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Propaganda

PERSPECTIVES

FEBRUARY 1972

ON ELIMINATING DISSENT

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ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN

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SHORT SUBJECTS


A COLD WINTER IN PRAGUE

USSR'S REPORTED OFFER OF CREDITS TO CHILE

A NEW YEAR'S GREETING FROM THE FCP

THE NEW ADMIRALS

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F A C T S H E E T

Shimoda Treaty of 1855

Established Czarist Russia-Japanese borders and declared Kunashiri and Etorofu Japanese possessions. The disposition was never questioned by the Czars, nor the Soviets after the 1917 revolution until 1945 when the Soviet Army occupied Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Yalta Agreement of February 1945

In which leaders of Soviet Union, the U.S. and Great Britain agreed, among other things, that the southern part of Sakhalin (Japanese name is Karafuto) and the Kuril Islands were to be transferred from Japanese to Soviet possession.

Potsdam Declaration of July 1945

In which the U.S., the Republic of China and Great Britain stated that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and "such minor islands as we determine."

San Francisco Treaty of 1951

A peace treaty with Japan signed by the U.S. and 48 other non-Communist nations. The treaty laid the basis for the eventual return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands to Japanese rule.

Reversion of Amami Islands

Returned to Japanese control by U.S. in early 1950's.

Japanese-Soviet Declaration of 1956

Japan and the USSR signed a declaration on 19 October 1956 ending a technical state of war and outlining a Soviet commitment to return Shikotan and the Habomai Chain to Japan after a peace treaty has been concluded between the two countries.

Reversion of Bonins, etc.

On 26 June 1968 the U.S. returned to Japanese control the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands (including Iwo Jima) and Marcus Island, all taken during World War II.

Nixon-Sato Agreement

Concluded 6 January 1972, at San Clemente, and provided that Okinawa and the other islands of the Ryukyus will revert to Japanese rule on 15 May 1972.

Geography (See map attached): The Northern Territories are

islands which lie between Japan and the USSR in the Sea of Okhotsk. They are composed of:

- the Kuril Island Chain (stretches between Japan's northernmost main island and the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula)
- the southern half of Sakhalin (Karafuto is Japanese name)
- the islands of Shikotan and Etorofu (an important Soviet military base)
- Kunashiri (protects Etorofu geographically from Japan)
- the archipelago of Habomai (lies just north of Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido)

The Kurils were handed over to the Soviets under the terms of the Yalta Agreement and have since been incorporated into the RSFSR (largest Soviet republic). The remaining islands comprising the Northern Territories were occupied by Soviet army personnel in 1945 after Japan was defeated. Shikotan and the Habomais are the islands to which Japan has the best claim for they are neither geographically nor geologically part of the Kuril Island Chain but like the Kurils have been under continuous Japanese dominion since 1798.

Etorofu and Kunashiri are claimed by the Japanese as a northern extension of Hokkaido; the Soviets claim they are the southernmost tip of the Kurils and thus covered under the Yalta Agreement and the San Francisco Treaty. However, they, too, have been continuously under Japanese dominion since 1798 and have been traditional Japanese fishing grounds for centuries.

The Okinawa Reversion arrangements provide for:

- Transfer to Japan of full responsibility for civil government functions which the U.S. has exercised since the end of World War II.

- Japan's assuming responsibility for the defense of Okinawa, including ground, air and maritime patrol, search and rescue, not later than July 1, 1973.

- Transfer to Japan of those physical assets and properties in the Ryukyus appropriate to the responsibilities Japan will assume upon reversion, with provision for Japan's reimbursing the United States for certain of the facilities' improvements and developments effected during the period of U.S. administration and

for costs incurred by the U.S. under the agreement.


--Application of U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty provisions and related arrangements to the Ryukyus area without change or modification.

--U.S. commercial interests now operated in Okinawa to continue their businesses and professions there and to conduct business also in Japan proper, subject to applicable Japanese laws and regulations.

CPYRGHT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

"Northern Territories"



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 January 1972

CPYRGHT

The Kremlin wooing Tokyo

CPYRGHT

Gromyko to air Soviet pact?

Moscow

By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

The Russians are wooing Japan with renewed vigor.

Against the backdrop of shifting political balances in Asia, Moscow is— for one thing—soft-pedaling its once frequent theme of Japanese militarism.

Several other developments point toward Moscow's seeking new influence in Tokyo:

- Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at long last is headed Japan-ward for regular political consultations. He is scheduled to arrive in Tokyo Jan. 23.

- A meeting of the joint Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee, which should have been held last year, will take place in Tokyo in February.

- Kenzo Kono, president of the Japanese Diet's upper house, has been visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet. Shortly before his scheduled departure Wednesday he had a meeting with Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny.

Mr. Gromyko's visit will be his first to Japan since 1966, and the joint ministerial talks will be the first since 1969, when Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi stopped in Moscow briefly en route to the United Nations.

Though economic relations between the two nations have spurted forward since that time, political problems have remained in the background. These now will come to the fore.

The very fact that Mr. Gromyko has finally decided to go to Japan clearly reflects the confusingly changing scene in Asia.

Diplomatic observers believe that, with the United States gradually withdrawing from the region and China expanding its influence there, Moscow seeks to avoid a Japanese defection into a Sino-American "understanding" that would leave the Soviet Union out in the cold and to encourage Tokyo to pursue a policy of balance in its relations with the big powers.

A related problem is that of Japanese fishing rights in the southern Kuriles, which used to be one of Japan's richest fishing areas.

The Russians insist on a 12-mile limit for territorial waters and arrest fishing boats found

are holding more than a dozen Japanese fishermen.

The Japanese also hope to make progress on a cultural-exchange program. Technical problems have held up a formal government agreement, although exchanges do take place on an informal basis.

While detailed economic talks will be left to the joint meeting in February, Mr. Gromyko is expected to bring up the broad subject of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the development of Siberia.

Among the projects the Russians are promoting are the construction of a pipeline from Irkusk to the port of Nakhodka, through which they would supply Siberian oil to Japan. They are also interested in development of the southern Yakut coal fields and the natural gas on Sakhalin Island, as well as an expansion of coastal trade.

Siberian pace slow

Soviet-Japanese cooperation in Siberia generally has not grown as fast as once anticipated, largely because the Russians are asking for long-term credits that Japanese business is not in a position to give. Whether this obstacle can be surmounted now remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the Soviet press has been soft-pedaling its treatment of Japan of late. The long diatribes about Japan's growing military budget and the danger of militarism have disappeared for the moment.

Even articles of Tokyo's currency and export difficulties with the United States seem fairly moderate in tone, suggesting that Moscow would prefer Japan to remain more closely allied with Washington than to become too friendly with Peking.

Izvestia summary

All in all, the current Soviet mood is summed up by an Izvestia commentator in these words:

"Soviet-Japanese relations have now reached a level where both countries stand face to face with new quantitative and qualitative improvements of their ties. And the only requirement for turning possibilities into reality is to eliminate the obstacles standing in the way of full normalization and thereby open the way to genuine good-neighborliness.

"The objective conditions require this. And the people of both countries want it."

THE WASHINGTON POST
20 January 1972

Stanley Karnow

Gromyko's Trip To Japan Eyed

CPYRGHT

SOVIET Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is scheduled to visit Japan for a week starting this Sunday, and his trip could have a significant impact on the rapidly changing balance of power in East Asia.

The Russians and Japanese are both concerned about the outcome of President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking. Thus they are beginning to explore the chances of an accommodation that might serve as a counterweight to a possible reapproachment between the United States and China.

This confirms that East Asia is currently shifting into a complex array of alignments that will involve the United States, China, the Soviet Union and Japan. It means, moreover, that the old designations of "free world" and Communist bloc have become obsolete—if, indeed, they ever had any validity.

After treating them badly for years, the Russians are eager at present to warm up to the Japanese. As in all their endeavors, the Rus-

sians are mainly motivated by an obsession to outflank the Chinese.

THE KREMLIN'S DRIVE to encircle China made tremendous gains in the recent war between India and Pakistan, which strengthened Soviet sway on the Indian subcontinent. The Russians are also believed to be increasing their influence in Hanoi as a result of North Vietnamese irritation with China's decision to welcome Mr. Nixon.

Now, in an obvious effort to tighten the noose around China, the Russians are seeking to reinforce their position in Japan.

Severely jolted by President Nixon's move to visit Peking without consulting them beforehand, the Japanese are currently worried by the prospect of a U.S. reconciliation with China that leaves them out in the cold.

Hence they are searching for other links, and it would be logical for them to cozy up to the Russians.

The outstanding issue that divides the Russians and Japanese is the status of Habomai, Shikotan and other islands north of Japan. The Russians occupied these is-

lands at the end of World War II and expelled their inhabitants.

Pointing to the return of Okinawa by the United States, the Japanese contend that the time has come for the Russians to give them back the disputed islands. That gesture, they say, would pave the way for the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. The treaty officially ending their World War II hostilities has never been signed.

THE RUSSIANS REALIZE that, by returning the islands to Japan, they would make themselves vulnerable to territorial demands from countries as far-ranging as Romania and China. But Gromyko may in fact accede to Japanese claims on the grounds that the political advantages of such a settlement outweigh the problems it would create elsewhere for the Kremlin.

Another move that Gromyko could make while in Tokyo would be to ease the conditions for Japanese investment in Siberia. The Soviet Union and Japan have

talked at length about joint development of the region, but Russian terms for such development have been too tough to suit Japanese firms.

By way of improving Soviet-Japanese atmospherics, Gromyko is expected to invite Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to Moscow and propose that Soviet Premier Kosygin visit Japan. A visit to Moscow by Sato would be the first trip to the Soviet Union by a Japanese Prime Minister.

A compact between Japan and the Soviet Union would have important psychological repercussions—at minimal cost to both the Russians and the Japanese. It would jolt the Chinese. It would also arouse those in the United States who have warned that President Nixon's approaches to Peking might drive Japan into the Kremlin's arms.

Thus the Japanese and the Russians are in a position to counter the Sino-American romance with a flirtation of their own. The way Gromyko woos the Japanese in the coming week will therefore indicate whether a marriage of convenience is in the offing.

SAIGON POST
20 December 1971

CPYRGHT

Soviets Stand Pat

Okinawa's Return Poses Kuriles Case

By WIRATMO SUKITO

NUSANTARA—The agreement for returning Okinawa Island to Japan — the Okinawa Reversion Pact — signed in Tokyo and Washington last July 17 by Kiichi Aichi and William Rogers, was ratified on November 10th by the U.S. Senate, requiring a two third majority vote to do so. An exchange of instruments of ratification will soon be held in Tokyo between Japan and the U.S.

Under article IX of the agreement the return of Okinawa (and other Ryukyu Islands) to Japan will come into effect two months after the exchange of the documents of ratification in Tokyo. This means that next year Japan will assume responsibility on the island; but under the Japanese-U.S. Security Pact which in 1970 was extended for another ten years, the U.S. is permitted to station 50,000 American personnel on Okinawa for combat purposes with the prior approval of the Japanese government.

The Okinawa Reversion Pact is one of the logical consequences of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed in San Francisco on 8 Sept. 1951.

According to ASAHI SHIMBUN (November 9) which quoted defense sources, soon after the return, Japan will begin placing 5,000 air defense units on the island. 4,800 officers and men on the

island before March 1973. The number will rise to 6,800 in March 1973 at the end of Japan's Fourth Defense Build-up Program.

President Nixon recently urged the U.S. Senate to ratify the agreement in order to improve U.S. relations with Japan. When the agreement was discussed in Senate, Sen William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, warned that failure to ratify the agreement could cause fundamental damage to U.S.-Japanese relations.

As is known, at the end of the Pacific war, Okinawa was a scene of major fighting, following the landing of U.S. troops near Kerama on 26 March 1945. When the US gained complete control of the island and Japanese resistance broke on 23 June 1945, the U.S. and lost 12,281 men, killed or wounded. It can be imagined how much the U.S. sacrificed to capture the island.

Okinawa became important to the U.S. after the Korean war broke out in 1950 in connection with the Cold War with China. At the end of the last decade there was a hint that the U.S. would hand over its Asian security responsibility to Japan which has revived as a strong Asian nation.

After Japan surrendered to the Allies the vacuum left by led by the US; but 20 years

later Japan sees that its influence in Asia is being restored; But though the return of Okinawa was agreed to by both governments the middle of last year, the return does not mean that Japan will assume responsibility for Asia's security. The US has not turned its back on Japan. Relations are thawing with China. So without creating a confrontation between China and Japan, the island of Okinawa will be returned to Japan.

For Japan, the return of Okinawa will inspire the demands for the return of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands occupied by the Soviet Union since the end of the Pacific war even though Moscow and Tokyo entered into a 10 year non-aggression agreement in 1941 (the purpose of this agreement was to prevent Japan's attack of Russia while Russia was at war with Germany in Europe and Russia agreed not to attack Japan while Japan was at war with the US and Britain in the Pacific.

At the Yalta conference (4-11 February 1945), President Roosevelt made a concession to Stalin when he agreed that Soviet sovereignty over Russian territories seized by Japan in the Japanese-Russian war of 1904-1905 would be restored, including over the Kurile Islands, so that Russia would attack Japan and the Pacific war as soon as

possible. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not attack Japan immediately because the 1941 non-aggression pact would cause embarrassment. In July 1945 Japan asked the Soviet Union to mediate its conflict with the U.S. (and Britain) to end the Pacific war, but the Soviet Union refused and informed the U.S. and Britain of the Japanese request. Yet the Soviet Union still did not attack Japan. Only after Japan had no hope to win the war did the Soviet Union launch an attack on 18 August 1945 which resulted in the easy capture of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. (President Truman who realized the U.S. could defeat Japan without Soviet participation warned the Russians not to occupy the Kurile Islands but the Russians reminded the U.S. of the Yalta agreement that the fact that Kurile Islands were to be handed over to the Soviet Union.)

When we compare how the Soviet Union won South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands with how the U.S. won Okinawa, we see that the Soviet Union wanted only to skim the cream from the milk. It was with the understanding that the Soviet Union would already have attacked Japan before the U.S. attacked Okinawa that the U.S. made the concession concerning South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but the Soviet Union let the

U.S. sacrifice 12 vicemen to Okinawa first.

Nonetheless the U.S. finally returns Okinawa to Japan while the Soviet Union does not want to return the Kurile

islands (much less South Sakhalin) to Japan. According to Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda, when visiting the Soviet Union as Minister for Agriculture and Forestry,

Prime Minister Kirubscov told him that he would consider the Japanese islands in the north (for return to Japan) once the U.S. returns Okinawa. But when in July the

chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party, Narita, visited Moscow, the Soviet Union told him that the islands in the north cannot be discussed any more:

JAPAN TIMES
28 October 1971

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Japanese-Soviet Relations

2 Opposing Reports on Northern Territories Mystifying Public

By MINORU SHIMIZU

Will the Soviet Union, which is desirous of better relations with Japan, change its strong attitude toward the question of the northern territories?

There were two missions to Moscow recently within a single month. They have returned from Moscow with two opposing views concerning the Russian attitude toward the northern islands issue. One is that the Russians have begun to adopt a flexible policy line while the other is that their attitude remains unchanged.

The former view was expressed by Kenji Miyamoto, chairman of the presidium of the Japan Communist Party, who visited Moscow toward the end of September. The other was expressed by Tokusaburo Kosaka, a Liberal-Democratic Dietman, who visited Moscow in the middle of October.

The problem of the northern territories is an important issue pending since the restoration of diplomatic relations of the two nations in 1956. In the Japan-Soviet joint declaration of that year, the Soviet Union promised that two islands, Habomai and Shikotan, would be returned to Japan when a peace treaty was concluded between the two countries. Subsequently, in 1960 when the new Japan-U.S. Secur-

ity Treaty was concluded between Japan and U.S., the Soviet Union sent a memorandum to the Japanese Government stating that it would not return the islands to Japan unless the American forces withdrew from Japan.

Japan, on the other hand, asserting that not only Habomai and Shikotan but also Kunashiri and Etorofu are inherent territories of Japan, has been strongly demanding that the Soviet Union return them to Japan.

Bitter Confrontation

The Russians have been reiterating that the territorial issue concerning Kunashiri and Etorofu has been settled. Moreover, they have proposed conditions for the return of Habomai and Shikotan. Thus, a bitter confrontation has continued between the two nations for over 10 years.

In a press interview held immediately after his return from Moscow, the JCP chairman said that Soviet Communist Party leaders would consider the return of Habomai and Shikotan after the signing of a peace treaty between the two nations and also that they would take up the return of Kunashiri and Etorofu as a diplomatic issue following the termination of the Japan-U.S.

Security Treaty.

This statement by Miyamoto was received as a sensational indication of bright prospects for the return of the northern territories.

The JCP launched a colorful campaign in early October through its organ "Akahata," claiming that Miyamoto's Moscow visit had achieved a great success. However, it was short-lived.

A mission of LDP Dietmen, including Kosaka returned with the bad news. They said, "When we mentioned the report by Miyamoto to N.N. Rodinov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, he simply dismissed it as a misunderstanding and the Russians did not change their attitude toward the issue of the northern territories."

Kosaka's Report

In an interview, Kosaka told this writer: "The Soviet Union's attitude toward the issue of the northern territories remains stiff. The Russians do not recognize Miyamoto's view."

Government leaders, including Foreign Ministry officials, are of the opinion that it is unthinkable that the Soviet Union had adopted a flexible attitude toward the northern territories at this time.

What appears to be most strange is that the JCP has not shown any reaction to Kosaka's report, remaining quiet. The JCP should clarify whether Miyamoto's report is true, since it publicized it as a great achievement.

On Oct. 19, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Soviet Union exchanged telegrams congratulating each other on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-Soviet Union joint declaration and rejoicing in their friendly relations. There has been great improvement in the two nations' relations through the expansion of trade and cultural exchanges during the past 15 years. But the two nations' confrontation concerning the issue of the northern territories has been hampering their true friendship.

Government and LDP leaders as well as the people at large are now turning their attention toward the issue of the northern territories now that the return of Okinawa is scheduled for 1972.

Consequently, if the Soviet Union persists with its adamant attitude toward the issue, it will cast a dark cloud over the current amicable atmosphere in the Japan-Soviet relations.

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February 1972

ON ELIMINATING DISSENT

In the Soviet Union, January was a very bad month for the voices of reason and the defenders of human rights and constitutional legality:

- 5 January: One-day trial of Vladimir Bukovsky, out of which came one of the harshest sentences ever given a Russian dissident. (See "The Case of Vladimir Bukovsky," this issue.)
- 12-13 January: KGB raids in Lvov and Kiev resulting in the arrest of at least thirteen Ukrainian dissidents, apparently on suspicion of nationalist activity. The arrestees are said to be held under an article of the Ukrainian criminal code that prohibits the distribution of "deliberately false fabrications defaming the Soviet state."

Five Ukrainians were reportedly arrested in Kiev, among them the literary critic Ivan Svitlichny. The Ukrainian underground samizdat publication, Ukrainsky Visnyk, has named Svitlichny as one of several intellectuals whom the KGB is trying to discredit.

Eight other arrests were reportedly made in Lvov, including former TV journalist, Vycheslav Chornovil. Chornovil, in his 30's, was first arrested in 1967 after he had compiled and circulated as samizdat a documented account of KGB methods used in mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in the mid-1960's.

Also believed arrested in Lvov was another literary critic, Ivan Dzyuba. Dzyuba was a cosigner, along with Chornovil and author Boris Antonenko-Davydovich of a letter dated 21 September 1971 (which circulated in samizdat) written in defense of Valentyn Moroz. Moroz, historian and author, was arrested in June 1970 and in November of the same year was sentenced to nine years imprisonment, the period to be divided between prison and enforced labor in a "strict regime" camp, and to five years exile --- a total fourteen years. Moroz, was charged with "writing several literary-publicist

articles on questions dealing with the preservation of the nation's cultural and spiritual values" (i.e., Ukrainian nationalism).

16 January: The KGB raided the homes of nine Moscow dissidents to confiscate sacks of books and papers which they said "were needed for an investigation in progress." Reliable Moscow sources said the KGB took over 3,000 documents, articles, clippings, tapes and booklets, including a copy of George Orwell's "1984" from the apartment of Pyotr Yakir. Yakir, a young historian regarded by the KGB as the leader of a loose group of dissidents who call themselves "The Democratic Movement," has been quoted as saying that the KGB told him that only the reputation of his late father had protected him from arrest for "anti-Soviet deeds." Yakir's father, Major-General Iona Yakir, was liquidated in Stalin's 1937 purge of the General Staff and then "rehabilitated" under Khrushchev.

18 January: An article in Izvestiya attacked Valeriy Chalidze, cofounder with Andrey Sakharov of the Soviet "Committee for Human Rights," for his allegedly "nefarious" meeting in Moscow with U.S. Congressman James Scheuer. This was the first critical comment on Chalidze to have appeared in the Soviet press; the article merely referred to him as "a certain V.N. Chalidze."

19 January: Reports of additional arrests and searches in the Ukraine gave rise to speculation that the militant stand assumed by the Ukrainian Communist Party against Ukrainian nationalists may have triggered a nation-wide crackdown. The Ukrainian KGB chief, Fedorchuk, is reportedly one of those in the Ukrainian leadership who favors harsh treatment of the voices of dissent, whatever their origins.

Among those whose homes were searched 19 January was Ukrainian author Viktor P. Nekrasov, who first gained fame with a popular World War II novel, "In the Trenches of Stalingrad." Nekrasov came under sharp attack in 1963 for favorable comments he made on life in the West in an account he wrote of his travels to the U.S., Italy and France, "Both Sides of the Ocean."

19 January: In Moscow, the KGB took in for questioning and detained mathematician Yuri Shikhanovich and astronomer Kronid Lyubarsky. Other arrests were

reportedly feared. Shikhanovich's name appeared among the names of 95 Soviet mathematicians who in March 1968 signed a petition protesting the arrest of poet and mathematician Yesenin-Volpin, a strong supporter of the human rights movement who had been incarcerated in a mental institution.

February: ??

WASHINGTON POST
16 January 1972

U.S. Recalls Attacked Aide From Russia

<p>A U.S. Air Force attache reportedly assaulted by Russians at an airport is being reassigned to the United States, the Pentagon said yesterday.</p> <p>A Defense Department spokesman said Capt. Elmer L. Alderfer, 33, was enroute from the Soviet Union.</p> <p>He is being assigned to the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. His parents live in Telford, Pa.</p> <p>The State Department said</p>	<p>Friday that Alderfer, an assistant attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was attacked by more than a dozen Russians, Jan. 5, at the Riga airport. At the time, Alderfer was visiting Riga on a trip approved by Soviet officials, the State Department said.</p> <p>The U.S. Embassy in Moscow on Jan. 6 orally "strongly protested this violation of diplomatic immunity," a State Department spokesman said.</p> <p>The embassy's complaint, citing the failure of local authorities to prevent the assault on the U.S. officer at a</p>	<p>public airport and the failure to arrest the attackers, was rejected by the Soviet foreign ministry pending investigation, said.</p> <p>The spokesman said another protest was lodged with the Soviet Embassy in Washington Jan. 10, but no reply has been received.</p> <p>He said the United States considers the incident serious and does not intend to let it drop. (More often, however, the attache is retained in his post until such matters are resolved.)</p>
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NEW YORK TIMES
16 January 1972

SCHEUER DECRIES OUSTER BY SOVIET

By ALVIN SHUSTER

LONDON, Jan. 15—Representative James H. Scheuer, the Bronx Democrat expelled from the Soviet Union on the ground of "improper activities," said here tonight that his ouster was "pointless and irrational." The step apparently was designed to discourage Americans from private contacts with Soviet citizens.

Mr. Scheuer, who arrived here from Leningrad, denied that he had carried any material for distribution in the Soviet Union and that he had sought to encourage Soviet Jews to

emigrate to Israel. He said he had three or four meetings with scientists who had been denied the right to emigrate but that such meetings "are not against the law."

"If you call sympathetic concern with the plight of such people as subversive activity, then I am guilty," he added in a telephone interview from his hotel.

Visited With Study Groups

Mr. Scheuer, who represents the heavily Jewish 22d Congressional District in the Bronx, went to the Soviet Union as a member of a Congressional study group for a two-week

tour of educational institutions. He remained there in a private capacity after the official tour ended Wednesday.

Explaining his private contacts, Mr. Scheuer said that he had carried with him the names of six or seven Jewish scientists denied permission to emigrate to Israel and the names of those Jews jailed after Leningrad trials last year at which they were accused of having plotted to hijack a Soviet airliner.

He said the names had been provided by several sources in New York, including Leonid Rigerman, who emigrated to the United States from the Soviet Union last year after a long struggle, claiming American citizenship.

Police in Moscow Detain Rep. Scheuer for an Hour

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 12—Soviet police detained an American congressman for nearly an hour tonight after telling his Soviet hosts they were looking for a criminal disguised as a foreigner.

The congressman, Rep. James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.), said after the incident he was sure it was no accident, though he couldn't say for certain why he was detained. The most likely reason, Scheuer said, was his interest in the status of Jews in the Soviet Union.

Scheuer was having dinner tonight in the apartment of Prof. Alexander Lerner, a Soviet Jew and computer specialist who lost both his job and his Communist Party membership when he applied for permission to emigrate to Israel.

Until last October, Dr. Lerner served as director of the department of large-scale systems in Moscow's Institute of Control Sciences and was also professor at the Science and Technical University.

It was the first time that a visiting U.S. congressman was detained in the Soviet capital. The incident coincided with the opening in Washington of a Soviet arts and crafts exhibition at the Corcoran Gallery. (Story on Page E1.)

It recalled the earlier coincidence of Yale professor Frederick Barghoorn's arrest in Moscow in October, 1963, at a time, like the present, when there were signs of imminent improvement in Soviet-American relations.

[In Washington, State Department officials refused to comment on the incident, saying they were awaiting details from Moscow.]

According to the congressmen, two policemen appeared at Lerner's apartment at about 8:30 p.m. tonight and said they

Soviet desperado in the neighborhood in the guise of a foreigner," in Scheuer's words.

The police added that they would therefore have to take into custody anyone looking like a foreigner. Scheuer said he was with a group of about half a dozen Jewish scientists, and he was the only obvious outsider.

"I showed them my Diners' Club card, but that didn't impress them," Scheuer said in a light-hearted mood afterward.

"I showed them my American Express card, but that didn't impress them either. I showed them my air travel card stamped 'international' I told them with that, Kosygin could fly to Buenos Aires, but even that didn't impress them. I showed them my congressional I.D. card, with my picture on it, and they said, 'oh, artists can make those up.'"

Scheuer said his passport would identify him beyond any doubt as a United States congressman, but that he had left it in his hotel room. The police, he reported, said they would have to take him to the hotel to find the passport.

Instead, according to Scheuer, the police took him and the 26-year-old son of his host (who speaks English) to "the pokey"—a neighborhood police station.

"They put us in a little room with one light bulb, Scheuer said by telephone tonight. "We were in there about half an hour, 40 minutes. All of it up to now had been informal, not too serious. Now, this first lieutenant drew himself up and made a speech—now it's a United Nations' session, and he asked Vladimir (the 26-year-old) to translate every sentence to me.

"I wish to inform the congressman," he said, pausing to let him translate that much, "that we have made extensive inquiries. We have found that there is a group of congress-

men visiting Moscow. We have found that there is a Congressman Scheuer from New York.

And we think you are that Scheuer."

With that, the police agreed to release him, Scheuer said. They offered to take him and Young Vladimir back to the Lerner apartment, but the congressman decided he should first see someone from the U.S. Embassy here. The police had allowed him to call the embassy from the station.

So the police got Scheuer a taxi, he related, and went with Vladimir to his hotel, where several embassy personnel were waiting.

After telling their story, the two intended to return to their dinner at the Lerner apartment, but the police again picked up Vladimir "to grill him about what he told the Americans," Scheuer said. "I waited for him another hour," Scheuer added. But he did eventually get back to Lerner's apartment, from which he talked to this correspondent by telephone.

For once, the Lerner had some exciting news to convey to their friends in Chicago.

Scheuer said he didn't see how the arrest could have been an accident. The arresting officers had sufficient evidence that he was an American congressman, he said. "If they didn't know what that meant, they could have picked up the phone and called headquarters to ask," he added.

He noted that he had raised the question of the position of Jews in Soviet society in several meetings with Soviet officials during the past 10 days. He is here with a House education subcommittee. He also had one three-hour discussion on the Jewish question with Alexander B. Chakovsky, editor of the important weekly Literary Gazette, and himself a Jew. All these discussions were relaxed and friend-

NEW YORK TIMES
19 January 1972

Tighter Soviet Internal Security Is Seen

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 18—Western diplomats believe that the Soviet Union is tightening internal security and seeking to shore up ideological vigilance among Soviet citizens to offset possible side effects of its policy of relaxing tensions with the West.

They cite indications that Soviet security agencies are engaged in a campaign against domestic dissidents, especially those having contact with foreigners.

Some diplomats consider this no more than one of the periodic "vigilance campaigns" that the Kremlin sanctions from time to time. Others suspect that the security agencies may be intending to deal a more crippling blow to major elements of the dissident movement, which has functioned here for several years.

Conviction, Arrests, Raids

Since a call in December to Communist party members for greater vigilance against the dangers of subversion and hostile propaganda from foreign travelers, residents and radio stations, there have been the following developments:

Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a 29-year-old dissident, was convicted Jan. 5 of anti-Soviet agitation and propagandizing and given the maximum sentence, seven years in prison and five in exile. His summary one-day trial was used by the newspaper Vechernaya Moskva to warn of the dangers of having contact with foreign correspondents here.

Thirteen Ukrainians were arrested last week in Kiev and Lvov for nationalist activities. The 13 included Vyacheslav Chornovil, a journalist jailed in 1967 after having prepared an account of political trials in the Ukraine, and two literary critics, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba.

The homes of nine Moscow dissidents were raided by security police Jan. 14 as part of an investigation of suspected "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." More than 3,000 documents, articles, clippings, letters, tapes and booklets, including a copy of Orwell's "1984," were reported taken from the apartment of Pyotr Yakir, a historian regarded by the police as the leader of the loose group of dissidents who call themselves the Democratic Movement.

Further Arrests Feared

Two of the nine, Yuri Shikhanovich, a mathematician, and Kronid Lyubarsky, an astronomer employed at the Chornogolovka Institute of Solid State Physics near Moscow, were called in subsequently for questioning and detained by the K.G.B., or secret police. Dissidents say that they fear further arrests.

Agents in Kiev searched the apartment of Viktor P. Nekrasov, a noted Ukrainian author. He gained fame with a popular World War II novel, "In the Trenches of Stalingrad," and was sharply attacked in 1963 for favorable comments on life in the West in a book, "Both Sides of the Ocean," his account of a visit to the United States, Italy, and France.

In an attack on the activities of visiting American Congressmen, the Government newspaper Izvestia charged yesterday that Representative James H. Scheuer, Democrat of the Bronx, had been following instructions of the "American Secret Service." It contended that four intellectuals whom he met were "the kind of people relied upon by those across the ocean" who plan to create subversive organizations "the aim of which is to incite Soviet citizens to come out against the existing regime and Soviet Government." The Soviet Union expelled Mr. Scheuer last Friday, accusing him of "improper

activities."

3 Lost Their Jobs

The four men cited by Izvestia were V. N. Chalidze, a physicist who is a member of the small Soviet Committee on Human Rights, and three Jewish intellectuals who have lost their jobs since they applied to emigrate to Israel, Aleksandr Y. Lerner, a computer specialist, and his son, Vladimir, and Viktor G. Polsky, an electronics specialist who formerly headed a laboratory.

Diplomatic observers emphasized that the steps taken recently were still very minor compared with the purges of the thirties or even later crackdowns, and Moscow intellectuals insist that the general atmosphere is a far cry from the Stalinist period.

Nonetheless, the latest actions are widely regarded as the most pronounced internal security tightening in at least a year and perhaps longer. The last notable crackdown was the trial in Leningrad in 1970 of Jews and others accused of having conspired to hijack a Soviet commercial airliner.

The latest wave of police action was preceded in November by a speech by the Ukrainian party leader, Pyotr Shelest, urging party workers not to let the policy of détente weaken their ideological vigilance.

There was also an article last month in the Communist party monthly that urged party faithful not to slacken the ideological struggle with the west because of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The article said Western countries sought to use détente to try to undermine socialism through political and economic means and intelligence operations.

Jewish activists, however, apparently have been exempted from arrests or raids in keeping with the comparatively moderate policy of allowing many Jews to emigrate after bureaucratic delays provided that they do not take away needed skills.

Vladimir Bukovsky's Harsh Sentence Was the First Sign of . . .

A New Soviet Crackdown on Political Dissent

By Robert G. Kaiser

MOSCOW—The unseemly odor of a political police crackdown is in the frosty Moscow air this January. A series of arrests, harassments and articles in the official press have provided a steady stream of "crackdown" stories for the Western news organizations here—the single most attentive audience to the confusing spectacle of political dissent in the Soviet Union.

Abrupt changes in the political temperature recur periodically here. Old hands can remember dozens of them. For newer observers the process is bewildering and fascinating. Bewildering because it is so hard to know what such a crackdown really means. Fascinating because it revives one of the basic questions about this society: How does it change, and why?

By actual count, the current crackdown has directly touched less than 35 people (assuming its full dimensions are known, which is problematical.) Nineteen of these were arrested in the Ukraine on charges of nationalist agitation, perhaps in connection with the arrest of a Belgian tourist in the Ukraine at the same time.

The others affected by the crackdown are mostly Moscow dissidents, friends of Pyotr Yakir, the 43-year-old son of a Soviet general killed in a Stalin purge, and now Moscow's most active political renegade. Yakir's colleague Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to seven years in prison and five more in exile,

"Abrupt changes in the political temperature recur periodically here. Old hands can remember dozens of them. For newer observers, the process is bewildering and fascinating. Bewildering because it is so hard to know what such a crackdown really means. Fascinating because it revives one of the basic questions about this society: How does it change, and why?"

a harsh punishment which was the first sign of the new crackdown. The apartments of Yakir and seven friends were searched. The Moscow correspondent of the London Times and his wife were jostled and detained by police after visiting Yakir in his flat.

Two other Soviet intellectuals identified with political non-conformity were attacked in the Soviet press, Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, the writer, and Valery N. Chalidze, a physicist and an organizer of the unofficial Committee for Human Rights. Both attacks were unusual. Solzhenitsyn has been ignored by the Soviet press for most of a year, and Chalidze had hitherto been immune from public criticism.

All these events coincide with an increased number of supplications to the party faithful to maintain their vigilance against subversive foreign ideas. For example, an important party ideologist, V. Bolshakov, wrote recently in Pravda that "the actions of the counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968 . . . were an attempt to carry out a new tactic in the struggle of imperialism against socialism . . . a tactic known as the 'bridge-building' policy." Western bridge-builders, Bolshakov added, "hope it will be possible to export counter-revolution together with industrial commodities."

The crackdown plus the vigilance campaign as given rise to a theory, popular in several of the biggest Western chanceries in Moscow, that the Soviet leaders are reminding their people that talk of detente in foreign policy does not mean any loosening of controls at home. It is a plausible but untestable theory.

One Westerner with many years experience says it is wrong to look for such an elaborate explanation. "Even in the freest days under Khrushchev, such things occasionally happened, just to remind people that the KGB was still in business," he said.

In the recent crackdown, only the published attacks on Solzhenitsyn and Chalidze could have had a wide impact of this kind. Curiously, a very different signal has probably made a much greater impression on Moscow intellectuals this month—a signal from a brilliant movie called "Andrei Rublev."

This film, made six years ago by Andrei Tarkovsky, was shown with great success in Paris, but was banned here until last month. It is a dark and gloomy chronicle of the life of Rublev, an icon painter of the 15th century. In a style reminiscent of Ingmar Bergman at his best, Tarkovsky draws a vivid and woefully depressing picture of medieval Russia, its cruel princes and wild Tartar invaders.

No reason was given for banning the film, or for releasing it now. The Soviets recently refused to let the movie be exported to Yugoslavia, a hint that it still troubles them. There is much in the film that would trouble even the most orthodox Soviet. Its negative view of life in medieval Russia, its number-

ous references to the arbitrary and silly use of state power, Rublev's tormented debate with himself about an artist's role in society. Perhaps most troubling, the film is an individual and unusual work, a piece of creativity unstilted by party line or official dicta. Muscovites have been flocking to see it, and the film is said to be opening all over the country.

