleum, chemicals and fertilizers. U. S. engineers helped build the giant Dnieper Dam, at one time the world's largest. American experts taught Russian farmers how to grow wheat on a large scale.

During World War II, with Russia staggering before advancing German

armies, it was the U. S. again which came to the rescue with food, transport and fuel.

After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev—the same Khrushchev who boasted that Russia would be outproducing the U. S. by 1970—sent his farm experts to the U. S. to see whether Iowa's corn and hog-raising techniques could be adopted by Russia to help solve chronic food problems.

Specialists on Soviet affairs do stress this point: Russia has made giant strides in some sectors over the years.

Crude-steel output totaled only 4 million tons in 1928; today it tops 100 million tons. In certain industries, notably machine tools and cement, Soviet output exceeds that of the U. S. In fact, Russia ranks second only to the U. S. as a military and industrial power.

Still, Russia's total production of goods and services amounts to no more than half that of the U. S. The average Russian waits years to buy a car. He still finds it hard to purchase such ordinary items as gloves, towels and razor blades. The chart on page 55 compares production of the U. S. and Russia in several key areas.

Shabby, shoddy. One Western authority on Soviet affairs describes the Russia of today in these terms:

"Soviet planning—or the failure of it—has produced a country where shabbily dressed peasants use high-powered jets to take baskets of poultry and produce to market because food-short city dwellers will pay prices that will more than cover air fares. It has produced a country which was the first to orbit a satellite around the earth—but where some buildings are equipped with nets to catch falling bricks and plaster."

A Soviet economist, I. Pashko, has detailed his country's backwardness in engineering. Soviet auto engines, he said, weigh two to three times more per horsepower than comparable American auto engines. The weight of Russian truck engines is four times as great as American counterparts.

Practice in Russia is to pour time and capital into overhauling existing machines rather than introducing new ones. For example, 500,000 lathes in Russia have been in operation for more than 20 years. One third of all Soviet textile mills are two decades old, or older. One fifth of all papermaking machines are over 50 years old.

To maintain this old equipment, what the Russians call "the second machine-building industry" has been spawned, geared to reconditioning antiquated machinery. This industry ties up more than 1 million metal-cutting lathes—almost as many as are used in the entire machine-building industry itself. In 1968 some 5 billion dollars was set aside for this rebuilding of industrial machinery—more than all capital investment in machine building.

Squandered resources. Waste is widespread. In 1965, according to one Soviet source, Russia's engineering industry used 25 per cent more material than was used in foreign countries to produce the same output. Twenty-nine per cent of Soviet rolled metal is scrapped each year. In the ball-bearing industry the figure is 57 per cent. Annual waste of steel shavings is three to four times as high as in other industrial countries.

Human resources are equally wasted. Nearly one out of four workers is employed in "auxiliary work"—such as moving materials from one place to another. Manual labor is widespread. In the mechanical-engineering and metal-processing industry only 38 per cent of the work force is engaged in mechanized tasks. Workers in coal mines still prop timbers by hand. Only five of 88 major gas fields are fully automated. Some 200 rolling mills are not mechanized.

In new construction, Russia lags dramatically behind the West. Example: It takes 1 to 2 years to build a chemical plant in the U. S. and Britain; 5 to 7 years in Russia.

Notes one Soviet writer:

"We design new enterprises in two or three years, we build them in five to seven years and we take one to two years to get them producing. . . . This shows how inefficiently we are using new technology and how we are slowing technical progress."

Auto production is another example. While the rest of the industrial world grapples with problems of auto pollution, traffic jams and parking, the Soviet Union is barely entering the automobile age. With a population of 253 million people it has only 1.3 million cars—half of them Government-owned—and 3 million trucks. Soviet auto production in 1970 was around 300,000 and truck output half a million. That compared with U. S. production of 6.6 million cars and 1.7 million trucks, a below-normal output because of the 1970 auto strike.

Computer shortage. Nowhere are Soviet failings more apparent than in the computer field. Academician Sakharov estimates that Russian computer capacity is "hundreds of times less" than America's.

Russia not only has fewer computers in operation—5,000, against more than 60,000 in the U. S.—but also lacks the big, complex models that have helped spur technology in the West. One writer estimates that 60 to 80 per cent of computers in the U. S. and Western Europe belong to the third—the latest—generation of computers, with the remainder in the second generation. In Russia and Eastern Europe less than 5 per cent are third generation and more than one third are first generation.

The Soviet Union also is falling down in computer "software"—programing the machines to deliver at utmost efficiency. Computers in Russian factories, for instance, are usually called upon to solve very limited problems. Computer systems to run an entire plant—administratively as well as on the production lines—are relatively few. Often they perform poorly.

Finally, Russia lacks the mathematicians and cybernetics specialists who can solve practical industrial problems.

Looking to West. With such deficiencies and weaknesses it is no wonder, experts on Russia point out, that the Russians are searching for help from the West. Cars, computers and chemicals—these are the fields where the Russians are most anxious to get assistance.

To refashion the languishing Soviet auto industry, the Italians are building the Togliatti plant. It is scheduled to produce 600,000 autos a year by the end of 1972—more than half the country's estimated production at that time.

Negotiations are under way to organize a European consortium, led by West Germany's Daimler-Benz, to build a 1-billion-dollar truck factory with an annual capacity of 150,000 vehicles. Renault of France and DAF of Holland are also involved. The Russians began talking to these European manufacturers after getting a turn-down from Henry Ford II of the U. S. Ford, however, is reported still to be considering a tractor deal with the Russians.

Moscow, in its bid to tap Western ingenuity in the computer sector, is running into trouble. Main reason: An embargo, observed by all countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Japan, prohibits the export to Russia of the large, more sophisticated computers that could be of strategic value.

For example: Russia last October tried to get International Business Machines of the U. S. to build a subassembly plant in the Soviet Union. This was rejected. Now it is turning to Siemens of West Germany to explore the possibilities of co-operation in electronic data processing. How these negotiations will fare in view of the NATO restrictions is uncertain.

Bogged-down deal. In a related development, Britain's International Computers, Ltd., has concluded a contract for 12 million dollars to deliver two big

RUSSIA TRAILS U.S. IN NEARLY EVERY FIELD OF PRODUCTION



Estimated output in 1970–	U.S.S.R.	U.S.
Electric power, billion kilowatt-hours	737	1,630
Oil, million barrels	2,480	3,650
Natural gas, billion cubic feet	6,980	22,000
Coal, million tons	690	585
Steel, million tons	127	130
Computer systems	Fewer than 1,000	25,000
Cement, million barrels	533	400
Trucks	520,000	1,700,000
Automobiles	329,000	6,600,000
Refrigerators	4,100,000	5,500,000
Washing machines	5,400,000	3,800,000

Source: estimates by USN&WR Economic Unit, based on official data

computers to the Serpukhov high-energy physics center. That deal, too, is stalled in NATO on strategic grounds.

British firms are going ahead with providing help for construction of two giant petrochemical plants in Russia. One, a terylene facility designed to produce 50,000 tons of synthetic fibers annually, is scheduled to begin operation this year. A polyester-film factory is being built near Moscow with British aid. The two projects involve contracts totaling nearly 130 million dollars.

Nowhere is Russia relying on Western aid more than in development of Siberia's wealth of natural resources. Buried in that frigid land are 90 per cent of the country's coal, over half its iron ore, three quarters of its timber, huge oil reserves and one third its natural gas.

To get that gas out fast is a major reason behind the "pipe for gas" agreements Russia has negotiated in Europe. Russia does not have the time, capital or equipment to tap those reserves now. Nor does it manufacture the large 42-inch pipe needed to distribute it. So West Germany is supplying 333 million dollars' worth of pipe and other machinery in return for gas, Italy 200 million dollars' worth.

Tapping foreign know-how. The pipe deal points up the advantages accruing to the Russians in such ventures. It was described this way by one observer:

"Russians grant no concessions to foreign firms. Foreigners are not permitted to own their own producing plants. No foreign internal-development project is permanent. No joint Soviet-foreign companies are permitted.

"Instead, Russia calls in foreign firms to do a job, take a profit and get out.

"In short, the Russians get development without any cost to their foreign-exchange reserves and also acquire a lucrative new source of hard-currency earnings in the future."

Siberia's timber resources are being exploited similarly in an arrangement with Japan. The Japanese have agreed to supply on deferred-payment terms 150 million dollars' worth of machinery and other equipment for forestry development. Payment will be 3.3 billion board feet of lumber.

Japan also is co-operating with Russia in construction of the new port of Urangelya in the Far East near Nahodka, to handle the rapidly growing volume of trade between the Soviet Union and Japan. Russia is angling for long-term, low-interest loans of 90 million dollars from Japanese banks to finance the first stage of this port development.

British projects. Other projects in the works concerning Siberia:

Development of copper, zinc and nickel by British and other European firms; construction by Britain of a rail freight-container system from Leningrad to the Pacific Coast; building of a forging plant by Britain's GKN Company.

How far and how fast these ventures will go, and how successful they will be are still matters of conjecture among Western experts. Officials specializing in East-West economic affairs seem reasonably optimistic about prospects for deals involving 1 billion dollars or more —provided Moscow gets the long-term credit it wants and if payment is accepted in the form of raw materials or semi-finished products.

Even so, there seem to be limits. A recent study by the Geneva-based Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) showed that Russia in the decade ahead will find a declining market for its farm products, mineral fuels and industrial materials compared with the 1950s and 1960s. Why? Western needs are not rising as fast.

Also: Russian products are often of a kind and quality hard to sell in the West.

There are a few exceptions. West German industrial companies and research institutes are using certain kinds of Soviet isotopes because they come cheaper than from the U. S. Russia supplies automated welding equipment and superhard tools to work on stress parts of engines. Russia is to furnish equipment and technical help for a large iron and steel plant to be built in France. An Italian company has purchased several Yak-40 jet planes that can land and

take off on beaten-earth fields. By and large, however, the flow of technological goods is a one-way street, from West to East.

The military drain. A question that persists as the Russians look to the West for more help is why a country occupying one sixth of the world's land surface, so rich in natural resources, has been unable to keep up with the rest of the industrialized world. From Soviet experts in Europe and the U. S. come these explanations:

1. Defense and the space race have placed a tremendous burden on the Soviet economy, sharply limiting resources available for progress in other sectors. Says one expert:

"With a national income that is only about half that of the U. S., Russia is trying to rival America as a military power and in space. The strain produced by this effort has been much greater than for the richer U. S. economy."

At the same time, both defense and space technology are surrounded by an impenetrable security blanket. This has retarded the "spin-off" that has helped technological advancement in the West's civilian sector.

2. Over the last decade, Soviet policy makers have been under rising pressure from the people to transfer more resources to consumer-goods industries and to housing. Russia has not been wholly successful in this—as Kremlin leaders themselves have admitted—but the effort has drained capital away from the "growth inducing" capital-goods industries.

3. The traditional system of economic planning from the center has created a nightmare of ineptitude. Basic economic decisions are made by a handful of "experts" in Moscow, many of whom are neither experts nor planners, but Communist Party faithful.

When the "experts" make a mistake, there is no free market to correct them. Since consumers have little say about what is made, a flood of unwanted and unneeded goods flows out of factories to sit—unsold—on store shelves. Enterprises which make these goods do not "go out of business" until the planners order it—so unwanted products keep pouring out year after year despite criticism and complaints.

4. Administrative barriers and red tape hamper innovation. Managers of state-owned plants have little incentive to introduce different machines or other improvements. For example:

To install new machinery, managers would have to shut down production lines, fall behind in their quotas, lose possible benefits. Even if new machinery were introduced, pitfalls would remain. Fresh equipment means higher production targets that could complicate life for both supervisors and laborers.

Result: An attitude of "just getting by" permeates the entire production process.

Faults conceded. None of these failings has been entirely lost on Russian leaders. Over the decades, Soviet officials have conceded major faults—as the statements below indicate. In 1965 the Kremlin decreed an overhaul of the productive machinery. It failed. Two years ago new changes were made in an effort to deal with planning, prices, investment and incentives. Recent complaints by Soviet leaders indicate that these "innovations" also are not working.

A leading expert on Soviet economics, Mrs. Gertrude E. Schroeder, visiting professor of economics at the University of Virginia, summed up the Russians' drive to accelerate technology in the periodical "Problems of Communism." She said:

"The present thrust seems unlikely to produce significant results even if given a great deal more time. The main reason for this conclusion is that the Soviet leadership, as in the past, is still relying on administrative methods of resolving the problem."

With results falling far behind expectations, odds are that Russian overtures to the West will continue to expand. In the view of many Western observers, they should be rebuffed, however.

Asks one: "Why should free-world capitalists come to the aid of Soviet Communists—and in terms that are so highly favorable to the Russians?"

What the West gives Russia, these observers continue, will not solve the basic problems inherent in the Communist system, but they will benefit Soviet leaders as they seek to overtake the U.S. and narrow the technology gap.

One British political commentator put it this way: "It's sheer insanity that leads Western countries to scramble for an opportunity to help a nation that is still dedicated to their destruction."

NEW YORK TIMES,
7 February 1971

Soviet Union:

Picking Up A Bit of Capitalist Know-How

MOSCOW—The largest bookstore here is Dom Knigi, and on the same counter where works "exposing" the evils of capitalism are sold, a thick, 807-page volume extolling American business methods went on sale the other day. Copies were quickly bought by eager customers.

It was a Russian translation, in abridged form, of "Executive Leadership Course," which was originally published in the United States to aid American capitalists in running their concerns along the most up-to-date paths.

And on Wednesday, Neues eksei N. Kosygin, Politburo member Andrei P. Kirilenko and other top officials were lending their prestige to the formal opening of a new, high-level school, the Institute for Management of the National Economy. This establishment has all the earmarks of turning into the Soviet equivalent of I.B.M.'s special institute for American executives, or similar programs at Harvard, M.I.T. or other places.

The new institute, which was opened last Monday, has as its goal the retraining of the veteran Soviet élite. The first class of students, enrolled for a three-month session, consists of Ministers, Deputy Ministers and other industrial czars.

Among the courses being given at the institute are: "The Present-day State of the Soviet Economy," "The Latest Achievements In, and Prospects for De-

veloping, the Scientific and Technical Revolution" and "Progress in Science, Technology and Production in the Soviet Union and Abroad."

These developments underscored what has become increasingly evident here in recent years, namely the determination of Soviet authorities to bend their ideological anathema to the American way of life by borrowing some of the management tools used by American industry to make the United States the world's leading economic power.

Soviet officials have stressed, and there is no reason to quarrel with them, that the decision to use economic levers and practices common in the West in no way dilutes Russia's commitment to a Socialist economy. The Soviet state still controls all means of production and sets prices and wages, the main regulators.

New 'Plan' Is Due

The attention now paid to management is part of an overall Soviet effort to modernize its economy and take advantage of the technological revolution now sweeping the rest of the world, but which has had only a small impact so far in Russia's civilian economy. The drive has particular impetus now because a new "Five-Year Plan" is scheduled to be announced in the near future.

The results of the last such plan, which ended on Dec. 31, were made public last week. As expected, they indicated that most of the targets set by Premier Kosygin in 1966 were not reached, primarily because of delays in construction, backward plants and shortages in capital and labor investments.

Over-all, the Soviet economy recorded a strong comeback in 1970 after a poor showing in 1969. Both industrial and agricultural output showed significant gains, and officials have claimed a record grain harvest.

Russians are hoping that science and technology can be introduced rapidly in order to accelerate the economy's growth and to tie the Soviet Union securely to the computer age. Soviet officials have striven to interest Western concerns in signing long-term agreements to export new technology here, and select young scientists have gone abroad to study. New departments have been established in a few universities to teach cybernetics to Russians.

But officials have stressed that the advanced technology will be wasted if the top leadership of Soviet enterprises remains ignorant of its possibilities, or, through misguided ideological vigilance, opposes its introduction in Ministries and enterprises.

A Soviet economist with long experience in the United States once noted how surprised he was, during a visit to New England, to ascertain that a shoe manufacturer — "an old-fashioned capitalist" — seemed fully aware of modern management ideas, could discuss cogently the latest computers on the market and could converse with his young engineers easily.

"Most of our older directors are former skilled workers with little advanced training," he said. "They rose to important posts under Stalin because they could organize workers to meet planned output goals. They are relatively unsophisticated and know very little about modern techniques. We are trying to change their attitude, but it is hard work."

"Knowledge of the methods and techniques of management today is necessary for the leaders of the national economy," said Vladimir A. Kirillin, chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, in an interview in Pravda last week. "Without this, it is difficult to raise the efficiency of production, and to use fully the achievements of science and technology."

—BERNARD GWERTZMAN

WASHINGTON STAR
1 November 1970

VICTOR ZORZA

Restlessness in Soviet Scientific Circles

The ferment in the Soviet intellectual community, particularly among the scientists, is compelling the Kremlin to bring out into the open the evidence of opposition which it would rather suppress. The latest issue of Party Life finds that the Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow, one of the Soviet Union's leading nuclear research centers, has been infected with "bourgeois" ideology.

Since the institute counts among its associates such men as Academician Sakharov, the most famous member of the "scientific political opposition," the party journal's attack on it is no surprise. What is surprising is that it has been so long delayed. Sakharov's call for the democratization of the Soviet system, which began circulating through underground channels in Russia some two years ago, certainly constituted sufficient provocation for the Kremlin, which would normally have given short shrift to the challenger and his associates.

But to deal with the matter with its customary firmness, the Kremlin would have had to risk alienating an important section of the scientific community, without whose cooperation the system could hardly remain viable for very long. Sakharov was gradually deprived of most of the positions he held, and an attempt was made to tighten up the ideological discipline in the scientific world without too much public fuss—but, it now seems, to no avail.

The criticism of the Lebedev Institute is attributed in Party Life to the Central Committee itself, which means that a decision has been taken at the highest level to use the present attack as an object lesson for the country's scientific community as a whole. It is the institute's party committee, not just the non-party scientists, which is said to have failed to display "the necessary staunchness in the struggle with the unscientific and idealistic conceptions of bourgeois scientists."

But it is not foreign scientific ideas that the Kremlin is concerned about. In the future, the institute's party committee must ensure that the scientists acquire "a Marxist-Leninist understanding of political, socio-economic and philosophical problems of the day." It must further arouse among them "an uncompromising attitude towards the ideological concepts of anti-communism and revisionism."

Behind the long words are very simple ideas. "Revisionist" and "bourgeois" labels have always been used by Soviet leaders to decry and discredit the demands made by any section of the community for basic freedoms. Among the scientists, the rallying call is increasingly for freedom of communication with the outside world. They argue that this must be granted to them if Soviet science is to be truly effective, that without it they cannot produce the results which the party needs to keep up the power of the Soviet Union in relation to the West.

But they know, and the party knows, that once this freedom has been granted to scientists, it could not be long withheld from the rest of the nation. The free circulation of ideas, political as well as scientific, that would inevitably follow, would soon undermine the party's monopoly of political wisdom and, therefore, of political power.

Nor is the demand confined any longer to outright rebels like Sakharov. A debate in the Ukrainian press on the basic directions of science, which soon spilled over into matters of freedom, was recently initi-

ated by a 30-year-old physicist, Vitaly Shelest, who had been greatly impressed by what he had seen in America. Young Shelest's father is the party secretary for the Ukraine, a nation of 50 million people.

Ostensibly, Shelest was concerned with the preference given to the applied sciences in the Soviet Union, and the restrictions, financial and organizational, placed on the basic sciences. But the basic sciences include, for him, "the history of the fatherland"—an area that is beset by taboos and censorship bans, to prevent the critical discussion of political ideas, and of the party's conduct during the 53 years it has ruled the country.

Articles by other scientists in the Ukrainian Literary Gazette soon took up, however, the inevitable topic of foreign contacts. This was absolutely necessary if young scientists were to develop their abilities fully, "but, unfortunately, we sent on such creative foreign trips for the most part anyone but those who are true scientists."

Foreign travel permits were governed by "a system of questionnaires, personal files, recommendations, and the like, which has completely failed." Yet the system "still exists and hampers progress." The writer, himself a young scientist, demanded that the head of a scientific establishment should alone be responsible for deciding whether members of his staff may travel abroad.

This is the most direct and daring discussion to have appeared in the Soviet press so far of the degrading system of checks and investigations, administered by a special department of the Central Committee, which every Soviet citizen must undergo before he obtains a foreign travel permit. Previously, the system had only been criticized in literature circulated through underground channels.

Another complaint voiced in the Ukranian debate was that "it is almost impossible to obtain, on time, a journal or a book from abroad." The author had inserted "on time" for the censor's benefit, for his readers will know of the great number of books that are not allowed into the country for political reasons—even when they deal with scientific topics.

A study published officially in Moscow last year concluded that the efficiency of Soviet science was greatly impaired by restrictions on the circulation of scientific literature and of the scientists themselves. Foreign journals reached subscribers with great delays, it said, and it was "particularly deplorable" that "the most important of them" were available only in the form of photographic reproductions made in the Soviet Union from foreign originals. (Any "undesirable" matter is, of course, deleted in the process of reproduction.)

The study laid particular stress on the importance of personal links between scientists of different countries. These were now increasingly necessary, because the high degree of specialization and the "imformation explosion" made such personal contacts the most efficient way of acquiring much of the important new knowledge. In the Soviet Union, the book concluded, "the delays in the movement of new ideas through the channels of communication are impermissibly great."

Some of the Soviet leaders are aware of the problem. Dzherman Gvishiani, the deputy chairman of the State Science Committee, who is one of the men most concerned in the Soviet leadership with improving the utilization of science in the interests of the national economy and defense, has often stressed the importance of foreign contacts.

Although he is the son of a KGB general, Gvishiani has worked so hard to extend Russia's foreign links that in some quarters he is regarded as a liberal. Perhaps he is. The offspring of KGB officials sometimes turn out to be remarkably progressive.

As the son-in-law of Alexei Kosygin, the prime minister, he can afford to take risks—although he also remembers, no doubt, the sad fate of Mr. Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexey Adzhubey, who became a "liberal" standard-bearer as editor of Izvestia, and has been last heard of as a reporter on a picture magazine.

In a recent article, Gvishiani stressed the "great importance" of studies designed to determine the effectiveness of Soviet science and scientists who, with auxiliary personnel, now amounted to more than three million people. It is an army with considerable revolutionary potential—and the more the Kremlin does to improve its "effectiveness," the more dangerous it will become.

NEWSWEEK
1 February 1971

Dissent in Russia: The Thin Wedge

He lives alone in a two-room, red brick bungalow on a country estate 25 miles west of Moscow, and his wants are starkly simple. Occasionally, he receives a visitor or relaxes by skiing in the solitary silence of the nearby woods. But most of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's waking hours are poured into the neat, longhand manuscript of his new novel, "August 1914," a ruthlessly candid portrait of his homeland during the last days of czarist rule. Yet for all his single-minded immersion in the past, the present tugs doggedly at Solzhenitsyn's elbow. In ever more strident tones, the government-controlled press denounces him as a scandalmonger and a traitor, and only last week his Nobel Prize was compared to "the mark of Cain." One by one, his colleagues are hounded from their jobs, hauled off by the secret police and, sometimes, sent away to rot in prisons. And although he would prefer his world to be bounded by the narrow, paper-strewn writing desk and the peaceful woods outside, the clandestine chorus of Soviet dissent nags him relentlessly toward a role of moral leadership.

By now, Solzhenitsyn has come to accept his fate. "For a country to have a great writer," says a character in one of his novels, "is like having another government." In the grand tradition of Dostoevski, Pushkin and other nineteenth-century Russian writers, Solzhenitsyn has learned that he cannot maintain forever the distinction between art and politics. And like Dostoevski, who was trained as an engineer, and Chekhov, a practicing doctor, Solzhenitsyn uniquely spans the two strongest branches of traditional Russian liberalism: art and science. For although he has worked for much of his life as a mathematician, it is his fiction that has brought him fame—as well as a painful sense of responsibility to his country's tiny but courageously persistent dissent movement.

Protest: In his dual role as a man of letters and a man of science, Solzhenitsyn, 52, personifies a turning point for the Soviet Union. In recent months, a growing number of prominent scientists have joined artistic dissenters in open protest against the Soviet repression of individuality. And this union of the artistic and scientific intelligentsia is the most important phenomenon in the course of Soviet

dissent since the death of Joseph Stalin eighteen years ago.

Like their artistic predecessors in the movement, the newly vocal scientists are concerned with civil liberties and creative freedom. But most of them are also motivated by the realization that the dead hand of Soviet conformity has throttled research and development, and may ultimately consign their country to a technological backwater (box, page 32). Few of the dissenters are Western-style democrats; what they seek is an enlightened *Soviet* system. But even that relatively modest demand confronts the cautious bureaucrats in the Kremlin with their gravest challenge of the post-Stalin era. In all likelihood, the issue will not be settled soon. But the government's painful dilemma—whether to bend with the winds of change or to crack down savagely on dissent—may ultimately hold the key to the success or failure of the Marxist experiment in Russia.

In a sense, the father of current Soviet dissent was Nikita Khrushchev. By inaugurating the de-Stalinization campaign in 1956, Khrushchev raised many hopes and, quite unintentionally, sparked the birth of a literary counterculture. Under Khrushchev, Solzhenitsyn was permitted to publish his novel "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich"—a searing indictment of Stalin's prison camps. Even this much dissent, however, alarmed the gray bureaucrats who succeeded Khrushchev, and soon the government began to crack down again. In early 1966, it staged what was to become the Soviet Union's Dreyfus case—the trial of writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, both of whom were sentenced to prison camp for having sent "anti-Soviet" manuscripts abroad for publication.

Prison: Dissent did not approach its present stage, however, until men like Solzhenitsyn edged off the sidelines. Solzhenitsyn's first timid step into political involvement—a series of wartime letters to a friend in which he criticized Stalin—had earned him eight years in a labor camp. And after his release, he carefully avoided politics, settling down to a quiet job teaching mathematics in a provincial city. But then Solzhenitsyn turned to literature, and it was his evolution into a novelist of conscience that eventually brought him back to criticism of the regime. Thus, in 1967, he wrote to the Writers' Union demanding an end to the censorship that had "smothered, gagged and slandered" his novels "The First Circle" and "Cancer Ward." The next year, Andrei Sakharov, an illustrious physicist who is known as one of the "fathers" of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, published a liberal manifesto, in which he declared: "Intellectual freedom is essential to human society." And early last year, Zhores Medvedev, a biologist who had already made a name for himself by exposing Stalin's crackpot court scientist, Trofim Lysenko, lashed out furiously at censorship of the mails.

At first, the new dissenters were unorganized, if only because Soviet law forbids the formation of anything that resembles a political opposition group. But events were soon to convince some scientists that they would be better off hanging together. Last May, when Medvedev was arrested and hustled off to a mental institution, Solzhenitsyn joined the vast public outcry that quickly won the biologist his freedom and eventually even a new job. And when a less renowned scientist, Leningrad mathematician Revolt Pimenov, was slapped into prison, Sakharov and two of his colleagues broke the organizational ice by setting up a "Human Rights Committee." In December, Solzhenitsyn himself joined up as an honorary member.

Even though they were kept from the attention of the average Russian, these actions made waves that are still rippling across the world of Soviet art and science. Still other eminent figures have been drawn into the fray. As the official press heaped fresh abuse on Solzhenitsyn, the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich—who had taken the novelist into his country *dacha* outside Moscow—leapt to his friend's defense in an open letter to four Russian newspapers. When the authorities retaliated by barring Rostropovich from a scheduled concert, two other distinguished musicians, violinist David Oistrakh and pianist Sviatoslav Richter, refused to participate in the concert until Rostropovich had been reinstated. The battle, however, did not end there, for last week, Rostropovich's public appearances abroad for the next six months were canceled, and his wife, the soprano Galina Vishnevskaya, was abruptly dropped from a Moscow performance of "Madame Butterfly."

Yet for all their fame, men like Rostropovich, Oistrakh and Richter are not vitally important to the bureaucrats who rule the nation. "The Soviet regime can get along perfectly well without its poets or musicians," says one Western Kremlinologist. "But it can't get along so well without its technical elite." It is thus a cause of considerable concern to the men in the Kremlin that many Russian scientists feel increasingly alienated from their society. Partly, this estrangement is due to the steady encroachments of neo-Stalinism. "Some time ago, we scholars lost our sense of personal security," mathematician Pimenov said shortly before he was jailed. "For scientific work, one must be certain of tomorrow." No less important, scientific dissent is also fostered by a growing awareness that censorship and political orthodoxy are severe handicaps to Soviet research, as well as to the country's technological capabilities.

Perhaps the most common complaint among Soviet scientists is that they are often denied access to foreign scientific books and journals and thus fail to keep pace with developments abroad. According to various estimates, the Soviet Union obtains considerably less than half of the technical periodicals that are published in the world each year. Even those publications it does subscribe to are slow in reaching their destinations; Glavlit, the state censorship agency, insists upon duplicating periodicals and removing certain advertisements, and this process alone can take six months or more. In many fields, furthermore, new developments are occurring so rapidly that the journals cannot keep up with them; non-Soviet scientists stay abreast through letters and conversations with foreign colleagues, but this possibility is not open to most Russian scientists. "We are even encountering difficulty comprehending some foreign publications we receive because we are not familiar with all the long discussions that preceded articles in them," admitted a study published in Moscow two years ago. "Sometimes we have to form special groups to 'decode' these unintelligible reports ... All this may take several years."

Refusal: Soviet scientists also have scant opportunity to attend conferences in other countries, which are a gold mine of news and ideas for researchers. Russian delegations to these affairs are usually small and closely guarded by the KGB, the state security police, and they generally consist of older executives, rather than young innovators. In his book "The Medvedev Papers," (which will be published next June by Macmillan), Zhores Medvedev describes how his superiors frequently declined conference invitations on his behalf "due to extreme overpressure of work." On one such occasion the very day when he was supposed to address a prestigious gathering in Britain Medvedev's "prior obligation" consisted of helping with the potato harvest in the fields outside his laboratory at Obninsk, in Kaluga province. "Can we imagine a European scientist, 50 to 60 years old, who has never

once traveled beyond the limits of his own country, nor ever taken part in an international meeting abroad, nor ever once visited a foreign laboratory, even in neighboring countries?" asks Medvedev. "Of course we cannot imagine it; it would be impossible in England, France or Belgium. But in the U.S.S.R. this is still true of most scientists."

Because of their isolation, Soviet researchers waste much of their time. In 1961, Medvedev reports, 85 per cent of the Soviet Union's inventions merely duplicated earlier foreign discoveries, and there is no reason to believe that Russia has closed the gap in subsequent years. Thus, in the interests of efficiency, if nothing else, the active dissidents in Soviet science are eager to tear down the mental iron curtain that surrounds their laboratories. "The source of our difficulties is not the socialist system," Sakharov, physicist Valentin Turchin and historian Roy Medvedev (who is Zhores Medvedev's twin brother) insisted last year in an open letter to the top Soviet leadership. "[The] source is the anti-democratic traditions and norms of public life which appeared during Stalin's period and have not been completely liquidated down to the present time."

Factions: Despite their prominence, the dissident scientists and their allies in the arts have no monopoly on protest in Russia; a whole spectrum of loosely organized groups—ranging from clusters of Ukrainian and Baltic separatists to Jews, Baptists and Christian socialists—are arrayed against the government. But although these latter groups are generally dedicated to the overthrow of the established order (or least to making good their escape from it), it appears that, apart from the Jews, their impact on Soviet society hardly extends beyond the barbed-wire perimeters of its 1,000 prison camps. In comparison, the impact of the dissident intellectuals is considerable. Some foreign observers, however, discern a potentially damaging split in the "respectable" opposition among the intelligentsia. According to this theory, one group—composed of influential men like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov—hopes to change Soviet society from within and news more or less strictly to legal forms of protest. The other faction, made up of younger dissenters—most of them artists—is frustrated by a lack of influence and, as a result, has moved into activities that lie outside Soviet law.

"They fight the authorities," one Russian says of these mavericks. "They confront them directly. They do not have the fear of the labor camp in their bones." Thus, in addition to filing formal protests, lending moral support when their friends stand trial and signing the petitions that play a time-honored role in Russian dissent, these rebels stage illegal demonstrations, write articles, stories and poems in *samizdat* ("self-published") form and pass around smudged carbon copies of A Chronicle of Current Events, the Soviet Union's principal underground newspaper. "Thank you, Party," goes a poem in one issue of the Chronicle, "for all you have done and are doing to nurture the hatred we feel today. Thank you, Party."

Friends: Life is a hand-to-mouth business for young dissenters on the fringe of the intelligentsia. Most are unable to obtain the kind of jobs for which they were trained, and since unemployment makes them vulnerable to imprisonment or exile to Siberia as "parasites," they take on menial work whenever they can find it. (Ironically, it is useful to have been ruled "insane" by the KGB; a number of quite lucid nonconformists get around the requirement that they must hold jobs by drawing pensions for their alleged mental disability.) But money is the least of their worries, for in the free-wheeling underground scene, a frugal dissenter can live well enough if he operates on the age-old Russian principle that it is better to have 100 friends than 1,000 rubles.

