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DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SOVIET-LED INVASION
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AUGUST 1968

1. From Problems of Communism May-June 1971, Vol. XX. United States Information Service.

WHO INVITED WHOM?

The question poses itself, Who invited these armies in? . . . The question was never discussed to the end; it has not been resolved. No names have been published. When the matter was discussed in Bratislava, Prague and Moscow with our leaders, all members of the leadership of the federal and the Slovak parties, without exception, gave their word of honor that they were not involved in any such *démarche* and had no knowledge of it. *I know of no leading personality in Czech or Slovak political life of whom it could be said with certainty he had taken this step. . . .* (Emphasis added.)

—Gustav Husak's statement, reported in *Pravda* (Bratislava), Aug. 29, 1968.

[The Soviet occupation] is an act of use of force which cannot be justified by any means. It did not take place upon request or demand of the Czechoslovak government, nor of any other constitutional organs of this republic.

—Speech of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek at the UN Security Council, New York, Aug. 24, 1968, *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1968.

[The occupation] happened without the knowledge of the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Premier, or the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.

—Radio Prague, Aug. 21, 1968, attributed to the Presidium of the CPCS Central Committee.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia knew nothing of any invitation to the armies of the Warsaw Pact. We are dissociating ourselves from everything that has been done and is being done except by the legally, democratically elected leadership of the party and state.

—Radio Czechoslovakia in Slovakia, Aug. 22, 1968.

Heeding the *appeal of the party and state leaders and the Communist and working people of Czechoslovakia, and taking into consideration the danger created for the gains of socialism in that country, at that time we, together with the fraternal socialist countries, adopted the decision to give Czechoslovakia international aid in defense of socialism. . . .* (Emphasis added.)

—Leonid I. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress, Moscow Radio, March 30, 1971.

Thousands of Communists, individual citizens, and entire collectives of the working people, representatives of all strata of the people and of diverse organizations, including members of the CPCS Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, as well as members of the Czechoslovak government and deputies to the National Assembly and the Slovak National Council . . . began to turn to the leaderships of the fraternal parties and also to the governments of our allies, begging them in this historically grave moment to grant international assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of socialism. . . . (Emphasis added.)

—CC CPCS, "Lessons Drawn from the Critical Developments in the Party and Society after the 13th CPCS Congress," *Pravda* (Bratislava), Jan. 14, 1971.

On behalf of our delegation, we want to express from the rostrum of this Congress [the 24th CPSU Congress] our sincere thanks to the CPSU, to the Soviet government and the Soviet people for having understood the anxieties of the Czechoslovak Communists regarding socialism and their appeals for help. . . .

—Gustav Husak's address to the 24th CPSU Congress, Radio Moscow, April 1, 1971.

2. DECLARATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT

The text, as issued in English by the Czechoslovak Embassy in London, of the declaration made on August 21, 1968, by the Czechoslovak government.

To All People of Czechoslovakia:

Today, Czechoslovakia has been occupied by the military forces of the five states—members of the Warsaw Treaty—against the will of its government, the National Assembly, the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the people.

Thus for the first time in the history of the international communist movement occurred an action of aggression against a state administered by a Communist Party, an action carried out by allied military armies of the socialist countries.

The crisis has continued since the early morning hours. The constitutional organs of the republic are deeply disrupted, the individual members of the government, the National Assembly, the leadership of the Communist Party, the National Front and other organizations have no possibility of mutual contact nor that with the population of the country, which has spontaneously given them their trust during the recent months.

The council of the members of the government and the leadership of the party, leading deputies of the National Assembly and other representatives are detained. The semilegal Czechoslovak radio station, maintained only with the greatest efforts of its employees, remains as the last link of communication. It is being gradually silenced. Even under the above circumstances the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

and the constitutional organs together with the leadership of the party want to carry out their constitutional duties and safeguard the normal life in the country.

We call on you, Czechs and Slovaks, citizens belonging to the national minorities, all citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, with the following appeal:

1. We demand an immediate withdrawal of the armies of the five states—members of the Warsaw Treaty—as well as correct adherence to the treaty and full respect for the state of sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.

2. We urgently demand that the governments of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic and the Bulgarian People's Republic issue an order to stop the armed actions during which lives are lost and material values destroyed in our country.

3. We demand that normal conditions for the activity of Czechoslovak constitutional and political organs be immediately created and the detained individual members of those organs released in order that they can renew their activities.

4. We demand an immediate commencement of the session of the whole National Assembly before which the complete Czechoslovak government can stand with its position toward the settlement of the existing situation.

To all citizens of the country!

We appeal to you to assist in the above demands of the government, primarily by:

1. Showing—just as you have already done many times in the past—the necessary statesmanlike reason, and unifying your strength around the legally elected Czechoslovak government which ex-

ists and to which you have given your full trust this past April.

2. Not permitting that by any other way another government be installed at the head of our republic than the government which has been elected under free democratic conditions and in observance of all principles of our Constitution.

3. Urging the workers of factories and other workshops and offices to display their support of the position of the Czechoslovak government to the headquarters of the occupational forces and the governments of the five countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

4. Creating conditions for the preservation of order.

Exclude all *ad hoc* actions directed against the members of the occupational armies. Ensure by your own means the necessary supply of the population with foodstuffs, water, gas and electricity in all regions, and arrange for the safety of enterprises and important equipment as well as for the prevention of other economic losses.

Dear Citizens,

We pass through difficult moments. The happy life of this country can be guaranteed only by the people who inhabit and work in it.

We believe that at this moment you will give your government full support and strength in the service of our socialist republic.

Citizens, it is still in our power to complete with your assistance the great task of renaissance which we embarked upon in January. The government believes that with your help we will do so without any unnecessary sacrifices and bloodshed.

3. DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The text, as issued in English by the Czechoslovak Embassy in London, of the declaration made on August 21, 1968, by the Czechoslovak National Assembly.

The deputies of the National Assembly have met and unanimously agreed on the following declaration at a time when the government and other organs cannot carry out their functions:

1. We fully agree with the declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Presidium of the National Assembly pro-

testing against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the five countries—members of the Warsaw Treaty—and considering it the violation of international law, the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty and the principles of equal relations among nations.

2. We demand the release from detention of the constitutional representatives, namely President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda, Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik, President of the National Assembly Josef Smrkovsky and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Czechoslovakia Alexander Dubcek, Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front Dr. Frantisek Kriegel, Chairman of the Czech National Council Cestmir Cisar, and others in order that they can carry out their constitutional functions entrusted to them by the sovereign people of the country.

The delegation which we have sent to the Soviet Embassy this morning has not yet returned. We protest against the fact that the National Assembly, the government and all bodies of the National Front are prevented from carrying out

their legal rights and the freedom of movement and assembly.

3. We categorically demand immediate withdrawal of the armies of the five states—members of the Warsaw Treaty—and full respect of the state sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. We call on the parliaments of all countries and the world public opinion to support our legal demands.

4. We empower a delegation of the National Assembly composed of Marie Mikova, Josef Macek, Josef Vallo, Pavol Peos, Josef Pospichal and Vaclav Kucera to enter into contact with the President of the National Assembly Josef Smrkovsky, the President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda, and the Prime Minister O. Cernik, in order to inform them about the above decision and agree with them on further procedure. The delegation will immediately inform the Czechoslovak people about the result of their negotiations.

5. We call on all the people not to take any violent action against the occupational armies and not let themselves be

provoked by various forces which want to gather proof for the justification of the intervention and use the situation for self-appointed actions.

Working people, citizens, remain in your workshops and offices and safeguard your factories and enterprises. Use all democratic methods for further development of socialism in Czechoslovakia! If necessary you will surely be able to resist by general strike. We believe that we will come out of these difficult moments with raised head and firm backbones.

At the above meeting, the Deputy President of the National Assembly Josef Vallo has likewise informed the deputies about his discussion with the President of the Republic in which Mr. Ludvik Svoboda expressed his approval of the calling of the plenary session of the Assembly.

6. In view of the fact that the government is primarily aware of the political consequences of the occupation and at the same time of its responsibility for the proper management of the national economy, it turns to all workers, peasants and

intelligentsia to constantly guard the interests contained in the declaration of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted at today's session and simultaneously turn their attention to the safeguarding of the industrial production, agriculture, transport and supplies in order to prevent a disruption of the national economy.

7. The government particularly calls on the young people—the hope of our nations—that especially they by a dignified and self-conscious calmness face the situation which has arisen and in no case give any pretext for useless sacrifices.

8. We call on all people to face the arguments about the necessity of military action from abroad by securing of the proper management of production and maintenance of calmness and sound reason. The government appreciates the support of all international progressive forces all over the world which has been given to our socialist republic in today's difficult situation.

4. Excerpts from the communique on Soviet-Czechoslovak talks 23-26 August 1968 between the Soviet leaders and the Dubcek leadership which had been spirited to Moscow in the wake of the invasion:

"During the talks in a free, comradely discussion the two sides considered questions relating to the present development of the international situation, the activation of imperialism's machinations against the socialist countries, the situation in Czechoslovakia in the recent period, and the temporary entry of troops of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovak territory....

"Agreement was reached on measures aimed at the speediest normalization of the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Czechoslovak leaders informed the Soviet side on the planned immediate measures they are carrying out with these aims in view....

"The troops of the allied countries that entered temporarily the territory of Czechoslovakia will not interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

"Agreement was reached on the terms of the withdrawal of these troops from its territory as the situation in Czechoslovakia normalizes...."

5. TASS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Text in Pravda and Izvestia, August 21, 1968.

TASS is authorized to state that party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have requested the Soviet Union and other allied states to give the fraternal Czechoslovak people immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces. The reason for this appeal is the threat posed to the socialist system existing in Czechoslovakia and to the constitutionally established state system by counterrevolutionary forces that have entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism.

The events in and around Czechoslovakia have more than once been the subject of exchanges of opinions by leaders of the fraternal socialist countries, including the leaders of Czechoslovakia. These countries are united on the premise that the support, strengthening and defense of the peoples' socialist gains are the common international duty of all the

socialist states. This common position of theirs was officially proclaimed in the Bratislava statement.

Further exacerbation of the situation in Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the security interests of the states in the socialist commonwealth. The threat to the socialist system in Czechoslovakia is at the same time a threat to the foundations of peace in Europe.

The Soviet government and the governments of the allied countries—the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Polish People's Republic—proceeding on principles of indissoluble friendship and cooperation and in conformity with existing treaty obligations, have decided to meet the above-mentioned request for giving the fraternal Czechoslovak people the necessary aid.

This decision is in complete accord with the right of states to individual and collective self-defense, as stipulated in the allied treaties concluded between the fra-

ternal socialist countries. It also complies with the vital interests of our countries in defending peace in Europe against the forces of militarism, aggression and revanchism, which more than once have plunged the peoples of Europe into war.

On Aug. 21 Soviet military units, along with military units of the above-mentioned allied countries, entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. They will be immediately withdrawn from the C.S.S.R. as soon as the threat to socialism's achievements that has developed in Czechoslovakia, a threat to the security of countries in the socialist commonwealth, is eliminated and the legal authorities find that the further presence of these military units is no longer necessary.

The actions undertaken are not directed against any state and to no extent infringe upon any state interests. They serve the purpose of peace and are dictated by concern for strengthening it.

The fraternal countries firmly and resolutely oppose their inviolable solidarity to any threat from the outside. No one shall ever be allowed to break off a single link from the commonwealth of social states.

6. Excerpts from the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee document: "Lessons Drawn from Critical Developments in the Party and Society after the 13th CPCZ Congress" --approved by the CPCZ Central Committee Plenum December 1970.

This general outline of the critical development in the party and society of the CSSR confirms that the process of subversion initiated by the rightwing and anti-socialist forces seized the entire field of public and political life--the economy, the ideology, and foreign policy. In August 1968 there emerged in Czechoslovakia a clear-cut counterrevolutionary situation, and our country reached the brink of civil war. The question of who would prevail emerged on the agenda in all sharpness. Either the counterrevolution, drawing support from international reaction, would complete its pernicious work or the socialist forces would succeed in warding off the counterrevolution and in defending the cause of socialism.

Communists and noncommunists who realized the deadly danger threatening our socialist system asked the leadership of the party and state to take a determined stand against the counterrevolutionary forces and to come out in defense of the achievements of socialism. These urgent appeals were contained in many resolutions and letters addressed to the CPCZ Central Committee. They remained without reply, however. At the time when the counterrevolutionary forces, striving to seize power, in Prague and in other places switched to open attack, the rightwing representatives in the party leadership assured the public that "everything was in order" and that "the process of renewal and democratization was successfully developing."

Thousands of communists, individual citizens, and entire collectives of the working people, representatives of all the strata of the people and of diverse organizations, including members of the CPCZ Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party as well as members of the Czechoslovak Government and deputies to the National Assembly and the Slovak National Council who realized their class, national, and international responsibility for the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia ardently sought a way out of the grave, critical situation. Because the rightwing part of the party did not want to adopt any measures which would frustrate the counterrevolutionary overthrow and ward off a civil war, they began to turn to the leaderships of the fraternal parties and also to the governments of our allies, begging them in this historically grave moment to grant international assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of socialism.

They did so in the profound conviction that their class brethren would not leave Czechoslovakia at the mercy of the counterrevolution which threatened bloodshed, and that they would prevent our country from being torn out of the socialist community.

Objective assessment and clarification of the causes and the interrelations of the profound crisis in which the CPCZ and all our society found themselves in 1968 irrefutably prove that the international forces, paralyzed by the policy of the rightwing representatives in the party leadership, were incapable of mobilizing and of stopping the frontal attack of the counterrevolution. In this situation it had to be decided whether one should wait until the counterrevolution evoked a fratricidal struggle in which thousands of people would die and grant international help only afterward, or whether one should come in time and prevent a bloody tragedy even at the price of an initial lack of understanding at home and abroad. The entry of the allied troops into Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 prevented such bloodshed, and was therefore the necessary and the only right solution.

A thorough examination of the facts relating to conditions in our party and in the whole country before August 1968 and in the later period confirms that any solution which did not include immediate outside help from the Soviet Union and other of our allies could have had no hope of success in conditions whereby the activity of our party was paralyzed and the Czechoslovak state system was on the brink of disintegration any other solution would not have led to saving socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The entry of the allied forces of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of internationalist solidarity which corresponded both to joint interests of the Czechoslovak working people and the international working class, of the socialist community and the class interests of the world communist movement. By this internationalist action the lives of thousands of people were saved, the internal and external conditions for their peaceful and calm work were safeguarded, the Western borders of the socialist camp were strengthened, and the imperialist circles' hopes for a revision of the results of World War II were foiled.

The CPCZ Central Committee rejects an abstract concept of the sovereignty of a socialist state as is spread by bourgeois propaganda to deceive the masses, and it holds positions which, in the question of sovereignty, are in line with the class and international substance of a socialist state. It therefore considers the entry of the allied troops into the CSSR as fraternal international assistance to the Czechoslovak people.

The international action of August for saving socialism in the CSSR created a firm background for the Czechoslovak communists who, thanks to this assistance, were able to fully develop their own political struggle against the counterrevolutionary, anti-socialist, and rightwing opportunist forces and overcome, through political means, the counterrevolutionary threat to the cause of socialism in the CSSR.

The true recognition of the entire background of the actual situation in 1969 and of all the motives for the entry of the allied troops into the CSSR shed the right light on all the lies, calumnies, and willful distortion of the facts about the August events as they were made up and spread by our domestic reaction, the rightwing opportunists, and foreign bourgeois propaganda.

The profound and correct understanding of the true purpose of these events is at the same time the decisive prerequisite for the creation of a sound political atmosphere in our country, for the strengthening of the ideological unity of the CPCZ and its united action on a Marxist-Leninist and international base.

After the entry of the allied forces, Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky, Frantisek Kriegel, Josef Spacek, Zdenek Mlynar, Stefan Sedovsky, Cestimir Cisar, and Vaclav Slavik deepened their betrayal of the interests of the party, the Czechoslovak people, and the international communist movement and took a further gamble: In the course of the night of 20-21 August 1968 they pushed through, in spite of principled opposition and disagreement from the Marxist-Leninist portion in the party leadership, a nonclass, anti-internationalist proclamation of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, the publication of which had catastrophic consequences.

After this perfidious act, Alexander Dubcek dissolved the meeting of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee. With his knowledge and behind the back of the party Central Committee, there was convened by the Presidium and by part of the city party committee in Prague--which was a well-known stronghold of the rightwing--the illegal extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at which the rightist opportunists wanted to assume full control of the party leadership and, above all, to proclaim a general struggle against the Soviet Union and mobilize all domestic and foreign anti-Soviet and anticommunist forces.

Following 21 August, the antisocialist forces turned the statement of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium--which in its substance was an unparalleled antiparty act--into their shield. The rightwing blackmailed thousands of members and officials of the party and compelled them to take their guidance from this statement. They pointed out that the communists must implement the decisions of the Central Committee Presidium of their party in a disciplined way. With the help of this statement, they fully opened the sluices to anti-Soviet hysteria and set moving the avalanche of chauvinism which made its outward appearance in sham patriotic appeals and slogans. An incredible disorientation arose because the counterrevolution deliberately, with the help of the communications media, evoked a headless panic. It turned upside down all basic terms and values. That which was legal was declared illegal, while all illegal acts of the counterrevolution were given the semblance of legality.

On the basis of the proclamation of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, the rightwing forced the adoption of similar statements on the government, the National Assembly, and other state and social organizations. The rightwing opportunists and counterrevolutionary forces extracted these nationalistic and anti-Soviet statements through moral terror and even threats of physical violence.

The counterrevolutionary role of the communications media culminated after 21 August in a tornado of chauvinistic demagogy to prevent Czechoslovak citizens from seeing the correct dividing line of the class struggle. At the same time, this demagogy was to arouse in our country and in the state the impression that what was involved was a nationwide patriotic movement. Many honorable communists and honest citizens of our republic succumbed to such an atmosphere. Through the fault of the overall misinformation and the deeply mistaken declaration of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, these people were unable to speedily discern the real truth

Some of them perpetrated acts which were contrary to their real convictions. They gradually convinced themselves, and are convincing themselves, of the correctness of the allies' international aid; they are sincerely sorry for their attitudes and acts at those times, and by honest work are expressing their allegiance to the cause of socialism.

7. Excerpt from "Theses on the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the CPCZ; Half A Century of Struggle for the Interests of the Workers Class and the Peoples of Czechoslovakia," Rude Pravo, 25 March 1971.

V

The Political Crisis and the Counterrevolutionary Attempt of the Antisocialist Forces To Achieve Radical Change of Social-Political Conditions in the CSSR (January 1968-April 1969)

20--The January plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee was an expression of the necessity for solving the growing crisis in the party and the society. Its purpose was to eliminate from the activity of the party and its leadership all that hampered the consistent implementation of Leninist principles, all that prevented the further development of the socialist society. In this spirit the results of the January plenum were welcomed by the majority of the party and the people.

The new CPCZ leadership was incapable of making use of the support of the majority of communists who for years had been striving to improve the party's work. By its irresolute and unprincipled procedure it freed the scope for a revisionist, opportunist trend in the party, for a purposeful and gradual attack against the foundations of the principles of our social system, which finally resulted in the counter-revolutionary attempt of the antisocialist forces to effect a change of social-political conditions in the CSSR. Some of the party leadership went over directly to the positions of rightist-opportunism and nationalism.

21--The counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia oriented itself toward the use of political, ideological, and economic methods for the destruction of the foundations of the socialist system and the gradual takeover of power over a long period of time. Under the slogans "revival," "new model of socialism," and "socialism with a human face," the destruction of socialist values and a revision of the basic principles of socialism were carried out and the party and the entire social system was systematically disintegrated; our friendship and alliance with the USSR were destroyed.

The rightist revisionist forces in the CPCZ gained supremacy in the party leadership. Owing to them the ideological, political, and action unity of the party was undermined and its leading role in society crippled. The communications media, including the party ones, gradually changed over--with certain exceptions--to the services of rightist opportunism and reaction. The majority of the people, including a considerable number of party members, lost their bearings in the situation. The action program approved by the 1968 April plenum reflected opportunist concessions and contained revisionist formulations, especially in basic questions of the party's leading role in society. Revisionist forces inside the CPCZ formed a second center in the party. Their endeavors culminated in the staging of the nationalist and anti-Soviet so-called Vysocany Congress.

In their struggle for positions of power, the revisionists joined forces with the openly antisocialist forces, the defeated remainder of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeois elements. The Domestic onslaught of the rightist forces was closely bound to the anticommunist centers and received their all-round assistance.

The rightist and antisocialist forces gradually disintegrated all the spheres of the public and political life--the party, state, the entire political system, economy, ideology, and our fraternal relations with the socialist countries. The foundations of the international security of our country were threatened. In August 1968 the counterrevolutionary development achieved such a state that our country stood on the verge of a civil war.

22--Devoted and honest communists--Marxist-Leninists--waged a tremendously difficult fight to save socialism in our country. The majority of honest forces devoted to socialism nevertheless remained split; there was no party leadership that would organize and direct them.

Since the rightist part of the party leadership did not want to adopt any measures which could thwart the counterrevolutionary putsch and ward off the civil war, the members of the party, the Central Committee, the government, and the National Assembly appealed to the leaderships of the fraternal parties and the governments of our allies, asking them at his historically grave moment to grant the Czechoslovak people international help in the defense of socialism.

The CPSU and the other fraternal parties followed with concern the grave threat to the positions of socialism in Czechoslovakia and warned the CPCZ leadership at conferences and meetings against the growing counterrevolutionary danger. After exhausting all political possibilities, in a situation when the domestic revolutionary forces were incapable of warding off the concentrated counterrevolutionary onslaught, the socialist states decided, on the basis of the request of many communists who had the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia at heart, in favor of the only possible solution in the given situation and sent their troops into our fatherland.

The entry of the allied troops was an act of international aid. It corresponded to the common interests of both the Czechoslovak working people and the international workers class, the socialist community, and the world communist movement.

The timely entry of the armed forces of the fraternal countries into the CSSR prevented a terrible tragedy; it also granted support to the domestic Marxist-Leninist forces and aided the necessary political differentiation in the party and the society. The revival of Marxist-Leninist principles in the domestic and foreign policy of the CPCZ and the CSSR progressed in a stubborn struggle against the rightist and counterrevolutionary forces, which continued trying to prolong and intensify the critical period. The historic struggle in the party and the society culminated at the 1969 April plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee.

8. Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev's address to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 30 March 1971.

No small place in the international events of the recent years was occupied by the political crisis in Czechoslovakia. There does not seem to be any need to set out the factual aspects of the matter as they are well known. Let us therefore dwell on certain, more important--from our point of view--conclusions to be drawn from what happened.

The Czechoslovak events reminded us yet again of the fact that the internal antisocialist forces which have survived one way or another in the countries that have begun building socialism can, in certain conditions, become more active and even embark on direct counterrevolutionary action in the hope of obtaining outside support from imperialism, which for its part is always ready to band together with such forces. In this connection, clearly manifested was the danger of rightist revisionism, which under the guise of "improving" socialism seeks to emasculate the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism and clears the way for the penetration of bourgeois ideology.

The Czechoslovak events demonstrated convincingly how important it is to constantly strengthen the leading role of the party in a socialist society and to continuously perfect the forms and methods of party leadership and apply the creative Marxist-Leninist approach to the solution of the pressing problems of the development of socialism. It was clear to us that this was not just an attempt by imperialism and its henchmen to overthrow the socialist regime in Czechoslovakia; it was also an attempt to deal a blow to the positions of socialism in Europe as a whole, to create favorable conditions for an attack on the socialist world by the most aggressive forces of imperialism.

Heeding the appeal of the party and state leaders and the communist and working people of Czechoslovakia, and taking into consideration the danger created for the gains of socialism in that country, at that time we, together with the fraternal socialist countries, adopted the decision to give Czechoslovakia international aid in defense of socialism. [applause] Under the extraordinary conditions created by the forces of imperialism and counterrevolution, we were pledged to this by our class duty, our loyalty to socialist internationalism, and our concern for the interests of our states and for the fate of socialism and peace in Europe.

The plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, in a document "Lessons of the Crisis Development," provided, as is known, the following assessment of the meaning of the collective aid of the fraternal countries. I quote, comrades: The entry of the allied troops of five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of international solidarity meeting the common interests of the Czechoslovak working people as well as the interests of the international communist movement. This internationalist act saved the lives of thousands of people and insured the internal and external conditions for peaceful and tranquil labor. It strengthened the western frontiers of the socialist camp and destroyed the hopes of the imperialist circles to revise the results of World War II.

We fully share the conclusion which was drawn by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The experience of life has again convincingly demonstrated that the fraternal unity of the socialist countries is the most reliable barrier in the path of the forces which are trying to attack and weaken the camp of socialism, to subvert and bring to naught the socialist achievements of the working people. The peoples of the socialist countries clearly demonstrate to the whole world that their revolutionary gains will not be given up, that the frontiers of the socialist community are inviolable and not to be encroached upon.

We are sincerely glad that the communists of Czechoslovakia successfully coped with the trials which befell them. Now the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is approaching its 14th congress, which we are convinced will be an important new stage along the road of strengthening the positions of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

9. Excerpt from the speech of Gustav Husak on 1 April 1971 at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We are sincerely pleased to be able to convey to you, delegates to the 24th CPSU Congress, and to all Soviet people ardent fraternal greetings from the Czechoslovak communists and from all our people. The congress of Lenin's party, which was the first to translate into reality the ancient dream of the oppressed and exploited, always arouses the profound interest of all those who fight against capitalism and imperialist aggression, for the just cause of peace, for democracy and socialism.

The Soviet people, under the leadership of its Leninist party, have covered a new stretch of their heroic path. They have overcome difficulties and obstacles, and with dedicated, creative work have achieved outstanding successes in the national economy, in science, technology, education, and in living and cultural standards. The Soviet Union is today the main guarantor of world peace and progress.

The Czechoslovak communists, all citizens of our homeland to whom socialism has become the meaning of life, have attentively familiarized themselves with the prospects which you are charting for yourselves at the present congress, and they follow the proceedings of your congress with exceptional interest. The Czechoslovak people value the enormous successes which you have attained and pay tribute to all those who, through their devoted everyday work, are fulfilling the immortal legacy of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. We are all aware of what immense significance your successes are, not only for the Soviet Union, but also for us, for Czechoslovakia, and the other fraternal socialist countries, and for the progressive and peace-loving forces of the world in general.

We are commemorating this year the 50th anniversary of the founding of the CPCZ. We realize anew, all that the glorious party of Lenin has meant and accomplished for the CPCZ from its very origin; how deep and ancient are the roots of friendly relations between our nations. The birth and first steps of the activity of the CPCZ enjoyed the immediate assistance of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The CPSU also helped our party later on in molding itself into a force capable of leading our people to victory over the bourgeoisie.

The Soviet Union and its party became a firm support for our Czechoslovak people in the period of the Munich diktat as well as during the enslavement of our homeland by Hitlerite fascism. Our nations will never forget that it was the heroic Soviet Army which liberated Czechoslovakia, thus rescuing our nations from fascist perdition. [applause] In the struggle for our freedom, there were fighting, side by side with the Soviet Army, Czechoslovak units commanded by Army Gen Comrade Ludvik Svoboda, who is now President of the Czechoslovak Republic and is today a member of our delegation.

In this joint struggle the firm friendship, sealed by joint bloodshed, was maintained. All of history convinces us that the Czechoslovak communists always attained successes in the struggle against capitalism and in building socialism when they nurtured close and comradely relations with the Soviet communists.

Every weakening of relations was to the detriment of our party and of our nations. We convinced ourselves again of this fundamental truth in the 1968-69 crisis years when the antisocialist forces of society, together with the rightwing opportunist and revisionist forces within the CPCZ and the all-round assistance and support of international reaction, attempted the overthrow of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, which as its logical consequence would have led to the threatening of the socialist position in Europe and to the revision of the victories of World War II.

These aims were thwarted only thanks to the timely international assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

On behalf of our delegation, we want to express from the rostrum of this congress our sincere thanks to the CPSU, to the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet people for having understood the anxieties of Czechoslovak communists regarding socialism and their appeals for help.

This international assistance saved our country from civil war, from counterrevolution, and helped to safeguard the achievements of socialism.