HOW DOES one movie—or one small wave of arrests and harassments—affect the spirit of a Soviet citizen? For an outsider living here, that is the most intriguing but most unanswerable of questions. The party ideologists apparently fear something akin to the "Prague Spring" of 1968, but what could bring that sort of phenomenon to the Soviet Union? What are the signals that a Soviet intellectual feels most strongly, that can make him change his ways of thinking and living?

Recent Soviet history suggests that the one really powerful signal is terror. Stalin kept "foreign" influences out of the Soviet Union by enforcing appalling penalties on those who fell under their sway. Soviet art, music and literature shriveled to the point of death under Stalin, because artists were afraid to challenge the official standards.

The terror ended in the early 1950s, and by the late 1950s the poetry readings which gave birth to the dissident movement had begun. Pasternak finished "Doctor Zhivago," Solzhenitsyn published "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," Voznesensky and Yev-

The Soviet Union is not shutting itself off from the outside world. Intourist, the state tourist organization, is working hard to reverse a decline in the number of tourists here in 1971 . . . The Soviet government is courting other countries ardently, and shows every indication of a keen desire to be admired by outsiders . . ."

tushenko brought life back into Russian poetry, a few directors partially revived the Russian theater and movies.

The mood has relaxed and tightened in turn, but Stalinism has not reappeared. New boundaries of permissible behavior have been drawn, far outside the tiny circle imposed by Stalin (though still woefully short of anything that would be acceptable in the West). Soviet intellectuals have occupied the

new territory that has been opened to them. "Andrei Rublev" seems proof that the Russian creative impulse is alive and strong, if hidden much of the time. It is hard to see how the political police could restore the old sterility and silence—unless the Stalinist terror was restored too.

The KGB and the government can control the most obvious manifestations of intellectual life. They can ban books, movies and plays, jam foreign broadcasts. By threatening to deprive people of jobs and privileges, they can also control open expressions of unacceptable opinions. They are doing all of these regularly. But this is not the same as the complete subservience of the intellectual class, which the terror did maintain.

Without complete subservience, some degree of courageous (if foolhardy) open dissidence seems inevitable. Even a foreigner can quickly learn that numerous Soviet intellectuals are frustrated by censorship and a heavy-handed bureaucracy. This correspondent has had several startling experiences with responsible Soviet officials, trusted members of the Communist Party, who indicated unhappiness with censorship or controls on foreign travel. The police are as unpopular a group among the Soviet intelligentsia as they are with the American intellectual left. If thoughts like these are widespread, a tiny fraction of those who share them are likely to act eventually on their beliefs. Such action is dissidence in the contemporary Soviet Union.

A SOVIET citizen contemplating active participation in the dissident movement might well be deterred when he hears about Vladimir Bukovsky's harsh prison sentence, or the raids on the apartments of Pyotr Yakir and his friends. Probably because of arrests and stiff prison sentences in the past, the dissident movement is smaller today than it was in the mid-1960s.

At the same time some startling things have happened in this country. Jews have conducted successful sit-ins in official offices. Scientists' protests have forced the release of a prominent biologist from a mental hospital. Alexander Solzhenitsyn lives openly and is writing a new book.

The Soviet Union is not shutting itself off from the outside world. Intourist, the state tourist organization, is working hard to reverse a decline in the number of tourists here in 1971, a decline attributed to Western reaction against Soviet treatment of Jews and perhaps dissidents. The Soviet government is courting other countries ardently, and shows every indication of a keen desire to be admired by outsiders. The tolerance of

CPYRGHT

Solzhenitsyn and the decision to permit substantial Jewish emigration seem to be evidence that the Kremlin now responds to foreign opinion in a way Stalin would have laughed at.

None of this is liberalism. From a liberal point of view it may not even be hopeful. Soviet intellectuals may be willing to live within the current boundaries, permitted an occasional "Andreï Rublev" and their private frustrations, but nothing more. Each year, no doubt, a few will be unwilling, will join the active dissidents, and will probably

end in jail. There isn't even a hint that the great mass of citizens cares about censorship, foreign travel or civil rights.

Brezhnev and his colleagues may have achieved a new status quo—ahead of Stalin's, well behind Khrushchev's at his most liberal, and by all appearances stable. Perhaps its susceptibility to foreign pressure is a weakness that will lead to change, but that is only speculation. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to confirm that no amount of foreign disapproval could dissuade the men in the Kremlin when they are really afraid.

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February 1972

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY: BIOGRAPHIC OUTLINE

- 1943: Born; parents were respected Communist Party members.
- 1960: Expelled from Moscow High School No.59 where, in his senior year, he published Martyr, an underground magazine of humorous satire in protest against the repression and injustices of the Soviet system.
- 1961-1962: Enrolled at Moscow University and studied biophysics for a year in spite of an official ban against his ever studying in a Soviet university. When his identity was eventually learned, he was expelled and then worked as handyman at a museum, while continuing to meet with a group of his contemporaries for evening discussions against the system they all opposed. (This group is considered the forerunner for the present day dissident movement.)
- 1962: Organized illegal art exhibition featuring works of proscribed artists. When exhibition was ordered closed, Bukovsky escaped arrest by joining archaeological expedition to Siberia for six months.
- Early 1963: Returned to Moscow and worked as computer programmer.
- May 1963: Arrested by KGB and charged with having in his possession two copies of the book, The New Class, by Milovan Djilas. He was sent to Serbsky Psychiatric Institute where he was declared insane.
- Dec 1963: Transferred to prison asylum in Leningrad.
- Feb 1965: Released and returned to Moscow where he again became involved in the dissident movement.
- Dec 1965: Arrested and sent to Serbsky Institute for organizing demonstration demanding an open trial for writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel.
- Aug 1966: Released.
- Jan 1967: Arrested for organizing demonstration on behalf of Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov. Convicted and sentenced to three years in the Borr labor camp

in Voronezhskaya district, 300 miles south of Moscow.

Jan 1970: Released, and in poor health, including heart murmur and rheumatic ailments.

Mar 1971: Arrested and held incommunicado, part of the time in Serbsky Institute, for sending abroad an open letter asking that Western psychiatrists investigate Soviets' use of mental hospitals to detain dissident intellectuals, and for his continued contacts with foreign journalists.

Jan 1972: At one-day trial, Bukovsky was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," and given the maximum twelve-year sentence under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code: two years in prison, five years in a labor camp and five years in exile (or enforced residence in a remote area designated by Soviet authorities).

* * * * *

20 Jan 1972: Andrei Sakharov wrote Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev requesting Bukovsky's release. Pointing out that the trial had been closed and the defense prevented from calling witnesses, Sakharov said that everyone who knew of Bukovsky's activities "justifiably assumes that the real reason for the extremely strict sentence was his self-sacrificing struggle for human rights," and that "healthy forces in the leadership of the country and among the people are concerned. . ."

WASHINGTON POST
6 January 1972

Russian Dissident Gets Prison, Exile

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 5—A Moscow court tonight sentenced Vladimir Bukovsky, a prominent Soviet dissident, to seven years in a "strict regimen corrective labor colony" and five additional years in exile. It was one of the harshest sentences ever given to a well-known member of the tiny and shrinking dissident community.

Bukovsky was charged with "activity aimed at undermining and weakening Soviet power" under article 70 of the Soviet criminal code. A seven-year prison sentence is the maximum provided by this statute. The court ruled tonight that Bukovsky should spend two years in jail, five in a labor camp and then five more in exile, probably in some place like Siberia.

Bukovsky, 28, has already spent nearly seven years in Soviet prisons and mental hospitals for past political transgressions. He now suffers from heart trouble. He has always displayed his opposition to the Soviet regime openly, sometimes brazenly. He also cultivated the friendship of Western journalists, something Soviet officials constantly discourage.

His severe sentence coincides with an increasingly popular theory in Moscow's

Western diplomatic community. According to the theory, the Soviet Union is beginning a new crackdown on domestic opposition as a complement to Moscow's current diplomatic offensive abroad. One Westerner called this "an opening to the outside world protected by tightening the screws at home."

The theory assumes that the Soviets fear the domestic impact of increased contact with foreigners, even on an official level. It is easier to postulate such a theory than to test it.

Outsiders have not been able to perceive any significant degree of opposition to the regime here. Figures like Bukovsky seem to be rare exceptions, not representatives of any large movement. But outsiders are in no position to judge the state of Soviet society.

According to Tass, the government news agency, the prosecutor in the Bukovsky case today accused him of trying to smuggle a printing press into the Soviet Union, of "disseminating slanderous lies about the social and government system of the U.S.S.R.," and of trying to persuade two soldiers to disobey orders and help him. Tass said Bukovsky "did not deny the facts concerning the actions for which he was tried" when he addressed the court.

According to friends, Bukov-

ski told the court that he only regretted he had done "so little" for freedom in the Soviet Union while he was last out of prison—from January, 1970, until last April, when he was arrested on the charges which led to today's one-day trial. Western newsmen were barred from the trial, which Tass described as open.

The dissident movement of which Bukovsky has been a fixture apparently reached the apex of its influence after the 1965 trials of two writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. Their seven- and five-year prison terms aroused widespread indignation and an unprecedented—though still tiny—amount of public protest.

But those protests (Bukovsky organized one, and went to jail for it) were to no avail. Later criticisms of the invasion of Czechoslovakia were similarly fruitless. By their own admission, the dissidents lost much open support, and in the last year or so they have openly bemoaned their fate and their failures.

More Cautious

One prominent opponent of the regime said not long ago that people who might have joined a protest or signed a petition five years ago are more cautious now.

"They see that petitions don't have much effect," this person said.

One group of dissenters remains active and has had success—the Jews. Perhaps as many as 12,000 Jews were allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel during 1971, more than in all previous years combined. "The Jews have an advantage," one dissident noted. "They have a goal to work for"—i.e. emigration to Israel.

And if the dissidents have lost some following and many leaders, they have two prominent and apparently permanent allies who, so far at least, seem beyond the reach of the police authorities. They are Andrei Sakharov, a distinguished physicist known as father of the Russian hydrogen bomb, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize-winning novelist.

Sakharov is founder of the unofficial committee for human rights. He regularly circulates letters of protest against arbitrary government actions. He has several times protested on Bukovsky's behalf, and he was barred from the courtroom today.

Solzhenitsyn takes no known active role in dissident affairs, but he has become a symbol of the Russian intellectual who endures his government rather than supporting it. His every public utterance is now widely reported in the West, and then by short-wave radio back to the Soviet Union.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 January 1972

Soviet court deals harshly with dissident

BY DEAN HILLS

Moscow—A Soviet court found Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a civil rights activist, guilty of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" yesterday and handed him the maximum possible sentence—seven years in prison and labor camp followed by five

years' exile in Siberia.

The sentence, which followed a speedy, one-day trial, is extraordinarily harsh, even for dissident cases. It carried an ominous message to other like Mr. Bukovsky who openly criticize the system.

There were few details available yesterday regarding the 12-hour trial, except for short official versions by Tass, the official news agency.

Bukovsky's supporters gathered outside the courthouse, in an

industrial section of southeast Moscow, but they were refused entrance. Among them was Andrei Sakharov, the nuclear physicist who helped build the bomb and the co-founder of an unofficial human rights committee.

The only details of Mr. Bukovsky's own statements available yesterday were his closing words to the court. In a reference to his human-rights activities between the time he was released from a previous sentence in 1970 and his arrest on the new charges last March, he reportedly said:

"I regret very much that in one year, three months, and three days, I did very little."

Mr. Bukovsky, 29, who has been confined several times to various Russian mental hospitals himself, campaigned particularly fervently against the practice of incarcerating political prisoners in such institutions. He gave interviews to Western correspondents and wrote letters to Western authorities on the question.

He said during his brief peri-

od of freedom that, whatever the official charges against him, it would be for this that Soviet authorities would arrest him.

His friends said yesterday that excerpts from the filmed interview he gave the Columbia Broadcasting System's former Moscow correspondent, Bill Cole, were shown in court.

The woman prosecuting attorney, Aza Bobrushko, also cited as evidence against him favorable references to Mr. Bukovsky in broadcasts by the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Mr. Bukovsky apparently withstood the trial well, the friends said. But his sister, Olga, fainted at one point. His mother, Mrs. Nina Bukovsky, was in "very bad condition" after the sentence was pronounced they said. Mrs. Bukov-

sky has written a series of appeals to leaders here and throughout the world in an attempt to free her son.

The article of the Russian Federation Criminal Code under which Mr. Bukovsky was tried prohibits "agitation or propaganda aimed at subverting or weakening Soviet power" and the preparation or possession of literature containing "libelous fabrications" against the Soviet system.

The specific acts with which he was charged, according to Tass, seemed to be, in Western terms, not so much acts as thoughts:

1. "Bukovsky was going to use the assistance of one of his foreign acquaintances (to) smuggle a portable printshop into the country." (Private citizens are not allowed to own any kind of duplication equipment in the Soviet Union).

2. Two Soviet military officers testified that the defendant had tried to persuade them to "betray their oath of enlistment." The officers testified, according to Tass, that he had "asked them to disobey orders from the command and persuade the privates to do the same" after meeting them in a Moscow cafe. There was no explanation of what kind of orders were involved.

3. There were, said Tass, "several foreign citizens with whom Bukovsky had meetings with illegal aims in view."

The single concrete charge against him mentioned by Tass was that he disseminated "anti-Soviet materials" published by the People's Labor Union, an anti-Soviet Russian emigre organization based in Western Europe.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
6 January 1972

CPYRGHT

Why One Soviet Became a Dissident

By Frank Starr

WASHINGTON—They threw the book at Vladimir Bukovsky on Wednesday—putting him away for 12 years.

If he serves it all, as it seems likely he will, the longest stretch of freedom he will have known between the ages of 20 and 42 will have been 15 months.

His reaction: "I very much regret that in one year, three months, and three days, I did very little."

Violated Criminal Code

What this 29-year-old son of the Soviet intelligentsia had done, according to official accounts, was to violate a broadly worded article of the criminal code prohibiting "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" by seeking to smuggle portable printing equipment into the Soviet Union, persuading acquaintances to smuggle information abroad, and trying to enlist two army officers to help him smuggle it.

He took seriously the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights providing for free flow of information across national boundaries and the Soviet constitution's article 125, which reads:

"In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the Socialist system, the citizens of the U. S. S. R. are guaranteed by law freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings, freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

"These civil rights are insured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities, and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights."

Vladimir Bukovsky made clear the importance of these provisions of the constitution to him, and how he came to

be where he is now, in a tape-recorded interview with me when I had the good fortune to know him well during his 15 months of freedom. That freedom ended with his arrest last March.

"For my generation—10 to 12 years old when Stalin died—he [Stalin] was the personification of Soviet rule," Bukovsky had said. "We were raised in this spirit by the newspapers, our parents, the schools, and by our total environment.

Strong Deification Concept

"Even tho it was never said outright, there was a religious feeling toward Stalin, and the concept of his deification was strong. We children, for example, saw a mysterious aspect in the signatures of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin—an otherworldly power.

"Try, then, to imagine Stalin's sudden disappearance and the concept of his deification that

God is mortal. There was great confusion even among those people whom we had grown accustomed to regarding as strong people—our teachers and parents.

"They were bewildered; they did not know what to say or how to behave. Teachers sobbed during lessons and our parents cried their hearts out at home. All this was perfectly sincere, not the least artificial. The whole country was united in a desperate feeling of catastrophe.

"Just imagine, after this profound experience of our childhood, the death of a god. Literally two or three years later came the unmasking of that god. And suddenly it was revealed that this was not god but a terrible monster; a Moloch who had devoured millions of people, and had irretrievably perverted everything.

"Just as before, when Stalin and Soviet rule and Communism symbolized to us everything that is beautiful, to which everyone owed allegiance, now by that analogy the image of Stalin and the understanding of Communism and Soviet rule in our minds became the symbols of evil, force, and destruction. This occurred quite mechanically, as a matter of course, and it occurred simultaneously in millions of minds.

A System of Lies

"Naturally, we who were young at that time, 15 or so, being impulsive and craving generalizations, came to the firm conclusion that the whole system was oppressive and evil, a system of lies and falsehoods.

"It turned out that all those who understood this had lied all their lives, starting with the state and ending with one's own friends. It turned out that the whole structure was by no means mankind's centuries-old dream. It turned out everything had been fabricated. It turned out that nature, people, state, and society had been raped. All those who contradicted were eliminated. It became obvious to us that there could not be any truth or justice in general in such a system and that it had to be changed radically.

"A second fact which I regard as a turning point was the rebellion in Hungary in 1956. Coming so quickly after the unmasking of our god, this caused a quick and acute reaction."

By 1957, when he was 15, he was already in a spontaneous, and therefore illegal, organization—a loose association of youngsters who thought alike but

never got beyond recruiting one another.

Two years later he saw the Soviet punitive system in action firsthand for the first time. He edited a satirical magazine in school, unbeknownst to officials, called *Martyr*—a play on words. *Uchenik* in Russian means student; *Muchenik*, the name of the magazine, means martyr.

The Communist Party Central Committee building was near the school, and news of the magazine reached the committee quickly. The director of the school was fired immediately. An effort to gain a general condemnation of the magazine from the student body failed, but Bukovsky was expelled.

"Stew in Laborers' Caldron"

He was interviewed by officials, who told him to change his views, but he refused even to say he would. So he was told that instead of being permitted to study he would have to "stew in the laborers' caldron to understand what life is all about."

Bukovsky, whose father is an official writer and confirmed Communist and whose mother was a journalist for Radio Moscow but who since has defended her son, was deeply affected by this experience. He was already on his way to becoming a hardened, devoted leader of what would eventually be the Soviet Union's first spontaneous political opposition movement.

In June, 1963, he was arrested for making and distributing copies of the Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas' book, "The New Class," and was committed to a Leningrad mental hospital until February, 1965.

The next December he was arrested again for organizing a demonstration against the arrest of writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. He was sent to psychiatric wards again until August, 1966. In January, 1967, he was arrested for organizing another street demonstration in defense of those who'd been arrested for compiling an account of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and was sent to labor camps until January, 1970.

At that trial, Bukovsky made a final plea that has become a landmark in the dissident movement. Speaking for two hours, Bukovsky argued "with a tremendous sense of personal dignity" and "with legal erudition" his right to the actions of which he was accused.

Bukovsky concluded by saying, "I absolutely do not repent of having organized the demonstration. I believe it has done its job and, when I am free

again, I shall organize other demonstrations—always, of course, like this one, in perfect conformity with the law."

Works Hard After Release

After his release, he did indeed work hard, seeing as his chief objective informing the world and the Soviet people in as much detail as possible of the use of psychiatric institutions against dissidents, of every instance of official legal abuse. According to the authoritative but clandestine journal of the democratic movement, *Chronicle of Current Events*, he succeeded just before his arrest last March in sending to the West clinical findings in a series of psychiatric cases involving dissidents.

During his 15 months of freedom, I knew him well. He was a remarkably optimistic and cheerful young man but at the same time intensely devoted to his own objectives and courageous beyond the limit of many of his associates and beyond the belief of many of his foreign friends.

Muscular, square-jawed, and tough, Bukovsky was always polite, sometimes brusquely businesslike. In the 15 months I knew him he never once asked for anything for himself, as many Russians who saw the opportunity for otherwise unavailable consumer goods did.

During that 15 months he told Bill Cole, an American television correspondent, in a clandestinely filmed interview:

"I am often asked what hope there

"He was a remarkably optimistic and cheerful young man but at the same time intensely devoted to his own objectives."

is for change in this country and how many sympathizers we have. That's an understandable question but a difficult one to answer. First, one must understand the essence of our struggle, which in my opinion, is a struggle with fear, the fear which gripped society in Stalin's time, which still does not subside, and thanks to which there still exists a dictatorial system of oppression. It is against precisely this fear that we concentrate our efforts, and in this struggle the personal example has great significance.

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struggle."

That Bukovsky was tried in the course of one day in a small courtroom on the outskirts of Moscow from which foreign correspondents were barred but fed one-sided accounts thru the official press agency, that he was given the maximum sentence Soviet law will al-

"One Must Struggle"

"I personally did what I believed in, protested when I wanted to. And I am alive. Now I am sitting here, not in prison. I can walk about; I can live. For me and for many people, that is a very important fact. That fact shows that one can struggle, that one must

low—seven years imprisonment followed by five years of exile—where apparently he was not accused of passing secrets but simply "slandorous" information, that Soviet authorities have decided to risk international censure by creating an intellectual martyr must be a measure of the fear they have of him.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
8 January 1972

SOVIET SOCIETY SICK WITH FEAR, SAYS BUKOVSKY

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By DAVID FLOYD

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY, 29, the Russian dissident sentenced to seven years' hard labour on Wednesday for "anti-Soviet activity," turned his final speech into a denunciation of the methods used by the police and judiciary to silence him.

The full text of his speech was smuggled out of court and passed by other dissidents to foreign correspondents in Moscow. "I will never renounce my convictions," he said.

"Under the right given me by Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution, I shall continue to communicate them to all who wish to listen to me.

"I shall fight for legality and justice and, my only regret is that, in the short period during which I was at liberty—one year two months and three days—I succeeded in doing too little for this cause."

Held in jail

Bukovsky was last arrested in March. Since when he has been held mostly in Lefortovo jail, Moscow.

In 1963 he was confined to a mental institution, though later declared sane, and in 1967 he was sentenced to three years in a prison camp.

Whenever he was free he resumed his campaign of criticism of the Soviet régime. He has played a leading part in exposing the Soviet authorities' use of committal to mental hospitals as a means of silencing opponents of the régime.

"Our society is still sick," he told the court on Wednesday. "It is sick with a fear which has come down to us from the Stalin era.

"But the process of the spiritual recovery of our society has already begun and it cannot be stopped."

Bukovsky revealed that the KGB (secret police) had tried to have him certified insane so that there would have been no trial and no publicity.

His opposition to this and public interest in his case made this impossible.

"The investigation department of the KGB very much wanted me to be found not responsible for my actions," Bukovsky told the court, in the Moscow suburb of Lyublino.

"How convenient that would have been. Then there would have been no case against me, no charges to be concocted and no need to prove a crime had been committed. The man is just sick, mad . . ."

There would also have been no sentence as a reprisal against him and he could not have made his final speech to the court.

"They would have tried me in *absentia*, had it not been for the influence of intensive intervention by the public."

Civil rights movement

Bukovsky was presumably referring to the activity on his behalf by the civil rights movement in Russia, in which prominent intellectuals such as Academician Sakharov play an important part. They have kept the outside world aware of the treatment being meted out to Bukovsky and other dissidents.

Bukovsky said that in September he learnt that the medical commission appointed to examine him intended to pronounce him incapable of standing trial.

"It was only on Nov. 5, after pressure had been exerted by the public, that a new medical commission pronounced me fit.

"There you have clear proof of my assertion, which has been called slanderous in this court, that psychiatric reprisals are organised against dissenters on orders of the KGB."

He recalled that this was the second time the authorities had tried to have him certified insane.

"And so," he continued, "on Nov. 5 I was declared sane, put into prison again and the breaches of legal procedure continued."

Among the breaches of Soviet law with which Bukovsky charged the authorities were:

Police persecution.

Provocation in prison.

Refusal of defence lawyer.

"Before my arrest there was constantly a 'tail' on me. I was followed, threatened with murder and one of the people following me lost his self-control sufficiently to threaten me with his

It was after Bukovsky complained about this that the police called for an inquiry into his "psychological condition."

Stool pigeon

He said: "The police put a stool pigeon into the cell with me—a certain Trofimov—who admitted to me that he had been instructed to carry on anti-Soviet conversations with me with the idea of provoking me to make similar remarks.

"For this he was promised early release from prison."

Bukovsky asked to be represented by Mme. Dina Kaminskaya, a Moscow lawyer known for her vigorous defence of other dissidents.

His application was rejected on the ground that Mme. Kaminskaya did not have "access to secret case procedure."

Bukovsky commented: "One wonders what kind of secret case can be involved when I am being tried for anti-Soviet propaganda?"

"In any case where and in what Soviet law is this celebrated 'access' set out? No-where."

WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1972

CPYRGHT

Remembrances of Vladimir Bukovsky, Soviet Dissident

By Anthony Astrachan

THE LAST TIME I saw Vladimir Bukovsky, the Soviet dissident sentenced last Wednesday to seven years in prison and labor camp followed by five years' exile, it was in his Moscow apartment. The heart murmur and rheumatic ailments that he had acquired in Soviet psychiatric clinics had recurred and made him too ill to descend four flights of stairs to greet friends at the street door. Over cups of tea he predicted he would soon be in jail again. And a few weeks later, at the end of March, he was.

But neither illness nor his unending struggle could dim the talents and energy that had enabled him to learn English in a Soviet prison camp. They could not quench his laughter when two secret police teams, one following him and one following a correspondent, met on his street and failed to recognize their common employer. Nothing instilled fear in him or lessened his capacity to love friends, family, women.

I thought, over the tea, that it was a tragic waste for Volodya to spend his whole life fighting a system he could not change significantly in that lifetime. But Bukovsky himself did not regard his life as wasted. Every battle against public fear was its own victory, in his view. Every confirmed report of repression that he helped make public by passing information to Western newsmen in Moscow, prevented a Stalin-like terror from building up on its own secrecy.

He seldom agreed with foreigners who said the dissidents would never be able to bring about significant change in the Soviet system. But he sometimes agreed with observers who said the Soviets treated the dissidents so harshly because they kept the possibility of change alive, and that this alone was more than the authorities could tolerate.

ACCORDING TO his own account, Bukovsky was one of the original literary radicals whose gatherings in Moscow's Mayakovsky Square in 1948 and 1959 were the precursors of today's dissidence. He was then 16.

Bukovsky was sent to psychiatric hospitals in 1963 for organizing an illegal art exhibit and in 1965 for organizing a demonstration protesting the arrest of writers Andrei Sinyasky and Muli Daniel.

Bukovsky was sentenced to three years in prison camp in January, 1967, for organizing a demonstration on behalf of Aleksandr

Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov, two writers who had been arrested after taking up the cause of Sinyasky and Daniel. At that trial, Bukovsky read aloud Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of speech, the press, meeting and assembly, and marching and demonstrating in the streets. Isn't the Constitution the basic law in our country?" he asked.

The trial proceedings were recorded by Pavel Litvinov, a grandson of the prewar Soviet foreign minister, and published in the West. Litvinov was exiled to Siberia for five years in 1968 for protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In Bukovsky's one-



VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY

day trial this year, the authorities made sure no friend of his was making a transcript.

After emerging from prison, Bukovsky got to know foreign correspondents in Moscow. In May, 1970, he gave an interview to Holger Jensen of the Associated Press, which was published in The Washington Post. It was the just detailed account of the treatment of political inmates in Soviet psychiatric hospitals, it also described conditions he had seen in Soviet prison camps.

In June, Bukovsky was interrogated by the Moscow prosecutor's office and warned that he could be put on trial for the interview. Bukovsky replied, "Is that a threat? Don't threaten me. I am not afraid. If one trial is not sufficient, if my last speech was not enough, there will be a second one—and

after my release, more material for a new interview."

Early in 1971, Bukovsky sent abroad appeals to western psychiatrists, asking them to put the forcible hospitalization of political dissidents on the agenda of international psychiatric congresses. But The World Psychiatric Association decided just last month that it had no procedural basis on which it could condemn the Soviets.

In September, 1971, the Soviets showed their real concern over dissident publicity by having the KGB (secret police) interrogate two western correspondents, James R. Peipert of the Associated Press and Andrew Waller of Reuter, as part of the pre-trial investigation of the Bukovsky case. They were told it was a prison offense to reveal anything about the interrogation. This changed the unwritten rules of the journalistic game in Moscow, where the usual actions against foreign correspondents had previously been official warnings, attacks in the official Soviet press, and expulsion.

LEAKS TO DISSIDENTS during Bukovsky's pre-trial investigation indicated that his dealings with the foreign press were part of the Soviet case against him. Vechernaya Moskva said specifically last Thursday that Bukovsky's TV interview with CBS correspondent William Cole was part of the prosecution's case. In that interview, he said, "The essence of the struggle is the struggle against fear in which personal example plays a great role."

Many people may feel that Bukovsky's personal example will be lost, now that he is back in prison. Despite the waste of talent and spirit that his prison sentence means, I am not so sure. I cannot get out of my head an image from a short story that Volodya wrote in his earlier literary days.

The story is about a little boy whose grandmother repeats an old Russian nursery rhyme to him:

*What proud man can lift Tsar-bell
Or move the huge Tsar-cannon's weight
Or be slow to doff his cap
At the Kremlin's holy gate!*

"I always tried to imagine that proud man," Bukovsky wrote. "There he was, standing at the Spassky gate, hands on hips and looking up, with his head flung so far back that his cap almost fell off. And he looked so valiant!"

Bukovsky was seeing himself, his friends

INFORMACIONES, Madrid
12 January 1972

LOS INTELLECTUALES Y EL REGIMEN SOVIETICO

EN estos días, la Prensa internacional se está ocupando del caso, ya típico, de un escritor soviético. Vladimir Bukovski, el escritor en cuestión, es un intelectual de modesto relieve, pero con un signo de rebeldía compartida con otros escritores de su generación. Bukovski ha sido acusado como «culpable de actos tendentes a perjudicar el poder soviético y a debilitarlo», y, en consecuencia, acaba de ser condenado por un Tribunal de Moscú a siete años de privación de libertad, de los cuales los dos primeros habrá de pasarlos en una prisión de rehabilitación, y el resto, como deportado.

El proceso se ha desarrollado sin la presencia de corresponsales de Prensa extranjeros ni tampoco le ha sido permitida la asistencia al mismo al académico soviético Zakharov, físico de prestigio internacional y fundador de un Comité de Derechos del Hombre (no reconocido legalmente), que había intervenido públicamente a favor de Bukovski. Los cargos que pesaban sobre éste, según la agencia Tass, eran haber incitado a los militares a la desobediencia y haber tratado de difundir escritos clandestinos y contestatarios, en contacto con algunos extranjeros.

No vamos a ser nosotros, desde luego, quienes juzguemos nuevamente el caso

Bukovski, pero sí cabe recordar que éste es uno más de la ya larga lista formada por los Sinlanski, Daniel, Tarsis, Babitski, Brodski, Litvinov, Amatrik, Pasternak, Kuznetsov y Solzhenitsyn, entre otros. Como algunos de ellos, Bukovski ha pasado también, antes de esta condena, por clínicas psiquiátricas especiales, ese tratamiento, tan especial también de la Unión Soviética, reservado y ya familiar para los intelectuales «divergentes».

Tampoco pretendemos insistir en estos casos, bastante alreodados y aun desordenados, según las autoridades de Moscú, que no tardan en hablar de «campañas antisoviéticas» occidentales. Lo cierto es, sin em-

ma soviético, pero, como vemos, éste llega a morderse la cola.

Si el grado de libertad creadora — y crítica — de los artistas e intelectuales ha sido siempre un buen criterio para juzgar el índice de «salud» interna de una sociedad, el baremo también debe aplicarse con todo derecho a la U.R.S.S.

Una U. R. S. S., además, actualmente empeñada en la relajación de todas las tensiones con el Oeste europeo. Pero esas tensiones —tampoco hul que olvidarlo— existen, están ahí, como los dispositivos militares, por algo. Las fuerzas militares opuestas entre los dos bloques son, sin duda, la mejor expresión de las tensiones, tanto como una causa de ellas, aunque no la única. Generalmente son las tropas las que vienen detrás de las tensiones, no a la inversa.

Pues bien, si la U.R.S.S. desea con tanto interés que se allanen obstáculos dentro de la gran Europa del Atlántico a los Urales, no parece que baste para ello una simple retirada de soldados. Para que esa Europa quede en calma es preciso que se limen también otros contrastes que están en la base de todas las tensiones. En otras palabras, antes de la gran cita europea a que invita la U. R. S. S. es necesario arreglar la casa por dentro previamente. Y la represión de la «intelligentsia», como de ordinario cualquier represión, dice poco a favor de cómo andan las cosas de puertas adentro en la U. R. S. S.

quieran o no, su actitud acaba siempre volviéndose contra el orden vigente en su país.

El escritor, como el intelectual en general, es muy apreciado socialmente en la Unión Soviética. El pueblo ruso, uno de los que más leen en el mundo, requiere escritores en abundancia. Ese afán cultural fue promovido por el propio sistema, pero que esos casos se siguen produciendo y que los mismos encausados son los primeros en saber que a menudo son utilizados contra su país. Pese a todo, si que habiendo escritores «malditos» en la U. R. S. S. y se sigue hablando de ellos, con lo que el hecho ha pasado a la categoría de un fenómeno habitual y típico. Debe tratarse, por tanto, y —lo que es tal vez más importante— no sólo por atención a la problemática interna de la U. R. S. S.

¿Qué ocurre con los escritores, artistas e intelectuales de talento más o menos «contestatarios» en la U. R. S. S.? La respuesta parece difícil —no siempre se puede reunir, por ejemplo, un buen conjunto de datos—, como tampoco puede hacerse sin matizaciones. Pero, en general, es ya de suyo significativo que todos estos intelectuales, que ordinariamente no renuncian de la ideología socialista, no duden en afrontar las penas y la evidente persecución de que son objeto por parte de las autoridades soviéticas. Lo

NEW YORK TIMES
13 January 1972

'Our Society Is Still Sick'

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By VLADIMIR K. BUKOVSKY

MOSCOW—Before my arrest there was constantly a tail on me. I was pursued, threatened with murder, and one of those following me lost his self-restraint to such an extent that he threatened me with his service weapon.

While under investigation I petitioned for a criminal case to be instituted against these people. I even gave

the number of the official car in which these people traveled around behind me and presented other facts which made it possible for them to be sought out.

However, I never received an answer to this request from those departments to which I sent it.

As far as the detective is concerned, he, instead of examining my complaint

and giving me an answer, sent me to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry for medical examination.

The investigation department of the K.G.B. very much wanted me to be found irresponsible. How convenient.

Then there would be no case about me, no need to construct a charge and here there would be no need to prove the fact of commission of a

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crime. The man is just sick, mad.

And only on Nov. 5, after pressure was exerted by the public, a new medical commission pronounced me healthy.

There you have trustworthy proof of my assertion—which is called slanderous here in court—that on the instructions of the K.G.B. psychiatric reprisals are set up against dissenters.

In accordance with my right to defense, I demanded that the lawyer Dina Isakovna Kaminskaya be invited for my defense in court.

No lawyer was given me.

It took my 12-day hunger strike, a complaint to the prosecutor general, to the Justice Ministry and the Communist party Central Committee, and also new, active intervention by members of the public before my legal right to defense was finally fulfilled and I was given lawyer Shveisk, who was invited by my mother.

The trial proceedings today have also been conducted with numerous procedural infringements. The indictment, in which the word "slanderous"

is used 33 times and the word "anti-Soviet" 13 times, contains no concrete indications of which facts are slanderous among those I communicated to Western correspondents and which materials which I allegedly distributed are anti-Soviet.

I allegedly handed over these materials in the presence of Volpin and Chalidze [Aleksandr. Yesenin-Volpin, son of poet Sergei Yesenin, and Valeri Chalidze, a physicist and member of an unofficial Soviet civil rights committee].

However, my demand that these two people be called as witnesses was not met.

Furthermore, not one of the eight people I called who could confirm the authenticity of my assertions on the facts of confinement and conditions of detention of people in special psychiatric hospitals was summoned to the court.

What were all these provocations and crude procedural violations needed for, this stream of slander and unfounded accusations? What was this trial needed for? Only to punish one

person?

No, there is a "principle," a kind of "philosophy" here. Behind the accusation presented, there stands another, unrepresented.

With the reprisal against me they want to frighten those who try to tell the whole world about their crimes.

Our society is still sick. It is sick with the fear which has come down to us from the Stalin era. But the process of the public's spiritual enlightenment has already begun and cannot be stopped.

And however long I have to spend in detention I will never renounce my convictions and I will express them, availing myself of the right given me by Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution, to all who want to listen to me.