Andrei Amalrik, the 32-year-old historian whose book "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" predicts that his country will disintegrate into total chaos, is in many ways typical of his generation of dissenters. His last "recognized" job was as an occasional feature writer for the Novosti press agency in 1967, and until recently, when he was sentenced to three years in a labor camp, Amalrik applied for one marginal job after another. Each time, the KGB scared off prospective employers until finally the young historian landed a position as a reader to a blind man. In a material sense at least, Amalrik clearly had little to lose. "A man like Sakharov," observes a Western student of Soviet affairs, "has reached his prime; he can say: 'What can they do to me?' Andrei Amalrik and those who are like him have so little hope of anything that they can say: 'What does it *matter* what they do to us?' "

For all their cool determination, however, Amalrik and his friends—and even Sakharov and his more influential colleagues—are nonentities to most Russians. The average Soviet citizen, in fact, belongs to a "Silent Majority" of such awesome docility that, by comparison, the most conventional middle-class American might almost be a Weatherman. "This country has no tradition of freedom," says a young magazine editor, "and that's why there's not going to be any." Adds another gloomy writer: "Nothing will change this country in our lifetime. The lower classes are unhappy, sure, about things like the shortage of meat. But they do have their vodka. And the ruling classes—the *apparatchiki*—will do anything to hold onto their power. The younger bureaucrats are the worst of all. At least the Old Bolsheviks had ideals."

Immunity: Like their less-educated countrymen, the majority of Soviet intellectuals are still uninvolved in dissent. "We care about things," a Moscow technician told NEWSWEEK's Jay Axelbank. "We applauded Sakharov and we were thrilled by Rostropovich's letter. But I have a wife and kids. Would an American like you rush out to denounce the Vietnam war?" "I have never been given a petition to sign," says a chemist, "but if I were, I don't know what I'd do. If 25 people from my institute signed a petition for something or other, the authorities would be very clever. They would put one or two people in an insane asylum and give good jobs to two or three others to create suspicion that some of us are informers."

Of all the dissenters, only Solzhenitsyn himself is known to a large percentage of Soviet citizens, and even if the government does not yet dare to arrest him, the KGB has many ways of keeping his influence in check. In September 1966, Article 190 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code was amended to provide three years in prison or in *ssylka* (internal exile) for the "dissemination of conscious fabrications discrediting the Soviet state and social order" and for the "organization of or participation in group activities which violate the public order." Usually, the threat of three years' detention is enough to deter potential dissenters. Recently, Sakharov's Lebedev Institute of Physics in Moscow was officially warned by the party Central Committee to toe the line, and a Western scientist who has worked there describes the institute as "a hotbed of silence." "Remember this once and for all," a party official told mathematician Pimenov last spring before his arrest. "I can enumerate to you on my fingers those basic truths that may not be violated."

And yet the KGB and the judicial system are no longer the iron fist that they were in Stalin's day. Obviously, the government could crush the protest movement overnight if it wanted to, but instead it has given many dissenters a little leash, and it has allowed "subversive" publications like the Chronicles to circulate fairly widely. One reason for this approach may be that, although the KGB still contains a large quota of thugs and narrow-minded bureaucrats, it has also attracted many relatively liberal

recruits in recent years. In addition, the courts have placed a great deal of emphasis recently on the strict observance of "socialist legality," and when dissenters' lawyers base their cases—as they increasingly do—on solid points of law, they sometimes win. This trend may indicate that the dissent movement already wields influence out of all proportion to its size—and that the government has begun to sense the limits of modern-day repression.

Road: Yet even if that lesson has been learned, there is no guarantee that it will be put to good use. Above all, Brezhnev and his elderly colleagues are cautious men, not given to innovation (even the relatively mild economic reforms proposed by Premier Aleksei Kosygin six years ago have long since been watered down to almost nothing). And they have been frightened by the spectacle of liberalization in Czechoslovakia and the excesses of radical dissenters in the West. Thus, barring some crisis such as a major economic slowdown, the leadership will probably continue to march more or less down the middle of its rocky road, pursuing re-Stalinization in a modest way.

But halfway measures are unlikely to solve anything. "If the Soviet Union is to survive," Andrei Amalrik wrote, "it must undergo a total transformation. But if the present Soviet leadership is to survive, everything must remain exactly as it is." And therein lies Russia's great dilemma. As the men in the Kremlin are painfully aware, their options in dealing with the dissidents are severely limited. If the Soviet leaders choose to crack down by launching a Stalinist reign of terror, how can they be sure that they themselves will not be the ultimate victims? On the other hand, any effort to buy off the scientific dissidents by permitting them greater access to Western ideas may well open a floodgate of demands for democratic reforms.

Yet, although Brezhnev and Co. will try to avoid either of these two courses, the forces of change cannot be ignored. A reckoning between the Soviet establishment and the dissidents may be avoided until a new generation of leaders replaces the current Politburo (whose average age is 63). But sooner or later, the Soviet Union will have to come to terms with a disaffected intellectual elite that is its major hope for remaining a superpower in the decades ahead.

March 1971

International Communist Dissidence

Hard upon Lenin's takeover of Russia in 1917, he quickly established the infamous 3rd Communist International (Comintern). It was a motley group of Communist parties --- some large, established parties, others hardly worthy of the name, consisting merely of an avowed Communist or two willing to swear complete obedience to Lenin's orders. Just as Lenin had forged for Russia a conspiratorial party of professional revolutionaries subject to the principle of "democratic centralism", i.e. unquestioning obedience to orders from above, so Lenin set out to build an international conspiratorial organization of professional revolutionaries subject to the parallel principle of "proletarian internationalism", i.e. unquestioning obedience to orders from the center of world revolution, the Soviet Union. What Lenin started, Stalin perfected (or corrupted, depending on one's point of view) and finally disbanded in 1943, as an organization, though not as an idea.

The history of the international Communist movement can be charted as a progressive diminution of ideological zeal from its high point under Lenin to the ritualistic verbiage of today, a cynical echo of once-real beliefs and convictions.

There may be a number of ways to explain the disillusionment of Communists, but an essential element of the explanation is that the Soviet Union, the first "socialist" country and the fountainhead of Communist ideology, has repeatedly betrayed the ideals it professed. Starting with Lenin's switch to capitalistic economics in his announcement of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, progressing through the repeated 180-degree switches in the Comintern line, the countless deaths resulting from Stalin's assertion of political control of the countryside through the device of collectivization, the purges of millions of the Party loyal in the 30's, the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956, the invasion of Soviet Hungary in 1956, and most recently the invasion of Czechoslovakia --- this history is a dramatic contrast between professed ideals and acts.

Each betrayal has been accompanied by defections from the Soviet-led Communist movement. In pre-World War II

years, defections were by individuals. Then, as post-war developments created other "socialist" states, states began to defect --- first Yugoslavia in 1948, then Albania in 1961, then Communist China. These states were all resisting Soviet efforts to exploit them and to impose the Soviet style of Communism on them. Disillusion with the Soviet model of Communism prompted the Hungarian revolt in 1956, crushed under Soviet tanks. And the originally non-violent effort to shape its own form of socialism by Czechoslovakia 12 years later ended the same way, killed by what Ernst Fischer calls "tank Communism." Finally, Hungary once again, Rumania, and now Poland are seeking their independent ways to socialism. In all of the defections within the socialist camp, a central issue is the resistance of these countries to Soviet ideological and political domination, encompassed in the expression, "the Soviet model of socialism."

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, free world Communists have again expressed their disillusionment. This time the disaffection is on a greater scale than before, more eloquent in denouncing the Soviet "model", more widespread geographically. The Communist parties, or important elements of them, from France, Italy, Austria, Spain, (among others in Europe), to Japan and Australia in Asia, and Venezuela and Mexico in Latin America have strongly criticized the invasion and have persistently analyzed the fundamental weaknesses and wrongs of the Soviet system. See attached sampling of Communist criticism of the Soviet Union.

Symbolic of world Communist disillusion with the Soviet system was the unique, international gathering of Communists on 26 November last year in Paris under the aegis of the "Committee of 5 January". The Committee is named for the date (in 1968) of the deposition of the Stalinist boss of Czechoslovakia, Anton Novotny, and the beginning of the Dubcek's experiment with "socialism with a human face." Speeches and messages commemorating the birth and death of the Czech experiment brought before an audience of more than 2,000 Communists and leftists testimony of the hope they had held for the Dubcek regime before the brutal suppression in August 1968. This gathering was unique in going beyond the isolated expressions of disillusionment with Soviet Communism so familiar in recent years. Rather it represented the beginnings of internationally organized Communist protest against the calcified, obsolete system of Communism practiced in the Soviet Union. It was perhaps the most significant renunciation of Soviet Communism by Communists

seen in recent years. The collected speeches and messages by Communist and ex-Communist luminaries from the Czechoslovak, French, Italian, Austrian, Belgian, and Australian Communist parties are attached.

There can be little question about the concern with which the Soviet leaders view the gradual disintegration of their ideological domain. What undoubtedly affects them even more is the gradual loss of organizational control over the international Communist movement. As world Communist conferences in 1957, 1960, and 1969 were used as a substitute for a formal international Communist organization, they became forums for Communist parties to air their dissatisfaction with Soviet hegemony. The communiques resulting from these world conclaves become more ambiguous and weasel-worded, designed to paper over deep-seated differences and to serve the differing propaganda purposes of the signatories. But despite almost total lack of Soviet ideological appeal to the world's Communist parties and despite the erosion of Soviet organizational controls, the CPSU can still invoke an overwhelming majority of Communist voices supporting Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The answer to this apparent paradox is simple: few Communist parties would be able to survive without the annual infusion of Soviet financial support, direct or indirect.

The ideological bonds between free world Communist parties and Moscow have been severely weakened thanks to Soviet actions and their exposure by Communist intellectuals. Organizational bonds have also weakened. The Soviets have been unable to re-establish an international organization resembling the Comintern or the post-war Cominform, and unable to control dissenting voices in world Communist conferences. Nonetheless financial ties remain to give substance to free world accusations of the existence of a Soviet-led subversive Communist conspiracy.

EXPRESSIONS OF FREE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTY DISSIDENCE

Samples of ideological opposition to the CPSU published by elements of free world Communist parties appear below. In addition to their quotability they may serve as guides to additional material in the same vein. This criticism of the Soviet Union emanating from the free world Communist parties stems from the realization that the Soviet brand of Communism is increasingly alien and inapplicable to their world, and it is typical of the feelings being expressed by an increasing number of free world Communists. Their parties' fate has usually been excommunication by the CPSU, or they are split by the CPSU, with the concomitant transfer of Soviet funding to the faction completely loyal to Kremlin directives. Roger Garaudy, the French dissident who was for many years a member of the top hierarchy of the French Communist Party, pointed out that in the immediate past Brezhnev used this technique, developed and proved by Lenin and Stalin before him, to interfere in the affairs of the Greek, Spanish, Finnish, Austrian, British, Portuguese, Venezuelan and Australian parties.

The principal theme running through most of this criticism is the need for many roads to Socialism, with the programs keyed to the national variables in the non-Soviet countries. Linked with this is a desire for an end to Soviet political interference in the operations of free world parties due to a growing realization that considerations of self-interest (rather than the interests of the international Communist movement at large) govern Soviet actions.

Indealistic revolutionaries in the foreign parties view with distaste the calcification of the bureaucratic overburden in the Soviet party. They see a hardening structure which, in losing touch with the old concept of "international revolutionary socialist solidarity," has developed a taste for the status quo and the preservation of its privileges and power. These critics disapprove of the ideological stagnation engendered by circumstances in which contrasting ideas are forbidden to compete freely with each other in party debate. These foreign critics see the Soviet Party, immobilized on an ideological dead center, as stifling the growth and development of the foreign parties.

A final, and somewhat subjective, major theme occurs in much of this criticism, a theme which evades precise definition. Perhaps it is a desire to recapture idealism, the dynamo which has produced the greatest fervor and self-sacrifice throughout history. It is a reaction to the sterility of Soviet-sponsored ideology, and to the non-inspirational sources of that ideology, such as power concerns and pragmatic self-interest.

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Venezuela

"The party leaders who talked to me in Bulgaria about the depolitization of the Bulgarian younger generation do not seem to understand that the younger generation is depoliticized because the entire life of the country is just that. The game of politics, the element of free debate, which should be the

maximum expression of self-government -- which, by the way, virtually does not exist -- is reduced at the summit to the Central Committee of the CP, while the vast masses are absent from any real political life. Without political debate, with elections in which it is impossible to choose, with Marxist education reduced to the tiresome memorizing of Marxist texts, with the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization) transformed into a Boy Scout organization -- how could anyone be surprised that the younger generation is not interested in politics? In what politics should they be interested? The politics of speeches and parades? The example of Czechoslovakia however reveals very neatly that this tired youth, presented as a caricature of political life and Marxist education, was more than ready for true political activity, for a true rebirth of socialist political life." Checoeslovakquia -- El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem) by Teodoro Petkoff.

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Venezuela.

"The Soviet Union is a very specific historical product. It is far from a kind of universal and absolute incarnation of the idea of socialism. It was born amid very special historical conditions and socialism there developed along peculiar lines that cannot be repeated. The Soviet Union constitutes a particular socialist model, concretely limited by historical coordinates that are absolutely its own.

"We pointed out several times that socialism was established for the first time in a country with insufficient capitalist development, a country that was very backward in the rural areas, with a very strong artisan and petit-bourgeois class, with a relatively small working class, a country in which the peasantry had an extremely high specific weight. That country was afterward devastated by imperialist war and by the civil war and built itself up during what was known as the capitalist encirclement at that time.

"Therefore, there had to take place in the USSR that bureaucratic-police deformation which is Stalinism and which developed a kind of socialism with singular characteristics of its own. It is easy to understand now -- after 50 years of socialist experience in the USSR and of the existence of other socialist countries -- that Soviet socialism is not the only model of the socialism and that its particular features -- many of which are determined very closely by the conditions under which they had to develop -- are not features common to all modalities of socialism and that some of them cannot even be considered as features of socialism in general...." Chechoeslovaquia -- El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem) by Teodoro Petdoff.

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Venezuela.

"Identifying the USSR with socialism is a dangerous expedient. Nor could one identify socialism with any other country in particular. Socialism is the combination of all of the existing socialist countries but it is also something more than this constellation of these countries.

But it is even more inadequate to establish an identity between socialism and the leadership of the CPSU. Historical experience should teach us to be very cautious on that topic since the political changes which have occurred in the USSR are, among other things, characterized by the fact that each new leadership team denies and almost absolutely denounces the preceding team. Once upon a time, socialism supposedly was Stalin, and then Malenkov, and then Khrushchev, and now Brezhnev. But, if the incarnation of socialism comes down to being what each one of these leaders says about his predecessor, then socialism would be a very poor thing indeed. And this is not a caricature. It is well known that one of the most curious deformations of contemporary socialism is the one which pretends to turn the communist leaders of some socialist powers into a kind of saint, a kind of pope who cannot be disrupted, the so-called vicars of Marx and Lenin on this earth.

"How long ago it seems now when Friedrich Engels, in his book on the German Peasant Wars, inserted the profound observation which serves as an epigram for these conclusions, between two hyphens, almost as a gesture of contempt!

"Finally, regardless of the individual's critical attitude toward the problems of socialism under construction, one cannot overlook one consideration on the march of the revolution in our countries. There is no disputing the relationship between Soviet policy and the world revolution but the opposite is also true: For decades the world revolution was carried on by the USSR alone. It is therefore not a moral problem. With a few exceptions in Asia and Latin America, we revolutionaries have for many years failed to do our duty toward socialism and toward the USSR. And it is no coincidence that the maximum degree of unconditionalism toward Soviet policy and its changes, that the greatest reduction of critical capacity toward the problems of socialism, is found precisely there, in sectors and persons who have made a doubtful contribution to the bill of their own revolution. This is why -- to conclude with a phrase that is sacred to the Latin American revolutionaires -- the critical attitude toward the USSR must at the same time be an attitude of self-criticism, so that it may not only be morally valid but so that it may also be politically effective." Checoeslovaquia -- El Socialismo Como Problema (Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem) by Teodoro Petkoff.

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Sweden.

A spokesman of the youth organization of the Swedish Communist Party at the 22nd Swedish Party Congress in September 1969 said the regime of the Soviet Union is "tyranny to which the working class is subjected by a bureaucratic bourgeoisie of fascist character."

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Spain.

"As far as this phony Mundo Obrero is concerned -- which they (the pro-Soviet Lister faction) came out with after their bankruptcy in the Central Committee -- the best one could say is that it contains slander

directed against the party which, we believe, not even Franco propaganda ever outdid.... All of this is tempered by an obsession, by a fury which we can only refer to as smacking of "trial".... From this prose, there emerges an unmistakable smell: the smell of Beria. Behind all of this rises his sinister shadow. This is new proof of how certain communists -- misguided by the most serious ideological and political distortions, moved by personal interests and power ambitions -- can degenerate to the point where they become the very antithesis of our doctrine, our revolutionary role in history, and our reason for existence." Mundo Obrero, Communist Party newspaper, Madrid 30 September 1970."

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Czechoslovakia.

"The fact is that the CPSU leadership today must itself play the role which the Cominform used to play and therefore relies on the discipline of the other parties. This is why it is angry not only with the Czechoslovak communists and this is why it wants to decimate their party to a small but obedient sect; it is just as hostile toward the Communist Party of Italy which, on the basis of its mass character, its bonds with the people, its participation in the parliamentary struggle, its strong political cadre and its independent ideas of socialist upheaval, constitutes a potential heretic. This is why the CPSU leadership without hesitation and consideration of the tragic consequences, practically allowed the Communist Party of Austria to fall apart and this is why it promoted the smashing of the Communist Party of Greece against which it struck a blow at the very moment when its leading representatives were jailed and tortured by the dictatorial regime of the colonels. With equal distrust it looks toward the Left in the West and the national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to the extent that these movements do not want to subordinate themselves to Moscow and develop their own, local fighting and development forms." An excerpt from Jiri Pelikan's introduction to Der Piller Bericht: Das unterdruckte Dossier, Europa Verlag, Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich 1970.

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Albania.

"But attempts to arouse suspicion about the correct stand of our party in Bucharest were not confined to Moscow alone, they were made with even more fervor in Tirana by the employees of the Soviet embassy with the Soviet ambassador to Tirana himself in the lead.... They began feverishly and intensively to attack the Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Workers' Party to split the party, to create panic and confusion in its ranks, to alienate the leadership from the party, and the Soviet ambassador to Tirana went so far as to attempt to incite the generals of our army to raise the peoples' army against the leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party and the Albanian state...." Enver Hoxha in a previously unpublished speech first given in November 1960 to a meeting of 81 Communist parties in Moscow and published in June 1970 in the third volume of a history of the Albanian Workers' Party.

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Australia.

"(The Russians) made scarcely any secret of the fact that they claimed the right to intervene in our affairs and to support an opposition devoted to them. This can only lead to a further division and weakening of the already bitterly divided and enfeebled world Communist movement and is of ill omen for all those (if there still are such people left) gullible enough to believe that the CPSU's relations with them are based on Socialist premises and not on what the Soviet Union considers to be her self-interest." Eric Aarons, Vice-President of the CPA, in an article for the dissident Austrian Communist monthly, Wiener Tagebuch, October 1970.

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Austria.

"Characteristic of our superficiality was the fact that in exposing the deformations of the Stalin era we left out of consideration completely the decisive fact that in our time the great idea of producer democracy was completely forgotten and lost sight of. The idea of Soviets, which seemed so appealing at the time, the simple idea that people have a claim on the function of control in the place (of work), where they after all spend the largest part of their conscious life, where they spend most of their energies -- this idea has been completely lost so that all that is left of the idea of Soviets is the name itself." Franz Marek, Politburo member, Wiener Tagebuch, Vienna, July-August, 1969.

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Japan.

"If the Government organizations confuse the reasonable dissatisfaction of the people with provocations by anti-revolutionary elements and delinquent elements and take suppressive measures hastily, then it will come to give a golden opportunity to the plot of anti-socialist and anti-revolutionary elements and activities of disturbance by the imperialist camp." Akahata, JCP newspaper, 24 December 1970.

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Yugoslavia.

"From the time of Engels to the present day every impartial investigation, even on a quasi-scientific basis, has been proscribed; everything is subordinated to the current practical needs of the party, or, rather, of the party faction in power. In view of this state of affairs, it is not difficult for people of limited knowledge (like Todor Zhivkov, in Bulgaria, and Wladyslaw Gomulka, in Poland) to become watchdogs of theoretical purity. This inevitably leads to the vulgarization of the original Marxism, and to the disappointment and defection of the best brains in the movement. The dogma has become part of the power structure, with the leader, by right, its

high priest, like a caliph or sultan in Islam." Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1969.

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Italy.

"The fact is that there is a political reason behind all this, a political reason which has nothing to do with law and with Marxism. The Leningrad trial definitely confronts us with two basic problems which, on the one hand, involve the renewed repudiation of socialist law and, on the other hand, the failure to include in this law some essential factors of civilization which have definitively been added to the heritage of mankind." Umberto Terracini, Italian CP leader, in an article in L'Espresso, Rome, 17 January 1971.

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Italy.

"But first of all I should raise another issue: does or does not the Leningrad trial conform to socialist legality, or, more properly, to Soviet legality, which is not in and of itself the all in all of socialist legality. And I answer that, unfortunately, it was a new, scandalous, and deplorable example of the special Soviet sub-species of violation of socialist legality which has so often in the past been denounced and condemned. It has been pointed out that every nation has its own legality, and that within the limits in which it achieves that, every state is a state of law. This law, furthermore, is substantiated and expressed in the constitution which every state has adopted for its own governance. Significant by this standard is the fact that, in modern times, whenever a state is born it either makes or remakes its own constitution. The Soviet Union has its constitution, which, although it is not complete and fully satisfactory from the point of view of the universal exigencies of civil cohabitation, does define the firm and inflexible principles of the system in which it operates. But it was precisely some of its most basic rules that were violated in the Leningrad trial...." Article by Umberto Terracini, Vie Nuove, Rome, 20 January 1971.

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Italy.

"More correct, it seems, would be to attempt to go to the root of these conflicts, which sometimes -- as in Poland -- takes on the character of social conflicts or, as in the Soviet Union, the character of strident contradiction between the political and constitutional affirmation of the existence in the Soviet Union of a state of law and a bureaucratic or judiciary practice that has the stamp of authoritarianism.

"It is this practice, for example, that makes certain verdicts, like that of Leningrad, incomprehensible for us.

"The failure to comprehend comes into being not only because of the aberrant nature of a punishment like capital punishment, a pure residue of the already negated past in the Soviet Union, but because of a failure to coincide between the system of guarantees for the individual and citizen -- clearly provided for by the Soviet Constitution and also by the codes

of law -- and the insufficient Soviet mass democratic control over the vitality of these guarantees that are not the formal but the substantial key foundations of a method of socialist democracy," Leningrad Like Burgos: Democracy in Socialist Power, Marizio Ferrara, Rinascita, 10 January 1971.

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France.

"In 1948, Yugoslavia having been the first socialist nation to confront authoritarian dogmatism and seek its own approach to the construction of socialism, its leaders were denounced as counterrevolutionary agents, spies, murderers, and fascists. These accusations were again leveled 20 years later, in the name of the same postulates and even more brutally, when on 21 August 1968 Soviet tanks crushed the attempts by Czech communists to develop a 'model' of socialism corresponding to the requirements of a highly developed society. Brezhnev thus went beyond the limits of Stalinism; at least Stalin did not invade Yugoslavia!" Le Grand Tournant de Socialisme (The Great Turning Point of Socialism) by Roger Garaudy, Paris, 1969.

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France.

"How is one to describe the regime of a country where the demands of the workers can find expression only through uprisings; where those uprisings are suppressed, at the cost of dozens of dead and hundreds of wounded, by a police and militia allegedly representing the people; where journalists are willy-nilly reduced to reproducing official communiques, and their foreign colleagues are expelled to prevent them from testifying; where, one fine morning or evening workers learn from the radio that their wages have been frozen, the population learns that prices have raised by 10 to 20 per cent, and the nation learns that the head of state has been ousted by the real ruling group -- without the citizens having been at any time consulted, or even informed in advance?" Gilbert Souchal in Politique Hebdo, new-left weekly, "quel Socialisme?", 31 December 1970.

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France.

"How can the French people, and even the militants, believe that our party wants to set up a true socialism and a true democracy when, during the same week and after discussions by the party leaders with Soviet and Polish leaders, the final communiques approve, without reserve, of the Polish party, in spite of the latter's savagely anti-Semitic policy that serves as an excuse for its break with the masses; and approve, without reserve, of the Soviet party to which, in addition to internal oppression, is added the sinister 'normalization' in Czechoslovakia. And this at the same time Goldstuecker's letter published in Les Lettres Francaises showed us how the communist movement and socialism in Czechoslovakia, under the

heel of the occupier, becomes synonymous with falsification, injustice, and obscurantism..." Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 12-18 October 1970, "A Communist Speaks to the Communists", Roger Garaudy.

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France.

"The socialist movement in the world is now in a state of crisis. This is manifested not only in the true split dividing our Soviet and Chinese comrades, but was also manifested at the Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow: The agreement at the Conference (which in any case was partial) became realizable only because of the elimination of the basic problems -- by the elimination of the Chinese problem, the Czechoslovak problem, by the elimination of the central problem of different roads by which each country, in accordance with its own social structures and national traditions, may travel toward socialism. As I see it, this crisis does not arise out of variety, which, on the contrary, would be a sign of the health and richness of the movement, but it arises out of the refusal to recognize variety in the models of socialism. This situation is not new, you Yugoslavs are familiar with something of this, since in 1948 the first excommunication in the movement took place, with all the adverse consequences of the failure to understand the desires of a people to move toward socialism along its own roads, consequences which were adverse not only because of the isolation and boycott of Yugoslavia, but adverse for the movement as a whole...." Komunist, Belgrad, 4 September 1969, interview of Roger Garaupy by Vukoje Bulatovic.

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France.

"If we judge by the document adopted at the (June 1969) Conference in Moscow, we would apparently have to say that socialist thought is in a state of stagnation.... If, then, we are thinking of the analysis of the situation contained in the Moscow document, which was so superficial, we might get the impression of a sclerosis of socialist thought...." Komunist, Belgrade, 4 September 1969, Interview of Roger Garaudy by Vukoje Bulatovic.

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France.

"The Stalinist thesis, based on purely economic criteria, that socialism has been achieved and that they were beginning to build Communism, was taken up again at the XXIIIrd Congress. But, without restricting oneself to a purely mechanistic definition of socialism, strictly economic; the suppression of private ownership of the means of production, it is evident that, at the level of the superstructures (of the state, of socialist democracy, or of cultural creativity, for example) there still does not exist more than embryonic socialism.

"This theoretical deformation, this dogmatism and this schematism devoid of reality, make up the foundations for deformations in practice

and, especially, of bureaucracy, a characteristic of the Soviet state which still falls under Lenin's condemnation: it is a state for the workers, but not by the workers...." Pour un Modele francais du Socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism) by Roger Garaudy, Gallimard, 1968.

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France.

"But by far the gravest manifestation of theoretical and political degeneration on the part of the leadership of the CPSU was the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was not an 'error" or a 'madness,' but the necessary consequence of a systematic conception: from the moment when the Soviet leaders were dogmatically imprisoned in the Stalinist schema identifying socialism with the sole model historically realized in the Soviet Union, they were led to consider as a menace to socialism any initiative to adapt the forms of building socialism to the conditions, for example, in a country already highly industrialized before the revolution. This is how they judged the attempt by the Czechoslovak Communist Party and its chief, Dubcek, to create a socialist democracy." Pour un Modele francais du Socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism) by Roger Garaudy, Gallimard, 1968.

"The recognition of .... needed diversity alone can, in each country, liberate the movement from a heavy burden: to pose the problem of a single form of socialism, for example, for France, means first of all making it clear that what is required is not a choice between capitalism and socialism based on the Soviet model, for some, and on the Chinese model, for others. To do this it is not enough to stress that socialism in France can be established along other 'paths' and may take other 'forms,' because it is a matter a basically different model. This requires that we study the Soviet model in an objective and not an apologetic fashion, that is analyze, as in the example Varga has set for us, the earlier social structure which led to the development of such a form. This requires that we not keep silent concerning the efforts to export this model and to impose it upon countries whose social structure is drastically different and in which the application to this foreign model leads to catastrophe and to crime as was the case in Czechoslovakia...." Preface by Roger Garaudy to Le Testament De Varga (The Testament of Varga), Paris, editions Bernard Grassey, French, 1970.

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France.

"Without going back into the problem of the overall concept and realization of a 'French form of Socialism' here (see Roger Garaudy, Toward a French Version of Socialism, Gallimard, 1968), we can accept, from the analysis made by Varga of the bureaucratization and the repressive form assumed by the Russian model, that in France and in our time none of the objective historic conditions which led the USSR to these distortions and these bureaucratic and repressive perversions exist.

"The debate on the prospects for socialism in France, and also the [illegible] and the common struggle to implement it,

can also be liberated from the heavy burden and the confusions engendered by deadly silence concerning the threat to and crime against socialism represented by export of an unsuitable model, most recently to Czechoslovakia, with the fears which this may arouse concerning the future..." Preface by Roger Garaudy to Le Testament de Varga (The Testament of Varga), Paris, Editions Bernard Grassey, French, 1970.

* * *

In addition to the sources of dissident literature indicated by the quotations above a number of books have been written by dissident communists which are generally available sources of anti-Soviet material. They are:

a) Pour un Modele Francais du Socialisme, by Roger Garaudy, Paris, Grasset, Gallimard, 1968. This is a revised edition of the author's Peut-on Etre Communist Aujourd'hui?, complete with an analysis of the French student movement and of the May events in Paris, as well as Czechoslovakia's struggle for liberalization. He concludes that neither the Soviet Union, China nor Czechoslovakia could serve as a pattern for France's future. A new socialist model should be identified.

b) Toute la Verite: Mai 1970 Fevrier 1970, Roger Garaudy, Paris, Grasset, 1970. The book traces the history of what is called the "Garaudy affair" in the French Communist Party. The author analyzes the causes and consequences of the dispute which went on from May 1968 through February 1970 between himself and his party. It contains a sharp attack on Soviet policies and on the servility of the French CP.

c) Toward a Marxist Humanism. Essays on the Left Today, Leszek Kolakowski, New York, Grove, 1968. This collection of essays confirms the originality and talent of the Polish philosopher Kolakowski and the conservatism of the Polish communist leaders who expelled him from the party and dismissed him from Warsaw University. The main topics investigated by these essays are the secular and religious interest in achieving maximum good, Karl Marx and the classical definition of Truth, change in Marxism, and the manner in which individuals are responsible for their acts despite the determinism of history.

d) Revolutionary Marxist Students in Poland Speak Out (1964-1968, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelevski, New York, Merit, 1968. Published under the auspices of the 4th International, the booklet reproduces the famous "open letter" sent to the Polish party authorities of the University of Warsaw by two dissident intellectuals. It is a critical examination of various aspects of the Polish social and political system and its repressive organs. (The authors are now in prison.)

e) Chechoeslovaquia - El Socialismo como Problema, Teodoro Petkoff, Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1970. Teodoro Petkoff is an economist, a former member of the Venezuelan Congress and

a member of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party (and of its Politbureau until April 1968.) Once a guerrilla fighter, Petkoff is now the leader of the left-wing faction of the Venezuelan CP. He renounces the armed struggle and battles for the recognition of a 'diversity of socialist types and roads'. The book is an intelligent reappraisal of the course of events in Czechoslovakia, beginning with the application of the Soviet economic model in 1948 and its disastrous effect on the national economy. Continuing with an analysis of the Novotny era and the period of reform, he ends with a condemnation of the Russian invasion. (Some of this material has been reproduced above.)

March 1971

The Troubled Soviet Empire

The Soviet Union wants to regard Communist East Europe as a "...socialist Commonwealth...stable as a voluntary union of equal independents." Today, in fact, they see eight unhappy and (except for Bulgaria) unstable and unreliable Communist "allies." A once-tight chain of command from the CPSU to each country leader, bolstered by ideological, personal and financial support, is now a frazzled rope. The Soviet Union's failures in industry and agriculture, its bureaucratized Party and its increasing repression have acted as a centrifugal force from the Baltic to the Balkans and as countries have pulled away, the CPSU has adopted severe measures to hold them. Ultimately, armed force was required and so the Brezhnev Doctrine was formulated and originally used to kill "socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Brezhnev Doctrine does not solve all of Moscow's problems in Eastern Europe, however. While the implicit threat of Soviet military take-over dangles over Party leadership in Eastern Europe, it is not enough to keep the common man in line. The worker-consumer who has suffered most from 20 years of Communist inadequacies is not easily deterred from striking the system despite the prospect that he will get a new set of rascals in place of the old -- witness the Polish riots of December 1970.