We Czechoslovak communists can confirm from our own example the correctness and wisdom of the ideas of Vladimir Ilich Lenin on the role and responsibility of the Communist Party under the conditions of building socialism. Our experiences confirm that a great threat to socialism always arises when under the slogans of so-called improving and so-called reforming of socialism, disunity and loss of the capability for action by the party leadership takes place; when socialism loses its revolutionary

content; when the party surrenders its leading role in society; when under the influence of petit-bourgeois opportunism it becomes ideologically divided, organizationally destroyed, and incapable of united action; when the principles of democratic centralism are being denied; when the class principles of the socialist state are ignored; and when proletarian internationalism is replaced by the hysteria of nationalism and chauvinism.

In Czechoslovakia such a separation from fundamental Leninist principles and also from the general requirements for building socialism took place. In 1968 the fundamental cause of the crisis development and the gradually increasing counterrevolutionary advance and its dimensions and depth threatened not only the revolutionary achievements of the working class, but the very existence of the socialist system.

We have also convinced ourselves from the histories of the revolutionary movement and from the recent history of our party that the communist advance guard, the working class, must never lose sight of the fact that even after assuming power the defeated forces hostile to socialism never cease to be active in society.

To realize their designs, they seek allies, identify themselves with diversionist imperialist forces, and are willing to take any risk and adventure should a situation arise in which socialism would find itself internally weakened. The forces of reaction and imperialism have learned from our Czechoslovak example that the well-known conclusions--the declaration of the six fraternal parties made in Bratislava in 1968 on the necessity of an international defense of socialist gains--was not merely declarative. They have learned that they will meet the resolute resistance of a united international solidarity wherever they would want to overthrow the socialist system by means of a counterrevolutionary offensive.

The plans of imperialism and reaction in Czechoslovakia during the 1968-69 period failed completely. There can be no doubt that the detachment of Czechoslovakia from the alliance of socialist states--which was their aim--would have been a victory of imperialism and the loss and defeat of the forces of the world revolutionary and anti-imperialist movement. In contrast to it, the safeguarding and strengthening of socialism in Czechoslovakia has strengthened the position and self-assurance of revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces in their struggle with imperialism. From our experience it is possible to draw an unequivocal conclusion, namely that a socialist state is a sovereign state under the condition that the power of the working class headed by the communist party is firm, indestructible, and inviolable. When there arises a serious threat to it and when, as a result of a counterrevolutionary offensive, it finds itself in danger this results in the sovereignty of the socialist state itself being endangered since a danger of dependence on imperialism arises.

10. Excerpt from Gustav Husak's address to the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 25 May 1971.

The Czechoslovak events in 1968 reaffirmed the truthfulness of the Leninist precept that unless it has a principleminded and firm leadership which stands unreservedly on positions of Marxism-Leninism, even the largest revolutionary force becomes a dispersed mass incapable of organized action and, under the onslaught of counterrevolutionary forces, may under certain circumstances suffer defeat.

An objective analysis of the development in this period confirms that had it not been for the timely international assistance of our closest socialist allies, the power of the workers class and the working people in our country would have suffered a defeat which would have had inestimable consequences not only for our people but for peace in Europe and would have led to the threatening of the positions

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From the rostrum of our congress we want to reaffirm the evaluation of 21 August 1968 as was unanimously approved in December 1970 by our Central Committee and supported by the whole party.

The entry of the allied forces of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of international solidarity

which corresponded to both the common interests of the working people and the international workers class and the socialist community, and to the class interests of the world communist movement.

Through this international action the lives of thousands of people were saved, the internal and external conditions for peaceful and quiet work were insured, the western border of the socialist camp was strengthened, and the hopes of the imperialist circles to revise the consequences of World War II were frustrated.

At our 14th congress we are concluding a crisis-ridden and complicated period. On behalf of our whole party and the great majority of the working people, we want to express our sincere thanks to the CPSU, the Soviet Government, the Soviet people, you personally, Comrade Brezhnev

and the other socialist friends from the fraternal parties whose first secretaries are present today that in a difficult situation they understood the fears of the Czechoslovak communists for the cause of socialism, the request by many party and state functionaries, by many communists and collectives of working people for assistance, that this international assistance saved our country from civil war and counterrevolution, and that the achievements of socialism were defended.

The rightwing majority of the party leadership tried to hide the truth about the international assistance rendered by the allies, which permitted open treason against the Marxist-Leninist policy with the well-known statement by the Central Committee Presidium of 21 August 1968. This act of breach of faith greatly harmed our country and the interests of the international communist movement. Primarily because of this statement and its dissemination by all communications media, an atmosphere of unbelievable disinformation and of chauvinist hysteria was created at a difficult moment, and under the pressure of mass psychosis even many communists and honest citizens succumbed, and they then committed deeds which very often contrasted completely with all their previous work for socialism and their convictions.

The entry of the allied troops multiplied the power of our domestic forces, who were determined to defend by political means the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia and to create a firm hinterland for development of the broad mobilization of the working people for the struggle to overcome the counterrevolutionary threat. The signing of the protocol between the Soviet and Czechoslovak representatives in the days of 23-26 August 1968 in Moscow strengthened the security of the healthy forces. It became a mighty impulse for the growth of political self-confidence and capability for action by the party, the working class, and the whole of our society.

11. Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 26 May 1971.

Comrades, your present achievements, your confidence in the future, are based on the fact that the party has mapped out the correct way, which meets the vital interests of the multimillion masses of the working people in towns and villages. They are convinced of this through their everyday experience. They show their loyalty to the Communist Party and their trust in its policy in the most convincing manner--with deeds and creative labor. This is precisely why the country's economy, which had been thoroughly shattered and in essence brought to the brink of crisis by the revisionists, the so-called improvers of socialism, was restored in a short time and is moving confidently ahead.

Dear comrades, we have already had occasion to speak about the lessons learned by your party from the sharp skirmishes with the class enemy are significant not only for the further development of Czechoslovakia but also for other socialist countries and for other communist parties. Your experience again reminds us that the sacred duty of communists in socialist countries is to strictly follow, in all activity connected with building the new society, Lenin's behests, the revolutionary essence of his great teaching, and to give a decisive rebuff to any attempts to distort and falsify Leninism or any manifestations of opportunism.

This experience repeatedly confirms and warns of the great danger of complacency, the great necessity of indefatigable vigilance toward all forms of hostile activity by the enemies of socialism. It teaches understanding of the necessity of waging a consistent struggle against the subversive actions of international imperialism. It shows the importance of strengthening the leading role of the Communist Party, its links with the wide masses of the working people, of constantly improving the style and method of party work in educating the masses, of consistently developing socialist democracy.

Life has again convincingly confirmed that the force of socialist internationalism, the fraternal cohesion of socialist states and their unbreakable solidarity and mutual support were, are, and will be of the greatest value for communists of socialist countries, for their reliable support and powerful weapons in the struggle with terrible enemies.

Tempered in class battles, the CPCZ is confidently leading the working people to new achievements in building socialism. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic today stands before the entire world as a strong link in the great alliance of the people building a new life, and no one will ever be able to sever Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp.

No one will ever be able to break out brotherhood and our friendship.

12. SOVIET NEWS, London
12 May 1970

Text of Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance

We publish below the text of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which was signed in Prague on May 6.

For the USSR, the treaty was signed by Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and for Czechoslovakia, by Gustav Husak, first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and Lubomir Strougal, Chairman of the Government.

THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

Reaffirming their loyalty to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Co-operation, concluded on December 12, 1943, and prolonged on November 23, 1947, which played a historic role in the development of friendly relations

between the peoples of the two states and laid a firm foundation for the further consolidation of fraternal friendship and all-round co-operation between them,

Being profoundly convinced that the inviolable friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which was the result of the joint struggle against fascism and further deepened in the years of the build-

ing of socialism and communism, and also the fraternal mutual assistance and all-round co-operation between them, based on the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and the immutable principles of socialist internationalism, accord with the paramount interests of the peoples of both countries and the entire socialist

Reaffirming that support for, and the consolidation and protection of,

the socialist gains achieved at the cost of the heroic efforts and selfless labour of each people, are the common internationalist duty of socialist countries,

Consistently and unswervingly coming out for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of all the countries of the socialist commonwealth, based on the community of their social systems and ultimate aims,

Fully resolved to observe strictly the obligations stemming from the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955,

Stating that economic co-operation between the two countries is facilitating their development and also the further improvement of the international socialist division of labour and socialist economic integration within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,

Expressing the firm intention to enhance the cause of strengthening peace and security in Europe and throughout the world and to oppose imperialism, revanchism and militarism,

Proceeding on the basis of the aims and principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter,

And taking into consideration the achievements of socialist and communist construction in the two countries, the present situation and the prospects for all-round co-operation, as well as the changes that have taken place in Europe and throughout the world since the conclusion of the Treaty of December 12, 1943,

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties, in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, shall further strengthen the eternal and unbreakable friendship between the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and shall develop all-round co-operation between the two countries and render one another fraternal aid and support, proceeding on the basis of mutual respect for state sovereignty and independence, equality, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs.

ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties, proceeding on the basis of the principles of friendly mutual assistance and the international socialist division of labour, shall further develop and deepen mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral economic, scientific and technical co-operation

with the aim of developing the national economy, achieving the highest scientific and technical level and efficiency of social production, and improving the material wellbeing of the working people of their countries.

The two sides will contribute to the further development of economic ties and co-operation, and to the socialist economic integration of member-states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties shall further develop and expand co-operation between the two countries in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, the press, radio, the cinema, television, public health, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

ARTICLE 4

The high contracting parties shall further facilitate the expansion of co-operation and direct ties between organs of state power and public organisations of working people with the object of making the peoples of the two states better acquainted with one another on a reciprocal basis and bringing them closer together.

ARTICLE 5

The high contracting parties, expressing their unswerving determination to advance along the road of building socialism and communism, shall undertake the necessary measures to defend the socialist gains of the peoples and the security and independence of both countries, shall strive for the development of all-round relations among the states of the socialist community and shall act in the spirit of consolidating their unity, friendship and brotherhood.

ARTICLE 6

The high contracting parties proceed from the assumption that the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, was reached under the threat of a war of aggression and the use of force against Czechoslovakia, was a component part of Hitler Germany's criminal conspiracy against peace and a flagrant violation of the principal standards of international law, and, therefore, was invalid from the very outset, with all the consequences stemming from this.

ARTICLE 7

The high contracting parties, consistently promoting a policy of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems, shall make every effort to safeguard international peace and the security of

the peoples from encroachments by the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction, to lessen international tension, to stop the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament and the final abolition of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, and to render support to countries that have become free from colonial domination and are advancing along the road of strengthening their national independence and sovereignty.

ARTICLE 8

The high contracting parties shall press jointly to improve the situation and ensure peace in Europe, to consolidate and develop co-operation among European states, to establish good-neighbourly relations between them and to create an effective system of European security on the basis of the collective efforts of all European states.

ARTICLE 9

The high contracting parties declare that the immutability of the state frontiers in Europe, formed after the Second World War, is one of the main prerequisites for ensuring European security. They express their firm determination to ensure, jointly with other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, and in accordance with it, the inviolability of the frontiers of the member-states of that Treaty, and to take all the necessary measures to prevent aggression by any forces of militarism and revanchism and to repel the aggressor.

ARTICLE 10

If one of the high contracting parties is subjected to armed attack by some state or group of states, the other contracting party, viewing this as an attack against itself, shall immediately afford it every assistance, including armed assistance, and shall also support it by all means at its disposal in implementation of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The measures taken on the strength of this Article shall be immediately reported by the high contracting parties to the United Nations Security Council and they shall act in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 11

The high contracting parties shall inform each other and consult with each other on all important international questions involving their interests and shall act on the basis of their common position, agreed upon

in accordance with the interests of both states.

ARTICLE 12

The high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 13

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to be carried out in Moscow at the earliest possible date.

ARTICLE 14

The treaty is concluded for 20 years and shall be automatically prolonged

for the next five years unless one of the high contracting parties gives notice of abrogation 12 months before the corresponding period expires.

Done in Prague on May 6, 1970, in two copies, each in the Russian and Czech languages, both texts being equally authentic.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 May 1970

Soviet-Czech Pact Signed; Backs Brezhnev Doctrine

CPYRGHT

PRAGUE, May 6 (Reuters)—Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union today signed a new treaty of friendship that endorses the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine used to justify the 1968 invasion by Warsaw Pact nations. The text of the treaty, made public by C.T.K., the Czechoslovak press agency, was signed by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the par-tial leader, and Premier Aleksei Kosygin for the Soviet Union, and by Dr. Gustav Husak, the party chief, and Premier Bohumir Strougal for Czechoslovakia.

The signing came on the first visit to Czechoslovakia by the Kremlin leaders since they ordered the 1968 occupation, to stop the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek.

The preamble of the treaty has the paragraph: "The defense of socialist achievements that were gained by the heroic efforts of the people of each country is the common duty of socialist countries."

The defense of socialism was the justification, Mr. Brezhnev gave for the intervention. He

said Mr. Dubcek's democratization movement had endangered socialism.

Informed sources said there was concern by other East European allies of Moscow about the treaty, which not only alludes to the right of intervention in another member of the pact, but commits Czechoslovakia to possible military support to the Soviet Union outside Europe.

This is provided for in Article 10, which says that in the case of "armed attack against one of the high contracting parties by any state or group of states,

the contracting parties will regard it as an attack against themselves and will immediately extend all assistance including military assistance."

The article did not limit this assistance to Europe, and is likely to spark speculation about a Czechoslovak commitment to any further deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and China.

Article 2 says both sides will contribute to the further development of economic integration among the members of Comecon, East Europe's trading market.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

July 1971

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY

Under slogans chosen by the Czechoslovak Central Committee for the occasion, Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders held another cheerless celebration, the 25th anniversary of the Soviet "liberation" of Czechoslovakia which wound up with the 6 May signing of a new 20-year joint treaty of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance." The treaty is like a burial rite, a final gesture to mark the end of the Czechoslovak experiment which started with the ascendancy of the Dubcek leadership in January 1968 and which was ended by the Soviet invasion in August 1968.

While this treaty closely resembles other USSR-Warsaw Pact treaties, the few additions and perhaps the deletions, are significant. The key new paragraph is the long-feared incorporation of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty. The Soviets would doubtless like to incorporate this feature into all future treaties with the East European Communist regimes. How or whether the Brezhnev Doctrine is included in the initialed but still unsigned Soviet-Rumanian treaty will be of special interest and will be of immediate and extreme concern to all Communist regimes.

To understand what the treaty means, not merely what it says, a glossary of Communist euphemisms and circumlocutions might be useful for non-Communists. While the Brezhnev Doctrine, of course, is not mentioned, every good Communist will recognize that notorious doctrine in these words from the Preamble: "Confirming that the support, consolidation and protection of socialist gains achieved at the price of the heroic efforts and selfless labour of each people,

a common internationalist duty of socialist countries..." (our underlining). us, any Communist country, if not itself the victim of Soviet-ordered intervention, is obligated to assist Soviet forces to dethrone a neighbor or attack a "deviationist." This proviso implicitly strengthens the possibility of Soviet adventurism in international disputes, the current quarrel with Communist China being the most immediate example. Earlier treaties had described the relationship to the USSR as according to "principles of socialist internationalism." These "principles" which are also mentioned in Article 1 of the new treaty, are understood to mean that binding decisions will be handed down by the CPSU to other Communist Parties. That principle and its domestic counterpart "democratic centralism," are a basic control weapon of the CPSU and continually under attack by Yugoslavia and by dissidents in many non-ruling parties.

Article 10 includes the obligation of each party to consider an attack on the other as "an attack against itself," to offer "every assistance, including armed assistance" to the other regardless of the quarter from which the attack is mounted. The Warsaw Pact treaty and other Soviet bilateral treaties with its Satellites expressly limit mutual defense obligations to Europe. By omitting this limitation in the current treaty, the way is open for use of Czechoslovak troops to assist the USSR anywhere in the world, Communist China being the outstanding possibility at this time.

Another new addition is Article 4, which provides for direct "ties between bodies of state power and the public organizations of working people... sanctification for close Soviet inspection, and even supervision, of Czechoslovaks at every level. It undoubtedly means the presence of a Soviet advisor in every key area of Party and government and the type of "shadow" government which prevailed in the pre-Dubcek era.

The Soviet Union apparently thought better of consecrating a "mutual friendship treaty" with agreement for armed occupation of the "friend's" territory. Without public sanction the military occupation may be considered somewhat extra-legal but that is a nicety of little value to the Czechoslovaks. By omitting any mention of troops the USSR has avoided any awkward precedents in the wording of treaties following future occupations.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF POST-INVASION CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I. Communist Authors

1. Garaudy, Roger. La Liberté en Sursis, Prague 1968. Paris, Fayard, 1968. 159 p. Garaudy presents a collection of previously unpublished texts by Alexander Dubcek, Ota Sik, Radovan Richter, Frantisek Chamalik, etc., which shed light on the ideological and social background of the events which led to the intervention of the Warsaw Pact powers in August 1968. Garaudy's introduction discusses the Czech economic model and describes the attempts towards a new socialist democracy, which was destroyed by the Russian intervention. Garaudy summarizes the invasion of Czechoslovakia as "a crime against hope, a crime against socialism, a crime against the future."
2. Garaudy, Roger. Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme. Paris, Gallimard, 1969. 318 p. "It is no longer possible to remain silent," begins Garaudy in this highly interesting book about the crisis of the communist movement. The author, at the time of publication still a member of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party's Central Committee, comes frankly to grips with the deepest problems which concern him as a communist. This study is a radical break with orthodoxy and poses the problem of the communist movement's future, with severe criticism of Soviet-style socialism.
3. Littel, Robert (ed.). The Czech Black Book. London, Pall Mall, 1969. 314 p. (prepared by the Institute of History, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) New York, Praeger, 1969. 303 p. An abridged version of the Czech original, Seven Days in Prague, which was a reply to the calumnious Soviet White Book, this collection of exciting documents selected by Czech historians gives a day-by-day, even hour-by-hour, account of the first seven days after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.
4. Löbl, Eugen - Grunwald Leopold. Die Intellektuelle Revolution; Hintergründe and Auswirkungen des "Prager Frühlings". Wien, Europa Vlg, 1969. 307 p.; Dusseldorf, Eon, 1969. 309 p. The volume is composed of two separate parts; the first, written by E. Löbl, "Wir alle sind Tschechoslovaken" (We all are Czechoslovaks), deals with the problems of the Soviet state which - according to the author - is not a socialist state; and with the model imposed by the Soviets on other communist parties, a model which, despite post-Stalin changes, was only a milder form of dictatorship. Some reflections on a socialist humanism are included.

In the second part, "21 August 1968," Leopold Grunwald analyzes the fundamental incentives of the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, which caused the "gravest crisis" of Communism. The main reason was, in Grunwald's opinion, the Soviet leadership's fear of a general contamination originating in Czechoslovakia of all the Warsaw Pact nations, thus endangering the Soviet power positions in Eastern Europe.

5. London, Artur. L'Aveu, Dans l'Engrenage du Proces du Prague. Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1968. Artur London spent some forty years in the communist movement. He was just 14 when he joined the Czech communist youth organization. Five years later, in 1934, he was sent to Moscow and in 1936 to Spain. He participated in the Spanish Civil War and was decorated in the French Resistance. After World War II he returned to his homeland and became Deputy Foreign Minister (1949-51). The book, the story of his persecution and arrest, is an upsetting human document, one very similar to those published by the Hungarian ex-communist, ex-political prisoners. It includes interesting passages on the intervention of some French communist leaders on London's behalf.

6. Mnacko, Ladislav. The Seventh Night. London, Dent. New York, Dutton 1969. 220 p. The author, a prominent Czech journalist and writer, was personally acquainted with the leaders of Czechoslovakia. He uses as a point of departure the 7 nights following the Russian invasion to give an account of the turmoil within the Czechoslovak Communist Party and government from the February 1948 takeover to the liberalization program of Alexander Dubcek in 1968. The book is an intriguing inside view of how the Stalinist system works.

7. Petkoff, Teodoro. Checoeslovaquia - El Socialismo como Problema. Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes. Teodoro Petkoff is an economist, a former member of the Venezuelan Congress and a member of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party (and of its Politbureau until April 1968). Once a guerilla fighter, Petkoff is now the leader of the left-wing faction of the Venezuelan C. P. He renounces the armed struggle and battles for the recognition of a "diversity of socialist types and roads." The book is an intelligent reappraisal of the course of events in Czechoslovakia, beginning with the application of the Soviet economic model in 1948 and its disastrous effect on the national economy. Continuing with an analysis of the Novotny era and the period of reforms, he ends with a condemnation of the Russian invasion.

8. Tigrid, Pavel. La chute Irresistible d'Alexandre Dubcek. Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1969.

9. Tigrid, Pavel. Le Printemps de Prague. Paris, Seuil, 1968. The best book-length survey of the pre-invasion period, based on the author's running analyses in Svedectvi (Czech emigre magazine in Paris).

II. Non-Communist Authors

1. Osley, Anthony. Free Communism, a Czech Experiment. London, Young Fabian Pamphlet, 1969. 35 p. This short study deals with the impossibility of liberalization of the existing communist system.

2. Schwartz, Harry. Prague's 200 Days. New York, Praeger, 1969.

3. Tatu, Michel. L'Heresie impossible: chronique du drame tchechoslovaque. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1967-1968. A collection of dispatches to Le Monde by their Vienna correspondent; the ablest journalistic coverage of the events.

4. Wechsberg, Joseph. The Voices. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1969. A brief, sensitive account of the "underground radios," by the Central European correspondent of The New Yorker.

5. Windsor, Philip and Roberts, Adam. Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. 200 p. The volume contains two essays by two members of the London School of Economics. "Eastern Europe and the Detente" is a history of the invasion of Czechoslovakia which, according to Windsor, resulted in replacing democratic centralism with the rule of factionalism. Prof. Roberts study, "Invasion and Resistance," discusses the revolutionary spontaneity of the civilian population and the passive role of the army during the critical weeks in August 1968.

6. Zeman, Z. A. B. Prague Spring: A Report on Czechoslovakia. London, Penguin. New York, Hill and Wang, 1969. 167 p. The author, a native of Czechoslovakia and now a professor of history at St. Andrews University in Scotland, spent several weeks in Czechoslovakia in April 1968. The study is a summary of his personal observations and of talks with people he met: state and party functionaries, intellectuals, workers, men on the street. It offers some historical background and relevant passages from speeches, manifestoes and articles. The study presents a fair picture of the reform movement and an excellent analysis of the Czechoslovak experiment. The chronology of events covers a period of time from June 1967 to August 1968.

III. Extensively Reviewed Books

1. WASHINGTON POST, 1 April 1971.

Courage in Czechoslovakia

CPYRGHT

One quotation from each author will demonstrate how contradictory their judgments about the meaning of the events they observed can be.

To the distinguished New York Times reporter, Tad Szulc, the Czechoslovak Spring and its anticlimax, the Soviet invasion, "marked the beginning of a fundamental metamorphosis of Communism . . . if not of its ultimate collapse."

Michel Solomon, a French physician turned journalist, saw the formal confirmation of the Soviet occupation as the curtain falling "on the most tragic chapter of European history since the end of World War II."

And Ivan Svitak, who identifies himself as a "Marxist philosopher, socialist humanist, and Czechoslovak citizen," expresses the conviction that "the Czechoslovak experiment foundered on its efforts to accomplish the impossible: the Europeanization of Russia and the humanization of Soviet Communism."

The brave men and women who carried the flag of freedom and economic reform through the streets of Prague and Bratislava during the exhilarating spring of 1968, were sure that they were writing the last and final chapter in the history of Marxism-Leninism. Most of them were active Party members and they recognized the predominant position of the Party; they wanted to preserve the socialist system of economy and they proclaimed their fidelity to the alliance with the Soviet Union. Intellectuals, as many of them were, sensitive to national traditions and the need for social progress and human dignity, they believed deeply in the reconciliation of the apparently incompatible goals of personal freedom and one-party rule.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Tad Szulc.

(Viking, 503 pp., \$14)

PRAGUE NOTEBOOK: The Strangled Revolution. By Michel Solomon. Translated from the French by Helen Eustis.

(Little, Brown, 361 pp., \$8.95)

THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXPERIMENT: 1968-1969. By Ivan Svitak.

(Columbia, 243 pp., illustrated, \$10.95)

Reviewed by Josef Korbek

The reviewer, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Studies at the University of Denver, is the author of several books including *Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948.*

Their admirable enthusiasm, unconcerned with the realities of the situation, even led them to the conviction that they were acting in the interests of the Soviet Union when they planned to establish "socialism with a human face." Ultimately, the face had to be smashed, but it shined unexpectedly for a few months even in the presence of Soviet tanks, when not only intellectuals and political reformers but masses of young people and workers defied the brutal forces of the invaders.

It is against this sketchy background that one can set out to evaluate the three books under review. Szulc and Solomon, both reporters, made full use of the extraordinary circumstances in which many leaders of the liberalization movement were anxious to talk to them about matters that must have been considered top secret in a one-party system. Both authors accepted some of the statements they heard uncritically and both fail to set them in proper perspective.

Solomon's treatment is anecdotal and episodic, a disjointed collection of essays, lacking in integration and missing the meaning of the political philosophy.

derecurrents responsible for the events he witnessed. In the second part of his book, he has some of the reformist leaders explain the causes of the "Spring"; but at that time they were carried away by enthusiasm and being in the midst of the fire, inevitably and understandably lost their sense of proportion.

Szulc has a deeper understanding of the historical quality of national upheavals. Czechoslovak Marxist philosophers were the first Westerners living in a Communist society to apply modern critical analysis to socialism in their attempt "to wed socialist concepts of social economic justice with the West's traditions of political, cultural, and scientific freedom." He sees the Prague events as "a revolution in the deepest philosophical sense." This is as good a summation of the sociological complexity of the Czechoslovak events as anyone can offer.

Szulc also puts the events in an explanatory historical setting going back to Czechoslovak politics during the War and proceeding to sketch their vicissitudes after the War—the brutal period of Stalinization, of purges, and belated de-Stalinization.

dimension by comparative "flashes" which throw a light on the developments in the other Communist countries in Eastern Europe, though this ambitious undertaking leads him necessarily to oversimplifications.

The author is thoroughly familiar with the theme of the Spring which, however, is frequently obscured by citations of scores of unimportant (and unpronounceable) names. He collected an enormous quantity of information, but a more judicious sifting of materials would have let events speak even more eloquently and convincingly for themselves. For instance, a sentence about Czechoslovakia, "in which the written word commands more attention than tanks," goes to the very roots of her history, the glory of her Spring, and the humiliation of her defeat by Soviet armies; but the sentence is lost in the massive presentation of details.

Svitak's book is a work of different caliber. He was one of the most active persons in the liberalization movement and his work consists mainly of articles and speeches he wrote during the Czechoslovak Spring and a few lectures he delivered post mortem in the United States, where he found refuge. Of all intellectual leaders, his demands for change were most radical.

Presenting them with a professorial pedantry, as if enunciating eternal truths, he was not only critical of past Stalinist totalitarianism but also suspicious of Dubcek's leadership, in which he saw another elitist group that sought only limited objectives. He pleaded for "democracy not democratization"; for a multiparty system, not just a change of guards; for human dignity, and the humanization of society. He advocated unity

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between mutually dependent intelligentsia and workers and, adjusting Marx (his teacher) to his own individualistic, non-Marxist images, he condemned all Communist parties as anti-Marxist.

To him the Spring was a revolution against alienation of the individual in an in-

dustrialized society, a conflict between two interpretations of Marxism. And he believed that real Marxism can be attained only through uncompromising protection of human rights and opposition to the Communist Party. A philosopher, drawn into the arena

of politics, he ignored his own dictum that "the politician's greatest skill is to decide what is realistic at a given moment and what is utopian." Therein lies the explanation of Svltak's and even his less radical colleagues' defeat; they underestimated or forgot the

brutal claws of the totalitarian bear to the

The three authors tell a story of the indomitable courage of a nation which will never abandon its struggle for liberty, but their books also provide a lesson about the reality of Soviet power and policy.

2. Shawcross, William. Dubcek. Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1970.

Dubcek

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS

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Relatively unknown before the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Alexander Dubcek suddenly emerged as a courageous, charismatic leader in the violent struggle which ended in his fall. In this first biography of Dubcek, William Shawcross explores the enigma of the politician who altered the image of European communism more dramatically than anyone since Stalin, the man who believed in "socialism with a human face."