I will fight for legality and justice. And I regret only that over the short period—one year, two months and three days—during which I was at liberty, I managed to do too little for this cause.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 January 1972

The irrepressible last word

CPYRGHT

The Soviet Union cannot escape the consequences of its attempts to force political "uniformity" upon its writers and thinkers.

This was the import of young Vladimir Bukovsky's response when sentenced last week to seven years in prison and labor camp, and another five years in exile. "The process of spiritual enlightenment of (Soviet) society has already begun, and it cannot be stopped. Society already understands that the criminal is not the person who washes dirty linen in public, but the person who dirties it."

And it was the import of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's prose poem written in memory of his friend Alexander Tvardovsky, who died in December just six months after being forced out of his edi-

torship of the literary magazine Novy Mir: "There are many ways of killing a poet—the method chosen for Tvardovsky was to take away his offspring, his passion, his journal. . . . But you need to be deaf and blind to the last century of Russia's history to regard this as a victory and not an irreparable blunder! Madmen! When the voices of the young resound, keen-edged, how you will miss this patient critic, whose gentle admonitory voice was heeded by all. Then you will be set to tear the earth with your hands for the sake of returning Trifonovich."

Strong words of moral judgment. It is not surprising then that the Soviet Union would want to silence a Bukovsky by sending him to prison, a Solzhenitsyn

by keeping his Nobel Prize from him and making him a nonperson, a Tvardovsky for a consistently liberal viewpoint. The irony of course is that these men, though in different ways, were showing that the system—of "hospitals" and "mental institutions" and "prisons" plus the courts and official press—meant to enforce a uniform doctrinal line only demonstrates its inherent ruthlessness.

Life can be desperate for men of free mind in the Soviet Union. Prison or silence or ill health seems to be forced upon them. How remarkable, then, that they can see past their own difficulties to the process of spiritual enlightenment at work. It is the voices of conscience that get the last word.

THE ECONOMIST
15 January 1972

Under western eyes again

Other communist states, is ruled by a few ageing men. They can count on the docility of a great part of a nation long accustomed to despotism, and only now achieving the transition to a mainly urban society from a very backward rural one. But they have no illusions about their popularity. The past few months have seen a rising accumulation of evidence of that, up to the imprisonment last week of Vladimir Bukovsky; and the evidence has been made available to people outside Russia by the regular appearance of the illegal, but apparently unstoppable, underground publications, such as "Chronicle of Current Events."

The leaders of the Soviet Union rule with less of an iron hand than Stalin did 20 years ago, but they dare not face an organised opposition. The average Soviet citizen lives better than he did in Stalin's time; but his masters know that appetite grows with eating, and that when the sheer struggle to survive is no longer all-absorbing people's surplus energies may overflow into dangerous channels. So they are still forced to maintain a huge, costly and cumbersome apparatus of political policing in order to curb manifestations of dissent. And this apparatus is not working well.

Ritually, at intervals, the people are marshalled to go through the motions of elections whose results are fixed, and known, in advance. Ritually, they are likewise required to attend "discussions," in which their role is in practice equally limited; all important questions are decided at the top, irreversibly. A population that is increasingly literate and sophisticated is ceasing to regard these rituals as forms of participation in politics in any real sense. And it is irked by its rulers' neurotic secretiveness—so much so that, on the occasions when Pravda tells the truth, many Russians suspend belief until they can check its version by listening to foreign broadcasts.

Russia's "silent majority" is silent for a sufficient reason. Any exercise of the right of free speech that is, in theory, guaranteed by the Soviet constitution means trouble. Speaking one's mind may lead to loss of promotion, of a job, of a chance to get a flat, of social security benefits, or of the right to further education. Persistence in speaking out brings harsher punishments: harassment, smearing accusations, transfer to degrading work in remote regions, persecution of the offender's relatives and friends, and, eventually, imprisonment in conditions so cruel that many victims do not survive it. In these circumstances, what is surprising is that any sounds of protest are heard in Russia at all.

In tsarist times the grip of the Russian police state was weaker than in Stalin's time because the political police were less efficient, because a well-born young dissenter was sometimes protected by his influential relatives or friends, and because the regime veered between bouts of severe repression and attempts to relax

the pressure in hope of letting off some of the steam harmlessly. Some of these conditions now seem to be reappearing. Last week a scaring account was published of the cruelties being inflicted on Andrei Amalrik, who has been sent to one of the notorious Kolyma prison camps in north-eastern Siberia after writing a book (banned, of course, in Russia) called "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?" In some ways the more relevant approaching date for Russia now seems to be 1905. That was the year when the tsarist façade cracked.

The veering tendency is again visible. In 1971 nearly 14,000 Jews were allowed to leave Russia. Never before have the Soviet rulers permitted any such number of their subjects to leave the country. Their purpose in doing so was evidently to reduce the pressure not only of the Jewish Russians' wish to emigrate to Israel but also of the protest movement as a whole. Throughout last year the regime also tolerated the existence of the human rights committee that had been formed in November, 1970, by a group of distinguished scientists, of whom Andrei Sakharov is the best known. Its members protested repeatedly at acts of injustice that flagrantly violated the Soviet constitution itself. They suffered some harassment, and of course the Soviet press monopoly gave its readers no hint of their existence; but the authorities failed to stop them circulating their protests abroad and, clandestinely, inside Russia too.

Last week Mr Sakharov was refused admission to the cruel farce of a "trial" at which the young writer Vladimir Bukovsky was given a 12-year sentence for protesting at the Soviet use of mental hospitals as places where political prisoners are confined and tortured. Nevertheless, the Sakharov committee's protests about the rigging of the trial were made widely known in the scientific and intellectual circles whose sympathy for the committee's aims inhibits the ruling group whenever it is tempted to try to squash these nuisances.

The KGB is more efficient, and less concerned not to violate the forms of law, than its tsarist predecessor, the Okhrana, was. But, like the Okhrana, it now finds it wise to inquire into a suspect's connections with influential people before taking drastic action against him. And it must be getting worried at the way it is now being repeatedly defied, even by people who have already been scarred by its claws. The more punishment is meted out to those who circulate forbidden material, the more such material is circulated. It is all uncomfortably reminiscent of the way things were going 70 years ago. The Russian opponents of despotism may still appear as weak and dispersed as they did at the time when Joseph Conrad wrote "Under Western Eyes," but there is little comfort in that comparison for the KGB and its masters.

The hammer flinches

As the latest attempts to retighten some of the screws

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proceed, rather hysterical notes are being sounded by the hacks who serve the political police in the Soviet press. Literaturnaya Gazeta has solemnly tried to discredit Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Prize-winning author of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," by asserting that his grandfather owned a large sheep farm. (George Orwell could tell who owns it now.) The Novosti agency, whose comment on the Bukovsky trial was unusually stomach-turning even by its own standards, is becoming shrill about alleged attempts to subvert army

officers. It seems to be getting harder to find anything to say that will not put undesirable ideas into people's heads. If one contrasts the few small visible signs of dissent with the colossal apparatus of repression that overhangs them, it is not easy to understand why the repressors should show such nervousness. It is as if a steam hammer were to get the jitters on being confronted with a nut. But perhaps this particular steam hammer knows something about the nut that we don't know.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 January 1972

Tighter Soviet Internal Security Is Seen

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to the New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 18—Western diplomats believe that the Soviet Union is tightening internal security and seeking to shore up ideological vigilance among Soviet citizens to offset possible side effects of its policy of relaxing tensions with the West.

They cite indications that Soviet security agencies are engaged in a campaign against domestic dissidents, especially those having contact with foreigners.

Some diplomats consider this no more than one of the periodic "vigilance campaigns" that the Kremlin sanctions from time to time. Others suspect that the security agencies may be intending to deal a more crippling blow to major elements of the dissident movement, which has functioned here for several years.

Conviction, Arrests, Raids

Since a call in December to Communist party members for greater vigilance against the dangers of subversion and hostile propaganda from foreign travelers, residents and radio stations, there have been the following developments:

Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a 29-year-old dissident, was convicted Jan. 5 of anti-Soviet agitation and propagandizing and given the maximum sentence, seven years in prison and five in exile. His summary one-day trial was used by the newspaper Vechernaya Moskva

to warn of the dangers of having contact with foreign correspondents here.

Thirteen Ukrainians were arrested last week in Kiev and Lvov for nationalist activities. The 13 included Vyacheslav Chornovil, a journalist jailed in 1967 after having prepared an account of political trials in the Ukraine, and two literary critics, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba.

The homes of nine Moscow dissidents were raided by security police Jan. 14 as part of an investigation of suspected "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." More than 3,000 documents, articles, clippings, letters, tapes and booklets, including a copy of Orwell's "1984," were reported taken from the apartment of Pyotr Yakir, a historian regarded by the police as the leader of the loose group of dissidents who call themselves the Democratic Movement.

Further Arrests Feared

Two of the nine, Yuri Shkhanovich, a mathematician, and Kronid Lyubarsky, an astronomer employed at the Chornogolovka Institute of Solid State Physics near Moscow, were called in subsequently for questioning and detained by the K.G.B., or secret police. Dissidents say that they fear further arrests.

Agents in Kiev searched the apartment of Viktor P. Nekrasov, a noted Ukrainian author. He gained fame with a popular World War II novel, "In the Trenches of Stalin-grad," and was sharply at-

tacked in 1963 for favorable comments on life in the West in a book, "Both Sides of the Ocean," his account of a visit to the United States, Italy, and France.

In an attack on the activities of visiting American Congressmen, the Government newspaper Izvestia charged yesterday that Representative James H. Scheuer, Democrat of the Bronx, had been following instructions of the "American Secret Service." It contended that four intellectuals whom he met were "the kind of people relied upon by those across the ocean" who plan to create subversive organizations "the aim of which is to incite Soviet citizens to come out against the existing regime and Soviet Government." The Soviet Union expelled Mr. Scheuer last Friday, accusing him of "improper activities."

3 Lost Their Jobs

The four men cited by Izvestia were V. N. Chalidze, a physicist who is a member of the small Soviet Committee on Human Rights, and three Jewish intellectuals who have lost their jobs since they applied to emigrate to Israel, Aleksandr Y. Lerner, a computer specialist, and his son, Vladimir, and Viktor G. Polsky, an electronics specialist who formerly headed a laboratory.

Diplomatic observers emphasized that the steps taken re-

cently were still very minor compared with the purges of the thirties or even later crackdowns, and Moscow intellectuals insist that the general atmosphere is a far cry from the Stalinist period.

Nonetheless, the latest actions are widely regarded as the most pronounced internal security tightening in at least a year and perhaps longer. The last notable crackdown was the trial in Leningrad in 1970 of Jews and others accused of having conspired to hijack a Soviet commercial airliner.

The latest wave of police action was preceded in November by a speech by the Ukrainian party leader, Pyotr Shelest, urging party workers not to let the policy of détente weaken their ideological vigilance.

There was also an article last month in the Communist party monthly that urged party faithful not to slacken the ideological struggle with the west because of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The article said Western countries sought to use détente to try to undermine socialism through political and economic means and intelligence operations.

Jewish activists, however, apparently have been exempted from arrests or raids in keeping with the comparatively moderate policy of allowing many Jews to emigrate after bureaucratic delays provided that they do not take away needed skills.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 January 1972

BREZHNEV IS URGED TO FREE DISSIDENT

MOSCOW, Jan. 20 — Andrei D. Sakharov, the Soviet physicist and civil-rights advocate, has petitioned the Kremlin for the release of a 29-year-old dissident, Vladimir K. Bukovsky, on the ground that his recent trial had not been public and that the defense had been given no opportunity to call its witnesses.

The petition, addressed to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Communist party leader, suggested that there might be "healthy forces" in the Soviet leadership that were not in agreement with the current campaign against political dissent.

There was no indication in the appeal whether the refer-

ence to "healthy forces" reflected special knowledge about official positions or merely Mr. Sakharov's wishful thinking.

Mr. Bukovsky was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, to be followed by five years' enforced residence in a remote place, after having been found guilty in a summary one-day

trial on charges of anti-Soviet activities. The sentence is being appealed.

He was accused in particular of having sent detailed documentation abroad to show that Soviet mental institutions were being used for the incarceration of sane persons with political views opposed to those of the Government.

SAIGON POST
10 November 1971

The 'Madness' Of Russ. Intellectuals

By JOHN SCOTT

There are strong political and economic reasons why both the French and the Soviet governments should have wished Brezhnev's visit to Paris to meet with every possible success. The Soviet press has been publishing lengthy articles recently on the increasingly warm relations between France and the USSR, and this has been reciprocated to a large extent in French newspapers. The French Ministry of the Interior ordered 58 possible trouble-makers to leave Paris for the duration of the Soviet Communist Party leader's visit. Even the Israeli community in France was courted by Ambassador Abrasimov, who invited some 60 of its members to the embassy in order to explain to them that Jews in the USSR shared full equality of rights and obligations with other Soviet citizens.

Not everyone, however, considers national interests more vital than the welfare of their own family, as became apparent from the appeal addressed to Madame Pompidou by one Soviet

mother. Her son, Vladimir Bukovsky, is at present being detained in a psychiatric hospital, and she wished the French President's wife to intervene on his behalf with the Soviet leader. She wrote that, being certain of the innocence of her son, she hoped that Madame Pompidou would use every legal means possible in his defence and especially her personal contacts with the Soviet ruler.

Mothers everywhere, of course, tend to claim that the whole regiment is out of step when their son marches off on the wrong foot, and few are likely to believe that their own son is insane. Much that Bukovsky said in an interview last year with the American journalist, William Cole, could be represented as persecution mania: "I am continually being followed; my telephone is always tapped; and I am conscious all the time of being under the observation of the authorities." But it could also be true. Even if not, it is scarcely enough evidence to have anyone certified. Perhaps we should look more

closely at the case of Vladimir Bukovsky.

Expulsion

Born in 1942, the son of a successful Soviet journalist, and with both parent in the Communist Party, one might have expected Bukovsky to have grown up as a contented member of privileged class of Soviet society. In 1960, however, he was expelled from school for publishing an unofficial satirical journal, and a year later continued his career as a free thinker, by being expelled from school for publishing an unofficial satirical journal, and a year later continued his career as a free thinker by being expelled from Moscow University as one of the organisers of the underground journal *Phoenix*. Although he was attacked in January 1962 for his literary activities in the Soviet press, the particular article admitted, albeit sarcastically, that the 19 year-old Bukovsky stood out among his companions as a "giant of theoretical thought." To escape arrest for having organised an unofficial exhibi-

tion of abstract painting, he disappeared for six months on a geological expedition. On returning to Moscow he continued his unorthodox behaviour. He was arrested in May 1963 and was confined without trial in the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, being later transferred to a psychiatric hospital in Leningrad. He later described this establishment as being a pre-revolutionary prison, full of murderers and the criminally insane; there were, however, some other inmates: political prisoners, dissidents for whom no article in the criminal code could be found. Among his companions in the asylum were the prize-winning Leningrad geophysicist Nikolai Sansonov, and a French Communist of Rumanian extraction who had come to the USSR to see how Communism worked in practice. They were kept in locked cells and had one hour's exercise a day. They were allowed visitors once a month, one letter a month to relatives and one parcel a month. The doctors themselves realised that it was more of a prison than a hospital and sometimes even said so openly. The inmates were punished for misbehaviour by doses of drugs which either depressed the nervous system, or induced a state of feverish restlessness for several days. Bukovsky also claims that they were tortured by being wrapped tightly in strips of wet canvas which shrank as it dried.

When he was released in February 1965 he immediately became involved in passing to foreign correspondents

information on the violation of human rights in the USSR. Indeed, Vladimir Bukovsky has shown such a consistent disregard for his own wellbeing that his more cautious compatriots could be forgiven for considering the foolhardiness of his courage a kind of 'madness'.

Bukovsky's involvement in the defence of the writers Daniel and Sinyavsky and consequently of Ginzburg and Galanskov resulted in his being brought to trial in February 1967. He was sentenced to three years corrective labour for 'illegal demonstration.' His clever citing during the trial of the Soviet Constitution which guarantees 'the right of street processions and demonstrations' did not endear him to the judge. He was freed in 1970 without having renounced his views. 'Stalinist methods no longer work. The authorities don't want a big scandal. They have to maintain a semblance of legality.'

In January of this he wrote an open letter to Western psychiatrists asking them to study the diagnoses made on several dissident intellectuals in order to decide if the evidence justified isolating them from society in mental institutions.

March Arrest

Bukovsky knew what to expect, and was in fact arrested in March 1968, after his letter had been delivered to the Paris press. Last month he was transferred to a mental institution.

Bukovsky is only one among hundreds of Soviet intellectuals who are reported to share his fate of indefinite interment in a psychiatric hospital. Andrei Amalrik, the

young Russian historian who wrote *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984*, says that he personally knows several normal, sane people who have been confined in such institutions. 'It seems to me that this is a clear example of the ideological capitulation of this regime before its opponents, if the only thing it can find to do with is to declare them insane.'

One of the best known is General Grigorenko, who has been held in Chernyakhovsk mental hospital since June 1970.—'If you consider that the only normal Soviet citizen is one who submits meekly to every detestable act committed by the bureaucrats, then I am, of course, abnormal.'

Last year the biologist Jaures Medvedev was interned in mental hospital for three months for his dissident writings, but was freed after strong protests by intellectuals both in the USSR and the West. On this occasion the Nobel-prize winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote: 'It is time to think clearly: the incarceration of free-thinking, healthy people in madhouses is spiritual murder. It is a variation on the gas chamber, but it is even more cruel — the torture of the people being killed is more malicious and more prolonged.'

At the beginning of October some 50 intellectuals, including Academician Sakharov, the leading Soviet physicist, signed a petition asking that Bukovsky be freed. Perhaps a more direct, personal approach by Madame Pompidou may yet succeed where they have failed — FWP

THE PROGRESSIVE
January 1972

CPYRGHT

THE NEW AGE OF SOVIET DISSENT

GEORGIE ANNE GEYER

That night, the rain swept in blinding, towering sheets across the gray rooftops of Moscow. It hammered at the windows of the old room where we sat, rattling a skull that sat grinning incongruously at us from between long shelves of books.

It was the room of a Soviet scientist, but not any ordinary Soviet scientist. This was the one-room home of Valery Chalidze, thirty-two-year-old Soviet physicist and dissident.

"Why should Russian scientists be interested in human rights?" I asked this darkly handsome man—half Russian, half Georgian—who ranks next to the famous physicist Andrei Sakharov in the scientific dissent community.

Chalidze ran his long fingers through straight, coal-black hair nearly shoulder-length and fixed his dark eyes on some remote spot above my head. "Because science demands an exact logic," he began. "We feel that the study of human rights also demands an exact logic. As scientists have logical minds, they are used to dealing in absolutes. They bring a special expertise and a special knowledge to the study."

On November 4, 1970, Chalidze, backed by Andrei Sakharov (father of the Soviet H-bomb) and several other leading scientists, began the U.S.S.R.'s first Human Rights Committee "to consult with government agencies on human rights and to study how human rights are guaranteed by Soviet law and practice and compare them with international laws."

"I and the committee feel that law should be based on law alone, with nothing ideological to precede the law," Chalidze said. "And if a person is sent away because of his political beliefs, it follows that human rights are not adequately protected."

To many Westerners, this forming of a "committee" might seem a normal, innocuous thing. But in the Soviet Union it is a daring, hitherto unheard-of thing. It has broken taboos, both by the act of forming the Committee and by the fact that it has been made a member of the International Committee for the Rights of Man, a consultative body to the United Nations. (Soviet citizens are not permitted to form voluntary associations and then ally them to international groups.)

Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has already begun studying such forbidden topics as the Soviet's incarceration of political prisoners in insane asylums and the place of the defense attorney in political and other cases. Also, despite warnings from the government, dismissals from jobs and sackings of scientists' apartments by the secret police, the KGB, these Committee members edit and publish a journal with

dissidents in the larger "democratic dissident movement" that has grown in the last five years to something of genuine importance. It is even, Sovietologists assert, approaching the scope of a "movement."

"This conception of a movement is entirely new," Edward Keenan, Soviet specialist at Harvard University, told me in an interview. "It is also important that there is a kind of cooperation among the various national and religious groups. A national approach in the past has been unheard of. People now have a sense of being together with their countrymen."

Who are the dissidents? What do they stand for? Have they actually had any positive effect on society—or will they, by arousing the ancient Russian fear of anarchy, only set back liberalization within the Soviet Union?

Pyotr Yakir is a dissident. He is a rotund man of forty-eight with a wild beard and dancing eyes. He is, at present, the leader of the "democratic" central coordinating group.

"The basic thing is to educate yourself and your friends," Yakir said one night, as we walked along the promenades by the Moscow River. "I am a pathological optimist. I am sure that in the long run society will change."

"Why?" I asked him. "Through what techniques?"

"Under Stalin, we called it the 'Iron Curtain,'" Yakir went on, "But now this has changed. Today, with regard to dissidents, the KGB occupies itself with one major goal—to see that information does not go out to the West. At this time in the country's history, the government is trying to put on a facade of complete democracy, of freedom of the press. It is trying to take its place among the countries of the world, and anything that destroys that illusion is dangerous."

To break this facade, Yakir's group gets information on political trials, religious persecutions, and any breaches of civil rights to the Western press in Moscow. The group trusts these correspondents to get this material printed in the West and then broadcast back to Russia through the BBC and the Voice of America. Group members also picket, sit-in, demonstrate, and send petitions to Soviet leaders on the occasions of trials and "special events." In effect, they have tried to force a psychiatric experience, bringing all the contradictions within Soviet society to the surface, where they can be dealt with.

"Why do we reach across the border in this way?" Yakir asked, as a warm breeze blew in over the river and the moon rose over the spires of ancient and modern Moscow. "Because the Voice of America and

the BBC are a kind of bullhorn for us. Our job is to get as much information to them as we can. Then it comes back here, and people from Siberia to the Urals know about it. They may not know us by name, but they are listening to information sent back by us."

Yakir's group, while it is the closest thing to a coordinating group that there is in the country, is only one of the strange, mystic (and very Russian) brotherhood of groups that today comprise "dissent." There are the scientists; the disaffected nationality groups like the Jews, the Crimean Tatars, the Armenians, the Caucasian Turks, and the Ukrainians; the religious dissidents, such as some Baptists, Evangelicals, and Orthodox; the strict legalists, the anti-Stalinists, and the simple, decent young people who are tired of everything.

While there are, at any one moment, only hundreds who might picket or write nationalistic poems (which can be a reason for a three-year sentence to Siberia), there are certainly, according to the Sovietologists who have studied the "movement," tens of thousands of Soviets, particularly young people, who sympathize because they, too, want to be able to read, to know, and to speak out.

Yakir says, probably correctly, that the movement is "like an iceberg." You see only the few at the top, but there is a huge mass underneath that to some degree is sympathetic. These supporting elements are not only occasionally and curiously intertwined organizationally, they are also spasmodically intertwined ideologically. Their motives range from anti-Stalinism to fighting ideological interference in science to demanding rights for nationalities to anti-Russianism and to desires for strict legalism.

Many of the dissidents are wholly new types of human beings for the Soviet Union. They go off to serve sentences in Siberia, then they come back to join the movement again. ("I absolutely do not repent having organized this demonstration," Vladimir Bukovsky, one of the most defiant dissidents, said in his court case. "When I am free again, I shall again organize demonstrations.") There is none of the willingness of the 1930s to express self-condemnation or to confess to crimes never committed. Instead, the dissidents stand up against the state, telling it that it is wrong. There is a sacrificial joyousness about many of them—they seem strangely free of the fear that has in the past paralyzed Russians. "Sacrificial populism, mingled with Jacobinism," the American Sovietologist Sidney Monas has written, "is part of the tragedy of Russian history."

With all their diverse complaints, what, basically, do the dissidents want? "They want a humanizing of society," one Sovietologist told me. "They want a return to the moral and ethical bases of society. Somehow values have to be found for the masses."

Lewis Feuer, the perceptive professor of sociology at the University of Toronto who has studied Russian student militants throughout history, finds a "philosophy of eternalism" among today's dissidents—a philosophy that has somehow siphoned through the cracks in the system. This "philosophy of eternalism," of course, is in total opposition to Marx's dialectical viewpoint that ethical

truths are relative. It is a belief that there are ethical truths which are eternally valid for all men.

Considering the enormously restrictive society, both politically and psychically, that all Soviets are raised in, it is astonishing that any Soviets should have the inner and outer courage to speak out and resist. But a look at the personal experiences of some of these men and women and a look at the times at least partially explain why.

"I was fourteen when they arrested me in 1937," Yakir explained that night, as we walked along the river. That was also the year his illustrious father, Major General Iona E. Yakir, was executed in Stalin's purges of two-thirds of the top officers of the Red Army—purges which left Russia supine in the early stages of the Nazi invasion. "I sat for a long time in the concentration camps," Yakir went on. "Sixteen years. I saw many horrible things with my own eyes. I saw many good, honest people die in the camps. Those people died not because of anything they did wrong, but because of an arbitrary government."

Once the Khrushchev "thaw" came in 1956, Yakir, like tens of thousands of other innocent survivors, was "rehabilitated." He was even chosen to travel around the country speaking about the Stalin years. He gave some 300 speeches before Khrushchev was demoted and the "thaw" turned to another freeze. Men like him, anti-Stalinists who had seen too much, had little to lose—they formed the core of the dissidents.

But the real beginning of organized dissent was the 1966 trial of Daniel Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, the two writers convicted of publishing "anti-Soviet" writings abroad. Khrushchev was out, and the trial was to be a warning to the young that the lid was going back on. But it was too late—there had been ten years of relative freedom, and there was no going back. Instead, the trial generated anger and defiance. For the first time, all the dissatisfied individuals and groups began to seek one another out, to know and to support one another.

Trial followed political trial, and the picketing dissenters drew closer together. They sent petitions to their leaders asking for redress and for the basic freedoms guaranteed by Soviet law and the Soviet constitution. "White boxes" were published underground, giving exact proceedings of the trials, and then were published abroad. Different dissenters, in turn, were arrested, and new ones came to take their place.

But by far the most amazing document is the underground journal *Cronika* or *Chronicle of Current Events*, a typewritten, terse, objective compilation of news reports, biographical sketches of dissenters, dissident literature, and news of deportations. It has come out—in carbon

copies—for forty months and, amazingly, it gets around that vast country rapidly. It is passed from hand to hand on the street and on trains and planes.

CPYRIGHT It is another such publication, *Political Diary*, which is less well known but equally important; it circulates among the higher echelon in the government and the intelligentsia and focuses more on forbidden political, social, and economic ideas that could not be published elsewhere.

Western students of dissent in the Soviet have come to the conclusion that these publications *must* be put out by people deep "in" and "up in" the society, simply because no one else could know as much as the people who put out these journals obviously know. There is always the suspicion that the KGB might be putting them out itself—in order to watch who is drawn to them—but in the last analysis that makes no sense because the publications cause the government and the KGB so much trouble and embarrassment. Rather, Sovietologists believe that *Cronika*, in particular, is put out by people in the scientific community—because they are the only ones who could have access to so much information. All of this indicates, of course, that there is some high-level collusion or at least sympathy with the dissidents, particularly the scientists.

Unquestionably, the scientists are the most interesting and important group of dissidents. Of a Soviet scientific community estimated at 400,000, some objective analysts estimate that perhaps as many as sixty per cent sympathize with or are dissidents. Moreover, the scientists are respected and needed. It is impossible to call them "hooligans" when they have so well served their country. The Soviet state hesitates before sending a Soviet scientist to Siberia. Men like Chalidze have lost their jobs, but they have not been arrested as yet because they have been meticulous about staying within the law. No one knows exactly why Yakir is still at large, but it is generally believed that it is because of posthumous respect for his famous father.

But have the dissenters really accomplished anything? Will they ever *really* change anything? Dissidents still go to Siberia and to insane asylums, where they are incarcerated because the Soviet officials want to tell them (and apparently genuinely believe) that anyone who dissents is mentally ill. Masses of "respectable" Soviet citizens still consider them "traitors." The state is as powerful as ever. Isn't it even possible that the dissenters, by challenging injustices too soon, might set *back* the glacially slow but steady liberalization of the Soviet Union?

There is more evidence to the contrary, reason to believe that the dissidents have had a surprising effect. Writers such as Bulat Okhudzhava, Alexander Galich, and the famous Alexander Solzhenitsyn now publish abroad without being tried at home. Chalidze's Human Rights Committee continues its investigations, even though members are harassed. This summer a friend of Solzhenitsyn was beaten up at the writer's summer home; the KGB formally apologized to Solzhenitsyn for the "error" (there were no apologies in Stalin's time). Ten thousand

to Israel in the last two years (some of their sit-ins at Soviet bureaus to secure permits lasted two or three days).

"Even in the last five years I have noticed a change," Yakir said. "Before, they would arrest you for standing outside a courtroom during a trial. Now even Tass (the Soviet News Agency) is forced to provide information on some of the trials. A lot of foreigners, raised in different traditions, can't realize the significance of five people demonstrating in Red Square. But to us, it's extraordinary."

"Yakir's right," Peter Reddaway, the Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics, told me in a recent interview. "Many taboos have come down, and they won't come again. The authorities won't go back to the old terror. They can't do it again."

There are, as the Soviets would say, "objective factors" at play. Slowly but gradually, the Soviet government is beginning to respond to its people; public opinion is becoming an operative force. As the government becomes increasingly sensitive to foreign criticism, it is faced with a vexing dilemma—as it becomes, more and more, a "respectable" world power, it must more and more act respectably at home; it can no longer indulge in the boorish behavior it has historically lavished upon its own citizens without some loss of respect as a world power.

It must be remembered, too, that the dissidents are not opting for another system or advocating the overthrow of the government. The vast majority are liberal Marxists who want political democracy within Marxism. They are challenging their country to be what it says it is. And—perhaps most important, they have broken, by their sheer numbers and determination, the government's assurance that anyone who disagrees with the official catechism is a "traitor" in the pay of a foreign government. It must deeply disturb the Soviet officials to know that not one of the dissidents has been linked with a foreign anti-Soviet emigre organization or the CIA.

As to the future, Soviet specialist Reddaway believes—and I concur—that the movement "will go on as before" but that "the field will become more differentiated. At the ends, groups will form that are quite different from the mainstream. The democratic movement will remain the mainstream, with fragmentation around the edges. There is bound to be an increase in the underground groups," Reddaway went on, "and some are bound to be violent because the government cannot possibly keep up with everything the young Russians want and because every society has certain violent proclivities which are not easily bought off by material change."

Perhaps, in the end, the dissidents' greatest value is the degree to which they have broken the chain of "eternal" fear and hatred of the outside world, a fear that seems to come in the blood. For centuries attacked, invaded, and massacred by marauders from all sides, the Russians turned in upon themselves. They clung to each other with a communal, collective passion that long preceded Marxism. To them, outsiders were dangerous and freedom was dissolution and anarchy. It

CPYRGHT

is only today—with this generation, the first to have a genuine inner and outer security and relative affluence—that this is changing. Today's young Russians are trying to talk rationality and not blood fears, law instead of terror, and objectivity instead of xenophobia. And it is not easy.

Yakir tells a story about the Chechens, a tribe that lives in the northern Caucasus and has always hated

Russians. "There was a Russian boy raised in a Chechen village," he said. "He was very close friends with a Chechen boy—they were like brothers. One day they were walking single-file down the pathway to a wedding when suddenly the Chechen, who was walking behind, said, 'Oh Vanya, you'd better walk behind. It's in my blood to kill you.'

"Well, that's the way it is between the dissidents and the KGB," Yakir said. "It is in their blood to hate us."

GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
15 January 1972

CPYRGHT *Where dissent is treason*

Moscow courts are tough. A 29-year-old Russian, Vladimir Bukovsky, accused of "having committed acts intended to weaken Soviet authority," was given last week the maximum sentence for those who oppose the regime — seven years' detention, two of them in prison, the balance in a corrective labour camp. He will then be under house arrest, outside Moscow, for a further period of five years. The accused man, according to TASS, admitted all the charges made against him.

In truth, Bukovsky never made a secret of what he was doing. He had already served three years in a labour camp for agitation in favour of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. The experience did not bring him to mend his ways. As soon as he was freed he resumed the struggle for the defence of persecuted intellectuals and distributed a document on the Soviet practice of interning dissidents in psychiatric institutions. It was presumably to this aspect of Bukovsky's work that the Public Prosecutor referred when he charged him with "having distributed untrue information which was used by anti-Soviet organisations abroad." Vlad-

imir Bukovsky had assumed the task of keeping the West posted on the protest movements in his country.

As in previous trials, no foreign journalists were permitted to be present. It was clear, right from the start, that the court was determined to give a sentence severe enough to serve as a warning to all those who pass on information illegally, though not surreptitiously. The Soviet police often turn a blind eye to such activities, and they had known for a long time what Bukovsky was doing. From time to time, however, they pounce on someone engaged in such activities in the hope of persuading the other "offenders" to accept the Soviet facts of life. This has been the method adopted since Leonid Brezhnev came to power.

Moscow can count on the world losing interest as the trials are repeated. The arrest of Daniel and Sinyavsky, for example, caused a worldwide reaction, but public opinion finally got used to these tactics which, in any event, are far less cruel than those practised in Stalin's time. In any case, the Soviet authorities have so far refrained from prosecuting internationally known figures,

like the Soviet academician Andrei Sakharov, who can thus continue his courageous fight for the rights of man. Others who are less well known abroad and don't carry the same weight in Soviet society take part in these struggles in the knowledge that they will in all probability pay a heavy price.

The dissidents are clearly only a tiny handful and quite apart from a society which hardly seems to share their longing for freedom. Yet their obstinacy irks, possibly even worries, a regime unaccustomed to being questioned. At these trials, the "rebels" usually admit the charges brought against them, but refuse to plead guilty, on the grounds that the Soviet Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and action.

As far as immediate results go, the activities of the dissidents seem hopeless, for they run the risk of being crushed by a regime which has a powerful secular arm at its disposal. Many of them have already done time in prison camps or psychiatric wards, but they persist in their struggle. They are alone, sustained only by the astonishing strength of men who have overcome their fear.

ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN

In early January it was announced in Stockholm that Alexander Solzhenitsyn would receive his Nobel Prize gold medal at a private ceremony in Moscow this spring. Along with the attached Backgrounder are included reprints of various media commentary on the Solzhenitsyn affair describing among other things his travails under constant and mounting KGB harassment. Together they include sufficient material to exploit the situation whether Solzhenitsyn does or does not get his Nobel medal.

For those able to use additional background we particularly recommend "Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record," edited by Leopold Labeledz (Harper & Row, 1971, \$7.95). Labeledz' skillful assembly of virtually all the known documents in the Solzhenitsyn "case" covers the author's rise to fame with the publication of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" and what Labeledz calls Solzhenitsyn's "road to Calvary" --- from official criticism and theft of his manuscripts by the KGB, prohibition from publishing his works or even mentioning his name, to the tawdry, official condemnation of the Nobel Prize. Attachments include a review of the Labeledz book and a reprint of its table of contents. See, also, page 4 of the Backgrounder.

Even though not himself an activist in the Soviet Human Rights or dissident movements, for many in the Soviet Union --- too many as far as the Politburo is concerned --- Solzhenitsyn has become the symbol of those movements. For that reason the KGB seeks in all possible ways to besmirch his character, his talents as an author, and his credentials as a loyal Russian. In this connection, see the excellent article, "Solzhenitsyn: The Obsession of Morality," by Abraham Rothberg, reprinted from Interplay, final attachment.

In commentary on the award or non-award of the Nobel medal, it would not be amiss to take a few swipes at the Swedish Government's timorousness in not allowing Solzhenitsyn to accept his well-deserved award in a small ceremony on the grounds of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow in the first place!

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

February 1972

ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN

The Swedish Academy has announced that it will present to Alexander Solzhenitsyn the Nobel Prize for literature, for which he was selected in October 1970, at a private ceremony in the USSR in spring of 1972, more than a year after the official ceremonies took place in Stockholm without him. The year between began with Solzhenitsyn's declining to go to Stockholm for his prize. The Soviet government, which sentenced him to ten years of penal servitude and exile for privately criticising Stalin, which refused to publish most of his work and which sent a former Nobel Prize winner* to Stockholm to work against his selection for the 1970 award, was quite capable of preventing Solzhenitsyn's return home if he should leave. Ekaterina Furtseva, Soviet Minister of Culture, confirmed at a press conference while visiting the U.S. in January 1972, that the Soviet government would indeed have done just that.