With increasingly nationalist spirit, each of the Eastern European countries resists CPSU domination according to its own history and traditions, its cultural and industrial levels, its leadership and distance from Moscow. If the strain becomes intolerable in any country or if a precarious balance is disturbed by the death of an aging strong man (Ulbricht, Tito or Hoxha) the lid can blow again as it did in 1953 in East Germany, in 1956 in Poland and Hungary, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia and last December in Poland. So the 24th Congress must make a public attempt to try to damp down any sparks of liberalism or discontent and restore the moribund Communist unity. But privately the CPSU can tick off troubles in nearly every country.

There are dangerous precedents in a still simmering Poland. How can the CPSU shield the proletariat elsewhere from the dangerous news that frustrated Polish workers

toppled Gomulka without punishment? And won promises of far-reaching reforms from his successor, Gierek? How can the Soviet Union suppress the startling news that a Communist Party has admitted not only fallibility but actual guilt for crimes against its own workers? While the CPSU struggles to prevent the Polish infection from spreading, Gierek will try to solve a problem which plagues most Communist regimes: how to coerce workers into higher production without decentralizing economic and political power and thus losing control of the whole apparatus.

In Czechoslovakia the defeated citizens are now sinking into an apathy which defeats all economic planning two and one-half years after they helped create a Communist society which was both popular and viable. Undoubtedly the CPSU still sees a connection between the liberal awakening of the 1968 Czech experiment and the current dissent of its own intellectuals. For this reason as well as for its calculated effect on the critical Western European CPs, the 24th Congress will probably make much of the recent abject Czechoslovak Communist Party declaration that the Soviet-led invasion of 1968 came in response to "thousands" of Czech invitations.

Fourteen years after Hungary became the first victim of what was later named the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, Hungary is pursuing a cautious policy of economic reform and the minimum political reform necessary to make it function. Although the CPSU may see Janos Kadar's methods as a rejection of their own rigidly centralized model for economic development, Hungary is not rocking the Communist boat today. The CPSU may speculate, however, on the future effect of even a slight economic upsurge, and a minor political reform, on the people who once fought most bitterly of all against Soviet domination.

The CPSU can take little comfort from a Rumania which still threads a delicate course between outright independence of Moscow in foreign affairs and strict observance of Soviet norms for Party control in domestic matters. Despite the implicit threat of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Rumania refuses to participate fully in Warsaw Pact and Comecon enterprises and makes it clear that her road to economic improvement runs toward western Europe.

The most nationalistic and independent Communist of them all, Tito has kept Yugoslavia out of the Soviet orbit since 1948. Preserving the form but not the substance of fraternal relations with the CPSU, he criticizes the Soviet model at every turn, lines up insurance in the form of

Western aid, trade and cultural contacts and has built a reputation in the third world as a "neutral" leader; Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union unquestionably fear each other. The spectre of a non-Communist or anti-Soviet regime in Yugoslavia following Tito's demise -- however unlikely it now appears -- frightens the CPSU. But since the Brezhnev Doctrine was devised for precisely such a contingency, the CPSU can simply watch and wait.

Tiny Albania's shrill defiance of Moscow and her "alliance" with Maoist China are mere pinpricks. But for a CPSU eyeing the Mediterranean, a Communist enemy at the entry to the Adriatic, and one who is now almost friendly with neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia, is real cause for uneasiness.

Even East Germany, which has caused little serious trouble since the June 1953 riots, is not entirely malleable today. Ulbricht's intransigence on rapprochement with West Germany is a stumbling block in current Soviet-West German negotiations.

Only docile Bulgaria, the garden spot of East Europe and traditional friend of Russia is a dependable satrapy.

Never a full-fledged Satellite in the Soviet empire, Communist China ceased being an ally in the early sixties and now represents an active threat to Soviet territorial integrity and ideological monopoly.

The 24th CPSU Congress will devote a portion of its message to optimistic praise of the solidarity of the fraternal Communist camp, but the whole world will the hollowness of the hymn of praise and recognize that what solidarity remains in the Soviet empire is due to the Soviet military power which functions as an adjunct or a substitue for direct or indirect financial support.

CURRENT HISTORY
October 1970

"The Soviet interest in East Europe continues to reflect the dual character of the Soviet Union as a great power with tendencies to regional hegemony and as the guardian of an ideological movement with universalist purposes."

Soviet Aims in East Europe

By Vernon V. Aspaturian
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The Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, signaled the Soviet Union's intention to reestablish its grip on a crumbling East European empire, and thus ushered in a new transitional phase in Soviet-East European relations. This phase has already shown Stalinesque characteristics, but it should not be confused with the earlier Stalinist period. During the era of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union relied not only on Soviet military occupation or envelopment, but on a common ideological orthodoxy (from which there was no deviation), a reliable and servile local Communist party leadership, the psychological momentum of a dynamic and accelerating upsurge in Soviet power and prestige and, most crucially, on Stalin's charisma.

Today, the conspicuous role of the Soviet military presence as the chief vehicle of Soviet control in East Europe is revealed by the often forgotten fact that no less than four of the eight East European Communist states—Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland—are under some form of military occupation. Yugoslavia and Albania are lost to the Soviet bloc, while Rumania persists in limiting her military responsibilities and obligations to Moscow as the Soviet leaders desperately search for some pretext to station Soviet troops on Rumanian soil. Of the six remaining members of the Soviet bloc, the U.S.S.R. can safely rely only on Bulgaria to follow the Soviet lead without the presence or threat of Soviet troops.

Clearly, the Soviet leadership failed to transform Stalin's rigid neocolonial system into a socialist commonwealth of states. The common characteristic of the Communist countries, namely the "socialist system," was insufficient to generate a common interest. When a number of East European states began to chart their separate roads—not necessarily in the direction of "communism"—the incompatibility rather than the compatibility of interest within the bloc became clear. The basic divergencies of interest materialized not only in the domestic realm—threatening to undermine the common features of the socio-political order—but in foreign policy as well, posing a threat not only to the "socialist order" but also to Soviet security.

The Russian interest in East Europe antedates the establishment of the Soviet state; in this region both history and geography have impelled the Soviet Union to absorb the natural interests of Czarist Russia. Yet the precise character and configuration of the Soviet relationship with East Europe have been determined largely by the history of the relationship between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement, of which the prewar East European Communist parties were an integral part.

The Soviet interest in East Europe continues to reflect the dual character of the Soviet Union as a great power with tendencies toward regional hegemony and as the

guardian of an ideological movement with universalist purposes. And while this dichotomy persists, its character has undergone a subtle transformation. The establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in East Europe satisfied the historic and the strategic necessity of a security zone, and also provided a convenient springboard for the further extension of the Communist system. During the past decade, the balance between these purposes of the Soviet presence in East Europe has been drastically altered, as the Soviet role and position in the world Communist movement have been eroded in response to challenges from within and risks and obstacles from without. As a consequence, the Soviet leaders have been forced to reexamine the basic premises of their presence in East Europe and to face more realistically the uneven consequences of the further deterioration of their control.

During the first decade following World War II, Soviet leaders managed to coordinate their purposes in East Europe with minimum conflict. Soviet ideological purposes were at first dominant, but as the needs of security began to conflict with the demands of ideology, Soviet actions and decisions favored Soviet security and national interest over ideology and world communism. The Soviet Union was faced with just such a dilemma during the Czech crisis of 1968, and resolved it by giving higher priority to its interests as a regional hegemonical power than to its position as guardian of an ideological movement. Although the Soviet leaders justified their action largely in ideological terms, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia clearly reflected the dominance of the interests of the Soviet Union as a regional and global power.

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

Before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, all Soviet interference in the internal affiairs of East European countries had been defined in terms of intraparty relationships. When intervention was necessary, the Soviet party dictated or directed changes in the leadership structure and ideological orientation of the particular satellite's Communist party which, in turn, altered the structure and composition of the government to introduce new policies and directions. Theoretically, there was no Soviet state interference in the domestic affairs of another state. While Soviet intervention in East European states was frequently blatant and ruthless, particularly from 1947 to 1953, the U.S.S.R. was nevertheless scrupulous in disclaiming any right to intervention and perennially reaffirmed its devotion to the norms of nonintervention and noninterference, and to the concept of the absolute sovereignty of states under international law. The Soviet leaders were thus careful to avoid any precedent that might justify intervention on the part of other powers.

The Brezhnev Doctrine, which was enunciated by Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev soon after the Czech occupation, thus must be viewed not only in its ideological dimension as a retroactive justification for the Czech occupation, but also in its substantive dimension as a warning that the U.S.S.R. was determined to preserve its dominance in East Europe even if it had to rely on military force alone. Although conceptualized as a collective or multilateral action, this doctrine enables the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in the affairs of any Communist state (Yugoslavia excepted) if, in its judgment, the internal socialist order of any Communist state is threatened with subversion from within or without. Theoretically, any Communist state enjoys the same right, but at this time only the Soviet Union possesses the power to exercise it. In some respects, the Brezhnev Doctrine resembles very closely the Monroe and Wilson doctrines, which have been multilateralized and institutionalized in the Organization of American States. In both instances, a collective or multilateral right to intervene in the affairs of member states is largely a juridical fig leaf concealing the unilateral right of a regional great power to intervene.

For the first time in its history, the Soviet Union has fashioned a theory that justifies in advance the right of the Soviet Union, as a state and not by means of the party, to in-

tervene in the affairs of another Communist state. The doctrine has been regarded as a doctrine of "limited sovereignty." On the grounds that the subversion or displacement of the socialist system in one country endangers its existence in others, each individual Communist state is precluded from the right to replace its socialist system with another.[1]

THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY

The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, signed in Prague on May 6, 1970, was the first international document formally incorporating the novel conceptions of the Brezhnev Doctrine.[2] The fusion of party and state relations and state borders and ideological frontiers was clarified by this treaty, which was signed not only by the formal representatives of the state (which is the normal pattern) but also by representatives of the two parties. Thus, an international legal document bears the signatures not only of the two heads of government (Premiers Aleksei Kosygin and Lubomir Strougal), but the names of the two party leaders (Leonid Brezhnev and Gustav Husak) as well. The dual character of the treaty as a legal and ideological document was openly conceded by Husak, who said that it was based on the recognition that

> Czechoslovakia's western borders are also the borders of the socialist camp, and that our state can develop only in close alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union and other friendly socialist states.[3]

According to the Preamble to the Treaty, "The support, consolidation and protection of socialist gains . . . are a common internationalist duty of socialist countries," while Article 5 further incorporates the basic idea of the Brezhnev Doctrine that the defense of socialism is a multilateral obligation:

> The High Contracting Parties, expressing unswerving resolve to advance along the road of building socialism and communism, shall take the necessary measures to defend the socialist gains of the peoples, the security and independence of both countries, strive for the development of all around relations between the states of the socialist community and shall act in the spirit of consolidating their unity, friendship and brotherhood.

The radical character of the new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is that the two signatory states, in patent violation of a rule of international law that treaties create neither rights nor duties for non-signatories, undertake to engage in the joint defense not only of their own countries, but of the "socialist community as a whole."

The new treaty is deliberately ambiguous in certain respects, particularly with regard to identification of the targets against which the treaty is directed. Czechoslovakia's possible attackers were all adequately covered by existing bilateral and multilateral alliances, but when we survey the possible threats to the Soviet Union, it becomes obvious that the only gap in the system of bilateral alliances is China. Aside from an ambiguous Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid signed with Mongolia in January, 1966, the Soviet Union was not legally assured of a single ally in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict.[4] The Warsaw Pact Treaty specifically restricts the obligations of the alliance members to provide assistance only "in the event of armed attack *in Europe* on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states."[5] Thus, the Warsaw Alliance cannot be activated in the event of a Sino-Soviet war. Similarly, the relatively recent treaties with East Germany in 1964 and Poland in 1965 are closely tied to the

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[1] Yugoslavia, Rumania and China have condemned the doctrine in varying degrees as being in violation not only of international law, but of proper norms of behavior among socialist states. While the Chinese leaders have condemned the doctrine, they have been insisting since about 1957 that they have a right under the rules of "proletarian internationalism" to call attention to Soviet doctrinal errors and even to rectify matters if necessary in the interests of world socialism. Conceivably, in the future, a powerful China might assemble a motley crew of Communist states and employ the Brezhnev Doctrine against its authors.

[2] *Cf. Pravda,* May 7, 1970, for the full text. All quoted provisions from the treaty are from this source.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Cf. Pravda,* January 16, 1966, for the full text of this treaty.

[5] Emphasis supplied. The full text of the Warsaw Pact can be found in *New Times* (Moscow), May 21, 1955.

Warsaw Treaty, and are specifically directed at Germany.[6] And the Soviet treaty with North Korea is directed against Japan or states allied with Japan.[7] And while the treaty with Mongolia is no longer specifically directed against Japan (Japan is not even mentioned in the treaty), its military provisions are so vague as to make it difficult to define a *casus foederis*.

The provisions of the Soviet treaties with East Germany and Mongolia reveal them to be the most amenable to unilateral Soviet interpretation and manipulation, since both are explicitly based on the principles of "socialist internationalism," the doctrine which Moscow has traditionally invoked to justify intervention. Significantly and revealingly, the Soviet-Polish treaty, signed in 1965 (during the period between the 1964 East German treaty and the 1966 Mongolian treaty) does not mention "socialist internationalism."

The new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty reflects the blatantly ideological and hegemonic character of the alliance, as do the treaties with East Germany and Mongolia. It also articulates the Soviet Union's role as a global power in contradistinction to its posture as a purely regional power which has been reflected in all other existing treaties. While the substance of the treaty is heavily saturated with ideological rhetoric,[8] the military provisions and the *casus foederis* are lucid and uncluttered with ambiguities, and are limited neither by geography nor ideology. Article 10, which contains both the activating clause and the definition of potential enemies, reads as follows:

> If one of the High Contracting Parties is subjected to armed attack by some state or a group of states, the other Contracting Side, viewing this as an attack against itself, shall immediately afford it every assistance, including military assistance, and shall support it by all means at its disposal.

The new treaty clearly obligates Czechoslovakia to join in any war in which the Soviet Union may become involved in its global concerns. In fact, unlike the Soviet treaties with East Germany and Poland, this treaty does not specifically mention Germany or German aggression. Furthermore, unlike the treaties with the other two members of the Northern Tier, the treaty with Czechoslovakia does not specifically guarantee Czechoslovakia's existing borders. Thus, Article 6 simply declares the Munich Pact to have been "invalid from its outset," whereas Article 4 of the treaty with the German Democratic Republic specifically states that "The inviolability of the national frontiers of the German Democratic Republic is one of the basic factors of European security," and Article 5 of the treaty with Poland stipulates that the "inviolability of the national frontiers of the People's Republic of Poland along the Oder and Neisse is one of the most important factors of European security." Instead, Article 9 of the Czechoslovak treaty declares that the postwar frontiers of all Europe are immutable:

> The High Contracting Parties declare that one of the main preconditions for ensuring European security is the immutability of the state borders that were formed in Europe after the second World War. They express their firm resolve, jointly with the other member states of the . . . Warsaw Treaty . . . to ensure the inviolability of the borders of the member-states of this treaty and to take all necessary steps to prevent aggression on the part of any forces of militarism and revanchism and to rebuff the aggressor.

Article 9 attempts to impose the same obligations on the other members of the Warsaw Pact by linking the defense of the Warsaw Pact with the defense of the "socialist commonwealth," although the Warsaw Pact limits the *casus foederis* specifically to an "armed attack in Europe."

It should be emphasized that while all members of the Warsaw Pact are also members of the "socialist commonwealth," it is true that some members of the "socialist

[6] For the treaty with the German Democratic Republic, *cf. Pravda*, June 13, 1964; for the Polish treaty, *cf. Pravda*, April 9, 1965.

[7] *Cf. Pravda*, July 7, 1961.

[8] "The whole content of the treaty is permeated with the principle of socialist internationalism," to use the precise wording of O. Khlestov, "New Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July, 1970, pp. 12, 13.

commonwealth" are not members of the Warsaw Alliance. The Warsaw Alliance, furthermore, according to Article 9, "is open to the accession of other states irrespective of their social and political systems," and is thus not technically an ideological alliance, since it is theoretically open to capitalist and other nonsocialist states. By linking the defense of the Warsaw Pact members with the defense of the "socialist commonwealth," the Soviet Union is attempting to ideologize the Warsaw Alliance in defiance of some of its members, most notably, Rumania.

The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, even more emphatically than the treaties with East Germany and Mongolia, legally transforms Czechoslovakia into an ideological and military protectorate of the Soviet Union. It is clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine, far from preserving a crumbling commonwealth, is designed to convert the commonwealth into a constellation of protectorates of the Soviet Union. The "socialist commonwealth" is to be protected not only from the United States, West Germany and Japan, but also from China, although China is ostensibly a member of the "commonwealth."

THREE DANGERS

The Soviet leaders perceive three major external sources of possible intrusion in their East European sphere: the United States, China, and West Germany. For more than a decade, they have been denouncing an alleged Bonn-Washington axis within NATO, and in more recent years they have publicly conjured up nightmares of a Sino-American combine in the East constituting one side of a giant nutcracker working in concert with a German-American axis in the West. Since the United States plays a prominent role in both hallucinations, because of its overarching global position, it might not take too much uncontrolled imagination to conjure up the image of an artful United States skilfully orchestrating a squeeze play, employing Bonn as its instrument in the West and Peking as its unwitting foil in the East. The force of this nightmare, however, has been substantially mitigated because of the domestic disturbances and eroding social consensus within the United States and the quagmire of war in Vietnam, both of which have served to blunt United States will and purpose to function as a militant global power.

It has been the grand strategy of Khrushchev's successors to deal with each of their main rivals within the context of an overall design embracing policies on three separate levels, each corresponding to one of the three threats.[9] With the United States, the Soviet leaders operate at the global level, in terms of strategic balances, nuclear stockpiles, missile development and overall rivalry in all parts of the globe. The arena within which the Soviet Union contests China is somewhat smaller and is restricted largely to the world Communist movement and the Third World. East Europe is relevant to the Sino-Soviet confrontation only because it is part of the ideological arena.

Within this context, West Germany operates in the smallest arena of all, at the regional level, but Bonn's choice of battlefields is precisely Moscow's East European garden. Consequently, East Europe has become the primary focus of West Germany's challenge. But since the Soviet sphere of influence in East Europe is the irreducible *desiderata* underpinning the Soviet Union's existence as a hegemonic power, West Germany's *Ostpolitik* threatens the foundations of the Soviet role as a global power and an ideological center.

Bonn's *Ostpolitik,* which was cautiously initiated in vague outline by West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's government in 1966, soon effloresced into a systematic, ambitious and positive policy. Instead of the old negative policies of the Konrad Adenauer era,[10] the *Ostpolitik* paralleled the Lyndon Johnson administration's policies of "bridge-

[9] *Cf.* V. V. Aspaturian, "Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," in A. Dallin and T. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), and "Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads," *International Organization,* Summer, 1969, pp. 589–620.

[10] Designed largely to supplement the policies of "rollback" and "liberation" enunciated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles.

building." Instead of a head-on challenge to Soviet hegemony in East Europe, the new policies sought to exploit apparent Soviet weakness.

As the countries of East Europe displayed independence of Soviet control (and some demonstrated a positive response to the largely rhetorical flourishes of French President Charles de Gaulle's Eastern policy), the *Ostpolitik* emerged to capitalize on a concatenation of circumstances and conditions that seemed to augur success for a renewed German assertion of interest in East Europe. These conditions included the power and prestige of the United States, Bonn's chief ally; the growing economic power of West Germany; the muted defiance to Soviet control of East Europe; the looming threat on Moscow's eastern flank of China's growing nuclear power; the humiliation of Israel's victory over Moscow's Arab client states in the war of 1967; the apparent disintegration of the world Communist movement; and the overall appearance of malaise and economic failure in the Soviet Union, which projected an image of weakness.

From the vantage-point of Moscow, the *Ostpolitik* loomed as a new version of the traditional German *Drang nach Osten,* and in a certain sense it was precisely that. West Germany, the "economic giant and political dwarf," fashioned the *Ostpolitik* as her first exercise in converting economic power into political and diplomatic muscle.

The ultimate aim of the *Ostpolitik* was to create conditions in East Europe conducive to the reunification of Germany into a single state without resorting to violence or threatening the security and borders of the East European countries. Given West Germany's ambiguous attitude toward the territorial annexations by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, such an aim was inherently contradictory, except that Bonn envisaged an agreement whereby unification between East and West Germany could be purchased in exchange for a firm guarantee of the territorial status quo in the area. To this end, Bonn offered not only economic inducements, which were powerful indeed, but also a possible political and diplomatic counterpoise to Soviet power that might create conditions for greater freedom and autonomy.

Thus West Germany sought to establish direct political and economic contacts with the East European countries. At the same time, by informing and reassuring Moscow at each step, she thought that the Soviets would be dissuaded from using force to block German penetration. In the German view, in time, German penetration would gradually undermine and erode Soviet influence, as the East European countries gradually reoriented their economies to the more complementary West German economy while isolating East Germany. Since the East European states would cooperate in West Germany's expanding activity, the Soviet Union could block the West German challenge only by employing overt military force. But it was thought that the Soviets would be unwilling or incapable of resorting to force in the face of peaceful, nonviolent challenge. The basic miscalculation, as Brezhnev himself perceptively noted, was that the Soviet Union would stand by idly while its East European dominoes fell in a German game of solitaire.

As a consequence of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the old *Ostpolitik* is dead, as are the old United States policies of "bridge-building." In their place, as a result of the victory of the Social Democrats in the elections of 1969, a new controversial *Ostpolitik,* fashioned by Chancellor Willy Brandt, has emerged which, while acceptable to Moscow, is largely unacceptable to the Christian Democrats. The new *Ostpolitik* does not parallel any new United States policy in the area, aside from the tacit acceptance by the United States of Soviet hegemony there. Consequently, although the new *Ostpolitik* has been cautiously encouraged by the United States and the West, West Germany is both vulnerable and isolated as she dickers with the Soviet Union over the kind of role that she can play in East Europe.

Although the occupation of Czechoslovakia effectively nullified the initial successes of the old *Ostpolitik* and the Brezhnev Doctrine ensured that it could not be resumed in its existing form, the Soviet Union remained aware that the West German state, with its growing economy and prosperity, would continue to be an attraction to East Europe. Consequently, instead of erecting a Chinese wall between West Germany and East Europe, Soviet leaders searched for a formula that would allow East Europe to exploit West Germany's economic wealth without allowing West German economic contacts to become political and diplomatic footholds. This policy required consummate sophistication and required West German cooperation, since it involved nothing less than a Soviet influence in the refashioning of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*. Willy Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* is then essentially a compromise growing out of West Germany's awareness that Moscow will not countenance any alteration in the political, territorial or military status quo in that area, and Moscow's acceptance of the reality of West Germany's powerful economy and its magnetic attraction for East Europe.

The current Soviet policy toward Bonn's *Ostpolitik* is thus the product of changing and conflicting Soviet perceptions of West Germany's potential for exploitation in East Europe, combined with shifting modifications in West Germany's attitudes and approaches. A close study of the Soviet press during this period suggests the existence of important differences within the Soviet elites on how Moscow should respond and react to German initiatives.

The initial pattern of the *Ostpolitik*, as mentioned earlier, concentrated on developing direct economic, diplomatic and cultural ties with the countries of East Europe. This policy apparently met with the unanimous disapproval of the Soviet leadership in the spring and summer of 1968, although sharp factional divisions developed over precisely how to counter the *Ostpolitik*. The upshot was, successively, inertia, vacillation, warning, threats, compromise and, finally, military occupation.[11] It became clear that the Soviet leadership perceived direct relations between West Germany and the countries of East Europe as a serious threat—not necessarily to Soviet security or even to the independence of the countries of East Europe—but to Soviet hegemony in the region and to the socio-political systems ("socialism") there. The establishment of West German economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with the people's democracies carried potential political import of unknown dimensions—hence, the singling out of West Germany as the main culprit in the Czech drama of 1968.

In wading through Soviet rhetoric, one should pay little attention to the specific charges levelled against Bonn, since it should be remembered that less than two years after this avalanche of abuse, Moscow and Bonn became involved in prolonged negotiations that resulted in a non-aggression treaty involving the renunciation of force in the settlement of disputes, and West German acceptance of the juridical, military and territorial status quo in East Europe, including the existence of the German Democratic Republic in its present form—at least until possible reunification at some remote date.[12]

As a temporary measure, the Brezhnev Doctrine must be judged a success in terms of Moscow's position as a global and as a regional power. It has compelled the United States to abandon whatever residual elements of the old "rollback" and "liberation" policies remained and virtually to jettison its new policies of "bridge building." For all practical purposes, the United States now accepts the Central-East European status quo and tacitly recognizes that the East European region is immune from outside interference. Similarly, the Brezhnev Doctrine has compelled West Germany to revise its *Ostpolitik* to accord with Soviet demands. In return for an agreement allowing German economic contacts with East Europe, Bonn has renounced the use of force in settling dis-

[11] V. V. Aspaturian, "The Aftermath of the Czech Invasion," *Current History*, November, 1968.

[12] For the text of the treaty see pp. 238ff. of this issue.

putes, abandoned all claims to the Sudeten territories, accepted the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border, recognized East Germany as a separate state under international law and, in effect, recognized Soviet rights as clarified in the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Brezhnev Doctrine has also complicated Peking's options in utilizing East Europe as a lever against Moscow or, rather, it has made it virtually impossible for the East European countries to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict to their advantage. Peking is being squeezed out of the world Communist movement, and the Warsaw Pact may become an anti-Chinese alliance.

The Brezhnev Doctrine constitutes a hermetic seal, which renders the countries of East Europe immune to political, ideological and military penetration, while allowing limited cultural and economic contacts. The course of liberalization has been arrested in East Europe, but the forces that impelled it remain intact and may later be revived. Similarly, any immediate hope that the other countries of East Europe could imitate Rumania's developing autonomy in foreign affairs is being frustrated.

Yet East Europe remains brittle, as resentments and frustrations continue to mount and fester within the suffocating atmosphere of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Germany remains a "political dwarf," but the dynamism of her people, her economy and her culture will eventually find a political outlet. In return for limited economic contacts with East Europe, closely supervised by Moscow to prevent any possible spill-over, West Germany runs enormous risks. She may give juridical sanction to the division of Germany and leave the status of West Berlin unclarified. Most important, there is the danger of Soviet political penetration feeding back over economic agreements.

Chancellor Brandt, apparently, is confident that irrepressible forces will break through whatever synthetic safeguards Moscow has erected to block both the nonviolent liberalization and the liberation of East Europe and East Germany. Only time will tell whether the new German-Soviet agreements will preserve, expand, or diminish the Soviet zone of influence in East-Central Europe.

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THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Feb. 10, 1971

Soviet Press Is Silent on Polish Leader's Speech Blaming Party for Baltic Riots

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Feb. 9—The Soviet Press remained significantly silent today on Polish Communist Party leader Edward Gierek's Sunday speech, in which he put responsibility for Poland's December riots and continuing problems squarely on the party's shoulders.

Moscow observers concluded that the Kremlin had misgivings about telling Soviet Citizens that a Communist party had found itself fallible; that at least 45 Poles were killed (unofficial estimates were higher) in what the Soviet press has portrayed as hooligan-inspired riots; or that Polish and Soviet ideas differ on what produces "revisionism" or how to unite a divided society.

Gierek's speech made these and other points.

There was no consensus among observers on the question of how much Kremlin disapproval of the Gierek regime could or should be read into the silence.

If the Soviet press publishes even an abridged version of the speech in the next few days, it will reinforce the contention that the Kremlin still approves Gierek's basic approach to revitalizing Poland. Moscow has appeared to back Gierek since he replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka at the head of the Polish Communist Party in December.

Even continuing silence may not mean disapproval.

It may simply be a sign of Kremlin nervousness about developments in a still volatile neighbor as the 24th Soviet Party Congress approaches.

At public meetings, Soviet citizens have been asking pointed questions about hooligan riots' causing the ouster of a party leader and the Polish decision not to collectivize agriculture.

Pravda, the only morning paper to appear on Monday, carried brief reports of the Polish central committee plenum and the charges in the Polish leadership. Other Soviet newspapers printed similar reports today.

Tass carried a five-page Polish press agency (PAP) summary of Gierek's speech in its English-language international service Monday, but not in its Russian service. The agency said today that it had received the summary from PAP in English and put it out without translating it.

The Monday editions of the Polish newspapers that carried the speech were not available today at Moscow newsstands that usually carry them.

Moscow observers could not tell whether the Tass version contained all of the PAP "concise summary." But Tass omitted some of the most important points in Gierek's speech. Among them:

- The statement that "all of us carry some responsibility" for the December events. The Soviet party has never blamed itself in this way, although it has blamed former Party leaders for past mistakes.
- The idea that the "Stultification of ideology" under Gomulka had led to "revisionism" and that reform is the best protection against revisionism (departure from the Marxist-Leninist norm, especially the Soviet-approved version of the norm).

The Soviets blessed Gomulka until his fall and might be embarrassed at such a characterization of his rule.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 February 1971

Workers' gains noted

Kremlin watches Polish unrest

By Paul Wohl
Written for The Christian Science Monitor

The success of Poland's workers in making party and government accept far-reaching political and economic demands is embarrassing for the Soviets. Such happenings are hard to reconcile with the victory paeans for world communism with which the Soviet Party's 24th Congress is ushered in.

The Kremlin's first reaction to the Polish events was silence. For weeks the Soviet Press, which devotes whole pages to strikes and demonstrations in the West merely reported some of Warsaw's terse communiqués.

Only toward the end of January did the Kremlin's concern over the Polish unrest come into the open. Careful perusal of the Soviet press and reports by Western technicians recently returned to their homelands point to the Soviet leaders' anxiety that the Polish events might influence their own workers.

No indication given

There was no hint that anything of momentum had happened in Poland when Poland's new First Secretary Edward Gierek and Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz visited Moscow. Yet Soviet readers must have become aware that displaced Polish Party Chief Wladyslaw Gomulka, who for years had been the Kremlin's devoted ally, suddenly had become an unperson.

Throughout most of January only a few spot reports by Pravda's Warsaw correspondents gave the Soviet public an inkling that Polish developments were not smooth and easy.

More information became available through Western broadcasts and through the frequently critical discussion of the Polish party's policy in Western Communist journals.

The Kremlin apparently is still not sure of the direction which Polish labor unrest will take and avoids anything smacking of political analysis or ideological appraisal

But Polish events no longer are completely gnored. On Jan. 29 a report of Pravda's Warsaw correspondent referred to "impor-ant happenings in the life of Poland," to he party's efforts to "strengthen its links vith the masses" and to the Polish leaders' ourney to Szczecin, Gdansk, and Gdynia for alks with representatives of the shipyards.

These talks, according to Tass, turned round "the political and economic problems f the country." The priority given to politi-al problems over economic ones is signifi-ant.

Pravda reported that the talks of Messrs Gierek and Jaroszewicz in Szczecin, Gdansk, nd Gdynia have given rise to "lively dis-ussions at party and workers meetings" hroughout the country.

Polish workers interviewed by Pravda's orrespondent admitted "difficulties and the eed to lead the country out of its present ondition" (difficulties hitherto ignored by he Soviet press).

Polish Communist workers interviewed by Pravda insisted on the need to "unmask ourgeois propaganda and to oppose all hose who sought to take advantage of ifficulties which have arisen in the building f socialism."

For Soviet readers such remarks are evi-ence that something has gone wrong.

Slogan often repeated

There are quite a few signs of the Krem-lin's concern over the Polish events and their possible effect on Soviet workers. Since the second half of December the strident demands for greater production efforts and more labor discipline have been toned down.

The Soviet Party's concern for the well-being of the people, an old slogan, is re-peated incessantly.

On Dec. 30, Izvestia published an inter-view with Russian First Deputy Trade Min-ister V. P. Shimansky, who categorically denied that the government intended to raise prices. This denial was interpreted in Mos-cow as an attempt to stop rumors that the Soviet Government planned "measures simi-lar to those which had led to trouble in Poland."

Throughout January the Soviet press has given more than usual space to criticism of various ministries and organizations who are said to be responsible for the inadequate supply of consumer goods and food.

On Jan. 6 Pravda took the trade unions to task for not paying enough attention to production conferences in factories.

Pravda demanded "wider participation of the workers in decisions about economic and social tasks and in vital questions of pro duction." Those who "loved a quiet life anc who saw a challenge to their undisturbec existence in every initiative coming from the workers" were severely upbraided.

While this topic is not new, the way it was presented in Pravda at this time sounded like a warning to avoid tensions of the kind which riled labor relations in Poland. There was a reason for such a warning.

On-the-spot observers have reported that the pressures exerted by the Soviet au-thorities during the last quarter of 1970 have led to strikes, slowdowns, and workers' pro-tests in several cities. Dismissals, higher work norms, and alleged discrimination in the distribution of bonuses were aggravated by the rude and impersonal manner in which some plant directors applied the new regula-tions.

Seen against this background and the un-precedented happenings in Poland where workers' demands led to a shake-up of state and party these developments have had something to do with the almost daily em-phasis on the "unbreakable unity of party leadership and people" on the air and in the press.