The account of Dubcek's attempt to reconcile communism and democracy—and his failure to do so—provides a revealing commentary on the nature and future of European politics. It is a commentary that goes to the heart of many of the critical political issues of the day: economic development, civil liberties, separation of powers, national sovereignty. Against these themes an exciting human drama of a sort "glimpsed otherwise only in novels," as *The Listener* put it, was played out. The drama centered

The culmination of this drama is one of the great power struggles of modern history, one with a most tragic and moving end.

Dubcek is based on pioneering research throughout Czechoslovakia, including interviews with politicians, writers, students, workers and friends of Dubcek. Interweaving personal accounts and documentary evidence, Shawcross vividly portrays Dubcek's early life and his father's restless search for the ideal society, first in America and then in the Soviet Union; the involvement of father and son in the Slovak national uprising against the Germans in 1944; Dubcek's years as an independent Party official; the strange, unstable coalition that brought him to power; the way in which his unique abilities and inescapable weaknesses brought about his fall; and his years of further humiliation and failure following his deposition.

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 A man who was at once a sincere idealist and a wily political strategist, a dedicated Communist and a civil libertarian, a nationalist and a man steeped in the tradition of international communism.

William Shawcross writes about East European affairs for the *London Sunday Times*.

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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
9 August 1970

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Dubcek biographer

WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, whose biography of Mr. Dubcek is to be published by Weidenfeld next week—the second anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—more or less stumbled into the task.

Now 24, he went in for the Diplomatic Service examination after Eton and University College, Oxford, and came second in the short list of successful candidates.

With splendidly unprecedented cheek he persuaded the Foreign Office to grant him a year's leave before joining them, so that he could study as a sculptor at

the St. Martin's School of Art.

In the middle of the course he and his sister Joanna—now on the way to becoming a doctor—went to Prague for a holiday.

The Russian invasion aroused in him an intense sympathy for the Czechs. On his return to England he chucked the Diplomatic Service and has since been back to Czechoslovakia about 20 times.

That he is the son of the man who prosecuted the German war criminals at Nuremberg in 1946 has been a help to him in his researches for the Dubcek book.

His next project: a volume on Hungary.

3. Weisskopf, Kurt. The Agony of Czechoslovakia '38/'68. Elek, London, 1968.

The Agony of Czechoslovakia '38/'68

KURT WEISSKOPF

CPYRGHT

15 March 1939 - The German Army marches into Prague

21 August 1968 - The Russians invade

Once more this small nation, just beginning to work out its salvation, has found itself threatened with brutal and soul-destroying tyranny.

Kurt Weisskopf is one of the few journalists of Czech origin now working in London who was present during the German rape of Czechoslovakia and has kept in touch with the country ever since. It is a dramatic coincidence that he should have been completing his political memoirs at the very moment when the Russians suddenly invaded. This book will give the world, stunned by Soviet perfidy, a deeper understanding of a nation's sufferings.

The first part of the book is a vivid description of Czechoslovakia in the months leading up to the Western powers' betrayal of the country to Hitler at Munich. The author, then a young trade union official, tried to alert his friends and political colleagues to the dangers of German territorial ambition and Nazi infiltration, only to encounter blind optimism, complacency and an unjustified faith in foreign allies. This inside story of the tragic disintegration of a highly civilized country throws a revealing light on the background, historical and psychological, of the 1968 upheaval.

Mr Weisskopf revisited Prague in 1945 and what he found in the liberated country, the surviving friends he talked to, gave him an insight into the disenchantment with democracy which contributed so strongly to the Communist take-over. His later visits, in 1966 and 1967, enabled him to give a devastating first-hand account of what the Czechs call 'the era of deformation': the bizarre and depressing tyranny masquerading under the title of 'Socialism' and associated with the name of Novotny.

He describes in detail the causes of the change of leadership in 1968 and discusses the extraordinary rapidity with which the people, after years of totalitarian indoctrination, embraced their new-found freedom. He analyses the new government's Action Programme and gives the first full summary in English of this important document. Then he follows the exciting developments of June to August, up to the return of the Czechoslovak leaders to Prague after the Russian invasion, while the world anxiously watches the outcome of the 'compromise' arrived at in Moscow.

This is a book by a man passionately committed to Czechoslovak freedom; who has seen many of his friends in Czech politics disappear in the Nazi holocaust, others vanish in the Communist purges, and still others emerge

among the country's new liberal leaders. It is both a political narrative and a personal testimony.

KURT WEISSKOPF was born in 1907, a doctor's son in an industrial town in North Bohemia, and became a socialist revolutionary at an early age. After graduating in law and economics at Prague University, he was employed as economic research officer in the progressive Private Employees' Union, and in this capacity met many of the Czechoslovak leaders of the future. When the Germans occupied Prague he escaped to Britain and joined the Czechoslovak army in exile. He fought in France in 1940 and took part in the invasion of the continent in 1944. He returned to Britain in 1945 and worked as a railway porter, a filing clerk and a stallholder in a street market before entering his present occupation of financial and economic journalist. He took British citizenship in 1949 and lives in London with his English wife, whom he married in 1940. This is his first book.

4. Rodnick, David. The Strangled Democracy Czechoslovakia 1948-1969. The Caprock Press, Lubbock, Texas, 1970.

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PREFACE

This study of the Czechs and Slovaks is the result of two visits my wife and I made to Czechoslovakia, one in 1948 and the other in 1969. In 1947 we had spent seven months doing research in the Czech and Slovak Unit of the Columbia University Project in Contemporary Cultures in New York City. By November we had become convinced that the internal situation in Czechoslovakia was so uncertain that, if we were to continue our researches there as we had planned, then we would have to hasten our arrival. In December 1947 we obtained a year's visa, and with the help of the late Ruth Benedict secured a grant from the Social Science Research Council. We arrived in Prague in late January 1948 and remained for ten months until the end of November.

During these ten months we visited 53 cities, towns, and villages in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, where we talked with 492 individuals on an average of two to four times. These included 71 farmers, 87 workers, 138 artisans, shopkeepers, clerks and minor administrative officials, and 196 doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, officials, factory managers, and former wealthy businessmen. We visited schools in town and country from nursery school to university level, including apprentice classes in six factories. Through the cooperation of the Ministry of Education, we were able to observe 70 classrooms and to visit with some 2,132 pupils and students from the ages of 3 to 22. Of these, we interviewed 608 more intensively on their family life, attitudes, and problems.

An original manuscript covering our field study in Czechoslovakia was never published, but from the vantage point of those findings we were able to foresee the Prague Spring which arrived in the first seven months of 1968. In the fall of 1969 we returned to Czechoslovakia for two months and experienced the feeling that we were resuming where we had left off in November 1948.

Most of the following chapters were part of our 1949 manuscript with the exception of those segments dealing with events and observations since 1948. We have added nothing to our original observations and hope that the reader will agree that they are still timely: despite Communism, the cultures of the Czechs and Slovaks have changed very little.

My wife has been as interested in compiling this manuscript as I. She was with me on the Columbia University Project in Contemporary Cultures, accompanied me on both trips to Czechoslovakia, and has spent many hours sifting, typing, and editing materials. We both feel that its subject matter touches us all as human beings.

5. Remington, Robert A. (ed.). Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis. The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1969. The original sources compiled in this volume, many of which have not previously been available in English, will allow students of communism to examine more closely both the substance of change in Czechoslovakia prior to Soviet intervention in August 1968 and the subsequent disarray in the international Communist movement. Robin Remington has

selected documents to show, first, what was actually happening in Czechoslovakia before invasion. How had what George Modelski calls "Communist culture" with its own literature, symbols, and ritual behavior declined in Prague? This section includes major statements on such questions as freedom of the press, the role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Czech-Slovak constitutional federation, the importance of interest groups within a Communist state, and the controversial Action Program of the new Dubcek government. The second and third sections of the book contain papers on Czechoslovak liberalization and orthodox response. The documents show increasingly concerned Soviet and East European reactions, pressures put on Prague, and negotiations, which, failing, led to invasion. The book's fourth section deals with the invasion and the split in world communism. It shows postinvasion justification from Moscow combined with deviant reactions from other Communist parties. Specifically, documents demonstrate where parties normally so far apart as the Chinese and the French stood in relation to the invasion, and they discuss reverberations in Yugoslavia and Rumania, Cuba, North Vietnam, and Italy. The text includes six cartoons from Czechoslovak journals, seventy-two documents, and thirty-five commentaries by Robin Remington, who is Research Associate in Communist Studies, M.I.T. Center for International Studies.

LE MONDE, Paris

2 May 1970

CPYRGHT

"THE CONFESSION" by Costa-Gavras "

After the last picture has faded away and after the words "The End" have disappeared from the screen, the viewer is left nonplussed and mute for a brief instant, as if suspended between the nightmare which he has just been through and a daily reality that slowly recovers its bearings.

That just about describes the emotional force of this film, its power of suggestion, to the point where it shakes up our nerves and wounds our conscience.

"Z", Costa-Gavras' preceding film, was a political pamphlet which took the form of a tale of adventures. "Adventure" however completely disappeared from "L'Aveu" [The Confession] and the pamphlet became a tragedy, the tragedy of a man placed in contradiction with his most intimate certainties, with his faith in an ideology which he never ceased to serve and in whose name -- by some monstrous irony -- he was forced even to deny himself.

This is an authentic tragedy. Its hero is Artur London and "The Confession" is directly inspired by the book which he published in France 2 years ago under the same title.

Artur London had been a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party since his youth; he fought in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War; he joined the French Resistance soon after the armistice and the Nazis deported him to Mauthausen. In 1951, Artur London was vice-minister of foreign affairs of the Czechoslovak government. He held this high office when he was arrested in Prague, held incommunicado, interrogated and tortured for 22 months, and finally sentenced with 13 of his friends -- including Party Secretary-General Slansky -- on charges of "conspiracy against the state." Sentenced to life imprisonment (11 of the accused were to be executed), Artur London was rehabilitated in 1956.

The film tells the principal episodes of London's imprisonment and trial. Minutely and pitilessly, Costa-Gavras describes the means used by the police machine to get the prisoner to confess (to "confess" what -- since he is innocent?), to force him step by step to feel that he is guilty. What we are presented with here is a long series of days and nights running into each other, a kind of abstract eternity, in the course of which his shouting guards forced him ceaselessly to run around the few square yards of his cell, to sleep in "regulation position," to lap his food like an animal, to begin a hundred times over to tell his life's story under the pretext that he was wrong about some details.... What we see here is the systematic destruction of the vital forces, the intelligence, the memory, and the reason of a human being. When truth and logic no longer make any sense, when physical exhaustion is added to terror, humiliation, and total solitude, even the most courageous individual winds up by condemning himself. London confessed, just like all of his comrades. The trial could begin but it is more like an "investigation" and it constitutes a grotesque parody of what one normally understands by a trial.

"The Confession" is essentially a political film and, beyond the crimes committed by the hangmen of the Stalinist power, it denounces the perversion of Communist ideals. But it never challenges the greatness and nobility of this ideal. In his book, Artur London constantly states that he remained faithful to Communism (at least to that faith of Communism which the Prague Spring brought out once again) and this fidelity of the author to the faith of his youth is one of the keys to the film. To make sure that there will be no misunderstanding, to make the dividing line between contempt and respect perfectly clear, Costa Gavras included in his tale some parentheses which come 10 years after London's release and which enable the latter to review his state of mind at the moment he wrote his book.

The film's last image perfectly illustrates the significance of this. It takes us back to Prague, but this time in 1968. The Russian troops have just invaded the capital. On a brick wall, students and workers can be seen writing the following slogan in huge letters: "Lenin, Wake Up! They Have Gone Mad."

Far from contradicting "Z", "The Confession" prolongs Costa Gavras' preceding film. The same menaces threaten the liberty of man on the right and on the left and we know very well that political police officers used (or are still using) Kafkaesque methods not only in the country of Kafka....

From the strictly cinematographic viewpoint, "The Confession" in my opinion was better than "Z". In this latter film (which won prizes in Hollywood and elsewhere), there were some elements of complacency which perhaps were motivated by the manner in which the subject was treated and by the characters (the "colonels" being considered here as buffoons). But in "The Confession" everything is simple, serious, and painful. There are no concessions here, no gratuitous effect. The movie is fastpaced, thus preventing this tight nightmare from turning to monotony. In Jorge Semprun, the scenario writer and author of the dialogues, Costa Gavras has found a valuable collaborator and in Yves Montand, gaunt, bruised, fighting step by step against his ultimate end, he has found a peerless character interpreter. We can guess that both (the same is true of Simone Signoret who plays the role of London's wife) were directly concerned with the theme of "The Confession" and some of their personal emotion is expressed in the movie.

The oppressing and pain character of "The Confession" will perhaps prevent this movie from being as successful as "Z". That would be infinitely regrettable.

*Ambassade, Berlitz, Images, Montparnasse, Pathe-Orleans, Convention, C 2 L Versailles.

LE MONDE, Paris
2 May 1971

le cinéma PAR JEAN DE BARONCELLI

« L'AVEU », de Costa Gavras

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Après la dernière image et même après que le mot « fin » a disparu de l'écran, on reste, un court instant, interdit et muet, comme en suspens entre le cauchemar que l'on vient de vivre et une réalité quotidienne qui, lentement, retrouve ses droits.

C'est dire la force émotive de ce film, son pouvoir de suggestion, à quel point il ébranle nos nerfs et blesse notre conscience.

Z, le précédent film de Costa Gavras, était un pamphlet politique qui prenait la forme d'un récit d'aventures. L'« aventure » a complètement disparu de l'Aveu et le pamphlet est devenu une tragédie, la tragédie d'un homme mis en contradiction avec ses certitudes les plus intimes, avec sa foi dans une idéologie qu'il n'a cessé de servir et au nom de laquelle, par une dérision monstrueuse, on l'oblige à se renier lui-même.

Cette tragédie est authentique. Son héros s'appelle Artur London et l'Aveu est directement inspiré par le livre que celui-ci a publié en France, il y a deux ans, sous le même titre.

Membre du parti communiste tchécoslovaque depuis sa jeunesse, combattant des Brigades internationales au moment de la guerre d'Espagne, entré dans la Résistance française aussitôt après l'armistice, déporté par les nazis à Mauthausen, Artur London était, en 1951, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du gouvernement tchécoslovaque. C'est alors qu'il occupe cette haute fonction qu'il est arrêté à Prague, tenu au secret, interrogé et torturé pendant vingt-deux mois, jugé enfin avec treize de ses amis — parmi lesquels le secrétaire général du parti, Slansky — sous l'inculpation de « conspiration contre l'Etat ». Condamné à la détention perpétuelle (parmi les accusés onze devaient être exécutés), Artur London fut réhabilité en 1956.

Ce sont les principaux épisodes de l'incarcération et du jugement de London que relate le film. Minu-

tieusement, impitoyablement, Costa Gavras décrit les moyens utilisés par la machine policière pour faire passer le prisonnier aux aveux, à l'« aveu » (mais quel « aveu », puisqu'il est innocent?), pour le contraindre progressivement à se sentir coupable. Et c'est la longue suite des jours et des nuits confondus en une sorte d'éternité abstrait, au cours de laquelle des gardiens vociférants l'obligent à parcourir sans arrêt les quelques mètres carrés de sa cellule, à dormir en « position réglementaire », à laper comme une bête sa nourriture, à recommencer vingt fois, sous prétexte qu'il se trompe, le récit de sa vie... Destruction systématique des forces vives, de l'intelligence, de la mémoire, de la raison d'un être humain. Quand la vérité et la logique n'ont plus de sens, quand l'épuisement physique s'ajoute à la terreur, à l'humiliation, à la solitude totale, l'individu le plus courageux finit par accepter de se condamner soi-même. Comme tous ses camarades, London avoue. Le procès peut commencer, qui n'est, à l'image de l'« instruction », qu'une grotesque parodie de procès.

Film essentiellement politique, l'Aveu dénonce, au-delà des crimes commis par les bourreaux du pouvoir stalinien, la perversion de l'idéal communiste. Mais jamais il ne met en cause la grandeur et la noblesse de cet idéal. Artur London affirme constamment dans son livre qu'il est resté fidèle au communisme (du moins à ce visage du communisme que le printemps de Prague fit réapparaître), et cette fidélité de l'autour à la foi de sa jeunesse est une des clés du film. Pour qu'aucune équivoque ne soit possible, pour qu'apparaisse clairement la ligne de partage entre le mépris et le respect, Costa Gavras a d'ailleurs inclus dans son récit des parenthèses qui se situent dix ans après la libération de London et qui permettent à celui-ci de faire le point sur son état d'esprit au moment où il écrit son livre.

La dernière image du film en

illustre parfaitement la signification. Elle nous ramène à Prague, mais en 1968 cette fois. Les troupes russes viennent dévaler la capitale. Sur un mur de briques, des étudiants et des ouvriers écrivent en lettres immenses : « Lénine, réveille-toi, ils sont devenus fous. »

Loin de contredire Z, l'Aveu prolonge le précédent film de Costa Gavras. A droite ou à gauche, ce sont les mêmes menaces qui pèsent sur la liberté de l'homme, et nous savons bien que ce n'est pas seulement au pays de Kafka que les fonctionnaires des polices politiques ont utilisé (ou utilisent encore) des méthodes kafkaïennes...

D'un point de vue strictement cinématographique, l'Aveu m'a paru supérieur à Z. Il y avait dans ce dernier film (couvert de récompenses à Hollywood et ailleurs) des complaisances motivées peut-être par la manière dont était traité le sujet et par les personnages (les « colonels » considérés comme des pochinettes). Tout, au contraire, est simple, grave et douloureux dans l'Aveu. Aucune concession, aucun effet gratuit. Un tempo rigoureux qui épargne à ce huis clos cauchemardesque de verser dans la monotonie. Costa Gavras a trouvé en Jorge Semprun, autour du scénario et des dialogues, un collaborateur précieux, et en Yves Montand, hâve, meurtri, lutant pas à pas contre sa déchéance, un interprète hors de pair. On devine que les uns et les autres (il en est de même de Simone Signoret, qui incarne l'épouse de London) ont été directement concernés par le thème de l'Aveu, et il passe quelque chose dans le film de leur émotion personnelle.

Le caractère oppressant et pénible de l'Aveu l'empêchera peut-être d'obtenir le succès de Z. Ce serait infiniment regrettable.

★ Ambassade, Berlitz, Images, Montparnasse, Pathé-Orléans, Convention, C 2 L, Versailles.

Madrid
March 1971

LA FALACIA DE «LA CONFESIÓN»

Por Gastón BAQUERO

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Yves Montand y Simone Signoret figuran entre los grandes nombres del comunismo mundial. Costa Gravas, menos famoso pero no menos comunista, saltó a la primera página de la publicidad internacional —esa que, pagada por la burguesía, los comunistas usufructúan como nadie— a cuenta de su actitud contra los coronales griegos.

¿Cómo se explica que estas tres figuras se hayan reunido para hacer una película tan anticomunista en apariencia como "La confesión"? Porque, a primera vista, no se ha presentado sino muy rara vez en el cine un documento contra el comunismo tan recio, veraz, definitivo sobre lo que el comunismo es por dentro, en esencia, como este documento de "La confesión". Será que Yves Montand, Simone Signoret y Costa Gravas se han arrepentido de servir al horror del sistema marxista-leninista de reorganización de la sociedad y pasan al lado del hombre libre?

Cuando se ve "La confesión", cabe ante todo una deducción enteramente razonable: quienes como el protagonista y su mujer han vivido, desde dentro del partido comunista, la verdad última de ese partido, tienen por fuerza, si salen vivos de a prueba, que quedar para siempre curados de respeto y de amor a la ideología. No es posible que después de tantos años de experiencias, que en la película comienzan con la actuación del protagonista en la guerra española a del lado de La Pasiónaria, y llegan

hasta nuestros días de crimen soviético en Hungría y en Checoslovaquia, conserve un ser humano la más mínima afición por una doctrina que ya él tendría que reconocer como la verdadera causante de los crímenes cometidos por sus servidores.

Y, sin embargo, en esta película el fin es absolutamente desconcertante. Cuando creíamos estar presenciando la exhibición de una anatomía exacta y veraz de lo que espera a cualquier hombre que se deje atrapar por el partido comunista, lo que los señores Montand, Signoret y Gravas nos dicen haber mostrado es a deformación que del pensamiento de Lenin han hecho los stalinistas antisemitas de la U. R. S. S. El film va dirigido contra el partido soviético ruso, pero no contra el comunismo. El señor Mao Tse-tung va a disfrutar con "La confesión" mucho más que, pongamos por caso, Nelson Rockefeller. Esta es una gran requisitoria, hecha por un grupo de comunistas judíos a título de tales, contra la Rusia que ellos ven como antisemita y como cruel e inhumana en su sistema político. Requisitoria contra unos hombres, pero no contra un sistema de ideas, no contra lo esencial sino contra lo anecdótico, que es aquí el mal proceder de unos señores, los rusos de Stalin, quienes según la película han traicionado el pensamiento de Lenin.

Aquí está el hueso de la cuestión; aquí está la gran falacia de esta película. Es cierto que por lo menos ha

como Yves Montand y Simone Signoret que prestan a la humanidad el servicio de confesar ellos mismos una gran parte de la realidad. Pero no menos cierto es que si todo lo que está en la película es verdad, ellos no han querido decir toda la verdad de una vez. No han querido ir al fondo de la cuestión, acaso por lo que les quede de romántica fe en los ideales de su juventud.

Stalin no deformó ningún pensamiento de nadie. Stalin aplicó a la perfección el esquema único e inexorable que ha de utilizar todo gobernante que se decida por el marxismo-leninismo. Ahí tienen a Castro con su paredón, y con sus campos de concentración, que cada día son mayores y están más llenos. Lo que llama Castro "Ley contra la vagancia" (es para reírse ver la indiferencia con que contemplan horrores como ese los que se dicen preocupados por si en el Brasil la Policía es muy dura y envían los consabidos cablecitos, no es un crimen inventado por él, es una necesidad intrínseca del marxismo-leninismo.

¿Por qué? Porque no puede haber en la práctica marxismo-leninismo con una mínima sombra de libertad para el ser humano. Quien vio muy bien esto, y lo dijo con su cinismo inagotable, fue el "Che" Guevara. Se rela éste a mandíbula batiente de los burguesitos que lo adoraban, y les decía cara a cara: "La revolución es cruel, tiene que ser cruel por necesidad, no lo olviden." Y cuando el "Che" estaba con sus manos al

te años en estado de revolución o a un momento de dieciséis años, no estaba cometiendo un crimen personal, de él como individuo, sino que estaba siendo fiel a la doctrina de la crueldad de la dureza. Los sandonimos de Lenin y de Stalin son reveladores.

Aj final de "La confesión", Yves Montand y Simone Signoret presentan a unos jóvenes checos que, desafiando a los tanques soviéticos en Praga, pintan en las paredes un letrero que dice: "Lenin, despierta, te han engañado." ¿Quién puede creer que un joven que está presenciando y viviendo la realidad más real y verdadera del comunismo va a ser tan imbécil que invoque a Lenin? Si Lenin despierta, ¿qué queda un solo checo vivo en mil millas a la distancia. Porque Stalin, Khrushchev, Breznev y toda la gerencia son franciscanos que están al lado de Lenin, el imbécil.

Yves Montand y Simone Signoret nos han dado una buena muestra de cómo la razón tenía aquel Papa ahora denostado y negado, la Santidad del XI, cuando definió al comunismo como algo "intrínsecamente perverso". No se trata de que sean más o menos fieles a los señores Stalin o el señor Guevara. El mal no está en los individuos que aparecen en la película. El mal está en la doctrina. Si a San Juan de la Cruz se le nombra el cardenal general de la Iglesia Comunista, San Juan de la Cruz de Asís actúa exactamente igual que Stalin o el Che Guevara.

JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris
2 June 1970

L'AVEU
Film français
de Costa-Gavras

CPYRGHT

GINEMA
Guy Hennebelle
a vu cette semaine

Artur London est demeuré communiste. Il vit aujourd'hui en France avec sa femme. Il voulait que son livre soit d'abord publié à Prague. Il s'y rendit, à cette fin, le 22 août 1968. Il y trouva les chars soviétiques. Tels sont donc les faits. Que dire du film lui-même maintenant? Reconnaissons

d'abord que nous ne sommes pas en présence d'un grand morceau de cinéma, comme on dit. La mise en scène est d'évidence très conventionnelle. Certains effets sont appuyés avec une lourdeur inutile, voire disgracieuse. Néanmoins, Costa-Gavras a réalisé un film efficace, direct, simple, qui devrait toucher un grand nombre de spectateurs. En particulier ceux de certains

pays du Tiers Monde où la police recourt à des méthodes qui rappellent pour moitié celles de « Z » et pour moitié celles qui sont décrites ici. Il a respecté « L'aveu » dans ses grandes lignes. A vrai dire, on ne comprend guère le critique du quotidien français « l'Humanité » selon qui « d'un livre qui se voulait communiste Costa-Gavras a fait un film anticommuniste ». Le cinéaste n'a pas trahi l'esprit du témoignage de London, même s'il a dû — éternel problème de l'adaptation — le transcrire et l'agencer un peu différemment. Michel Capdenac a, au contraire, montré dans « les Lettres françaises » la valeur et l'intérêt du travail de Costa-Gavras.

Il convient d'ailleurs d'insister sur le fait que le metteur en scène et le scénariste ont, au prix de deux « flashs forward » (projections dans le futur) d'ailleurs inélégants, dénié d'avance aux tenants de l'ordre capitaliste le droit d'utiliser ces « graves violations de la légalité socialiste » (comme dit l'expression traditionnelle) pour dénoncer le socialisme lui-même. A ceux, d'autre part, qui craignent que ce film soit utilisé à des fins peu avouables, il faut répéter, avec un bien italien Gramsci, que « la vérité est toujours révolutionnaire ».

« Lénine, réveille-toi : ils sont devenus fous ! » C'est par cette inscription, cueillie par une caméra désespérée sur les murs de Prague, peu après l'intervention soviétique, en août 1968, que se termine le beau film adapté par Costa-Gavras (avec la collaboration du romancier-scénariste Jorge Semprun) du témoignage autobiographique publié aux éditions Gallimard par un rescapé d'un procès à la stalinienne : le Tchèque Artur London (voir notre interview exclusive page 33).

On se souvient que Costa-Gavras avait précédemment démontré dans « Z » (voir « J.A. » N° 427) — inspiré par le récit de l'écrivain grec Vassili Vassilikos — la technique du coup d'Etat fasciste dans un pays méditerranéen non défini. Il est de mode — maintenant que ce film a connu un énorme succès — de souligner (ses réelles) insuffisances idéologiques : on oublie que c'était la première œuvre politique d'envergure produite par le cinéma français depuis longtemps (et ce, grâce à une participation financière algérienne).

Cette fois, c'est à la mécanique de la folie policière dans un pays socialiste que s'est attaqué le cinéaste. Les faits :

En 1951, Artur London est, à Prague, vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères (le ministre s'appelle Clementis, le président de la République, Klement Gottwald, le secrétaire général du parti communiste, Slansky), il occupe ce poste depuis deux ans (la Tchécoslovaquie a opté — d'elle-même — pour le socialisme et le camp soviétique en 1948). Il est né en 1915. Il est marié à Lise, une Française qui est la sœur de Raymond D'Amboise (membre du comité central du Parti communiste français). Communiste depuis

son adolescence, il a fait partie des Brigades internationales qui luttèrent contre Franco en Espagne en 1936. Durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, il a milité dans la résistance française avant d'être déporté, à ce titre et en tant que Juif, au camp de concentration de Mauthausen dont il a réchappé en 1945.

Cet homme fait partie de l'« establishment » de la république socialiste tchèque : il possède villa, voiture avec chauffeur et dispose de bons spéciaux d'approvisionnement dans les magasins réservés aux diplomates. Il est entièrement acquis au régime.

Le film — qui insiste au passage sur ces éléments — commence en janvier 1951. Depuis quelques jours Artur London est inquiet. Pourquoi donc est-il suivi dans tous ses déplacements par une puissante et sinistre voiture noire de la police secrète qu'occupent des sbires à la mine patibulaire ? Il s'en ouvre au ministre de l'Intérieur qui avoue qu'il ignore lui-même qui a décidé cette surveillance et à quoi elle rime. Il lui promet de faire cesser rapidement cette comédie.