The Swedish government then refused to allow its Moscow Embassy to be used for the presentation for fear of offending the Soviet Union! And so the Soviet Union which had bitterly denounced the award as politically motivated, seemed to carry the day. Solzhenitsyn's subsequent correspondence with the Stockholm committee reflects his ironic view of himself as the victim in this bureaucratic tangle, rather than the honoree. The impasse was resolved only after Prime Minister Olaf Palme's defense of the Swedish position had publicly embarrassed his government.

Most of the world saw the Nobel award as proper recognition of a major talent, albeit with some political overtones because Solzhenitsyn's works were proscribed in his own country. The Italian newspaper Corriere Della Serra conducted a poll among literary critics of 47 countries on 4 continents before the Nobel award was announced. Only the Argentinian Jorge Luis Borges topped Solzhenitsyn -- and by only two votes.

Much of the independent Communist press agreed. Vittorio Strada, Italian Communist writer said in his party's Rinascita, 16 October 1970, "there is no doubt that it is not consistent to welcome the prize

* Mikhail Sholokhov, establishment author and winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize for Literature.

when it is conferred on a Soviet writer who is officially favored and to become indignant when the same prize is given to no less significant a Soviet writer who is not." Moscow correspondent for the Italian Communist Party's L'Unita called Solzhenitsyn one of "the most notable writers of our time." Kommunist, the Yugoslav Party weekly of 22 October 1970, supported the Nobel award and declared, "It is not Solzhenitsyn who is to be blamed that the truth he describes has been so dark. The facts are dark, and indeed, he has not invented them." At the same time the French Communist L'Humanité, 10 October 1970, called Solzhenitsyn "one of the most remarkable novelists of our time." The French Communist weekly, Les Lettres Françaises of 14 October, declared that "the choice of Alexander Solzhenitsyn is one of those which justify the existence of the Nobel Prize for Literature."

Strada also spoke in Rinascita of the "great prestige which, in spite of everything, he enjoys in his own country." "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," published during the brief de-Stalinization period under Khrushchev, gave most Soviet readers their first look at the infamous labor camps and at the way political prisoners were degraded in their peoples' democracy. It is the only one of Solzhenitsyn's novels published in the Soviet Union.* The others are reportedly circulating in samizdat -- painstakingly typed and illegally distributed. Thus the censorship-ridden Soviet people keep informed -- at great personal risk -- about what is actually happening in their own country and are able to read literature which is officially disapproved.

Banning these books has boomeranged against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: the stories are now widely read in samizdat; they are promoted abroad on the basis of their forbidden character; world opinion has again been shocked by Communist treatment of its intellectuals (not only the author but other brave and principled men who have protested their government's repression of thought). In effect the political content of his books has become as important as their literary value solely because of the CPSU's fear of free expression of opinion.

In addition to "One Day," the foreign press has snapped up all of Solzhenitsyn's available writings to publish editions in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. The main works published abroad include:

"August 1914," in Russian only, 1971, YMCA Press: the first of a trilogy concerning Russia's role in World War I. See comments below.

"Stories and Prose Poems," 1971, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: See comments below.

"For The Good of The Cause," 1970, Praeger: a novella of callous bureaucracy.

* And it is now banned in the USSR

"First Circle," 1968, Harper and Row: a novel about the exploitation of political prisoners with technical skills, based on the author's own experience.

"Cancer Ward," 1968, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: a novel of the life and attitudes of doctors and patients facing death in a Soviet hospital as was Solzhenitsyn.

August 1914

Solzhenitsyn's newest novel, the first in a projected trilogy, was published in June 1971 by the YMCA press, a Russian-language publishing house in Paris. It deals with the heroic efforts and agonies of the Russian people as individuals and as a nation during the first ten days of World War I. Acclaimed by its early readers for its epic sweep, "August 1914" was described in a review written from London by Anatole Shub as a "work that may well herald the most important Russian literary masterpiece of the 20th Century."

Shub describes Solzhenitsyn's epic as the author's "attempt to fix, shape, and color for the consciousness of future generations, the primal upheaval of recent Russian history with the same finality that Tolstoy depicted the Napoleonic wars ... and, like Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn brings the social fabric and cultural atmosphere of civilian Russia to the battlefield through a rich variety of characters, both historic and completely fictitious." Paris Le Monde, 12 June, reported that "August 1914" had been circulating in the Soviet Union as samizdat for some three months before it appeared in the West. Konstantin Simonov, author and one-time editor of Novy Mir, was among those who believed that "August 1914" should be published at home since there was nothing in the book that could remotely be considered as an attack on the Soviet Union.

It was just a week after the Swedish Academy had announced that Solzhenitsyn would be awarded his Nobel gold medal and diploma at a private ceremony in Moscow, that the city's officialdom took note of "August 1914" with a highly critical article in the 12 January 1972 issue of the Soviet Writers Union journal, Literary Gazette. That journal described "August 1914" as having "turned out to be very helpful for anti-Soviet elements of every description." This has aroused suspicion that some official action against the Nobel Prize winner might be contemplated.

Stories and Prose Poems

Also published for the first time in translation in 1971, this work contains twenty-two novellas, short stories and prose poems of widely varied style and color. When two of the stories, "Matryona's House" and "An Incident at Krechetovka Station" were first published in the USSR in 1963, the reviewer for the Soviet Writers Union wrote in Literary Gazette: "His talent is so individual and so striking

that from now on nothing that comes from his pen can fail to excite the liveliest interest..." How ironic.

Solzhenitsyn's "Stories and Prose Poems" give the foreign reader a vivid view of subsistence living in a poor village; of hoodlums drawn to a religious ceremony by curiosity and contempt; of the inefficient inhumanity of minor bureaucrats. The 16 prose poems are brief lyrical passages; a chained puppy as the symbol of the Russian people; a tribute to a poet who created beauty from a peasant's hut; the decay and desecration of old churches. Most are autobiographical, at least in part. All prove the author's knowing eye and compassionate heart. All are part of his continuing dissection of Soviet society fifty years after the revolution which was to free the worker and peasant from the tyrant. Here, only the tyrant has changed.

The translation, done by Michael Glenny, unfortunately abounds in British colloquialisms. The works have also been published in German as Im Interesse der Sache, 1970, by Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, West Berlin.

Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record

Also in 1971, Harper & Row published "Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record," edited by Leopold Labedz. It is a brilliantly conceived selection of Solzhenitsyn documents which, in essence, chronicle the Soviet Union's public and private response to the appearance in the USSR of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." (See attachments). Included are state documents and letters to and from Solzhenitsyn and about him. They begin with his 1956 release from exile following the terrible prison camp described in "One Day." They include discussions leading to his expulsion from the Soviet Writers Union and end with the address given in his absence at the Nobel Festival in December 1970. Throughout is the absurd spectacle of official attacks on the fourth Russian* to win the Nobel Prize for Literature only to be denounced by his own government! Courageous letters of defense and praise from his colleagues are included as are moving comments from former prison camp inmates. A Writers Union discussion on the publishing of "Cancer Ward" reveals the conflict of all writers under Communism between their literary judgement and their state-imposed political responsibilities. The latter inevitably wins.

As a member of the Union of Soviet Writers declares,

"...the works of Solzhenitsyn are more dangerous to us than those of Pasternak: Pasternak was a man divorced from life, while Solzhenitsyn with his animated, militant, ideological temperament, is a man of principle."

* Mikhail Sholokhov, 1965; Boris Pasternak, 1958; and Ivan Bunin, 1933.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
16 October 1971

L'Affaire Solzhenitsyn

Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record
Edited by Leopold Labedz

CPYRGHT

Since 1962, when Alexander Solzhenitsyn broke the stupefying silence about Stalin's concentration camps, *l'affaire Solzhenitsyn* has generated controversy. Masses of documents have accreted to his short novel, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. Most of these documents are extraliterary: manifestoes and counter-manifestoes, protests and rebuttals, eulogies and denunciations.

Premier Khrushchev was guided by political motives when he ordered the publication of the novel in 1962. Then under fire in the Kremlin for his de-Stalinization policies, he hoped to strike a blow at his competitors. Liberals in Russia misread his action as a signal that the crimes of the Stalin era would at last be fully and publicly exposed, together with some of their most wicked executioners. But Khrushchev, and his successors, gradually began to perceive that such disclosures inexorably pointed to their own complicity. *One Day*, Solzhenitsyn's only major work to be published in Russia, was removed from libraries and reading rooms, and its topic officially declared a "dangerous theme."

Leopold Labedz' brilliantly conceived selection of Solzhenitsyn documents is, in essence, a chronicle of Russia's public and private response to *One Day*, and to the coruscating issue of Stalinism. On one level, the Soviet press registered the reflex of instant and extravagant compliance to the order of the day that is automatic among bureaucrats, journalists and critics who acquired their professions under Stalin. Since the appearance of *One Day* seemed to promise punishment for

those immediately responsible for the imprisonment of writers like Solzhenitsyn, Isaac Babel, Osip Mandelstam, Boris Pilnyak and thousands of others, these persons were the first to speak up. The archetypal response came from the critic Vladimir Ermilov, the most notorious of Stalin's "literary" denunciators. Ermilov declared in *Pravda*: "In our literature there has come a writer gifted with a rare talent, and as befits a real artist, he has told us a truth that cannot be forgotten, that must not be forgotten, a truth that is staring us in the face."

Khrushchev's recognition of his folly in having published *One Day*, and Brezhnev's subsequent ban on all Solzhenitsyn's work, have resulted in an increasing flow of polluted verbiage that threatens, like the earlier praise, to engulf the genuine writer concerned. Even Americans, benumbed by the invective and obscenity in our own literature, must be impressed by the singular squalor of this journey through modern Soviet letters. But apart from the official cant and the vituperation, there exists a deep underlay of genuine feeling, both for and against Solzhenitsyn in the private sphere. Testifying to this is a remarkable document, edited by Solzhenitsyn, that circulates from hand to hand in Russia. It is a selection from some of the personal letters the author received in response to *One Day*. Half the correspondents are former or present-day prisoners in Soviet camps. The others are former or present-day camp guards and other Soviet security police personnel. These letters constitute a *sotto voce* dialogue between victims and

executioners that is likely to be carried on in Russia for some time. It is accompanied by Solzhenitsyn's own brief and often sardonic commentary.

In writing to Solzhenitsyn, many ex-prisoners literally identify themselves with the characters in the novel: "Ivan Denisovich. That's me, SZ-208. And I can give all the characters real names." Others offer thanks: "It has so much life, so much pain, that one's heart might stop beating. People who have not been there exclaim in horror. Now, just a little sympathy for those who perished is beginning to penetrate such people." Or: "I am astonished that they have not yet put you and Tvardovsky away." (Alexander Tvardovsky, the editor of *Novy Mir*, was the first to publish *One Day*. He was dismissed from his post in 1970.) Solzhenitsyn's comment: "We are surprised too."

The prisoners writing from today's camps are generally angry. One writes: "You at least were allowed to receive parcels and earn extra bread. Why does no one deign to come to a camp and see who is inside? Once you have decided to reveal the truth, you should take it through to the end."

There follow the letters from "practical workers." Who? Solzhenitsyn explains: "It turns out that this is how camp guards style themselves. The description is priceless." Here there is no trace of the artificially generated indignation that prevails in the Soviet press — only pure, spontaneous hatred: "He deliberately incites the people against the organs of the Security Police Ministry. It's a disgrace!"

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Solzhenitsyn's Challenge to the Police

Following is the text of the letter Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn sent Aug. 13 to Yuri V. Andropov, head of the Soviet police:

To the minister of government security of the U.S.S.R. Andropov

For many years I have borne in silence the lawlessness of your employees: the inspection of all my correspondence, the confiscation of half of it, the search of my correspondents' homes and their official and administrative persecution, the spying around my house, the shadowing of visitors, the tapping of telephone conversations, the drilling holes in ceilings, the placing of recording apparatus in my city apartment and garden plot, and a persistent slander campaign against me from speakers' platforms when they are offered to employees of your ministry.

But after the raid yesterday I will no longer be silent. My country house village of Rozhdestvo, Naro-Fominsky Rayon was empty, and the eavesdroppers counted on my absence. Having returned to Moscow, because I was taken suddenly ill, I had asked my friend Alexander Gorlov to go out to the country house for an automobile part. But it turned out there was no lock on the house and voices could be heard from inside. Gorlov stepped inside and demanded the robbers' documents. In the small structure, where three or four can barely turn around, there were about ten of them, in plain clothes.

On the command of the senior officer "To the woods with him and silence him"—they bound Gorlov, knocked him down, and dragged him face down into the woods and beat him cruelly. Simultaneously, others were running by a circuitous route through the bushes, carrying to their car packages, papers, objects perhaps also a part from the apparatus they had brought themselves. However, Gorlov fought back vigorously and yelled, summoning witnesses, neighbors from other garden plots came running in response to his shouts and barred the robbers' way to the highway and demanded their documents. Then one of the robbers presented a red identification card and the neighbors let them pass. They led Gorlov, his face mutilated and his suit torn to ribbons, to the car.

"Fine methods you have," he said to those who conducted him.

"We are on an operation, and on an operation we can do anything."

Captain—according to the documents he presented to the neighbors—Ivanov, according to his personal statement first took Gorlov to the Naro-Fominsky militia, where the local officers greeted "Ivanov" with deference. There, "Ivanov" demanded from Gorlov written explanation of what had happened. Although he had been fiercely beaten, Gorlov put in writing the purpose of his trip and all the circumstances. After that the senior robber demanded that Gorlov sign an oath of secrecy, Gorlov flatly refused.

Then they set off for Moscow and on the road the senior robber bombarded Gorlov with literally the following phrases: "If Solzhenitsyn finds out what took place at the Dacha, it's all over with you. Your official career [Gorlov is a candidate of technical sciences and has presented his doctoral dissertation for defense, works in the Institute Giprots of Gosstroya of the U.S.S.R.] will go no farther, you will not be able to defend any dissertation. This will affect your family and children and, if necessary, we will put you in prison."

Those who know our way of life know the full feasibility of these threats. But Gorlov did not give in to them, refused to sign the pledge, and now he is threatened with reprisal.

I demand from you, citizen minister, the public naming of all the robbers, their punishment as criminals and an explanation of this incident. Otherwise I can only believe that you sent them.

13 August 1971.

To, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin.

I am forwarding you a copy of my letter to the Minister of State Security. For all of the enumerated lawless actions I consider him personally responsible. If the government of the U.S.S.R. does not share in these actions of Minister Andropov, I will expect an investigation.

A. SOLZHENITSYN.
13 August 1971.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1971

CPYRGHT

Swedish Rebuff to Solzhenitsyn Scored

Special to The New York Times

STOCKHOLM, Sept. 12—The Swedish Government has been sharply criticized for its refusal to allow the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature to be handed over to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in its Moscow Embassy.

The attack was made in a book, "Middle Man in Moscow," published here last week by Per Egil Hegge, a Norwegian journalist and a former correspondent in the Soviet capital.

According to Mr. Hegge, who was expelled from the Soviet Union in February, he had been in touch with several of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends in the summer of 1970. He was the first journalist to interview the Soviet writer after the Nobel Prize announcement was made early in October.

On Oct. 28, Mr. Hegge was approached by one of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends. Mr. Hegge refers to him by a cover name of Ivanov. Ivanov said that the prize-winner wanted to come to the Swedish embassy to discuss with the Ambassador, Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, whether he would be able to go to Stockholm for the Nobel Prize ceremony. Dr. Jarring had at that time temporarily left his mission as United Nations mediator

in the Middle East and was back on his regular post as Swedish Ambassador in Moscow.

Sought Moscow Ceremony

Ivanov also said that Mr. Solzhenitsyn wanted to know whether the embassy could arrange a Nobel Prize ceremony in Moscow for him if he was unable to go to Sweden.

A few days later Mr. Hegge took a walk in Moscow with a Swedish diplomat, whom he calls "A." "A" said he had to forward these inquiries to the Swedish Foreign Ministry in Stockholm. He added that he personally thought that it would be difficult to arrange a Nobel Prize ceremony in the Swedish embassy.

"Remember we are here to maintain good relations with Soviet authorities and a ceremony for the sharply criticized author Solzhenitsyn might be embarrassing," he is reported to have said.

Mr. Hegge said he could understand that but since the prize was normally given to winners by King Gustaf VI Adolf in Stockholm, the Ambassador, who was the king's personal representative might also be able to do it.

In November, Mr. Hegge and "A" met again. "A" said that

Mr. Solzhenitsyn would not receive an invitation to the embassy but that the Ambassador would see him if he came there without invitation. "A" also said that a Nobel Prize ceremony at the embassy was impossible.

This decision had been made on a high Government level in Stockholm. "A" said that he understood that this "did not look very heroic," but that the first duty of the embassy was still to keep up good relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hegge said he reminded the diplomat that Nobel Prizes had been presented to Soviet winners previously by Swedish Ambassadors. He mentioned the literature winner, Mr. Mikhail A. Sholokhov in 1965 and Lev D. Landau, the winner in physics in 1962.

Mr. Hegge said that if the Swedish decision became known outside the Soviet Union the behavior of the Swedish embassy would be widely regarded as diplomatic servility.

On Nov. 20 Mr. Hegge finally met Mr. Solzhenitsyn in person. The meeting was arranged in cloak-and-dagger fashion. Ivanov came first to the meeting place, and after making sure that no suspicious

persons were around Mr. Solzhenitsyn appeared.

Mr. Hegge and Mr. Solzhenitsyn walked toward the Swedish embassy. Mr. Hegge said that the author was not bitter nor even surprised at the Swedish decision. Mr. Solzhenitsyn said that since he would receive no invitation and since the embassy did not intend to give him the prize he saw no reason for any further talks with the Swedish diplomats. He was said to be disappointed, however, that he would not be able to see the "famous Gunner Jarring."

Later Mr. Solzhenitsyn was said to have asked the embassy via Mr. Hegge whether the embassy could possibly forward a letter from him to the Secretary of the Swedish Academy, Karl Ragnar Gierow. The embassy reportedly first said no but then reluctantly gave in on the condition that the letter be unsealed so that the embassy could check its contents. The letter eventually reached Mr. Gierow.

Commenting on Mr. Hegge's book, Premier Olof Palme said that Mr. Solzhenitsyn could certainly have received his prize at the embassy if he had consented to do it without a ceremony.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 September 1971

CPYRGHT

The Rebuff of Solzhenitsyn

To the Editor:

Premier Olof Palme of Sweden is wrong in maintaining in his Sept. 17 letter that "a representative of Solzhenitsyn's publishers" proposed a ceremony in the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. As my book "Go-Between in Moscow" makes clear, and as the Swedish Embassy in Moscow notes, it was the Nobel laureate himself who, through me, at an early stage inquired whether presentation of the award at the embassy was possible. The answer

to this was no.

At the same time the embassy refused to give him an invitation card to the embassy for a conversation, stating as the reason that the embassy cannot invite private Soviet citizens.

In my view, Mr. Palme should answer the following question: How does he envisage the presentation of the Nobel Prize in an embassy that flatly refuses to invite the laureate?

PER EGIL HEGGE

Oslo, Norway, Sept. 17, 1971

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
20 October 1971

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Solzhenitsyn Rejects Secret 'Prize-giving'

ALLEXANDER Solzhenitsyn, winner of last year's Nobel Prize for literature, has insisted that he should receive his diploma and gold medal at a public ceremony in Moscow.

A request by the Soviet writer to receive the awards at a ceremony in the Swedish Embassy in Moscow and deliver his Nobel lecture has already been turned down by Dr Gunnar Jarring, Ambassador to Russia.

Instead, Dr Jarring offered to present the award privately—clearly so as not to offend the Soviet authorities.

Solzhenitsyn, 52, has written

to Per Egil Hegge, a Norwegian journalist expelled from Russia earlier this year, saying that to agree to such a proposal "would mean degrading the prize, regarding it as something shameful which must be hidden."

"Stolen goods?"

The writer also expressed surprise at Mr Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, who wrote to the *New York Times* to justify his Government's decision.

"Is the Nobel prize really stolen goods that must be presented behind closed doors and without witnesses?" he asked.

"And why was he (Mr Palme) so sure in advance that my

speech would be political? Suppose it would have been purely literary?"

Solzhenitsyn expressed his gratitude that Dr K. G. Gierow, permanent secretary to the Swedish Academy, was prepared to come to Moscow but said the academy must first reach an agreement with the Russian authorities and that, he feared, was not possible at present.

A week ago the National Swedish Authors' Association protested against the "degrading treatment" of Solzhenitsyn by the Swedish Foreign Ministry and Nobel officials.

The prize money of £52,000 was paid into the writer's account in a Swiss bank

NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 1971

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Text of Solzhenitsyn Letter to the Swedish Academy

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 23—Following is the text of a letter written Dec. 4 by the Nobel Prize novelist Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn to Dr. Karl Ragnar Gierow, permanent secretary of the Swedish Academy, suggesting an open ceremony in Moscow for the presentation of his Nobel medal and his Nobel lecture. The translation from the Russian was prepared by The New York Times.

Your last four letters [of Oct. 7 and 14 and Nov. 9 and 22] make all the more clear that it is feasible to present the Nobel medal to me in Moscow in a worthy—as you describe it—setting.

First of all I say: Although it seems that the obstacles are increasing and my cheerfulness is weakening, I highly and sincerely value the unwavering intention you have expressed to come to Moscow personally, at any time and under any conditions, in order that this presentation take place. I am sincerely grateful to you for such a decision and, speaking frankly, it is a ray of

light that shines through this much-encumbered situation.

And so, after all the inquiries, newspaper articles, press communiqués, answers of the Swedish Foreign Ministry and even personal explanations of your Premier, we come back to that which Mr. Jarring generously and effortlessly suggested to me a year ago: a secret, unpublished presentation of the Nobel medal in his closed study.

As the proverb goes: Just a little drop from a big cloud.

But the whole annoyance turns out to be that the Swedish Embassy in Moscow simply does not have the premises for any other procedure. (And because of this misfortune, maybe it can never even hold receptions?)

The question arises: Is there not some semantic misunderstanding? Is it not that Ambassador Jarring and the administration over him understand that, under the heading of "openness" and "publicity" for the procedure, it should be unfailingly "massive"? If it is not from eye to eye, then only in the presence of 1,000 people? For that, indeed, there are no

premises. But in Mr. Jarring's own study, is there not space for chairs for 30 people? And if these guests are invited by you and me, then I think this is an entirely worthy setting for the reading of the Nobel lecture. That is the most simple solution.

Alas, alas, I fear that it is not superficial semantics and the proprietors of the premises that separate us, but the unexpected difference in the understanding of where the frontiers of culture run. The Swedish Embassy has on its staff a cultural attaché and, consequently, his activities embrace all kinds of cultural questions, acts and events. But is the presentation of the Nobel Prize (unfortunately to me on this occasion) considered as an aspect of cultural life uniting our peoples? And if not, rather a reprehensible shadow threatening to darken the embassy's activity? Then, even with the largest premises, Mr. Gierow, there is no way of finding a place for our procedure.

'Independent and Inviolable'

But at this point I recall with comfort your words that the Swedish Academy and the Nobel Foundation are independent and inviolable and that an official ceremony organized "as though" by the Swedish state could even damage this state of affairs.

While understanding very well and sharing your feeling, and on the other hand not knowing in Moscow any public or cooperative organization that would agree to provide us with premises for the purpose in question, I venture to propose to you another possibility: to carry out the whole ceremony in Moscow in a private apartment, namely at the address to which you send me letters.

It is true this apartment is certainly not more spacious than the Swedish Embassy, but 40 to 50 people could be accommodated—in the Russian understanding—quite freely. This ceremony might lose somewhat in official character but would gain in homely warmth. And moreover, Mr. Gierow, just imagine what a load we would take off the mind of the Swed-

<p>ish Ambassador and from the Swedish Foreign Ministry.</p> <p>I do not know the Nobel annals, but I suppose there may have been a case in the past when a Nobel laureate was confined to a place—say, for example, due to sickness—and the representative of the foundation or the academy traveled to present him the prize at home.</p>	<p>His Son May Receive It</p> <p>And if all possibilities are barred to us? Well, then we will submit to fate: Let my Nobel medal continue to be kept in the Nobel Foundation. After all, it will not lose value from that. And sometime, even after my death, your successors, with understanding, will present it to my son.</p> <p>However, the Nobel lecture on literature in 1970, which</p>	<p>has already waited a year, is growing old. What shall we do with that? . . .</p> <p>In this letter, Mr. Glerow, I have allowed myself a somewhat frivolous tone only in order to cope more easily with the unpleasant complications. But you will recognize that nowhere was this tone addressed to you personally. Your decision is noble, to the limit of what you can do, and again I</p>	<p>warmly thank you for it.</p> <p>Convey my very best wishes to Mr. Nils Stenble [director of the Nobel Foundation], who, as I understood it, completely shares your views and opinions.</p> <p>Believing all the same that it is not precluded that we will meet in this life, I firmly shake your hand.</p> <p>Sincerely yours, SOLZHENITSYN.</p>
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WASHINGTON POST
24 December 1971

Author Mocks Swedes For Nobel Prize Snub

By Per Egil Hegge

OSLO, Dec. 23—Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the great dissident Soviet novelist, has written a devastatingly ironic letter to the Swedish Academy over Sweden's bumbling efforts to deliver his Nobel Prize insignia under the table to avoid offending the Soviet government.

In the letter, Solzhenitsyn suggested that the insignia be presented to him at a private flat in Moscow, since the Swedish embassy had not approved his proposals for a ceremony there.

With an ironic jab at the expense of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish embassy in Moscow, he said that such an arrangement would relieve these two institutions of a great "spiritual burden."

The letter, dated Dec. 14, was sent to the permanent secretary of the Swedish Academy, Dr. Karl-Ragnar Glerow. Solzhenitsyn has since taken steps to have it made public in Scandinavia.

Dr. Glerow confirmed that the letter has arrived, and that an answer has been sent. Dr. Glerow has stated that he is ready to go to Moscow to present the insignia, a medal and a diploma, to the author.

Last year, Solzhenitsyn intended to go to Stockholm for the Nobel ceremony but changed his mind when he felt that he might not be allowed to return to the Soviet Union. He then approached the Swedish

embassy, whose chief is Gunnar V. Jarring, special U.N. mediator on the Middle East and a reportedly reluctant candidate to succeed U Thant as secretary general, to inquire about the possibility of receiving the prize in the Swedish embassy.

The Nobel Prize winner felt rebuffed by the way the Swedish embassy treated his request for permission to have a few friends present during a Nobel ceremony there. After some criticism in Sweden over the way the affair was handled, the Swedish position is now that he may have the prize in the embassy, with friends present.

But, as Solzhenitsyn now insists on reading his Nobel lecture at the ceremony—a condition he did not make last year—the Swedes have said there is not enough space in the embassy for that. In his letter, Solzhenitsyn makes it clear that he sees this development as a pretext for avoiding a ceremony out of fear it might affect Sweden's relations with the Soviet Union:

"The whole misery then, is due to the fact that the Swedish embassy simply has no locality for any other procedure (than a secret, unpublicized ceremony). Perhaps they never even give receptions there because of this misfortune."

Alluding to the coolness with which he felt he was treated by the Swedes last year, he says the private flat which he proposes as a locality "is by no means bigger than

the Swedish embassy, but there is easily room for 40 to 50 people, by Russian standards. The ceremony might lose somewhat in official atmosphere, but then it might gain in homely warmth. And besides, imagine, Mr. Glerow, what a spiritual burden we shall then lift from the Swedish ambassador and even from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

Solzhenitsyn sees the explanation that there is not enough space in the embassy, as a reflection of an unexpected difference of opinion over the borders of culture.

"Does the Swedish embassy regard the presentation of the Nobel Prize (this time regretably, to me) as a cultural phenomenon which unites our peoples? And if it does not, but sees it rather as a prejudicial shadow, threatening to darken the activity of the embassy, then, Mr. Glerow, it would never be possible to find space for our procedure."

Towards the end of his letter, Solzhenitsyn says: "So what if, after all, every variation should prove impracticable? Well, let us subordinate ourselves to fate. Perhaps some time, even after my death, your successors will, with understanding, hand the insignia over to my son."

Publicly, the Swedish government has supported the Swedish embassy and Jarring in the handling of the Solzhenitsyn case. However, prominent ministers are known to have expressed misgivings in private over the way the matter has been dealt with.

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Solzhenitsyn to Get Nobel Prize At Private Ceremony in Moscow

CPYRGHT

<p>STOCKHOLM, Jan. 4 (Reuters)—The Swedish Academy said today that it would present the gold medal and diploma for the 1970 Nobel Prize in literature to Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn at a private ceremony in Moscow in the spring. The decision, announced by</p>	<p>the academy secretary, Dr. Karl Ragnar Gierow, ends a dispute over whether the insignia should be handed over at an official ceremony in the Swedish Embassy in Moscow or privately. The author, who is in official disgrace and whose works are banned in the Soviet Union,</p>	<p>originally declined to accept the prize at the traditional ceremony in Stockholm because he feared he would not be allowed to return home. His cash prize, worth \$83,000, has been paid into a Swiss bank account in his name. At one point in the debate</p>	<p>over the last year, the author asked the Swedish Government whether the prize was something to be ashamed of or hidden from the public. He proposed a small open ceremony at the embassy or, as an alternative, a ceremony in a Moscow apartment.</p>
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WASHINGTON POST
19 June 1971

CPYRGHT

Maybe the Century's Greatest Russian Novel

CPYRGHT

By Anatole Shub

<p>LONDON — A plain, white, soft-covered book of 570 pages, published in Paris last week with no advance warning, may well herald the most important Russian literary work of the 20th century. The book is "August 1914: Part One," by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize laureate in 1970, who has been slowly ostracized by Soviet Communist leaders since 1965. "August 1914: Part One" is, without a doubt, Solzhenitsyn's most ambitious novel to date. It is one which both explicitly and implicitly invites comparison with Tolstoy's "War and Peace." Written during 1969 and 1970, the novel is, moreover, but the start of a larger epic series which Solzhenitsyn, in a postscript, says will take him 20 years. The succeeding volumes, Solzhenitsyn adds laconically, will deal with the "Following Years" after 1914. In short, the 52-year-old novelist — former army captain, concentration-camp prisoner, cancer patient and moral hero of today's dissident Soviet intelligentsia — is serenely preparing, despite official displeasure, to write the</p>	<p>sian revolution. His is clearly an attempt to fix, shape and color, for the consciousness of future generations, the primal upheaval of recent Russian history with the same finality that Tolstoy depicted the Napoleonic wars. For Solzhenitsyn, the parallel with Tolstoy is conscious. Tolstoy himself appears briefly as a character in "August 1914." His social ideas are later discussed by other characters. And, perhaps most important, the Russian generals and officers of 1914 are shown to be constantly ruminating on Tolstoy's view of war, gauging their own conduct in the storm and stress of battle against the General Kutuzov of 1812 — not so much the historic Kutuzov as Tolstoy's Kutuzov. There is more war than peace in "August 1914," which describes the ill-fated Russian offensive into East Prussia that culminated in encirclement and rout by Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg. But, like Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn brings the social fabric and cultural atmosphere of civilian Russia to the battlefield through a rich variety of characters, both historic and completely fictitious. Like Tolstoy, he does not shy away from portraying the great and near-great at</p>	<p>close quarters—the British military attache, General Alfred Knox (who played an even greater role in the Russian civil war), the Huguenot genius of the Prussian army, General Von Francois, the man-mountain Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Perhaps the most masterful portrait in the book is of the ill-fated General Alexander Samsonov, whose Second Army perished in the encirclement at Tannenberg and who (in a haunting scene that will be read and reread for generations) redeemed his honor by shooting himself. As Prince Andrey spoke for Tolstoy and, saw with his eyes, Solzhenitsyn's hero is a young general staff colonel, Georgi Vorotintsev, whose mission takes him from corps to corps, from regiment to regiment, from GIIQ to behind the enemy lines. Brave, sensible, modest, a sensitive officer and patriot without illusions, Vorotintsev expresses for Solzhenitsyn the best in pre-revolutionary Russia. While some of the East Prussian landscape through which he passes was traversed by Artillery Captain Solzhenitsyn himself in 1944-45, Vorotintsev's character may represent the</p>	<p>father, an Imperial artillery captain who fought at Tannenberg. As a war novel alone, "August 1914" is superb, with vivid detail expertly woven into the larger movements and dilemmas of the clashing armies. But Solzhenitsyn rarely loses sight of the manner in which the war presaged the convulsion that doomed old Russian society. He shows us not only the battlefield itself through many eyes, but the varying contemporary perceptions of the war and its meaning—official myths, popular hopes, German and allied plans, revolutionary interpretations, philosophic theories. Little of this—even the brief, dry summaries of German strategy—is presented didactically. Nearly always, Solzhenitsyn expresses the general through the particular: through a scene, an incident, a dialogue, sometimes no more than a phrase. For Solzhenitsyn as a literary craftsman, "August 1914" represents a departure and an advance over previous works. Criticized sometimes (by his admirers, not his Soviet literary-political foes) for previous adherence to classic 19th-century narrative technique, Solzhenitsyn here embarks on the path of innovation. Into</p>
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ed—somewhat in the manner of "U.S.A."—newspaper headlines, official documents, songs of the time, and a remarkable series of "Cinema screen" prose poems which have the freedom and power of a Greek chorus. The cumulative effect is a scope and fluidity of movement which make "The First Circle" seem, by comparison, a conventional set piece.

Stylistically, "August 1914" is Solzhenitsyn at his best—and beyond it. Here the narrative economy of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" (1962) is combined with the diamond-sharp linguistic precision and vividness shown in the "Prose Tales and Miniature Sketches" (1965). Moreover, Solzhenitsyn's command of the ebb and flow of different styles—straight narrative Russian and dialects, interior monologues, pointilliste descriptions, the "cinema screen" prose poems—is supremely musical in construction, recalling such operatic masters as Verdi and Mussorgsky. (Might this power now for Solzhenitsyn, unconsciously reflect his close friendship these last few years with Mstislav Rostropovich, the cellist, and his wife, soprano Galina Vishnevskaya?)

The German novelist Heinrich Böll remarked, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that if the Kremlin were suddenly to permit Solzhenitsyn's works to be published in Russia, "It would start an avalanche." In many ways, "August 1914" proves Böll's point. To be sure, Konstantin Simonov among others in Moscow, has argued that it could and should be published in Russia, and there is nothing in the book that could remotely be considered, in any sane view, as an attack on the Soviet government. Nevertheless, "August 1914" represents the most profound sort of challenge to the very essence of the Stalinist and Neo-Stalinist regime which (except for the putative thaws of 1954-56 and 1962-64) has subjected two generations of Russians to a new glacial age.

The challenge is, in the first place, that of blindingly superior quality—the contrast offered by Solzhenitsyn's excellence, originality and broadness of spirit to the malignant meanness of the pre-revolutionary dwarfs who rule Soviet life.

Millions of Soviet citizens, official menacity and pap, would surely queue up instantly, as at a breadline in a siege, to read even a few pages of a book of such shining merits.

Yet, beyond purely literary genius, there is Solzhenitsyn's view of Russia, its inner glory and failure during the central tragedy of its experience. A uniquely personal view, it will not particularly shock the Western reader, for it is not very different from the view that, say, Chckhov might have taken had he lived to see and write about the events of 1914—sympathetic, clinical, humane, realistic.

Although Solzhenitsyn's characters among them express all sorts of opinions, from anarchist and populist to Tolstoyan and Fascist, the author's overall view is that of a free-thinking skeptic and a natural patriot. He is neither monarchist nor revolutionary, neither rationalist nor mystic (in refreshing contrast to Pasternak), neither religious believer (even in the Tolstoyan heresy) nor militant postivist.

Slavophile, perhaps—but with barely concealed contempt for the pan-Slavism which the Tsarist government invoked in 1914 to "help poor Serbia." Anti-intellectual, also, to a degree—except that Colonel Vorotintsev is not the only positive hero endowed with superior education and intelligence, and there is no glamorizing of peasants, workers and subalterns.