WASHINGTON POST
7 February 1971

The Czech Drama Is 'Rewritten'

By Richard Homan
Washington Post Staff Writer

THE CURRENT leadership of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party is engaged in a broad campaign, including a bald rewriting of history, to convince its people and the world that the 1968 Soviet-led invasion came at the request of thousands of Czechs.

But so far, none of these thousands have been named. This makes an interesting point because, at the height of the invasion by Warsaw Pact forces, the present leaders of Czechoslovakia's party and government declared publicly that they had not summoned outside troops and did not know who had.

The invasion, according to a 20,000-word document published last month by the party's Central Committee, prevented civil war and widespread bloodshed in Czechoslovakia and protected the western border of European socialism, as well as restoring Marxist ties between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The document provides the harshest official criticism yet made of former party leader Antonin Novotny, who is accused of setting the stage through his own "conceit" and "megalomania" for the activities of his successor, Alexander Dubcek, who later headed the reform movement.

It blames Zionism and unnamed Western anti-Communist centers for the temporary success of Dubcek's movement. It acknowledges frankly that, at the height of the reform, the Czechoslovak army no longer could be depended on to carry out orthodox Communist directives or to defend the country against the West.

It makes the argument that there is no such thing as sovereignty for a socialist state, that socialism is internationalist, and therefore subject to external corrective action.

But the most astonishing claim made by the document—raising eyebrows even in Yugoslavia—is that the invasion was by request.

Hard-Line Victory?

AS OF NOW, the document's full political implications are unclear. It has been assessed by some Westerners as a victory for Czechoslovakia's hard-line Communists over party leader Gustav Husak, a relative moderate.

But it has been subjected to a unanimously enthusiastic publicity campaign and favorable discussion in Czechoslovakia's press and radio that could hardly have sprung up unprompted by the party leadership.

The document was produced by a plenary session of the party's Central Committee in December and published a month later under the title, "Lesson Drawn from the Crisis Development in

the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."

The 13th Congress was held in May 1966. The document traces development of the reform movement from then, through successive party meetings, to its culmination and defeat in the summer of 1968, and its aftereffects through early 1970, when Dubcek at last was expelled from the Communist Party.

A preface says the document resulted from discussions and analyses at party meetings at all levels since September 1969 and drew heavily on interviews to which the party's 1.5 million members had to submit in order to receive new membership cards. In the process of the card exchange, more than 300,000 were purged "because their stands did not correspond to the demands placed upon Communists."

"The Lesson," as it has become familiarly known in the Czechoslovak press, apparently is a digest of an even bulkier analysis. The Prague correspondent for Tanjug, the official Yugoslav news agency, said last week that Husak, at the December plenum, argued that it was "beyond the competence and the power of the present Central Committee to carry out an objective analysis because the result would be a document which, because of its bulk, would hardly be accessible to the great number of members and workers."

So the party presidium, according to Tanjug, extracted only the conclusions and lessons from the analysis and presumably plans to make more detailed information available at the next party congress, expected in late spring.

"The lessons therefore rather bear the imprint of current political necessity," Tanjug said. But there are varying opinions as to what the current necessity is. Foremost, observers agree, is the need to convince Czechoslovaks that the "fraternal" invasion was needed to preserve their proper way of life.

(Last week, the Prague government refused to renew the Tanjug correspondent's visa.)

Here is what has become The Lesson's key passage. It refers to events in mid-1968:

"Thousands of Communists, individual citizens and entire collectives of working people, representatives of all strata of the population and various organizations, as well as (members of party and national governing bodies), being aware of their class, national and international responsibility for the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia, were persistently seeking a way out of the difficult, critical situation.

"In view of the fact that the rightist part of the party leadership did not want to adopt any measures which would have led to thwarting the counter-revolutionary coup and to averting civil war, they began to turn to the leadership of the fraternal parties and to the governments of our allies with the request that at this historically serious moment they should grant international assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of socialism."

Impressive, but who were these thousands?

At the time of the invasion by Warsaw Pact troops, there was no indication they had been invited by a single Czech of authority or consequence. In fact, two of the top figures in the present Czechoslovak regime—Husak and Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal—said publicly at the height of the invasion that they had not summoned the troops and knew no one who had.

"Our people resolutely reject the occupation as illegal, unconstitutional and groundless and demand the departure of the occupation armies," Strougal wrote in a letter to Moscow during the invasion. At about the same time, Husak categorically denied summoning outside help.

So for now, there will likely be no listing of names, if only because too many top figures would be conspicuous by their absence.

One Czechoslovak newspaper, the Slovak Communist Party daily Pravda, offers the theory that the requests came in letters to the editor from Czechoslovaks to Soviet newspapers. But until there is firmer documentation of the insistence that a mass of Czechoslovaks asked for an invasion, The Lesson will lack credibility in much of the East as well as the West.

Yugoslavia, which opposed the Warsaw Pact invasion, has not found the document persuasive. "It will satisfy hardly anyone," Radio Zagreb said last week. "Not only has the riddle of the existence of the appeal to the Warsaw Pact countries not yet been solved, but even after the so-called recovery of the party's health from the right-wing elements, no one has the courage to accept responsibility for sending the appeal" to the Soviet Union.

The problem of relations between the Eastern European nations and the Communist parties remains, Radio Zagreb said, because "there still is danger that differences and disputes will be solved by force, which is unacceptable and uncompatible with existing norms or international law and the U.N. charter's principles."

In its dutiful discussion of The Lesson last week, the Czech trade union daily Prace summarized the official view of the document's purpose: "Everybody in Czechoslovakia has pondered over the entry of the allied troops of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia.

"However, it was 'The Lesson Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party' which provided the needed and exact analysis of the causes and consequences of this act of internationalist solidarity, which saved the lives of thousands of Czechoslovak citizens, ensured the country's internal and external conditions for peaceful work, and enabled the people to create a positive political atmosphere in the country."

As Czechoslovak party politics unfolds over the next months, the true purpose of The Lesson may become clear.

WASHINGTON POST
1 December 1970

Hungary's Economic Reforms Bring Loosening of Controls

By Ian Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service

News Analysis

BUDAPEST—Three weeks before Hungarian Communists gathered last week for their 10th Party Congress there was another congress of sorts in Budapest at which most of the participants were under 30 years old.

More than 100 young economists, chemists and engineers—many of them non-Communists—met at the Chemical Trade Union headquarters to discuss what one delegate afterwards called the "surplus ambition" of junior professionals in Hungary's "new economic system."

The delegates attacked the young specialists' limited chances for business-connected foreign travel, merit promotions and responsibility, criticized inefficient senior management, and touched on inadequate starting pay—which is now about $60 a month at the tourist exchange rate.

One delegate, a 28-year-old deputy department director of a large Budapest chemical firm, told last week how he formed a chapter of young specialists to deal with management on such things as more foreign travel, more company education, and more responsibility for young colleagues. Though he has twice been sent by his company on missions to the eastern Soviet Union, he feels Hungarian enterprises still need to respond more to junior management's wants.

The decentralizing economic reforms introduced in January, 1968, have thus begun to open up Hungarian society at all levels, as people seek to exploit the opportunities and incentives offered by the program.

Ten years ago, young people were simply "assigned" to factories out of the university. Today there is a youth job market and more mobility—but also the competition and frustrations of an industrializing society.

Last week's 10th Party Congress—the supreme authority in Communist countries—left no doubt that "healthy criticism" of the kind practiced by the junior executives is now sanctioned and even solicited in Hungary.

The speakers hailed the success of the economic reforms, reffirmed complete loyalty and respect for the Soviet Union, and exuded a sense of quiet confidence and stability.

There was none of the flamboyance which characterized the brief period of Czechoslovak reformism in 1968. And nobody better personified the sober style of Hungarian policies than Party First Secretary Janos Kadar, who at 58 is genuinely revered by many non-Communists in Hungary today for moving the country slowly out of the despair of 1956 into the forefront of Eastern European economic realism and political moderation.

Visitors used to the personality cults which have been built up for such strongmen as Walter Ulbricht of East Germany are struck by the complete absence of any such aura surrounding Kadar. His picture is seldom seen, and the portrait gracing Hungarian offices is most often that of Lenin. Kadar lives modestly in a residential area of Buda, he is driven around town by a chauffeur who obeys traffic signals and he occasionally eats at a local town restaurant.

In 1966, at the Ninth Congress, he was battling for the economic reform program against a sturdy orthodox opposition. Two years later after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he disappeared from sight briefly, in deep dejection. But this week he placed his stamp firmly on the Communist meeting, emerged vindicated in almost all his policies, and was hailed by Soviet Party General Secretary Brezhnev in glowing terms as a "loyal son of the Hungarian people."

The transcript of the congress made a written record whose sum total placed the Hungarian Communist Party well ahead of any of its East European counterparts in the formal commitment to new ideas and "democratization" of life both inside the party and without.

Andras Benkei, interior minister, for instance indicated that the once feared police would henceforth limit themselves to "prosecuting, detecting and preventing crimes." On no account, he said, is the interior ministry's task to interfere in economic or production matters or to involve itself in ideological or political disputes. Moreover, he said, a distinction would be made between those who may hold a "hostile outlook" —for whom Marxist persuasion is the correct medicine —and those who directly carry out hostile activity against the state.

Kadar himself rejected "equally" the extremes of revisionism and "dogmatic modes." But the frankness of rhetoric of some of his party colleagues was more outspoken.

Politburo member Bela Biszku spoke of the need to "overcome bureaucracy" which [illegible] "abundantly in existence and hampering our social development." He suggested that slashes in the federal payroll would be one answer, though not for now. In another candid moment, Biszku said that the dictatorship of the proletariat in a one-party system, though essential, sometimes "even complicates" the work of the party, and he added that "our party is a governing party that must take upon itself the function of criticism too."

The congress also introduced the word "management" into party vocabulary. There was an expressed awareness of the dangers of a new, favored class, but the weight of opinion was clearly on the side of more prestige and backing for what Biszku called "the good manager."

"Economic reform," however could not be taken within a rigid political structure which penalizes initiative. As a result political reforms have been introduced.

In 1971, for instance, voters will elect a parliament under a new election law which will replace the old, single-list system with a choice of candidates in each district. The candidates will be nominated by the National Front—the coalition of interest groups which includes the Communists. But unless voters choose between candidates their ballots will be invalidated.

Also next year, enterprises will have to start paying a new six-per cent tax on profits to their local communities. The aim is to make them more responsive to problems in their own they have been recklessly polluting.

As a result, there is a growing sense among ordinary Hungarians that the re[illegible] improve

their personal lot. The new five-year plan calls for investments which "advance living conditions for the population." It envisions 250,000 more telephones, a second color television channel and 400,000 new flats for Hungary's tightly-packed apartment-dwellers. A million Hungarians a year travel to the West, and many of them return home to buy imported Western consumer goods here.

The prospect of real affluence has churned up frictions in Hungarian society, as the formation of the young professional groups indicate. As revolutionary passion melts into the humdrum need to run an industrial society, membership in the Communist Party by young people has dropped.

There are complaints from workers that farmers and managers are reaping the big benefits of the reforms. The regime, however, has been quick to respond to the criticism of those groups.

But the methods for doing so seek to avoid the medium of "administrative measures." And the police seem to play a diminished role in Hungary—though drivers on the streets of Budapest after 10 p.m. can expect routine checks of papers and passports.

The Kadar regime, according to expert observers in Budapest, is able to continue on this moderate course because it enjoys the confidence of the Soviet Union. The party is united more so, for instance, than in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. And as party ideologist Zoltan Komocsin emphasized in his speech to the congress, Hungary has avoided slipping into nationalism, which in Eastern Europe means anti-Sovietism.

Observers view this as a major accomplishment in a people with a history of political volatility, and in a non-Slavic nation surrounded on the north, east and part of the south by Slavs—all at a moment of political relaxation.

Hungarians, as a Budapest writer said last week, are learning patience. And they are hoping that others will do the same, for many intellectuals view another Eastern European explosion such as occurred in 1968 as the only real threat to the continuation of their course.

POUR UNE TCHECOSLOVAQUIE

LIBRE ET SOCIALISTE

Le Meeting du 26 novembre 1970

Discours et Messages

Edité par le

Comité du 5 janvier

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300120001-0

Le 26 novembre 1970, la grande salle de la Mutualité de Paris était emplie de partisans du socialisme, jeunes et vétérans, étudiants, ouvriers, employés, fonctionnaires, cadres, intellectuels de diverses tendances.

Pour la première fois, un meeting se tenait pour la rénovation du socialisme — il ne s'agissait donc pas d'un meeting antisoviétique ou anticommuniste — contre les déviations qui le défigurent, telle l'intervention armée contre la Tchécoslovaquie et la « normalisation » qui en résulte.

Si les déformations bureaucratiques et leurs responsables furent dénoncés, le régime socialiste y fut exalté et la présence de communistes étrangers, de partisans non communistes du socialisme à la tribune reflétait à la fois l'esprit d'internationalisme et d'union dans lequel le **« Comité du 5 janvier »**, organisateur, avait préparé le meeting.

Afin qu'il reste trace de cette importante manifestation, qui ne saurait être sans lendemain, les discours et les messages lus à la tribune ont été recueillis et forment cette modeste brochure, que chaque lecteur est invité à faire connaître ou à diffuser.

— pour une Tchécoslovaquie socialiste et indépendante ;

— pour le renouveau du Socialisme.

DISCOURS de

Charles TILLON

Je vous remercie d'être venus participer à ce meeting organisé par le Comité du 5 janvier pour une Tchécoslovaquie libre et socialiste et avec le concours des organisations animées des mêmes sentiments.

Je ressens profondément l'honneur qui m'est fait de présider devant vous cette assemblée et aux côtés des hommes de haute conscience et de grand mérite que je salue en votre nom. Ils parleront ce soir dans un Paris par vous fidèle à son devoir et à ses plus fières traditions. Dans le Paris qui pense à Prague, un Paris qui n'est Paris que dans le combat pour la Liberté.

Nous sommes, en effet, réunis pour affirmer notre solidarité fraternelle et agissante avec le Peuple de Tchécoslovaquie, mais encore avec le souci de donner à celle-ci un essor nouveau, digne de l'histoire de la classe ouvrière française et de tous les courants de pensée qui aspirent en France au Socialisme.

A cette tribune, je salue en votre nom, avec respect et affection, la présence de notre camarade Jiri PELIKAN, membre de droit imprescriptible du Comité Central du Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie du Parti qui devait se réunir en Congrès régulier la veille du jour où des chars, garnis de soldats abusés, rétablirent dans Prague un socialisme de caserne. Nous sommes unis pour proclamer que s'il faut quitter son pays pour ne pas se taire il n'y a pas d'apatrides pour un communiste, parce qu'il n'y a pas une seule patrie du socialisme, mais, pour tous les socialistes, un monde à gagner. Nous sommes réunis pour nous souvenir que ce fut Marx qui proposa la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme socialiste, qui confond tous ses falsificateurs. Nous sommes rassemblés au nom de ceux qui dans notre pays partagent les mêmes sentiments, une même volonté pour adresser au peuple tchécoslovaque notre hommage viril et fraternel, et nos devoirs de combattants pour un socialisme à visage humain, puisqu'un pléonasme est devenu indispensable à notre langue afin de distinguer ce qui a péri de ce qui demeure de plus noble pour l'avenir de l'humanité tout entière. C'est sous ce signe que notre meeting revêt ce soir sa signification internationale de solidarité avec le peuple tchécoslovaque en même temps qu'avec tous les peuples en lutte pour leur liberté et pour leur indépendance.

Tout ce que nous savons du peuple tchèque outragé nous fait ressentir son indignation, ses souffrances et admirer son inépuisable courage. Mais ce dont il s'agit avant tout pour nous, ce que vous attendez de cette assemblée, c'est ce qui aidera à faire œuvre utile, tout ce qui pourra concourir à effacer les conséquences du crime qui a été commis contre tout un peuple. Ce dont nous sommes sûrs c'est que la cause du socialisme dans Prague est invincible et qu'il n'y aura pas non plus de démission de conscience de la part des partisans du socialisme et de la liberté dans notre pays.

J'en aurais fini si je ne cédais au besoin de porter ici, personnellement, témoignage de l'amour irrépressible du peuple de Tchécoslovaquie pour la liberté, en vous disant en quelques mots ce que j'en garde à propos de ses épreuves du passé. Il me faut pour cela me souvenir de Prague tel que je l'ai connu, en 1938, au cœur de tous les tourments d'une Europe menacée par Hitler. Et d'abord dire pourquoi. Quand le sang qu'on garde dans les yeux de deux guerres qu'on a faites vous ramène à ces temps-là, on se reporte d'abord à la première des deux, qu'on appela la «Guerre du Droit» parce qu'on nous fit croire que nous nous battions pour la liberté des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes ! Ce n'est pas là une histoire d'ancien combattant dont on se sert pour faire rire la jeunesse aux dépens du passé, cependant qu'on ne lui offre, comme avenir, que la gérontologie politique des tenants du régime ou de ses alliés complaisants.

Ce fut bien pendant cette première guerre mondiale là, et mon cœur de communiste bat toujours de joie en y pensant, qu'un peuple immense conquit la liberté de disposer de lui-même, par la voie d'une Révolution triomphante en Octobre 1917 ! Ce fut alors que les partisans du socialisme dans le monde eurent le devoir de se solidariser pour défendre le pays des Soviets.

Au surplus, en France, le devoir s'imposa de braver le pouvoir pour briser une intervention étrangère contre le premier pays qui entrait dans le combat pour une voie socialiste. Il y eut des communistes, alors sans carte, faute d'un parti, qui s'affirmèrent dans l'action contre leur propre gouvernement, en proclamant « qu'un peuple qui en opprime un autre ne saurait être un peuple libre . Ceci dit, pour ne point jeter les ombres du présent sur le passé. Dit aussi parce qu'après plus de cinquante ans, il appartient à tous les peuples de juger le socialisme dans chaque pays pour ce qu'il leur enseigne. Lorsque nous voyons le génie des savants soviétiques animer leur robot fantastique sur la lune, nous admirons. Lorsque ces mêmes savants réclament sur la terre où ils vivent le simple respect des droits de l'homme proclamés par la Révolution Française depuis cent quatre-vingts ans, nous ne faisons pas de l'anti-soviétisme en considérant qu'il y a lieu de réviser ce soviétisme-là.

Mais, c'est de Prague que je veux seulement me souvenir, de Prague où nous comptons ce soir, j'en suis sûr, plus de fermes amis que ses rues ne comptent de galets. C'était à quelques jours de Munich en 1938. J'allais là-bas, comme membre d'une délégation du Comité Central du Parti Communiste Français chargée d'assurer le Parti tchèque de notre solidarité agissante dans la défense commune de la cause de la paix. Prague et Paris se ressemblaient alors comme des sœurs. Mais Prague vivait quotidiennement submergée par la masse populaire venue de tout le pays témoigner, à son gouvernement, sa volonté de le soutenir pour conserver la liberté et l'indépendance en péril.

Soudain la nouvelle arriva de Paris que la France mobilisait les premières réserves de son armée pour faire face à l'agression redoutée. En une heure, sous nos yeux, la ville engorgée de fièvre se vida de tous ses hommes valides. Puis la nuit tomba sur un peuple tout entier résolu aux plus grands sacrifices. J'ai vu ce jour-là Prague dans la résolution inoubliable d'un grand peuple.

De retour à Paris, Daladier se faisait acclamer par une foule, toujours la même, celle de toutes les grandes peurs sociales, acclamé parce qu'il avait décidé, avec Chamberlain, qu'ils abandonneraient la Tchécoslovaquie à son sort tragique. C'était trahir les intérêts de tous et vous savez quels malheurs s'ensuivirent.

Je dois à l'histoire de dire que, seuls, en France, les députés communistes et deux ou trois autres refusèrent de se désintéresser de la liberté du peuple tchèque et votèrent contre le crime de Munich. Ces devoirs sont l'honneur d'un parti.

Quand les Allemands eurent occupé les Sudètes, je dus me rendre à Prague, au nom du Secours Rouge International, pour aider à organiser la solidarité envers les militants révolutionnaires qui devaient fuir devant l'envahisseur. Un jour que je passais lentement sur le Pont Saint-Charles, en compagnie d'un camarade de Prague, un officier de l'armée tchèque qui nous avait entendu parler français revint sur ses pas. Et il cracha à nos pieds. Ce soldat exprimait son dégoût que la France l'eût trahi. C'était un de ces hommes de devoir, dont je revoyais le visage, sous l'occupation, quand nous rêvions de liberté pour toutes les nations.

Enfin, quand les peuples eurent vaincu les fascismes, — et nous n'oublions pas la mesure des sacrifices de chacun, — j'éprouvais une grande joie, à Prague, en 1947 lorsqu'à propos d'une cérémonie du souvenir je retrouvais des camarades anciens F.T.P. et parmi les meilleurs, qui avaient combattu dans la Résistance française. Mais la joie aussitôt fait place aux tourments, quand je pense à ceux qui ont souffert sous la torture, ou sont morts assassinés au temps de Novotny, le normalisateur d'avant Janvier.

C'est en le chassant, ainsi que d'autres persécuteurs, que le peuple tchécoslovaque s'était rassemblé autour du Parti Communiste, qui respirait enfin de son souffle populaire et créateur. Place, à présent, à la gloire du printemps de Prague, à ses drames et au combat qui demeure, et auquel nous associons nos volontés et nos forces. Pour nous, la Tchécoslovaquie reste au cœur même de la lutte pour une paix que nous voulons véritable et sans piège. Mais elle reste aussi sans liberté, au centre d'une Europe où, s'il est heureusement vrai que les forces de progrès social ont fait reculer, en Allemagne fédérale, celles qui regrettent encore une guerre perdue, voici d'autre part qu'est réapparu l'esprit de Munich, à l'ombre de Yalta, avec l'abandon du peuple tchèque, prisonnier politique et prisonnier d'un certain potentiel de guerre, en un mot livré à la subversion politique et militaire d'une occupation qui n'est, à la face du monde, que la négation du socialisme.

En France, hélas ! nous n'avons pas de leçon de socialisme à donner à personne. On oublie trop, pour cela, que le peuple est aussi responsable de ses gouvernants. Mais notre expérience de 1968 ne sera pas défigurée par ceux « qui lavent le pavé sombre » avec des mains complices. Nous affirmons notre confiance dans la lutte pour que la France se donne un avenir socialiste, démocratique, indépendant, et pour l'alliance dans l'action de tous les partisans du socialisme dans le monde.

Car c'est ainsi que nous voulons rendre effective notre amitié et notre solidarité avec le peuple de Tchécoslovaquie dans l'épreuve dont il sortira victorieux.

MESSAGE d'

Edward GOLDSTUCKER

membre du Comité Central

du Parti Communiste tchécoslovaque

Mesdames, Messieurs,
Chers amis,
Chers camarades,

J'aurais voulu vous saluer en personne, mais comme je suis empêché de le faire, permettez-moi d'indiquer, dans quelques notes rapides, ce que j'aurais voulu porter à votre attention.

Je suis convaincu que le Printemps de Prague de 1968, c'est-à-dire l'effort du Parti Communiste et du peuple de Tchécoslovaquie d'établir un régime socialiste démocratique correspondant aux besoins, au niveau de développement et aux traditions de ce pays, sera, dans l'histoire du socialisme, considéré comme un événement et une expérience historique comparable à la glorieuse Commune de Paris.

A tous ceux qui luttent pour le socialisme, à tous ceux qui voudraient voir émerger, des crises menaçantes de notre temps, un ordre social juste et libre, le Printemps de Prague, malgré sa suppression brutale, servira comme une indication de la possibilité réelle du socialisme au visage humain, c'est-à-dire d'un régime socialiste, issu de la révolution, qui introduit dans sa structure les garanties de droits et libertés fondamentales du citoyen, et crée par là les conditions où toutes les forces productives, toutes les énergies créatrices de la société peuvent être mobilisées pour atteindre ses buts.

C'est pourquoi l'effort tchécoslovaque de 1968 a partout, parmi les socialistes et les démocrates, provoqué un si grand intérêt et c'est pourquoi sa suppression n'est pas une « affaire de famille » entre Moscou et Prague, comme les « normalisateurs » insistent à la présenter, mais une question vitale pour les destins du socialisme dans le monde entier.

N'oubliez pas, chers camarades et amis, n'importe où vous vous trouvez, qu'aujourd'hui, dans ce petit pays au centre de notre continent, c'est votre cause dont il s'agit.

ALLOCUTION d'

Armand LANOUX

Dans ce siècle où la guerre a atteint parfois les dimensions d'une Apocalypse quotidienne, il n'y a pourtant pas eu que des lueurs d'incendie. Il y a eu des aubes. Il y a eu de ces illuminations d'espoir irrépressible, quant les hommes comprennent sans mot que tout n'est pas joué, que tout n'est jamais joué. Ce sentiment, un grand écrivain de la bourgeoisie a su l'exprimer quand, traitant des Hommes de bonne volonté, il a parlé de cette grande lueur à l'Est. *Oui, c'était bien cela. Les plus âgés d'entre nous en ont été marqués pour leur vie, et les plus jeunes ont joué à cette lumière d'aurore.*

Quelque chose du même ordre s'est produit à Prague, l'hiver 1967-1968, l'hiver du Dégel que célébrait et espérait Ilya Ehrenbourg, le tendre hiver de ce qu'on a appelé le socialisme à visage humain. Que cette aube soit provisoirement obscurcie ne change rien au réveil de l'espoir. Rien ne peut éteindre dans le souvenir des hommes de bonne volonté de l'Occident l'éclat de ce printemps qui nous rappelait que « tout est toujours possible ».

Oui, tout est possible. Je n'aime pas tellement l'expression socialisme à visage humain. *Elle peut véhiculer en contrebande une négation implicite de tout ce qui s'est passé avant Prague. Oui, humain et presque joyeux était, avant la dernière semaine, le visage de la Commune de Paris ; humain, le visage d'octobre 1917 ; humain le visage de Lénine, sa bonté et son humour, qui percent sous le masque du révolutionnaire responsable et de l'homme d'Etat. Ne retenons des mots « visage humain » que leur espoir bouleversant dans une révolution à hauteur d'homme. Dans un humanisme vrai. Le socialisme est aussi un humanisme. On ne peut pas concevoir une révolution qui soit en retrait sur les conquêtes des révolutions antérieures. On ne peut pas concevoir une révolution socialiste en arrière sur les conquêtes humaines des révolutions antérieures, même si celles-ci ont été bourgeoises. Il est indigne du socialisme que sa liberté soit inférieure en richesse et en qualité à la liberté arrachée par les hommes de 1789. Ce n'est pas sans signification que la devise de la première grande révolution ait été « Liberté - Egalité - Fraternité ». Ce n'est pas pour rien qu'elle commence par* Liberté. *Tout commence par la Liberté. Il n'y a rien sans elle. Il est là, le radieux visage humain, peint pour toujours par Delacroix. La révolution doit apporter à l'homme quelque chose de plus, la liberté économique, la libération de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. C'est essentiel. Mais pas aux dépens de la liberté fondamentale, le droit à l'expression sans contrainte, individuelle et nationale.*

Il n'y a pas de prison pour les idées. La Liberté en prison, celle d'Eluard, écrit son nom sur ses murs dans toutes les langues du monde. Le Printemps de Prague n'est que provisoirement obscurci. Il se réveillera demain. On ne sait où, à Moscou, peut-être, à Moscou, je le souhaite. Il fondra en une seule les deux grandes aurores du siècle, celle d'octobre, celle de Prague. Alors, on verra bien que c'était la même lumière qui ruisselait sur le visage des hommes.

MESSAGE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE D'AUSTRALIE

Le Parti Communiste d'Australie maintient sans équivoque sa position concernant le 21 août 1968, à savoir que l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie par les forces armées de l'U.R.S.S. et de quatre autres puissances du Pacte de Varsovie était injustifiée et injustifiable.

Le Parti Communiste Tchécoslovaque avait pris, le 5 janvier 1968, un cours nouveau en faveur d'une démocratie socialiste et de l'autogestion ouvrière. Ce cours nouveau avait reçu un support populaire massif de la part des ouvriers, paysans, intellectuels et étudiants, dans les pays tchèque et slovaque. Le Parti Communiste australien l'avait salué comme un développement des plus importants pour l'avenir de la révolution mondiale.

Les motifs allégués pour justifier l'occupation étaient faux et sans fondement. L'occupation a porté atteinte à la cause du socialisme en Tchécoslovaquie, dans le monde entier, et a terni de surcroît le prestige de l'Union Soviétique et des autres pays impliqués.

Les événements qui sont survenus depuis en Tchécoslovaquie n'ont ni réparé, ni même adouci les méfaits commis, mais au contraire affaibli la vraisemblance du socialisme dans ce pays.

La seule issue possible est celle qui découle des principes socialistes en matière de relations internationales tels qu'ils ont été établis par Marx et développés par Lénine : retrait immédiat de toutes les troupes d'occupation, restauration de l'indépendance nationale et de l'autonomie des nations tchèque et slovaque, de leurs partis communistes, de leurs syndicats et de toutes leurs organisations de masse, afin qu'ils puissent reprendre leur voie propre pour un renouveau du socialisme et un progrès de la démocratie.

Pour la Commission Exécutive
Laurie AARONS
Secrétaire national

ALLOCUTION

d'un jeune Socialiste Révolutionnaire tchécoslovaque

Je suis heureux de pouvoir parler à ce meeting à partir de positions communistes. En effet, jusqu'à une période récente, les staliniens pouvaient empêcher toute critique venant de l'opposition de gauche. Rien que le fait que ce meeting puisse s'être tenu, révèle qu'une page d'histoire vient d'être tournée.

Nous avons été témoin du processus de renouveau en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968 et le « Printemps de Prague » est devenu un mot fameux dans le monde entier. Aujourd'hui, avec le recul de deux années, nous pouvons mieux apprécier son déroulement et sa chute rapide.

La crise économique et sociale a atteint en 1968 un tel degré qu'un changement de conception politique est devenu une nécessité pour la majorité de la bureaucratie dominante elle-même. Le mécontentement des travailleurs et leur aspiration à un changement a joué aussi un grand rôle.

Mais ce processus a dû être imposé contre la volonté de l'aile conservatrice et stalinienne qui avait des positions dominantes dans l'appareil du Parti et de l'Etat, positions acquises dans les années 50. Les changements à venir menaçaient fondamentalement leurs intérêts personnels.

De là découlait pour l'aile Dubcek la nécessité de s'appuyer sur certains groupes à l'extérieur du Parti, groupes qui critiquaient la direction de Novotny.

Le changement qui apparaissait au départ comme une affaire purement interne au Parti est bientôt devenu, grâce aux moyens de communications de masse, l'affaire de tout le peuple. La réaction à ce changement a été bien plus spontanée que ne l'avait prévu la nouvelle direction. L'activité sans cesse croissante des masses dans la réalisation de ces changements, découlait de l'aspiration qu'avait la classe ouvrière à participer à la direction de l'Etat.

L'aile réformiste était incapable de prendre la tête de cette activité et de devenir une véritable avant-garde des travailleurs.

Cette direction s'efforçait plutôt de canaliser cette activité de façon artificielle. Ainsi est apparue la conception de Sik des Conseils ouvriers et peu après les propositions officielles quasiment identiques, ce qui révélait les racines idéologiques et politiques de l'aile libérale dans le stalinisme.

Dans aucune des conceptions officielles, venant soit des syndicats, soit des différentes variantes du projet gouvernemental concernant l'entreprise socialiste, nous ne trouvons l'idée de la centralisation politique de ces Conseils et de la création, par là, de nouvelles structures de pouvoir de la classe ouvrière et tous les autres travailleurs. C'est-à-dire l'institution du pouvoir direct des travailleurs. Il s'agit là d'une

conception technocratique comportant un danger réel de dégénérescence de ces Conseils comme on en a été témoin en Yougoslavie.

L'intéressement matériel a été porté au premier plan, l'émancipation de l'homme et sa participation, aux changements constants dans la société ne jouaient qu'un rôle secondaire.

En dépit de cela, cette évolution a provoqué les craintes du Kremlin dont la propagande insistait de plus en plus sur le danger de contre-révolution qui existerait chez nous.

Malgré l'incapacité de l'aile réformiste à devenir une avant-garde authentiquement marxiste, il faut souligner qu'elle restait au niveau politique et au niveau du pouvoir un garant contre une restauration éventuelle du capitalisme. Ceux qui osent parler d'un tel danger en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968 sont les mêmes qui identifient le régime de Novotny avec le socialisme.

La propagande bourgeoise n'avait pas en Tchécoslovaquie de perspectives réelles. Le plus grand exemple de propagande bourgeoise qu'a su invoquer le Kremlin — et moi, en tant que Tchécoslovaque, je suis persuadé qu'ils ont fait tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour cela — c'est le Manifeste des 2.000 mots qui appelle les travailleurs à s'organiser en Conseils Ouvriers.