Mais le 28 janvier Artur London est purement et simplement kidnappé dans la rue par ses indésirables anges gardiens. A la prison, on le frappe, on le déshabille, on l'humilie. Artur London ne comprend rien. Il proteste de son innocence, demande à voir des responsables, le secrétaire général du parti par exemple. Ricanelements, injures : « Celui-là ne tardera pas à te rejoindre, sale trotskiste, sioniste dégénéré, agent de l'impérialisme, ennemi intime du socialisme et de l'Union soviétique !

Commencent, après une période de mise en condition, les interrogatoires menés par des « référents » (c'est le terme officiel pour désigner les enquêteurs). On lui reproche notamment, semble-t-il, d'avoir fréquenté en France un certain Noël Field, un Américain qui se faisait passer pour progressiste, mais qu'on a découvert en 1949 être un agent des USA.

Artur London (interprété par Yves Montand, qui tenait dans « Z » le rôle du député Lambrakis) usera plusieurs « référents » avant d'être complètement réduit par ses bourreaux, par la privation de sommeil, l'insuffisance de la nourriture et d'autres moyens, moraux ceux-là.

Le but des responsables de cette mascarade est d'organiser un grand procès politique au cours duquel les accusés (dont Slansky et le rédacteur en chef de « Rude Pravo », le quotidien officiel : quatorze personnalités au total) reconnaîtront leurs « crimes ».

On se perd en conjectures sur la véritable signification de ce procès et sur les intentions profondes de ses auteurs.

On constate que la plupart des accusés étaient des anciens de la guerre d'Espagne, que beaucoup étaient juifs (mais nullement ou pas nécessairement sionistes, comme on le leur reprochait curieusement).

Toujours est-il qu'au procès dit de Pankrac London fut condamné avec deux coaccusés à la prison à perpétuité tandis que onze autres furent condamnés à la pendaison. Incinérés, leurs cendres furent éparpillées au vent.

Tous, y compris les morts (!), furent réhabilités en 1956.

RGHT

JAPAN TIMES
7 March 1971

CPYRGHT | 'L'Aveu' Strong Political Horror Film

By FOU MY SAISHO

Costa-Gavras' new film "L'Aveu" (at Marunouchi Shochiku) is another of his powerful indictment against totalitarianism. His target has shifted this time from the totalitarian right (as in "Z") to the totalitarian left. While the film speaks from the liberal conscience, the way it goes about its theme is more complex, certainly less dramatic than "Z" and demands of its viewer a modicum of intelligence and curiosity to add things up rather than the old habit of merely reacting at the receiving end of the visceral impact.

Actually the film is a reconstruction of certain facts involving a notorious show-trial known as the "Slansky Trial" occurring in Czechoslovakia of 1952 in which 14 high ranking government officials were put on trial for their lives under orders from Moscow. Eleven of them were later executed including the party secretary Rudolf Slansky. All the facts used in this film come from the memoir written by one of the survivors, Artur London, who was deputy minister of foreign affairs at the time of his arrest.

The time is 1951, place, Prague. Artur London (Yves Montand) has been aware for some time that he is being watched. Black automobiles follow him about. His friends avoid him. One Sunday afternoon in January 1951, London's

car is blocked by two black automobiles, armed men pour out, rough him up and bundle him away into a labyrinth of underground cells.

There he is put through a series of indignities and tortures carefully calculated to break his will. Compulsory walking in a dozen different cells without a moment's stop, the deprivation of every privacy as well as sleep by constant commands to recite serial numbers, food offered and quickly withdrawn, plain beatings, and alternately friendly and hostile interrogators. When the date of the show-trial draws near, he is given vitamin injections and a better diet to improve his complexion for the inspection of Soviet advisers.

During the trial, one of the defendants loses his pants as he recites his carefully rehearsed confession, and the whole court, including the men on trial, starts laughing a long resounding laughter, the pathetic old buffoon grinning at the camera knowingly. This scene is overlapped with a "flash-forward" in which the ashes of the executed men are scattered about on a gray road.

By this flash-forward device as well as a generous use of flashbacks, Costa-Gavras and his "Z" crew screenwriter Jorge Semprun and cinematographer Raoul Coutard — move about freely in time. In the middle of scenes recounting London's tortured

imprisonment, one finds scenes that occur years later — in 1966, for instance, where London is convalescing on the shores of the Mediterranean, reminiscing to his friends of his trial.

Through the film's adroit manipulation of time, we are given realistic enough information about London not to confuse him with the romanticist hero in Camus' fiction. A hard-bitten survivor of the Nazi concentration camp, and a fighter of the Spanish war, London is a dedicated Communist who refuses to believe that the party can do any wrong, that it is behind his arrest actually.

His cunning examiner (Gabriele Ferzetti) plays upon this aspect of his character to get a phony confession out of him. London willingly signs his self-condemning paper out of his personal credo "better be wrong within the party than right outside it."

What makes this film far more than a meticulously documented anatomy of the inquisition is Yves Montand's stoic portrayal of a man's shocking transformation under torture. Scarcely less important for the film, too, are the portrayals of the lower-echelon toughs in the Communist bureaucracy, Gabriele Ferzetti, for instance, as the relentless prosecuting attorney. The film is in French with English subtitles.

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July 1971

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE SOVIET PROTECTORATE

Last March the Soviets' 24th Communist Party Congress was carefully stage-managed to present a show of unity in an international Communist movement where frequent expressions of dissent from Soviet norms point to considerable disunity. Now the Soviets, acting behind the scenes, stage-managed another Congress, the second* 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) held 25-29 May. This time, however, some of the dissenting views found public expression, though not at the Congress.

Just as at the Moscow Congress, delegate speeches had to be submitted in advance for censorship of undesirable views. The British Communist Party would not accept the censorship and boycotted the Prague Congress. Its publicly stated reason was that the British delegate was refused permission to make his speech, in which he bluntly criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (see attached account).

The Italian Communist Party (PCI), which dispatched a relatively minor official as its delegate, also publicly protested the suppression of its message to the Congress, and later published the message in full in its own Party press. The PCI message reiterated approval of the Dubcek version of socialism for Czechoslovakia, criticized the Warsaw Pact intervention, and re-affirmed the PCI's insistence on the independence of each Communist Party and on an "Italian road to socialism" (see attachment). The Soviets cannot tolerate expression of such views by fraternal parties, but felt it even more important to prevent them from being aired before the international Communist audience gathered at the Congress.

How many more parties might have wanted, for their own practical reasons, to state similar views at the Prague Congress but were unable to do so is not known. The Australian and Dutch parties, among others, showed their displeasure by not attending the Congress at all. Ceausescu of Romania once

* The original, valid 14th Congress was held in August 1968 as Warsaw Pact troops were entering Czechoslovakia.

again showed his disapproval of Soviet attempts to dominate East Europe by sending a low-ranking delegate (Ceausescu's was the only Warsaw Pact nation that did not send its top Communist to Prague). He added to the insult by his visit to Communist China, the Soviets' bitterest Communist enemy.

Whatever the varied opportunistic motives for expression of differences within the Soviet-dominated international Communist movement, the Soviet myth of international ideological solidarity becomes ever harder to maintain in the face of such experiences as the 14th Czechoslovak Party Congress.

For the rest, the Congress (like all CP Congresses of recent date) contained no surprises. Sixty-four foreign and 1,195 Czech delegates heard Gustav Husak (whose new title of Secretary General conforms to that of his boss, Leonid Brezhnev) review the 50-year history of his Party, rewriting as he went. He praised the 25-year iron reign of Stalinist Klement Gottwald but pointedly ignored the terrible purge trials of 1951-52 of which he himself was a victim. He blamed hard liner Antonin Novotny, not for his repressive tactics but for his "error", which permitted Dubcek and his reformers to take over. The latter were pictured as permitting revisionists to get out of control to the point where Communism itself was seriously threatened -- and that in the eight months from January to August 1968!

Husak repeated the humiliating "invitation" claim from the December 1970 Party document* that "thousands" of Czechs had begged the Soviet Union to come to their aid. He again thanked Warsaw Pact members, and Brezhnev personally, for saving Czechoslovakia from the very brink of civil war and counterrevolution. Again, as in the "Lessons" and again as in Moscow, he offered no facts to support his thesis and could not name one of the "thousands" who appealed to Moscow nor one of the counter-revolutionaries whose evil plans were presumably thwarted. Nonetheless the "lives of thousands" and the "western frontiers of the socialist camp" were saved, he assured his audience, by the timely intervention of the Warsaw Pact allies.

It strains credulity that the Communist country which staged the 1950's purge trails of imaginary plotters is now unwilling to call to account the "dangerous counterrevolutionaries of 1968," much less identify them, if they actually exist. Few Czechs believe this post facto rationale for the invasion, but doubtless Moscow-line Communists everywhere will repeat it. Not so the clandestine Spanish Communist Party (PCE): "No one in his right mind would believe a socialist state could be threatened

*"Lessons Drawn from Critical Developments in the Party and Society after the 13th CPCZ Congress", December 1970, Central Committee of CPCZ.

by a few groups of dissidents. It cannot," said PCE's Realidad (see attachment).

At the Congress, Brezhnev's reference to the 1968 crisis concluded with a veiled reiteration of his notorious Brezhnev Doctrine: "...the lessons learned by your party from the sharp skirmishes with the class enemy are significant not only for the development of Czechoslovakia but also for other socialist countries and other Communist parties." He then went on to mouth a few of the more innocuous "lessons" such as the necessity for following the precepts of Marxism-Leninism, the dangers of complacency, the need for vigilance, etc. etc., but he closed with the most significant lesson! "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic today stands before the entire world as a strong link in the great alliance of the people building a new life, and no one will ever be able to sever Czechoslovakia [and one could add: 'nor Poland nor Romania'] from the socialist camp" (emphasis added).

That Czechoslovakia is fully "normalized" is recognized by all--first of all, by the Soviet and Czech Communist leaders. This was confirmed by the 14th Congress. Despite the fact that Brezhnev promised at the time of the invasion that troops would remain on Czechoslovak soil only until the situation was normalized, 80,000 Soviet troops are still there. One can only conclude that a "normalized" Czechoslovakia for the Soviets means an occupied territory, in effect, a protectorate essentially like that imposed by the Nazis during World War II.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1971

BREZHNEV LINKS CZECH 'TRIUMPH' TO UNITY OF REDS

Party Delegates in Prague Cheer as Soviet Leader Assails 'Class Enemies'

By JAMES FERON
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, May 26 — The Brezhnev Doctrine was re-endorsed here today by its author Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, as an essential element in Czechoslovakia's "triumph over the enemies of socialism."

Speaking to nearly 3,000 delegates and guests at the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Party, Mr. Brezhnev warned of the continuing need for socialist states to stand together against 'class ene-

mies" at home and abroad.

The Soviet party leader, applauded repeatedly throughout his address, received a standing ovation when he said:

"Nobody will ever be successful in taking Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. Nobody ever will be successful in barking our friendship and fraternity."

Lauds Czech Leader

Mr. Brezhnev lauded Gustav Husak, the Czechoslovak party leader, for having overcome the "counterrevolutionary intrigues" that he said had gathered force in 1968 under Alexander Dubcek, then party chief.

It was in August, 1968, that Warsaw Pact military forces led by Soviet units entered Czechoslovakia to end the liberal regime or Mr. Dubcek and pave the way for a return to more orthodox socialism under Mr. Husak.

The incursion was later justified by the Soviet leader as the duty of socialist states to intervene to protect their system against revisionism. This policy of limited sovereignty

in Eastern Europe became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Mr. Brezhnev, speaking in the Czech capital nearly three years after Soviet tanks ringed its main square, devoted a major portion of his 45-minute address to stressing a continuing need for interdependence among Warsaw Pact states.

Others With Brezhnev

Among those on the podium of the ornate convention hall were the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, whose military units participated in the invasion. Only Soviet troops—estimated at 80,000—remain in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet leader turned briefly to foreign affairs in his address, speaking critically of a tendency among Western nations to insist on solving European problems in packages, rather than individually.

The reference was to the Berlin problem, which Western governments have tied to ratification of Warsaw and Moscow treaties with Bonn and to

a proposed European unity conference favored by the Soviet Union.

"We assess the situation realistically," Mr. Brezhnev said. "We see the efforts for sabotage, and we know who stands behind it."

Charting New Courses

The Soviet party leader praised Mr. Husak, President Ludvik Svoboda and "other fighters" as having defended the nation against "right-wing revisionists" and for charting new economic, political and social courses.

As a result, he said, they now "have considerable authority in today's world Communist movement."

The endorsements seemed to most observers to represent sufficient backing for Mr. Husak to be re-elected party leader. He has come under muted attack within the party for not having carried the post-Dubcek purge far enough.

It is estimated that 300,000 party members, roughly one-fifth of the total, have been ousted in the "cleansing" of party ranks that ended a few months ago.

WASHINGTON POST
26 May 1971

CPYRGHT

Czech Party Hails '68 Soviet Invasion

From News Dispatches

PRAGUE, May 25—Czechoslovak Communists today formally approved the invasion of Czechoslovakia amid a storm of applause for the leaders of Warsaw Pact nations whose troops crushed the "Prague Spring" of 1968.

About 1,200 delegates to the 14th congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party interrupted their leader, Gustav Husak, with rhythmic applause and cheering when he turned toward Soviet party leader Brezhnev on the platform and thanked him personally for the decision to invade Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968.

Husak also thanked the Communist leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria seated with

Brezhnev on the platform. It was a moment of personal triumph for Brezhnev who rose to his feet to return the ovation.

Today's expression of Czechoslovak's "sincere gratitude" to Moscow and "especially to you, Comrade Brezhnev" was a repetition of earlier such statements but it had the distinction of being made at a party congress, the supreme gathering of Czechoslovak Communists. The 14th congress was delayed more than two years by the 1968 invasion.

Husak, delivering the main report on the events of the past five years, denounced both his predecessors in office, Antonin Novotny and Alexander Dubcek.

He accused Novotny of "right-wing revisionism" and of allowing anti-socialist

forces to infiltrate the party. Dubcek was accused once again of weakness, a two-faced policy and toleration of anti-communism.

Novotny, 66, ran Czechoslovakia almost single-handed from 1953 until he was replaced by Dubcek in January, 1968. He has been suspended from the party and lives in retirement.

Dubcek, 49, has been expelled from the party and works in the regional forestry administration in Bratislava, Slovakia.

Liberal Communists held a 14th party congress in secret immediately after the invasion, but the meeting, although attended by legally chosen delegates, was later repudiated under pressure from official congress still recognized

was in 1966, when Novotny led the party.

The meeting that began today will set a seal on the past five years of political, economic and military upheaval and plot a quieter course for the future.

One of its tasks is to elect a new central committee to replace the patchwork of appointed officials who have taken the place of purge victims. Husak is expected to be reelected.

The congress also is to approve a new five-year economic plan. Husak promised today continued improvement of the Czechoslovak living standard, already one of the highest in the Communist world. He said real income will increase by five per cent a year for the next five years, 500,000 apartments and 700,000 cars will be produced by 1975.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES
28 May 1971

BREZHNEV HINTS AT CZECH TRIALS

He Asserts in Prague That
Reformers Broke Laws

By JAMES FERON

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, May 27—Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party chief, raised the possibility of political trials in Czechoslovakia today by warning the purged leaders of the Dubcek reform movement that they had broken Czechoslovak laws.

The Soviet leader, who is attending the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak party, made the assertion while speaking in a Prague factory that had figured dramatically in events at the time of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion.

"Under the cover of demagoguery," he said, the "right-wing revisionists broke the democratic laws of socialist Czechoslovakia" and "stripped the

defenders of socialism of their basic rights as guaranteed by law."

Mr. Brezhnev mentioned no names but derided "two-faced politicians who spoke so much about humane socialism," an obvious allusion to Alexander Dubcek, the former Communist party leader who sought to introduce "socialism with a human face" to Czechoslovakia.

Only 3 Political Trials

Although about 300,000 party members have been purged—60,000 of them were expelled from the party—since Mr. Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak as party chief in April, 1969, there have been only three trials of Czechs on political charges.

No leaders of the Dubcek reform movement have been tried, and there has been no hint so far that such trials are contemplated. But Mr. Husak, who was a political prisoner for nine years, is understood to be under pressure by party hard liners to continue the purge and initiate trials.

Mr. Brezhnev's remarks, although offered informally during a tour of the Auto Praga plant, will nevertheless en-

courage those who want to maintain and extend the anti-Dubcek efforts.

Mr. Husak's own position appeared tonight to be secure, however. He was endorsed yesterday and today by Mr. Brezhnev as a true patriot and a leader of international stature. His re-election as party chief was all but confirmed tonight by Vasil Bilak, a member of the party Presidium considered by some to be a rival of Mr. Husak.

'Will Be Confirmed'

Addressing the Congress Mr. Bilak said that Mr. Husak will be confirmed in his post and his authority strengthened.

The Soviet party chief's visit to the Praga plant was apparently intended to recall one example of Czechoslovak support for the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion, which brought an end to the Dubcek era.

A letter written by 99 Praga workers and printed in Pravda, the Soviet party newspaper, in July, 1968, one month before the invasion, supported the presence of Soviet units in Czechoslovakia, in which they had been withdrawing slowly after East bloc maneuvers.

The "letter of the 99" was based on the workers' alleged fear of the danger of imperialism mounting in the nation. A few weeks later, the letter was disavowed by other Prague workers and was condemned a second time, even more forcefully, after the Warsaw Pact units marched into Czechoslovakia.

According to C.T.K., the Czechoslovak press agency, Mr.

Brezhnev said: "Many of you who wrote the letter are here. I know you did not have an easy time. Enemies of socialism called you deserters, traitors and collaborators and said your letter was a knife stabbed in the back of Czechoslovakia."

"Where are all those today who called for the 99 to be punished?" Mr. Brezhnev asked. He then described critics of the 99 as "two-faced politicians who spoke so much about humane socialism, who would give anything to unleash a witch hunt against the defenders of socialist achievements."

Then answering his own question, he said: "The party expelled them from their ranks. The people have cast them aside with scorn."

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
28 May 1971

Thank you, big brother

CPYRGHT

SOVIET party leader Leonid Brezhnev's gall in appearing at the Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress this week was like a scene out of George Orwell's "1984."

Mr. Brezhnev had the role of Big Brother, who ruled a third of the world in the Orwell novel thru brainwashing, thought control and terror. His subjects practiced doublethink and spoke Newspeak: war is peace, black is white, truth is lie, joy is forced labor, etc.

In true Orwellian style, the congress tumultuously applauded Mr. Brezhnev, author of the 1968 Soviet Army invasion that crushed Czechoslovakia's autonomy and ended its efforts to give social-

ism "a human face."

The scene illustrated one of the Kremlin's the nastiest and most hypocritical traits: It not only does terrible things, such as enslaving people, but insists that they profusely thank it for the favor.

This time the sad task fell to Gustav Husak, a decent Slovak who runs the country for Russia, probably to prevent a bunch of Stalinists, traitors and police sadists from taking over.

Poor Mr. Husak had to "express our sincere gratitude" to the Soviet Union "and to you personally, Comrade Brezhnev" for invading Czechoslovakia and overthrowing the government of Al-

exander Dubcek, which had overwhelming popular support.

It is a pity that Orwell, a disillusioned British Communist, did not live to see the Soviet rape of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Brezhnev's later triumphant appearance.

Orwell might have been inspired to update his dictionary of Newspeak with entries like: invasion is nonintervention, domination is equality, do not wait for an invitation to violate a country — it will be issued after the event.

Unfortunately, Orwell's novel was prophecy. This week Big Brother was alive and well in Prague. And in Czechoslovakia it is already "1984."

NEW YORK TIMES
26 May 1971

Husak Lauds '68 Invasion As Prague Congress Opens

CPYRGHT

By JAMES FERON

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, May 25 — Gustav Husak, the Czechoslovak Communist party leader, opened the long-delayed 14th Congress of his party today with praise for the invasion of his country by Warsaw Pact nations in August, 1968.

CPYRGHT

A packed convention hall exploded in cheers and the rhythmic chanting of "Long live the Soviet Union." As Mr. Husak, who replaced Alexander Dubcek as party chief, turned to thank the Soviet party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Mr. Brezhnev stood to return the applause of nearly 1,200 delegates, 1,500 guests and the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary.

A Source of Outrage

The 14th Czechoslovak party congress was originally scheduled for September, 1968, but the meeting was canceled as the military forces of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Poland invaded in August and ended Mr. Dubcek's liberal rule. He was replaced by Mr. Husak in April, 1969.

The invasion outraged many Western governments and cre-

ated turmoil in Western Communist parties. The Soviet party leaders' later justification of the policy of limited sovereignty in Eastern Europe has become known as the Brezhnev doctrine.

It is estimated that 80,000 Soviet troops remain in Czechoslovakia. They are seen, occasionally — a jeep in downtown Prague, soldiers in small groups in a provincial town, a few trucks on a country road — but they are not obvious to casual travelers.

A clandestine 14th party congress held in the fall of 1968, in a Prague factory under the leadership of Mr. Dubcek was later declared invalid by Mr. Husak, who restored more orthodox Communism to Czechoslovakia.

The congress beginning today is expected to signal the end of a purge that has seen major changes in the national party membership and the removal of many nonparty supporters of Mr. Dubcek in education, the arts and other fields.

Review of 'Hard Trials'

The opening session was devoted in large measure to a review of Mr. Husak of the "years of hard trial for our party and for the socialist society" since the 13th Congress, in 1966.

He said "Today we can responsibly declare that the advance of counterrevolutionary forces has been repelled, the socialist system defended."

The "international assistance" of 1968 — the official term here for the invasion — was necessary, Mr. Husak declared, to "defeat right-wing opportunist, revisionist and antisocialist forces" under Mr. Dubcek.

The 49-year-old former leader was thrown out of the party last year, one of about 300,000 party members who were ousted in the party "cleansing." Mr. Dubcek is understood to be running the mechanization section of the forestry department in Bratislava, his home town.

The delegates applauded repeatedly in favor of the invasion, and in particularly in tribute to its author, Mr. Brezhnev.

Others On Podium

With Mr. Brezhnev on the podium of the Fucik Park Cultural Center in downtown Prague were the leaders of the four other Eastern European countries that participated in the invasion.

They were Janos Kadar of Hungary and Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria and two leaders who have come to power since the 1968 incursion; Edward Gierek of Poland and Erich Honecker of East Germany.

Mr. Husak spoke of the Czech Communist party's origins 50 years ago this month, and of the experiences since then, all leading to the "profound conviction" that national existence can be guaranteed only in close alliance with the Soviet Union.

Speaking of the last decade, Mr. Husak condemned the "intoxication in the leadership of our party" and said that Leninist ideas were not respected under the leadership of Antonin Novotny, who was suspended from the party in May, 1968, and under Mr. Dubcek.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1971

Charade in Prague

CPYRGHT

Since both Gustav Husak and Leonid I. Brezhnev are intelligent men, neither can take very seriously the current charade at the fourteenth congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party in Prague. References to the "international assistance" the Soviet Union gave Czechoslovakia in 1968 are unlikely to convince anyone aware of the facts that what happened was anything but a brutal invasion—one that robbed a small country of its sovereignty. At most, Messrs. Husak and Brezhnev are engaged in the retrospective rewriting of history, apparently hopeful that future generations may be deceived even if their contemporaries are not.

Essentially, the seeming love duet in Prague represents a coldly calculated deal between the two Communist leaders. Mr. Husak has set up the party congress as a public demonstration of unquestioned Czechoslovak obedi-

sance to the Soviet Union. Mr. Brezhnev will come away with material to argue that whatever mistakes he may have made vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia a few years ago have been fully rectified. Mr. Brezhnev's need for such evidence of victory arises out of his failure to foresee and prevent the Dubcek era when—in late 1967—he intervened personally in Prague and allowed the fall of Antonin Novotny, Alexander Dubcek's predecessor.

In return for this service, Mr. Husak has received full endorsement from Mr. Brezhnev, backing that will presumably enable the Czechoslovak leader to keep his political rivals in Prague in check for the predictable future. Thus, both leaders benefit from the charade, while the Czechoslovak people have no alternative but to nurse their bitterness and treasure their memories of the short, sweet "Prague spring" of 1968.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1971

CPYRGHT

Czech Congress Re-elects Husak at Its Final Session

PRAGUE, May 29 — Gustav Husak was renamed head of the Czechoslovak Communist party today at its 14th congress amid shouts of "Long live the Soviet Union."

The re-election of the 68-year-old leader, who replaced Alexander Dubcek as party chief in 1969, was expected at a congress that had few surprises.

The session was intended to mark the end of the purges and political unrest that followed the Soviet-led invasion in 1968 and Mr. Dubcek's ouster. Addressing nearly 1,200 delegates to the congress, the first since 1966, Mr. Husak made that point and added, "We have proved now that we belong to the socialist camp."

Pledges Vigilance

In his brief speech accepting the mandate, Mr. Husak concentrated on reassuring delegates that party publications and regulations would be scrutinized to insure against inroads by "right-wing revisionists." This is the term used for those who opposed Dubcek's liberalization policies.

With the Soviet party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, looking on, Husak said, "never will anything at any time disrupt our relationship and partnership with the Soviet Union."

Mr. Brezhnev, whose military units led the invasion in August, 1968, to put down what was described as a threatened counter-revolution, stood to receive the chants of praise from the delegates.

The last scene of the week-long session was in many ways a re-enactment of the first, with Mr. Husak thanking Mr. Brezhnev for having saved Czechoslovak socialism from the internal and external dangers of imperialism.

Leaders of Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria, whose forces participated in the 1968 invasion, also attended the congress. Edward Gierek of Poland and Janos Kadar of Hungary were present at the final session.

Mr. Brezhnev's presence at the last session was considered unusual by most observers. He usually leaves Soviet-bloc party congresses after a few days. His presence through the meeting was seen as an indica-

tion of solidarity.

Only the Soviet forces now remain in Czechoslovakia, with an estimated 80,000 troops stationed in garrisons mostly in Bohemia and Moravia. They are seen occasionally, but their presence is not obvious.

The congress elected a new 115-member Central Committee as the new ruling body of the Czechoslovak Communist party. It replaced a 132-member body that had been altered over the last two years through resignations and the inclusion of new members to reflect the post-Dubcek political changes.

54 New Members

Even so, the Central Committee named today has 54 new members. Of the old members, only 26 are holdovers from the 1966 Central Committee under Antonin Novotny, Mr. Dubcek's predecessor.

The new Central Committee met this morning before the final, televised session to elect a new 11-member Presidium. It contained only one change, the replacement of 59-year-old Evzan Erban by Karel Hoffman, head of the trades union movement.

Mr. Erban, a former Social Democrat whose party merged with the Communists in 1948, had been in the Czech leadership for years. His departure was believed to have no ideological significance.

Mr. Hoffman, 47 years old, has been a minister of transport and a minister of communications. He had been a candidate-member of the Presidium since December and was made head of the trades union movement only recently.

2 Key Figures Dropped

Among the members dropped from the Central Committee were Frantisek Barbirek and Jan Piller, conservatives who played a key role in the Czech leadership's immediate response to the Warsaw Pact invasion.

They were said to have switched their allegiance the night the troops were entering Czechoslovakia, supporting Mr. Dubcek against those party leaders who were in favor of welcoming the units.

Observers have said that if the two men had supported the anti-Dubcek forces, the liberal leader would have been ousted immediately and a pro-Soviet Czech government installed.

Because Mr. Dubcek vacillated at the time of the invasion, eight months elapsed before he was replaced by Mr. Husak. Although Mr. Husak introduced a more conservative brand of Communism to Czechoslovakia, he is considered by most Czechoslovaks to be more liberal than the regime that would have been installed had Mr. Dubcek been ousted immediately.

Mr. Husak, in his concluding speech today, spoke to the delegates of three changes in the party statutes: the convening of party congresses every five years instead of every four, the reintroduction of candidate-members and the change in title of party chief from first secretary to general secretary.

The changes are seen to have little practical significance. Their introduction appeared to

observers to be motivated by a desire to follow the Soviet example.