Such a view is as out of touch with current Kremlin ideology as the later works of Thomas Mann were with the weltanschauung of Doctor Goebbels. It is no accident (as Pravda might, but will not, say) that the late Georg Lukacs, whose lifetime literary model was Thomas Mann, wrote his last book in praise of Solzhenitsyn.

What will most offend the literary policemen of Mr. Brezhnev's agit-prop department is the whole of Solzhenitsyn's treatment of 1914 rather than any particular passages. It is offensive to Leninist-Stalinists precisely because Solzhenitsyn attempts a truthful, multicolored and ultimately loving—rather than dogmatic or pre-revolutionary Russia.

While Solzhenitsyn shows, the weaknesses, failures and corruptions of Tsarist Russia, he also portrays the faultiness, arrogant pride and frivolity of those who were (by omission and commission) to destroy the old regime. But all these weaknesses, on either side and in the middle—as well as the courage and perspicacity to be found among individuals in all camps—he portrays as human qualities as in the nature of the human condition, transcending "Tsarist autocracy," "capitalism" or similar transient political-science categories.

Critics both East and West, sympathetic and unsympathetic, will spend decades analyzing and debating particular dialogues in "August 1914," which pose and confront the most difficult, often agonizing historical and philosophical questions.

The Kremlin, for example, may well choose to maintain utter silence about this book, as it did about "Cancer Ward" and "First Circle." But, if they were unleashed, Communist critics might have a field day with dialogues in which characters suggest that neither capitalism nor socialism but production itself is the key to material wealth, and that 90 per cent of the secret of production is intelligence, knowledge, innovation and organizational talent rather than (Marx to the contrary) the labor of the masses.

Similarly, Russian nationalists (in emigration as well as in the Soviet Union) will not enjoy the manner in which Solzhenitsyn gives the Germans of 1914 their due, both for a higher level of civilization generally and for superior strategy, tactics and execution on the battlefield.

In indicating that the Germans earned their victory, Solzhenitsyn also rejects Tolstoy's view of the chance nature of war, as elsewhere he questions even more poignantly Tolstoy's faith in the immanent power of love and good.

Westerners and "westernizing" Russians, for their part, will be uncomfortable with Solzhenitsyn's hostile view of the Franco-Russian alliance, his acid portrait of General Knox, his lines at the Tsarist generals of German origin, and his mocking

of young educated Russians' "English gentlemen."

Liberals, optimists and Rousseauvians of all countries—but especially Russian democrats in emigration—will wince at his suggestion that most of mankind (and specifically most of the Russians of 1914) were "not ready" for the brave new world of intellectuals' dreams, nor for the kingdom of heaven on earth.

While there is a serenity and verve in Solzhenitsyn the writer which is anything but pessimistic, and his zest for the mysteries of individual personality is absolutely cheerful, "August 1914" is a tragedy, and Solzhenitsyn's is the tragic view of life and history.

In the final pages of the book, Colonel Vorotintsev confronts the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the entire high command, to denounce the strategy which led the ill-prepared Russian army to launch an offensive into East Prussia primarily to fulfill a lightly-undertaken military convention with France. In fact, the hasty Russian offensive compelled the Germans to transfer divisions from the western front, enabling Marshal Joffre to win the Battle of the Marne and save Paris.

The generals plead treaty obligations, and Vorotintsev replies: "According to the convention, Russia promised decisive aid but not suicidal. Your Excellency, you under-signed suicide for Russia. . . Even the French will not appreciate us for this tomorrow."

The current Kremlin authorities can hardly be expected to appreciate the suggestion that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represents the product of Russia's suicide—even from an author who was born under Lenin and fought to defend his country under (and despite) Stalin.

The last sentence of Solzhenitsyn's magnificent novel quietly advises both the oppressors and the oppressed in today's Russia not to take his view personally. "Injustice," he says, "did not begin with us, nor will it end with us." Above and beyond the smoke of battlefield and the gas of ideologies, Solzhenitsyn's is the vision of Ecclesiastes.

LITERARY GAZETTE
12 January 1972

JOURNAL NOTES W. GERMAN ARTICLE ON SOLZHENITSYN

Moscow January 11 TASS--The LITERARY GAZETTE comments on information about the family background of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn published in the STERN magazine of Hamburg. A correspondent of the magazine, who visited the north Caucasus where the Solzhenitsyn's lived, says that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's father belonged to the family of a wealthy landowner.

A LITERARY GAZETTE correspondent who also visited the north Caucasus writes: "Indeed, in the village of Sablya old-timers still remember the wealthy family of the Solzhenitsyn's. His grandfather, Semen Yefimovich Solzhenitsyn, owned up to 2,000 dessiatinas of land and about 20,000 head of sheep early in the present century. (one dessiatina equals 2.7 acres).

He employed over 50 farmhands.

"Of course, we are far from the idea to set up a direct vulgar sociological connection between the descent of a person, his surroundings in adolescence and his upbringing on the one hand, and his activities at an adult age on the other hand," the newspaper notes.

The article in the STERN magazine was printed in connection with the publication in the West of Solzhenitsyn's book "August, 1914". Many Western newspapers and magazines, the LITERARY GAZETTE writes, emphasize the anti-Soviet trend of this novel. For example, the Washington POST said that "August 1914" is a real undisguised challenge thrown by Solzhenitsyn to the present regime and directed against its essence.

"The appearance of this book in the West (the manuscript was handed over abroad by the author himself along with the publishing rights and a detailed instruction concerning the fees) turned out very helpful for anti-Soviet elements of every description. Although this composition seems to deal with a historical subject (depicting the defeat by the Germans of General Samsonov's army in August 1914), anti-Soviet elements immediately grasped the rich opportunities offered them by Solzhenitsyn", the LITERARY GAZETTE said.

"The editors of the Hamburg magazine pondered over the question posed incidentally by other Western periodicals: How much autobiographical is Solzhenitsyn's composition? or, more exactly, how much have the author's family background, upbringing and inherited views told on its contents? and here, they succeeded in bringing very curious details to light", the LITERARY GAZETTE says in conclusion.

BALTIMORE SUN
12 January 1972

Tass calls new Solzhenitsyn novel 'helpful for anti-Soviet elements'

Moscow (AP)—The Soviet press charged last night that Alexander Solzhenitsyn's latest novel, "August 1914," has "turned out to be very helpful for anti-Soviet elements of every description."

The first official comment here on the work of Mr. Solzhenitsyn, winner of the 1970 Nobel Prize for literature, was to appear in today's edition of the *Literary Gazette*, newspaper of the Writers Union. A synopsis of the comment was distributed by the official news agency, Tass. This aroused speculation whether some action against Mr. Solzhenitsyn might be contemplated.

"August 1914," published in the West but banned in Russia, describes the early days of World War I on the Russian

front and the defeat of a Russian army commanded by a General Samsonov.

"Although this composition seems to deal with a historical subject, anti-Soviet elements immediately grasped the rich opportunities offered them by Solzhenitsyn," Tass quoted the *Literary Gazette* as saying.

"Many Western newspapers and magazines emphasize the anti-Soviet trend of this novel. For example, the *Washington Post* said that 'August 1914' is a real undisguised challenge directed by Solzhenitsyn at the present regime and at its essence."

The Soviet literary newspaper also accused Mr. Solzhenitsyn of perpetuating in his work such prerevolutionary ideas as private ownership of land and the employment of private laborers. It referred to a story published

earlier this year by the West German magazine, *Stern*.

"A correspondent of the magazine, who visited the North Caucasus where the Solzhenitsyns lived, says that Alexander Solzhenitsyn's father belonged to the family of a wealthy landowner," Tass quoted *Literary Gazette* as saying.

"A *Literary Gazette* correspondent who also visited the North Caucasus writes:

"Indeed, in the village of Sablya, old-timers still remember the wealthy family of the Solzhenitsyns. His grandfather, Semyon Yefimovich Solzhenitsyn, owned up to 2,000 desyatinas of land and about 20,000 head of sheep early in the present century. He employed over 50 farmhands."

A "desyatina" is an old Russian measure of land equal to 2.7 acres.

RUSSIAN commentators say Nobel Prize-winner Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn is a mediocre writer, and they'll prove it as soon as they're allowed to read his banned books.

INTERPLAY
February 1971

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Obsession of Morality

Abraham Rothberg

With the memories of the roles that writers and intellectuals played in the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 reinforced by the consciousness of how the Czechoslovak writers and intellectuals contributed to the liberalization of their country from 1966 to 1968, the Soviet authorities are determined to see that Solzhenitsyn's works, like those of a number of other Soviet writers, bring neither increased turbulence at home nor decreased prestige and power for the Soviet Union and its leadership abroad. If they are uneasy about Solzhenitsyn's "blackening the image" of the USSR, of providing grist for foreign "anti-Soviet" propaganda mills, they are increasingly resentful of the position which Solzhenitsyn willy-nilly has come to occupy as the leader of the "domestic opposition." Many would, with justice, confer such a title on Pyotr Yakir, or Andrei Sakharov, or General Grigorenko, but in some ways Solzhenitsyn speaks for all of them in a voice they all respect and admire, and what he says in his books is given international attention in a way in which their words usually are not.

Solzhenitsyn's publications in the West have displeased the Soviet leaders, yet they have given the novelist a continuing leverage with the regime while making it even more concerned with effectively controlling him. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has not been eager to use the outright and most coercive Stalinist methods of the past against him, but that they are determined to bring the novelist to heel is unquestionable. Soviet leaders have had long, and for the writers tragic, experience in "handling" literary mavericks (not to speak of other kinds of mavericks) with an arsenal that includes censorship, denial of publication, ostracism, harassment, blackmail, confinement in mental institutions, exile, imprisonment and execution.

The present Soviet authorities have, in general, refrained from using the most violent of such measures against writers, especially those with some international reputation, but when they have thought

the occasion required it, as in the cases of Sinyavsky and Daniel, for instance, the rulers of the Soviet Union continue to be quite capable of using almost the entire gamut of neo-Stalinist terror. However much Soviet leaders protest to the contrary, and however much they do tarnish their reputation when they feel their power seriously challenged or important doctrinal issues at stake (witness the lengths to which they were willing to go in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), they remain quite sensitive about their "image" abroad. Because they have for decades forwarded themselves as the leader of "progressive" causes and as the "motherland of socialism," because they have built a modern Potemkin facade with which to dupe and distract the unwary in the rest of the world about the virtues and accomplishments of their system, and because it is important for them to retain the loyalties of their many sympathizers and Communist Party members abroad, they must pay very careful attention to any Soviet writer who would disabuse people at home or abroad about Soviet intentions and who would disenchant them about "Soviet reality."

Other reasons, more difficult to define but persistent nonetheless, go far back into Russian history and deep into the Russian psyche, both of which have so often revealed the most abject sense of inferiority to things Western while simultaneously asserting a compensatory and overweening Slavic sense of superiority and manifest destiny. Andrei Amalric, whose own realistically ironic view of his people has much to commend it, has written: "The idea of justice is motivated [in Russia] by the hatred of everything that is outstanding, which we make no effort to imitate, but, on the contrary, try to bring down to our level. . . . This psychology is, of course, most typical of the peasantry . . . and those of peasant origin constitute the overwhelming majority in our country."

THE FAILURE OF THE REVOLUTION

Solzhenitsyn's writings have made him the best-known Soviet literary figure abroad since Boris Pasternak and the same focus of controversy at home. But Pasternak was a more subtle and eccentric writer, less willing to become a leader of literary or political opposition—and less able—a man obsessed with his private life and his art almost to the exclusion of the public life. Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, writes more simply and straightforwardly, and is therefore available to much broader audiences than was Pasternak. Though each of the men wrote about the life he knew and lived, they belonged to different generations, and the experiences of Solzhenitsyn's generation are closer to the present-day Soviet audience, particularly the youth. Where the main action of *Dr. Zhivago*, therefore, takes place during the period 1903 to 1929, with a brief epilogue and conclusion set at the end of World War II, it is World War II where Solzhenitsyn's writings begin to be set, and most of his work is set in postwar Soviet Russia, giving it greater impact and appeal to contemporary readers. If Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* "goes so far as to cast doubt upon the validity of the October Revolution, describing it as almost the greatest crime in Russian history," as Anatoly Surkov said, then Solzhenitsyn's works document the failure of the consequences of that revolution and the bankruptcy of the system which was built on it. In spite of his personal shyness and retiring nature, Solzhenitsyn is a man obsessed with the injustices done to his country and people, as well as to him personally, and he is compelled to bear witness to the injuries which were inflicted on him and which symbolize what the country and the people at large have endured, and at the same time to resist their repetition. Where Pasternak evidently knew when and how to accommodate himself to the regime for survival, and was even sufficiently terrorized by Khrushchev to repudiate the Nobel Prize, Solzhenitsyn has so far refused to kiss the rod, has stood his ground, accepting the Nobel Prize, resisting the regime's commands in a way that Pasternak, both for reasons of character and because most of his life was spent under Stalin, could not.

On the basis of this courageous personal commitment, exemplified both in his life and his writing, Solzhenitsyn has become a symbol of conscience in the Soviet Union, a rallying point for those who would loosen the reins of tyranny and a political *cause célèbre* at home and internationally. These roles, domestic and foreign, compounded of reality and myth, have displeased the Soviet authorities, and the

Prize for literature to Solzhenitsyn for carrying on the ethical traditions of Russian writing could consequently only exacerbate their displeasure—and simultaneously give additional leverage, an added measure of personal safety, to Solzhenitsyn. One must look, even in the Soviet Union, for a Nobel Prize winner with impunity. In the circumstances, Soviet leaders were bound to remember that oft-repeated saying which swept the Moscow intelligentsia after the publication of Solzhenitsyn's first novel: "Tell me what you think of *Ivan Denisovich* and I will tell you what you are."

Solzhenitsyn also represents the new Soviet generation which has not, as yet, come to the most important seats of power. Born in 1918, he is, unlike Pasternak, altogether a product of the Soviet system, and it is difficult to accuse him of being tainted by a former "bourgeois" life, as was done with Pasternak. He has never been abroad, except during the fighting of World War II, and then only in Poland and East Germany, and has few foreign friends or connections. His war record and his public stance, as well as his books, demonstrate that he is a man who loves Russia with that curious and intense ambivalence that afflicts almost all the best Russian writers, a man who has consciously accepted the role of conscience for his people and his country.

NO NEED FOR "GOOD" BOOKS

Whatever the changes in "theory" or in the political exigencies, there is continuous regime hostility and repressiveness against the works of any Soviet writer who criticizes any important aspect of Soviet life. This is especially true of those who would restore the truth to Soviet history and to the Soviet people's picture of themselves and their lives, just as it is true for those who would jettison or resist the leading role of the Party, who would deny that Marxist-Leninism is not a perfect philosophy, or that its so-called embodiment in the Soviet system is either perfect or on its way to perfection, or who would defend individuals' private lives and put them beyond the Party's indoctrination or control. The Soviet regime does need "good" books, books "good" enough for people to want to read them, but only such "good" books as do their bidding. Since Stalin came to power, the Soviet authorities have not been able to elicit such books from their writers, either from those most faithful to their cause, or from those alienated from it, because good books cannot be written to order. Given their insistence on Party tutelage in the arts, their compulsive need to control every aspect of the creative process, their failure is no surprise. In the end, the Russian writer can write for the desk drawer, or write for an audience

abroad—dangerous, frustrating and in important ways artistically debilitating—or confine himself to that small audience he can reach through the *samizdat* network, with all its shortcomings.

All these choices are ultimately unsatisfactory to the truly creative among Russian artists, yet the regime will permit them no others because it is truly terrified and horrified by freedom of creativity. They have seen how often "liberating" literature has powerful political repercussions which are antithetical to their interests. It is a tribute to their respect for the power of the word that they watch it so carefully, reward it so well, and praise it so fulsomely when it does their bidding; but trust it they do not. Year in and year out, therefore, the Soviet rulers fight even the slightest literary and intellectual deviations from their political imperatives: there is always a Party line—and someone is always overstepping it.

WARNING OF ANOTHER "SILVER AGE"

Even if the Soviet leaders permitted a degree of creative freedom they never even seem to have considered, it is unlikely that an important literature would arise in the Soviet Union for quite some time. Such a literature takes layer and layer of writers and writing as a "seedbed" for great writers and great works. The writers of Russia are not without gifts, but they have not been permitted to exercise those gifts, to read and have discourse with other writers and writings, to breathe the winds of the world of culture for almost 40 years. Police terror and censorship had instilled a profound wariness, an internal censorship in most writers which must be difficult if not impossible to surmount; and if some few writers do surmount it, they must expend great creative energy in doing so which would otherwise go into their writings. Stifled since the 1930s, at least two generations of writers have been deprived of or have surrendered their heritage for a pot of message, and, as a consequence, who has been interested in a Soviet writer or painter or sculptor anywhere outside of the Communist bloc for the past four decades?

Some few—Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak, the painter Glazounov and the sculptor Ernst Neztvestny—are the rare exceptions which prove the rule. As Peter Benno put it so astutely:

Khrushchevian Moscow is very far from being—or ever becoming—another Periclean Athens, Medicean Florence, or Alexandrine Petersburg. Despite the wishful thinking that in both Russia and the West often colors the view of this cultural flowering, in actual fact the literary merit of most (if not all) of the great successes of the post-Stalin era is low by any standards and in particular—to take the example closest in time and culture—by comparison with the works of the generation of Russia's "Silver Age" in the first three decades of the present century.

In his novels, his major works, Solzhenitsyn has set out to tear the scales from the eyes of the ordinary Russian, and it is the Russian reader which primarily concerns him, to force him to face Soviet life as it really is, shorn of ideological trappings, cant and camouflage. This is symbolically shown in the stage instructions for Solzhenitsyn's play, *The Love-Girl and the Innocent*, in which the old Potemkin facade is explicit:

The curtain rises. It is an ordinary theater curtain, but is not used again until the end of the play. Behind it there is a second curtain—a length of fabric crudely painted with a poster-like industrial landscape, depicting cheerful, apple-cheeked, muscular men and women working away quite effortlessly. In one corner of the curtain a joyful procession is in progress complete with flowers, children and a portrait of Stalin.

But beyond that curtain is a concentration camp, with its prisoners and guards, its barbed wire and watchtowers. All three of Solzhenitsyn's novels insist on just such an unrelenting examination of Soviet society and its recent history, exposing both as vicious and bankrupt, depicting Soviet reality as a vast police-state concentration camp.

INMATES OF CLOSED SYSTEMS

Using what at first would seem to be extreme or marginal settings and situations—a concentration camp, a prisoner research center, a cancer hospital—as metaphors for Soviet society, Solzhenitsyn shows them to be central to the Soviet experience, microcosms of all Soviet society. Solzhenitsyn perceives the Soviet people as inmates of closed systems in which all are sentenced and condemned, usually unjustly and without legal recourse or appeal, and in which all are doomed. Incarcerated in penal colonies, condemned to exile, isolation, loneliness, illness and death, all his characters are at the mercy of cruel and implacable institutions, and the vicious and violent who run them.

Since the settings are places *in extremis*, there is almost no ordinary life, or ordinary life has become so malevolent that most of its healing and solace are lost or attenuated. There are no wives and children, no creature comforts, or very few, and his prisoners and patients remember their former "ordinary" lives as an unreal dream, the daily round of common life having receded into the mists of fantasy. Thus Solzhenitsyn makes ordinary life seem to be extraordinary, common life uncommon, and the violations and ravages of concentration camp and police state, cancer and the cancer ward, routine.

Solzhenitsyn deliberately chooses institutions which by their nature permit the selection and depiction of a cross-section of Soviet life. People of different classes, education and ethnic back-

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grounds called for them. The secret police, bureaucrats and intelligentsia, are thrown together so their varying characters and viewpoints are contrasted. Throughout there is the one constant of traditional Russian literature: the "they" of the rulers and the "we" of the ruled, of the oppressors and the oppressed; but even the rulers and oppressors are themselves ruled and oppressed by those above them in hierarchy, so that almost all of his characters are at the mercy of others, almost none have control over their own lives, almost all live in fear and servility: tyranny, pain, deprivation and death are epidemic and inevitable. In *Ivan Denisovich*, the "we" are the prisoners, the "they" the Gulag camp administration; in *The First Circle*, the "we" are the prisoner scientists and technicians, the "they" their MGB jailers and the secret-police and government bureaucrats all the way up the hierarchy through Ryumin and Abakumov to Stalin himself; in *Cancer Ward*, the "we" are the patients and the "they" are the medical staff.

Within the institutions he portrays, Solzhenitsyn shows the omnipresent pecking order, the gradations of privilege and deprivation, with everyone, or almost everyone, trying to move up the ladder of privilege by one or more rungs by hook or by crook. Because almost no one is free and independence is always threatened, meaningful life, personal integrity and the sense of values are always under assault, both from above and from below. Even in the concentration camp there is a pecking order. At the top is the Chekist Lt. Volkovoi, the camp security chief, who used to beat prisoners with a "whip of plaited leather, as thick as his forearm." At the very bottom are the jackals like Fetiukov, or the "goners" (in *Love-Girl and the Innocent*), men at the end of their tether, who search in garbage pails for food or lick out the bowls of other prisoners after they have eaten. Between them is a whole range of meticulously graded camp authorities, officers, doctors, physicians, guards, and prisoners, criminal and political, who range from foremen, trustees, warders, squad leaders, deputies, cooks and spies down to the "goners" and jackals.

"FREE ALL OVER AGAIN"

Yet, even in the midst of human evil, weakness, illness and corruption, there remains some core of humanity, sparks of compassion and pleasure and even of saintliness. Most settle for staying alive physically, but many try to do more, try to remain alive emotionally and intellectually, and there the heroism of common men is most apparent—as the cruelty of the system is most apparent. Some things do remain to men even in the depths: the pleasure

of work and of meditation, the brief sensuous joys of the taste of bread, exercising, smoking a cigarette, staying warm or dry, the more important meanings of comradeship, the spiritual solaces of religious belief or even of Communist idealism. Moreover, when men are stripped of almost everything, they are able to reacquire their integrity, able to recover their freedom, for, no longer having anything worse to fear they can possess "the fearlessness of those who have lost everything," they can speak their minds. As one of the prisoners in *The First Circle* explains it to his MGB tormentor: "Just understand one thing and pass it along to everyone at the top who still doesn't know that you are strong only as long as you don't deprive people of everything. A person from whom you have taken everything is no longer in your power. He is free all over again."

MENACE TO THE HEIRS OF STALIN

Solzhenitsyn condemns the Soviet system absolutely, but here his metaphors go beyond that country and its society to the world at large. All men in modern society are imprisoned and strait-jacketed, tormented and sick. Man is sick and so are his institutions; the jail and the cancer ward, the penal colony and the *sharashka*, are everywhere operative. Evil societies breed evil men, but evil men also breed evil societies; and if Solzhenitsyn refuses to damn man irretrievably, he also refuses to absolve him of responsibility. Men are not only responsible for their institutions in general but specifically for their personal behavior. Man must affirm and uphold justice, must resist and oppose injustice; morality is a responsibility which men must defend even at the cost of personal martyrdom.

Ultimately, therefore, Solzhenitsyn is a moral writer, not a political one; and it is precisely because of that that he is an even greater menace to the "heirs of Stalin." For, though he is aware of men's frailties and views them with compassion, his judgment of the sadists and torturers, the squealers and cheats, the slackers and parasites is severe and rigorous.

Nevertheless, the picture of Soviet life as etched by Solzhenitsyn is scarcely appealing even to the most sympathetic foreign observer, much less the domestic reader who has felt the mailed fist of Stalin and his heirs on his flesh. Solzhenitsyn's fictional depiction is far more powerful and effective than the reports that Western scholars, journalists, diplomats and travelers have brought back, because it is more intimately known and more artistically rendered; and it is far more persuasive to the Russian reader because of its unvarnished candor. This special persuasiveness is reinforced by the fact that it is apparent even to the most casual or hostile reader that Solzhenitsyn has known most

of what he writes. His ability generally elicits audience sympathy and suspension of disbelief and makes Solzhenitsyn a novelist all the more difficult to dismiss as wrongheaded or simply ill-informed.

Moreover, his obvious love for his homeland and his people, his insistence personally and artistically on ethical conduct, his accepting, almost reluctantly yet with pride, the mantle of moral conscience that the great Russian writers have traditionally donned, with its attendant hairshirt and crown of thorns, have lifted him above all of the other contemporary writers in the Soviet Union and made him an example and a target. As Dan Jacobson wrote in *Commentary*, May 1969, about Solzhenitsyn as moralist:

Solzhenitsyn takes for granted an absolutely direct and open connection between literature and morality, art and life. He believes our responsibilities in the one to be inseparable from our responsibilities in the other; indeed, to be all but identical with one another.

In the West today such an assumption about the relationship between art and morality is distinctly unfashionable. We like to insist nowadays on the detachment of art from moral considerations, on the element of sheer "play" in it, on its aesthetic autonomy and aloofness from the messiness of the world in which decisions with real consequences have to be made. Or if we admit any commerce between art and morality . . . then what we are likely to demand of our art is that it should subvert and overthrow all the traditional moral notions; that it should do its best to fragment the self into a thousand pieces, rather than to stress its organic wholeness

If Solzhenitsyn has a vision of a better life, it is not a vision which he identifies with a specific social system. If he condemns Soviet society for its tyranny and evil, he does so without approving of any other form of human organization, in fact or in theory, for Solzhenitsyn is aware of how inadequate most human institutions are, how com-

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he portrays the profound and almost ineradicable evil he sees in man, a creature full of cruelty, violence and self-interest, of shoddiness and betrayals, moving among all institutions.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SOUL

But he also sees and depicts men's basic virtues, showing their comradeship and compassion, their kindness and decency, their loyalty and in some rare instances even their saintliness. All of Solzhenitsyn's major works are set in contexts where men have little or no control over their lives—prison, *sharashka*, cancer ward—where human beings are debased and diseased, where fear, tyranny and pain are endemic and inevitable, but how men live under these circumstances, how they endure and remain men, is Solzhenitsyn's obsession. His characters cry out not to be shoved around, they ask to retain their dignity and their sovereignty, they refuse to surrender their freedom or the illusion of their freedom, and their privacy, struggling to the very end to maintain some corner of the mind, the heart, the soul to themselves, private, refusing even *in extremis* sometimes to accept direction from others, from above, even when it is, as presumably it is in *Cancer Ward*, "for their own good." If one finds here an almost peasant recalcitrance, one also finds a religious and idealistic commitment to the worth of the human individual, a refusal to consider that human being a means rather than end, and therefore a rebelliousness against all institutions, against all the necessary and unnecessary repressiveness and surrenders of sovereignty which any state—not only the totalitarian—requires of its citizens.

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AL-HAYAH, Beirut
12 December 1971

SHIPMENT OF SOVIET ARMS TO INDIA VIA CAIRO CONDEMNED

[Excerpt] Readers last Sunday read on this page how 30 Antonov planes land at Cairo airport daily en route to India to supply the Indian forces with weapons and destructive equipment to be used in invading Pakistani territory, to kill thousands of the sons of the Islamic Pakistani people including, as reported by all the news sources, large numbers of children, women, and old men. Is there any pretext by which we can justify making our land a path for the fire and lava that is hurled at the heads of the sons of our religion and the supporters of our cause, except that we are dragged by the nose behind the interests and objectives of those who can direct us and who draw up our course to serve their private interests, even if this course is against our national and religious interests and against our objectives, principles, and our political, ideological, and national convictions?

AL-AQSA, Amman
15 December 1971

AL-AQSA RAPS AS-SADAT FOR STAND ON INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR

Amman--The newspaper AL-AQSA, organ of the Jordanian Armed Forces, today attacks the stand of President Anwar as-Sadat toward the war currently taking place between India and Pakistan.

The paper says that President as-Sadat's statement to an American newspaper that the problem of East Pakistan should be solved through granting it some kind of autonomy is a dangerous statement, particularly that it comes from Moslem Arab Cairo.

The paper accuses President as-Sadat of supporting India against Moslem Pakistan by giving India and the USSR an air corridor via Cairo to transport the arms which is being used against the Moslem people of Pakistan.

The paper also launches a violent attack on Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's latest article and accuses Haykal of working against the Moslems and Islam.

ATH-THAWRAH, Tripoli
15 December 1971

PRESS ATTACKS SOVIET ROLE

Tripoli, Libya--The newspaper ATH-THAWRAH today waged a fierce attack on Soviet Russia describing it "an imperialist state." The paper carried a banner headline in red ink saying "Russia Is an Imperialist State." The paper's editorial denounced the Soviet-Indian conspiracy on Pakistan under the headline: "Finally Moscow Showed its Real Aggressive Nature."

ATH-THAWRAH began its editorial by reviewing Soviet Russia's history of aggression in various parts of the world. The paper cited as examples when some years ago Russian tanks and armor ran over the bodies of the Hungarians who were demanding freedom and independence and Russian rockets razed those who were shouting for the death of the Russian invaders, and also when Russian tanks and armor went berserk in Czechoslovakia sabotaging, burning, and causing destruction because the Czechoslovak people wanted to free themselves from enslavement and subjugation to Moscow.

The paper said: The same Russian tanks and armor are now plowing through Pakistani territory killing women and children, destroying hospitals and shelters, and choking every voice raised in defense of the homeland's soil, unity, and dignity.

The paper added that Russian planes, some flown by Indian and other by Russian pilots, are amassing in Pakistani air space. Both Indian and Russian pilots are committing the most atrocious murders ever suffered by a people.

Meanwhile, false voices are heard in the Kremlin speaking about peace and the request of peoples' independence. These cause headaches for everyone. Their slogans have been exposed by the ugly war which the Kremlin leaders are responsible for instigating and planning. They are also responsible for participating in it with various political and material means. Russian arms flow into India over a bridge which history will never forget, extending from the Kremlin of lies and falsifications to the positions of destruction and starvation on the soil of East Pakistan. This bridge extends over the bodies of Moslem Pakistanis who are defending their religion against atheism and their nationalism against the myth of internationalism which the Soviet Union constantly exploits and uses as a screen for plotting.

The paper then strongly attacks the Russians' stand toward the Indian-Pakistani conflict and says: At a time when Russian planes and Russian pilots are carrying out their massacres over the Pakistani soil and when the Soviet Union is audaciously exposing its ugly aggressive and imperialist nature, the Russian UN delegate, to complete the picture, declared his country's rejection of the cease-fire and of the withdrawal of the invading Indian forces. The Russian delegate stood three times to reject peace which his country falsely claims to support, and to reject Pakistan's sovereignty over its territory.

The paper then expresses strong doubt about the facades behind which the Soviet Union stands and the Soviet masks of peace, humanity, the support of people and the respect for peoples' sovereignty on their land.

The paper wonders: How can we believe the Soviet Union when it is killing hundreds of people daily on the one hand and calling for disarmament, condemning Zionist aggression on the Arabs and the U.S. aggression on Southeast Asia on the other?

The paper adds: The Soviet Union relished destroying hospitals, schools, and shelters, and striving millions of Pakistanis and denying them water and medicine. It refuses to stop the dirty war and dances with joy at the sight of the hungry millions, the death of children and old people, and of the destruction of houses and farms.

The paper says: It is ironical that the Soviet Union does not stop raising false slogans and does not show its true face to the world which it knows very well.

The paper then refers to Podgorny's appeal to Pakistan last April in which he spoke about peace, humanity and every people's right to sovereignty in accordance with the declaration of human rights. The paper wonders: What is the Russian concept of human rights? Is it the total invasion of a people as happened in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and as today is happening in Pakistan? Or is it the destruction of houses and the killing of orphans and old people? Is it the right of veto which Moscow used three times in 10 days? [words indistinct] in which thousands of peoples in Pakistan are dispersed with Russian arms and support.

The paper adds: We here in the Libyan Arab Republic would like to say it loud and clear to all those who remained silent over what is happening in Pakistan not out of fear from Russia or because they want something from it, we would like to tell them: We are afraid of nobody and we want nothing from anybody [as received] We have no direct interests in India or Pakistan but we are inspired by our principles and values and are promoted by the need for peace and justice everywhere. We raise our voices today in support of right which cannot be defeated, of justice which must be established, and of peace which must prevail. We raise our voice in the face of the aggressor and of those who support him--by they big or small, a major power or a small nation.

We raise our voice in the face of imperialist Russia, we condemn its designs, and repudiate its support for Indian aggression on Pakistan.

Concluding, the paper expresses confidence in Pakistan's eventual victory over the Indian forces of tyranny and aggression "even if the Soviet Union throws all its weight behind these forces."

AL-HYRRIYAH, Tripoli
12 December 1971

ADDITIONAL PRESS ATTACKS ON SOVIET ROLE

Tripoli, Libya--The newspaper AL-HURRIYAH expresses regret over the Soviet Union's role in supporting the Indian aggression against Pakistan and its alinement with the secession because of its desire to wrench East Pakistan out of the central treaty. The paper says that India, which has agreed to be a cat's-paw in implementing the imperialist intentions, is now risking loss of respect and appreciation of third world states.

AL JUNDI, Tripoli
18 December 1971

Tripoli--AL-JUNDI speaks about the situation resulting in the Indian subcontinent from the Soviet-Indian aggression on Pakistan. The paper accuses the Soviet Union of moving its agent, India, at this specific time to divert the attention of the world and the United Nations from the serious discussion which would have been given to the Middle East issue.

The paper says that Russia did this because it wants the situation to continue as it is, so that what it terms its presence in the area will continue. It always wants to feel that the Arabs need it. Therefore, it is not in Russia's interest that the Arab land be liberated. It even wants this occupation to continue.

The paper affirms that Russia is an imperialist state the same as the United States and Britain. It says that the Kremlin's history is rich with such tragedies. Russia crushed the Hungarian people, Russia invaded Czechoslovakia and Russia is the one which now moves India and supplies it with weapons and fighters to tear apart Pakistan's unity.

The paper says that the slogans raised by the Kremlin are pure falseness and hypocrisy, and it has no slogan other than that of interest.

AR-RA'ID strongly denounces the Soviet-Indian collusion in invading Pakistan. It compares this with the Soviet Union's stand on the 5th of June when the Kremlin leaders reassured the Arab leaders and asked them not to start the offensive and when Israel launched its treacherous aggression, they left the Arabs alone to receive blows from Israel and from the United States through its Mediterranean fleet.

The paper warns against the danger coming from Moscow and says it is not any less serious than the similar danger coming from Washington because these major powers are guided by their political and economic interests.

ATH-THAWRAH

17 December 1971

Under the headline: "Russia Supports Aggression," ATH-THAWRAH says: The false slogans behind which the Soviet Union was hiding have collapsed. Its criminal expansionist intentions have been exposed in its support to the Indian aggression against the Pakistani territory by three times using the veto in the United Nations to preclude any intervention that might find an outlet to the bloody crisis between the two conflicting states.

ATH-THAWRAH adds: Where is the peace the Russians have been advocating to the world? Where is the justice they claimed to uphold? Where is their live conscience and true humanity? All these have collapsed with its instigating India to continue its forcible occupation of a neighboring state's territory through the help of a number of Russian pilots. The Russians have participated in and planned the occupation operation and supervised the execution until the last moments.

The masked face of the Russians became known to the masses after the events have removed all the fanciful claims through which they have been deceiving certain weak people.

The Pakistani tragedy is a brand of shame to the Russians and the world, for the latter has failed to take decisive resolutions regarding it. It is a shame branding the United Nations whose member states confined themselves to empty statements without taking a practical and immediate measure to check the ambitions of the aggressor states and to force them to respect the international charter.

The present events are similar to those in the past, when the General Assembly also failed to adopt a suitable formula deterring the Zionist enemy and forcing him to withdraw from the Arab territory which he occupied by force.

The events that took place in the Pakistani and Arab arenas definitely prove that the world today is a prisoner of big imperialist strategies and plans led by Russia and the United States. Therefore, world peoples should be vigilant to this danger, aware of its significance and its dreadful dimensions, and should take measures defending themselves against unexpected invasion.

However, imperialism, whether Eastern or Western, forgets the reality of the masses and their strong reaction. The Pakistanis, the Arabs and other peoples who have been subjected to occupation will not remain idle but will fiercely fight to restore their usurped dignity, standing and rights. The coming days will register facts in the immortal history.