Un des aspects les plus positifs de cette évolution a été que pour la première fois depuis 20 années, s'est développée une large discussion politique sur les contradictions de notre société ainsi qu'une critique de plus en plus conséquente du passé.

Seule la montée de l'activité des masses pouvait garantir leur dépassement véritable. Sa manifestation la plus progressiste a été la constitution spontanée de Conseils ouvriers. Ceci était le début d'un véritable processus révolutionnaire dont l'aspect fondamental n'a pas été compris par le Parti Communiste tchécoslovaque.

Il est cependant hors de doute que la politique même de Dubcek a pu préparer le terrain pour le développement du socialisme, c'est-à-dire d'une société qui s'appuirait exclusivement sur l'activité des masses organisées.

Il nous semble cependant que ce processus n'aurait pu être mené à bien dans toutes ses conséquences, que par une nouvelle avant-garde, qui politiquement et idéologiquement, ne subisse pas le poids des déformations du passé. Cette nouvelle avant-garde n'est ni un produit de notre pensée, ni une tentative d'importer des tendances en provenance des pays capitalistes en Tchécoslovaquie.

Principalement aux yeux de la jeunesse, le Parti communiste tchécoslovaque ne pouvait satisfaire pleinement ses besoins. Sa politique ne garantissait pas à la nouvelle génération des perspectives suffisantes. Cette méfiance de la jeune génération s'est déjà manifestée de nombreuses fois — sur-

tout en août 69 — et commence à trouver des formes organisationnelles concrètes. Il ne s'agit nullement d'un conflit de générations, mais de la mise en place d'une nouvelle conception révolutionnaire qui instaurerait, à la place du pouvoir de la bureaucratie, un pouvoir des travailleurs organisés à la base.

Le mouvement anti-bureaucratique et l'aspiration des travailleurs tchécoslovaques à gérer eux-même leurs affaires ne peut être réalisé qu'à condition qu'existe un nouveau Parti marxiste révolutionnaire qui, enchaînant sur les expériences récentes et comparables, luttera pour la démocratie prolétarienne.

Nous ne pouvons condamner l'intervention des cinq du Pacte de Varsovie, seulement à partir de positions morales et parce que les règles fondamentales du droit international ont été violées. L'intervention qui devait empêcher la contre-révolution devait en fait défendre les intérêts de la bureaucratie.

Sa conséquence, c'est un discrédit encore plus grand du socialisme aux yeux des couches les plus larges et surtout de la jeune génération.

De même qu'il faut condamner le fait que par cet acte a été dans une large mesure anéantie l'activité des travailleurs et surtout de la classe ouvrière dans les entreprises.

En aucun cas nous n'accepterons cet état de choses. Les éléments conscients du peuple travailleur tchécoslovaque et surtout de la jeunesse lutterons contre.

Nous considérons cette lutte pour une véritable démocratie prolétarienne en Tchécoslovaquie comme une composante de la révolution socialiste mondiale.

LIBERTE POUR L'OPPOSITION SOCIALISTE
EN TCHECOSLOVAQUIE !

VIVE LA REVOLUTION ANTI-BUREAUCRATIQUE !

MESSAGE de

Jacques MADAULE

Désolé de ne pouvoir assister à ce meeting, je tiens à proclamer à quel point je suis d'accord avec ceux qui y participent. L'occupation brutale de la Tchécoslovaquie, le 21 août 1968, par les troupes du Pacte de Varsovie ne fut que le commencement d'une évolution qui se poursuit sous nos yeux. On put avoir l'illusion pendant quelques temps que le coup avait manqué. Les envahisseurs ne trouvèrent sur le moment personne qui voulût les avoir appelés. Le Parti communiste tchécoslovaque tint dans une semi-clandestinité le Congrès qui avait été prévu et préparé. Dubcek était toujours secrétaire général et rien n'avait changé en apparence, sauf la présence de soldats étrangers non invités.

de penser que les dirigeants de l'Union Soviétique avaient donné un coup d'épée dans l'eau. Au printemps de 1969, à l'occasion d'une victoire tchèque en hockey sur glace, une manifestation antisoviétique se produisit à Prague. Elle entraîna l'élimination du Dubcek et l'installation d'une nouvelle équipe. Il faut croire que cela ne suffisait pas encore, car le peuple de Prague manifesta encore pour l'anniversaire du 21 août. Cette fois Dubcek fut chassé du parti communiste, celui-ci fut rigoureusement épuré et tous ceux qui s'étaient tus en août 1968 retrouvèrent la voix. Ce fut la condamnation sur tous les tons du Printemps de Prague. Il faut croire que les occupants avaient obtenu ce qu'ils voulaient, car depuis lors, le peuple de Prague n'a plus manifesté.

Tout cela ne trompe personne, ni Tchécoslovaquie, ni ailleurs. Reste une terrible réalité, qu'on ne saurait accepter sans protester : au centre de l'Europe, un peuple qui fut celui de Jean Huss, qui a maintes fois étonné le monde par son génie, qui fut récemment encore la proie de l'Allemagne nazie, est lentement et savamment pressé jusqu'à ce que ses représentants officiels en viennent à renier tout ce qui avait été proclamé par eux-mêmes. Ce qui était blanc en 1968 est devenu noir. Les mots n'ont plus de sens. Tout un peuple au garrot. Le nœud se resserre et personne ne dit rien, les uns parce qu'on ne saurait se mêler des affaires d'un parti étranger ; les autres parce que les affaires avec l'Union Soviétique sont beaucoup plus intéressantes que la Tchécoslovaquie. Au surplus, qui a intérêt à ce que se réalise quelque part un socialisme à visage humain ? A coup sûr pas les puissances capitalistes dont ce serait la mort. Tout le monde est donc d'accord pour se taire et passer le peuple tchécoslovaque par profits et pertes. Moscou n'a jamais été plus accueillante et Washington plus compréhensif.

Tel est le scandale permanent contre lequel on ne saurait protester trop fort et voilà pourquoi je suis totalement avec vous quand vous proclamez votre indignation qui devrait être celle de tous les peuples devant la mise en condition silencieuse et sournoise de l'un d'entre eux au cœur de l'Europe.

 MESSAGE de

Ernst FISCHER

Chers amis et camarades,

Je regrette beaucoup que mon mauvais état de santé ne me permette pas de participer à ce meeting avec vous.

La révolution démocratique des Tchèques et des Slovaques, la naissance d'une démocratie socialiste en Europe était plus qu'un intermède historique : la preuve y fut établie qu'une démocratie socialiste était possible, qu'elle était la meilleure manière pour armer le peuple, lui donner l'initiative, faire éclore l'amitié, la solidarité, l'imagination et la pleine conscience qui commençait à y naître.

Nous n'avons pas d'illusions : la défaite du socialisme en Tchécoslovaquie n'est pas imposée pour une courte période. Mais l'accord des peuples dans la lutte pour leur liberté, en Indochine, en Amérique Latine, en Espagne et en Grèce est inséparable de la lutte pour la liberté en Tchécoslovaquie, une lutte qui n'est pas terminée, car la force irrésistible des peuples finira par mettre fin à la politique de « grande puissance ».

 DISCOURS de

VERCORS

Il est possible que la date du 21 août 1968 prenne figure dans l'Histoire du jour le plus noir de la seconde moitié du XX^e siècle. L'étendue d'une catastrophe humaine ne se mesure pas forcément au sang répandu, au nombre des morts, mais à la gravité des répercussions immédiates et lointaines. L'intervention à Budapest, il y a quatorze ans, avait déjà rudement blessé les consciences révolutionnaires. L'Armée rouge tirait sur le peuple ! Elle y perdait son innocence. Du moins nous sûmes plus tard que le danger d'une contre-révolution, suivi de celui d'une troisième guerre mondiale, n'avait pas été négligeable. L'intervention armée y trouvait une excuse, à défaut de justification. Nous savons, sans l'ombre d'un doute, qu'aucun danger de cette sorte n'accompagnait le printemps de Prague. Qu'au contraire celui-ci ouvrait aux partis communistes du monde entier une audience que ceux-ci n'avaient jamais connue. Au point même que, après les barricades de mai, la bourgeoisie française ne s'effrayait pas moins de cette lueur à l'est, qui semblait jeter entre Paris et Prague le pont d'une révolution dans la vérité et la joie. L'intervention des Soviétiques l'a rassurée presque autant que celle des C.R.S. L'ordre régnait à Prague, il régnait à Paris, ouf ! l'on pouvait de nouveau dormir tranquille. D'autant plus que le choc ressenti, à travers le

monde, par les partis frères, a tellement secoué ces partis qu'ils ne peuvent enrayer leur décomposition. Avec l'aide d'ailleurs du gouvernement soviétique, les murs en sont fêlés comme après un tremblement de terre.

Pour longtemps la bourgeoisie n'a plus à craindre qu'une révolution puisse sortir de ces murs qui s'effritent. Il s'agit donc de les reconstruire. Ne nous illusionnons pas : c'est un travail de longue haleine. D'autant plus qu'il ne doit, ne peut être entrepris contre les partis existants, auxquels font encore confiance la majorité des travailleurs. Ce qu'il faut obtenir, ce sont des prises de conscience, qui serviront de noyau à cette reconstruction.

L'idéal serait que l'erreur criminelle du 21 août se dévoile dans toute sa gravité de cataclysme, sinon à ceux qui l'on commise et n'en voudront bien sûr jamais convenir, au moins aux éléments les plus honnêtes et les plus clairvoyants de Moscou et de Prague.

C'est pourquoi je crois, pour ma part, que nous ne devrons jamais mettre un terme à nos protestations, jamais nous abandonner à la résignation, à la fatigue. L'avenir du socialisme est sans doute à ce prix.

VERCORS

ALLOCUTION de

Franz MAREK

membre du Bureau Politique du P.C. autrichien de 1945 à 1968

Chers camarades,

Quand on discute avec des amis tchécoslovaques, surtout avec ceux qui vivent dans leur pays, on subit quelquefois la remarque, qui équivaut à un reproche, qu'ils se sentent un peu oubliés. Et cela non seulement dans le jeu diplomatique, mais aussi oubliés par nous, leurs amis, qui sommes obligés d'affronter les problèmes qui nous sont posés chaque jour par l'actualité.

On pourrait répondre à cette préoccupation légitime en paraphrasant la formule de Jaurès, avec un seul mot modifié :

« Si on reste à la surface des événements en cours, on oublie la Tchécoslovaquie ; mais quand on les étudie à fond, on revient toujours à la Tchécoslovaquie. »

Car ce qui relie les insoumis de Prague aux sacrifiés d'Annam, c'est bien cette Yaltatisation de la politique mondiale, politique des blocs qui bloque la politique des mouvements progressistes.

Et ce qui réunit les camarades exclus de Prague et Bra-

tislava à ceux d'autres partis normalisés, c'est bien ce processus de « normalisation » qui tend à cimenter tout ce qui est anormal dans le mouvement ouvrier.

C'est donc dans un cadre général qu'il nous faut poser le problème de la solidarité avec la Tchécoslovaquie. Je voudrais y contribuer en soulevant aujourd'hui deux aspects du problème :

Dans nos rencontres avec des socialistes authentiques de l'Union Soviétique et des démocraties populaires, nous avons quelquefois du mal à trouver un langage commun. Il en est qui n'arrivent pas à comprendre ce qui se passe dans la gauche des pays d'Occident. Les problèmes des mouvements de libération nationale dans les continents oubliés ne les préoccupent pas autant que nous. Hantés par le spectre du stalinisme, ils répètent souvent, au sujet de la Chine, les formules présentées par la propagande officielle de leur pays, pourtant détestée par eux. Il faut bien comprendre la différence des points de départ : les documents qui nous parviennent de là-bas nous semblent quelquefois d'une empreinte trop libérale ; ce qui leur parvient de chez nous leur semble parfois pas assez démocratique. On pourrait dire, en simplifiant : parce qu'ils aspirent à un socialisme vrai, ils parlent surtout de la démocratie ; tandis que nous qui réclamons une vraie démocratie, nous parlons surtout du socialisme.

Je sais bien que c'est une simplification, qui vaut ce qu'elle vaut, mais je m'en sers pour faire ressortir la spécificité des conditions qui complique les tentatives pour trouver une base d'entente et de compréhension avec nos amis de ces pays.

Or, il me semble qu'il s'agit là d'une nécessité de première importance et qu'une perspective révolutionnaire qui ne tiendrait pas compte de cette nécessité, ne serait qu'une variante gauchiste de la politique des blocs. C'est ici que les expériences de la Tchécoslovaquie et les connaissances de nos amis tchécoslovaques pourront nous aider à trouver le trait d'union.

Prenons, par exemple, cette grande idée de la démocratie directe des producteurs qui a retrouvé, en Tchécoslovaquie, son expression dans les conseils ouvriers, malgré toutes leurs limites.

A ce moment, on a souvent rabâché la phrase printanière selon laquelle il s'agissait de faire la synthèse entre la démocratie et le socialisme dans une démocratie socialiste. Proférée par des gens qui avaient la nostalgie de la démocratie de l'entre-deux guerres, cette formule ne peut nous satisfaire. La synthèse d'un socialisme qui n'en est pas un avec une démocratie qui n'en était pas une, ne pouvait aboutir à une démocratie socialiste.

C'est le retour à l'idée de la démocratie directe — qui a pénétré dans le mouvement ouvrier lors des dix jours qui

firent trembler le monde — qui fait l'importance des conseils ouvriers tchécoslovaques, durant les sept mois qui remplirent le mouvement ouvrier d'espérance.

C'est cette grande idée ensevelie au temps de Staline qui montre la voie vers une démocratie socialiste. C'est donc de points de départ différents que les révolutionnaires de l'Est et de l'Ouest peuvent se rencontrer.

Ici, c'est la constatation du fait que la démocratie bourgeoise s'arrête à l'entrée de l'usine, de l'atelier. Là-bas, il y a déjà l'expérience que si l'autogestion s'arrête à la sortie de l'usine, de l'atelier, si la démocratie directe ne se prolonge pas à tous les domaines, l'autogestion perd son sang, et nous n'arrivons pas à l'Etat dont nos classiques disent qu'il n'est plus un Etat dans le vrai sens du mot.

Et nous nous trouvons obligés de dire : si le jeune Marx a écrit que les soi-disant Etats chrétiens ne sont pas une expression étatique du christianisme, on pourrait ajouter aujourd'hui que les soi-disant Etats socialistes ne sont pas encore une expression étatique du socialisme.

Je le répète : dans la crise idéologique que traverse le mouvement ouvrier en Europe, il faut placer la question de la solidarité avec la Tchécoslovaquie dans le cadre d'une entente des forces progressistes de l'Est et de l'Ouest. L'idée de la démocratie directe devra nous permettre de trouver un terrain commun.

Quelques mots sur le deuxième aspect de notre solidarité avec nos amis tchécoslovaques. Nous avons enregistré dernièrement certains signes intéressants dans ce pays, notamment la polémique ouverte entre l'équipe imposée et les ultras du stalinisme, tentatives de séduction pour regagner une partie des techniciens, ajournement des procès annoncés, libération d'un camarade détenu, etc. Nous savons bien qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une démocratisation du régime « normalisé » même pas d'une libéralisation, et ce n'est pas l'heure de procéder à une analyse de ce mini-new-look, de ses rapports avec certaines négociations diplomatiques, avec les difficultés économiques, etc. Toutefois, on ne peut faire de la politique sans prendre en considération toutes les nuances et il se peut que, dans quelques temps, nous aurons même des affiches annonçant une réunion-débat à la salle Lucerna de Prague, sur le thème : « Dites-moi, Monsieur Bilak ! ». C'est possible...

Mais cela ne changera rien aux problèmes soulevés par le 21 août 1968, qui demeurent, comme demeurent les questions abordées dans le programme d'action du Parti Communiste tchécoslovaque adopté en avril 1968... comme demeure notre conviction que, dans cette année mémorable de 1968, à Paris et à Prague des feux ont été allumés qu'il ne faut pas laisser s'éteindre.

DISCOURS de

Roger GARAUDY

Nous devons aujourd'hui parler puisque d'autres se taisent.

Ce qui est écrasé, à Prague, par la normalisation, c'est l'initiative historique de tout un peuple et de son parti communiste pour réaliser un modèle de socialisme correspondant aux exigences propres de leur pays. Ce n'est pas un événement extérieur : c'est un coup qui frappe directement chacun de nous, chacun de ceux qui, dans le monde, veulent construire le socialisme.

Aucun argument n'est valable pour garder le silence.

L'on invoque parfois le principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires d'un autre parti.

Mais lorsque les dirigeants soviétiques, excommuniant la Yougoslavie, ont appelé ouvertement le peuple yougoslave à se soulever contre l'Etat et le Parti de leur pays, l'on n'a pas invoqué la non-ingérence ; l'on a rivalisé d'injures pour justifier l'ingérence soviétique.

Lorsque les dirigeants soviétiques, afin d'exercer une pression politique sur la Chine, ont rompu tous leurs contrats pour désorganiser son économie, un grand nombre de partis communistes se sont conduits comme s'ils n'avaient, à l'égard des communistes chinois, aucun devoir d'internationalisme prolétarien. Loin d'invoqur la non-ingérence, ils ont repris en chœur les pires calomnies pour justifier, une fois encore, l'ingérence soviétique.

Lorsque les dirigeants soviétiques, sous le nom de « normalisation », imposent à la Tchécoslovaquie le modèle stalinien, les mêmes partis se taisent, et ce silence a le même objet que les vociférations contre la Yougoslavie ou contre la Chine : il ne s'agit pas de respecter le principe de non-ingérence, mais de se faire complices, une fois de plus, de l'ingérence soviétique.

L'on évoque aussi l'argument selon lequel toute protestation nourrirait les campagnes antisoviétiques et anticommunistes. Mais ce qui nourrit les campagnes antisoviétiques et anticommunistes ce n'est pas de dénoncer les crimes c'est de les accomplir. Ce n'était pas de l'antisoviétisme que de dénoncer les crimes de Staline ; et pas davantage ceux de Brejnev. Par contre, c'est de faire le jeu de tous les anticommunistes que de cautionner, par notre silence, une « normalisation» qui donne au communisme un visage repoussant.

— L'on nous dit enfin : la « normalisation », en Tchécolovaquie, c'est un problème extérieur ,qui n'intéresse pas le peuple français. C'est un autre mensonge, car ce qui est écrasé en Tchécoslovaquie, c'est l'avenir socialiste de la France.

Les communistes tchécoslovaques, de janvier à août 1968, ont montré que le socialisme pouvait n'être pas la suppression des conquêtes de la démocratie bourgeoise, mais au contraire la destruction de ses limitations.

Dans un premier temps, ils ont supprimé la censure, les procès politiques, le délit d'opinion, toutes les libertés « formelles » que les pays capitalistes ne garantissent d'ailleurs plus, comme le montrent les récents procès politiques aux Etats-Unis ou en France.

Dans un deuxième temps, ils ont commencé à créer les organes d'une démocratie socialiste : une démocratie directe, et non pas déléguée et aliénée. Dans les pays capitalistes l'on accorde volontiers à chaque travailleur, un jour tous les trois ou quatre ans, le titre de souverain, le dimanche des élections, où il délègue et il aliène en un jour tous ses pouvoirs ; mais le lendemain matin lundi, à la porte de son entreprise il retrouve la monarchie patronale. La démocratie bourgeoise se fonde ainsi sur un double mensonge : un mensonge politique car elle n'est, à ce niveau, qu'une démocratie déléguée, aliénée ; un mensonge économique car, au niveau de l'entreprise, la démocratie est radicalement exclue. La tentative de démocratie directe des Conseils ouvriers marque la rupture avec ce système capitaliste du double mensonge et de la double abdication. La rupture aussi avec le modèle d'un socialisme bureaucratique et autoritaire, où tout est décimé « d'en haut », par les appareils du Parti et de l'Etat, parlant au nom de la classe ouvrière sans que celle-ci prenne réellement part à la décision. Avec la création des Conseils ouvriers les communistes tchécoslovaques s'engageaient dans la voie du socialisme tel que la définissait Marx : une « libre association de travailleurs » ; ils s'engageaient dans la voie du socialisme telle que la définissait Lénine, lorsque décelant, avant sa mort, les premières déformations bureaucratiques, il rappelait que les soviets ne doivent pas faire seulement le socialisme pour le peuple mais le faire par le peuple; ils s'engageaient dans la voie d'un socialisme dont la préoccupation première est de libérer les initiatives historiques des masses, même si les conditions et les moyens sont très différents. Celui de la Commune de Paris et du contrôle ouvrier de la Révolution d'Octobre, celui du programme d'autogestion yougoslave et des communes populaires de Chine. Comme la Commune de Paris, comme les Soviets en 1905, les Conseils ouvriers, en Tchécoslovaquie, sont une création de la base. Dès que le parti eut mis fin au système qui avait empêché la nouvelle génération d'exercer entièrement ses aptitudes créatrices, l'impulsion vint d'en bas, des travailleurs eux-mêmes : à l'usine Wilhelm Pieck, de constructions mécaniques, apparut la première initiative de créer des organes de gestion démocratique de l'économie. Le véritable « Printemps de Prague » ce fut, avant tout, cette mise en mouvement des masses profondes du peuple, dépolitisées par le despotisme, et redevenant le véritable sujet de l'histoire en participant passionnément à la création de leur propre avenir.

Le mérite des dirigeants est d'avoir compris cela et d'avoir aidé à développer ce mouvement. Que sont, à partir de là, les fautes qu'ils ont pu commettre et que l'on commet inévitablement lorsqu'on s'engage dans une voie inédite, dès lors qu'ils accomplissaient le premier

devoir de tout dirigeant révolutionnaire : celui de déceler le sens des grandes initiatives historiques des masses, de les aider à prendre forme et à se développer au lieu de leur imposer des cadres préfabriqués. Désormais dans chaque entreprise, l'ensemble des travailleurs, manuels et intellectuels, décidaient directement (et non pas par délégation à des bureaucrates) de tout ce qui concerne la vie de l'entreprise.

Le projet de Conseil ouvrier, élaboré par les travailleurs des usines Wilhelm Pieck, reçut l'appui officiel du parti et de l'Etat.

Des centaines de Conseils d'entreprises surgirent ainsi. A partir de cette expérience vivante le gouvernement publia un projet de loi-cadre pour la constitution de Conseils ouvriers. C'était en juillet 1968 ; fin août devaient avoir lieu la discussion et le vote ; cette espérance, les tanks la broyèrent dans la nuit du 20 août.

En mars 1969, sous l'occupation soviétique, au VII[e] Congrès des syndicats tchécoslovaques, le Président du Conseil Central des syndicats, Karel Polacek, reprenait sur les syndicats la conception de Lénine qui disait dès 1920 : « Notre Etat est tel aujourd'hui que le prolétariat totalement organisé doit se défendre, et nous devons utiliser ces organisations ouvrières pour défendre les ouvriers contre leur Etat, et pour que les ouvriers défendent notre Etat. » L'une des tâches essentielle des syndicats, ajoutait Lénine, c'est « la lutte contre les déformations bureaucratiques de l'appareil soviétique ».

Le président de la Fédération des métaux, Vlastimi Toman, au nom d'un million de métallos, proclamait, au même Congrès, que sa Fédération « n'était pas disposée à payer l'apaisement au prix du sacrifice des droits civiques et de la liberté de la presse ».

Le représentant du Bureau Politique tchèque à ce Congrès, Strougal, se fit le porte-parole des occupants soviétiques en demandant de renoncer aux Conseils ouvriers. Sa proposition fut repoussée par le Congrès représentant plus de 5 millions de travailleurs.

Depuis lors, par la volonté de l'occupant, le collabo Strougal est devenu président du Conseil, alors que le Président du Conseil Central des syndicats, Karel Polacek et le Président de la Fédération des métaux, Vlastimi Toman, réélus par le Congrès des syndicats, ont été destitués de leurs fonctions en novembre 1970. Quelques semaines plus tard, l'occupant soviétique ordonnait à ses « collabos » l'abrogation du droit de grève. La « normalisation », c'est d'abord cela : la répression systématique de toute tentative des ouvriers ou des intellectuels de décider eux-mêmes de leur propre destin.

C'est pourquoi elle n'est pas seulement l'affaire du peuple tchécoslovaque. Elle est notre affaire à tous. C'est pourquoi nous ne sommes pas venus ce soir, en pleureuses de l'histoire, gémir sur le passé. La plus virile façon d'affirmer notre solidarité avec les communistes tchécoslovaques victimes de la normalisation c'est de réfléchir sur la signification de leur « printemps » et de le faire revivre ici en France en élaborant, avec tous ceux, sans discrimination, qui veulent le socialisme, les voies, les formes et le modèle d'un socialisme correspondant aux besoins de notre pays.

D'abord parce que la marche vers un renouveau du socialisme n'est pas bloquée seulement à Prague, et par des tanks. Lorsqu'un parti communiste refuse de se taire devant ce crime contre le socialisme que constitue la normalisation, les dirigeants soviétiques n'hésitent pas à encourager ou à créer une scission, afin d'y disposer au moins d'une fraction acceptant inconditionnellement leurs ordres, comme cela s'est produit avec un éclat particulier contre les partis communistes de Grèce, d'Espagne, de Finlande, d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de Portugal, d'Australie et de bien d'autres. La crise du mouvement communiste international est née de la volonté des dirigeants soviétiques d'imposer leur système bureaucratique et stalinien comme le modèle unique du socialisme. Chaque parti est dès lors contraint de choisir : ou bien se faire le propagandiste de ce modèle d'importation, ou bien le dénoncer comme une caricature du socialisme, s'il veut être parmi les constructeurs du socialisme dans son propre pays. Tout parti acceptant de se faire le propagandiste du modèle soviétique en se taisant devant ses perversions et ses crimes, se condamne à l'impuissance et à la stérilité.

Ce n'est pas un hasard de l'histoire si, depuis la Révolution d'Octobre, tous les peuples qui ont réalisé le socialisme par leurs propres moyens l'ont fait en dehors des schémas de Staline et de Brejnev, en Chine, au Viet-Nam, en Yougoslavie ou à Cuba.

La marche au socialisme est bloquée aussi par l'importation de schémas périmés qui ne permettent ni de comprendre les développements du capitalisme à la fin du XX^{e} siècle, ni ceux de la classe ouvrière, ni ceux des forces qui, au côté de la classe ouvrière, sont porteuses de l'avenir. Cette asphyxie de la pensée et de l'action révolutionnaire vivante, c'est la « normalisation » silencieuse. C'est contre elle que nous nous levons ce soir pour le renouveau du socialisme.

Dans notre lutte pour le socialisme nous n'avons plus en face de nous le capitalisme de la machine à vapeur et du chassepot, mais le capitalisme de l'ordinateur et des missiles intercontinentaux. **Et cela exige une nouvelle analyse et une nouvelle stratégie.**

Les forces porteuses de la révolution ne sont plus seulement celles des exclus de la consommation mais aussi celles des exclus de la décision : la classe ouvrière d'abord et, avec elle, les millions d'intellectuels et d'étudiants qui font mouvement vers elle et qui feront de plus en plus bloc avec elle, comme l'ont montré les éruptions de mai 1968. **Et cela exige une conception nouvelle de l'unité.**

Les conditions de la lutte révolutionnaire pour le socialisme, dans notre pays, ne sont pas celles d'un pays à dominante agraire, où la classe ouvrière était une minorité dans une masse inculte, où elle était contrainte à la clandestinité et à une organisation où régnait la discipline d'une armée, où, par conséquent, un appareil professionnel parle et commande au nom de la classe.

Le socialisme, en France, peut n'être pas octroyé à notre peuple de l'extérieur, mais, au contraire, naître de ses aspirations les plus profondes, et des initiatives de base de la classe ouvrière, et des intellectuels qui ont fait leur sa perspective historique. **Et cela exige un parti de type nouveau.**

Tel est le triptyque de base pour le renouveau du socialisme en France :

— analyse nouvelle des rapports de classe et stratégie nouvelle,
— conception nouvelle de l'unité,
— parti de type nouveau.

Nous ne connaissons pas d'ennemis parmi ceux qui poursuivent un tel obectif : ni parmi les communistes qui prennent conscience de la stérilité à laquelle les conduit l'observance des schémas staliniens de Brenev, et le silence sur l'antisémitisme sordide qui se développe en Pologne et en Union soviétique, ni parmi les socialistes de toutes nuances qui prennent conscience que jamais un parti socialiste, là où il a été au pouvoir, n'a construit le socialisme, ni parmi ceux qu'on appelle les « gauchistes » qui ont pris conscience à la fois des impuissances du réformisme et de l'impuissance de groupuscules qui n'auraient avec la classe ouvrière que des liens spéculatifs, ni parmi les chrétiens qui, après avoir fait l'expérience, dans toute l'Europe, de la malfaisance de « partis chrétiens » aspirent, avec juste raison, à une expression politique.

Il ne s'agit nullement, ni ce soir, ni demain, de créer un centre d'opposition au Parti Communiste français ni à toute autre force du socialisme en France, mais de susciter partout des centres d'impulsion, de recherche commune et d'action,

— **pour libérer,** à l'exemple du printemps de Prague, l'initiative historique de la base,
— **pour rechercher** et créer les conditions de l'unité et de l'efficacité de tous ceux qui veulent en France construire le socialisme.

Le seul problème est de savoir si, par delà nos divergences, nous saurons choisir, comme disait Rosa Luxembourg, entre la barbarie et le socialisme.

Le socialisme, espérance de tous, ne peut être que l'œuvre de tous : de ceux pour qui le socialisme a le visage de Jaurès ou celui de Lénine, le visage de Trotsky, celui de Mao Tsé Toung ou celui de Camillo Torrès.

Le problème est d'unir la classe et le bloc,
— tous ceux qui ne veulent pas s'enfermer dans les limites du système capitaliste,
— tous ceux qui refusent d'y être intégrés,
— tous ceux qui en mettent en cause, fondamentalement, le sens, la valeur et les fins.

Il ne s'agit pas d'un rassemblement éclectique et sans principe. Tout au contraire, avec une claire conscience de nos divergences, et sans vouloir revendiquer un quelconque rôle dirigeant, sans prétendre créer un groupe, un parti ou une internationale qui ne pourraient que diviser davantage encore le mouvement, il s'agit d'être pour tous la même interrogation sur le modèle de socialisme que nous voulons réaliser, sur les conditions de notre unité et de notre efficacité.

Une jeunesse qui a aujourd'hui l'âge de l'apocalypse d'Hiroshima et de la Révolution chinoise, une jeunesse qui a commencé sa vie consciente entre les remises en cause irréversibles du XX[e] Congrès du

Parti bolchévik, et le Concile de Vatican II, ne saurait concevoir un socialisme défensif, se retranchant peureusement derrière des murs, des blindés ou des censures,

mais un socialisme offensif, sûr de son propre rayonnement.

Il ne s'agit pas de fournir des alibis à ceux qui ne reculent pas devant la barbarie du génocide au Viet-Nam, et contre lesquels nous manifestions ensemble, ce soir, de la Bastille à la République ; mais d'arracher les masques qui, en défigurant le socialisme, affaiblissent la lutte commune contre l'impérialisme et pour le Vietnam.

De la mer des Caraïbes à la Cordillière des Andes et de la Guinée au Vietnam, sous des formes diverses, des victoires sont remportées contre l'ennemi commun. Ne rejetons les leçons ni les possibilités d'aucune d'elles. Non pour les importer ou pour les imiter, mais pour nous aider à résoudre nos propres problèmes, en inventant des moyens peut-être inédits.

Il nous appartient à tous de faire rougir et rugir les volcans éteints.

Par delà les schémas périmés, sachons retrouver l'élan de ce que furent toutes les révolutions socialistes naissantes ; sachons faire revivre l'esprit de la Commune de Paris et de la Révolution d'Octobre, de la Longue Marche chinoise, de l'épopée du Vietnam et du Printemps de Prague, sachons retrouver les initiatives de pensée et d'action de Rosa Luxembourg et d'Antonio Gramsci.

Ainsi, et ainsi seulement, nous ne ferons pas de ce jour celui d'un deuil, mais celui d'une naissance, celui du commencement de notre longue marche commune pour la reconquête de l'espoir.

DISCOURS de

Jiri PELIKAN

Chers camarades,

Chers amis,

Je voudrais tout d'abord remercier de tout mon cœur les organisateurs de ce meeting, le Comité du 5 janvier, les organisations et les camarades qui ont participé à sa préparation, les camarades étrangers qui sont venus ou ont envoyé des messages de différents pays, et vous tous qui vous trouvez ce soir à la Mutualité pour manifester votre solidarité avec la lutte du peuple tchécoslovaque contre l'occupation et la « normalisation », pour la Tchécoslovaquie indépendante, démocratique et socialiste.

Votre geste est d'autant plus important que le régime actuel imposé à la Tchécoslovaquie par l'occupation, essaie de briser la résistance des masses populaires en affirmant qu'elles sont isolées et abandonnées et qu'il ne reste rien de plus que d'accepter cette soi-disant réalité nouvelle. Comme s'ils avaient oublié que nous sommes devenus communistes et socialistes non pour accepter la « réalité » mais justement pour la changer.