The full Presidium, as announced by Mr. Husak, is as follows: Gustav Husak, Ludvik Svoboda (President), Vasil Bilak, Peter Colotka, Karel Hoffman, Alois Indra, Antonin Kapel, Jozef Kempny, Jozef Korcak, Jozef Lenart and Lubomir Strougal.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
26 May 1971

CZECH BAN ON SPEECH BY BRITISH PARTY

CPYRGHT

By Our Communist Affairs Staff

The British Communist party is boycotting the Czechoslovak Communist party congress due to the Czech refusal to allow the proposed speech of the British delegate to be given.

The boycott follows the earlier acceptance by the British party to attend. The words objected to were: "The military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, was a grave mistake and a

violation of the commonly agreed principles of the international Communist movement."

In its statement last night the British party said: "We informed the Czechoslovak party in advance that we would include these points in our speech. They subsequently informed us they regarded it as an interference in their internal affairs and could not allow it to be made."

MORNING STAR, London
26 May 1971

CPYRGHT

The Communist Party of Great Britain regrets it will not be represented at the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

In a statement yesterday, the British party said that this was because the Communist party of Czechoslovakia had refused to allow the speech of the British party's delegate to be made at its congress.

"At its last meeting our executive committee accepted an invitation to be present, elected a delegate and approved the brief speech he intended making on our behalf," the statement went on.

"In the course of 600-word speech dealing with the struggle against imperialism and the movement in Britain to defeat the Tory government and its policies, we reaffirmed our position on the events of 1968, saying: 'As you know, our congress expressed the view that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was a grave mistake, and a violation of the commonly agreed principles of the international communist movement concerning relations between socialist states and relations between communist parties entire movement.

"Nothing that has happened or been said since has changed our assessment.

"We informed the Czechoslovak Party in advance that we would include these points in our speech to their congress. They subsequently informed us they regarded it as an interference in their internal affairs and could not allow it to be made to their congress.

"We cannot accept this. Our speech said nothing about internal Czechoslovak affairs, but was concerned only with the events of 1968 which affected the entire international communist movement.

"We recognize the right of a communist party to decide who shall speak at its own congress, but as the decision of the Czechoslovak Communist Party meant our delegate would not be allowed to deliver the speech approved by our executive committee, it was decided he should not attend."

The delegate elected by the party executive committee was Mr Ruben Falber, assistant general secretary.

BRIEFS

YUGOSLAV-NORWEGIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS--Oslo, May 25--Economic relations between Yugoslavia and Norway developed successfully last year, it has been concluded by a mixed Yugoslav-Norwegian commission for economic cooperation, whose work has started here. It has been announced that the mixed commission will dedicate attention to new possibilities for the expansion of economic cooperation, within which tourism will be especially considered. There will also be discussed the possibilities for the signing of a convention on social insurance. The Yugoslav delegation is headed by member of the Yugoslav Government Nikola Pavletic, and the Norwegian delegation by minister of trade and shipping, Per Leppe. Norwegian Premier Trygve Bratteli has received Pavletic, who has also held talks with Norwegian Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen and Secretary of State Turnvald Stoltneberg. [Text] (Belgrade TANJUG International English 1620 GMT 25 May 71 L)

PRGRSV GREETINGS--South Viet Nam May 17--President Huynh Tan Phat of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam has sent a message of greetings to Mr Trygve Bratteli, prime minister of the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, on the occasion of Norway's Constitutional Day. The message said: "On the occasion of the Constitutional Day of the Kingdom of Norway, on behalf of the RSVN PRG I wish to convey to Your Excellency, the government and the people of Norway our warmest greetings". On this occasion Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, minister for foreign affairs of the RSVN PRG also sent a message of greetings to Mr. Andreas Cappelen, minister for foreign affairs of the Kingdom of Norway. [Text] (LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY/Clandestine/English East Europe and Far East 1524 GMT 17 May 71 B)

YUGOSLAV CONGRATULATIONS--President of the Republic Jozip Broz Tito has sent the following telegram to King Olav V of Norway: "On the occasion of the national holiday of your country, I am pleased to send Your Majesty and the friendly people of Norway most cordial congratulations and best wishes for the personal happiness of Your Majesty and the progress of friendly Norway." [Text] (Belgrade BORBA 17 May 71 p 2 A)

BULGARIAN GREETINGS--Georgi Traykov, chairman of the National Assembly Presidium, has sent a greetings telegram to the King of Norway Olav V, on the occasion of the national holiday of the country. (Sofia Domestic Bulgarian 1430 GMT 20 May 71 A)

CZECHOSLOVAK MESSAGE--Prague May 16--Czechoslovak President Ludvik Svoboda has sent a telegram of congratulations to Norwegian King Olav V., on his country's national day. [Text] (Prague CTK International English 2054 GMT 16 May 71 L)

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
29 May 1971

Communists suppress Italian note

CPYRGHT From DAN MORGAN, Rome, May 28

The Italian Communist Party said today that its message of dissent to the invasion of Czechoslovakia had been suppressed by the party congress meeting this week in Prague.

The announcement from the party press office in Rome marred the elaborately prepared surface harmony of the Prague meeting, which is being attended by top delegations from each of the invading countries, including the Soviet leader, Mr Brezhnev.

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It was also a reminder of the steadfast criticism of the invasion from the West's largest Communist Party. The Italian Communists received 27 per cent of the vote in the last general election and claim 1.5 million members.

The party announcement said the text of the message was being published in Rome because the Italian representative to the congress, Signor Sergio Segre, was unable to read it.

Signor Segre is a member of the Italian Central Committee, but is considered to be of low enough level in the Italian

party to signify disapproval of the course being taken by the regime of Mr Husak in Prague. It was also possible that the Italians did not wish to expose one of their top political officers to the humiliation of being muzzled in Prague.

The correspondent of the party paper "L'Unita" wrote this week that extreme conservatives were coming to the fore in Czechoslovakia who go beyond the official line of the party.

The suppressed message said that the Italian party had given a positive appraisal to the 1968

reforms and "from this was born our dissent with respect to the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact."

It continued: "With the frankness that we think must always underly the relations between Communist parties, we tell you that we do not believe that there occurred subsequently elements that can induce us to change our position."

The statement also stressed Italy's belief in the sovereignty of each State, in diversities in reaching socialism, and in the need for collaboration between different political forces in

Socialist society. It underlined the need for a "multiplicity of forms and of democratic organisations" and for the "direct and active participation of the masses."

Since 1968, the Italian party has consistently refused to toe the approved Soviet line on the invasion. At the 1969 world conference of Communist parties in Moscow, Italian representatives voiced similar objections, and left the conference early. With municipal and provincial elections in Italy soon, the party clearly wishes to leave no doubt on its stand. — Washington Post.

WASHINGTON POST
29 May 1971

CPYRGHT

Italian Reds Disclose Dissenting Note They Say Czech Parley Suppressed

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

CPYRGHT

ROME, May 28 (Italy's Communist Party asserted today that its message of "dissent" to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia had been suppressed by the party congress meeting this week in Prague.

The announcement from the party press office in Rome marred the elaborately prepared surface harmony of the

Prague meeting, which is being attended by top delegations from each of the invading countries, including Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

It was also a reminder of the steadfast criticism of the 1968 invasion from the West's largest Communist Party. The Italian Communists received 27 per cent of the vote in the last general election and claim 1.5 million members.

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Segre is a member of the Italian central committee, but is considered to be of low enough level in the Italian party to signify disapproval of the course being taken by the regime of Gustav Husak in Prague. It was also possible

that the Italians did not wish to expose one of their top political officers to the humiliation of being muzzled in Prague.

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The statement also stressed Italy's belief in the sover-

eignty of each state, in "diversities" in reaching socialism, and in the need for collaboration between different political forces in Socialist society.

It further underlined the need for a "multiplicity of forms and of democratic organizations" and for the "direct and active participation of the masses."

With municipal and provincial elections coming up again in Italy, the party clearly wishes to leave no doubt on its stand.

L'UNITA, Rome
29 May 1971

(Text of PCI message to 14th CPCZ congress)

CPYRGHT

The PCI press office has released the text of the PCI Directorate's message to the CPCZ congress, which was to have been read by Comrade Sergio Segre and which the congress presidency did not consider necessary to have read:

Comrades, I have been charged by the PCI Directorate to convey, through this message addressed to your congress, the greetings of the Italian communists to the communists, workers, and people of Czechoslovakia.

You are aware that the Italian communists have always highly appreciated the contribution which the Czechoslovak communists, workers, and nation have made in the struggle against fascism and nazism, as well as the contribution which they have made and are called upon to make in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism and for peace, European security, and socialism.

The permanent reasons which animate and guide the internationalism of the Italian communists lie in the great objectives of the defense of peace, the liberation of the peoples and of all the oppressed and exploited masses, and the realization of a new society of free and equal people. We proceed from the belief that in the struggle for these objectives it is necessary to further the ever widening collaboration and the unity between all the anti-imperialist, progressive, revolutionary, and peace-loving forces in Europe and throughout the world.

We are also convinced that in order to pursue an effective internationalist unity it is necessary to recognize the differences which mark for every country the path to be pursued toward socialism, that the existing disputes should not be ignored, and that it is necessary to proceed from the exact awareness of these disputes in the activity directed at overcoming them in fact and through an open and frank debate.

This is obviously not the place to discuss the problems which have been opened up and the quite profound differences which exist today within the international workers movement and between our two parties. However, we also consider it our duty to confirm on this occasion the political and principled positions assumed by our party in connection with the Czechoslovak events of recent years, events which have been of international importance and which have raised questions which are at the moment under discussion within the international workers and communist movement.

Our positions are known to you. We have made a positive appreciation of the new course initiated by your party in January 1968, although not ignoring the difficulties and dangers arising in its implementation but believing that they should be overcome through

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an open appeal to the communists and the working class of your country. Our differences with regard to the military intervention of five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia also arises partly from this. With the frankness that we believe should always inspire relations between communist parties, we say to you that we do not believe that any elements have emerged meanwhile which could induce us to change our positions.

They are based, in addition to our judgment of the development of the events, on the firm belief that the independence and sovereignty of every communist party and of every state are the absolute foundations of internationalism.

We believe that the national character and internationalism of a revolutionary force are both essential and inseparable, and that only in this way can the working class acquire ever growing importance, become the predominant class in its own country, and thus make an effective contribution to the struggle of the international proletariat.

Comrades, in the profound social and political crisis which Italy is going through, we communists are working to promote the broadest possible convergences and agreements between all the forces of the left, both lay and Catholic, with the aim of securing the democratic progress and social renovation of Italy, in the prospect of socialism. We are thus struggling to open up the path to the realization and building of a socialist society with the collaboration of various political forces, a society based on a multiplicity of democratic forms and organizations, popular consent, and on the direct and active participation of the masses.

Advancing on the Italian path toward socialism traced out by our party in accordance with the teachings of Marx and Lenin, in 50 years of struggle under the leadership of Gramsci and Togliatti we have become a great worker, popular, national, and internationalist force. Our solidarity with the socialist countries, with the national liberation movements, and with all the struggles of the working class and of the democratic forces in the capitalist countries is a deep and concrete solidarity; and so is our solidarity with the heroic peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, with the Arab peoples, and with all those who are struggling against imperialism, aggression, and oppression throughout the world. We highly appreciate the aid which the USSR, your own country, and all the socialist countries are giving to the struggles of these peoples, as well as the initiatives for peace which have been undertaken on an international level. We believe the time has now come for the peoples of Europe to unite in the struggle for a system of collective security based on the recognition of the reality which has emerged from World War II, and which would help overcome the continent's division into two counterposed blocs and begin a new phase of cooperation and collaboration. The proposals recently advanced by the 24th CPSU congress for a policy of peace appear to us to be of particular importance in this respect.

In this spirit we beg you to accept, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of your party, the warm salute which we address to all Czechoslovak communists and workers, in the hope that Czechoslovakia may advance in building socialism in the unity of the communists and with the consent of the workers and of the people.

[The following is a summary of and excerpts from an article by Spanish Communist Manuel Azcarte, "On the Use of Marxist Methods," writing in Realidad as broadcast by the Spanish Communist Party's clandestine radio: "Radio Espana Independiente" on 25 May 1971.]

The "Lessons From the Crisis-Ridden Development in the Party and Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress" attempt to give a theoretical and historical foundation to the official thesis of the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. They attempt to explain how a situation in which counterrevolution and capitalism were about to take over and in which socialism could only be saved by a military invasion could be created in a country where the working class had been in power for more than 20 years and where the communist party had all the resources and made all the decisions.

The document claimed that socialism was about to be destroyed from within. It is not contested that certain antisocialist elements existed in the 1968 political crisis and that the communist party had to face up to the dangers such forces represented. The Czechoslovakia Communist Party leadership recognized this danger after January 1968 and faced up to it. Dubcek himself clearly expressed his attitude in his talks with the French comrades.

"This point is not contested. The communist parties which, like ours, expressed their opposition to the military intervention, have never cast doubt on the existence of these elements."

"What the document tries to show us is the existence, in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, of the extraordinary and [word indistinct] counterrevolutionary force which was on the point of overthrowing the socialist state and of destroying socialism."

"The two arguments which could be used to logically justify the intervention were, first, the threat of an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Atlantic troops and, second, the existence of a powerful, organized, counterrevolutionary plot, a plot which was armed and had support, which was on the point of launching an attack on the government, and which was strong enough to destroy the socialist state."

Was socialism in danger? The document cites the two groups K 231 and KAN as being antisocialist. These consisted of only a small group of people." Could they be a danger to socialism? To say yes is not only to laugh at truth, but also to insult socialism. We Spanish communists, who are confronted with a fascist state which does not have the support of the masses and is the enemy of the people, know how difficult it is to struggle to destroy the state. No one in his right mind would believe that the existence of a socialist state could be threatened by a few groups of dissidents."

The document says that the counterrevolutionary forces were penetrating other areas and were launching an open attack. Launching an open attack is a very concrete affair, involving real people and places. But the document does not cite any facts to support its claim. It cannot.

"If this counterrevolution, this danger to socialism, had existed, the objective of the military intervention would have been to overthrow it. If so, the document could have told us today that the troops of the USSR and the other socialist countries had dismantled this counterrevolution, which consisted of specific people. The document contains nothing like this. In short, far from showing that there was a serious and imminent counterrevolutionary threat in August 1968, it shows a lack of facts and proof to support such a statement."

"What was the choice regarding the political scene in Czechoslovakia facing the Central Committee plenum in January-August 1968? Was it perhaps capitalism or socialism?"

A dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or a dictatorship of the proletariat? Alliance with the socialist countries or the Atlantic bloc? No. Such a choice never existed in fact. And, in a way, the document confirms this. This choice was different between two forms or models of socialism."

There are many incongruous aspects of the document and its absurdities. "How could interstructural phenomena reinstate capitalism without any modification of the structure of the class situation created under socialism, with the working class holding power?"

It is incongruous that explanations in the document are limited to the struggles, conflicts, and contradictions within the party, within the working class, within socialism. "But on the other hand, it is perfectly logical to see this as a confrontation between the two conceptions of socialism which became evident in the party."

The document says that the so-called rightwing revisionist forces took advantage of weakness in applying the 13th CPOZ Congress resolution. This current upset the party because there were ideological deficiencies in the schools and colleges. The so-called healthy current lost ground. The so-called rightwing revisionist group was formed at the January plenum, that is, the main nucleus including Dubcek and the party leadership. How did this so-called revisionist group become the counterrevolution? The document claims that it broke five permanent, unchangeable values of socialism, five objective laws which determine its character of socialist power. Violating these laws is the same as antisocialist and counterrevolutionary activity. It would have been logical for the Warsaw troops to have broken up and arrested a band of bourgeois counterrevolutionary spies, but they kept Dubcek and others in the Central Committee offices. Moreover, the Soviet Government started talks a few days later with them and accepted that they should remain in their posts when the Soviet troops were in the country. The document makes no mention of this at all.

After August, the process of expelling members from the party started. The Central Committee was changed from above and it later passed this document. This document shows, by the basic structure of this argument, the model and conception of socialism imposed on Czechoslovakia and the theoretical errors which Marxism makes when it strives to defend this model.

In his analysis of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's document, which tries to justify military intervention by five socialist countries, Manuel Azcarate writes:

The document presents the values of socialism as follows: The leading position of the working class and its vanguard the communist party; the role of the socialist state as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat; Marxist-Leninist ideology and its diffusion with the aid of all the means of mass influence; socialist ownership of the means of production and the principle of planned management of the national economy; and the principles of proletarian internationalism and their consistent application in foreign policy, especially in relation to the Soviet Union.

Azcarate argues that one first comes up against the adjective "immutable," which clashes with the Marxist and Leninist conception of socialism as a lower, a first, stage which leads to communism and which is still strongly impregnated with bourgeois residues, in particular the state. Moreover, presenting the above five values together as laws to be complied with, without dialectics between and within them, is surprising. Even more surprising is the order in which the five values are presented to us. Socialist ownership of the means of production is only on fourth place, after ideology. In this positioning of the value concerning the structure of property, of the really class aspect of the problem, fortuitous? Is the priority given to the state as an (?active) instrument to the party as director, to ideology as something to be thrust among the masses from above, fortuitous?

The basic problem here concerns relations between democracy and freedom. The defense of democracy and freedom is of fundamental importance for the communist parties, which are fighting in the capitalist countries. In the face of the spectacular development of monopolist state capitalism, the (?regression) of the forms of bourgeois democracy, and the emergence of powerful instruments for manipulating human minds, democracy and freedom become decisive platforms for uniting the great working masses, the youth, peasant, intellectual, and professional masses against the monopolist state. They become decisive for the socialist revolution.

The Leninist theses on the indissoluble bond between democracy and socialism must be fully retrieved and raised to a new level in the present day situation. The need for socialism to recover its democratic dimension was reflected in the document approved at the 1969 Moscow conference, although we wish it had been done in a more explicit way. In this document we read that socialism creates conditions for an authentic democracy, for real participation of the vast popular masses in the administration of society, for universal development of the human personality. And it adds: The building of socialism and its successive perfection is based on the support, action, and initiative of the broadest popular masses encouraged and led by the working class. Our concept of the Spanish path to socialism springs from the key idea that the communist party is leading not by virtue of a legal stipulation which can only accentuate tendencies toward bureaucratization, but only to the extent that it wins this role for itself and manages through its correct policy, the example of its men, and so forth to win the trust of the masses. Only thus and only in a socialism which realizes the most complete political democracy will the party be able to carry out a leadership role.

The sad thing about the Czechoslovak document is that it does not criticize certain aspects of the efforts made in Czechoslovakia after January 1968 to recover the democratic and popular dimension of socialism. It rejects such a concept. The document declares that the April 1968 action program is anti-Marxist. The document advocates the return to the autocratic system, to Stalinism.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1971

13 Downcast Prisoners, Spurned by Hanoi, Return to Danang

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By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

DANANG, South Vietnam, June 4—Thirteen disabled North Vietnamese prisoners, described as saddened and bewildered by the last-minute refusal of Hanoi to take them back, returned here today after a 24-hour sea journey to nowhere.

The Upshur, a 19,000-ton unarmed Navy troop transport, turned around after traveling 70 miles north and headed back to Danang on orders sent at midday to forego any effort to carry out the planned ship-to-ship transfer of the captives. Plans had called for the prisoners to be moved early this morning to a civilian barge, which was then to have been met by North Vietnamese craft near shore.

Hanoi, which had suggested the transfer arrangements in precise detail in response to a Saigon offer to return up to 570 prisoners, said that the low number aboard was "treacherous and dishonest." It then annulled its agreement to meet the barge off the coast of the demilitarized zone, which straddles the border between North and South Vietnam.

New Offer by Saigon

The South Vietnamese Government charged Hanoi today with "bad faith in going back on its word and refusing to receive its own invalid soldiers," but offered again in general terms to free all the sick and wounded who wanted to return to the North.

Despite the renewed offer, many observers believe that the whole episode set back the chances of any similar venture

for some time. It was clear that Saigon would think long and hard before again making any specific proposal for unilateral release of North Vietnamese prisoners.

United States officials have persuaded Saigon to make such gestures in the hope that mounting world pressure would result in release by Hanoi of at least some American prisoners.

Some officials expressed the belief tonight that Hanoi's refusal to accept the prisoners was meant as a warning to Washington that North Vietnam wants serious concessions at Paris in return for the release of the American prisoners and not its own men back, no matter how many.

Issue Embittered

In broader terms, officials say, the abortive effort has further embittered the atmosphere surrounding the sensitive prisoners issue. American officials, from the White House down, had hailed Hanoi's acceptance of Saigon's offer as an encouraging sign and a possible first step toward the return of the imprisoned Americans.

The lingering hope of American officials for reciprocity was illustrated by the appearance aboard the Upshur of a special five-man team. One member reported that they were there "just on the slim chance" that Hanoi would send a few Americans out with the vessel scheduled to pick up the North Vietnamese prisoners. The team included a doctor,

The dejected captives who walked or were carried from the Upshur today represented the only disabled among 660 interviewed by the International Red Cross who expressed a desire to return to the North. Officials have offered several possible reasons why the others refused repatriation: the fear of reprisals at home, underground instructions from Hanoi to remain or a sincere desire to stay in South Vietnam.

'Sad and Confused'

American hospital corpsmen, who helped care for the prisoners in the ship's hospital ward assisted the disabled captives down the ramp here today. One prisoner who had lost a leg left the ship on the back of an American corpsman.

"The corpsmen and the prisoners got along so well together on the brief voyage that they and the prisoners had tears in their eyes when it came time for them to leave," one of the ship's officers said.

Reporters traveling aboard the Upshur were not allowed to interview the captives. But officers reported that one or two of the prisoners began to suspect that they would not be going home when the time came and passed for the transfer.

They were finally informed of the change in plans at about 4 o'clock this afternoon, nearly eight hours after they had been scheduled to leave the Upshur for the barge.

"They were sad and confused when they heard the news," said Maj. To Cong Bien, public relations officer for the Joint General Staff. "They couldn't understand why North Vietnam would do that. We promised them that they would be in the first batch, if any, to return in the future."

The prisoners also told South Vietnamese and International Red Cross officials aboard that they wanted to be kept apart from all other prisoners if they were sent back to the camp at

Blenhoa, near Saigon. They expressed fear for their safety in a prison where almost all of their sick and wounded countrymen disagreed with their decision to return.

In Camp at Danang

The prisoners were taken to a prison camp in Danang tonight. South Vietnamese officers said that a decision would be made later on whether they would be sent to a separate compound at Blenhoa.

In its statement today, the South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said that Hanoi, in accepting Saigon's offer to take back the prisoners, "did not mention any specific number of prisoners as a condition for agreeing to receive them."

"On the contrary," the statement said, "the Hanoi regime solemnly declared at that time that it was ready to receive and help any prisoners of war who wished to return to North Vietnam."

CPYRGHT

BALTIMORE SUN
7 June 1971

POW Episode CPYRGHT

The sad little episode of the 13 disabled North Vietnamese prisoners of war who were to have been returned to North Vietnam points to difficulties that still lie ahead. The North Vietnamese government canceled its agreement to accept the prisoners after South Vietnam and the United States announced that a commission of the International Red Cross would interview 13 of 570 prisoners who were interrogated wished to go back. All of

the group were asked simply if they agreed to being released to the north. It is generally assumed that North Vietnam did not want the prisoners to return and that in one way or another this was understood by the prisoners. The 13 who agreed to be released, and who were taken on the futile voyage to the exchange point and back, are seriously disabled—pitiful victims of past fighting.

nam, will continue to be victims of the war, it appears. North Vietnam charges that the proposed return of the disabled prisoners was a put-up job, and that South Vietnam was "pretending" that only 13 wished to be released. North Vietnam, of course, never acknowledges even that it sends its soldiers into South Vietnam, and it shows no hesitation in coldly using the prisoners, ill and crippled as pawns.

Americans have a basic humanitarian concern with respect to all the prisoners of war, in particular the ill and the disabled, and we also have a special concern for the United States servicemen held as prisoners in North Vietnam. The hope of most Americans that the proposed release of the disabled North Vietnamese would lead to moves for the release of American prisoners now has been extinguished. The prisoners on both sides still are pawns in the larger issue of ending the war.

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

July 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

July	Yugoslavia	The collective presidency is to go into effect probably in July following passage of constitutional amendments in late June. Tito will retain the titular position of President of Yugoslavia for an indefinite time and preside over the 22-man collective presidency. Once Tito is no longer president, Yugoslavia's president will be chosen by annual rotation among the 22 members of the collective executive. Also, probably in July, the League of Yugoslav Communists will meet. Yugoslavia's current work on economic reforms, as well as the constitutional changes, and Soviet displeasure with the Yugoslav reforms make this year's LCY annual conference particularly important.
July 11	Mongolia	50th anniversary of Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence from China in 1921, following the overthrow of the Mongolian government by Mongolian revolutionaries with the aid of the Russian army. In 1924 the Mongolian Peoples Republic was proclaimed.
July 21	Indochina	Anniversary of the Geneva Accords providing for an Indochina armistice in 1954.
August 1	China	Army Day and the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Red Army in 1921.
August 13	Germany	10th anniversary of the Berlin Wall, built by East Germany to seal the border against mass fleeing of the East Germans to the West. (In July 1961 alone, a total of 30,444 refugees were registered at the West Berlin receiving center.)

August 19-24	USSR	35th anniversary of the Moscow Show Trial of the "16 Old Bolsheviks"-- a landmark in Stalin's Great Purge. The trial set in motion a mass witch-hunt for "Trotskyite traitors" in the USSR, which Stalin used to eliminate all rivals and consolidate his absolute power. Chief defendants at the trial, Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, had been co-members with Stalin in the triumverate that ruled Russia during Lenin's illness. They were accused of having plotted the assassination of Sergey Kirov, a key Soviet leader killed in December 1934, and of being members of an international Trotskyite conspiracy that was planning to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders. In fact, it is now widely acknowledged that the real conspirators in Kirov's assassination were probably Stalin and members of the Soviet secret police.
August 20-21	Czechoslovakia	Anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces from the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, to put an end to Czechoslovak internal reform in 1968. Explaining the Soviet Union's "necessity" for invading a small neighboring country, Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev announced Communist countries reserve the right to invade other Communist countries to maintain communist rule.
August 21	China	5th anniversary of the start of Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1966 when Chinese teenagers called "Red Guards" entered Peking in a nationwide ideological campaign that brought education to a halt,

disrupted industry, revived out-
moded forms of medicine, and per-
secuted the intelligentsia.

August 29- September 4	Sinaia, Romania	Annual Pugwash Conference of scientists from the Communist countries and the West.
September 12-18	Dublin	38th International Congress of PEN, the respected writers organization. Representatives from the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries have sometimes attended. However, the Secretary of the Board of the Soviet Writers Union, Georgi M. Markov, announced at the 5th Soviet Writers Congress in Moscow on June 29th that the Soviet Union would continue to boycott PEN congresses, as it has done in recent years, because of Western criticism of Soviet literary policies, including the imprison- ment of unorthodox writers in the Soviet Union.
September 21	New York	United Nations General Assembly opens.
September 23-25	Santiago	1st Latin American Journalists Conference of the (Communist) International Organization of Journalists. The main objective of the conference is to establish a Latin American Journalists Federation affiliated to the IOJ. The conference is also to discuss "freedom of the press" -- although the main organizers of this con- ference come from Communist countries where freedom of the press is intolerable (e.g., the beginning of a free press in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was one of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union invaded that country.)

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AL-MADINA, Jidda
25 May 1971

SOVIET "BIG BROTHERS" STUMBLE ON OIL-INDUSTRY AID TO ARAB STATES & OTHERS:
AFTER 15 YEARS, GLOOMY PICTURE FOR RECIPIENTS
CPYRGHT

LONDON-A big scandal is breaking into the open in world oil circles concerning deficiencies in the quality of the Soviet Union's technical assistance on petroleum to the developing countries. Complaints about slowness, bureaucracy, poor machinery, and inadequate personnel assigned to foreign aid programs have long been current among Arab as well as other professional oilmen and government officials. Now, no less an authority than Egypt's former deputy premier and oil minister, Eng. Mahmud Younesx, has added his voice to the murmurings.

"The reputation of the Soviet Union in matters of oil technology is not very good," he told a widely-attended oil conference at Northwestern University on March 29. The seminar was attended by experts from many countries who concurred in his verdict.