CPYRGHT

BALTIMORE SUN
16 December 1971

CBS says India has Soviet aides

New York (Reuter)—The Columbia Broadcasting System, in a report yesterday from Karachi, said the Pakistani Navy claims to have monitored Russian-speaking voices aboard Indian Navy missile boats operating in waters close to Karachi.

Dean Brelis, reporting for CBS news, said in a broadcast over the radio network: "The missile boats are of Soviet make. They were given to India by the Russians last August. Each missile boat carries four

Styx missiles, according to the Pakistanis. The missiles are fired through a complex countdown system."

Mr. Brelis added: "The voices taped by the Pakistani listening devices are unmistakably Russian. I listened to the taped Rus-

sian voices. They were engaged in a process of countdown. The Pakistanis pinpointed the missile boats as 20 miles offshore."

He said the Pakistanis believe the Russians are advisers who are training Indian crews to handle the missiles.

WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1971

Dismembering of Pakistan

CPYRGHT

THE EASE with which India, backed by the Soviet Union, is dismembering Pakistan has raised the most serious concern high in the Nixon administration over historic Russian expansionism in Southwest Asia.

What is not appreciated outside high government circles is that the fruits of India's military victory may not be limited to the detachment of East Pakistan from the Pakistani central government as the independent state of Bangla Desh, in permanent vassalage to India.

Rather, border regions in West Pakistan itself may be carved out of Pakistan and placed under virtual Indian control—if Moscow concurs. In that event, the present Soviet leaders would have fulfilled the Czars' ancient dream of penetration deep into Southwest Asia. Given present Soviet activity in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, the step beyond this might be Northern Iran.

THUS, the future not just of East Pakistan but of the world balance of power is the major factor explaining the administration's support for Pakistan that so angers liberal politicians. Yet, there is little that President Nixon can do. U.S. reaction to the

events in the Indian subcontinent is drastically limited by two factors: First, reversion by the U.S. to a new form of isolationism, the direct product of the Vietnam war; second, the new U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity.

While Soviet-backed India carves up U.S.-allied Pakistan, neither the Nixon administration nor any other power today has the ability to say no and make it stick. Rather, the only real weapon available to President Nixon is indirect pressure based on Moscow's desire for vastly increased trade with the U.S., a settlement of Central European post-war problems and, perhaps, a strategic arms agreement.

NOBODY KNOWS whether the Kremlin will risk these top-priority goals by taking full advantage of the India-Pakistan war. But considering how quickly U.S. influence in the subcontinent has been smashed, it is taken for granted here that hardliners in the Kremlin will want to pyramid the Soviet assets so clearly evidenced by the India-Pakistan war.

The test of Soviet intentions probably lies in its reaction to Indian military actions in Kashmir and, be-

yond that, in two strategic areas of West Pakistan called Baluchistan and Pushtunistan.

It is assumed here that India will gobble up the small western strip of Kashmir now controlled by Pakistan unless the Soviet Union exerts maximum pressure on New Delhi to cease and desist once the East Pakistan operation ends.

Similarly, the fate of Baluchistan and Pushtunistan which, with a combined population of some 7 million, border Afghanistan, may be decided in Moscow. These two regions contain large minorities with separatist tendencies which could be easily exploited by India and Afghanistan. Considering the long history of Soviet aid to Afghanistan, the Kremlin could bring India and Afghanistan together in continuing the partition of Pakistan. The result: Semi-autonomous states under Indian domination in these two areas.

WORSE YET, India's freedom to dismember a sovereign member of the U.N. is perceived by policy experts here as the possible prelude to Soviet fishing elsewhere.

One such traditional fish-

ing ground is the Iranian province of Azerbaïdzhān, on the Soviet border. Though still remote, a large dose of Soviet-supported political agitation might conceivably trigger a separatist movement in Iranian Azerbaïdzhān, again with U.S. ability to react inhibited by domestic politics.

The pattern is simple. India has military supremacy, thanks to Soviet arms, and diplomatic immunity, thanks to Soviet vetoes in the United Nations.

Thus, Pakistan's incredibly stupid and shortsighted decision last spring in trying to smash Bangla Desh (East Pakistan) by military force is having worldwide repercussions far beyond East Pakistan.

Moreover, top officials here now admit that the Nixon administration's own handling of that doomed Pakistani decision was almost as stupid. Instead of moving quickly to compel Pakistan to negotiate the best deal it could with East Pakistan's irresistible drive for independence, President Nixon allowed events to drift out of control. The repercussions may extend ominously into the future.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 December 1971

Pakistan Says She Is Checking Reports of Soviet Fliers in India

CPYRGHT

By HENRY KAMM

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan, Dec. 9—A high Government spokesman sharply condemned the Soviet Union tonight for giving political and material assistance to India in the war against Pakistan.

The spokesman, a ranking Foreign Minister, said he does not ordinarily attend the daily military press briefing,

said that the Government here in West Pakistan was investigating press reports that Soviet personnel were commanding Indian missile boats and flying military aircraft in Indian territory.

However, the official said, Pakistan would break off diplomatic relations with the So-

viet Union if Moscow followed New Delhi's lead in recognizing the rebel government of Bangla Desh (Bengal Nation). Pakistan broke with India on that ground, although neither country has yet formally declared war on the other. The spokesman called on the world at large, particularly the big powers, to take appropri-

ate action against what he charged was "naked and barbarous aggression" by India. But, he added, "It is not for me to say what should be done by other governments."

Warmer Toward U. S.

A decided warming of the attitude toward public opinion of the United States has been felt here since the outbreak of war.

America is thought by many Pakistanis to have sided with Pakistan by condemning Indian actions.

But tonight the spokesman ruled out one of the possible avenues through which Pakistan could appeal to the United States for material assistance. He said that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which was fostered by the United States and of which Pakistan is a member, "has more or less been allowed to wither on the vine."

This is consistent with Pakistan's all but official withdrawal from the alliance in recent years, while she has been drawing closer to China. Although many Pakistanis of no particular political sophistication seem to expect it as a matter of course, there have been no known shipment of Chinese military aid since the war began.

With the growing physical isolation from the outside world that the war has brought to Pakistan, observers here believe that China could play an

important role not only as a furnisher of assistance but also as a channel for aid coming from third-world countries.

Access Is Difficult

East Pakistan is completely isolated. The only practical land route into the western half goes through landlocked Afghanistan and from there over the Khyber Pass. No commercial airplanes are flying into or within Pakistan. Indian air and naval forces are making access to Karachi, the principal harbor, difficult.

No shortages of commodities are noticeable, for the time being. However, a Government announcement tonight assured employes of Government agencies that adequate stocks of essential commodities were available for their use at special stores where prices are lower than on the open market.

Holders of registered cards, the announcement continued, could obtain goods "at prescribed rationed quantities."

WASHINGTON STAR
10 December 1971

CPYRGHT

Russians Chafing Over Role in War

By HENRY S. BRADSHAW

NEW DELHI — The Soviet Union is reported by informed Communist sources here to be unhappy that its support of India has placed it in the position of opposing the worldwide call for a cease-fire and to have no desire to escalate or enlarge the scope of the conflict.

"As soon as the realities of the situation in the east are recognized," — meaning Pakistan's acceptance of independence for Bangla Desh — "then there can be a solution in the west," Communist sources say.

Indian military commanders have been itching for a chance to smash the Pakistani tank and warplane strength in the west with major battles which they are confident of winning. But political control of the situation, heavily influenced by the Soviets, is against provoking big battles.

Anyway, India is already claiming to have destroyed about 10 percent of Pakistan's tank strength and more than 25 percent of its warplanes — while fighting mostly defensive actions — and a sizable percentage of its navy in sea raids.

Much of whatever success

the Indian military forces have had — Indian and Pakistani claims are in direct contradiction, with independent observers blocked from checking from either side — results from Soviet arming of India.

After the two countries signed their friendship treaty in August, Moscow speeded up delivery of the kinds of weapons it had been supplying India for a number of years. At the same time, so far as can be learned here, it did not discourage India from putting military pressure on East Pakistan of the kind which finally erupted into war a week ago.

The Soviets did, however, warn India against directly provoking war with Pakistan.

There was some fear in Moscow that the Soviet position of being India's main foreign friend and supporter might be tried dangerously by the strains of war.

This fear included apprehension that the Indians might repeat the Egyptian example of improperly using Soviet-made weaponry and in the resulting defeats blame the Russians for somehow failing to provide the right weapons.

But if Indian spokesmen can be believed, it is the Pakistanis who are failing to use some

equipment properly. The Pakistanis have Mirage jet fighter-bombers of the series that the Israelis have used with such skill and success against the Egyptians. The Indians have been shooting them down.

"We still respect the Mirage," one Indian official said, "but we don't respect those who are operating them."

These earlier Soviet fears are now submerged in the present discomfort over having to back India in the United Nations against the overwhelming weight of world opinion, according to informed Communist sources.

Under their treaty, the Soviets had no choice but to use their veto in the U.N. Security Council over the weekend and to vote against the General Assembly's cease-fire resolution, sources said. But there is considerable unhappiness involved.

Silent on Reports

Other sources of unknown reliability say the Soviets have told India that Moscow is willing to withstand the heat of world opinion for only a limited time, therefore India must hurry to finish the East Pakistan operations so a cease-fire can be accepted.

Senior Indian officials are unwilling to discuss such reports. When pressed, they deny them without much conviction. They are very reluctant to admit any kind of Soviet pressure which Communist sources willingly discuss.

Soviet support for India has exacerbated its relations with China, which is backing Pakistan.

Within recent days the old slugging match between the two big Communist countries has been reheated with the fresh material of the Indo-Pakistani war.

But China has done nothing more than issue statements. Indian officials feel their pre-war reading of the Chinese attitude is being proven right — that China would not support Pakistan with anything but words, contrary to Pakistani claims that China would come to their aid.

Indian military men report no sign of Chinese troop movements in Tibet along India's Himalayan border.

India and China fought and undeclared war there in 1962.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war China made threatening noises toward India in order to support Pakistan but nothing came of them.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 December 1971

CPYRGHT

India gets Moscow's moral support

BY DEAN MILLS

Moscow—Predictably, the Soviet government came down hard on the side of New Delhi yesterday and warned Pakistani leaders that they bear "grave responsibility" for the war between the two countries.

At the same time the Kremlin indicated a firm intention to avoid direct involvement in the war and called on the rest of the world to follow suit.

The statement, in the form of a 12-paragraph declaration issued by Tass, seemed to amount simply to a show of moral support for India, with no indication the Russians are anticipating increasing aid to their Indian allies.

"The Soviet Union comes out for the speediest ending of the bloodshed," the statement said, "and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people." It concluded:

"The Soviet government also believes that the governments of all countries should refrain

from steps signifying in one way or another that they are being drawn into the conflict, leading to a further aggravation of the situation in the Hindustan peninsula."

The concluding sentence seemed to be directed particularly toward China, Moscow's bitter ideological enemy and strong supporter of the Pakistani side. At the same time, the Tass statement—which has the effect here of an official government announcement—did not rule out the possibility of action in the future.

"The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent," it said, "to the developments, considering also the circumstance that they are taking place in direct proximity to the U.S.S.R.'s borders and, therefore, involve the interests of its security."

The reference to Soviet security and the geography of the situation may have been intended to point out that the Soviet Union, no less than China, has a legitimate interest in the area.

At their northernmost points, India and West Pakistan are

separated from Soviet territory only by a narrow strip of Afghanistan, no more than 25 miles wide in places.

In keeping with Soviet press coverage of the conflict, the statement interprets the war as a direct result of Pakistani attacks on India.

Soviet leaders have been outspokenly critical of Pakistani policies toward East Pakistan since the visit here by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India last September.

The Kremlin backs a settlement which would allow East Pakistan at least a large amount of autonomy and return the 10 million refugees now in India to Pakistan.

Moscow and New Delhi signed a treaty of "peace, friendship and co-operation" last August. The treaty provides, in the case of an attack or threatened attack on one of the sides, for immediate "mutual consultations with the goal of the elimination of such threat and the undertaking of corresponding effective measures to insure

peace and security of their countries."

The language is vague enough not to obligate either party to actual support of the other in the event of war, and most observers here doubt that Moscow would give massive amounts of arms to India even should New Delhi ask for them.

Pakistan amenable to war settlement

Rawalpindi, Pakistan (Reuter) — Pakistan would not be averse to any peaceful solution in the conflict with India, so long as this solution respected Pakistan's integrity and independence, a government spokesman said here.

Commenting on United Nations moves aimed at a cessation of hostilities between the two countries, the spokesman said Pakistan was engaged in a struggle for its existence and did not want to annex or occupy territory of any other country.

WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1971

CPYRGHT

Soviet Assistance, Advisers Promised to Bangladesh Soon

The Soviet Union and the new Bangladesh government in East Pakistan announced plans yesterday for a treaty of trade and technical assistance "as quickly as possible," under which special arrangements are being made to bring in Russian technicians to help rebuild the war-shattered country.

The disclosure was made in Dacca as Indian Prime Minis-

ter Indira Gandhi toured the former war front in Kashmir and said she hoped the new leadership in Pakistan would realize that the best course for the future lay in friendship with India.

Mrs. Gandhi, said however, that the danger of renewed warfare had not passed. "It looks as though we have only got some breathing time,

and peace has yet to finally come."

Official Indian sources described the border clash between Indian and Pakistani troops Monday and Tuesday, 200 miles northwest of New Delhi, as an isolated incident that did not jeopardize the cease-fire elsewhere on the western front.

government spokesman said last night any attempt by

India to bring Pakistani prisoners of war before a war crimes tribunal would be in defiance of the Geneva accords and the United Nations.

Meanwhile, a newspaper in West Pakistan reported that former President Yahya Khan was under house arrest and would remain under detention during an inquiry into his leadership during the war with India.

The Daily New Times said Yahya, who dropped out of sight when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto replaced him as president Dec. 20, continued to live in the presidential residence. The report said he would be moved to a private residence in Rawalpindi.

Several political and military leaders have demanded that Yahya be brought to trial for the loss of East Pakistan to India. Bhutto has responded by naming a commission to investigate the war.

Speaking in Lahore, a Punjab city that is the stronghold of his leftist People's Party, Bhutto promised that "the country's national honor will be vindicated." He also an-

nounced that he was holding off the convening of the year-old National Assembly, which has never met since elections were held in December, 1970.

Bhutto said that to summon the 313-member assembly now would mean its 169 East Pakistani representatives could not attend.

Bhutto's 10-day-old government held firm in its first major domestic crisis—protest demonstrations against the choice of Sardarghus Bakhsh Raisani as governor of Baluchistan Province.

The government said Raisani, who is opposed by the National Awami Party, a rival of Bhutto's People's Party, would be sworn in as scheduled.

Plans for a trade and technical assistance pact between

the Soviet Union and Bangladesh were announced after talks in Dacca between Soviet trade mission chief V. V. Zvreb and Finance Minister M. Mansoor Ali and Home Minister A. H. Kamaruzzaman.

The Bangladesh government said it needed cotton and electrical equipment as well as cash and technical advice to rebuild agricultural and industrial production which Ali said was "threadbare."

India and Bhutan are the only nations thus far to recognize the state of Bangladesh, but the Soviet actions seemed to indicate Russian recognition may be forthcoming shortly.

As the Bangladesh government pressed ahead with the establishment of the new

state, its acting president, Syed Nazrul Islam, said in Dacca that he would welcome relations with the United States if President Nixon changed his policies.

Meanwhile, Dr. A. M. Malik, the former Pakistani civilian governor in East Pakistan, made his first public appearance to deny reports that he had been turned over to Bangladesh authorities for trial as a war criminal.

In an interview with UPI, Malik confirmed that he and other West Pakistani officials were being held in an Indian military garrison on the western outskirts of Dacca to protect them from reprisals from Bengalis. He said he was being well treated by the Indians.

WASHINGTON POST
21 January 1972

CPYRGHT

Mujib Said Invited To Moscow

The Soviet government has invited Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to Moscow, a Rawalpindi newspaper close to the Pakistani Foreign Office reported today.

The New Times said the Russians would invite Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after they met with Sheikh Mujib. But the paper

said Mujib would not visit the Soviet Union until Moscow recognizes his government.

Diplomatic sources in Pakistan said that the Soviet Union appears to be trying to mediate between Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The diplomats said Moscow had relayed a peace-talk proposal from the Indians to the Pakistanis. But the Indians said they wouldn't talk until Paki-

stan recognizes the independence of Bangladesh, the sources added.

Denmark, Finland and Sweden announced that they had decided to recognize Bangladesh. They would be the first Western European nations to do so.

At the United Nations, Pakistan accused India of a series of violations of the cease-fire

in the Subcontinent and warned that if these were allowed to continue the truce might break down completely.

"The position is fraught with danger," Pakistani Ambassador Agha Shahi said in a brief covering note which accompanied a long list of cease-fire violations that he said occurred between Dec. 22 and Jan. 4.

WASHINGTON POST
25 January 1972

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Soviets Recognize Bangladesh Regime

Communists Reported Active in Bangladesh

From News Dispatches

The Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda said yesterday that the Bangladesh Communist Party has emerged from the underground and has "actively joined the social and political life of the country."

In a report from Dacca, Pravda noted that the Bangla-

desh party has gathered strength and is taking part in a recently formed consultative council.

Monti Singh, the Bangladesh party leader and veteran Communist, told Pravda in an interview that his party supported government measures aimed at increasing national independence.

Singh also assailed China,

noting the "disgraceful role played by the Maoist leadership" which "slipped to collusion with U.S. imperialism spearheaded in particular against the liberation movement in Bangladesh."

Meanwhile, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan arrived in Ankara yesterday for talks with Turkish government leaders on bilateral relations and development of the

Subcontinent.

Bhutto is scheduled to stay in Ankara for a day before leaving for North Africa. He is said to plan to visit Morocco, Liberia, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

Turkey and Pakistan are allies in the Central Treaty Organization, which also groups Britain and Iran, with the United States as an associate member.

WASHINGTON STAR
22 December 1971

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DAVID LAWRENCE

People on Other Side Need Facts

The Soviet Union doesn't make public its annual budget, but there is every indication that the situation in Asia is going to cost the Kremlin more money—especially by an increase in the amount of military assistance to be distributed throughout that continent.

As a result of the India-Pakistan conflict, the Soviets feel that they now should extend their military strength in various parts of Asia. The alliance with India is just the beginning of a movement to break down the prestige of Red China and build up naval bases for Russian ships along the southern coast of the continent.

The real expense for the Soviet Union in such a policy of expanding its influence in the world is that of furnishing arms, military equipment and supplies for the land, sea and air forces of certain nations.

Among these are the Arab states—notably Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Iraq—Cuba, Eastern Europe, North Korea and, of course, North Vietnam. These countries and others which the Kremlin seeks to bring under its wing are looking to Moscow for economic assistance of the type called "defense support"—roads, rail facilities, port equipment,

merchant shipping and the like.

Russia's latest venture in Asia made it possible for India to invade and dominate East Pakistan. This could not have been done without Soviet backing.

Although the new Bengal state is theoretically being granted independence, East Pakistan is an abysmally poor area and will need all kinds of help. Since India cannot afford to provide it—the Indians say they fought the war to get the Bengal refugees back into East Pakistan from India—this, too, will be up to Moscow.

There is a feeling now that, while Russia may allow the Vietnam war to come to what Americans will call a "conclusion," North Vietnam will in due time be given enough military support to take over Indochina. The assumption is that the United States is not going to be involved again in wars in Asia. The Soviets, on the other hand, are inclined toward more military encroachment on that continent.

There is talk of reducing the number of American troops in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Russians are pushing hard for this step. They are willing to promise to withdraw some of their forces

from the satellite countries. But the truth is they want the United States to take its troops back across the Atlantic so that the Kremlin will have virtually a free hand in the future.

With a cloud overhanging Asia, there are also beginning to be worries as to what will occur when the strength of NATO has been weakened. Its army at present is very small compared to the large units which can be mobilized currently by the Soviets.

The key to the whole problem of war and peace in Russia rests with the people. Millions of individuals are in military service, and the standard of living generally has not improved materially to anything like Western norms. Many persons are unhappy and some day will express their discontent in an outbreak against totalitarianism.

The big task now is not merely to stress in the United Nations the importance of maintaining world peace, but to convey the facts to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. In this era of new ways of scientific communication, peoples everywhere can find out what is blocking the road to peace.

The real question is: When are the people in the satellite countries and in the Soviet Union going to learn that major wars are keeping them from getting the income they deserve? When will they unite to stop intrusion in the lives of peoples on other continents?

The United States alone cannot offset what the Soviets are planning to do with funds obviously intended for military purposes. The Red Chinese are not likely to become entangled in a war with Russia because they are at a military disadvantage—they do not have the nuclear strength to combat the enemy.

So the Soviets are enabled through the India-Pakistan quarrel to get a stronger hold on Asia. They soon will increase their military threats to some of the other countries and obtain privileges for their navy and military units which certainly will be used to tighten the Soviet grip on the weaker nations in Asia.

All this is an expensive matter for the Russians. But unless it is thoroughly exposed and the Soviet people learn the facts by radio, the dropping of leaflets and other methods, there is no way to generate the natural influences that lead to liberation movements.

SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
October 1971

CPYRGHT

India and the New Tsarism

Ernst Kux

With the Indian alliance, cemented by the pact of friendship signed on August 9, Moscow is continuing a policy initiated by the Tsars. Brezhnev's expansion towards the Middle East and the Indian Ocean seems oddly familiar to those who have studied Karl Marx's analysis of the Tsars' policy of imperialism. In the Central Asia, which began with Peter the Great's

campaigns in Persia in 1717 to open the road for a Russian march on India, was part of a Russian dream of world supremacy. With astonishing clear-sightedness, Marx associated Russian operations in Afghanistan and Persia and her rivalry with England over India with Gorchakov's plans in the Baltic and Europe—an association which it would be well not

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to overlook in modern Soviet policy either. As far back as 1858 Engels was forecasting that "within 10 or 15 years we shall hear the Muscovites beating at the gates of India."

As Engels wrote proleptically at the time, foreseeing the interdependence of Russia's policy towards India and China, "It is a fact that Russia will soon be the leading power in Asia and will rapidly put England in the shade in that Continent. The conquest of Central Asia and the annexation of Manchuria expand her territories by an area as big as the whole of Europe if the Russian Empire is excluded, thus converting the frozen wastes of Siberia to a temperate zone. In a short time, the valleys of the Central Asian rivers and of the Amur will have been populated by Russian colonists. The strategic positions thus gained are as important to Asia as are those in Poland to Europe. The possession of the Turan is a threat to India and that of Manchuria is a threat to China. Yet China and India, with their 450 million inhabitants, are at present the most important countries in Asia."

Lenin regarded India and China less as objectives of Russian conquest than as centres of world revolution which, he claimed, would march from Peking on Paris via Delhi. The "final decision in the world struggle" between the "counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalistic East" depended in the last analysis, prophesied Lenin in his last pamphlet "Less but Better" in March 1923, on the fact that Russia, India and China represented the overwhelming majority of the world's population. In reality, the Bolsheviks were more interested in the reconquest of the furthest-flung colonies of the Tsarist Empire in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East than in actively supporting colonial revolution by the workers of the East. The first Soviet Foreign Minister, Chicherin, referred in an article dated August 12 1919 expressly to Gorchakov's assessment that Russia's future lay in Asia. It was no coincidence, therefore, that the newly-fledged Soviet Republic entered into its first diplomatic relations with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey, following this up in early 1921 with treaties of friendship and alliance.

After the failure of his China policy, Stalin concentrated on Europe and even declined to take up Hitler's offer, made to Molotov in November 1940, by which the Soviet Union would have joined the Three Power Pact and concentrated its expansion towards the south, seeking its outlets in the area of the Persian Gulf instead of the Mediterranean. It is not known how Stalin reacted to Roosevelt's suggestion at Teheran in 1943 that the Indian question should be solved "by reforms roughly on the Soviet plan." After the British withdrawal and India's acquisition of independence, Stalin, through the Cominform, called upon Communists there to seize power by force and

People's Democracy. As in other Asian countries that had achieved independence, communist riots controlled from Moscow took place in India during the summer of 1948, but they were suppressed by Nehru. Stalin had never fully understood the transformations effected by decolonialization or the desire of the new states for neutrality, and for him Nehru remained "a marionette of imperialistic colonialism." When diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and India were taken up in April 1947, they remained cool and of little importance. India's protests against the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 were ignored by Moscow. In view of these historical facts it sounds suspect, to say the least, when Gromyko speaks in Delhi to Indians of the unchanging and consistently friendly peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and implores them to revive the spirit of Nehru.

The spectacular tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan undertaken by Khrushchev and Bulganin in November 1955 demonstrated Moscow's growing interest in southern Asia. In the new policy of "peaceful coexistence" towards the non-aligned states of the Third World, India was selected as exhibition piece. Khrushchev went back there in February 1960, flattered Nehru and strove by means of development aid, including a complete steelworks, to win over the Indians to the Soviet model. Khrushchev's moves towards India were not only part of the rivalry with the West; they were also a reaction to China's growing activity in Asia and Africa initiated by Chou En Lai and Nehru with their declaration of coexistence and their joint participation in the Bandung Conference of April 1955. There are grounds for believing that Khrushchev had agreed to a delimitation of spheres of influence with Mao and that India had been allocated to the Soviet sphere.

The shooting on the China-India border in September 1959 and the breakdown of Khrushchev's American policy were a sign of conflict between Moscow and Peking and the start of their rivalry in India and the Third World generally. India's Communist Party was one of the first to split into a pro-Soviet and a pro-Chinese wing. During the Himalaya skirmishes with China in October 1962, for the outbreak of which India was not entirely blameless, Moscow, pre-occupied with the Cuba crisis at the time, maintained a "neutral" attitude and thus disappointed both Peking and Delhi. India, her position shaken by defeat in this border war, received support and help from both the Soviet Union and the United States and the beginnings of Soviet-American cooperation in containing China began to emerge. To combat this "holy alliance of imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries", Peking put out feelers to Pakistan, herself disconcerted by the friendly attitude of her American partner in CENTO towards India, thus confirming a role of the sub-continent that to enter

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into the most tenuous relations with one of the Communist superpowers automatically results in involvement in the conflict between Moscow and Peking.

With the fall of Khrushchev and the death of Nehru in 1964, the personalized propaganda phase of Soviet-Indian coexistence ended. Khrushchev's successors, who began by seeking a reconciliation with Peking, aimed at a neutral position on the Indian sub-continent. Kosygin, by his arbitration in the Indo-Pakistan border war over the Rann of Cooch at the Tashkent meeting between Shastri and Ayub Khan in January 1966, was able to secure the position of referee and strove to develop this by subsequent visits to Karachi and Delhi. Moscow's wooing of Ayub Khan and the Soviet economic and military aid to Pakistan led to violent anti-Soviet reactions in India and to a temporary cooling-off of relations. When Indira Gandhi succeeded Shastri at the head of the Indian Government, she began by continuing the policy of non-alignment alongside Nasser and Tito, but steadily built up closer links with Moscow. No foreign head of government has visited the Soviet Union as often as Mrs. Gandhi in the last six years, while Kosygin has repeatedly been to India, the heads of state have exchanged visits, and delegations are constantly travelling to and fro. In important questions of foreign policy such as the Middle East conflict and the Indo-China war, Delhi has taken up positions identical to those of Moscow. Since 1965 economic collaboration has been evolved further. The Soviet Union has built a second steelworks, provided 300 million roubles in credit for the 4th Indian economic plan and last December signed a commercial treaty with India covering 1971-75 and synchronized with the 5-year plans of the Soviet economy and Comecon.

At the same time, military collaboration has been intensified. In March 1967, General Staff Chief Zakharev visited India; in September 1967 and October 1968 the then Indian Defence Minister Swaran Singh (now Foreign Minister and co-signatory with Gromyko of the recent pact) went to Moscow for negotiations; in March 1969 Marshal Grechko was a guest in Delhi and a delegation under Grand Admiral Gorshkov inspected Indian harbours. The Soviet Union has supplied armaments, aircraft, warships and submarines to India and according to Chinese reports is to set up naval bases at Visakhapatnam, Bombay, Cochin, Mosmugao and Port Blair. With the British withdrawal from East of Suez, the run-down of the American engagement in Asia and the weakening of China through the Cultural Revolution, Moscow saw its chance to press forwards into the Indian Ocean and exploited it by dispatching Soviet squadrons, building bases and establishing diplomatic relations with all the states in the area.

The Indo-Soviet friendship pact, though long in preparation, is mainly intended as a counter-move to American and Chinese "ping-pong" diplomacy. By its means Moscow is showing its determination to prevent a displacement of the world power situation to its disadvantage through sectional collaboration between Peking and Washington, such as might be represented by support for Pakistan. But instead the result might well be that the American-Chinese rapprochement, in which developments in East Pakistan are probably playing an accelerating rôle, could now proceed more quickly and go further. There are even indications, such as the unexplained absence of foreign policy expert Suslov at the hurriedly-arranged ratification of the treaty, that this step has not met with approval everywhere in the Soviet union. At first sight it is of course a success and the fulfilment of ancient Russian dreams when Brezhnev and his emissary Gromyko bind India more closely to them and reap the reward of long years of not entirely smooth and effective work by Soviet diplomats, economic experts, soldiers and propagandists. By embracing India in the Soviet treaty system, which already covers Eastern Europe with bilateral agreements and extends to Cuba and Egypt, Moscow has obtained political and logistic foundations for its move forward into the Indian Ocean. But against this Moscow has lost the position as arbitrator between India and Pakistan it won at Tashkent and has been forced more or less to write off its past work to win over Pakistan. It is doubtful whether the pact with India will make Brezhnev's plan for collective security in Asia or Soviet proposals for regional economic cooperation any more attractive to other Asian states. Although the Russians acknowledge India's policy of non-alignment, this pact nonetheless represents a limitation of India's sovereignty in the form of an obligation to consult on all international questions, to refrain from any other military alliances, to dissociate herself from the West in the "struggle against colonialism and racialism"; and it is thus in fact the end of Nehru's non-alignment. Furthermore, this alliance, like the similarly-worded treaty with Egypt, makes it clear that Moscow in the era of the Brezhnev Doctrine is no longer interested in tolerating non-alignment and neutralism in the Third World, as Khrushchev pretended to be. The non-aligned countries are coming more and more into the slipstream of the global triangle of forces. With the Moscow alliance, India has practically abandoned her neutrality in the Soviet-Chinese conflict. Delhi might find itself invited by Moscow at some stage, under reference to Article 9 of the treaty, to take "effective steps" in the case of some new Soviet-Chinese border conflict. The most critical point of this controversial border, the area of the Pamirs, is, after all, close to India. Even if this extreme case may never arise, Moscow is hardly likely to

neglect the opportunity of exploiting the alliance with India to encircle China from the south. For some time now, Moscow has been playing up the Thibet question, and this region has taken on additional strategic importance from the posting there of Chinese nuclear and rocket installations previously in Sinkiang.

Russia's pressure towards India is no longer aimed against the British Empire, as Marx foretold, but against Communist China. A calculation which may seem attractive to the Soviet leaders is that the Soviet Union with its 250 million inhabitants now joins with 550 million Indians to form a counterbalance to 800 million Chinese. But account must also be taken of the fact that volatile underdeveloped, loosely-cohering India represents an additional millstone round the Soviet neck, already encumbered with Eastern Europe, Cuba and the Middle east. The cost of the alliance with India in

political, economic and military currency may quickly prove to be higher than expected and higher than the Soviet infrastructure is capable of bearing. Over-extension increases the dangers and uncertainties for Moscow's power, however demonstratively it may be displayed. Even Russia's communications with India cannot be regarded as sure, for to avoid trackless Central Asia and the Himalayas they must pass either through the Suez Canal or along China through Siberia and the Yellow Sea. In spite of his apparent success, Brezhnev may one day find himself to have been duped. Stalin extended Russian sway to the Elbe and achieved an alliance with Mao's China. Khrushchev derived not inconsiderable advantages from his rapprochement with America, even though he had to pay for it with upheavals in Eastern Europe and the break with Peking. But Brezhnev, in the global triangle of power, has neither China nor America on his side, and Cuba, Egypt and India can never compensate for that.

A MESSAGE FOR REVOLUTIONARIES

The message comes from Pierre Vallières, ideologue of the Canadian revolutionary Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ): he has publicly stated that terrorism has no place in the struggle for an independent Quebec. Vallières' words should have particular meaning for such organizations as Guatemala's F.A.R., the Eritrean Liberation Front in Africa, or other guerrilla activists anywhere who advocate kidnappings, and other terrorist tactics to reach their goals. Vallières' message may also be of interest to the urban-university variety of revolutionary everywhere, whose enthusiasm may cause them to confuse what should be with what is.

Attached to the backgrounder is an article by Vallières which appeared in the 13 December issue of the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir. In a detailed Marxist-revolutionary analysis of the situation in Quebec, Vallières concludes that, given the "objective conditions" which prevail, the FLQ is counter-productive and no longer has any raison d'etre.

February 1972

A MESSAGE FOR REVOLUTIONARIES

Pierre Vallières, ideologue and inspiration of the Canadian Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) which for a decade has been responsible for political kidnappings and other acts of terror in the Montreal area, has publicly stated that terrorist tactics are outmoded, that the legal aspects of the struggle must be paramount, and the FLQ no longer has any raison d'etre.

In a 27-page essay which was published in the 13 and 14 December issues of the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir, Vallières reaches some of the following conclusions regarding the role of the Quebec terrorist organization:

a) "No one can arrogate to himself, in the name of a theoretical principle, the right to engage an entire people in a confrontation which stands an excellent chance of resulting in greater repression for the masses.."

b) "The political error of the FLQ is to consider itself a sort of revolutionary foyer which will liberate the people by the contagion of its ideas and acts, by the spontaneous propaganda of its tactics, and by the microbic radiation of its "cells" on the social tissues of the population."

c) "The mass struggle in Quebec utilizes the electoral process and will continue to utilize it as long as that process appears to be the right method for attaining political power and for realizing its priority objectives: national independence and economic, social and cultural transformation."

d) "The FLQ is outmoded because the situation has changed and because armed agitation is not suitable to the present situation. Because this struggle must lead an entire people to victory and not defeat, the duty of FLQ members today is to put an end to FLQ activity in all its forms..and to continue the struggle according to the best interests of the Quebec people."

Vallières called upon his FLQ comrades to support the Parti Québécois (a party represented in the Quebec provincial legislature which is also dedicated to gaining independence for French Canada through strictly legal processes). Vallières points out that FLQ activities have become counter-productive since they furnish the authorities with a pretext to intervene in Quebec affairs and would lead to the suppression not only of the FLQ itself but of all other "progressive elements" such as the trade unions, citizens

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committees and above all the Parti Québécois to which the people look for leadership in their struggle for a separate state.

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LE DEVOIR, Montreal
13 December 1971

CPYRGHT

WHY THE FLQ TODAY NO LONGER HAS ANY RAISON D'ETRE
by Pierre Vallières

In a letter to the publisher of Le Devoir, M. Pierre Vallières announces that he will soon publish an essay entitled l'Urgence de Choisir, comprising four chapters. In the second chapter entitled "The FLQ and the Important Lessons of October 1970," the text of which is attached to this letter, Vallières explains why he is breaking definitively with the Quebec Liberation Front and urging its members to return to democratic practices. Here is the complete text of this chapter.

An analysis of the evolution, over the last ten years, of the struggle methods, the organizational machinery and the increasingly precise definition of political, economic, social and cultural objectives, as well as of the basic premises of this evolution have led us to the following principal conclusions:

- 1) under present circumstances, and taking account of objective conditions, the main strategic, political force in the liberation struggle is and can only be the Parti Québécois;
- 2) the creation of a second mass party (worker or Marxist) would only be a source of diversion and division for the Quebec masses, and at the same time would retard the development of the struggle in which the Quebec people are engaged in a total, that is inseparable, manner on what is called the "national" as well as on what is known as the "social" plane.
- 3) the "contents" of independence are shaped at the base (trade unions, citizens' committees, local chapters of the Parti Québécois, the liberation front of Quebec women, etc.) and must integrate with the political initiatives of the Parti Québécois (party of the masses), the makeup of which, in reality, overlaps with the "joint front" of labor unions, citizens' committees and progressive intellectuals.