Votre geste est d'autant plus important que notre peuple observe avec une certaine inquiétude et amertume l'embarras et le silence déprimant de beaucoup de ceux auxquels nous lient les mêmes buts du socialisme et qui, bien qu'ayant condamné l'intervention militaire en août 1968, commencent peu à peu à se concilier avec ses conséquences.

C'est pourquoi votre présence ici est pour notre peuple une confirmation concrète qu'il y a des communistes, des socialistes, qu'il y a des révolutionnaires qui n'abandonnent pas leurs camarades de combat, même s'il subit des coups, s'il est blessé et qui considèrent son combat comme le leur.

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Si nous revenons aujourd'hui à ce mouvement magnifique de 1968, connu sous le nom de « Printemps de Prague », c'est parce que, malgré ses particularités, il exprime les problèmes objectifs, les contradictions et aussi les solutions possibles d'un développement nouveau dans tous les pays socialistes, dans tout le mouvement socialiste, surtout dans les pays industrialisés. Parce que le Printemps de Prague n'a été ni une révolution de palais, ni un mouvement libéral, ni non plus une explosion due au hasard. Il a mûri longtemps au sein d'une société socialiste, comme conséquence des contradictions entre les idéaux et la pratique du socialisme, comme conséquence de l'incapacité du système bureaucratique à résoudre avec succès les nombreux problèmes du développement politique, économique et culturel et à assurer une participation démocratique du peuple à l'élaboration de la politique.

L'étude et l'analyse de tous les documents des organes du Parti et de l'Etat, des milliers de résolutions émanant de différentes organisations et des revendications des citoyens publiées à l'époque du Printemps de Prague, confirment d'une manière convaincante que tout ce mouvement a eu un caractère socialiste, qu'il s'agissait non pas d'affaiblir mais au contraire de renforcer le socialisme.

Peut-on considérer comme « antisocialiste » le renouveau et l'élargissement de tous les droits civiques, démocratiques, en particulier celui de la liberté d'expression

Peut-on considérer comme « antisocialiste » le principe de l'autogestion par les travailleurs des entreprises et par les citoyens des administrations publiques ?

Peut-on considérer comme « antisocialistes » l'autonomie des syndicats et des autres organisations de masse, la coopération — sur une base d'égalité — entre les différents groupements politiques et d'intérêts autour d'un programme socialiste ?

Si ces aspirations devaient être considérées comme antisocialistes et contre-révolutionnaires — comme le prétend la propagande officielle de Prague et de Moscou — alors on devrait exclure du mouvement communiste la majorité des dirigeants et des membres des partis communistes italien, espagnol, britannique, français et d'autres pays qui ont inclus ces points dans leur programme de lutte pour une société socialiste !

Bien sûr, on peut critiquer le Printemps de Prague pour certaines erreurs. A ce sujet, je voudrais souligner que nous-mêmes, les communistes tchécoslovaques, qui avons participé à ce mouvement et sommes restés fidèles aujourd'hui à ses idées, nous ne défendons pas inconditionnellement tout ce qui a été fait, dit ou écrit, parce qu'un tel mouvement démocratique ne peut se faire sans positions extrémistes et, surtout, nous n'avons pas la prétention de le présenter comme un « modèle » pour les autres. Mais il ne faut pas oublier dans quelles conditions objectives, intérieures et extérieures, ce mouvement a pris naissance et s'est développé. Que c'était seulement la liquidation du pouvoir personnel dans la direction du Parti et de l'Etat, en janvier 1968, qui a ouvert la voie à l'activité politique et idéologique et permis, au cours d'un développement de luttes et de débats, que se formulent graduellement les buts et les méthodes de la nouvelle politique.

Dans le même temps, la nouvelle direction d'Alexander Dubcek a été soumise constamment à la pression des forces conservatrices staliniennes de l'extérieur et de l'intérieur.

Ce processus a très bien été caractérisé par l'éminent marxiste autrichien, Ernst Fischer :

« Au fur et à mesure que l'élan et la conscience des travailleurs augmentaient, le mouvement se transformait en un mouvement révolutionnaire démocratique, en une seconde révolution présentant, de façon de plus en plus évidente, tous les éléments d'une démocratie directe, d'une transformation de toutes les relations humaines. »

Je pense que cette transformation graduelle du mouvement pour des réformes partielles du système centraliste-bureaucratique dans un mouvement vers la démocratie directe, est une des lois du développement de la société socialiste, pas seulement en Tchécoslovaquie, mais aussi en Pologne, en Hongrie et dans tous les autres pays socialistes, l'Union Soviétique comprise.

On entend tous les jours, dans les discours de Husak et des autres représentants de la soi-disant nouvelle direction du Parti Communiste tchécoslovaque, dire que l'Armée Soviétique est venue chez nous pour sauver le socialisme, parce qu'il n'y avait pas d'autre solution — étant donné qu'il n'y avait pas de force dans le pays qui puisse le défendre.

1° - Quel peut bien être ce socialisme qui n'aurait pas l'appui du peuple dans son pays et qui doit être amené et maintenu par une armée étrangère ?

2° - Puisque — d'après les déclarations de Husak et des autres — le socialisme est consolidé aujourd'hui en Tchécoslovaquie, pourquoi a-t-on toujours besoin dans le pays de cette armée étrangère qui est venue seulement le sauver ?

Il est tout à fait clair aujourd'hui que les raisons véritables de l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie ont été la peur de la bureaucratie stalinienne, à Moscou et dans certains autres pays socialistes, du succès du Printemps de Prague et de la contagion de son exemple : peur que les ouvriers et les autres couches de la population des pays socialistes prennent conscience de la possibilité de changer la forme stalienne du socialisme.

Cette preuve aurait été vitale, pas seulement pour les peuples des pays socialistes, mais aussi pour l'avenir du socialisme, particulièrement dans les pays industrialisés.

Il y a des gens appartenant à la gauche qui n'aiment pas s'avouer cette vérité amère, et c'est pourquoi ils se raccrochent à chaque fétu pour créer des illusions selon lesquelles il ne s'est agi que de malentendus tragiques, temporaires, et que tout finira par s'arranger. Dans les derniers temps, ils commencent à se consoler, en prétendant qu'un tournant positif se dessine en Tchécoslovaquie. Mais sur quoi se basent de tels jugements ?

De certains des derniers discours de Husak, on a choisi des passages concernant la nécessité d'améliorer les rapports avec les sans-parti et l'intelligentzia, ou alors du fait que, dans le cadre de la lutte interne dans le groupe dirigeant, certains représentants de la

tendance « ultra » ont été déplacés vers d'autres fonctions, ou bien que l'on a ajourné le procès politique des signataires des « 10 points » dont la date avait déjà été fixée.

Faisons donc rapidement une comparaison entre les déclarations des dirigeants du régime actuel d'occupation et la réalité :

1° - D'après les affirmations de Husak et la soi-disant nouvelle direction, le Parti communiste s'est renforcé et a rétabli son rôle dirigeant.

En réalité, le Parti communiste tchécoslovaque a été décimé, démoralisé, discrédité et transformé en un instrument obéissant au pouvoir des forces d'occupation. Il a perdu la confiance non seulement des masses sans parti, mais aussi de la majorité des communistes. Au cours de la purge, presque un demi-million de communistes, parmi les plus actifs, notamment des ouvriers, des jeunes, des intellectuels, ont été exclus ou ont quitté volontairement le Parti parce qu'ils étaient en désaccord avec sa politique. Même après l'épuration, l'activisation souhaitée ne s'est pas produite. En effet, dans le Parti se trouvent encore beaucoup de membres qui ne sont pas d'accord avec l'occupation et avec la politique de la direction actuelle, mais qui, pour des questions d'existence, pour garder leurs emplois, affichent un accord passif, ce qui est un élément supplémentaire de démoralisation et le noyau de conflits futurs.

Le pouvoir est concentré entre les mains d'un petit groupe d'hommes qui jouent la carte soviétique, mais luttent entre eux pour le pouvoir. Dans cette lutte, Husak et son groupe s'appuient sur Brejnev et ses partisans dans la direction soviétique : tandis que l'autre groupe — les ultras — s'appuie sur le commandement des unités d'occupation soviétiques et leurs protecteurs de certains milieux de l'Armée et de la « Sécurité » à Moscou. Tout changement dans la direction soviétique conduirait automatiquement à des changements en Tchécoslovaquie, du fait qu'aucune de ces deux fractions ne s'appuie sur la confiance de la population du pays.

2° - Selon l'affirmation de la prétendue « nouvelle direction » on assiste à une consolidation des organes de l'Etat.

En réalité, nous sommes témoins non seulement de la liquidation complète des droits démocratiques des citoyens, mais aussi des organes représentatifs qui — épurés des députés — sont de nouveau devenus des « courroies de transmission » pour approuver les décisions prises par l'appareil du Parti, lui-même « épuré ».

3° - Selon Husak et la soi-disant « nouvelle direction », la légalité socialiste se renforce et on n'utilise que des moyens « politiques » pour lutter contre les adversaires de la « normalisation ».

En réalité, ils ont fait légaliser après coup l'illégalité, de façon qu'aujourd'hui on peut être « légalement » arrêté pour n'importe quoi et condamné pour avoir exprimé une opinion différente. Dans la presse occidentale, on admet la thèse selon laquelle en Tchécoslovaquie il n'y a pas de « procès politiques ». En réalité, les gens sont arbitrairement arrêtés, emprisonnés ou libérés sans aucun verdict des tribunaux et sans explication. De plus, des centaines d'ouvriers et de jeunes gens ont été déjà condamnés ou attendent leur jugement.

Si, jusqu'à maintenant, il n'y a pas eu — et nous voulons espérer qu'il n'y aura pas — des procès contre des représentants de la direction élue avec Dubcek, cela est dû avant tout au fait que le régime a peur de la réaction de l'opinion publique dans le monde et dans le pays et, surtout qu'il craint les nouvelles contradictions que de tels procès provoqueraient dans le mouvement communiste international.

Je suis chargé, chers camarades et amis, par nos camarades de Tchécoslovaquie qui ne peuvent être présents ici, et ne peuvent même pas vous écrire, de vous exprimer leur reconnaissance et leur plus profond remerciement pour toutes vos actions contre la persécution en Tchécoslovaquie. Ce sont notamment ces actions qui ont obligé le régime à renvoyer le procès des signataires de la pétition dite « des 10 points » ; de mettre en liberté conditionnelle Tesar, Batek et d'envoyer dans une clinique Pachman, qui était d'ailleurs dans un état lamentable.

C'est en grande partie vos actions et votre solidarité qui peuvent atténuer la persécution et c'est pourquoi il est nécessaire non seulement de les poursuivre mais encore de les renforcer ! Nous savons que la préparation psychologique pour de nouveaux procès continue par des campagnes de calomnies scandaleuses contre Dubcek, Smrkovk, Kriegel et d'autres responsables communistes accusés de trahison, de collaboration avec les services d'espionnage étrangers, de révisionnisme, de trotskysme et de sionisme, sans qu'ils aient la moindre possibilité de se défendre contre ces accusations publiques.

4° - Selon Husak et la prétendue « nouvelle direction », on assiste au retour à la pratique d'une direction centralisée, qui a déjà fait faillite avant et qui conduit à une situation qui nous est connue : les journaux sont remplis de nouvelles sur le dépassement des plans pour l'extraction du charbon et, en même temps, il y a une insuffisance catastrophique de charbon et d'énergie électrique. On écrit que les réserves de marchandises augmentent dans les entrepôts, mais en même temps les gens ne peuvent pas acheter les produits de première nécessité. On affirme que le commerce extérieur avec l'Union Soviétique et les autres pays socialistes s'élargit, alors que la dette de la Tchécoslovaquie envers ces pays augmente. On fait des appels à la construction des logements, mais la crise de l'habitat s'approfondit.

L'autogestion dans les entreprises et les conseils ouvriers n'ont pas été seulement liquidés, mais sont déclarés aujourd'hui « instruments de la contre-révolution ». Les syndicats épurés sont redevenus des « courroies de transmission » dont la tâche principale est d'obliger les ouvriers à augmenter leur rendement.

5° - D'après Husak et la soi-disant « nouvelle direction » on assiste à un tournant parmi les intellectuels.

En réalité, il s'agit seulement d'une nouvelle tactique qui consiste à différencier les intellectuels en « bons » — ceux qui acceptent la nouvelle réalité et auxquels on promet le pardon — et en mauvais — ceux qui restent fidèles aux idées du renouveau et auxquels on déclare une lutte acharnée.

Des centaines et des milliers de représentants de l'intelligentzia, parmi lesquels beaucoup de communistes d'avant-guerre et de ceux qui sont issus de la classe ouvrière, sous le régime socialiste, sont

expulsés de leurs postes dans les universités, les instituts scientifiques et les écoles de tous les degrés, et ils ne peuvent plus trouver de travail dans leur qualification. Des centaines de nos meilleurs journalistes ont été chassés des rédactions de journaux, de la radio et de la télévision, condamnés au silence. Des dommages terribles, difficiles à évaluer, ont été et sont causés à la culture de notre pays. Ce n'est pas un hasard que cette situation pénible ait arraché la plume des mains des meilleurs écrivains et poussé certains au suicide.

6° - Selon Husak et la prétendue « direction nouvelle », l'alliance entre la Tchécoslovaquie et l'Union Soviétique s'est renforcée ; l'autorité et la sécurité de notre pays ont grandi.

En réalité, l'amitié sincère de notre peuple envers l'Union Soviétique a subi un coup terrible du fait de l'occupation. L'armée tchécoslovaque, qui était une des meilleures armées du Pacte de Varsovie, a été démoralisée, humiliée, et elle est devenue le chaînon le plus faible du Pacte.

Dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, la Tchécoslovaquie doit servilement suivre les directives soviétiques de politique de grande puissance, comme le démontre, par exemple, l'attitude scandaleuse des autorités tchécoslovaques envers le représentant du gouvernement national cambodgien, de Shianouk, à Prague, les actions insidieuses contre les communistes grecs en Tchécoslovaquie, l'établissement de relations consulaires avec l'Espagne de Franco, la participation aux campagnes contre la Chine Populaire, l'acceptation inconditionnelle des accords Brandt-Brejnev, etc.

En somme, de ces contradictions entre les déclarations officielles et la réalité, il résulte clairement que la soi-disant « normalisation » en Tchécoslovaquie, est essentiellement une combinaison de l'occupation et d'un putsch contre-révolutionnaire qui a établi brutalement une dictature oligarchique et conservatrice, de type stalinien, qui s'appuie sur les appareils du Parti, de la « Sécurité » et de l'armée d'occupation.

Le régime actuel jette la Tchécoslovaquie dans les déformations des années noires du passé et cela au moment où, dans les autres pays socialistes, on recherche de nouvelles voies pour sortir de la stagnation et de la crise.

Parfois, la question nous est posée : Pourquoi la lutte des masses populaires contre l'occupation et le régime imposé par elle, n'est-elle pas mieux organisée ? Beaucoup d'incompréhensions découlent du fait que l'on compare la situation en Tchécoslovaquie avec celle au Vietnam, ou en Grèce, ou au Brésil. Certains ont tendance, aussi, à juger la force d'un mouvement populaire d'après des actions spectaculaires, comme par exemple des manifestations, le kidnapping de diplomates ou d'avions, ou des attentats.

On n'apprécie pas toujours le fait qu'il s'agit d'une lutte d'un type tout à fait nouveau, d'une nouvelle expérience : d'une opposition socialiste, dans un Etat socialiste occupé par un autre pays socialiste. C'est pourquoi aussi les méthodes de cette lutte sont différentes et doivent seulement se cristalliser au cours de son développement.

Ce ne sont pas seulement des actions directes et ouvertes, comme par exemple la distribution de tracts, de littérature illégale, les grèves,

l'aide matérielle aux victimes de la persécution, etc., mais c'est parfois une combinaison complexe de résistance contre la direction actuelle avec une participation à l'intérieur des institutions, partout où cela permet de gagner des positions et d'obtenir la solution des problèmes vitaux de la population.

Mais l'opposition contre l'occupation est très large et se développe actuellement en un large mouvement autour d'un programme qui est essentiellement l'indépendance et le renouveau de la souveraineté de la Tchécoslovaquie, la poursuite des idées principales de la politique de janvier 1968.

La déclaration du Mouvement Socialiste des Citoyens tchécoslovaques, élaborée au cours d'une conférence de différents groupes, en octobre 1970 dans la banlieue de Prague — et que le Comité du 5 janvier vient de publier dans son bulletin « Vérité tchécoslavaque » n° 2 — est un pas très important dans ce sens.

Ce document répond aussi à une question essentielle, qui est parfois posée avec un certain doute ; à savoir s'il est possible de changer la situation existant actuellement en Tchécoslovaquie et comment. Le document affirme clairement :

> « L'avenir de la Tchécoslovaquie est inséparable de l'évolution
> « mondiale, mais ce sera de nous que dépendra de savoir
> « profiter d'une situation donnée et du contenu concret que
> « nous donnerons aux éventualités qui se présenteront. »

Il part de l'idée réaliste que le peuple tchécoslovaque seul, dans les conditions d'un pays occupé, ne peut pas changer fondamentalement le rapport des forces et vaincre, mais qu'il ne doit pas attendre passivement, et combattre pour ses droits en utilisant des méthodes qui correspondent à ses possibilités et à ses traditions. Il est bien entendu qu'un changement décisif ne peut se produire qu'à la suite de changements en Union Soviétique et dans d'autres pays socialistes. Ces changements se produiront, bien sûr, mais pas automatiquement, ou seulement à la suite de la révolution technique et scientifique. Leur développement et leur étendue dépendront en premier lieu de la pression des larges masses de ces pays, y compris de la lutte du peuple tchécoslovaque et aussi du soutien des forces progressistes dans le monde entier.

De plus, l'entrée de la Chine Populaire dans l'arène politique mondiale, ainsi que celle des peuples de l'Afrique, de l'Asie et de l'Amérique Latine qui se sont libérés du colonialisme, conduiront peu à peu à la liquidation de l'hégémonie des U.S.A. et de l'U.R.S.S., empêcheront le partage du monde entre ces deux grandes puissances et permettront aux autres Etats de jouer leur propre rôle.

Dans le mouvement communiste et progressiste international se dessinent de nouveaux courants et développements. De plus en plus s'affirme la volonté de construire la société socialiste d'après la volonté du peuple, en refusant un modèle soviétique ou autre, et en rejetant l'hégémonie d'un seul parti dans le mouvement ouvrier.

L'opposition socialiste tchécoslovaque voit dans tous ces courants ses alliés et se considère comme partie intégrante de ce mouvement international. Nous souhaitons que tous ces courants et tendances, qui s'orientent vers le but commun malgré leurs désaccords, trouvent en eux-mêmes non seulement l'élan révolutionnaire, mais aussi suffisamment de tolérance pour un dialogue véritable et la recherche de voies communes.

Toutes les manifestations d'exclusivité, tendant vers l'hégémonie de tel ou tel groupe, les attitudes sectaires, les accusations mutuelles et les nouveaux dogmes, tout cela sont des vestiges du passé et freinent la marche en avant des nouvelles forces révolutionnaires.

Chers camarades, je voudrais encore une fois vous remercier pour votre solidarité, qui est un grand encouragement pour notre peuple, et vous demander de ne pas la relâcher, mais au contraire de gagner de plus en plus de partisans et d'en développer toutes les formes : depuis les réunions et manifestations, le soutien moral et matériel envers les camarades persécutés, jusqu'aux protestations contre les arrestations, les expulsions du travail, etc.

En même temps, il faudrait développer votre effort pour que tous les partis communistes, socialistes et progressistes, les ouvriers, ainsi que les personnalités du monde culturel et scientifique, les étudiants, tous ceux qui veulent le progrès, la démocratie et le socialisme, demandent à la direction du Parti Communiste soviétique qu'elle accepte la seule solution véritable de la crise tchécoslovaque, c'est-à-dire :

— le retrait des troupes soviétiques du territoire tchécoslovaque ;

— le retour d'Alexandre Dubcek et de tous les autres dirigeants du P.C. tchécoslovaque qui ont été illégalement démis de leurs fonctions ;

— la convocation des délégués élus du XIV[e] Congrès extraordinaire du Parti Communiste tchécoslovaque, pour qu'ils puissent continuer leur travail, interrompu le 23 août 1968 ;

— l'annulation du soi-disant Protocole de Moscou qui a été imposé par le diktat militaire.

En luttant pour ces revendications fondamentales du peuple tchécoslovaque, vous luttez en même temps pour une issue à la crise actuelle du mouvement communiste mondial et pour une nouvelle offensive du socialisme dans le monde.

C'est le message principal qui devrait naître de ce meeting et qui peut donner le nouvel espoir, la force de croire en l'avenir du socialisme.

MESSAGE de

Riccardo LOMBARDI

Député italien
dirigeant de l'aile gauche du Parti Socialiste d'Italie

Ayant un engagement pris depuis longtemps pour participer à la Conférence de Stockholm pour le Vietnam, je regrette de ne pouvoir accepter votre invitation.

J'exprime à votre meeting ma solidarité et mon adhésion entières et je vous autorise expressément à les rendre publiques, ainsi que la solidarité et l'adhésion de la gauche socialiste italienne.

MESSAGE du

PARTI SOCIALISTE UNIFIE DE CATALOGNE

C'est pour remplir un devoir internationaliste que nous voulons manifester notre adhésion à l'acte de soutien au peuple tchécoslovaque et aux militants communistes qui se sont dressés contre l'intervention armée et l'assujétissement qui leur est imposé.

C'est la seule ligne de conduite qui donne tout son sens au socialisme que nous désirons, le socialisme des masses et non celui des groupes dominants.

Aussi, les camarades tchécoslovaques qui n'ont pas capitulé devant la dictature des tanks méritent-ils notre plus grande reconnaissance.

Plus que jamais il convient de s'élever avec vigueur contre les formes impérialistes et hégémonistes qui veulent se partager le monde en zones d'influences. Plus que jamais, il apparaît urgent de faire respecter les droits des peuples à décider du socialisme qu'ils veulent se donner.

MESSAGE de

Sadik PRENTAJ

Fondateur du Parti Communiste albanais
Membre exclu du Comité central

Au nom du combat que nous avons mené pendant l'occupation allemande pour la victoire du socialisme en Albanie, je désire saluer avec émotion cette manifestation de solidarité avec le peuple tchécoslovaque.

Durant le « Printemps de Prague » nous avons suivi passionnément les développements vers la révolution politique et contre le stalinisme.

Car nous savons qu'une victoire du socialisme de l'autogestion contre le stalinisme contribuera à faire se lever d'autres « Printemps de Prague » dans tous les Etats ouvriers.

MESSAGE de la

revue « AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW »

Nous, soussignés, exprimons notre solidarité avec le peuple tchécoslovaqu et avec tous les socialistes de différentes tendances qui continuent à travailler pour une Tchécoslovaquie indépendante et socialiste, libre des violations de la légalité et des crimes qui ont trop souvent assombri, dans le passé, les réalisations du socialisme.

Nous exprimons notre ferme opposition aux persécutions et aux représailles faites contre eux qui œuvraient pour un renouveau démocratique avant et après août 1968.

Nous maintenons que la première condition pour un renouveau socialiste en Tchécoslovaquie est le retrait des forces d'occupation.

Tom Uren, membre du Parlement Fédéral - Parti du Travail Australien
Dr M. Cass, membr du Parlement Fédéral - Parti du Travail Australien
Dr J. Cairns, membre du Parlement Fédéral - Parti du Travail Australien
Ian Turner - professeur Monash Université
Max Deutcher - professeur Université Macquarie
C. Manning Clark - professeur à l'Université Nationale
Alastair Davidson - lecteur Monash Université
John Playford - lecteur Monash Université
Rex Mortimer - lecteur - Université de Sydney
Anna Yeatman - répétitrice Université Adelaïde
Stephen Murray-Smith - rédacteur au journal « Overland »
Wendy Bacon - étudiant répétiteur - anarchiste
Pierre Vicary - étudiant journaliste
Rowan Cahill - étudiant gradué, rédacteur de « l'Australien Left Review »
Hal Greenland - responsable étudiant, membre du P.C. australien
Norman Docker - dirigeant fédéral de la Fédération des Ouvriers
Jack Mundey - secrétaire de l'Union des Travailleurs
W. Leslie - secrétaire-adjoint de la Fédération de l'Enseignement
Ken Mac Leod - dirigeant de la campagne du Moratoire pour le Vietnam
Alec Robertson - rédacteur à « Tribune »
Laurie Aarons - secrétaire national du Parti Communiste australien
John Sendy - secrétaire du P.C. australien du Victorian State
Charlie Gifford - secrétaire du P.C. australien du Queensland State
Jim Moss - secrétaire du P.C. australien du Sud-Australien
Mavis Robertson - membre du Bureau Politique du P.C. australien, et rédacteur à l'« Australian Left Review »

TELEGRAMME de

« IL MANIFESTO »

Engagés dans la bataille d'obstruction contre les décrets anti-ouvriers à la Chambre des députés italienne, nous ne pouvons participer à votre manifestation sur la Tchécoslovaquie.

Nous exprimons notre accord dans le sens de la condamnation de l'intervention soviétique contre un courageux mouvement de base dirigé contre le bureaucratisme et la social-démocratisation.

Nous sommes convaincus que la crise des pays de l'Est Européen sera surmontée par la relance de la lutte de classe et la restauration des valeurs du communisme.

MESSAGE

d'un groupe d'étudiants communistes de Belgique

Le « Printemps de Prague » a prouvé, une fois de plus, après la révolution hongroise, après l'expérience algérienne stoppée momentanément par le putsch de Boumedienne, que les sociétés de transition vers le socialisme, loin de pouvoir se développer librement dans un cadre bureaucratique, policier et étouffant, ne peuvent, pour avancer réellement vers le socialisme et le communisme, que se placer sous le signe de l'autogestion socialiste.

La combinaison de l'autogestion et d'une planification souple, démocratiquement élaborée, la conservation sous une certaine forme du marché, la démocratie prolétarienne la plus complète, c'est-à-dire le multipartisme ouvrier, le droit de tendance et de fraction dans le parti révolutionnaire, l'organisation autonome des masses ouvrières dans des Soviets et des collectifs d'autogestion, sont les garants du renforcement de la base socialiste de l'économie.

A l'heure où la bureaucratie russe tente d'étouffer les aspirations révolutionnaires du prolétariat et des étudiants tchécoslovaques, à l'heure où les staliniens tentent d'organiser des procès infâmes, PLUS QUE JAMAIS IL FAUT QUE LE MOUVEMENT COMMUNISTE INTERNATIONAL SOUTIENNE LA REVOLUTION POLITIQUE TCHECOSLOVAQUE !

POUR LA LIQUIDATION DU SYSTEME BUREAUCRATIQUE !

POUR LA MISE EN PLACE D'UN VERITABLE SYSTEME D'AUTOGESTION !

SOUTIEN A LA RESISTANCE COMMUNISTE TCHECOSLOVAQUE !

(Signature non reproduite)

MESSAGE du

CENTRE DES LUTTES LYCEENNES

« Le Centre de luttes lycéennes qui regroupe et coordonne l'activité d'une cinquantaine de Comités de lutte dans toute la France, soutient la lutte des travailleurs de Tchécoslovaquie contre la normalisation. C'est pourquoi il appuie la réunion de ce soir en espérant qu'elle sera le départ d'un mouvement de solidarité politique et matérielle à la Résistance tchécoslovaque. »

MESSAGE de l'

ALLIANCE MARXISTE REVOLUTIONNAIRE

Pour tous ceux qui aspirent à un régime socialiste démocratique basé sur l'autogestion par les producteurs et les citoyens dans tous les domaines et à tous les niveaux, le « Printemps de Prague » fut un exemple, parmi les plus stimulants, d'importance historique.

Pour cette raison, défendre les revendications des masses tchécoslovaques, telles qu'elles se sont exprimées en 1968, aïder la résistance tchécoslovaque qui se regroupe sur cette base et continuer le combat pour la victoire et le plein épanouissement des promesses du « Printemps de Prague » conduisant à une véritable révolution politique brisant les structures bureaucratiques du stalinisme, est un devoir impérieux de tout marxiste-révolutionnaire.

Nous saluons donc la tenue de ce meeting comme un jalon important dans la voie de la structuration d'une tendance marxiste-révolutionnaire internationale luttant pour le socialisme démocratique basé sur l'autogestion et rompant résolument avec les pratiques du stalinisme et du néo-stalinisme.

Nous considérons que les courants communistes formés dans les différents P.C.,à l'occasion de leur opposition à l'intervention brutale de la bureaucratie soviétique en Tchécoslovaquie en vue de stopper le processus amorcé en direction d'un socialisme basé sur l'autogestion, ont un rôle éminemment progressif à jouer s'ils confirment, par leurs idées et leur action conséquente, que leur rupture avec le stalinisme s'est effectuée à gauche et non à droite. C'est-à-dire s'ils continuent à se revendiquer, sans complexe aucun, du mouvement communiste international, s'ils ne cessent pas de s'adresser dans un langage approprié à la base prolétarienne des P.C., s'ils refusent des alliances douteuses et même carrément désastreuses avec des courants réformistes ou ultra-gauchistes, s'ils contribuent au renouveau du mouvement communiste inter-

national, qui réside dans l'établissement d'un véritable socialisme démocratique en U.R.S.S. et dans les autres Etats Ouvriers, basé sur l'autogestion, c'est-à-dire l'authentique pouvoir démocratique des producteurs et des citoyens dans tous les domaines et à tous les niveaux.

La création d'un Rassemblement international *permanent capable d'assurer la coordination des efforts* des différentes oppositions communistes *dans ce sens, serait un grand pas en avant. Comme le serait également la* création d'un Comité international *ouvert à toutes les forces révolutionnaires décidées à défendre l'acquis fondamental du « Printemps de Prague » et capable d'épauler de manière* continue et efficace *le combat de la Résistance Socialiste en Tchécoslovaquie.*

MESSAGE de la « LIGUE COMMUNISTE »

Camarades,

La Ligue Communiste (Section Française de la IV[e] Internationale) salue chaleureusement ce meeting de solidarité organisé par le Comité du 5 janvier. Il n'y a pas vingt ans, un tel meeting eût été impossible, si faibles étaient les forces communistes qui osaient dire non à la toute puissance stalinienne. La tenue de ce meeting aujourd'hui ne signifie nullement que l'idée de démocratie ouvrière ait fait son chemin dans la direction des P.C. staliniens — ceux qui « normalisent » à Prague et ceux qui, dans les faits, approuvent cette « normalisation » à Paris le prouvent — mais que le rapport des forces en 1970 n'est plus celui de 1950.

Ce qu'a démontré brusquement l'intervention soviétique à des millions de travailleurs, c'est que les dirigeants du Kremlin appliquent « la coexistence pacifique », la non-ingérence et même d'excellentes relations avec les pires dictatures militaires (Grèce, Espagne, Brésil...), mais qu'en ce qui concerne leur rapport avec des Etats à système sociaux pourtant identiques, ils n'hésitent pas à intervenir avec la dernière violence, quel qu'en soit le prix politique à payer.

C'est évidemment que les intérêts de la bureaucratie soviétique étaient menacés mortellement. Qui peut sincèrement croire que c'est « le danger de restauration capitaliste » qui a motivé l'intervention quand on voit comment et contre qui est dirigée la répression ? Quel que soit le flot de mensonges et de calomnies déversé par la direction actuelle du P.C.T., il est clair que l'effet principal de l'intervention est d'obtenir la plus grande passivité et démobilisation possible de la classe ouvrière et des intellectuels.

Pour nous, qui n'avons pas la conception stalinienne de l'histoire, il s'agit là d'une des plus grandes manœuvres anti-communiste menée par ceux-là même qui s'en réclament. Voilà pourquoi la lutte contre la bureaucratie stalinienne est une tâche prioritaire pour tous

ceux qui luttent pour la révolution socialiste.

L'échec du « Printemps tchécoslovaque » a confirmé ce que la Pologne et la Hongrie avaient déjà démontré en 1956 : l'impossibilité d'abattre la bureaucratie stalinienne par des réformes graduelles. Seule une mobilisation révolutionnaire des masses permettra d'établir dans « les démocraties populaires » et en U.R.S.S. même une véritable démocratie prolétarienne : celle pour laquelle ont combattu Lénine et Trotsky.

Nous sommes absolument confiant dans l'actualité de cette révolution : les nouvelles avant-gardes qui apparaissent en Yougoslavie, en Pologne et en U.R.S.S. même peuvent sembler faibles devant la puissance policière du Kremlin, mais elles ne semblaient pas davantage développées en juillet 1967 en Tchécoslovaquie...

L'armée soviétique a été envoyée en Tchécoslovaquie pour y régler des antagonismes sociaux et politiques qui existent aussi en U.R.S.S. même. Pourra-t-elle le faire aussi impunément dans son propre pays ?