One central fact the Egyptian dignitary probably had in mind is that Russia has provided technical services in geology, exploration, reservoir studies, prospecting and drilling for 15 or more years in a long string of countries. These include Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, India, Ceylon and others. Yet they have not one single major oil discovery to their credit.

All this must constitute a gloomy picture for those states which signed up for Russian "help," or which might be considering in future calling on Moscow for deals in prospecting or technical aid in running an oil industry. For this reason, the USSR is preparing a dazzling "show" at the forthcoming World Oil Congress in the Soviet capital in June. This may convince gullible unsophisticates that top-flight Soviet oil technology -- of which the Russians have a certain amount, it must be stated fairly -- is available for export under aid projects. But the facts and past experience show that the USSR needs all its best help for itself, not for foreign countries.

Take the true "inside" story of Russia's technical assistance to Egypt's state oil enterprises, which was becoming notorious in knowledgeable petroleum circles even before Eng. Younes spoke recently in a nutshell, the Soviets agreed in 1966 to give exploration help, but it took until now -- five years later -- to get into high gear. And this was in the Siwa Oasis area near the Libyan border, which Soviet geologists tout as the "most promising" region in Egypt!

What are the results so far? According to a statement in March by Eng. Ali Wali, chairman of Egypt's General Petroleum Corporation, exactly three holes have been completed in the intervening years. The first hole, which took a leisurely eight months to drill (slow by normal standards, due to trouble with the Russian turbodrill) found ... water. The other two were dry holes. It took Moscow until the beginning of this year to deliver to Egypt all six oil drilling-rigs promised under a protocol of May 8, 1969.

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Top Egyptian experts on Eng. Wali's staff conceal in public their disgust with the quality of Soviet oil aid. But in private they confide that much of the original Soviet equipment was badly-worn, suffered from frequent breakdowns, and was of about "1938-vintage" even if it was not actually that old.

For comparison, the agreement concluded between Egypt and the Amoco Oil Company in the same Western Desert area where the Soviets are operating at Siwa required drilling to start within six months. And, in fact, the government announced an exciting new discovery on this tract this month (April). In Libya, Occidental Oil prospected, drilled and discovered big oil within about six months. In the latest oil contracts in Venezuela, firms are given just three years in which to find petroleum. Oilmen joke that the Soviets would have been sent home from there by now, emptyhanded, at the speed they have operated in Egypt and elsewhere, such are the rigidities of the Soviet communist system.

The known lack of computers in Russia as well as the experience to harness them will further hamper progress as the oil industry modernizes. For instance, the thoroughness and accuracy of a study of Libyan petroleum reserves, currently underway in Tripoli with Soviet technicians, will inevitably be impaired by this shortfall in computer technique.

Its the same story in Iraq as in Egypt and elsewhere of ineffective Soviet oil "help", often extended for political motives.

The Iraqis signed us in June and July of 1969 for a huge "crash" program of Soviet oil aid and loans totaling sterling 59 million (\$142 million) to develop North Rumaila oil-field with an "immediate" start. The area had been recuperated from the western oil combine as a known oil pool, and an "immediate" start on development was stipulated. In fact, it took the first drilling rig in the Machine export-INOC contract took nine months for delivery to Basra, and commencement of drilling was delayed several more months, even though none of the usual advance prospection was needed. Iraqi officials were disappointed and bitter at the slow pace, and now they're looking at the calendar, wondering if there's any chance of getting Rumaila into production next year, as hoped. The prospect appears doubtful, thanks to Moscow's slow start.

Not only the Arabs are being short-changed on Soviet oil aid. In India, the government in February abandoned its first offshore oil drill in the Gulf of Cambay because of unsuitable Soviet equipment. India's heavy reliance on Soviet equipment and technical assistance for the past 15 years has slowed exploration for crude oil the country badly needs. Indian oilmen say Soviet exploration techniques are at least 10 years behind Western industry.

The first Cambay hole was abandoned at 4,900 feet, where a possible oil-bearing structure was found to be too thin to exploit, and the Soviet rig was moved to another shallow site. Indian geologists claim however that oil-bearing structures probably exist around 15,000 feet, but Soviet drills supplied to India are incapable of penetrating deeply of operating in deep water where the most promising structures are located. For this reason, New Delhi has been arranging for equipment and help from Japanese and Western for future deepwater drilling.

Soviet failures abroad, of course, are just a reflection of domestic problems with deficient equipment and techniques. The USSR possesses

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impressive oil reserves.

An authoritative article in "World Petroleum" magazine last year, entitled "Russia's Drilling Hit by Equipment Problems," outlined mechanical faults plaguing drilling rigs, bits, casings, pumps, bearings and a host of other needs. Spare parts were lacking, and design was recognized by the Soviets themselves to be obsolete, backward, and inefficient.

One proof came last July when the Soviet Ministry of Petroleum Industry, V.D. Shashin, visited the United States, largely, he admitted, to buy large quantities of U.S. equipment and technical processes.

The previously-mentioned deficiency in computers in Soviet oil operations, as elsewhere in Soviet industry, is especially noticeable. Only about 2,500 computers existed in the USSR in 1970, whereas 13,000 are needed by 1975 if the country's development is not to be slowed. This computer shortage comes atop other known oil-industry shortfalls in surveying and exact geophysical prospection needed to pinpoint oil deposits even if the general area is known.

The Soviet Union is at least a decade behind other countries in computerized seismographic technology. This permits exploration of deep, complex geological formations and the consequent finding of new oil-fields. While such "digital seismic" technology, as it's called, had contributed impressive benefits to US exploration by 1963, and was in use in Libya for instance by 1966, the first computerized digital seismic field unit was deployed in the northern region of the USSR only in 1969. So it's hardly surprising that in April, 1971, when Algeria -- which relies heavily on Soviet oil assistance -- needed experienced computer professionals for its CERI research center, it turned to ... Britain, to recruit expatriates with a big advertising campaign!

AL-MADINA Jidda
25 May 1971

Jidda daily "Al-Madina" 25 May 1971
"Sweeping Failures of Soviets in their Foreign Assistance for oil production"

فشل ذريع لروسيا في استخراج البترول

- أراليب التنقيب السوفيتية متخلفة عشر سنوات على الأقل
- المعدات قديمة وبالية والافتقار حديد للعقول الإلكترونية
- السوفيات يشتركون لأنفسهم معدات البترول الفنية من الغرب

CPYRGHT

لندن - بدأت تنتشر علنا لفجوة كبيرة في الاوساط البترولية بخصوص النقص في نوعية المساعدة الفنية التي يقدمها الاتحاد السوفياتي في حقول البترول الى الدول النامية . وقد كانت لشكاوى حول التباطؤ ولاة العمل بطريقة روتينية جامدة . ورداة الآلات وجود الموظفين غير الملائمين المعينين لبرامج المساعدة الاجنبية شائعة بين العرب ورجال الزيت المهنيين والمسؤولين الحكوميين . وقد اضاف الآن مسئول كبير عمل نائباً لرئيس وزراء مصر روزيرا للبترول في السابق هو المهندس حمود يونس صوته الى جملة اصوات المتذمرين .

ان كبار الخبراء المصريين في هيئة المؤلفين التي كان يشرف عليها المهندس والى تخلي امام الجمهور اشتملواها من نوعية المساعدة البترولية السوفيساتية . لكنها تذكر سرا بان معظم الادوات السوفيساتية الاصلية قد كانت بائية ، وكانت غالباً ما تتعطل عن العمل . وقد كانت من الادوات العتيقة التي يمكن ان يرد تاريخها الى عام ١٩٣٨ وان كانت في الواقع ليست بمثل هذا القدم .

ولاعلينا نوع من الموازنة ان الاتفاقية التي ابرمت بين مصر وشركة اوكو اويل كومباني ، في نفس المنطقة الغربية التي يعمل فيها الروس في سيوة قد طالبت بان يبدأ الحفر خلال ستة اشهر . وفي الواقع اهلنستت الحكومة عن اكتشاف جديد ومثير في هذه البقعة خلال شهر ابريل الماضي وفي ليبيا تقبت شركة اوكسدنال اويل

وحفرت واكتشفت كميات كبيرة من الزيت خلال ستة اشهر تقريبا . وفي اتفاقيات البترول الاخيرة في فنزويلا اعطيت الشركات مهلة ثلاث سنوات فقط لاكتشاف البترول . ويطلق رجال البترول النكات بانهم اعطى السوفيات الذين عملوا في مصر وفي أماكن اخرى هذا التحديد الزمني لكانوا قد اعيدوا الى ديارهم فارغى الايدي . ومرجع هذا كله الى عدم مرونة النظام الشيوعي

الروس في مصر
خذ القصة الداخلية الحقيقية للمساعدة الفنية الروسية لمشروع الزيت الحكومية في مصر ، والتي اصبحت مفضوحة في اوساط البترول العلمية حتى قيل ان يقف بها المهندس يونس اخيرا . وباختصار فبان السوفيات واقفوا في عام ١٩٦٦ على تقديم المساعدة للتنقيب عن البترول ، لكن هذه المساعدة استمرت ضعيفة حتى الآن . بعد خمس سنوات من ان بدأت تدخل دورا فعالا . والتنقيب يجري في واحة سيوة غرب الحدود الليبية ، التي يشير اليها الخبراء الجيولوجيون السوفيات بانها اكبر المناطق رجاءا في مصر . . .

المصرية سابقا والوزير الآن في حكومة الرئيس السادات الجديدة ، لم يتم في السنوات الماضية سوى فتح ثلاثة آبار فقط . فالبئر الاول الذي استغرق حفره ٨ اشهر (وهو بئر) بالنسبة للمستويات العادية نتيجة للمشاكل التي يجابهها الروس في ادوات الحفر الطوبوغرافية التي يستخدمونها (انتهى باخراج الماء . اما البئران الثانيان فقد وجد جالين . وقد اعضت موسكو طول المدة حتى بداية هذا العام كي تسلم التي كانت قد وعدتها بها بموجب

الاتفاق الموقع في ٨ مايو ١٩٦٩ .
المعدات بائية

وايبلغ مؤتمر للبترول في ٢٩ مارس الماضي عقد في جامعة نوت دسترن وهم عددا كبيرا من الحاضرين بان سمعة الانتعاش السوفياتي ليست طيبة في تكنولوجيا البترول . وقد حضر هذه الدورة خبراء من عدة دول اتفقوا على

الرأي .
تجربة ١٥ عاما
ولعل هذه الشخصية المفترية كانت تفكر في حقيقة اساسية وهي ان روسيا قد قدمت خدماتها الفنية في الجيولوجيا والاكتشاف ودراسة الاحتمال والتنقيب عن البترول والحفر لمدة ١٥ عاما او ما يزيد في حزام طويل من البلدان . وهذا الحزام يشمل مصر والعراق وسوريا وانجرا والفرغ وليبيا والهند وسيلان وغيرها . ورغم ذلك لم يسجل الروس اكتشافا رئيسيا واحدا يمكن ان يكتب لصالحهم .

وكن هذا يجب ان يعطى صورة قاتمة لهذه الدول التي وقعت على المساعدة الروسية او التي تفكر في دعوة موسكو في المستقبل من اجل النخول معها في صفقات خاصة بالتنقيب او المساعدة الفنية في ادارة صناعة الزيت . لهذا السبب ، بعد الانتعاش السوفياتي - عرضا ايقا ومبيرا للبصر في مؤتمر الزيت العالمي القادم في العاصمة السوفياتية في شهر يونيو القادم .

التكنولوجيا الرفيعة لصناعة الزيت السوفياتية - والتي يجب الفسول بانصاف ان للروس باعا فيها - متبيرة لتتصدر بموجب اشاريس العون . سهرنا ان الاتحاد السوفياتي يحتاج الى افضل ما لديه من مساعدة لنفسه وليس للدول الاجنبية . يستوردون من الغرب

وقد ظهر الدليل في شهر يوليو الماضي عندما زار ف.د. شاشين ، وزير الصناعة البترولية السوفياتية الولايات المتحدة . فقد اعترف بان زيارته تتعلق بشكل رئيسي بشراء كميات كبيرة من المعدات والصنوعات الفنية الاميركية .

ويلاحظ بشكل خاص الميوب في الآلات الحاسبة الخاصة بالمحليسات البترولية السوفياتية كما ذكر سابقا كما تلاحظ هذه الميوب في النواحي الاخرى في الصناعة السوفياتية . ولم يكن في الاتحاد السوفياتي سوى ٢٥٠٠ آلة حاسبة (عقل الكتروني) في عام ١٩٧٠ ، بينما تحتاج البلاد الى ١٣٠٠٠ آلة في عام ١٩٧٥ لكي لا يضعف النمو فيها . وهذا النقص في العاقل الالكترونية يأتي على راس عوامل الضعف الاخرى المعروفة في صناعة الزيت مثل المسح والدقة في التنقيب الجيولوجي الفروريان لتحديد مكان الزيت حتى ولو تمت معرفة المنطقة بشكل عام .

حقل البترول ، والتي تقدم مساهمة
لأهداف سياسية .
المراسلون ونحوها على التفسيرين في

برنو ويزكيو من عام ١٩٦٩ من اجل
برنامج ضخ ومباشر من المساعدة
البترونية السوفياتية ومن اجل الحصول
على فروض تبلغ قيمتها ٥٩ مليون جنيه
استرليني (١٤٢ مليون دولار) لتقوم
حقل الزيت في شمال الرملة مع البلد
في الحال . وكانت هذه المنطقة قد
استردت من مجموعة شركات غربية عاملة
وما كشركة واحدة . واستردت البلد في
الحال في تطويقها ، والواقع ان اول
جهاز لتخزين بعد الاتفاق بين مساهمين
اكسيبوت الروسية وشركة الزيت

الوطنية العراقية استغرق تسعة اشهر
تسليمه الى البصرة كما تاخر الحفر
عدة اشهر اخرى ، مع العلم بأنه لم
يكن هناك اية حاجة للتنقيب المسمى
الذي يحتاج الى اساليب متطورة . وقد
اظهر المسئولون العراقيون خيبة امل
ومرارة نتيجة لبطء في الاعمال ، وهم
الآن يفكرون بعورة اذا كانت هناك اية

موقع ضحل اخر . غير ان الجيولوجيون
الهنود يدعون ان من المحتمل ان يكون
التركيب الارضي الذي يحتوي على
الزيت يقع على عمق ١٥٠٠٠ قدم ،
لكن الحفارات السوفياتية التي قدمت
لهند لا تستطيع التوجه الى عمق كاف
يساعد على العمل في المياه العميقة حيث
تقع هذه التركيب التي يرجى ايجاد
الزيت فيها . ولهذا السبب كان
ثيودوري تقوم بترتيبات للحصول على
المعدات والمساعدة من مصادر يابانية
وغربية من اجل الحفر في المياه العميقة
في المستقبل .

السبب مشاكل داخلية

ان فشل السوفيات في الخارج يعكس
بالتطبع مشاكل داخلية في الاتحاد
السوفياتي مع وجود عيوب وتناقض في
المعدات والاساليب ، على الرغم من ان
الاتحاد السوفياتي يمتلك بلا شك
احتياطيا كبيرا من الزيت .

وقد اجعل مقسمال وسمي في مجلة
«بتروال العالم» في السنة الماضية يحمل
العنوان «حفرات البترول الروسية
تصاب بمشاكل آلية» العيوب الميكانيكية
التي تزعم اجهزة الحفر وهي الاجهزة
اللوكية الدوارة من المثاقب والتعليقات
الخارجية وغيرها من الاشياء الضرورية
الاجري . اما قطع الفياض لعدم توفرها وكان
السوفيات انفسهم يتقرون بان
تصفيحاتهم القديمة وعطية الحركة .

الاتقار الى العقول

ان الاعتقاد الى الآلات الحاسبة
(العقول الالكترونية) في روسيا كما هو
معروف والى الخبرات لاستخدام هذه
الآلات سوف يعطل التقدم في العمل
بشكل زائد كلما تطورت صناعة
الزيت ، فعلى سبيل المثال ، فان الدقة
والشمول في دراسة احتياطي البترول
التيين الجارية حاليا في طرابلس
بمساعدة الفنيين السوفيات سوف
تتعطل حتما نتيجة للضعف في التكنيك
الاحصائي الذي يحتاج الى العقول
الالكترونية .

ونفس قصة مصر تنطبق ايضا على
العراق وعلى اي مكان آخر بالنسبة
للمساعدة السوفياتية غير الفعالة في

الاهتزازات الارضية بواسطة العقول
الالكترونية بمقد من الزمن . وهذا
النوع من الرسم يساعد على التنقيب
في تكويطات جيولوجية عميقة والمساعدة
وايجاد حقول بترولية جديدة نتيجة
لذلك . وفي الوقت الذي استمدت
تكنولوجيا التسجيل الزلزالي الرقمي .

كما هي معروفة خدمات رافعة للحفريات
الاميركية في عام ١٩٦٣ ، واستخدمت
في ليبيا في عام ١٩٦٦ ، فان اول وحدة
«للتسجيل الزلزالي الرقمي» قد

استخدمت في المناطق الشمالية من
الاتحاد السوفياتي في عام ١٩٦٩ .
لذلك لم يكن من الغريب ان تنجح
الجزائر - التي تعتمد اعتمادا كبيرا
على المساعدة البترولية السوفياتية والتي
تحتاج الى الحفرون واصحاب الخبرات
في تشغيل العقول الالكترونية لمركز
ابحاثها «سيبري» الى بريطانيا لتوظيف
كل شخص يوافق على الاعتراق وان
تقوم بعملية دعائية كبيرة لهذا الغرض .

فرصة للبد ، في الانتاج في حقل الرملة
في السنة القادمة كما كان مرجوا .
ويبدو هذا الاحتمال مشكوكا فيه
نتيجة لبدية موسكو البطيئة .
وفي الهند ايضا .

وليس العرب فقط هم الذين خدعوا
بالمساعدة البترولية السوفياتية . ففي
الهند تخلت الحكومة في فبراير عن
اول حفريات عن الزيت في المناطق
المعزولة في خليج كمبراي نظرا لعدم
صلاح المعدات السوفياتية . وان اعتماد
الهند الشديد على المعدات والمساعدة
الفنية السوفياتية خلال السنوات الخمس
عشرة الاخيرة قد ادى الى الايقاع في
التنقيب عن الزيت الخام الذي تحتاج
اليه البلاد بشدة . ويقول رجال النفط
الهنود ان اساليب التنقيب السوفياتية
متخلفة عن الصناعة الغربية بعشر
سنوات على الاقل .

وقد تم التخلي عن اول بئر في خليج
كمبراي على عمق ٤٩٠٠ قدم ، حيث
وجد التركيب الارضي الذي يحتوي على
الزيت وقيلا لدرجة لا تساعد على
استخراجه ، وقد نقل جهاز الحفر الى

AL-JAMHURIYYAH, Beirut
25 April 1971

SOVIET OILMEN RIDE THE ARABS' COAT-TAILS ... TO STEAL ARAB MARKETS!

(By Our Own Correspondent)

CPYRGHT

PARIS - Recent news dispatches show the Soviet Union -- once again -- is profiting from the Arabs' oil struggle. The facts speak for themselves: quietly, scarcely lifting a finger, Russian oilmen have been able to manipulate the Arabs' victorious battle against Western oil companies to their own benefit. Leaving aside any political capital to be made, as a oil-producing nation the USSR has taken this advantage to move deeper into normal markets of Middle Eastern and North African oil. At the same time, it finds an excuse to increase the selling price for its oil, although it did nothing to confront the West on this issue, as the Arabs did at some considerable risk.

The truth is that while the Gulf oil states were locked in crucial negotiations with the Western firms and while they were having trouble placing their own oil due to the continued closing of the Suez Canal, and while Libya and Algeria on policy grounds were limiting export shipments, Moscow's oil salesmen have been busy. Here is a factual resume of their recent unpublicized dealings:

France: Russia has just offered the Pompidou government a 48% increase in crude oil supplies under the 1971 bilateral trade agreement, or 80,000 barrels-per-day compared with 54,000 barrels daily last year. Refined products (mazout, heating oil, etc.) shipments will rise by 23% at Russian insistence, despite the reluctance of the French petroleum industry.

Italy: Russia is slated to sell more oil this year to ENI than the Italian state oil agency is taking from its near neighbor Libya or the usual Arabian Gulf suppliers to Europe. The Soviet Union in fact disposes of more oil to Italy than to any other country in the world, including the East Bloc. Here are the statistics of ENI consignments: USSR 4.6 million metric tons; Libya 4.4 million; Kuwait 1.2 million; Saudi Arabia 1.0 million; and Iraq 0.7 million.

Britain: For the first time since the 1967 war (1) the Soviets since February have been shipping crude oil to the U.K. The first license covers 150,000 tons, with the British Trade Ministry saying further permits are "not ruled out." Experts saw an obvious explanation of the British side's reaction: a desire to show the OPEC members they could get some oil elsewhere than from the Arabs, if necessary. The Soviets apparently were willing to abet this "ploy" despite their profession of "solidarity" with the Arab cause.

Not all Arabs, of course, are blind to Soviet methods. At the last Arab League Petroleum Congress, the Director General of Technical Affairs in the Oil Ministry of revolutionary Libya, Abdelhai M. Ben Omran, warned the 600 delegates gathered in Kuwait about Moscow's role as a natural competitor. Before Russia embarks on any more so-called "oil aid" projects with developing countries, Ben Omran said, Arab oil producing states would like "the Soviet Union to show the world they are not competing in selling crude oil or gas" The Soviet

CPYRGHT

delegation, sitting in the hall, did not make any answer.

One case-history the Libyan may have recalled was the Soviet manipulation of the 1967 Arab oil boycott to its own benefit. At a time when many Arab oil producing states had shut down pumping and the Suez Canal was closed, the Soviet reaction was to increase many of its oil exports contracts. Total Shipments scheduled to Italy, for example, jumped from 10.6 million tons in 1967, to 11.0 million tons in 1968 under impact of the crisis, before settling back down to a more normal 9.3 millions in 1969 when the situation stabilized.

Soviet competition however is not limited to Europe. In Morocco, Russia has managed to displace Morocco's Maghreb neighbor Algeria as the leading source of imported oil for this year. A clearing accord pushed through by the Soviets in Casablanca calls for shipments of 900,000 tons compared with 720,000 tons last year -- a 23% rise.

In Ghana, Russia came back strongly to tender the winning bid to supply four-fifths of the local refinery needs for 1971. This squeezes out Arab oil producers nearer-by, like Libya which has not exported to Ghana since 1967. The Soviets took the deal despite defaulting several times on previous years' supply contracts, putting the Ghanaians in difficulty.

Moscow is able to count other selfish gains from the Arab struggle, not only by stealing markets but also by raising prices.

News-agencies on 23 February carried a Moscow report quoting the Soviet Foreign Ministry journal that takers of Russian oil will have to face a price increase. The reason estensibly given was the extra cost of preparing the big Western Siberia oil deposits for commercial exploitation. But this program was known -- and already published last year and again in the new Five-Year Plan. So was it just coincidence that the Soviets decided to up their prices just within days of OPEC's price agreement at Teheran which became effective on 15 February?

The gain for the Soviets may be substantial if recent negotiations for a trade agreement with Japan is any index. For example, fuel oil exports delivered from the Black Sea to Japan (competing with Arabian Gulf exports directly) would rise 50% to the equivalent of \$30 per ton, compared with \$20 last year. If crude oil prices also rise to developing countries, besides, Ghana and Morocco, there'll be others hard hit: Egypt, which takes over 1-million tons from the USSR, India, Turkey, Syria, etc.

But oil experts know it is nothing new for the Soviets to draw the maximum profit: last year, when Libya rapped the Western oil companies with a half-million barrels daily production cutback, the Soviets reversed an earlier refusal and decided to sell more oil to France's ELF company. The deal filled 300,000 tons of the Libyan shortfall covering the period July-December, 1970, thus handily relieving the pressure for one firm, at least. Moscow made a good thing financially, too. After demanding a 30% price increase, just on the eve of President Pompidou's visit to the USSR they settled for 15% more. That is to say, while Libya sacrificed a tax revenue of about \$1.00 per barrel to prove its point, the Soviet Union was putting 20-cents a barrel in its pocket.

AL-JAMHURRIYAH, Beirut
25 April 1971

CPYRGHT

حول سياسة روسيا السوفياتية البترولية

باريس - وكالات الانباء - على اثر المحادثات البترولية التي جرت اخيرا مع الحكومة الفرنسية والجزائر عرضت حكومة السيد بومبيدو زيادة ٤,٨ بالمائة من النفط الخام وعلى هذا الاساس سوف يزيد شحن النفط المكرر بالساح من الروس ٢٣ % اما إيطاليا فانها تنوي بيع المزيد من النفط هذا العام عن النسبة التي تصدرها ليبيا وبلدان الخليج العربي ، وتبلغ كميات النفط المصدرة من روسيا ٦,٤ مليون طن متري ، وليبيا ٤,٤ والكويت ١,٢ والسعودية ١ مليون والعراق ٠,٧ مليون . وجد يز بالذكر ان روسيا السوفياتية بدأت تصدر النفط الى بريطانيا لأول مرة منذ ١٩٦٧ وبالفعل فقد بلغ نصيبها ١٥٠ الف طن . ولكن على الرغم من ادعاء الروس تعاضد هم مع البلدان والقضية العربية فانهم لا يتأخرون عن اللجوء الى " الوسائل الامبريالية " للمضاربة على نفط البلدان العربية . وهذا ما اشار اليه مندوب ليبيا في اجتماع ٦٠٠ مندوب بالكويت عندما تحدث اليه عبد الحى بن عمران عن كون الاتحاد السوفياتي هو المضارب الطبيعي على النفط العربي . وقد مت ليبيا مثلا حيا على ذلك بقول مندوبها ان موقف الروس من قضية النفط عام ١٩٦٧ لم تكن سوى عمل لمصلحتهم الخاصة . فقد زادوا من تصدير نفطهم ، على حساب الخسائر وعلى حساب الملاقاة ثناء السويس ، وزيادة عقودهم مع العالم المستورد للنفط . وبذلك قفرت كمية النفط السوفياتي المصدرة من ٦,٤ مليون طن عام ١٩٦٧ الى ١١ مليون عام ١٩٦٨ . وقد توصل الروس الى تصريف نفطهم حتى في بلستان افريقيا كغانا مثلا التي كانت تعاني صعوبات على صنعها الحصول على النفط فبرز الروس كافضل موردين لها من هذه المادة .

من كل ذلك يتبين ان الاتحاد السوفياتي يتبع سياسة بترولية خاصة تتنافس المصالح العربية في الوقت الذي يدعي فيه موازنة العرب .

VITA, Rome
29 May 1971

RUSSIAN BLUNDERS IMPLICIT IN NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN ON PETROLEUM;
SOVIET BLOC MAY IMPORT MIDDLE EAST OIL AS TEMPORARY STOPGAP

CPYRGHT

LONDON - Reading between the lines of the new Soviet Five-Year Plan, those who understand such matters say it displays tacit evidence of past blunders and technological backwardness which remains to be rectified in one of Russia's most important industries, that of petroleum. This is the true explanation of the statistically-impressive advances programmed for the USSR's oil sector under the new five year plan laid before the recent 24th Congress of PCUS.

Output of crude oil is tabulated to rise from 353 million tons last year to about 490 million tons in 1975. This is a creditable figure on paper, but it overlooks the awkward fact that the pace of Soviet petroleum production has been slowing and now lags behind the world growth rate. The USSR's 1970 output was 8% over the 1969 total of 328 million tons, whereas for comparison the world growth rate, as announced by British Petroleum (in April), was 9.6% for the same period.

Current and future targets in the Soviet Union tend to be relatively more impressive due to previous mistakes, obsolete techniques, and shortfalls often revealed in Soviet publications themselves. Putting it plainly, they have further to catch up compared with the other industrialized countries. Even a layman can realize that for the new five-year plan to project an "increase in labor productivity of 50%" in the oil refinery sector, for instance, there must be wide deficiencies to be made up.

That such defects exist plentifully is well-known among Western oil specialists, and is becoming increasingly born home upon foreign recipients of the USSR's technical aid in petroleum technology among the developing countries. Algeria, which soon will have almost 20 Russian oil drilling rigs, discovered much of the Soviet equipment to be 15-20 years behind similar Western machinery and had to order four American rigs for deep drilling work. Iran has not been overly impressed by Russian supplies received in barter for their deals. Egypt has a long list of woes, too, from its exhaustive experience of Soviet "assistance," adding up to delays and equipment complaints on their project to find oil at Siwa Oasis in the Western desert, although Western companies have located oil not far away.