On the political level, the division between a party which claims to be leading this so-called social "front" and the Parti Québécois (which one is too inclined to reduce to a purely "national" or nationalist "front"), would constitute an internal division within the same mass struggle, would compromise the chances for success of this struggle and, in short, would strengthen the incumbent regime. In such a division, the people of Quebec would stand to lose enormously from every point of view.

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In the light of these conclusions, is an FLQ necessary? The problem is not to determine whether or not the FLQ possesses at present the technical means for carrying out actions similar to those of October 1970, but to decide whether, politically, these actions are necessary for the Quebec liberation struggle and whether they will be necessary in the foreseeable future.

To answer this question, it is useful first of all to ask whether the current situation is revolutionary and, consequently, whether armed struggle is justified. For a situation to be revolutionary and for armed struggle to constitute a politically valid means of struggle for the masses, the following objective conditions must exist:

- 1) total inability of the regime in power to satisfy popular aspirations and demands;
- 2) the suppression of democratic and civil liberties;
- 3) a permanent state of repression and of political, economic and social crisis;
- 4) Antagonisms embittered to the point that they can be resolved only by armed confrontation;
- 5) the objective impossibility of a mass struggle developing in the election process; i.e., that a mass party could attain political power through elections;
- 6) the objective need for the people to have recourse to armed struggle (or guerrilla warfare) in order to realize their political, economic and social objectives.

Is it possible to conceive of an intermediate situation in which armed struggle would be just another formula and in which the electoral struggle would remain predominant? Certain Quebec revolutionaries imagine such a situation. They believe that the FLQ and the Parti Québécois should complement each other. They know very well that the present situation is not yet revolutionary and that therefore the struggle of the masses must assume an electoral form. Moreover, they note that the incumbent regime, threatened with disintegration, daily slides increasingly toward fascism. They foresee that in the face of the threat posed by the Parti Québécois, the unions and the citizens committees, the authorities will obstruct the electoral process and will install in Quebec a dictatorship of the Greek or Uruguayan variety. They describe the present situation as pre-revolutionary.

And, in reality, the political implications of the people's dissatisfaction today include an enormous potential for explosion. However, this is not enough to touch off a revolution. Rather, it

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leads to confrontations in which the authorities, at all levels, make use of stronger and stronger repressive measures. If the Parti Québécois did not exist and if it were not making an effort to channel this growing dissatisfaction toward a specific objective (independence and the basic transformation of the economic and social structure) capable of mobilizing the great majority of the Quebec people, the counter-offensive would already have had tragic and baneful consequences for the development of the liberation struggle (which is a revolutionary struggle) and for the workers of Quebec. The risks of widespread demobilization and a retreat into darkness would, in such circumstances, be great. It would constitute a decisive victory for Canadian colonialism and American imperialism.

This is why the authorities, more and more openly, are seeking a confrontation which they hope will provide an opportunity to forcibly crush the Quebec people by destroying the organizations which the people created in order to free themselves: the Parti Québécois, the unions, the citizens' committees, etc. The October 1970 crisis provided the authorities with the occasion for a "dress rehearsal" of this classic scenario at a time when the organization which by its actions had provoked the crisis did not have the resources for an extended offensive against the authorities nor to offer the Quebec people the strategy and weapons which would have enabled them to resist repression, still less the techniques of revolutionary action which would have enabled it to achieve its ends: winning political power and constructing a new society.

Had it not been for the combined action of the Parti Québécois, the workers' groups and all of Quebec's progressive forces, the "ever-present danger of reaction and retreat which always hangs over a transitional society" would have occurred and the FLQ would have had to take the odious responsibility before history of having given the exploiters of the Quebec people the opportunity of striking them a possibly fatal blow.

Fortunately, the irreparable did not occur because the authorities, taken by surprise, reacted too slowly and were not really able to resolve the contradictions which existed between the various decision-making levels and within each of these levels. But the crisis would have provided the authorities with the opportunity not only to scare people but also and especially to resolve some of its own contradictions by uniting around the central government the exploiters of the Quebec people.

If ever the FLQ were to offer the authorities a new opportunity to invoke the War Measures Law against Quebec, this time all levels of the state would be prepared, whereas the FLQ again would have no control over the process it had set in motion. As in October 1970, it would be obliged to leave to the Parti Québécois and to the unions the task of resisting the repression which would be carried out against everyone. In short, it would condemn the people to the defensive, to retreat and to fear. In fact, it would have to swallow what it claimed to combat:

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repression. Worse, it would condemn the entire population to a loss of initiative, to passive acceptance of the state's counter-attack and to dependence on the mercies of the authorities.

One cannot challenge, in the name of the people, the army of a regime when one does not oneself possess an army in which the people can find itself, become part of consciously and through a collective fight, take the road to political power and the realization of their social objectives. And in order for such a people's army to organize, develop and triumph, it is necessary first of all that the people have no choice but to take up arms, that they know this and that in their midst there have developed a leadership capable of assuming the historic responsibility of guiding an entire people toward certain victory.

No one can assume -- like a self-awarded diploma -- the task of being the avant-garde of a people on the way to liberation. Above all, no one can arrogate to himself, in the name of a theoretical principle, the right to engage an entire people in a confrontation which stands an excellent chance of resulting in greater repression for the masses and, for the revolutionary and progressive forces, attrition if not total annihilation.

Actions such as those of October 1970 reduce the revolutionary struggle to a series of isolated tactics, of flashy initiatives which depend on special circumstances and are without any strategic significance. At the level on which they occur, such actions, even if they arouse the people from their lethargy, compromise in the long run the security and militancy of the most politically aware elements of the population, and thus the nation as a whole.

The fact that an important part of the population up to now has sympathized with FLQ initiatives, supported its October Manifesto, admire its acquisition of political prisoners etc. does not mean that the FLQ automatically represents for the masses an alternative for attaining political power. If the masses confuse so easily "felquistes" (FLN members) and "pequistes" (Parti Québécois adherents), it is because for them the FLQ represents the "radical element" of a liberation movement whose prime mover remains the Parti Québécois.

In the eyes of the Quebec masses and also in the eyes of the authorities, it is the Parti Québécois which constitutes the real alternative to power. It is neither the trade unions, nor the citizens committees nor the FLQ. The FLQ is regarded by the people as shock troops in the struggle for independence and socialism. This subjective view of the FLQ is closer to the truth than that, also subjective, which the FLQ members have of themselves when they characterize themselves as a

guerrilla army around which the other political, trade union and social forces in the Quebec liberation struggle will allegedly radicalize. This subjective and erroneous view of themselves is not shared by all FLQ members. The October 1970 Manifesto, for example, gives a definition of the FLQ which corresponds approximately to the way the masses see it. In any case, it should be very difficult for the FLQ -- at best -- to be more than a tactical support for a broad, mass movement whose main strategic strength is supplied by the Parti Québécois.

The political and subjective error of the FLQ, maintained and fed by the authorities and the information media, is to consider itself a sort of revolutionary foyer which will liberate the people by the contagion of its ideas and acts, by the spontaneous propaganda of its tactics and by the microbic radiation of its "cells" on the social tissues of the population -- all this simply by the political-magical effect of its violence, its courage, its generosity and its good intentions. This biological interpretation of urban guerrilla activity confuses one center among others of social agitation with an authentic guerrilla activity, which in a given situation acts as the motivating force in a people's war because there exists no other popular struggle strategy which can lead the masses to the realization of their objectives.

In Quebec there is no doubt that armed agitation has nothing to do with the armed struggle, which is a mass struggle. The FLQ has engaged in armed agitation; it has never engaged in an armed struggle because in Quebec the mass struggle can utilize the normal electoral process and does use it. The electoral process and armed struggle cannot be used at the same time, since the mass struggle cannot have two heads and two strategies without repudiating itself. In reality, armed mass struggle and electoral mass struggle cannot coexist. The masses cannot at one time become part of two different strategies, as if they were living at the same time in two different situations. The masses can and should change political strategy once the situation itself has changed and requires a different struggle method than that which corresponded to the conditions of the previous situation.

A strategy never develops by itself and each people has to forge one of its own by its efforts, its sacrifices, its errors, its defeats, its battles won or lost, which the people must experience in order to discover it [the strategy], master it and apply it. In this domain, even failures, by the experience and knowledge they generate, are often more tempering than successes too easily won.

The mass struggle in Quebec -- whether or not this pleases those who only concede revolutionary value to armed political action -- makes use of the electoral process and will continue to make use of it as long as that process appears to be the right method and formula for

attaining political power and realizing its priority objectives: national independence and the economic, social and cultural changes that are the concomitants of independence.

The mass struggle will commit itself to another approach only if the situation is radically changed by -- let us say -- the outlawing of the Parti Québécois, censorship, permanent military occupation, the suppression of the present election process or by a marked limitation of its "normal" operation.

In his book Guerrilla Warfare, One Method (1961), Che Guevara emphasizes that one must never exclude a priori that revolutionary change in a given society can begin through the election process. So much the better, one must add, if this change can take place completely through this process. Armed struggle, as revolutionary strategy and method for mass political action, cannot be undertaken nor develop if the masses think they can realize their goals through the electoral process. A revolutionary is one who finds the strategy and tactics appropriate to the objective situation which exists and who is capable of foreseeing those conditions which will obtain whenever this or that modification in the objective situation drastically changes the balance between the forces involved and concomitantly demands that the masses develop new methods of action, either for seizing political power or for defending what they have already won.

In the present situation, it would be an unforgivable error for the advocates of a real social revolution in Quebec to underestimate -- or worse deny -- that the Quebec people can profit by the strategy of the Parti Québécois. For it is this strategy which, for the first time in Quebec, has permitted large segments of the population to participate directly in a process aimed at attaining political power and, through a collective effort, to understand its mechanisms, implications, limitations, dangers and possibilities; in a word, to become aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their resources, of the importance of their unity and solidarity in the face of those who threaten them indiscriminately and seek to divide them in order to better dominate and exploit them.

Who can deny the sound basis of René Lévesque's statement that in Quebec "the struggle for national emancipation must develop in the classic confusion of a social revolution" and that consequently we must find a way of carrying out simultaneously the struggle for national liberation and the struggle for social liberation "remembering that without national freedom we will have neither the maturity nor the means to accomplish a social, economic and cultural renaissance which is not incomplete or illusory." (Le Devoir, 29 November 1971).

If it is not in the interest of the majority of the Quebec people at present for the trade unions to set up a second party of the masses (which would differ from the Parti Québécois only by its phraseology and which, moreover, by its rivalry with the Parti Québécois, would

retard the political and social emancipation of Quebec and the historic process which is taking place), is it in the interest of the Quebec people that the FLQ continue its action begun in 1963 and which in October 1970 provoked the crisis that everyone is familiar with?

Is it in the interest of the Canadian people that FLQ armed agitation, such as it has carried out in Quebec for the last eight years, continue to present itself, mythically, as armed struggle, when in reality it possesses none of the basic characteristics of a true armed struggle and when objective conditions at present neither permit nor require the development of such a struggle?

One must reply categorically no.

Even if the political, economic and social objectives of the FLQ are based on the real aspirations of the Quebec people, its actions have always been more or less spontaneous, irregular and dependent on circumstances. Except for its violence, nothing distinguishes it politically from the agitation of other angry exploited and colonized groups: 'Mouvement de Libération Populaire, Front de Libération Populaire, Mouvement de Libération du Taxi, Ligue pour l'Intégration Scholaire, Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance National (in its early years).

This agitation has been useful. It has made aware and given a political viewpoint to an ever increasing number of Quebec citizens. Above all it has been responsible for the emergence of an organized mass movement, the Parti Québécois, and has contributed to the radicalization of the trade unions.

Only one form of coherent political activity, one real alternative road to power for the "white niggers" of Quebec has come from the social struggle and political efforts of the last few years: the Parti Québécois.

That this party is not perfect, none will deny. But if it were to disappear without having accomplished its task and without having taken advantage of all the possibilities which unquestionably the democracy in power (no matter how sick) still offers, it is certain that, in such a case, so much effort over the past ten years in so many different fields of activity, would be lost for a long while in defeatism, fatigue and discouragement, especially if such a premature and catastrophic disappearance were to be caused (consciously or not) by ideological quarrels based more on theories from books (devoting little attention to the study of history) than on a concrete, constantly re-examined understanding of a specific ever-evolving situation. The consequences would be ever more severe if the Parti Québécois were crushed or paralyzed by a savage campaign of repression occasioned by, or for which the pretext was provided, by some flashy act of the FLQ.

The advocates of armed action and of "autumn offensives" should learn the main lesson of October 1970 and draw from it practical,

politically justified conclusions, in the interest of the people of Quebec and of their liberation struggle and not thinking -- egoistically, aristocratically and isolatedly with no regard for the most elementary sense of responsibility -- of preserving their "principles" and their nucleus of an organization for armed agitation under the pretext that some day, inevitable, a peoples war situation will exist in Quebec, or that the program of the Parti Québécois is not revolutionary enough.

The principal lesson of October 1970 is the following: the authorities consider that they are threatened first and foremost, not by the FLQ whose real importance they understand, but by the joint political activity of the Parti Québécois, the labor unions and the citizens' committees, political activity which is basically radical because it aims objectively -- and with increasing awareness -- at the rupture of the colonial and imperialist relations from which the Anglo-Canadian bourgeoisie, its American masters and the "débris of elites" who make up the rickety French-speaking "business" bourgeoisie all profit to the detriment of the development of the Quebec people, its economy, its own institutions, its culture, its creativity, its freedom and its dignity.

Now the regime in power portrays itself as a liberal democracy and has surrounded itself with political and legal institutions which conform to the liberal ideology that the Anglo-Saxons value so highly (for themselves, first of all). Therefore, it is with the greatest anxiety that the regime observes the use which the Quebec separatists make of the political instruments that the regime itself has forged....

How to oppose the "historic process" which, under the present political system, the Parti Québécois and the forces which support it have the legal right to accomplish by electoral means? Even though in a democracy, the expression of separatist "ideas" is tolerated, can a federal state, no matter how liberal, allow one of the members of the federation to undertake separatist actions? Even if such a political process were allegedly carried out by legal, democratic means? How to avoid the dilemma already presented by the prospect of the accession to power in Quebec of the separatist Parti Québécois and, moreover, driven to the wall by popular pressure (particularly that of the unions and the citizens' committees) to undertake economic and social changes, as the struggle for independence develops, in the words of René Lévesque, "in the classic disorder of a social revolution?" [sic]

If the separatists, on the one side, hope to win political power in Quebec, the Canadians, on their side, cannot resign themselves to seeing Quebec free itself politically (and even less economically) from their domination and proclaiming itself a sovereign people. Already, even the possibility that the Parti Québécois might soon succeed in

this operation has provoked a large-scale crisis throughout Canada. Often in history, such basic antagonisms could be resolved only by armed confrontation.

However, the reputation of being an "advanced democracy" which Canada enjoys at home and abroad obliges its good federalist "democrats" to use a bit more political finesse than one would expect from a dictatorship of gorillas.

The federal government -- beyond any doubt -- seriously plans armed intervention. However, what it needs in the present situation -- and taking into account Anglo-Canadian views regarding civil liberties -- are pretexts, opportunities to intervene militarily in Quebec using the expedient of an all-out war against "terrorism."

The possibility of Canadian military intervention against a Quebec which is attaining its independence by the electoral process must be clearly faced, without, however, forgetting the fact that for English Canada such intervention would be extremely costly from the political viewpoint. English Canada's objectives would be much better served if an opportunity were provided (by an illegal group) to crush the Parti Québécois and the forces capable of reestablishing or replacing it BEFORE this mass party had won the elections and achieved legitimacy -- within the country, as well as abroad -- and has attained the authority which would make it both.

1) The authentic and unchallengeable spokesman of the people of Quebec, with which the central authorities would have to negotiate the forms of independence (negotiations which it would be in Ottawa's interest to prolong, if its objective were, by paralyzing such negotiations, to stimulate in Quebec a political and social climate which, in the eyes of English Canada would justify the "discovery" of an insurrection and the invoking of the famous Law re emergency war measures); and

2) "the new social nerve structure," to use the expression of Jean-Claude Leclere, of a proletarian nation which expects from independence something more than a change of "cliques," - expects nothing less than a basic transformation of the economic and social structures and the development of new social relations.

Thus, for English Canada, for the central authorities, the objective is to create a pretext for intervening against the separatist and progressive forces in Quebec before the Parti Québécois has acquired legitimacy through democratic elections and, if possible, before it has acquired even that popular legitimacy which historically often precedes the election, the ballot and the accession to power.

But will the central authorities bring about this confrontation which will permit it to take the offensive?...

There is no doubt that the authorities are making every possible use of the "FLQ menace" to put its police and military shock troops on a permanent war footing in order to restrict civil liberties and increase the number of repressive laws. Since October 1970, the "FLQ menace" has been the handiest political justification for bludgeonings, searches, spying, proclamations, anti-demonstration regulations, emergency laws, large-scale army maneuvers across Quebec territory, plot rumors, conspiracies, imaginary plans for selective assassinations, fake political trials etc...

If, for one year, the "FLQ menace" has constituted the leitmotiv for the public pronouncements of the "authorities," it is because the October crisis showed them how much they had to gain from the brilliant feats of the FLQ which were without strategic revolutionary significance, but which could be credibly represented as being part of a long-range offensive in a genuine revolutionary armed struggle campaign, when in reality these initiatives were nothing of the sort.

In these circumstances, every FLQ act, no matter how small or limited, every communication bearing the FLQ seal, no matter how hair-brained, every FLQ "message," sham or real, acquires a political importance which only helps those who use the permanent "FLQ menace" as additional pretexts to bludgeon the liberation movement of the Quebec masses, while waiting for one "major" opportunity which would furnish the pretest for marshalling all its resources in order to definitely break the back of the liberation movement...

If, up to October 1970, FLQ armed agitation was the radical expression of the spontaneous and anarchic character which every national liberation movement experiences in the beginning, today it has become, in fact, the unconscious but objective ally of the repressive strategy of the regime, and thus, far from constituting a tactical support for the struggle of the Quebec people, stands to contribute to the crushing of that struggle and to the liquidation of its momentum.

The intellectual conviction that armed confrontation is inevitable (even if founded on a serious analysis of the world situation) can IN NO WISE justify the recourse to armed agitation in the present situation as modified by the October crisis. If ever in the past, it was warranted as a means of calling attention to conditions of domination and stimulating a firm resolve to escape it, today armed agitation (as well as the non-armed agitation of those who confuse breaking a glass window with a conscious, positive and mobilizing political act) is counter-revolutionary...

For these reasons, which are based neither on opportunism, sentimentality nor even less on fear of action, but solely on an objective analysis of a specific situation, one must not hesitate to state clearly and vigorously that the FLQ ("symbol" of liberation more than the organization of liberation, and guerrilla "myth" more than popular resistance), today no

longer has any raison d'etre. And, for my part, having reached such a conclusion, to be satisfied to break definitively with the FLQ and withdraw from it every kind of support (including facile sympathy) without publicly stating the well-founded reasons for my decision, would be inexcusable.

The FLQ is outmoded because the situation has changed and because armed agitation is not suitable to present conditions. However, the struggle itself continues. Because this struggle must lead an entire people to victory and not defeat, the responsibility and political duty of FLQ members today is to put an end to FLQ activity in all its forms, including verbal FLQ-ism and to continue the struggle in the best interests of the Quebec people...

All that has gone into making popular heroes and myths of FLQ members does not exempt them from self-criticism or from the responsibilities inherent in all revolutionary activity. On the contrary, it demand it of them to an even greater extent since the need is greater. They cannot escape this high and urgent obligation except by renouncing their convictions and ideals, and replacing them with the illusion that they are the sole possessors of revolutionary truth.

"L'urgence de choisir"

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Pourquoi le FLQ n'a plus de raison d'être aujourd'hui

par PIERRE VALLIÈRES

L'analyse de l'évolution, de puis dix ans, des formes de lutte, des instruments organisationnels et de la définition de plus en plus précise des objectifs politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels, ainsi que des bases de départ de cette évolution, nous a conduits (...) aux principales conclusions suivantes:

1) que dans la conjoncture actuelle, compte tenu des conditions objectives, la principale force politique stratégique de la lutte de libération est et ne peut être que le Parti québécois;

2) que la création d'un deuxième parti de masse (ouvrier ou bien marxiste) ne pourrait être qu'un facteur de diversion et de division au sein des masses québécoises, et du même coup constituerait un frein au développement de la lutte que les Québécois livrent de manière inséparable, donc globale, au plan dit "national" comme à celui dit "social";

3) que le "contenu" de l'indépendance se définit à la base (syndicats, comités de citoyens, organisations locales du P.Q., front de libération des femmes québécoises, etc.) et doit s'intégrer à l'action politique du Parti québécois (parti de masse) dont la composition est, en réalité, la même que recouvre le "front commun" des centrales syndicales, des comités de citoyens et des intellectuels progressistes.

Une division au plan politique, entre un parti prétendant "coiffer" ce "front" dit social et le Parti québécois qu'on a trop tendance à réduire à un "front" purement "national" ou nationaliste, constituerait en réalité une division à l'intérieur d'une même lutte de masse, compromettrait les chances de succès de cette lutte et renforcerait, en définitive, le régime en place. Le peuple québécois y perdrait énormément à tous les paliers, opposera une répression de plus en plus vive. Si le Parti québécois n'existait pas et s'il ne faisait pas l'effort de canaliser ce mécontentement croissant vers un objectif précis (indépendance et transformation en profondeur des structures économiques et sociales) capable de mobiliser l'immense majorité des Québécois, la contre-offensive aurait déjà des conséquences tragiques et néfastes pour le développement de la lutte de libération (qui est une lutte révolutionnaire) et donc pour l'ensemble des travailleurs québécois. Les risques de démobilité générale et d'un retour à la grande noirceur seraient alors considérables. Ce pourrait être une victoire décisive pour le colonialisme canadien et l'impérialisme américain.

Dans sa lettre au directeur du Devoir, M. Pierre Vallières annonce qu'il publiera bientôt un essai, "L'urgence de choisir", composé de quatre chapitres. C'est dans le 2e chapitre, intitulé "Le F.L.Q. et les grandes leçons d'octobre 1970", texte annexé à sa lettre, que Vallières explique pourquoi il rompt définitivement avec le Front de libération du Québec et lui retire tout appui, exhortant les membres actuels du mouvement à revenir à l'action démocratique. Voici le texte intégral de ce chapitre.

Compte tenu de ces conclusions, un F.L.Q. est-il nécessaire? La question n'est pas de savoir si le F.L.Q. possède ou non, présentement, les moyens techniques de réaliser des actions comme celles d'octobre 1970, mais de décider si politiquement ces actions sont nécessaires aujourd'hui au développement de la lutte de libération des Québécois et si elles seront nécessaires dans un avenir prévisible.

Pour répondre à cette question, il convient d'abord de se demander si la situation actuelle est révolutionnaire et, par conséquent, si la lutte armée est justifiée. Pour qu'une situation soit révolutionnaire et pour que la lutte armée constitue le mode de lutte politiquement juste pour les masses, il faut qu'existent les conditions objectives suivantes:

1) l'incapacité absolue du pouvoir en place de satisfaire les aspirations et les revendications populaires;

2) la suppression des libertés civiles et démocratiques;

3) un état permanent de répression et de crise politique, économique et sociale;

4) l'exacerbation d'antagonismes ne pouvant se résoudre que dans et par un affrontement armé;

5) l'impossibilité objective qu'une lutte de masse puisse s'organiser et se développer dans le processus électoral et, par conséquent, qu'un parti de masse puisse conquérir le pouvoir politique par des élections.

6) la nécessité objective pour le peuple d'avoir recours à la lutte armée (ou guerre de guérilla) pour réaliser ses objectifs politiques, économiques et sociaux.

Peut-on imaginer une situation intermédiaire dans laquelle la lutte armée serait une formule parmi d'autres et où la lutte électorale demeurerait prédominante, en attendant qu'à son tour la lutte armée devienne le mode d'action politique prédominant? Certains révolutionnaires québécois imaginent ainsi la situation. Ils croient que le P.Q. et le F.L.Q. doivent être complémentaires l'un de l'autre. Ils savent bien que la situation actuelle n'est pas encore révolutionnaire et que la lutte des masses emprunte donc le mode électoral. D'autre part, ils constatent que, menacé de désintégration, le régime en place glisse chaque jour davantage vers le fascisme. Ils prévoient que, tôt ou tard, face à la menace que représentent ensemble le P.Q., les centrales syndicales et les comités de citoyens, les tenants actuels du pouvoir vont bloquer le processus électoral et instaurer au Québec une dictature de type grec ou uruguayen. Ils qualifient la situation présente de pré-révolutionnaire.

Et, en effet, l'implication politique de l'agitation populaire comporte aujourd'hui un énorme potentiel de rupture. Cela ne suffit pas cependant à déclencher une véritable révolution mais conduit à des affrontements auxquels le pouvoir, à tous ses paliers, opposera une répression de plus en plus vive. Si le Parti québécois n'existait pas et s'il ne faisait pas l'effort de canaliser ce mécontentement croissant vers un objectif précis (indépendance et transformation en profondeur des structures économiques et sociales) capable de mobiliser l'immense majorité des Québécois, la contre-offensive aurait déjà des conséquences tragiques et néfastes pour le développement de la lutte de libération (qui est une lutte révolutionnaire) et donc pour l'ensemble des travailleurs québécois. Les risques de démobilité générale et d'un retour à la grande noirceur seraient alors considérables. Ce pourrait être une victoire décisive pour le colonialisme canadien et l'impérialisme américain.

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C'est pourquoi, de plus en plus ouvertement, le pouvoir recherche un affrontement qui, espère-t-il, lui fournira l'occasion d'écraser par la force le peuple québécois en détruisant les organisations qu'il s'est données pour s'affranchir: le P.Q., les centrales syndicales, les comités de citoyens, etc. La crise d'octobre 1970 a fourni au pouvoir l'occasion d'une "répétition générale" de ce scénario classique, à un moment où l'organisation qui avait, par son action, déclenché la crise ne possédait aucun moyen de soutenir une offensive de longue durée contre le pouvoir ni d'offrir au peuple québécois la stratégie et les armes qui lui auraient permis de résister à la répression, et encore moins la méthode d'action révolutionnaire qui lui aurait permis d'arriver à ses fins: la conquête du pouvoir et la construction d'une nouvelle société.

N'eût été l'action conjointe du P.Q., des centrales ouvrières et de tout ce que le Québec comporte de forces progressistes, la situation aurait déclenché un régime permanent

de réaction et de recul qui flotte toujours sur une société en transition" (René Lévesque, *Le Devoir*, 29 nov. 1971) se serait concrétisé et le F.L.Q. aurait eu à assumer devant l'histoire l'odieuse responsabilité d'avoir offert aux exploiters du peuple québécois l'occasion rêvée de lui porter un coup peut-être fatal.

L'irréparable heureusement ne s'est pas produit, parce que le pouvoir a été pris par surprise, a mis trop de temps à réagir et n'a vraiment réussi à résoudre les contradictions qui existent entre ses différents paliers de décision et à l'intérieur de chacun de ces paliers. Mais la crise lui aura quand même fourni l'occasion non seulement de "faire peur au monde" mais également et surtout de résoudre certaines de ses propres contradictions en réalisant, autour de l'Etat central, l'union sacrée des exploiters contre la population québécoise.

Si jamais le F.L.Q. devait offrir au pouvoir une nouvelle occasion de promulguer contre le Québec La Loi des mesures de guerres, tous les paliers du pouvoir seraient, cette fois, bien préparés, alors que le F.L.Q., de son côté, ne pourrait une fois de plus avoir aucun contrôle sur le processus qu'il aurait déclenché. Il devrait, comme en octobre 1970, s'en remettre au P.Q. et aux centrales syndicales du soin de résister à la répression qui s'exercerait contre tous. En somme, il condamnerait le peuple à la défensive, au repli et à la peur. Il avaliserait en fait ce qu'il prétendrait combattre: la répression. Pire, il condamnerait la population entière à perdre toute forme d'initiative, à subir passivement la contre-attaque du pouvoir et à dépendre du bon vouloir des autorités.

On ne provoque pas au nom du peuple l'armée du pouvoir en place quand on ne possède pas soi-même une armée dans laquelle un peuple peut se reconnaître, s'intégrer consciemment et, par un combat collectif, s'acheminer vers la conquête du pouvoir politique et la réalisation de ses objectifs sociaux. Et pour qu'une telle armée du peuple puisse s'organiser, se développer et vaincre, il faut d'abord que le peuple ne puisse objectivement avoir d'autre choix que de prendre les armes, qu'il en ait conscience, qu'il ait développé en son sein une direction politique et militaire pleinement capable d'assumer la lourde responsabilité historique de guider le peuple tout entier vers une victoire certaine.

Personne ne peut solliciter comme un diplôme qu'il se donne à lui-même la charge d'être l'avant-garde d'un peuple en voie de libération. Personne surtout ne peut s'arroger le droit, au nom de principes théoriques, d'engager tout un peuple dans un affrontement qui a toutes les chances de se solder, pour les masses, par une répression accrue, et pour les forces révolutionnaires et progressistes, par l'usure, sinon l'écrasement total. Des actions comme celles d'octobre 1970 réduisent la lutte révolutionnaire à une succession de tactiques isolées, de coups d'éclat "circonstanciels", privés de toute portée stratégique. Sur le plan où elles se situent, ces actions, même si elles tirent la population de sa torpeur, compromettent à long terme la sécurité et la combativité des secteurs les plus politisés de la population et, par le fait même, de la nation tout entière.

Ce n'est pas parce qu'une partie importante de la population, jusqu'à maintenant, a sympathisé avec des actions du F.L.Q., qu'elle a appuyé le contenu de son Manifeste d'octobre, qu'elle admire les prisonniers politiques, etc., que le F.L.Q. constitue automatiquement une alternative de pouvoir pour les masses. Si les masses confondent si facilement les felquistes avec les péquistes, c'est que pour elles le F.L.Q. regroupe une "section radicale" d'un mouvement de libération dont le principal moteur demeure, pour elles, le P.Q.

C'est le P.Q. qui, aux yeux des masses québécoises et aux yeux aussi du présent régime, constitue l'alternative réelle de pouvoir. Ce ne sont ni les syndicats, ni les comités de citoyens, ni le F.L.Q. Le F.L.Q. est perçu par le peuple comme un groupe de choc de la lutte pour l'indépendance et le socialisme. Cette perception subjective du F.L.Q. est plus proche de la vérité que celle, subjective elle aussi, qu'ont d'eux-mêmes les felquistes qui se définissent comme une armée de guérilla autour de laquelle se radicaliseraient les autres forces politiques, syndicales et sociales dans la lutte de libération des Québécois. Cette perception subjective et erronée de soi n'est toutefois pas commune à tous les felquistes. Le Manifeste d'octobre 1970, par exemple, donne du F.L.Q. une définition qui correspond à peu près à la représentation que les masses s'en font. De toutes façons, il serait bien difficile au F.L.Q. d'être plus (en mettant les

tactique à un vaste mouvement de masse dont la force stratégique principale est constituée par le P.Q.

L'erreur subjective et politique du F.L.Q., entretenue et cultivée d'ailleurs par le pouvoir et les médias d'information, est de se croire une espèce de "foyer" révolutionnaire qui libérera le peuple par la contagion de ses idées et de ses actions, par la propagande spontanée de ses tactiques, par l'irradiation microbienne de ses "cellules" sur les tissus sociaux de la population, tout cela par le simple effet politico-magique de sa violence, de son courage, de sa générosité et de ses bonnes intentions. Cette interprétation biologique de la guérilla urbaine confond un foyer parmi d'autres d'agitation sociale avec une authentique guérilla qui, dans une situation déterminée, est appelée à devenir le moteur d'une guerre du peuple parce qu'il n'y existe aucune autre stratégie de lutte populaire qui puisse conduire les masses à la réalisation de leurs objectifs.

Au Québec, il ne fait aucun doute que l'agitation armée n'a rien à voir avec la lutte armée qui est une lutte de masse. Le F.L.Q. a fait de l'agitation armée, il ne s'est jamais engagé dans une lutte armée, parce qu'au Québec la lutte de masse peut emprunter le processus électoral normal et l'emprunte effectivement. Elle ne peut emprunter à la fois le processus électoral et celui de la lutte armée, car la lutte de masse ne saurait être biphase et bistratégique sans se nier elle-même. Dans les faits, lutte armée des masses et lutte électorale des masses ne peuvent donc coexister. Les masses ne peuvent s'intégrer en même temps à deux stratégies différentes, comme si elles vivaient simultanément deux situations globales différentes. Elles peuvent et même doivent changer de stratégie politique lorsque la situation elle-même a changé et impose un autre mode de lutte que celui correspondant aux conditions spécifiques de la situation antérieure.

Une stratégie n'est jamais donnée naturellement et chaque peuple s'en forge une à même les efforts, les sacrifices, les erreurs, les défaites, les batailles gagnées ou perdues auxquels il a dû consentir pour la découvrir, la maîtriser et l'appliquer jusqu'au bout. Et dans ce domaine, les échecs eux-mêmes constituent des tremplins: souvent plus enrichissants d'expérience et de savoir que certains succès trop faciles.

La lutte de masse au Qué-

à ceux qui n'accordent de valeur révolutionnaire qu'à l'action politique armée... emprunte le processus électoral et continuera de l'emprunter tant et aussi longtemps que ce processus lui apparaîtra la méthode à suivre, la formule à utiliser pour la prise du pouvoir et la réalisation de son objectif prioritaire: l'indépendance nationale et les changements économiques, sociaux et culturels qu'elle attend de cette indépendance.

La lutte de masse ne s'engagera dans un autre processus que si la situation est radicalement modifiée par, disons, la mise hors-la-loi du Parti québécois, l'établissement de la censure, l'occupation militaire permanente, la répression sans pitié des syndicats et de toutes les forces d'opposition; bref, par la suppression du processus électoral actuel ou encore par une limitation considérable de son fonctionnement "normal".

Dans La guerre de guérilla: une méthode (1961), Che Guevara souligne qu'il ne faut jamais exclure a priori qu'un changement révolutionnaire dans une société donnée puisse commencer par un processus électoral. Tant mieux, faut-il ajouter, si ce changement peut se réaliser totalement par ce processus. La lutte armée, en tant que stratégie révolutionnaire et mode d'action politique de masse, ne peut être amorcée ni se développer si les masses croient pouvoir réaliser leurs aspirations par un processus électoral donné. Le révolutionnaire est celui qui peut trouver la stratégie et les tactiques adéquates pour la situation objective existante et qui est capable de prévoir celles qui le seront lorsque tel ou tel changement de la situation objective modifiera radicalement le rapport des forces en présence et, du même coup, imposera aux masses de nouveaux modes d'action, soit pour s'emparer du pouvoir politique, soit pour défendre ce qu'elles auraient déjà conquis.

Dans la situation actuelle, ce serait une erreur impardonnable pour les partisans d'une véritable révolution sociale au Québec de sous-estimer ou, pire, de nier ce que le peuple québécois peut gagner par la stratégie définie par le P.Q. et qui a permis, pour la première fois au Québec, à de très larges secteurs de la population de participer directement à un processus visant à la conquête du pouvoir et, par cette pratique collective, d'en

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les implications, les limites, les dangers, les possibilités; en un mot, de prendre conscience de la force et de la faiblesse de leurs moyens d'action, de l'importance de leur unité et de leur solidarité face à ce qui les menace indistinctement et cherche à les diviser, pour mieux les dominer et les exploiter.

Qui niera le bien-fondé de l'affirmation de René Lévesque suivant laquelle au Québec "la lutte pour l'émancipation nationale doit se poursuivre dans le désordre classique d'une révolution sociale" et qu'en conséquence nous devons trouver le moyen de mener de front la lutte de libération nationale et la lutte de libération sociale "en n'oubliant pas que sans la liberté nationale nous n'aurons ni la maturité ni les instruments qu'il faut pour mener à bien aucune rénovation sociale, économique ou culturelle qui ne soit illusoire ou tronquée"? (Le Devoir, 29 nov. 1971)

S'il n'est pas dans l'intérêt de la majorité des Québécois que les centrales syndicales mettent sur pied présentement un deuxième parti de masse qui se distinguerait du P.Q. par sa seule phraséologie et qui, de plus, par son opposition au P.Q., constituerait un frein à l'émancipation politique et sociale de la collectivité québécoise et au processus historique en cours, est-il dans l'intérêt du peuple québécois que le F.L.Q. poursuive l'action entreprise depuis 1963 et qui a servi de détonateur, en octobre 1970, à la crise que l'on sait?