Avec Modzelewski et Kuron, révolutionnaires polonais emprisonnés pour leur activité anti-bureaucratique, nous proclamons :

> « Notre allié contre l'intervention des chars soviétiques est la classe ouvrière russe, ukrainienne, hongroise, tchèque. Notre allié contre la pression et les menaces de l'impérialisme est la classe ouvrière de l'Occident industrialisé, la révolution coloniale montante dans les pays sous-développés. Contre l'entente de la bureaucratie internationale avec la bourgeoisie impérialiste internationale qui maintiennent des systèmes de dictature antipopulaires dans leurs sphères d'influence respectives, nous lançons le mot d'ordre traditionnel du mouvement ouvrier : « Prolétaires de tous les pays, unissez-vous ! »

MESSAGE du

C. I. M. R.

Camarades,

Nous saluons le meeting international de solidarité car nous croyons que l'explosion tchécoslovaque comme le Mai français ont ouvert de nouvelles perspectives aux militants révolutionnaires.

En Tchécoslovaquie, c'est la révolte anti-bureaucratique des masses qui a donné toute sa signification à un mouvement qui menaçait les privilèges et les positions de pouvoir de ce qu'il faut bien nommer une classe dirigeante. La « normalisation » c'est-à-dire la répression généralisée contre toute rébellion s'en est suivie.

C'est ainsi que s'est créée une situation de « normalisation globale » établissant un certain équilibre et une certaine concer-

lation entre les politiques soviétique et américaine : cette normalisation globale se manifeste certes par des interventions diverses, plus ou moins violentes selon les circonstances ; tantôt communes, tantôt réparties selon une division des rôles dans les parties du monde qui échappent à la sphère d'intervention commune. Quand, comme au Vietnam ou à Cuba, la lutte héroïque d'un peuple ou la victoire d'une révolution ne permettent pas à l'U.R.S.S. de se soustraire à une caution ou à un appui, celle-ci exerce en contrepartie une pression et un conditionnement politiques ; quand la lutte armée a des origines plus faibles comme au Cambodge ou en Palestine, les grandes puissances s'accordent pour isoler et tenter de réduire à des phénomènes marginaux ces minorités révolutionnaires. A l'intérieur de chaque camp, les deux puissances se reconnaissent un droit réciproque de police internationale : les Etats-Unis accordent peu de gravité à l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie, l'U.R.S.S. freine la lutte armée en Amérique Latine ou au Moyen Orient et tonne contre « l'extrémisme » de la gauche révolutionnaire en Occident.

Cette orientation conduit à un aboutissement logique : soit les partis communistes disparaissent en tant que forces politiques réelles (dans les pays sous-développés) soit disparaissent en tant que force révolutionnaire (comme en France ou en Finlande).

Car, à travers l'expérience tchécoslovaque, ce qui est en cause et nous concerne directement, c'est bien le projet de société à construire et la nature de la stratégie qui y conduit.

Et la question décisive doit aujourd'hui être nettement posée : quelle est la nature de la crise du mouvement communiste, s'agit-il fondamentalement d' « erreurs » de directions sclérosées, d'une « déformation opportuniste et bureaucratique », ou, au contraire, d'une dégénérescence profonde caractéristique de l'ensemble du mouvement. Au fond, on serait tenté de reprendre la vieille formule : « réforme ou révolution » ; pour notre part, nous ne croyons pas à la réforme possible des appareils staliniens, ici aussi une révolution est à faire.

C'est aussi pourquoi nous pensons qu'il faut tout faire pour sortir du cercle vicieux dans lequel est aujourd'hui bloquée la gauche révolutionnaire entre un parti communiste impuissant de dégager de l'intérieur une nouvelle force ; et de nouveaux militants incapables de s'unifier pour devenir un point de référence extérieur. Une extraordinaire force potentielle est ainsi gaspillée. C'est pourquoi nous pensons qu'une reconstruction du mouvement communiste est nécessaire et qu'à terme la formation d'une nouvelle force politique ne pourra être évitée.

MESSAGE du

BUREAU NATIONAL DU P.S.U.

Le **Parti Socialiste Unifié** a voulu s'associer ce soir, comme il s'y est associé de toutes ses forces militantes, en 1968, à la protestation que des militants du mouvement communiste international élèvent contre le maintien de l'occupation militaire russe en Tchécoslovaquie et contre la répression qui continue de se développer contre les militants révolutionnaires tchécoslovaques, dont le seul crime est de jeter à la face des occupants le vieux mot d'ordre du mouvement socialiste international : « **Un peuple qui en opprime un autre ne saurait être un peuple libre** ».

Les événements qui se sont déroulés en Europe depuis 1968 ont démontré l'inanité des arguments invoqués par le Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique pour justifier l'intervention des forces armées du Pacte de Varsovie contre la Tchécoslovaquie socialiste. Que l'on se souvienne que le prétexte de l'invasion fut la volonté prêtée aux dirigeants tchécoslovaques de renouer des relations diplomatiques avec la République Fédérale Allemande ; que l'on s'en souviennen après la signature du Pacte Allemagne Fédérale-U.R.S.S. et du pacte germano-polonais.

En réalité, nul ne s'est trompé sur les mobiles réels de l'intervention soviétique : c'est le jour où la République Populaire Tchécoslovaque a commencé de s'orienter irrésistiblement vers l'organisation des conseils ouvriers, de la base au sommet ; a commencé, dans l'enthousiasme de tout le peuple tchécoslovaque, de bâtir cette démocratie des producteurs sans lesquels il n'est que des caricatures de socialisme, que l'armée soviétique a lancé ses blindés contre les ouvriers tchèques et slovaques.

Et nous n'oublions pas que, comme un signe prémonitoire, la presse officielle soviétique a désapprouvé en termes identiques à ceux de nos gouvernants capitalistes, le grand mouvement révolutionnaire français de mai 1968.

La restauration de la démocratie socialiste en Tchécoslovaquie, l'évacuation des troupes soviétiques est une nécessité absolue pour le développement des mouvements révolutionnaires dans les pays capitalistes d'Europe occidentale.

La coexistence pacifique des puissances impériales de l'Est et de l'Ouest est la Sainte-Alliance des rois contre les peuples. Ensemble, nous la briserons.

N.D.L.R. — Par suite d'une défectuosité d'enregistrement, nous n'avons pu reproduire le texte de l'intervention de M. Livio Labor, militant chrétien italien, coordinateur national du « Mouvement Politique des Travailleurs d'Italie ». Nous nous en excusons vivement et insérerons son texte dans le prochain numéro de « Vérité Tchécoslovaque ».

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

Vous venez de vivre — ou de revivre — ce meeting de solidarité internationale à nos camarades tchécoslovaques et comprenez la nécessité de ne pas laisser le voile de l'oubli tomber sur l'oppression dont ils sont victimes.

C'est vrai que, pour les larges masses, l'affaire tchécoslovaque s'estompe et que des événements nouveaux, dramatiques sont mis en avant, imposés par l'actualité politique, comme Burgos, Gdanzk et Gydnia, le procès de Léningrad, etc. Mais la protestation contre les dénis de justice, la répression meurtrière, les atteintes aux libertés des peuples — dans lesquels malheureusement des pays socialistes tiennent aussi la vedette — ne doit pas nous faire oublier un instant les frères « normalisés » de la Tchécoslovaquie occupée ; le combat pour leur indépendance, pour leur droit de démocratiser le socialisme, est inséparable des autres luttes que nous avons à mener.

Justement, parce que les staliniens d'U.R.S.S. et de France, d'accord sur ce point avec l'impéralisme international, veulent qu'on ne parle plus de la Tchécoslovaquie, qu'on considère cette occupation et ses conséquences comme un fait acquis, nous devons sans cesse mobiliser les partisans du socialisme, alerter l'opinion : c'est le seul moyen de saisir aux poignets les néo-staliniens et d'empêcher que la « normalisation » s'étende a des arrestations, à des procès, à des condamnations de dirigeants élus par les instances régulières de leur Parti et approuvés par la quasi unanimité du peuple

tchécoslovaque. C'est aider la résistance tchécoslovaque à stopper la « normalisation » et à préparer la reconquête de l'indépendance.

1.200 citoyennes et citoyens, parmi lesquels plus de 600 membres du Parti Communiste Français ont signé la « Déclaration du 5 janvier 1970 », c'est bien parce que jamais nulle pétition de ce caractère n'atteignit un tel résultat. Mais c'est peu parce que des dizaines de milliers de partisans du socialisme, en France, sont pour le rétablissement de la souveraineté de la démocratie populaire tchécoslovaque.

Il faut donc que le meeting du 26 novembre soit le point de départ — et non l'aboutissement — de notre campagne : faites signer la Déclaration du 5 janvier à des centaines de camarades dans les entreprises, les chantiers, les universités, les bureaux, les quartiers, les immeubles. Dès qu'une dizaine de signataires peuvent être réunis, constituez un Comité du 5 janvier, qui entreprendra son propre travail de propagande, pour que nos frères tchécoslovaques ne soient pas oubliés, pour que la protestation mondiale, résistant à l'estompage du temps, les aide dans leur action **pour une Tchécoslovaquie libre et socialiste.**

SIGNEZ !

FAITES SIGNER !

La déclaration du 5 Janvier

pour une Tchécoslovaquie libre et socialiste

Le 5 janvier 1968, le Comité central du Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie évinçait de sa direction le groupe stalinien de Novotny et votait de premières résolutions qui firent naître l'immense espérance du « Printemps de Prague ».

A l'occasion du 2e anniversaire de cet événement capital, les soussignés renouvellent leur condamnation de l'intervention armée menée en août 1968 contre la Tchécoslovaquie, contre sa classe ouvrière et contre son Parti Communiste, afin d'empêcher l'application des résolutions de janvier et de celles qui suivirent.

Les soussignés considèrent que la désapprobation de l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie, formulée en août 1968 par une partie importante du mouvement communiste a constitué à ce moment-là un acte positif.

Cependant, pour sauver durablement dans la conscience des travailleurs, l'espoir qu'ils peuvent mettre dans l'avènement d'une société vraiment socialiste, cette désapprobation, sous peine d'apparaître comme un geste inconséquent et platonique à l'usage des autres partis de gauche et de l'opinion publique, devait se prolonger par la condamnation, dans notre pays, d'une prétendue « normalisation » actuellement imposée par les armées étrangères à un pays dont 87 % des habitants avaient approuvé l'orientation politique vers un « socialisme à visage humain ».

Approuvant les décisions essentielles de janvier 1968 qui tendaient à informer largement les masses travailleuses, à s'informer sur leurs aspirations et à les entraîner à la gestion de l'Etat socialiste, les signataires dénoncent les tentatives actuelles tendant à dissimuler, à minimiser ou à faire oublier en France les effets de l'intervention militaire contre la Tchécoslovaquie socialiste. Ils réaffirment donc leur solidarité avec ceux qui tentèrent de créer une société socialiste où le pouvoir des mains des bureaucrates passe aux mains des travailleurs.

Ils s'efforceront de faire connaître en France la vérité sur la Tchécoslovaquie, et notamment le contenu des déclarations des dirigeants destitués par ordre de l'occupant et mis actuellement dans l'impossibilité de présenter publiquement leur défense.

Ecrire à **René DAZY - 25, rue d'Hauteville 75 - PARIS-10e**

LISEZ

" VERITÉ TCHECOSLOVAQUE "

BULLETIN DU

COMITE DU 5 JANVIER

le n° 2 est paru

Ce numéro contient le texte intégral de l' « Appel du mouvement socialiste des citoyens tchécoslovaques », *des documents de l'instruction des procès politiques, une interview de Jiri Pélikan, et d'autres documents inédits.*

l'exemplaire : **1 F**

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DIFFUSEZ LA BROCHURE

Le Meeting du 26 novembre

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No. 190

MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL DISSIDENT COMMUNISTS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA



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[Selected speeches from booklet edited by "Committee of 5 January"; Paris, Le Meeting du 26 Novembre 1970 -- Discours et Messages, French, pp 3-9, 11-14, 16-33, 36 and 43-45]

[p 3]

On 26 November 1970, the Great Hall of the Mutual Insurance Building in Paris was filled with the partisans of socialism, both young and veteran, students, workers, white-collar employees, civil servants, cadres, and intellectuals with various leanings.

For the first time, a meeting was being held for the renewal of socialism -- this was therefore not an anti-Soviet or anticommunist meeting -- and against the deviations which disfigure it, such as the armed intervention against Czechoslovakia and the ensuring "normalization."

While the bureaucratic distortions and those responsible for them were being denounced, the socialist regime was exalted there and the presence of foreign communists, of noncommunist supporters of socialism, on the speaker's platform reflected at once the spirit of internationalism and union in which the "Committee of 5 January," the organizer of this event, had prepared the meeting.

The speeches and messages read from the speaker's rostrum have been collected and constitute this modest brochure which each reader is invited to publicize or disseminate; the purpose is to leave a record of this important event which undoubtedly will have its aftereffects.

For a socialist and independent Czechoslovakia; for the renewal of socialism.

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[pp 5-8]

Speech by Charles Tillon

I want to thank you for coming to this meeting organized by the Committee of 5 January for a free and socialist Czechoslovakia with the support of organizations inspired by these same feelings.

I deeply appreciate the honor which was bestowed upon me in having me preside over this assembly before you, side by side with the men of high conscience and great merit whom I salute in your name. They will speak tonight in a Paris that is faithful to its duty and to its proudest traditions. In a Paris which thinks of Prague, a Paris which is Paris only in the fight for liberty.

We have gathered here to assert our brotherly and active solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia but also for the purpose of giving this solidarity a new impetus, worthy of the history of the French working class and of all currents of thought which aspire to socialism in France.

On this rostrum, I salute -- in your name, with respect and affection -- the presence of our Comrade Jiri Pelikan, by right the irrevocable member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which was to meet at its regular congress on the eve of the very day when tanks, with misled soldiers perched on them, restored a brand of barracks socialism in Prague. We have gathered here to proclaim that, though some people may have to leave their country so that they will not have to shut up, there are no expatriates for a communist because there is not just a single Fatherland of socialism but rather a whole world to be won, for all socialists. We have gathered here to recall that it was Marx who proposed the universal declaration of the rights of socialist man, which confounds all of its adulterers. We have gathered here in the name of those who, in our country, share the same feelings, the same determination to address our virile and brotherly homage to the Czechoslovak people, and our duties as fighters for socialism with a human face, since a pleonasm has become indispensable in our language so as to distinguish that which has perished from that which remains most noble for the future of all mankind. It is under this sign that our meeting tonight assumes its international significance of solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and with all peoples who are fighting for their liberty and their independence.

Everything we know about the outraged Czech people makes us feel its indignation, its sufferings, and makes us admire its unquenchable courage. But the thing we are most concerned with now, the thing that you expect from this assembly, is that which will

help us do something useful, in other words, anything that can help wipe out the consequences of the crime which was committed against an entire people. One thing we are sure of and that is that the cause of socialism in Prague is invincible and that there will be no more resignation of conscience on the part of the supporters of socialism and liberty in our country.

That would just about conclude my remarks here if I had not felt the need personally to bear witness here to the irrepressible love of the Czechoslovak people for liberty by telling you in a few words what I think about its past trials and tribulations. First of all I might recall the Prague I knew once upon a time, in 1938, in the very heart of all of the torments of a Europe threatened by Hitler. Above all, I want to tell you why I think as I do. Amid all of the blood shed in two wars, we think back first of all to the first of these wars, which was called the "War of Right" because we were made to believe that we were fighting for the freedom of peoples to settle their own affairs! This is not the story of a veteran fighter, a story which helps make the young people laugh at the expense of the past while this veteran is offered -- by way of the future -- only the political gerontology of the men in power or their compliant allies.

It was during this first world war -- and my communist heart still beats joyfully as I think of this -- that an immense people won its freedom to settle its own affairs through a triumphant revolution in October 1917! It was then that the partisans of socialism throughout the world had the duty to join ranks to defend the country of the Soviets.

In France, moreover, we faced the duty of confronting the government in order to smash foreign intervention against the first country which had joined battle for a socialist way. There were communists -- who at that time were not card-carrying because there was no party -- who asserted themselves in action against their own government by proclaiming "that a people which oppresses another people cannot be a free people." I say this in order not to cast the shadows of the present over the past. I say this also because, after more than 50 years, it is up to all peoples to judge socialism in each country in terms of what it has taught them. When we see the genius of Soviet scientists animate their fantastic robot on the moon, we admire them. When these same scientists -- on the land on which they live -- demand simple respect for the rights of man as proclaimed by the French Revolution 180 years ago, we are not engaging in anti-Sovietism in holding that the time has come to revise that Sovietism there.

But it is only Prague which I want to remember here now, the Prague whose firm friends we can count here tonight, I am sure, in

much greater numbers than there are cobblestones on its streets. It was a few days before Munich in 1938. I had gone there as a member of a delegation from the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, charged with assuring the Czech party of our active solidarity in the common defense of the cause of peace. Prague and Paris at that time looked as much alike as a couple of sisters. But Prague daily lived submerged in the popular mass that had come from all over the country to express to its government its determination to support it so as to preserve liberty and independence which were in peril.

Suddenly the news arrived from Paris that France was mobilizing the first reserves of its army in order to confront the aggression which was feared at the time. In just an hour, before our very eyes, the city, at first fever-swollen, was emptied of all of its able-bodied men. Then night fell on an entire people, resolutely determined to make the greatest sacrifices. On that day in Prague I saw the unforgettable resolution of a great people.

On his return to Paris, Daladier had himself acclaimed by a crowd -- still the same crowd, the crowd that turns up whenever there are great social fears -- acclaimed because, with Chamberlain, he had decided that they would abandon Czechoslovakia to its tragic fate. That was a betrayal of the interests of everyone and you know what misfortunes followed this.

I owe it to history to say that only in France did the Communist deputies and two or three others refuse to forget about the liberty of the Czech people and vote against the crime of Munich. This duty is the honor of a party.

When the Germans occupied the Sudetenland, I had to go to Prague, in the name of the International Red Cross, to help organize solidarity with the revolutionary militants who had to flee before the invader. One day I was slowly crossing St Charles Bridge, accompanied by a Prague comrade, when a Czech Army officer, who had heard us talk French, turned around and walked toward us. He clicked his heels. This soldier expressed his disgust over the fact that France had betrayed his country. He was one of those men of duty, whose face I see again and again, under the occupation, when we dreamed of liberty for all nations.

Finally, when the people had defeated fascism -- and we must not forget the measure of sacrifice made by each people -- I had the tremendous joy, in Prague, in 1947, on the occasion of a memorial ceremony, to run into the old comrades of the FTP [Franctireurs of the Fatherland] who were among the best who had fought in the French Resistance. But my happiness quickly gave way to pain as I thought of those who had suffered under torture or who were assassinated during the term of office of Novotny, the normalizer before January...

The Czechoslovak people rallied around the Communist Party, which at last produced its popular and creative air, by driving him and other persecutors out. This, then, is the place for the glory of the Prague Spring, its drama and the struggle that remains, a struggle to which we give our determination and our strength. For us, Czechoslovakia remains in the very heart of the struggle for a peace which we really want without any strings attached. But it also has no liberty in the center of a Europe where -- through it is fortunately true that the forces of social progress have, in West Germany, driven back those who still feel sorry about having lost the war -- on the other hand the spirit of Munich has reappeared in the shadow of Yalta, with the abandonment of the Czech people who are political prisoners and prisoners of a certain war potential -- in a word, delivered up to the political and military subversion of an occupation which, before all the world, is but the denial of socialism.

In France, unfortunately, we cannot teach anyone any lessons in socialism. For that, we tend to forget too often that the people are also responsible for their rulers. But our experience in 1968 will not be distorted by those "who try to wash away the stains with dirty hands." We assert our confidence in the struggle that will enable France to have a socialist, democratic, and independent future, a struggle for the action alliance of all partisans of socialism throughout the world.

This is the way we want to make our friendship and our solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia effective in this trial from which it will emerge victorious.

[p 9]

Message of Edward Goldstucker, Member, Central Committee, Czechoslovak Communist Party

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, dear comrades.

I would have liked to greet you in person but since I am unable to do so, permit me to tell you something, in a few words, which I have always wanted to bring to your attention.

I am convinced that the 1968 Prague Spring, that is, the effort of the Communist Party and the people of Czechoslovakia to establish a socialist democratic regime corresponding to the needs, the level of development, and the traditions of this country, will -- in the history of socialism -- be considered as a historical event and experience comparable to the glorious Paris Commune.

To all those who fight for socialism, to all those who would like to see a just and free social order emerge from the threatening crises of our times, the Prague Spring -- in spite of its brutal suppression -- will serve as an indication of the real possibility of socialism with a human face, that is, a socialist regime that springs from the revolution, that introduces the guarantees of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizen into its structure, and that thus creates conditions under which all production forces, all creative energies of society may be mobilized to attain its goals.

This is why the Czechoslovak effort in 1968 everywhere, among socialists and democrats alike, triggered such great interest and this is why its suppression is not a "family affair" between Moscow and Prague, as the "normalizers" insist in picturing it as, but rather a vital issue for the destiny of socialism throughout the entire world.

Do not forget, dear comrades and friends, no matter where you are, that it is your cause which is at stake today in that little country in the center of our continent.

[p 11]

Message from Communist Party of Australia

The Communist Party of Australia unequivocally maintains its position on 21 August 1968, that is, that the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the USSR and the other four powers of the Warsaw Pact was unjustified and unjustifiable.

On 5 January 1968, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had adopted a new course toward a socialist democracy and toward worker self-management. This new support received massive popular support from the workers, peasants, intellectuals, and students in the Czech and Slovak parts of the country. The Australian Communist Party hailed this as one of the most important developments for the future of the world revolution.

The reasons given to justify the occupation were wrong and unfounded. The occupation has struck at the very cause of socialism in Czechoslovakia and in the entire world and it has moreover tarnished the prestige of the Soviet Union and the other countries implicated in this.

The events which occurred in Czechoslovakia afterward neither repaired, nor mitigated the misdeeds that had been committed; on the contrary, they reduced the chances of socialism in that country.

The only possible outcome is that which comes from the socialist principles in the matter of international relations, such as they were established by Marx and developed by Lenin: immediate withdrawal of all occupation troops, restoration of national independence and of the autonomy of the Czech and Slovak nations, of their communist parties, of their labor unions, and of all their mass organizations, so that they may resume their own road toward a renewal of socialism and progress toward democracy.

For the Executive Commission: Laurie Aarons, National Secretary.

[pp 12-14]

Address by a Young Czechoslovak Revolutionary Socialist Woman

I am happy to be able to speak at this meeting on the basis of communist positions. As a matter of fact, until very recently the Stalinists were able to block any criticism coming from the left-wing opposition. The very fact that this meeting could be held, shows that we have turned another page in history.

We have witnessed the process of renewal in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the "Prague Spring" has become a famous word throughout the world. Today, after 2 years, we can better appreciate its development and its rapid fall.

In 1968 the economic and social crisis reached such a degree that a change in the political concept became a necessity for the majority of the ruling bureaucracy itself. The discontent of the workers and their aspiration for a change also played a great role.

But this process had to be imposed against the will of the conservative and Stalinist wing which held dominant positions in the party and government machine, positions gained during the fifties. The changes to come thus fundamentally threatened their personal interests.

This meant that the Dubcek win had to obtain support from certain groups outside the party, groups which criticized the Novotny leadership.

The change which appeared in the beginning as a purely internal affair within the party, soon -- thanks to the mass communications media -- became the affair of the entire people. The reaction to this change was quite a bit more spontaneous than the new leadership had anticipated. The ceaselessly growing activity of the masses in

the implementation of these changes sprang from the working class's aspiration to participate in the management of the state.

The reformist wing had been incapable of taking the lead in this activity and becoming a real worker vanguard.

This leadership instead tried to channel this activity in an artificial manner. This led to Sik's conception of the worker councils and, shortly afterward, the almost identical official proposals revealing the ideological and political roots of the liberal wing in Stalinism.

In none of the official concepts -- coming either from the labor unions, or from the different variants of the government projects concerning socialist enterprise -- do we find the idea of the political centralization of the councils and the resultant creation of new power structures of the working class and all other working people. In other words, the institution of the direct power of the workers. This was a technocratic conception, entailing a real danger that these councils might degenerate, as we saw in Yugoslavia.

Material incentive was emphasized, first and foremost, and the emancipation of man and his participation in the constant changes in society only played a secondary role.

In spite of this, this evolution triggered fears in the Kremlin whose propaganda increasingly emphasized the danger of counterrevolution which supposedly existed among us.

In spite of the inability of the reformist wing to become an authentically Marxist vanguard, we must emphasize the fact that it remained a guarantor against a possible restoration of capitalism on the political level and on the government level. Those who dared talk of such a danger in Czechoslovakia in 1968 are the same who identified the Novotny regime with socialism.

Bourgeois propaganda did not really have any outlook in Czechoslovakia. The biggest example of bourgeois propaganda which the Kremlin could cite -- and while I was in Czechoslovakia I became sure that they did everything they could do along those lines -- is the Manifesto of 2,000 Words which urges the workers to organize themselves in worker councils.

One of the most positive aspects of this evolution was that, for the first time in 20 years, there developed a broad political discussion on the contradictions of our society as well as an increasingly consistent criticism of the past.

Only the upsurge in the activity of the masses could guarantee their true advance. Its most progressive manifestation was the spontaneous constitution of the worker councils. That was the beginning of a true revolutionary process whose fundamental aspect was not understood by the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

There is however no doubt that Dubcek's policy was able to prepare the ground for the development of socialism, that is to say, of a society which would exclusively be based on the activity of the organized masses.

It seems to us however that this process could only have been managed better, in terms of all of its consequences, by a new vanguard which politically and ideologically was not weighted down by the distortions of the past. This new vanguard is neither a product of our thought, nor an attempt to import tendencies from capitalist countries into Czechoslovakia.

It was primarily in the eyes of the younger generation that the Czechoslovak Communist Party was unable fully to satisfy its needs. Its policy did not guarantee the new generation any sufficient prospects. This distrust on the part of the younger generation has manifested itself many times -- especially in August 1969 -- and is beginning to take on specific organizational forms. This is not a conflict between the generations but rather the establishment of a new revolutionary concept which would install a government of the workers, organized at the base, in the place of the power of the bureaucracy.

The antibureaucratic movement and the aspirations of the Czechoslovak workers to manage their own affairs themselves however can be realized only under the condition that there be a new revolutionary Marxist party which, tying in with recent and comparable experiences, would fight for proletarian democracy.

We cannot condemn the intervention of the five Warsaw Pact powers only on the basis of moral positions and because the fundamental rules of international law were violated. The intervention, which was designed to prevent the counterrevolution, in fact had to defend the interests of the bureaucracy.

Its consequence is an even greater blot on socialism in the eyes of the broadest strata and especially in the eyes of the younger generation.

Likewise we must condemn the fact that the activity of the workers and especially of the working class in the enterprises was wiped out to a great extent by this act.

We will under no circumstances accept this state of affairs. The conscious elements of the Czechoslovak working people and especially we of the younger generation will fight against this.

We believe that this struggle for a true proletarian democracy in Czechoslovakia is a part of the international socialist revolution.

Liberty for the socialist opposition in Czechoslovakia!

Long live the antibureaucratic revolution!

[p 16]

Message of Ernst Fischer

Dear friends and comrades:

I am very sorry that my poor health does not permit me to attend this meeting with you.

The democratic revolution of the Czechs and Slovaks and the birth of a socialist democracy in Europe were more than just a historical interlude: they furnished proof that a socialist democracy was possible, that it was the best way to arm the people, to give it initiative, to bring to bloom friendship, solidarity, imagination, and the full awareness of what was beginning to be born there.

We entertain no illusions: the defeat of socialism in Czechoslovakia has not been imposed for just a short period of time. But the agreement among peoples in the struggle for their liberty, in Indochina, in Latin America, in Spain, and in Greece is inseparable from the struggle for liberty in Czechoslovakia, a struggle which is not over because the irresistible force of the people will wind up by putting an end to the "big-power" policy.

[pp 16-17]

Speech by Vercors

It is possible that the date of 21 August 1968 will go down in history as the darkest day in the second half of the 20th century. The extent of a human catastrophe is not necessarily measured by the blood that was spilled, by the number of dead, but by the gravities of the immediate and the more distant repercussions. The intervention in Budapest, 14 years ago, had already rudely hurt revolutionary

consciences. The Red Army had fired upon the people! That is where it lost its innocence. At least we learned later on that the danger of a counterrevolution, followed by the danger of a third world war, had not been negligible. Armed intervention found an excuse there, in the absence of justification. We know without the slightest shadow of a doubt that no such danger accompanied the Prague Spring. That, on the contrary, this spring gave the communist parties of the entire world an audience which they had never had before. At the very same time after the May Barricades, the French bourgeoisie were no less afraid of this glimmer to the East which seemed to build a bridge of revolution in truth and joy between Paris and Prague. The intervention of the Soviets served to reassure it, much more so than the intervention of the CRS [Republican Security Companies]. Order prevailed in Prague and order prevailed in Paris -- One could once again sleep peacefully. Especially so since the impact that had been felt throughout the world by the sister parties had so shaken these parties that they could not stop disintigrating. And so it was rather with the help of the Soviet government that the walls fell, as if after an earthquake.

For a long time the bourgeoisie no longer had reason to fear that a revolution might spring from these walls which were crumbling. The important thing thus was to rebuild them. But we entertained no illusions: this is a long-term job. Especially since it must not and cannot be undertaken against the existing parties which still have the confidence of the majority of the workers. The thing now is to get everyone to become aware of what is going on because this awareness will serve as the rallying point for this reconstruction.

The ideal thing would be for the criminal error of 21 August to be revealed in all of its gravity as a cataclysm, if not to those who committed it and who certainly would never agree that they were wrong, then at least to the most honest and the most clear-sighted elements in Moscow and Prague.

This is why I personally believe that we must never put an end to our protests, that we must never abandon ourselves to resignation and fatigue. The future of socialism undoubtedly will cost us that price.

[pp 17-19]

Address by Franz Marek, member, Politburo, Austrian Communist Party, 1945-1968

Dear comrades:

In talking to Czechoslovak friends, especially those who live in their country, you sometimes hear a remark -- which is tantamount

to a reproach -- to the effect that they feel somewhat forgotten. Not just in the diplomatic sense but also forgotten by us, their friends, those of us who are forced to confront the problems we face each day in our lives.

One could reply to this quite legitimate concern by paraphrasing the formula of Jaures, changing just one word in it:

"If we look at events in progress in a superficial manner, we actually overlook Czechoslovakia; but as we look into them, in depth, we always run into Czechoslovakia."

The thing that links the unsubjugated of Prague to the sacrifices of Annam is that Yaltatization of world policy, the policy of blocs which actually blocks the policy of the progressive movements.

And the thing that unites the ousted comrades in Prague and Bratislava to those in other normalized parties is that very process of "normalization" which tends to cement all that which is abnormal in the worker movement.

We must thus pose for ourselves the problem of solidarity with Czechoslovakia in a general framework. I would like to contribute something to this by emphasizing two aspects of the problem here today:

In our meetings with true socialists from the Soviet Union and from the people's democracies, we sometimes had trouble finding a common language. It so happens that they do not understand what is going on in the Left in the Western countries. The problems of the national liberation movements in the forgotten continents do not preoccupy them as much as they concern us. Haunted by the specter of Stalinism, they often repeat -- when the subject of China comes up -- the formulas presented by the official propaganda of their countries, although they detest it. We must clearly understand the difference in the points of departure: the documents which reach us from over there sometimes look a little bit too liberal to us; and those which reach them from us seem a little bit too democratic to them. One could say, by way of simplification: because they aspire to a true socialism, they speak above all of democracy; whereas we, who call for true democracy, speak above all about socialism.

I know very well that this is an oversimplification, for what it may be worth, but I use it to bring out the specific nature of the conditions complicating attempts to find a basis of agreement and understanding with our friends from these countries.

Now, it seems to me that this is a prime necessity and that a revolutionary perspective, which would not take this necessity into account, would be nothing but a Leftist variant of the bloc policy. It is here that the experiences of Czechoslovakia and the knowledge of our Czechoslovak friends could help us find a link.

For example, let us take the great idea of direct democracy of the producers which, in Czechoslovakia, found expression once again in the worker councils, in spite of all of their limitations.

Today we often hear the phrase about the "Spring" according to which the issue was to make a synthesis between democracy and socialism in a socialist democracy. Presented by people who were nostalgic for democracy such as it was between the two wars, this formula cannot satisfy us. The synthesis of a socialism, which is not one with a democracy that was not one, could not lead to a socialist democracy.

It is the return to the idea of direct democracy -- which penetrated the worker movement during the 10 days that shook the world -- which made the Czechoslovak worker councils so important during the 7 months that filled the worker movement with hope.

This great idea, which was buried during the time of Stalin, shows the road to a true socialist democracy. The revolutionaries of East and West can meet thus from different points of departure.

Here, it is the establishment of the fact that bourgeois democracy stops at the entrance to the factory or the workshop. Over there, they already have the experience that, if self-management stops at the exit of the factory or the workshop, if direct democracy is not extended to all areas, then self-management loses its life blood and we do not arrive at the State our classical authors describe as no longer existing in the true sense of the word.