Despite such bad experiences, the recipients tend to keep quiet, first from wounded pride, but also because Soviet assistance gives them a political alternative to relying on the West. Some countries not yet fully tied to Soviet oil aid may nevertheless be thinking twice before choosing to limit themselves to such a choice. India, for instance, after over a decade of experience with Russia oil techniques, just called in the Japanese after Soviet offshore drilling equipment and crews showed up as flagrantly inadequate in the Gulf of Cambay drilling.

Rectification of the deep internal problems of the Soviet oil industry as well as the time required for discovery and development of oil resources in its remoter areas, helps explain the new direct communist interest in Middle East and North African oil. Specialists suggest the Soviet bloc will need to import oil increasingly in the interim period until its own assets are more effectively used.

This need might rise to 100 million tons yearly in 1980, if the USSR is to keep Eastern Europe supplied and maintain shipments abroad to earn hard currency. But the Soviet Union, is reluctant to depend longterm on outside sources. Policy dictates self-sufficiency. Thus any massively increased imports are likely to be stopgap nature, for a few years only, and nothing on which the Middle Eastern and Arab states would want to build their economics.

Doubtless some shining examples of Soviet technology will be displayed to impress visitors at this June's World Petroleum Congress in Moscow. But a step-by-step examination of the various stages of hydrocarbon production cited in the five-year plan -- as matched against known existing facts -- frequently tells a disappointing story, as the following examples illustrate:

The five-year plan calls for "improvement in the technological basis" of the oil and gas industries. It does not say that the first essential, geophysical exploration (without which no oil field can be found) is notoriously backward. The result is a tendency to locate only the big, more obvious oil ferous sites, but then there is trouble in pin-pointing exact locations to drill, which is critically important since an error of a few meters may spell failure. Seismographic data-gathering is 7-10 years behind the USA and the West, while in computers required to process precise information there is at least a four-fold shortfall.

Drilling is another essential element in petroleum exploration. Here the Soviet plan calls for a 15-20% efficiency increase and reduction in costs. What this masks is an over-reliance on turbodrilling for three-fourths of all operations, whereas this process is not suited for deep drilling required for a more advanced oil search inside the Soviet Union as well as in foreign lands receiving Soviet assistance. Soviet deep-drilling capability also is limited by a shortage of high-quality drill pipe, drilling bits, pumps and other items. Burdened with such handicaps, Soviet drillers require nine months to drill a hole which Western crews could sink in a month. (We make no mention here of the known lack of larger-size pipe for pipeline transport, which Italy and West Germany is supplying.)

Consider this rare frank criticism of a communist party economist quoted in Kuz Kemmunist Ukrainy of Kiev, in a well-established petroleum producing region. "Year after year the plan for the deep prospective drilling in the Ukraine is not fulfilled. The main reasons for this? High frequency of accidents, prolonged stoppage, inferior quality of material and technical previsions, and shortage of qualified workers and engineering and technical cadres"

Concerning offshore drilling, now an important element in the West, Russia will be virtually a non-starter in the 1970's, due to its reliance on low-efficiency, slow-to-build fixed drilling platforms. Currently the USSR has just three mobile drilling rigs and this will rise to only 13 units of modest capacity by 1980, according to experts, unless Moscow obtains advanced equipment and know how outside.

On the land, in some regions such as the Urals-Volga oil fields, extraction at excessive rates has been the result of constant urging for engineers to maximize short-run achievements. Such tactics boost statistics, but excessive production has reduced the ultimate amount of oil that can be recovered by about one-third. Faulty use of water-injection into the productive layers, to force out the oil has isolated and rendered unrecoverable sizable pockets of oil. Then there is the case of Western Kazakhstan, where frigid sea water was pumped into

an oil-bearing zone high in paraffin wax content. The oil solidified and product was lost.

Large-scale burning off of natural gas found in association with oil, instead of pumping it back into the oil fields to maintain pressure, has been another Soviet characteristic in recent years -- at the same time as the Arab oil producing states have been tightening up on such wastage of resources. Now, tardily, the Soviet five-year plan calls for utilizing of "four-fifths of gas associated with oil."

Labor productivity in the oil fields is to be increased by 40%, a virtual admission of what must surely have been signal inefficiency, while as we said, worker productivity in refineries is to rise by a huge 50%. Indication of the poor situation is substantiated by V.S. Federev, USSR Minister of Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Industry, who disclosed that employment in existing refineries was reduced by almost 5,000 workers during recent years.

The five-year plan similarly calls for a 50% increase in refinery output during 1971-75. The quality of oil products is to be improved, while there will be higher yields of high-octane petrol and other items now in short supply. What is not stated is the fact that expansion of existing refineries and construction of new ones has consistently fallen short of plans. Soviet refinery technique, as well as that of Eastern Europe to a lesser extent, "trails free-world standards to an embarrassing degree," states the authoritative industry publication, Oil & Gas Journal. Capitalist France has been the biggest foreign supplier of refinery equipment to the USSR, elbowing aside East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, which formerly held the lead in deliveries to Russia. One trouble of Russian operations in refineries, as elsewhere, has been excessive centralization and bureaucracy. A classic case is that of the major refinery at Grezny, which was exposed in Moscow's Izvestia newspaper: the refinery has been engaged "for years," according to the paper, in re-processing its crude oil in order to overfulfill its quota and please its Moscow masters.

Obiettivi grandiosi ma poco realistici

CPYRGHT

Come abbiamo già avuto occasione di rilevare, il petrolio è l'unica produzione di base che nell'URSS abbia raggiunto il traguardo 1970 stabilito dall'ottavo piano quinquennale, toccando la cifra di 353 milioni di tonnellate. Dai rispettivi traguardi sono infatti rimasti più o meno distanti l'energia elettrica, il metano, il carbone, la ghisa, l'acciaio e il cemento.

Il nono piano, approvato recentemente dal XXIV congresso del Pcus, prevede che la produzione del petrolio salga nel 1975 a 480-500 milioni di tonnellate. Ma per una serie di considerazioni gli esperti occidentali dubitano fortemente che questo obiettivo, indubbiamente grandioso, possa considerarsi realistico. A parte un dato abbastanza significativo, e cioè che la produzione di petrolio dal 1969 al 1970 è aumentata nell'URSS dell'8 per cento contro il 9,6 per cento che rappresenta (secondo un rapporto della British Petroleum dell'aprile scorso) l'incremento mondiale nello stesso periodo, viene infatti ricordato che le attrezzature petrolifere sovietiche lasciano molto a desiderare sia sul piano della quantità (come denuncia anche l'ultimo consuntivo economico) che su quello della qualità.

Anche gli assistenti del Terzo mondo se ne sono accorti. L'Algeria ha trovato arretrati di 15-20 anni gli impianti di trivellazione (circa una ventina) che le sono stati forniti dall'URSS e recentemente si è rivolta agli Stati Uniti per quattro impianti adatti alle trivellazioni in profondità. Per ragioni analoghe si sono lamentati l'Iran e l'Egitto: quest'ultimo, in particolare, per il ritardo delle ricerche nell'oasi di Siwa, nella parte ovest del suo deserto, non lontano da giacimenti già scoperti da compagnie occidentali. Nell'intento di tenersi aperta un'alternativa questi paesi non hanno rinunciato all'assistenza sovietica nel settore; altri invece si sono rivolti al Giappone, cui l'India, per esempio, ha chiesto attrezzature

e tecnici per le trivellazioni sottomarine nel golfo di Cambay.

Nel giugno prossimo si terrà a Mosca il Congresso internazionale del petrolio e c'è da aspettarsi che in quell'occasione i sovietici faranno il possibile per mantenere alto il proprio prestigio. Non si può tuttavia dimenticare che il loro successo specifico nel quinquennio trascorso è dipeso essenzialmente da un supersfruttamento dei giacimenti degli Urals e del Volga, le cui riserve sono già state ridotte di un terzo. Le ricerche in altre zone procedono infatti lentamente a causa dell'arretratezza che caratterizza i sismografi (simili a quelli che venivano utilizzati negli USA e in altri paesi occidentali 10 anni or sono) e della scarsità dei calcolatori elettronici, anch'essi di tipo ormai antiquato, di cui dispongono i sovietici.

Sul "Kommunist Ukraini", poco fa, veniva citato il franco parere di un economista: "Di anno in anno il piano per le trivellazioni profonde in Ucraina non viene rispettato. Quali sono le ragioni? L'alta frequenza degli incidenti, le lunghe interruzioni dei lavori, la cattiva qualità dei materiali e delle attrezzature, la mancanza di operai e tecnici qualificati..." E' vero, infatti, che le trivellazioni in profondità sono ostacolate nell'URSS dall'inadeguatezza dei tubi, delle punte trivellatrici, delle pompe e via dicendo: tanto che una perforazione sovietica richiede in media nove mesi contro un solo mese impiegato dalle compagnie occidentali.

Da questa situazione derivano l'irrazionalità e sprechi. Gran parte del gas che esce insieme con il petrolio viene disperso o bruciato invece di essere ripompato nei giacimenti per mantenere la pressione necessaria e per essere infine sfruttato come preziosa fonte di energia. Il nuovo piano prevede che si arrivi ad utilizzarne il grosso (precisamente i quattro quinti), seguendo le tecniche che già sono

largamente applicate altrove, ma l'obiettivo per il momento resta ancora molto lontano. Nei giacimenti sovietici è largamente diffuso il sistema dell'immissione di acqua, che, se è un modo per ricostruire la pressione, provoca l'isolamento e l'inutilizzabilità di rilevanti sacche di petrolio. Quando non accade di peggio: come, ad esempio, nel Kazakistan, dove l'immissione di acqua marina in un giacimento che aveva un alto contenuto di paraffina ha determinato la solidificazione del prodotto e quindi l'impossibilità di estrarlo.

Un "gap" ancora più grande divide la tecnica sovietica da quella occidentale nel campo delle trivellazioni sottomarine, la cui importanza sta aumentando di continuo. Nell'URSS esistono attualmente solo tre piattaforme da impiegarsi nelle prospezioni e nelle estrazioni "offshore" e la previsione è che salgano a tredici (un numero pur sempre esiguo) nel 1980. Gli esperti escludono inoltre che esse, sia pure tra un decennio, possano risultare veramente efficienti, e meno che i sovietici non facciano ricorso al Know-how dei complessi petroliferi stranieri.

Tutto questo contribuisce senz'altro a spiegare il crescente interesse del Cremlino per i paesi del Medio Oriente e dell'Africa settentrionale, dai quali l'URSS, si calcola, dovrà importare attorno al 1980 non meno di 100 mila milioni di tonnellate di grezzo l'anno se vorrà continuare a rifornire di petrolio l'area dell'Europa orientale e procurarsi valuta pregiata vendendo il prodotto raffinato su altri mercati.

Anche la raffinazione, in ogni caso, dovrebbe compiere sostanziali progressi per tenere l'URSS al passo con i tempi. In particolare occorre, come hanno riconosciuto gli stessi pianificatori, che si produca benzina con maggior numero di ottani e che si allarghi la gamma, ancora insoddisfatta, degli altri prodotti ricavabili dal grezzo.

MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
13 March 1971

After Crores Are Wasted, Government Admits...

Sorry, Aliabet Is A Flop!

CPYRGHT

MARCH Special

NEW DELHI: "India's first oil well off-shore has failed. No oil has been found... it is feared that the Aliabet structure might have to be written off... the platform built at approximately Rs 1.5 crores will now have to be written off as, being a fixed one, it cannot be taken elsewhere."

CPYRGHT

This obituary on India's ill-fated and completely stupid dabbling in off-shore oil wells at Aliabet, in the Gulf of Cambay, is from the Statesman.

MARCH of the NATION is delighted to say "We told you so," because this paper had declared from the very start that the venture would be a total fiasco and that Aliabet was merely another link in the long chain of Soviet swindles that includes steel projects, drug plants and wagon deals.

"It is amusing to find the Statesman reporting that "the platform was built entirely in India, though the Soviet Union provided some technical assistance," creating the impression that India is mainly responsible for the Aliabet bungle and that Moscow's share is marginal.

The truth is quite different. On January 24, 1970 MARCH of the NATION quoted Dr Triguna Sen, Union Minister for Petroleum, Chemicals, Mines and Metals, as saying: "The first off-shore well is going to be drilled at the Aliabet structure by March 31, 1970. The Soviet Union is rendering all help in this project by supervision, platform installation and drilling."

This is surely a good deal more than "some technical assistance"!
BEST OF BOTH WORLDS

Pretty obviously the Russians always get the best of both worlds. When a project is given to them they insist on total control and an "outsiders" who may pick the bubble of their much-vaunted

technological accomplishments. But when the project flops — they coolly back out and claim they were merely helping out on the fringes!

Dr Triguna Sen was, of course, suffering from the usual socialist hallucinations in expecting results from this Indo-Soviet partnership, for Aliabet, as MARCH pointed out, was NOT an "off-shore" installation at all, and the Soviets, in any case, lacked the requisite technology for off-shore drilling as it is defined throughout the rest of the world, being some six or seven years behind the time.

MARCH said it then, and MARCH rubs it in today, that all the Soviet Union wanted to do by grabbing the Aliabet contract, was to improve its primitive oil technology at India's cost.

FOOLS NEVER LEARN

Even after this paper blew Dr Triguna Sen's wishful thinking sky-high, the Indian Government persisted in carrying on with this disastrous venture.

In fact the socialists were so annoyed at the MARCH exposure that they insisted on hurrying the programme through, even when it meant endangering the lives of the workers.

This behaviour was also exposed by MARCH of the NATION — but a fat lot of good that did; the Oil Ministry kept on piling on the pressure and the poor workmen had to try as best they could to deliver the goods.

Finally the Socialist Queen, Mrs Indira Gandhi, herself descended to the market, accompanied by brass bands and bunting.

It is just possible they might have succeeded if the Russian "experts" assigned to the project were half-way competent. In fact they were so thoroughly inept at their jobs that they were not even able to get the drilling rig in the correct location except after several attempts.

Unfortunately, with Minister Triguna Sen having already given out firm deadlines, the poor ONGC personnel had to do what they could to salvage his reputation.

Finally they did manage to set up the fixed drilling platform and got ready, with brass bands, bunting and the rest, to welcome Socialist Queen Indira Gandhi herself.

We quote from MARCH of the NATION, May 9, 1970: "She pressed the button or cut the ribbon or whatever it was, and the drilling rig, supposed to be yet another monument to Indo-Soviet co-operation, went into action.

"For twenty minutes or so everything went according to plan, and Mrs Gandhi, her pleasant duty done, retired from the scene."

"Possibly the lady does not know it even today, but the unpleasant truth is that twenty minutes after drilling commenced, the machine broke down when it was supposed to have gone on more or less indefinitely till it struck oil."

The fantastic part of it was that there was no oil at Aliabet. Report of February 5, 1971: "Ex-

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ploration in the shallow water of Aliabet was undertaken in the belief that oil-bearing sands in the Ankleshwar oilfield area would stretch up to the coast. But there has been no trace of oil-bearing sand at Aliabet.

"According to authoritative sources, ONGC, which faced some initial setbacks at Aliabet, completed one well going to a depth of about 1,700 metres. This well has proved dry.

"ONGC is understood to be carrying out further tests and if these confirm the absence of oil-bearing sands, no further drilling will be undertaken at Aliabet."

COSTLY HOBBY-HORSE

Millions of rupees have disappeared in the waters of the Gulf of Cambay. Countless lives have been endangered. The halting of advancing of the nation has received a further severe setback. And for what? Simply in order to allow the Prime Minister and her Fabian friends the luxury of prancing around on their Socialist hobby-horses.

Long before Aliabet was given to the Russians, an American firm, Tenneco, had come forward with an offer which entailed no risk whatever for India.

Tenneco had offered to underwrite the whole cost of oil exploration at Aliabet. India would not have to pay a single penny if oil was not found. If oil was found, India would retain a bulk of the discoveries and give only a small proportion to Tenneco, to market at an agreed price.

PEOPLE FORK OUT

Anybody with a grain of commonsense would have preferred this "no risk" offer to the absurdity of the Russian proposal, under which India had to bear the full cost of the exploration and risk being crores of rupees in the red if oil was not discovered.

The money Mrs Gandhi has wasted on Aliabet is not her private patrimony. It is money that belongs to the people of India.

A few days ago Mrs. Indira Gandhi plaintively told an election gathering that in future she would try and see that some of the Public Sector's drawbacks were rectified. MARCH of the NATION submits that Mrs Gandhi and her socialist friends can hardly be taken seriously when they do not have to shell out a single paisa when their crazy socialist schemes come un-

One can understand a bunch of novices stumbling into disasters but Mrs Gandhi and her crew have engineered one catastrophe after another even after technologists have given them ample warning and the press has publicised the warnings to the entire nation.

~~FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

July 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

A MOSCOW SING-ALONG. A visiting performer who was mysteriously advertised on Moscow billboards last month as "Dzhon Uilyam, Singer From France," turned out to be the popular Ivory Coast singer of spirituals, John William, temporarily a resident of Paris. In contracting for him to appear, the state impresarios from *goskontsert* evidently got more than they had bargained for. Word from Abidjan is that William's concerts were virtually sold out. His repertoire consisted mostly of American spirituals and folk songs sung in French and English. His fine, strong voice carried his enthusiastic audiences right along with him in either language. William's success at getting audiences to sing along with him will probably not soon be forgotten at the Teatr Estrady where he appeared. Memorable to all are the capacity audiences of Muscovites clapping and chanting with William in honor of "Jesus, My Saviour!"

* * * * *

AUGUST 1914. Last month, there was published in the West a new literary work that has already been hailed as possibly Russia's greatest novel of the 20th Century -- Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn's August 1914: Part One. It is the concensus of the early readers of this 573-page novel, the first of an epic series detailing the history of the Russian revolution, that Solzhenitsyn's work will preserve for future generations the climate of upheaval of recent Russian history with the same finality that Tolstoy depicted the Napoleonic wars. Attached are reprints of reviews and commentary on the work as well as a translation of Solzhenitsyn's postscript, published in the New York Times as "An Author's Appeal." All merit wide replay, with emphasis on the theme that as far as the Soviet leadership is concerned, the real challenge of this new literary work (as noted in the attached Anatole Shub review) lies in its "blindingly superior quality and the contrast offered by Solzhenitsyn's excellence, originality and broadness of spirit to the malignant meanness of the political and cultural dwarfs who rule Soviet life."

* * * * *

CASTRO AND CUBA'S INTELLECTUALS: END OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

In continuing propaganda on the Padilla affair, an exploitable but generally little-noted aspect is that this is not the first instance of conflict between Cuban intellectuals and Castro, but it is the first time that Castro has retaliated so severely in order to stifle intellectual dissent. The following review of some previous incidents, in which the Castro regime either backed down from its position, or at least took no retaliatory action, underscores the recent, sinister trend toward Sovietization which the Cuban regime has taken. Further, it can lead to speculation that not only does it indicate that the Soviets may be calling the tune more directly in Cuba these days, but that the political climate has become uncertain enough that Castro feels he must suppress dissent at home even if it costs the support of many eminent, formerly pro-Cuban intellectuals abroad. Protests from Cuban intellectuals go back as far as 1961, when Blas Roca, head of the pre-Castro Communist Party, tried to impose controls on the intellectual community. Castro then intervened, claiming that "...artists and intellectuals who are not genuine revolutionaries [should be able to] find within the Revolution a place to work and create." Two years later, in 1963, Roca tried again, but failed, to introduce controls by publicly censuring controversial foreign films. In his 1965 interview with U.S. journalist Lee Lockwood, Castro frankly acknowledged that minimal criticism was tolerated in Cuba, and that works by counterrevolutionary authors would not be published. But he cited economic limitations as the reason for the latter, indicating that textbooks, reference works and politically acceptable books had priority. Also in 1965, when special work units were set up as part of the Armed Forces Ministry and anyone -- ranging from criminals to clergymen -- outside the normal labor market was likely to be recruited, a few intellectuals got caught in the roundup of potential laborers. When the intellectual community vehemently protested, Castro ordered the release of those recruited, reportedly with apologies. Although Castro has never backed down from his decree abolishing the copyright, again when Cuban writers and artists protested, they were not punished for their stand. Finally, even after Padilla's poetry was awarded the Artists and Writers Union Prize in 1968, despite heavy official pressure against it, it did get published, although it carried a note that it lacked "revolutionary content." When Padilla was unable later to find work, it was Castro himself who allegedly interceded to permit Padilla to work at Havana University.

* * * * *

TITO'S RIGHT-HAND MAN REMEMBERS. Two volumes of memoirs entitled Revolution on the Move written by one of Tito's closest associates and once Yugoslavia's top Party leader (now in retirement), Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, were published in Yugoslavia earlier this year. Extracts from the memoirs have appeared sporadically in Belgrade's daily Politika. As a first-hand witness to the creation of modern Yugoslavia, Vukmanovic-Tempo gives a frank account of how and why Tito reached his decision to resist with arms any Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia in the late 1970's and he reveals new details concerning Tito's resistance to Moscow in the years following 1948. As one commentator noted: "When reading installments of the memoirs written by Vukmanovic-Tempo ...one cannot but conclude that very little has changed in Soviet tactics vis-à-vis other Communist states over the past 23 years." Carl Gustaf Stroehm, noted journalist and Soviet affairs expert, wrote in Stuttgart's Deutsche Zeitung that Vukmanovic's "account of relations with the USSR and of meetings with Khrushchev and Mikoyan are unprecedented in the history of modern Communism." Attached are reprints of the Stroehm article and some excerpts from the memoirs, translations of which were published in the June issue of Atlas magazine.

* * * * *

TREADING ON EGG SHELLS. Shortly before East Germany's Eighth Party Congress got under way in mid-June, the man who symbolized East Germany for a quarter century stepped down to make way for his replacement as Communist Party chief by Erich Honecker. The new Party chief ran a smoothly staged operation; in his six-hour speech he mentioned the Soviet Union no fewer than 55 times. As with the three Party conclaves (those held by the USSR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia) that preceded it, the East German congress produced not a single surprise. Just as Brezhnev's and Honecker's personalities appear similar --- colorless but evidently in command of the situation --- so the tenor of the congress was consistent with the current Soviet line of relative moderation combined with firmness. And it has been just to ensure propagation of that line that Leonid Brezhnev has concentrated his efforts for the past few months, keeping himself at stage center as curtains went up and down in Moscow, Sofia, Prague and Pankow to give the outside world brief glimpses of Party harmony, normalcy, and self-assurance. Never mind that just off-stage lurked such anxiety-making bogeys as the possible contagiousness of the Polish riots, the big question of just how normalized relations with Czechoslovakia are, and the ever widening ripples of discontent within the international Communist movement. How Mr. Brezhnev managed all this is taken up again in "Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Protectorate" in this issue.

* * * * *

SEX ORGY LEADS TO ASYLUM. The Soviet practice of silencing political dissenters by sending them to insane asylums is spreading in the Soviet Bloc. A recent case in Hungary illustrates the chain-reaction effects this abuse of science can have on the medical profession, and how quickly a technique for political oppression can be adapted to individual crime. The Hungarian victim was a nurse, Mrs. Ferenc Holecz, whose only "crime" was to refuse an invitation to join a sex orgy ring operating in Budapest and run by two physicians, Dr. Vimos Scheda and Dr. Susanna Marko. Always in need of pretty girls to participate in their groups, the doctors had noticed the attractive nurse and asked her to join. When she refused, the two had Mrs. Holecz committed to their hospital's psychiatric ward and then arranged for her transfer to a lunatic asylum for incarceration in a maximum security section with dangerous psychotics. Fortunately Mrs. Holecz convinced the asylum physicians of her sanity and was released. Immediately she went to the police, and charges were brought against Drs. Scheda and Marko. Both were convicted and sentenced to 14 months in jail for fraudulently committing a sane person to an insane asylum, something the Soviets have been doing with increasing frequency for the past few years for political purposes.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 June 1971

An Author's Appeal

CPYRGHT

By ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN

This book cannot at the present time be published in our native land except in Samizdat [privately circulated typescript] because of censorship objections unintelligible to normal human reason and which, in addition, demand that the word God be unfailingly written without a capital letter. To this indignity I cannot stoop.

The directive to write God in small letters is the cheapest kind of atheistic pettiness. Both believers and unbelievers must agree that when the Regional Procurement Administration is written with capital letters or K.G.B. or Z.A.G.S. (the secret police or city registration bureau) are written in all caps then we might at least employ one capital letter to designate the highest Creative Force in the Universe. Not to add that on the lips and in the understanding of the people of 1914 the word "god" in small letters grates on the ears and is historically false.

The general design revealed in this first part [of the novel] came to me in 1936 when I was finishing high school. Up to the present time I have never deviated from it, viewing this as the chief artistic design of my life.

I have been diverted to other books only by the peculiarities of my career and richness of contemporary impressions.

I have continued to prepare myself and gather material solely for this one purpose. And already it is almost too late. My own life and creative imagination are not sufficient for this 20-year work, and contemporary witnesses of these events have almost all died, those who could correct me, who would enrich my work and advise me on that which has not been written down and has not been preserved. In

my own country all collections of materials, open to others, are barred to me.

Russian writers, older than myself, either concentrate for the most part on our more recent history or slip over the rest superficially. And there is even less hope that it can be written by those younger than myself or that in the future it will be possible to re-create these years when even for my generation this is virtually impossible. So I must carry on.

The first segment of my work I am now publishing for Russian readers abroad with a simultaneous plea for criticism, corrections and supplements, especially with regard to historical personages on whom I have little material: on Generals A. D. Nechvolodov, Martos, Krymov, Posmovsky, Filimonov, Artamonov, V. I. Gurko, Savitsky; Colonels Kabanov, Pervushin, Kakhovsky, Isaev, Khristinich; Lieutenant Colonel Sukhachevsky, the Cossack Captain Vedernikov, and Staff Captain Semechkin.

I would be grateful for any unpublished materials relating to subsequent years but strictly with respect to the following places: Petrograd, Moscow, Tambov, Rostov-on-Don, Novocherkassk, Kislovodsk-Pyatigorsk. All the remaining places not embraced in my design long ago have been put away in books and files.

I am hopeful that the publishers may take upon themselves the work of collecting for me any materials that are sent in.

Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Russia's Nobel Prize-winning author, made public the above appeal in connection with the publication in Paris in the Russian language of his new novel, "August 1914," first in a projected trilogy.

TIME

28 June 1971

CPYRGHT A Soldier's Death: From Solzhenitsyn's August 1914

Denied the right to publish his powerful new work in the Soviet Union, Russian Novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn allowed it to be issued in Paris two weeks ago (TIME, June 21). Already *August 1914* has been acclaimed by its early readers for its epic sweep, for the religious themes that echo through it and for its superb battle scenes; some, in fact, have called it Solzhenitsyn's *War and Peace*.

All of Solzhenitsyn's major novels are concerned with the behavior of men *in extremis*; be it in prison, in a cancer ward or, as in this case, at the battle front. The author describes the new work, the first volume of a projected trilogy, as "the main task of my life," and notes with regret in an afterword: "Now that I am on my way to the goal, I am afraid it is too late. I may not have time and creative imagination left for this 20-year work." Solzhenitsyn focuses on eleven days during the Czarist army's disastrous East Prussian campaign. He sees this period as the turning point of modern Russian history, leading to revolution and the birth of the Bolshevik regime. Although it occurs more than 100 pages before the panoramic novel's end, the excerpt that follows is the dramatic climax.

It takes place on the night of Aug. 29, 1914, after the rout of the Russians at Tannenberg. The Russian commander, General Alexander Samsonov (an actual historical figure), walks through the dense Prussian forests with the remnants of his staff. "He had only wanted what was good," writes Solzhenitsyn, "but it all turned out extremely badly." This is one of the novelist's principal themes—that good intentions are not enough to make the world a better place.

As his fellow officers prepare for their capture by burying their documents and insignia to conceal their high rank, Samsonov at first resists. Finally, apathetically, he allows one of his comrades to strip him of his own insignia. Suddenly he feels unencumbered and free—the freedom that rises out of total despair. Now he is anxious only to rid himself of his entourage and especially his orderly, Kupchik, who sticks close to him carrying the saddle blanket that belonged to the commander's abandoned horse.

It was difficult to walk. His legs were not used to it, and he was stricken by shortness of breath. His asthmatic breathing was

this simple, unencumbered movement. The real test for the body comes when you lose authority over others, when your means of transport and protection are gone, when your general's epaulets, which once expressed the essence of your being, have been cast away, and your heart cannot keep pace. Your lungs can no longer take a full breath, as though they were more than half blocked. Your legs are unsteady. Your pace falters. You stumble on the mossy ground, and trip on the fallen brushwood. Instead of being pleased to be making some headway, escaping perhaps, you are glad only of a halt when you can lean against a tree trunk and catch your breath.

Samsonov felt ashamed to ask his men to stop for a rest, but perhaps out of concern for him they did so every hour, and sat on the ground. Kupchik was always there to deftly spread out the saddle blanket under him. He was glad to be able to stretch out and rest his aching legs.

But they could never sit for long. The brief hours of night would soon slip away and with them, their last chance. Toward midnight, the moon lowered and was clouded over, together with the stars. They could see nothing in the dark as they stumbled along in single file sensing each other's presence only by the crackle of twigs underfoot and their own heavy breathing. The forest trail had got much worse. It was swampy and sometimes the way was barred by impenetrable undergrowth or by dense thickets of young pines. They thought it would be dangerous to stray in the direction of Willenburg where they could easily run into a German patrol. They bunched closer together and kept calling out in low voices. Now there were no more halts. Whenever they came to ditches, Kupchik and a Cossack captain gripped Samsonov by the arms and pulled him across.

What Samsonov found most burdensome was his body. Only his body. It dragged him down into pain, suffering, shame and disgrace. To rid himself of the disgrace, the pain and the burden, all he needed to do was to rid himself of his body. It would mean passing over to freedom—something he longed for—like taking a first really deep breath with his congested lungs. Earlier that night he had been reduced to a mere sacrificial idol for his staff officers. Now, after midnight, he had become more

like a pillar of stone that could scarcely be moved any longer.

The hardest thing was to get away from Kupchik, who kept right behind him, sometimes touching his back or his arm. But as they skirted a thicket, Samsonov tricked his orderly. He slipped to one side and stood dead still. The sound of branches crackling and breaking, and the lumbering tread of heavy footsteps faded away.

It was quiet everywhere. The whole world was hushed. Armies had ceased to battle. Only a fresh night breeze stirred, ruffling the treetops. This forest was not hostile. It belonged neither to the Germans nor to the Russians but to God, and it gave refuge to all His creatures.

Leaning against a tree trunk, Samsonov stood for a moment and listened to the sound of the forest. Near by, the torn pine bark creaked in the wind. And above it all, just under the sky: the cleansing sigh of the treetops.

He felt more and more at peace. He had come to the end of his long soldier's career. He was abandoning himself to danger and death. Now ready to die, he had never imagined that it could be so simple, and such a release.

But the only trouble was that suicide is held to be a sin.

The hammer of his revolver clicked back softly. Samsonov placed it in his cap, which had fallen to the ground. He took off his saber and kissed it. He groped for the locket with his wife's portrait and kissed it too. He walked a few steps to a place where the sky showed through clearly. It was clouded over except for one tiny star that vanished, then appeared again. Dropping to his knees on the warm pine needles, he prayed with his face lifted to the star—he did not know which way was east. First he said the ordinary prayers, then none at all. He just knelt, looked at the sky and breathed. Now he groaned out loud, without restraint, like any other dying forest creature: "Lord, forgive me, if You can, and receive me. You see: There was nothing else I could do, there is nothing I can do."

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NEWSWEEK
28 June 1971

SOVIET UNION:

A New 'War and Peace'

CPYRGHT

I do not believe that it is the task of literature, with respect to either society or the individual, to conceal the truth or tone it down . . . No one can bar the road to truth, and to advance its cause I am prepared to accept even death.

—Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 1967

CPYRGHT

No one thought for a moment that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's latest scrape with Soviet authorities involved any risk of death for the Nobel Prize-winning author. But with the recent publication abroad of his new book, "August 1914," it seemed almost certain that the 52-year-old novelist was in for a new round of official vilification and harassment. In fact, some observers of the Russian scene went so far as to suggest that Solzhenitsyn's open defiance of Kremlin leaders (who had banned his book in Russia) could land him back in Soviet labor camps where he spent eight years during the Stalin era.

Although the 573-page novel ostensibly deals only with a ten-day period in the early phase of World War I, its tone struck some experts as unmistakably anti-revolutionary. The first part of a multivolume series that Solzhenitsyn himself described as a twenty-year project, "August 1914" portrays the bloody collapse of the Russian attack on East Prussia at the Battle of Tannenberg as a disaster which paved the way for the Bolshevik revolution—an event about which the author apparently has mixed emotions. A revolution, as one of the heroes of "August 1914" declares, "does not rejuvenate the country but ruins it for a long time. And the bloodier the revolution is, the longer it goes on, the more the country pays for it and the closer this revolution comes to the title 'great.'"

It would be a mistake, however, to see Solzhenitsyn's massive novel as largely an anti-revolutionary tract. Through his characters, the rigid, oppressive czarist regime is also condemned. The suffering of the ordinary soldiers is portrayed with moving sympathy, and, far more than in his previous works, Solzhenitsyn reveals a profound interest in the values of religion. But in a very real sense, the central theme of this intensely patriotic book is the very destiny of Russia itself.

For by depicting in meticulous detail the moral dilemma of thousands caught up in that convulsive time, Solzhenitsyn has vividly portrayed the moral dilemma confronting all men under an oppressive system: whether to go along with the regime, hoping to make small changes from the inside or to risk hardship and bloodshed by trying to violently restructure the system. "The comparison with Tolstoi strikes you immediately," said Leo Labedz, editor of *Survey*, a journal of Soviet affairs. "What Solzhenitsyn seems to be attempting is nothing less than a new 'War and Peace' from just before to on beyond the Russian Revolution and right into the Soviet framework."

The idea of that kind of independent, grand-scale assessment of twentieth-century history clearly unnerved the Soviet regime. But apart from denunciations of Solzhenitsyn in the press and other minor attempts at harassment, it was questionable just how much farther the Kremlin could go in the way of reprisals. Sending books abroad for publication is not in itself a crime for Soviet writers. And by selecting the small but literarily respectable YMCA Press in Paris to publish the book and asking it to contribute all royalties to construction of a Russian Orthodox church in the West, Solzhenitsyn may have successfully anticipated charges that he sent the book to the capitalist world in order to earn money.

Immune: Even more important, Solzhenitsyn's stature makes him seemingly immune to tactics that the regime might use on lesser figures. Comfortably ensconced in a two-room bungalow on the country estate of cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, Solzhenitsyn even appeared likely to be spared the familiar attacks by gangs of government-directed hooligans. "If he was in some provincial city," said one of the author's close friends, "anything could happen. But at Rostropovich's dacha, which is located near

dachas of important government people—that is another story." Similarly, any blatant Kremlin move to silence Solzhenitsyn would spark a world uproar.

At home, too, Solzhenitsyn is not without a corps of ardent supporters. And the importance of their backing has been magnified by the fortuitous timing of the book's release two weeks before the scheduled start of the Fifth Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers. For although the union's secretariat voted to expel Solzhenitsyn in 1969, his admirers among the rank-and-file membership of some 6,000 are numerous. And in the eyes of many Kremlinologists, neither the Communist Party nor the union's conservative leadership would be willing to launch the kind of all-out attack on Solzhenitsyn that might provoke his defenders to open resistance—and perhaps even inspire a potentially explosive congress debate on intellectual freedom.

WASHINGTON POST
19 June 1971

Maybe the Century's Greatest Russian Novel

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CPYRGHT

By Anatole Shub

LONDON — A plain, white, soft-covered book of 570 pages, published in Paris last week with no advance warning, may well herald the most important Russian literary work of the 20th century.

The book is "August 1914: Part One," by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize laureate in 1970, who has been slowly ostracized by Soviet Communist leaders since 1965. "August 1914: Part One" is, without a doubt, Solzhenitsyn's most ambitious novel to date. It is one which both explicitly and implicitly invites comparison with Tolstoy's "War and Peace."

Written during 1969 and 1970, the novel is, moreover, but the start of a larger epic series which Solzhenitsyn, in a postscript, says will take him 20 years. The succeeding volumes, Solzhenitsyn adds laconically, will deal with the "Following Years" after 1914.

In short, the 52-year-old novelist — former army captain, concentration-camp prisoner, cancer patient and moral hero of today's dissident Soviet intelligentsia — is serenely preparing, despite official displeasure, to write the epic of the Russian revolution. His is clearly an attempt to fix, shape and color, for the consciousness of future generations, the primal upheaval of recent Russian history with the same finality that Tolstoy depicted the Napoleonic wars.

For Solzhenitsyn, the parallel with Tolstoy is conscious. Tolstoy himself appears briefly as a character in "August 1914." His social ideas are later discussed by other characters. Most important, the

Russian generals and officers of 1914 are shown to be constantly ruminating on Tolstoy's view of war, gauging their own conduct in the storm and stress of battle against the General Kutuzov of 1812 — not so much the historic Kutuzov as Tolstoy's Kutuzov.

There is more war than peace in "August 1914," which describes the ill-fated Russian offensive into East Prussia that culminated in encirclement and rout by Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg. But, like Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn brings the social fabric and cultural atmosphere of civilian Russia to the battlefield through a rich variety of characters, both historic and completely fictitious.

Like Tolstoy, he does not shy away from portraying the great and near-great at

close quarters—the British military attache, General Alfred Knox (who played an even greater role in the Russian civil war), the Huguenot genius of the Prussian army, General Von Francois, the man-mountain Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolalevich. Perhaps the most masterful portrait in the book is of the ill-fated General Alexander Samsonov, whose Second Army perished in the encirclement at Tannenberg and who (in a haunting scene that will be read and reread for generations) redeemed his honor by shooting himself.

As Prince Andrey spoke for Tolstoy and saw with his eyes, Solzhenitsyn's hero is a young general staff colonel, Georgi Vorotintsev, whose mission takes him from corps to corps, from regiment to regiment, from GHQ to behind the enemy lines. Brave, sensible, modest, a sensitive officer and patriot without illusions,

Vorotintsev expresses for Solzhenitsyn the best in pre-revolutionary Russia. While some of the East Prussian landscape through which he passes was traversed by Artillery Captain Solzhenitsyn himself in 1944-45, Vorotintsev's character may represent the author's tribute to his own father, an Imperial artillery captain who fought at Tannenberg.

As a war novel alone, "August 1914" is superb, with vivid detail expertly woven into the larger movements and dilemmas of the clashing armies. But Solzhenitsyn rarely loses sight of the manner in which the war presaged the convulsion that doomed old Russian society. He shows us not only the battlefield itself through many eyes, but the varying contemporary perceptions of the war and its meaning—official myths, popular hopes, German and allied plans, revolutionary interpretations, philosophic theories.

Little of this—even the brief, dry summaries of German strategy—is presented didactically. Nearly always, Solzhenitsyn expresses the general through the particular: through a scene, an incident, a dialogue, sometimes no more than a phrase.

For Solzhenitsyn as a literary craftsman, "August 1914" represents a departure and an advance over previous works. Criticized sometimes (by his admirers, not his Soviet literary-political foes) for previous adherence to classic 19th-century narrative technique, Solzhenitsyn here embarks on the path of innovation. Into his narrative are interpolated—somewhat in the manner of John Dos Passos' "U.S.A."—newspaper headlines, official documents, songs of the time, and a remarkable series of "Cinema

screen" prose poems which have the freedom and power of a Greek chorus. The cumulative effect is a scope and fluidity of movement which make "The First Circle" seem, by comparison, a conventional set piece.

Stylistically, "August 1914" is Solzhenitsyn at his best—and beyond it. Here the narrative economy of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" (1962) is combined with the diamond-sharp linguistic precision and vividness shown in the "Prose Tales and Miniature Sketches" (1965). Moreover, Solzhenitsyn's command of the ebb and flow of different styles—straight narrative Russian and dialects, interior monologues, pointillist descriptions, the "cinema screen" prose poems—is supremely musical in construction, recalling such operatic masters as Verdi and Mussorgsky. (Might this power new for Solzhenitsyn, unconsciously reflect his close friendship these last few years with Mstislav Rostropovich, the cellist, and his wife, soprano Galina Vishnevskaya?)

The German novelist Heinrich Boell remarked, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that if the Kremlin were suddenly to permit Solzhenitsyn's works to be published in Russia, "It would start an avalanche." In many ways, "August 1914" proves Boell's point. To be sure, Konstantin Simonov among others in Moscow, has argued that it could and should be published in Russia, and there is nothing in the book that could remotely be considered, on any sane view, as an attack on the Soviet government. Nevertheless, "August 1914" represents the most profound sort of challenge to the very essence of the Stalinist and Neo-Stalinist system. (Solzhenitsyn's work, except for the putative thaws of 1954-56 and 1962-64) has subjected

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two generations of Russians to a new glacial age.

The challenge is, in the first place, that of blindingly superior quality—the contrast offered by Solzhenitsyn's excellence, originality and broadness of spirit to the malignant meanness of the political and cultural dwarfs who rule Soviet life. Millions of Soviet citizens, spiritually demeaned by official menacity and pap, would surely queue up instantly, as at a breadline in a siege, to read even a few pages of a book of such shining merits.

Yet, beyond purely literary genius, there is Solzhenitsyn's view of Russia, its inner glory and failure during the central tragedy of its experience. A uniquely personal view, it will not particularly shock the Western reader, for it is not very different from the view that, say, Chekhov might have taken had he lived to see and write about the events of 1914—sympathetic, clinical, humane, realistic.

Although Solzhenitsyn's characters among them express all sorts of opinions, from anarchist and populist to Tolstoyan and Fascist, the author's overall view is that of a free-thinking skeptic and a natural patriot. He is neither monarchist nor revolutionary, neither rationalist nor mystic (in refreshing contrast to Pasternak), neither religious believer (even in the Tolstoyan heresy) nor militant positivist.

Slavophile, perhaps—but with barely concealed contempt for the pan-Slavism which the Tsarist government invoked in 1914 to "help poor Serbia." Anti-intellectual, also, to a degree,—except that Colonel Vorotintsev is not the only positive hero endowed with superior education and intelligence, and there is no glamorizing of peasants, workers and subalterns.

Such a view is as out of touch with current Kremlin ideology as the later works of Thomas Mann were with the *weltanschauung* of Doctor Goebbels. It is no accident (as Pravda might, but will not, say) that the late Georg Lukacs, whose lifetime literary model was Thomas Mann, wrote his last book in praise of Solzhenitsyn.

What will most offend the literary policemen of Mr. Brezhnev's agit-prop department is the whole of Solzhenitsyn's treatment of 1914 rather than any particular passages. It is offensive to Leninist-Stalinists precisely because Solzhenitsyn attempts a truthful, multicolored and ultimately loving—rather than dogmatic or demonological—portrayal of pre-revolutionary Russia.

While Solzhenitsyn shows, on almost every other page, the weaknesses, failures and corruptions of Tsarist Russia, he also portrays the faculty, arrant pride and frivolity of those who were (by omission and commission) to destroy the old regime. But all these weaknesses, on either side and in the middle—as well as the courage and perspicacity to be found among individuals in all camps—he portrays as human qualities as in the nature of the human condition, transcending "Tsarist autocracy," "capitalism" or similar transient political-science categories.

Critics both East and West, sympathetic and unsympathetic, will spend decades analyzing and debating particular dialogues in "August 1914," which pose and confront the most difficult, often agonizing historical and philosophical questions.

The Kremlin, for example, may well choose to maintain utter silence about this book, as it did about "Cancer Ward" and "First Cir-

cle." But, if they were unleashed, Communist critics might have a field day with dialogues in which characters suggest that neither capitalism nor socialism but production itself is the key to material wealth, and that 90 per cent of the secret of production is intelligence, knowledge, innovation and organizational talent rather than (Marx to the contrary) the labor of the masses.

Similarly, Russian nationalists (in emigration as well as in the Soviet Union) will not enjoy the manner in which Solzhenitsyn gives the Germans of 1914 their due, both for a higher level of civilization generally and for superior strategy, tactics and execution on the battlefield.

In indicating that the Germans earned their victory, Solzhenitsyn also rejects Tolstoy's view of the chance nature of war, as elsewhere he questions even more poignantly Tolstoy's faith in the immanent power of love and good.

Westerners and "westernizing" Russians, for their part, will be uncomfortable with Solzhenitsyn's hostile view of the Franco-Russian alliance, his acid portrait of General Knox, his jibes at the Tsarist generals of German origin, and his mocking of young educated Russians' pretensions to be "English gentlemen."

Liberals, optimists and Rousseauvians of all countries—but especially Russian democrats in emigration—will wince at his suggestion that most of mankind (and specifically most of the Russians of 1914) were "not ready" for the brave new world of intellectuals' dreams, nor for the kingdom of heaven on earth.

While there is nobility and verve in Solzhenitsyn the writer which is anything

but pessimistic, and his zest for the mysteries of individual personality is absolutely cheerful, "August 1914" is a tragedy, and Solzhenitsyn's is the tragic view of life and history.

In the final pages of the book, Colonel Vorotintsev confronts the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich and the entire high command, to denounce the strategy which led the illprepared Russian army to launch an offensive into East Prussia primarily to fulfill a lightly-undertaken military convention with France. In fact, the hasty Russian offensive compelled the Germans to transfer divisions from the western front, enabling Marshal Joffre to win the Battle of the Marne and save Paris.

The generals plead treaty obligations, and Vorotintsev replies: "According to the convention, Russia promised decisive aid but not suicide! Your Excellency, you undersigned suicide for Russia! . . . Even the French will not appreciate us for this tomorrow."

The current Kremlin authorities can hardly be expected to appreciate the suggestion that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represents the product of Russia's suicide—even from an author who was born under Lenin and fought to defend his country under (and despite) Stalin.

The last sentence of Solzhenitsyn's magnificent novel quietly advises both the oppressors and the oppressed in today's Russia not to take his view personally. "Injustice," he says, "did not begin with us, nor will it end with us." Above and beyond the smoke of battlefield and the gas of ideologies, Solzhenitsyn's is the vision of Ecclesiastes.

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21 June 1971

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SOVIET UNION

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God Is Upper-Case

This book cannot now be published in our homeland except in Samizdat because of objections by censors that are inconceivable to the normal human mind and also because it would be necessary to write the word God in lower-case. I cannot bow down to such a humiliation.*

So writes Nobel-prizewinning Novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn in a postscript to his new novel, *August 1914*, which was published last week in Russian by the small YMCA Press in Paris. It is the only one of his books, aside from *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, that Solzhenitsyn has agreed to have published in the West.

Ever since he completed *August 1914* in October 1970, Solzhenitsyn has been trying to have it published in the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that all his major works except *One Day* have been banned in Russia, he felt that there was some hope for the new novel; unlike the other books, it does not center on the crimes of Stalinism, which by implication embarrass Soviet leaders who came to prominence under the old tyrant. Nonetheless, Soviet censors raised many objections. They even insisted, as Solzhenitsyn points out in the postscript, that the word God be printed in lower-case but that KGB (the secret police) be printed in capitals.

When Solzhenitsyn learned that a copy of the novel had made its way to the West, he got in touch with his Zurich lawyer, Fritz Heeb. He wanted to avoid what had happened to his other books: Western publishers scrambled to

* Literally, self-publishing—the clandestine re-typing and circulation of forbidden literary documents.

print competing editions, often in excruciating translations. To establish copyright in Solzhenitsyn's name in France,

Heeb quietly authorized the small YMCA Press (so named because it was founded by a member of the association, Dr. John Mott, in 1921) to publish *August 1914* in Russian.

Veiled Criticism. The novel is the first part of a trilogy on a subject that has haunted Solzhenitsyn all his life: Russia's role in the war against Germany in 1914. The work is intended as a memorial to his father, an artillery officer in the Czarist army who participated in the disastrous battle of Tannenberg in East Prussia in August 1914. As an artillery captain in World War II, Solzhenitsyn passed through Tannenberg, but he was not around to savor the eventual Russian victory. In February 1945, Solzhenitsyn was arrested for writing barely veiled criticism of Stalin in letters to a friend, and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. During that time, he developed and overcame cancer. Solzhenitsyn's greatest fear is that he will be prevented from finishing the trilogy—either by a recurrence of cancer or by the Soviet authorities.

Even as Solzhenitsyn's latest book appeared in the West, another Russian writer, imprisoned for publishing articles and stories abroad (*On Socialist Realism, The Trial Begins*), was released from a Soviet labor camp. In late 1966, Andrei Sinyavsky, now 46, was sentenced to seven years at hard labor for "anti-Soviet slander," while Fellow Writer Yuli Daniel was given five years on the same charge. Daniel was released last year after serving his full sentence, but Sinyavsky was set free 20 months early for good behavior. Even so, he was banned for two more years from returning to Moscow.

DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Stuttgart
June 1971

The Daring Memoirs of Tito's Right-Hand Man

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An unprecedented Yugoslav document

Translated from DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Stuttgart

IN THE BELGRADE newspaper *Politika* an unusual series is appearing—the recollections of Svetozar Vukmanovic, known as “Tempo” in World War II partisan days when he was a close collaborator of Tito’s. This is the first time in the history of modern communism that a former Politburo member has published his memoirs.

A Montenegrin like Milovan Djilas, Vukmanovic has been a Communist since 1935. He served as member of the Supreme Partisan Headquarters and Central Committee, as Tito’s partisan chief in Macedonia, and at war’s end as chief of the political administration of the army. Later he became a member of the Politburo and vice-president of the Federal Executive Council. After a stint as trade-union chief he retired from public life and is now pensioned.

Khrushchev once remarked that if you want a really good fight you should send Vukmanovic into the negotiations. Indeed the stormy Montenegrin was famous for his irascible temper. During the war, Tempo quarreled with the Bulgarian communists in Macedonia when he thwarted their plan to split that province off from Yugoslavia.

At war’s end Vukmanovic ran up against the Red Army generals. In his capacity as political commissar, General Vukmanovic went together with Chief-of-Staff Jovanovic (three years later shot as a Soviet sympathizer by the Yugoslav secret police) to Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin’s headquarters at

Vienna. Their mission was to demand the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Yugoslav territory, units put into Macedonia as occupation forces by the Germans and later used against the Germans by the Russians.

When Tolbukhin’s rage reached the boiling point, his deputy tackled the Yugoslavs. “Why don’t you people love the Red Army? The Bulgarians love us,” he whined. Vukmanovic jumped up and shouted: “Listen, comrade, when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow I took my gun in hand and said that my country and I would endure all that the Soviet Union must endure.”

On his first visit to Moscow Vukmanovic learned that the Soviets were watching and following his every move. He was shaken by his impressions of the Soviet capital, particularly by the housing conditions: “Worse than the slummiest suburbs of Belgrade.”

And he waxed indignant over the behavior of Stalin and the Politburo. Vukmanovic, Djilas and the others knew that their hotel rooms were bugged, their conversations overheard. Once when Djilas tried to stop a Yugoslav conversation that was getting too frank, Vukmanovic, who was violent in his criticism of the Soviet Union, said: “Listen, Djido, if they are listening to me and have no faith in me, then they can go to hell. What I say is the truth.” The others laughed and went right on talking.

Montenegrans are Russophiles by tradition, and Tempo is no ex-

ception. He speaks glowingly of the ordinary Soviet people, particularly the Moscow theater audiences, who are moved to tears by the fate of Uncle Vanya or Anna Karenina.

But political reality was something the proud partisan could not ignore. He saw how Yugoslav officers sent to the U.S.S.R. for training were systematically indoctrinated against their own Party and government leaders. Even before the 1948 break with Stalin, Vukmanovic decided not to send any more Yugoslavs to the Soviet Union for military and political training.

He recounts how Tito’s colleague Edvard Kardelj, likewise on a Moscow visit, was dragged out of his bed in the middle of the night and taken to Molotov’s office. There the sleepy Yugoslav official was ordered to sign a consultation treaty on the spot.

“... The Soviet leaders treated an independent country and its government as if they were a colony.”

POLITIKA, Belgrade
June 1971

Khrushchev to Vukmanovic:

"You Petit Bourgeois, You!"

Translated from POLITIKA, Belgrade

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Carl Gustaf Ströhm, as noted in the preceding article, spotted these memoirs serialized in Belgrade's influential magazine *Politika*. The following excerpts are preceded by short, condensed explanations to place them in context. They have been kept in the first person for reasons of clarity.

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In 1955 Khrushchev tried to place Yugoslav-Soviet relations on a fresh footing. On his famous visit to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Party chief attributed the deterioration of relations to provocation on the part of Beria and Abakumov—both of whom had in the meantime been purged and liquidated. I, Vukmanovic, took up the argument.

At the first meeting of the Yugoslav and Soviet Party chiefs, I said: "Comrade Khrushchev, I don't see how the conflict between our Parties can be explained on the basis of the allegation that Beria slandered our country. Let us assume that Beria told the truth about us, namely, that we adopted Bukharin's views, for example, on agricultural policy. If that were so, would the blockade and the pressure against our country be justified? The reason I ask is that I am interested in knowing how you will react to such situations in the future. If we should decide, say, to build a Bukharin-type socialism in the rural areas, what would you people do then?"

Khrushchev turned red in the face and shouted at me: "You are a *petit bourgeois* element!"

After that incident I asked to be relieved of my assignment to the Yugoslav delegation at the talks. But Tito, who was infuriated himself by the exchange, reacted in true partisan fashion: "You will remain in the delegation," he said with a smile. "That's important, because you are one of the people the Soviets call 'dubious Marxists'. Just remember that for us the future means more than the past.

The fact that they (the Soviets) have come to Belgrade shows that they would like to make up for their past mistakes. That's enough for the time being. Why should we ask more from them than they are capable of giving?"

In the summer of 1956 I accompanied Tito on a return visit to the Soviet Union. I tried to explain to my host, Mikoyan:

"You all made me so mad that I wanted to fight you just as I fought against the Germans."

Mikoyan replied: "That cannot be, Tempo."

"If you had attacked us," I continued, "we would have fought you as we would any other aggressor."

"We did not attack you."

"But you had the intention of attacking. Why else would you have mobilized such a large force at our border?"

"To defend ourselves against you," answered Mikoyan.

"Then what was the meaning of Molotov's dispatch to our government, openly threatening the 'Fascist gang in Belgrade' and saying the Soviets had other ways of bringing them to their senses?"

Mikoyan said: "There was no such dispatch."

"I'm afraid there was," I replied. "We have kept the original. The fact that we reacted immediately shows that we took it seriously. We organized partisan detachments on Yugoslav territory. Every kilometer of road and railroad was controlled by partisan units, and if you had tried to invade our country we would have prepared a hellish reception for you." And I

added after a pause: "The Central Committee had named me commander-in-chief of the partisans and I organized the detachments."

Many years later, the Yugoslavs took the old partisan plans from the Stalin period out of the file and dusted them off. This was on the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

I spoke to Khrushchev several times in the early 1960's, and during one conversation he said:

"Our Soviets are no longer like the Leninist Soviets of worker, peasant and soldier deputies. Lenin insisted that all power should be in the hands of the Soviets, but Stalin reduced them to mere subsidiaries of the central government. Power must be returned as far as possible to the working masses."

While Khrushchev expanded on his vision of a new Soviet Union in the Leninist spirit, I wondered to myself who could be counted on to carry out such a plan. What Khrushchev was proposing was nothing less than a revolution. Stalin had created a powerful apparatus of Party and State; it could not be undone without revolutionary disturbances. It was hardly a task which could be accomplished under the leadership in power in Moscow at the time.

Khrushchev went on: "I want to turn the Soviet Army into an armed people's militia. On the military side, we will have to rely primarily on rockets." I thought to myself: "But what will the officers and the generals say to that? Will they agree to give up the financial security and the social positions

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they enjoy in the army as it is now constituted? Or will they turn against Khrushchev and join forces with his opponents among the political leaders?"

On the question of nationalities in the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev had this to say: "Contrary to what Lenin wanted, the various member

Republics are nothing but administrative territorial units."

I found Khrushchev's ideas exciting, but at the same time I was filled with doubts as to whether all that could be accomplished, particularly in view of the composition of the Soviet leadership even after the 20th Party Congress.