And we will then have to say: while young Marx wrote that the so-called Christian states are not a government expression of Christianity, one could add today that the so-called socialist "states" are not yet a government expression of socialism.

Let me say it again: in the ideological crisis that pervades the worker movement in Europe we must place the question of solidarity with Czechoslovakia within the framework of an agreement of the progressive forces of East and West. The idea of direct democracy should permit us to find common ground.

Now a few words on the second aspect of our solidarity with our Czechoslovak friends. We have recently observed certain interesting

signs in that country, especially the open polemic between the leadership team that was imposed and the Stalinist extremists -- attempts at seduction to regain a party of technicians, postponement of trials that had been announced, release of a comrade who had been under arrest, etc. We know very well that this is not a democratization of the "normalized" regime, not even a liberalization, and that this is not the time to proceed to an analysis of this mini-new-look, of its relationships with certain diplomatic negotiations, with economic difficulties, etc. However, one cannot make politics without taking into consideration all the nuances and it may be that, within some time, w e w i l l have posters announcing a debate meeting in the Lucerna Hall in Prague on the topic: "Tell me, Mr Bilak!" That is possible...

But that changes nothing in the problems raised by 21 August 1968 which are still with us, just as the questions taken up in the action program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party adopted in April 1968 are **still** with us and just as we retain our conviction that fires were lighted, during that memorable year of 1968, in Paris and in Prague which one must not allow to go out.

[pp 20-25]

Speech by Roger Garaudy

We must speak out here today because others **must** keep silent.

The thing that was crushed by normalization in Prague is the historical initiative of an entire people and its Communist Party to build a model of socialism that would correspond to the requirements of their country. This is not an external event: this is a blow which directly strikes each one of us, each one of those who, throughout the world, want to build socialism.

There is no valid argument for remaining silent.

The principle of noninterference in the affairs of another party is sometimes mentioned in this connection.

But when the Soviet leaders -- in excommunicating Yugoslavia -- openly called upon the Yugoslav people to rise against the state and the party of their country, nobody said anything about noninterference; people rivaled each other in hurling insults to justify Soviet interference.

When the Soviet leaders -- in an effort to exert political pressure against China -- broke all their contracts in order to disorganize its economy, many communist parties behaved as if they had no duty of proletarian internationalism toward the Chinese Communists. Far from invoking no interference, they engaged in the worst slander to justify Soviet interference once again.

When the Soviet leaders -- in the name of "normalization" -- imposed the Stalinist model upon Czechoslovakia, the same parties kept silent and this silence has the same purpose as the vociferations against Yugoslavia or against China. This was not a matter of respecting the principle of no interference but rather of once again being an accomplice to Soviet interference.

Some people also at length bring up the argument that any protest would only nurture anti-Soviet and anticommunist campaigns. But the thing that feeds anti-Soviet and anticommunist campaigns is the failure to denounce these crimes and the fact that one is an accomplice in them. It was not anti-Sovietism to denounce the crimes of Stalin; and it is not anti-Sovietism to denounce those of Brezhnev. On the other hand, one is only playing the game of all anticommunists when, through our silence, one approves a "normalization" which gives communism a repugnant face.

Finally we are told: "normalization" in Czechoslovakia is an external problem which does not concern the French people. This is another lie because the thing that was crushed in Czechoslovakia is the socialist future of France.

From January to August 1968, the Czechoslovak communists showed that socialism is not the suppression of the conquests of bourgeois democracy but is on the contrary the destruction of its limitations.

At first, they ended censorship, political trials, the crime of expressing an opinion, all of the "formal" liberties which the capitalist countries no longer guarantee, as the recent political trials in the United States and France prove.

Then they began to create the agencies of socialist democracy: a direct democracy, not a delegated and alienated democracy. In the capitalist countries, each worker, on one day every 3 or 4 years, is gladly given the title of sovereign individual on election Sunday, when he delegates and alienates all of his powers in one day; but on the next day, on Monday morning, he once again finds the monarchy of the bosses at the gates to his factory. Bourgeois democracy is thus based on a double lie: a political lie because, on this level, it is nothing but a delegated, alienated democracy; an economic lie because,

on the economic level, democracy is radically excluded. The attempt at direct democracy represented by the worker councils marks the break with this capitalist system of the double lie and of the double abdication as well as the break with the model of a bureaucratic and authoritarian socialism where everything is decided "topside," by the party and government machines, speaking in the name of the working class, without the latter really becoming involved in the decision.

With the creation of worker councils, Czechoslovak communists embarked upon the road of socialism as defined by Marx: a "free association of workers;" they embarked upon the road of socialism, as defined by Lenin when, before his death, he detected the first bureaucratic distortions and recalled that the Soviets could not only make socialism for the people but make it through the people; they embarked on the road of a socialism whose first concern was to release the historical initiatives of the masses, even though the conditions and the means may be very different: The initiative of the Paris Commune and of worker control during the October Revolution, the initiative of the Yugoslav self-management program and of the people's communes in China. Like the Paris Commune, like the Soviets in 1905, the worker councils in Czechoslovakia are a creation of the rank and file. The moment the party put an end to the system which had prevented the new generation from fully exercising its creative aptitudes, the impetus came from the bottom up, from the workers themselves: at the Wilhelm Pieck machine-building plant the first initiative to create democratic economy management agencies appeared. The real "Prague Spring" above all was that effort to set in motion the vast masses of the people who had been depoliticized by despotism and who were again becoming the true subject of history by passionately participating in the creation of their own future.

The merit of the leaders is that they understood this and that they helped this movement develop. Now, from that point on, what are the mistakes which they could commit and which one inevitably makes when one embarks upon a new road, the moment these leaders have accomplished the first duty of any revolutionary leader: the duty of detecting the direction of the great historical initiatives of the masses, helping them take shape and develop instead of imposing prefabricated frameworks upon them. Henceforth, in every enterprise, all of the workers, both manual and intellectuals, directly (and not through delegation to bureaucrats) decided everything that concerned the life of the enterprise.

The worker council draft, prepared by the workers at the Wilhelm Pieck plant, received the official support of the party and the State.

Thus hundreds of enterprise councils sprang up. On the basis of this living experience, the government published the draft of a basic law for the establishment of worker councils. That was in July 1968; the discussion and the voting were scheduled for the end of August; but the tanks crushed this hope during the night of 20 August.

Under Soviet occupation, at the 7th congress of the Czechoslovak labor unions, in March 1969, Karel Polacek, chairman of the Central Council of Labor Unions, came back to the concept of labor unions as held by Lenin who in 1920 said: "Our State is such today that the totally organized proletariat must defend itself and we must use these worker organizations in order to defend the workers against their State so that the workers may defend our State." One of the essential tasks of the labor unions, added Lenin, is "the struggle against the bureaucratic distortions of the Soviet apparatus."

Vlastimil Toman, president of the Metal Workers Federation, told the same congress, in the name of 1 million metal workers, that his federation "was not inclined to pay for appeasement at the price of sacrificing civil rights and freedom of the press."

Strougal, the Czech Politburo representative at that congress, made himself the spokesman of the Soviet occupiers when he demanded that the worker councils be dropped. His motion was rejected by the congress which represented more than 5 million workers.

After that, by the will of the occupier, collaborator Strougal became chairman of the council, whereas Karel Polacek, chairman of the Central Council of Labor Unions, and Vlastimil Toman, president of the Metal Workers Federation, who had been reelected by the Congress of Labor Unions, were stripped of their functions in November 1970. A few weeks later the Soviet occupier ordered its "collaborators" to abrogate the right to strike. "Normalization" is primarily this: the systematic repression of any attempt on the part of the workers or the intellectuals to decide their own destiny for themselves.

This is why all this is not just the affair of the Czechoslovak people. It is the affair of all of us. This is why we have not come here today at this sad moment in history, to ruminate on the past. The most manly way to assert our solidarity with the Czechoslovak communists, who are victims of normalization, is to reflect upon the significance of their "Spring" and to revive it here in France by working out -- with all those who want socialism, without any discrimination whatsoever -- the ways, the forms, and the model of a socialism that will correspond to the needs of our country.

First of all because the march toward a renewal of socialism is not blocked only in Prague by tanks. When a Communist Party refuses to be silent in the face of this crime against socialism, as represented by normalization, the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to encourage or create a split so as to be able to have at least one fraction available which unconditionally accepts their orders, as happened in a particularly noticeable manner against the communist parties of Greece, Spain, Finland, Austria, Great Britain, Portugal, Australia, and quite a few others. The crisis in the International Communist Movement has sprung from the determination of the Soviet leaders to impose their bureaucratic and Stalinist system as the only model of socialism. Each party henceforth must choose: it can either become the propagandist of this imported model or it can denounce it as a caricature of socialism, if it wants to be among the builders of socialism in its own country. Any party that agrees to become the propagandist for the Soviet model by keeping silent in the face of its perversions and crimes condemns itself to powerlessness and sterility.

It is not a coincidence of history that, after the October Revolution, all peoples who achieved socialism by their own means, did so outside the schemes of Stalin and Brezhnev, in China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, or Cuba.

The march to socialism is also blocked by the importing of outdated schemes which enable us to understand neither the developments of capitalism at the end of the 20th century, nor those of the working class, nor those of the forces which, side by side with the working class, are the standard-bearers of the future. Silent "normalization" stifles living revolutionary thought and action. We rise against it, tonight, for the renewal of socialism.

In our struggle for socialism, we are no longer facing the capitalism of the steam engine or the flintlock, but rather the capitalism of the computer and the intercontinental missile. And this requires a new analysis and a new strategy.

The forces that are the standard-bearers of the revolution are not only those that are excluded from consumption but also those that are excluded from the decision-making process: first of all the working class and, with it, the millions of intellectuals and students who are moving toward it and who increasingly constitute a bloc with it, as demonstrated by the eruptions of May 1968. And this calls for a new concept of unity.

The conditions of the revolutionary struggle for socialism, in our country, are not those of a predominantly agricultural country, where the working class was a minority in an uneducated mass, where it was forced underground and into an organization run on army discipline, where, consequently, a professional apparatus speaks and commands in the name of the class.

In France, socialism cannot be forced upon our people from the outside but, on the contrary, must be born of its most profound aspirations and must spring from the rank and file initiatives of the working class and the intellectuals who have adopted its historical perspective as their own. And that calls for a party of the new type.

Such is the basic triptych for the renewal of socialism in France: new analysis of class relations and new strategy; new concept of unity; new-type party.

We have no enemies among those who pursue such a goal: neither among the communists, who are beginning to be aware of the sterility to which the observance of the Stalinist schemes of Brezhnev has led them, along with silence on the sordid anti-Semitism which is developing in Poland and in the Soviet Union, nor among the socialists of all shades who are becoming aware that a socialist party, wherever it was in power, has never built socialism, nor among those who are called "Leftists" and who have become aware of the powerlessness of reformism and the powerlessness of the many tiny little groups that only had speculative links with the working class, nor among the Christians who, after having experienced the evil-mindedness of the "Christian parties" throughout Europe, with good reason aspire to political expression.

The issue is not -- neither tonight, nor tomorrow -- to create a center of opposition to the French Communist Party, nor to any other force of socialism in France, but everywhere to bring to life centers of impetus, of common search and action. To release the historical initiative of the rank and file, along the example of the Prague Spring, and to search for and create the conditions of unity and effectiveness of all of those who want to build socialism in France.

The only problem is to find out whether, beyond all of our disagreements, we can choose between barbarism and socialism, as Rosa Luxemburg put it.

Socialism, the hope of everyone, can only be the work of everyone: of those for whom socialism has the face of Jaures or of Lenin, the face of Trotsky, the face of Mao Tse-tung, or the face of Camillo Torres.

The problem is to unite the class and the bloc, all those who do not wish to be fenced in by the limitations of the capitalist system, all those who refuse to be integrated into it, all those who fundamentally challenge its direction, values, and ultimate purposes.

This is not an eclectic rally without principle. On the contrary, with a clear awareness of our disagreements, and without wishing to claim any kind of leadership role, without pretending to create a group, a party, or an international that could only divide the movement even further, the important thing now for everyone is to ask ourselves about the model of socialism which we want to build, about the conditions of our unity and our effectiveness.

A youth who today lives in the age of the apocalypse of Hiroshima and the Chinese Revolution, a youth who has embarked upon a conscious road between the irreversible challenges of the 20th congress of the Bolshevik Party and Vatican Council II, such a youth could not conceive a defensive socialism, a socialism that fearfully entrenches itself behind walls, tanks or censorship, but rather an offensive socialism, sure of its own significance.

The important thing now is not to provide alibis for those who do not recoil before the barbarism of genocide in Vietnam, against which we demonstrate together, tonight, from the Bastille to the Republic; but rather to cast away the masks which, by disfiguring socialism, weaken the common struggle against imperialism and for Vietnam.

From the Caribbean to the Andes mountain range and from Guinea to Vietnam, victories are being won against the common enemy in various forms. Let us not reject any of the lessons or possibilities emerging from them -- not to import them or to imitate them, but to use them to help us solve our own problems by inventing perhaps unheard-of means.

It is up to us now to turn the extinct volcanoes on and make them roar.

Beyond the outdated schemes, we must find ways to recover the elan of what all of the nascent socialist revolutions were; let us find ways to revive the spirit of the Paris Commune and of the October Revolution, of the Chinese Long March, of the epic of Vietnam, and the Prague Spring; let us find ways to recover the initiatives of thought and action of Rosa Luxemburg and of Antonio Gramsci.

This way, and only this way, will we be present today not at a wake but rather at a birth, at the beginning of our common long march for the recovery of hope.

[pp 26-33]

Speech of Jiri Pelikan

Dear comrades, dear friends.

I would first of all like to thank, with all my heart, the organizers of this meeting, the Committee of 5 January, the organizations and comrades who participated in its preparation, the foreign comrades who have come or who have sent messages from different countries, and you all who are here tonight, at the Mutual Insurance Building, to express your solidarity with the struggle of the Czechoslovak people against the occupation and "normalization," for an independent, democratic, and socialist Czechoslovakia.

Your gesture is all the more important since the present regime imposed upon Czechoslovakia by the occupation is trying to crush the resistance of the popular masses by asserting that they are isolated and abandoned and that there is nothing left for them to do but to accept this so-called new reality. As if they had forgotten that we all became communists and socialists not to accept "reality" but, precisely, to change it.

Your gesture is all the more important since our people can observe, with a certain degree of concern and bitterness, the depressing hesitation and silence on the part of many of those to whom we are linked by the same goals of socialism and who, though they condemned the military intervention in August 1968, are gradually beginning to reconcile themselves to its consequences.

This is why your presence here is a concrete confirmation for our people that there are communists and socialists, that there are revolutionaries who are not abandoning their comrades in arms, even if they suffer blows and wounds, and who consider the struggle of our people to be their struggle.

We come back today to that magnificent movement of 1968, known under the name of "Prague Spring," because, in spite of its particular features, it expressed the objective problems, the contradictions, and also the possible solutions of a new development in all socialist countries, in the entire socialist movement, especially in the industrialized countries. This is because the Prague Spring was neither

a palace revolution, nor a liberal movement, nor a chance explosion. It had been maturing for a long time within a socialist society, as a consequence of the contradictions between the ideals and the practice of socialism, as a consequence of the inability of the bureaucratic system successfully to solve the many problems of political, economic, and cultural development, and to assure a democratic participation of the people in the development of policy.

The study and analysis of all of the documents of the party and government agencies, of thousands of resolutions emanating from different organizations and from the demands of the citizens, published at the time of the Prague Spring, convincingly confirm the fact that this entire movement had a socialist character, that the idea here was not to weaken but, on the contrary, to strengthen socialism.

Can one say that the renewal and enlargement of all civil, democratic rights, especially the right of free expression, was "antisocialist"?

Can one say that the principle of self-management of the enterprises by the workers and of government agencies by the citizens was "antisocialist"?

Can one say that the autonomy of the labor unions and of other mass organizations, cooperation -- on a basis of equality -- between different political groups and interests around a socialist program was "antisocialist"?

If these aspirations had to be considered antisocialist and counterrevolutionary -- as official government propaganda in Prague and Moscow claims -- then one would have to exclude from the Communist Movement the majority of the leaders and the members of the Italian, Spanish, British, French, and other communist parties who included these points in their fighting program for a socialist society!

Of course, one can criticize the Prague Spring in connection with certain errors. On this subject, I would like to emphasize that we ourselves, the Czechoslovak communists, who participated in this movement and who are today faithful to its ideas, are not unconditionally defending everything that was done, said, or written, because such a democratic movement cannot be carried out without extremist positions and, above all, we do not intend to picture it as a "model" for the others. But one must not forget under what internal and external objective conditions this movement was born and developed. One must not forget that it was only the liquidation of personal power in the party and government leadership, in January 1968, which opened the road to political and ideological activity and which, in the course

of a development full of struggle and debates, made it possible for the purposes and the methods of this new policy to take shape gradually.

At the same time, the new leadership under Alexander Dubcek was constantly subjected to pressure from the Stalinist conservative forces abroad and at home.

This process was very well described by the eminent Austrian Marxist Ernst Fischer:

"As the dash and conscience of the workers increased gradually, the movement became a democratic revolutionary movement, a second revolution which in an increasingly evident fashion revealed all of the elements of direct democracy, of a transformation of all human relationships."

I think that this gradual transformation of the movement for partial reforms of the centralist-bureaucratic system into a movement toward direct democracy is one of the laws of development of socialist society, not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in Poland, in Hungary, and in all of the other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union.

Every day, in the speeches of Husak and the other representatives of the so-called new leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, one can hear words to the effect that the Soviet Army has come among us to save socialism because there was no other solution -- in view of the fact that there was no force in the country that could have defended it.

1. What good can this socialism be if it does not have the support of the people in its own country and if it must be guided and upheld by a foreign army?

2. Since -- according to the declarations of Husak and others -- socialism has today been consolidated in Czechoslovakia, why does that country still have to have a foreign army which has only come to save it?

It is quite clear today that the real reasons for the occupation of Czechoslovakia were represented by the fear of the Stalinist bureaucracy, in Moscow and in certain other socialist countries, of the success of the Prague Spring and of the contagiousness of its example: the fear that the workers and other population strata of the socialist countries might become aware of the possibility of changing the Stalinist form of socialism.

This test would have been vital, not only for the people of the socialist countries, but also for the future of socialism, particularly in the industrialized countries.

There are people on the Left who do not like to state this bitter truth and this is why they cling to every scrap in an effort to create illusions according to which this only involved tragic and temporary misunderstandings and that everything will fall into place in the end. Recently, they have begun to console themselves by pretending that a definite turn is taking shape in Czechoslovakia. But on what are they basing these judgements?

Passages from some of Husak's latest speeches have been selected and these passages concern the need for improving relations with persons that do not have any party affiliation and with the intelligentsia, or passages to the effect that, within the framework of the internal struggle in the leadership group, some representatives of the "extremist" tendency have been shifted to other jobs, or that the political trial of the signers of the "10 Points" -- a trial whose date had already been set -- was postponed.

Let us therefore briefly compare the declarations of the leaders of the present occupation regime and reality such as it is:

1. According to the statements of Husak and the so-called new leadership, the Communist Party has become stronger and has re-established its leading role.

In reality, the Czechoslovak Communist Party has been decimated, demoralized, discredited, and turned into an obedient tool of the power of the occupation forces. It has lost the confidence not only of the unaffiliated masses but also of the majority of the communists. In the course of the purge, almost half a million communists -- including the most active ones, especially workers, young people, and intellectuals -- were thrown out or left the party voluntarily because they disagreed with its policy. In effect, there are still many members in the party who do not agree with the occupation and with the policy of the present leadership but who, for reasons of existence, to hold on to their jobs, feign passive agreement, which is an additional element of demoralization and constitutes the nucleus of future conflicts.

Power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of men who play the Soviet game but who struggle for power among each other. In this struggle, Husak and his group get support from Brezhnev and his supporters in the Soviet leadership: whereas the other group -- the extremists -- get support from the high command of the Soviet

occupation units and their protectors in certain circles in the army and the "Security" in Moscow. Any change in the Soviet leadership would thus automatically lead to changes in Czechoslovakia due to the fact that neither of these two factions has the confidence of the country's population.

2. According to the assertion of the alleged "new leadership" there is now a consolidation of government agencies in progress.

The fact is that we can witness not only the complete liquidation of the democratic rights of the citizens but also of the representative agencies which -- purged of deputies -- have once again become the "transmission belts" for approving decisions made by the party apparatus which itself has been "purged."

3. According to Husak and the so-called "new leadership," socialist legality has been strengthened and they are using only "political" means to fight against the adversaries of "normalization."

In reality, they are legalizing unlawfulness, after the fact, so that one can today be "legally" arrested for anything at all and so that one can be sentenced for simply having expressed a different opinion. The Western press admits that there are no more "political trials" in Czechoslovakia. The fact is that people are arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned, or released without any court verdict and without explanation. Moreover, hundreds of workers and young people have already been sentenced or are awaiting judgement.

So far there have not been -- and we certainly hope that there never will be -- any trials of the representatives of the leadership elected with Dubcek; this is primarily due to the fact that the regime is afraid of the reaction from public opinion throughout the world and in the country and that it above all fears the new contradictions which such trials might produce in the International Communist Movement.

I have charged, dear comrades and friends, by our comrades in Czechoslovakia who cannot be here tonight, and who cannot even write to you, to express to you their appreciation and their profound thanks for all of your actions against persecution in Czechoslovakia. It was especially these actions which forced the regime to postpone the trial of the people who signed the so-called "10 Point" petition; to order the conditional release of Tesar, Batek, and to send Pachman to a hospital; by the way, he was in very poor condition.

It is to a great extent your actions and your solidarity which can mitigate the persecution and this is why it is necessary not only

to continue these actions but to step them up! We know that psychological preparation for new trials continues through scandalous slander campaigns against Dubcek, Smrkovk [Smrkovsky], Kriegel, and other communist leaders accused of treason, collaboration with foreign intelligence services, revisionism, Trotskyism, and Zionism, without having the slightest possibility of defending themselves against these public charges.

4. According to Husak and the so-called "new leadership," we are now witnessing the return to the practice of centralized leadership which has already failed before and which led to a situation we all are familiar with: the newspapers are full of news on the ways in which plans for coal extraction have been exceeded and at the same time there is a disastrous shortage of coal and electric power. One can read that merchandise reserves are increasing in the warehouses but at the same time the people cannot buy prime necessities. It is said that foreign trade with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is increasing whereas Czechoslovakia's debt toward these countries is going up. There are appeals for the construction of housing but the housing crisis is getting worse.

Self-management in the enterprises and the worker councils have not only been liquidated but have today been declared "instruments of the counterrevolution." The purged labor unions have once again become "transmission belts" whose primary mission is to force the workers to increase their output.

5. According to Husak and the so-called "new leadership," we are witnessing a turning point among the intellectuals.

In reality, this is only a new tactic which consists in differentiating the intellectuals into "good ones" -- those who accept the new reality and who are promised pardon -- and bad ones, those who remain faithful to the ideas of the renewal and on whom war is declared.

Hundreds and thousands of representatives of the intelligentsia including many pre-war communists and many who emerged from the working class, under the socialist regime, have been fired from their jobs at universities, scientific institutes, and schools on all levels and they can no longer find jobs in their skills. Hundreds of our best journalists have been fired from the editorial boards of newspapers, from the radio and television and they have been condemned to silence. Terrible damage, difficult to evaluate, has been and is being inflicted upon the culture of our country. It is no coincidence that this painful situation has struck the pen from the hands of the best writers and has driven some of them to suicide.

6. According to Husak and the alleged "new leadership," the alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union has become stronger; the authority and security of our country have grown.

The fact is that the sincere friendship of our people toward the Soviet Union has suffered a terrible blow due to the occupation. The Czechoslovak Army, which was one of the best armies of the Warsaw Pact, has been demoralized and humiliated and it has become the weakest link in the Pact.

In the field of foreign policy, Czechoslovakia must in a servile manner follow Soviet big-power policy directives, as demonstrated, for example, by the scandalous attitude of the Czechoslovak authorities toward the representative of the Cambodian national government, of Sihanouk, in Prague, the insidious actions against the Greek communists in Czechoslovakia, the establishment of consular relationships with Franco Spain, the participation in the campaigns against the Chinese People's Republic, the unconditional acceptance of the Brandt-Brezhnev accords, etc.

In summary, we can see very clearly, from these contradictions between official declarations and reality, that the so-called "normalization" in Czechoslovakia is essentially a combination of occupation and a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat which brutally established an oligarchic and conservative dictatorship of the Stalin type that is based on the party, "security," and occupation army apparatuses.

The present regime is plunging Czechoslovakia into the distortions of the dark years of the past, at the very moment when, in other socialist countries, there is a search for new ways to emerge from stagnation and crisis.

We are sometimes asked: why is the struggle of the popular masses against the occupation and the regime imposed by it not better organized? Much misunderstanding derives from the fact that the situation in Czechoslovakia is being compared with the situation in Vietnam or in Greece or in Brazil. Some people have a tendency, likewise, to judge the strength of a popular movement according to spectacular actions, such as, for example, demonstrations, kidnapping diplomates, hijackings, or assassinations.

People do not everywhere appreciate the fact that this is a struggle of an entirely new type, a new experience: this involves a socialist opposition in a socialist state occupied by another socialist country. This is why the methods of this struggle are also different and can emerge only in the course of its development.

What we have here is not just some direct and overt actions, such as, for example, the distribution of tracts, illegal literature, strikes, material assistance to the victims of persecution, etc., but we also sometimes have here a complex combination of resistance against the present leadership with participation inside the institutions, wherever this makes it possible to win jobs and to achieve the solution of the vital problems of the population.

But the opposition against the occupation is very widespread and it is presently developing into a broad movement around a program which is essentially the program of independence and the renewal of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, the pursuit of the principal ideas of the policy of January 1968.

The declaration of the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens, drafted in the course of a conference of the different groups in October 1970 in the Prague suburbs -- which the Committee of 5 January has just published in its bulletin Verite tchecoslavaque, No 2 -- is a very important step in this direction.

This document also answers an essential question which is sometimes asked with a certain degree of doubt: that is, whether it is possible to change the situation that exists in Czechoslovakia at this time, and how. The document clearly states:

"The future of Czechoslovakia is inseparable from world evolution but it will depend on us to exploit a given situation and the concrete content which we will give to the eventualities that present themselves will also depend on us."

The document starts with the realistic idea that the Czechoslovak people alone -- under the conditions of an occupied country -- cannot fundamentally change the balance of power and win but that it must not wait passively and that it must fight for its rights by using methods which are in line with its possibilities and its traditions. It is of course understood that a decisive change can come about only as a result of changes in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries. These changes certainly will come about, but not automatically, or only in the wake of the technological and scientific revolution. Their development and their extent will depend first of all on the pressure from the broad masses of these countries, including the struggle of the Czechoslovak people and also the support of the progressive forces throughout the world.

Moreover, the entry of the Chinese People's Republic into the world political arena, as well as the entry of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, who have liberated themselves from colonialism,

will gradually lead to the liquidation of the hegemony of the United States and the USSR; this will prevent the partition of the world among these two big powers and this will enable the other states to play their own role.

New currents and developments are emerging in the International Communist and Progressive Movement. The will to build the socialist society, according to the will of the people, is asserting itself increasingly, and the people reject the Soviet model or any other model; they reject the hegemony of just one party in the worker movement.

The Czechoslovak socialist opposition sees its allies in all of these currents and considers itself an integral part of this international movement. We hope that all of these currents and tendencies, which are oriented toward the common purpose in spite of their disagreements, will find in themselves not only revolutionary elan but also sufficient tolerance for a real dialogue and for a search for common ways.

All of the demonstrations of exclusiveness, tending toward the hegemony of this or that group, sectarian attitudes, mutual accusations and new dogmas -- all of these are but the vestiges of the past and they slow down the forward march of the new revolutionary forces.

Dear comrades, I would once again like to thank you for your solidarity, which is a tremendous encouragement to our people, and I want to ask you not to let up but, on the contrary, to win more and more supporters and to develop your action in all forms: from meetings and demonstrations, from moral and material support for persecuted comrades, all the way to protests against arrests, firings, etc.

At the same time you must develop your effort so that all communist, socialist and progressive parties, the workers, as well as the personalities in the world of culture and science, the students, all those who want progress, democracy, and socialism, will demand of the leadership of the CPSU that it accept the only true solution to the Czechoslovak crisis, that is:

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory;

Return of Alexander Dubcek and all other leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party who were illegally fired from their jobs;

The convocation of the elected delegates of the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, so that they may continue their work which was interrupted on 23 August 1968;

The annulment of the so-called Moscow Protocol which was imposed by military dictate.

By fighting for these fundamental demands of the Czechoslovak people, you will at the same time be fighting for a way out of the present crisis in the International Communist Movement and for a new offensive of socialism throughout the world.

This is the principal message which must emerge from this meeting and which can give new hope and the strength to believe in the future of socialism.

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Telegram from Il Manifesto

Committed to the battle of obstruction against the anti-worker decrees in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, we cannot participate in your demonstration on Czechoslovakia.

We express our agreement in terms of the condemnation of Soviet intervention against a courageous rank and file movement directed against bureaucraticism and [for] social-democratization.

We are convinced that the crisis of the countries of Eastern Europe will be overcome through the revival of the class struggle and the restoration of the values of communism.

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In Conclusion

You have just lived through -- or relived -- this meeting of international solidarity with our Czechoslovak comrades and you understand the need for not letting the curtain of oblivion fall upon the oppression whose victims they are.

It is true that, for the broad masses, the Czechoslovak affair is fading away and that new, dramatic events take the limelight, imposed by political reality, such as Burgos, Gdansk, and Gdynia, the Leningrad trial, etc. But the protest against the denial of justice, against murderous repression, against the attacks upon the freedoms of the people -- in which, unfortunately, some socialist countries are also to be found -- these must not for an instant cause us to forget the "normalized" brothers in occupied Czechoslovakia; the struggle for their independence, for their right to democratize socialism, is inseparable from the other struggles we must fight.

It is precisely because the Stalinists in the USSR and France -- agreeing on this point with international imperialism -- do not want us to talk about Czechoslovakia anymore and want us to consider this occupation and its consequences as an accomplished fact -- it is precisely because of this that we must ceaselessly mobilize the supporters of socialism and alert public opinion: this is the only way to stop the neo-Stalinists and prevent "normalization" from extending to arrests, trials, and condemnations of leaders elected by the party regulars and approved almost unanimously by the Czechoslovak people. This means aiding Czechoslovak resistance in stopping "normalization" and preparing the reconquest of independence.

One thousand two hundred citizens, including more than 600 French Communist Party members, have signed the "Declaration of 5 January 1970"; this is good since no petition of this kind has ever achieved such results. But this is not much because tens of thousands of supporters of socialism in France are for the restoration of the sovereignty of Czechoslovak people's democracy.

The 26 November movement must therefore be the point of departure -- and not the end -- of our campaign: see to it that the Declaration of 5 January is signed by hundreds of comrades in the enterprises, at construction sites, universities, in offices, residential areas, and other buildings. The moment 10 signers have been gotten together, you must establish a 5 January Committee which will do its own propaganda work so that our Czechoslovak brothers will not be forgotten, so that world protest, resisting the effects of the passage of time, will help them in their action for a free and socialist Czechoslovakia.

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The Declaration of 5 January for a Free and Socialist Czechoslovakia

Sign! Get others to sign!

On 5 January 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ousted from its leadership the Stalinist group of Novotny and adopted the first resolutions which gave birth to the immense hope of the "Prague Spring."

On the occasion of the second anniversary of this capital event, the undersigned renew their condemnation of the armed intervention in August 1968 against Czechoslovakia, against its working class and its Communist Party, so as to prevent the application of the January resolutions and those that followed.

The undersigned believe that the disapproval of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, expressed in August 1968 by a large portion of the Communist Movement, constituted a positive act at that moment.

However, in order to salvage -- in a lasting fashion, in the conscience of the workers -- the hope which they can place in the advent of a truly socialist society, this disapproval -- lest it become an inconsistent and platonic gesture for use by other left-wing parties and public opinion -- must go on to condemnation, in our country, of the alleged "normalization" presently imposed by foreign armies on a country 87 percent of whose inhabitants had approved the policy orientation toward a "socialism with a human face."

In approving the essential decisions of January 1968 which tended to inform the working masses at length about their aspirations and which tended to involve them in the management of the socialist state, the signers denounce present attempts aimed at dissimulating, minimizing, or erasing in France the effects of the military intervention against socialist Czechoslovakia. They therefore reassert their solidarity with those who tried to create a socialist society where power would pass from the hands of the bureaucrats into the hands of the workers.

They will try to bring the truth about Czechoslovakia to France, especially the content of the statements of leaders ousted by order of the occupier and presently unable to defend themselves publicly.

Write to Rene Dazy, 24, rue d'Hauteville, 75, Paris, 10.

5058
CSO: 01690/71-W

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