Est-il dans l'intérêt du peuple québécois que l'agitation armée du F.L.Q., telle qu'elle a été pratiquée au Québec depuis huit ans, continue de s'affirmer mythiquement comme lutte armée, alors qu'en réalité elle ne possède aucune des caractéristiques fondamentales d'une véritable lutte armée et que les conditions objectives ne permettent pas et n'exigent pas le développement d'une telle lutte dans la conjoncture actuelle?

Il faut répondre par un non catégorique.

Même si les objectifs politiques, économiques et sociaux poursuivis par le F.L.Q. s'appuient sur les aspirations réelles des Québécois, son action fut toujours plus ou moins spontanée, périodique, circonstancielle. A part son caractère violent, rien ne la distingue politiquement de l'agitation provoquée par d'autres groupes d'exploités et de colonisés en colère: Mouvement de libération populaire, Front de

libération populaire, Mouvement de libération du taxi, Ligue pour l'intégration scolaire, Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (dans ses années d'apprentissage).

Cette agitation a eu son utilité. Elle a permis de sensibiliser et de politiser un nombre sans cesse croissant de Québécois. Elle a surtout permis l'émergence d'un mouvement de masses structuré, le Parti québécois, tout en favorisant la radicalisation des syndicats. En fait, de la confrontation permanente de luttes sociales et de crises politiques au Québec, depuis une dizaine d'années, n'a surgi qu'une forme d'action politique cohérente, qu'une alternative réelle de pouvoir pour les "nègres blancs" québécois: et c'est le Parti québécois.

Que ce parti soit imparfait, personne ne le niera. Mais que ce parti vienne à disparaître avant d'avoir été au bout de son action et d'avoir épuisé toutes les possibilités que lui offre incontestablement encore la démocratie en place (si malade soit-elle), et il est certain qu'alors tant d'efforts déployés depuis dix ans, dans les milieux les plus divers, se perdraient pour longtemps dans le défaitisme, la lassitude et le découragement, surtout si cette disparition prématurée et catastrophique devait être provoquée (consciencièrement ou non, peu importe) par des querelles idéologiques s'appuyant davantage sur des théories issues d'une érudition livresque (faisant peu de place à l'étude de l'histoire) que d'une connaissance concrète, toujours remise à jour, d'une situation concrète en perpétuelle évolution. Les conséquences en seraient encore plus dramatiques si le P.Q. devait être écrasé ou seulement paralysé par une répression sauvage dont l'occasion ou le prétexte serait un coup d'éclat du F.L.Q.

Les partisans de l'agitation armée et des "offensives d'automne" improvisées doivent comprendre la principale leçon d'octobre 1970 et en tirer des conclusions pratiques, politiquement justes, dans l'intérêt du peuple québécois et de sa lutte de libération et non en songeant d'abord égoïstement, aristocratiquement et solitairement, au mépris du plus élémentaire sens des responsabilités, à conserver leurs "principes" et leur embryon d'organisation d'agitation armée sous prétexte qu'un jour, inévitablement, une situation de guerre populaire existera au Québec, ou encore que le programme du Parti québécois n'est pas assez révolutionnaire

(phraseologiquement parlant).

La grande leçon d'octobre 1970 est la suivante: le pouvoir se sent et se sait d'abord et principalement menacé, non par le F.L.Q. dont il connaît l'importance réelle, mais par la pratique politique convergente du Parti québécois, des centrales syndicales et des comités de citoyens, pratique politique au départ radicale puisqu'elle vise objectivement - et de plus en plus consciemment - l'éclatement des rapports coloniaux et impérialistes dont profitent la bourgeoisie anglo-canadienne, ses maîtres américains et les "débris d'élites" qui composent la rachitique bourgeoisie "d'affaires" francophone, au détriment du développement de la société québécoise, de son économie, de ses institutions propres, de sa culture, de sa créativité, de sa liberté et de sa dignité.

Le mouvement indépendantiste, qui est en même temps mouvement de libération sociale, relève clairement d'une volonté collective de structuration d'un Etat québécois libre politiquement et d'une économie québécoise radicalement transformée. Expression consciente de l'ensemble complexe des antagonismes engendrés par la situation globale de domination de la nation québécoise par l'impérialisme, le colonialisme et le capitalisme, ce mouvement de libération nationale menace directement les assises politiques et économiques de nos "débris d'élites" et surtout les intérêts économiques et politiques de ceux qu'ils (principalement les Libéraux) représentent aux divers paliers de gouvernement. L'affirmation la plus cohérente, la plus structurée politiquement, de cette volonté collective de libération étant le Parti québécois, celui-ci est la cible numéro un des intérêts politiques et économiques menacés.

Or, le régime en place se définit comme une démocratie libérale et il s'est donné des structures politiques et juridiques conformes à l'idéologie libérale que chérissent tant les Anglo-saxons (pour eux-mêmes, d'abord). Le régime assiste donc avec angoisse à l'utilisation que font les indépendantistes québécois des instruments politiques qu'il a lui-même définis.

La situation n'est pas sans rappeler celle qui mena aux affrontements de 1837-38. Les indépendantistes, comme le

Parti patriote d'alors, utilisent ce que le système garantit à tous mais dont, depuis 1840, ne s'étaient servi que des factions de la bourgeoisie(?) québécoise unanimement acquises à la politique de collaboration avec l'Etat central, l'Etat de la société dominante anglosaxonne. Les indépendantistes, eux, réclament non moins que la séparation de la société québécoise de la Confédération canadienne, l'affranchissement total du Québec de la domination qui depuis 1760 s'exerce sur lui. Le système politique que les Anglo-canadiens ont imposé par la force aux Québécois se révèle un instrument parfaitement légal et démocratique pour ces derniers d'échapper au joug colonial canadien par lequel l'impérialisme exerce lui aussi sa domination sur le Québec, société doublement colonisée.

Cette contradiction dans leur système de domination, les Anglo-canadiens ne la "digèrent" plus depuis que, sous le gouvernement Lesage, le Québec a cessé de se percevoir comme une simple entité culturelle pour se reconnaître comme une société, comme une nation, prenant ainsi conscience de sa situation globale de peuple colonisé et prolétaire.

Le système confédéral de 1867 visait à intégrer définitivement le Québec au Canada anglais et, par le biais de ce dernier, à la métropole du "One Canada": d'abord la Grande-Bretagne, puis les Etats-Unis. Après la deuxième guerre mondiale, le duplisme conservateur et obscurantiste rendait cette intégration peu rentable pour les Canadiens et les Américains. Le duplisme était mal adapté au mode de production impérialiste atteint par le capitalisme monopoliste et expansionniste, sous la poussée des entreprises multinationales américaines. (...) La politique de rattrapage amorcée par la "révolution tranquille", au début des années 60, avait comme objectif économique-politique l'intégration "fonctionnelle", rationnelle, efficace et rentable de la société québécoise à la société canadienne-anglaise, elle-même intégrée continentalement à l'empire américain.

Mais voilà que la politique de rattrapage a déclenché malgré elle un processus dont le contrôle lui échappe, un processus collectif d'affirmation et de libération qu'amorce le mouvement des élé-

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ments les plus progressistes et les plus dynamiques de la société québécoise (formés dans la contestation des années 1948-60) auxquels s'ajoutent d'année en année des couches de plus en plus larges de la population, et cela s'effectue à un rythme tel qu'avant même que les Canadiens anglais et les Américains n'aient eu le temps de reviser leur stratégie à l'égard du Québec, les Québécois se découvrent unanimes à contester le statu quo.

L'Etat du Québec a cessé d'être "la province de Québec", "the french province". Même les plus modérés, derniers survivants du duplessisme, vont jusqu'à réclamer "l'égalité ou l'indépendance", "pas nécessairement l'indépendance mais l'indépendance si nécessaire"... Mais la revendication la plus populaire, celle qui répond le mieux aux aspirations des masses québécoises, c'est l'indépendance politique du Québec accompagnée d'une transformation en profondeur des structures économiques et sociales. L'idéologie de dépassement a remplacé l'idéologie de rattrapage dont les rares promoteurs, toujours au pouvoir (mais pour combien de temps?), sont acculés à une farouche défensive qui les transforme rapidement en partisans partisans de "Law and Order" et d'un nouveau duplessisme, cette fois étiqueté "libéral".

La bourgeoisie dominante canadienne et sa clique de garde-chiourmes québécois (principalement libéraux, non par principes mais par appartenance au parti politique qui porte ce nom paradoxal et qui représente les intérêts les plus puissants, donc les plus conservateurs, du Canada), sont littéralement aux abois. Alors que la crise de l'impérialisme américain ne leur permet aucun espoir de solution à la grave crise économique qui affecte le Québec; que les structures politiques du fédéralisme actuel paralysent totalement le gouvernement du Québec dans une camisole de force que le pouvoir central resserre impitoyablement; et que lui-même, à Ottawa, doit encaisser le coup de massue que Washington vient de lui asséner par ses récentes politiques économiques: le mouvement de libération ne cesse de croître au Québec et René Lévesque peut aujourd'hui affirmer

contredit par aucun observateur impartial de la situation, que "le dénouement approche".

Que faire pour s'opposer à "l'opération historique" que, dans le système politique actuel, le Parti québécois et les forces qui l'appuient ont juridiquement le droit de réaliser par le processus électoral? Passe encore qu'en démocratie l'on tolère l'expression des "idées" séparatistes, mais un Etat fédéral, si libéral soit-il, peut-il laisser poser à l'une des sociétés de la fédération les actes de la séparation? Même sous prétexte que cette opération politique s'essetue par des moyens légitimes, des moyens démocratiques? Comment sortir du dilemme que pose déjà la perspective de la prise éventuelle du pouvoir à Québec par le P.Q. indépendantiste et, au surplus, acculé par la pression populaire (particulièrement celle des centrales syndicales et des comités de citoyens) à s'engager dans une transformation économique et sociale, la lutte pour l'indépendance se développant, selon les propres termes de René Lévesque, "dans le désordre classique d'une révolution sociale"?

Si, d'un côté, les indépendantistes visent la conquête du pouvoir politique à Québec, les Canadiens, de leur côté, ne peuvent se résoudre à voir le Québec se libérer politiquement (et encore moins économiquement) de leur domination et s'affirmer comme peuple souverain. Déjà, la seule perspective que le P.Q. mène prochainement à bien cette opération suscite une crise d'envergure à travers tout le Canada. Très souvent dans l'histoire des antagonismes de cette importance n'ont pu se résoudre que dans et par un affrontement armé.

Mais la réputation de "démocratie avancée" que possède et entretient le Canada chez lui comme à l'étranger oblige ces bons "démocrates" fédéralistes à plus de finesse politique qu'on en peut escompter d'une dictature de gorilles. Le fédéral, à n'en pas douter, envisage sérieusement l'intervention armée. Ce dont il a besoin, cependant, dans la situation présente et compte tenu de l'état actuel de l'opinion anglo-canadienne concernant les libertés civiles, ce sont de prétextes, d'occasions, d'intervenir militairement au Québec par le biais d'une guerre sans merci au "terrorisme".

d'intervenir militairement à la faveur du paroxysme qu'atteindra sans doute la crise politique "canadienne", si le P. Q. remporte les élections d'ici quelques années, comme le laisse prévoir l'évolution de la situation au Québec? (Si tel est le cas, je crois personnellement que, indépendamment de la couleur politique du parti alors au pouvoir à Ottawa, cette intervention sera en définitive dictée par la bourgeoisie capitaliste anglo-canadienne et leurs amis américains. Un gouvernement central qui oserait s'opposer à la volonté de la bourgeoisie américano-canadienne serait, dans ces circonstances, renversé et remplacé par un gouvernement plus "patriotique". On voit d'ici que la crise provoquée par l'accession du Québec à l'indépendance risque d'entraîner des bouleversements considérables au Canada anglais et vraisemblablement aux Etats-Unis, où augmente sans cesse le nombre de ceux, particulièrement les jeunes, qui appuient le mouvement indépendantiste québécois.)

L'hypothèse d'une intervention militaire canadienne contre un Québec accédant à sa souveraineté par un processus électoral normal doit être lucidement envisagée, mais sans oublier le fait que semblable intervention serait pour le Canada anglais une opération politique extrêmement coûteuse. L'intérêt du Canada anglais serait beaucoup mieux servi si l'occasion lui était fournie (par un groupe illégal) d'écraser le P. Q. et les forces susceptibles de le reconstituer ou de le remplacer AVANT que ce parti de masse n'ait réalisé le consensus, acquis la légitimité - à l'intérieur du pays comme à l'étranger - et conquis l'autorité qui en feront à la fois:

1) l'interlocuteur authentique et incontesté du peuple québécois avec lequel le pouvoir central devra négocier les modalités de l'indépendance (négociations qu'Ottawa aura intérêt à prolonger le plus possible si son intention est en les paralysant au besoin de susciter au Québec un climat politique et social qui le justifierait, aux yeux du Canada anglais, d'"appréhender" une insurrection et d'invoquer la fameuse Loi sur les mesures de guerre); et

2) "la nouvelle nervure sociale" selon l'expression de Jean-Claude Leclerc, d'une nation-protectionniste, qui, au

pendance, attend bien davantage qu'un changement de "clique" au pouvoir; rien de moins qu'une transformation radicale des structures économiques et sociales et l'élaboration de nouveaux rapports sociaux.

L'intérêt donc du Canada anglais, du pouvoir central est de provoquer l'occasion qui lui permettra d'intervenir contre les forces indépendantistes et progressistes du Québec avant que le Parti québécois n'ait acquis la légitimité gouvernementale élu démocratiquement et, si possible, avant même qu'il n'ait acquis cette légitimité populaire qui, souvent dans l'histoire, précède la période électorale, le scrutin et la prise du pouvoir.

Mais comment le pouvoir central va-t-il provoquer cet affrontement qui lui permettrait de passer à l'offensive et d'appliquer, sous les apparences de la légitimité, la stratégie du plus fort, de celui qui seul, dans le présent régime, possède le pouvoir de recourir à l'armée? Comment, en somme, le pouvoir central peut-il provoquer (avant que le P. Q. ne s'empare démocratiquement du pouvoir à Québec ou qu'il s'en approche de trop près) "l'insurrection appréhendée" qui lui permettrait de promulguer, comme en octobre 1970, La Loi sur les mesures de guerre et, cette fois, de porter aux indépendantistes québécois un coup dont ils ne se relèveraient pas?

Il est impossible de répondre avec précision à cette question. Mais une chose est certaine: le pouvoir central et ses alliés de Québec et de Montréal recherchent avidement l'occasion de passer à l'action directe. On peut difficilement expliquer autrement ces provocations grossières (parmi tant d'autres) par lesquelles les autorités tenterent, le 29 octobre 1971, de transformer une vaste manifestation ouvrière en une émeute incontrôlable qui aurait pu constituer "l'amorce" de cette fameuse "insurrection appréhendée" qu'attendait, dès l'après-midi, l'avant-garde de l'armée rassemblée à l'ex-marché Amherst et au Quartier général de la Sûreté du Québec, rue Parthenais.

Sans l'ombre d'un doute, le pouvoir recherche l'occasion d'appliquer intégralement le scénario dont, en octobre 1970, il nous a été donné de ne connaître qu'un brouillon incomplet, mais dont l'élaboration est tout de même assez pré-

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cise pour nous permettre de découvrir les résultats recherchés.

Il ne fait pas de doute non plus que les cibles du pouvoir sont: 1) le Parti québécois, 2) les centrales syndicales (c'est devenu plus évident pour elles le 29 octobre), et 3) les comités de citoyens, soit l'ensemble du mouvement de libération nationale et de libération sociale.

Il ne fait pas de doute enfin que le pouvoir utilise de toutes les manières possibles "la menace felquist" pour placer sur pied de guerre, en permanence, ses troupes de choc policières et militaires, pour restreindre les libertés civiles et pour multiplier les législations répressives. Depuis octobre 1970, "la menace felquist" est un argument politique qui permet de justifier plus facilement les matraquages, les perquisitions, l'espionnage, la déclaration, les règlements anti-manifestations, les lois d'exception, "les grandes manoeuvres" de l'armée à travers le territoire québécois, les rumeurs de complots, les conspirations, les projets imaginaires d'assassinats sélectifs, les procès politiques truqués, etc.

Du même coup, ces multiples formes de répression, d'intimidation et de démagogie constituent autant de provocations qui, ajoutées les unes aux autres, amorceront (espère-t-on en haut lieu) l'explosion de violence, l'occasion recherchée de crier à "l'insurrection appréhendée" et de se servir de la loi ultra-fasciste des mesures de guerre pour casser les reins du P. Q., des centrales syndicales, des comités de citoyens et de tous ceux qui menacent le statu quo (comme les journalistes, par exemple).

Si "la menace felquist" constitue depuis un an le leitmotiv des déclarations publiques des "autorités" en place, c'est que la crise d'octobre leur a révélé tout le profit que le régime pouvait tirer de coups d'éclat fracassants, privés de toute portée stratégique révolutionnaire, mais qui peuvent être présentés, de manière encore vraisemblable, comme étant des actions intégrées à une offensive de longue durée s'inscrivant dans une stratégie de véritable lutte armée révolutionnaire, alors qu'en réalité il n'en est rien.

Chaque action du F.L.Q., si minime et circonscrite soit-elle, chaque communiqué por-

tant le sigle F.L.Q., si factuel soit-il, chaque "message" du F.L.Q., fictif ou réel, acquiert dans ces circonstances une importance politique dont profitent uniquement ceux qui usent de "la menace felquist" permanente pour multiplier les motifs et les occasions de matraquer le mouvement de libération des masses québécoises en attendant la "grosse" occasion qui lui permettra de tout mettre en oeuvre pour lui casser définitivement les reins.

Objectivement donc, à la suite de la crise d'octobre 1970, chaque geste posé par le F.L.Q. ou en son nom, (ce que peut faire la police aussi bien que n'importe qui), avalise ce qu'il prétend combattre au nom du peuple: la répression du peuple et des organisations qu'il s'est forgées en y investissant le meilleur de lui-même pendant des années, non sans difficultés considérables, et constamment pourchassé par la peur de l'échec, même aux jours où l'espoir et l'enthousiasme atteignent leur niveau le plus élevé; car le peuple québécois n'ignore pas que rien encore n'est définitivement gagné, que ses ennemis sont redoutablement puissants et cyniques (cynisme que Trudeau ne rate jamais une occasion de manifester par son mépris et ses inlassables provocations calculées), que s'il ne gagne pas cette fois-ci la bataille de l'indépendance on ne lui laissera plus jamais ni l'occasion ni les moyens de reconstituer ses forces, déjà si péniblement rassemblées, pour entreprendre une nouvelle bataille de l'envergure de celle qu'il livre maintenant en y mettant toutes les énergies, tout le coeur, toute l'intelligence, tout le bon sens, tout l'espoir et toute la détermination qu'il possède, non sans que cela ne lui coûte sécurité, tranquillité et souvent de douloureux et pénibles débats de conscience face à la perspective de se voir voler les fruits de sa lutte par une nouvelle classe de requins ou encore de se voir à nouveau écrasé, comme les ancêtres de 1837-38, par les armes que l'ennemi cherche le moyen et l'occasion d'utiliser massivement et sans pitié contre lui qui, à peine redevenu conscient de sa liberté et de ses droits, vient tout juste de s'engager - et encore, partiellement - dans une action politique de masse unifiée, consciente et organisée qui,

tout en tenant compte de l'extrême diversité des situations concrètes et des niveaux de conscience au Québec, l'achemine vers la réalisation de ses aspirations les plus profondes.

Si jusqu'en octobre 1970 l'agitation armée du F.L.Q. était l'expression radicale du caractère spontanéiste et anarchique que tout mouvement de libération nationale connaît à ses débuts, elle est devenue de fait aujourd'hui l'alliée inconsciente mais objective de la stratégie répressive du régime en place et, par là, loin de constituer un appui tactique à la lutte du peuple québécois, risque de contribuer à l'écrasement de cette lutte et à la liquidation de ses forces vives.

La conviction intellectuelle qu'un affrontement armé sera un jour ou l'autre inévitable (même si elle se fonde sur une analyse très approfondie de la situation globale) ne peut EN AUCUNE FAÇON justifier dans la situation présente, modifiée par la crise d'octobre, le recours à l'agitation armée comme méthode d'action politique révolutionnaire. Si jamais elle a pu l'être dans le passé, en tant que révélateur d'une condition de domination et d'une volonté résolue d'en sortir, l'agitation armée, tout comme l'agitation non armée de ceux qui confondent le bris d'une vitrine avec une action politique consciente, positive et mobilisatrice, est aujourd'hui contre-révolutionnaire.

Aujourd'hui que le rapport des forces nous apparaît tel qu'il est objectivement, l'agitation armée, beaucoup plus qu'une simple erreur politique ou un simple "égarement", est devenue un moyen idéal de "piéger" et de saboter le développement de la lutte de libération:

1) en niant le caractère objectivement libérateur du processus électoral que pratique le Parti québécois (et non tel qu'il est pratiqué par les partis de la classe dominante), à ce stade-ci de la lutte de libération;

2) en étant son contenu de lutte de masse à la lutte armée qu'un jour, peut-être, le peuple québécois sera contraint par l'adversaire de livrer collectivement pour défendre sa liberté, et en caricaturant son mode d'action politique, lequel ne devient indispensable pour un peuple ou une majorité que lorsque les processus pacifiques de con-

quête du pouvoir sont interdits par la dictature, l'occupation militaire et la répression totale;

3) en niant la nécessité pour les masses d'épuiser tous les moyens démocratiques avant de passer à une méthode armée d'action politique, à une stratégie de guérilla qui exige d'elles les plus grands sacrifices en même temps qu'un degré très élevé de conscience politique et de combativité (voir à ce sujet les premières pages de La guerre de guérilla de Che Guevara, peu suspect d'opportunisme!);

4) en dissimulant le caractère de lutte prolongée de tout processus de libération par une présentation romantique d'une possibilité ou d'une perspective imaginaire de révolution ou de victoire à court terme;

5) en divisant les efforts de ceux qui combattent les mêmes ennemis et qui ne peuvent espérer vaincre qu'en renforçant constamment leur unité;

6) en substituant à toute vision stratégique à long terme l'incohérence d'une agitation pratiquée pour elle-même et pour les "kiks" qu'elle procure au délinquant qui sommeille en chacun de nous;

7) enfin, et ce qui couronne le reste d'une irresponsabilité incalculable, en fournissant au pouvoir en place l'occasion qu'il recherche de promulguer les mesures de guerre afin d'appliquer une stratégie de force (de force armée) contre l'ensemble du mouvement québécois de libération, par le biais d'une contre-offensive décisive dirigée apparemment contre la "guerre révolutionnaire" felquist; et cela si possible avant que le Parti québécois n'acquiert la légitimité qui le rendrait politiquement invulnérable non seulement par les votes massifs qu'il pourrait recueillir des masses québécoises, ces prochaines années, mais aussi et surtout par l'intégration consciente de ces masses à une lutte quotidienne sur tous les fronts: politique, économique, social et culturel.

Pour toutes ces raisons, qui ne se fondent ni sur l'opportunisme ni sur le sentimentalisme et encore moins sur la peur de l'action, mais uniquement sur une analyse objective d'une situation concrète, il ne faut pas craindre d'affirmer clairement et avec vigueur que le F.L.Q., "symbole" plutôt qu'organisation de libération

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que résistance populaire, n'a plus aucune raison d'être aujourd'hui. Et pour ma part, je serais inexcusable, après être parvenu à cette conclusion, de me contenter de rompre définitivement avec le F.L.Q. et de lui retirer toute espèce d'appui (y inclus la sympathie facile du perpétuel "bon diable") sans donner publiquement les raisons, bien fondées, de ma décision.

Et si pour le faire, j'ai choisi le cadre d'une analyse aussi longue (dont on trouvera la suite quelques lignes plus bas), c'est dans l'espoir que cette décision soit bien comprise, et surtout qu'elle serve aux felquistes, autant qu'elle m'a servi à moi, à démystifier l'agitation armée ou non comme forme privilégiée et "pure" d'action politique. Il ne s'agit pas, bien sûr, de substituer au travail politique l'attentisme bienheureux et studieux des analystes patentés de la "science politique" doctorifiée. Non. Mais tout simplement d'éviter que par inconscience ou par entêtement des patriotes ne s'enferment dans un cul-de-sac.

Le F.L.Q. est dépassé, parce que la situation a changé et que l'agitation armée n'est pas adaptée à la situation présente. Mais la lutte, elle, continue. Et c'est parce qu'elle doit conduire tout un peuple à la victoire et non à la défaite qu'aujourd'hui la responsabilité, le devoir politique des felquistes est de faire cesser le felquisme sous toutes ses formes, y compris le felquisme verbal, et de poursuivre la lutte dans le meilleur intérêt du peuple

québécois.

Les raisons de ce choix politique nécessaire ne se résument pas seulement à celles exposées plus haut. Il y en a d'autres, tout aussi sérieuses, dont nous parlerons dans la seconde moitié de cette analyse sans les dissocier, cependant, des premières qui leur sont étroitement liées.

Trop longtemps fut entretenue au Québec (hélas, avec notre complicité inconsciente) la perspective fallacieuse d'une révolution populaire que suffirait seule à déclencher et à développer une agitation, armée ou non, qui par la simple multiplication d'actions d'éclat et de mobilisations occasionnelles fusionnerait progressivement les révoltes populaires spontanées pour en faire surgir "naturellement" une lutte de masse. Cette conception du processus révolutionnaire qui caractérise principalement les groupements gauchistes et anarchistes est une pure vision de l'esprit qui ne manque jamais, sur le terrain, de connaître rapidement la sanction de l'échec.

Tout révolutionnaire, tout patriote commence presque inévitablement par la son apprentissage de l'action politique. Il n'a pas raison de s'en vouloir à mort pour cela puisque, comme tout le monde, il n'est pas né avec la science infuse. De l'échec il doit toujours rechercher les raisons objectives et, les sachant, continuer la lutte avec une efficacité accrue, enrichi par l'expérience et guidé par l'unique souci de travailler de toutes

ses forces pour que le peuple se libère de l'exploitation, du mépris, de l'aliénation où le système en place l'emprisonne et le négrie.

Les militants et les militants du F.L.Q., comme ceux d'autres groupes similaires, n'ont pas à se sentir honteux des gestes qu'ils posèrent, au mépris de leur existence, pour promouvoir le remplacement de l'esclavage par la liberté et la dignité collectives. Ils sont loin d'être isolés, comme l'écrit Claude Ryan, "au plan de la critique de la société et de la définition des objectifs politiques et sociaux". Ils peuvent même revendiquer l'honneur, toujours selon Claude Ryan, d'avoir constitué "la première manifestation cohérente et organisée d'une pensée révolutionnaire radicale au sein de la société québécoise" et d'avoir, les premiers, "compris qu'une pensée révolutionnaire qui n'est pas action est vaine et stérile" (*Le Devoir et la crise d'octobre 70*, Leméac, Montréal, 1971, pp. 273, 271).

Mais tout cela qui a fait des felquistes des héros populaires et des mythes ne les dispense ni de l'autocritique ni des responsabilités inhérentes à toute activité révolutionnaire mais, au contraire, leur en commande d'autant plus la nécessité. Ils ne pourraient éluder ce devoir impérieux et urgent qu'en renonçant à leurs convictions et à leur idéal pour leur substituer l'illusion aberrante de se croire en possession tranquille de la vérité révolution-

naire, même au risque de faire sanctionner leur intolérance et leur parti-pris d'échecs mortels ou, pire encore, de la dérouté du peuple dont ils doivent être les serviteurs et non les apprentis-sorciers.

Je connais trop bien les intentions désintéressées et la générosité sans limites des felquistes que j'ai pu connaître depuis sept ans (il y en a beaucoup plus que je n'ai jamais rencontrés) pour imaginer que certains d'entre eux puissent s'accrocher désespérément à une forme d'action, l'agitation armée (qui n'est pas, je le répète, la lutte armée) qui, dans la situation actuelle, serait avalisée par la stratégie du pouvoir central visant, sous le couvert d'une guerre sans merci au terrorisme, à écraser par la force l'ensemble du mouvement de libération du peuple québécois et qui transformerait, par une dialectique absurde et ruineuse, des ennemis déclarés du pouvoir en agents inconscients de sa stratégie et de sa répression.

Si cela devait, malgré tout, se produire, il ne serait pas possible à tout Québécois sain d'esprit de se solidariser avec un geste semblable. Il ne serait pas possible de s'abandonner aveuglément, comme en octobre 1970, à une euphorie enthousiaste et irresponsable, car il est toujours extrêmement coûteux de se laisser charrier par un processus sur lequel on ne possède aucun contrôle et qui, de surcroît, sert la stratégie de l'adversaire. La lutte des Québécois n'a rien d'un "happening".

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DATES WORTH NOTING

- Feb 8 France 2nd anniversary of Roger Garaudy's ouster from his seat on the Central Committee of the French Communist Party (FCP) and from its Politburo in 1970. The FCP acted against Garaudy because of his public criticisms of the Soviet brand of Communism. In January 1971 Garaudy became one of the founders of a new national organization of dissident French Communists called the Centers of Communist Initiatives (CIC), which now claims 1,300 members of whom 31% still belong to the French CP and 58% are former FCP members. The CIC is highly critical of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and of Brezhnev who, it says, "has given the USSR the image of 'Panzer-Communism.'" (Action, journal of the CIC, November 1971)
- Feb 10-14 USSR Anniversary of the trial in 1966 of writers Andrei Sinyavskiy and Yuli Daniel and their sentencing to imprisonment in forced labor camps for publishing abroad novels of allegedly anti-Soviet character. Subsequently other Soviet dissidents have described the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial as a decisive event that gave growth to the Soviet dissidence movement.
- Feb 11 USSR Anniversary of the Red Army invasion of Georgia in 1921, whereby Soviet Russia broke its Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Republic of Georgia in its drive to reassert Russian control of neighboring countries that had been part of the Tsarist Empire. (The USSR is celebrating this year its 50th anniversary as a union, marking the founding Congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 30 December 1922, which joined the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to Russia.)

Feb 14	USSR/CPR	Anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact, signed in 1950.
Feb 21-28	US/CPR	President Nixon to visit China.
Feb 29- Mar 2	Jidda	Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting.
Mar 5	USSR	Anniversary of Stalin's death in 1953.
Mar 8-15	USSR	55th anniversary of the February Revolution (February 23 - March 2, Old Calendar) which overthrew the Tsar, broke up the Tsarist Empire, and started Russia's short-lived attempt at free elections and parliamentary democracy, which ended with the Bolshevik seizure of power the following November.
Mar 11	Italy	13th Party Congress of the Italian Communist Party.
Mar 19	Poland	Parliamentary elections are to be held; the elections will be a year ahead of schedule.
Mar 20	USSR	15th Congress of the Soviet All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. Held every four years.

SHORT SUBJECTS

A Cold Winter in Prague

Word from Prague of the latest arrests, obviously targeted at outspoken dissidents and intellectuals clearly shows that the regime intends to toughen its stand against miscreants. One problem area which the Party leadership admits still mars the "consolidated" Czechoslovak landscape is the intelligentsia. Despite the Husak regime's systematic dismemberment of intellectual unions, the suspension of their publications, the arrest of many of their leaders, the controls placed on printing, the forcing of intellectuals into menial jobs paying bare subsistence wages -- the outspoken continue to be heard. Rome's Il Manifesto (journal of dissident Italian Communists) last month published a translation of the text of a leaflet issued by a Czechoslovak underground group calling on workers to fight against the country's pro-Soviet leadership from within the Communist Party and the Trade Unions and to boycott official rallies. (See attached reprint of New York Times article "Czech Workers Urged to Resist").

The chronology of the program of arrests, as news reached the West is as follows:

On 11 January, the official Czechoslovak news agency CTK announced that "despite progress in consolidation and public support for the Communist Party as expressed in the November elections" (elections which offered a one-candidate slate for each of more than 200,000 electoral posts, leaving voters no choice)... "there still remain isolated cases of law violations." As a result, CTK went on, "several persons" had been arrested in late 1971 and early 1972 for producing and disseminating "anti-State leaflets and other material of a similar nature." The CTK announcement gave no hint of the actual magnitude of these wide-scale arrests: authoritative information from sources in Prague reaching Czechoslovaks abroad brings the numbers of those arrested to 200, as reported in the press.

Most of the arrests took place December 25-26, according to information gathered by persons inside Czechoslovakia, who say the reason for the majority of them was critical remarks in letters mailed to foreign countries or in clandestinely circulated leaflets. Some earlier arrests were reportedly carried out at the time of the elections, November 26-27, against persons engaging in opposition political activity including a number known for their open refusal to acquiesce in the "normalization" process supposedly already accomplished. CTK's 11 January announcement, describing the operations as small scale, fits with the Husak regime's claims that the November elections had left the "rightists" (liberals) crushed as a political force.

Arrested and accused of pre-election political agitation were: sociologist Rudolf Battek, one of the leaders in 1968 of a movement to create an alternative to monolithic Communist rule; historian Jan Tesar who, with Battek, coauthored a "Ten Point Manifesto" denouncing the 1968 Soviet occupation and resulting "normalization" of their country (as a result, both Battek and Tesar have already spent up to thirteen months in prison); philosopher and sociologist, Ladislav Hejdanek; Protestant minister Jaromir Dus; Brno politician Jaroslav Sabata, an uncompromising reformist who was expelled from the Party in 1969 and has been the object of Czechoslovak media attacks ever since; and Jiri Mueller, leader of student protest movements against Party abuses under former First Secretary Antonin Novotny.

Among those arrested in late December were: well-known dissident writer Jiri Lederer whose trial was rumored to be opening in mid-January; Ludek Pachman, who won international fame as Czechoslovakia's grand master chess champion and who has already spent one year in prison; Karel Kyncl, an outspoken former radio and TV commentator; and Milan Huebl, former director of the Communist Party College. All were outspoken reformists during the Dubcek era and have, off and on, been in trouble with the Husak regime.

Not unrelated to these incidents is a recent article by leading Italian Communist journalist Guiseppe Boffa in which he sees the results of "normalization" as threatening to alienate vast masses from socialism. Writing in the 7 January issue of the Italian Communist Party weekly, Rinascita, Boffa said: "What has happened in Czechoslovakia since August 1968 certainly does not cause socialism to advance -- I do not say in the world, but in Czechoslovakia itself, where on the contrary, it threatens to alienate vast masses of the population from socialism and for a long historical period."

* * * * *

USSR's Reported Offer of Credits to Chile

The offer of \$50 million in credits which the Soviet Union has reportedly made to Chile in recent weeks through Soviet-controlled European banks is typical of numerous other offers of Soviet credit, since it is obviously designed for political impact: it comes as thirteen Western creditor nations, including the United States, prepare to negotiate with Chilean representatives in Paris on Chile's request to postpone, for three years, payments now falling due on her foreign debts.

Chile's total foreign indebtedness is reported to be \$2 billion to \$3 billion. She has indicated that she wants a three-year moratorium, repayment of debts over a ten-year period starting in

1976 and fresh credits to tide her over the present economic crisis. Although more than half of the total debt is said to be owed to the U.S. Government or to private creditors, including approximately \$450 million to 45 American banks, of the \$1 billion due in the next two years, 60% is owed to European creditors.

Unexplained is the fact that the Soviet Union does not have enough hard currency reserves to lend \$50 million to Chile outright, and this would not be consistent with its pattern of offering credits for equipment, usually heavy machinery. Chile does not need this kind of credit, and it is unlikely that the USSR would offer her consumer goods, which is where Chile suffers the worst shortage. Also unexplained is the fact that the former Christian Democratic administration of Eduardo Frei was offered \$50 million in credit by the Soviet Union to modernize the port of Valparaiso, and that credit has never been used. (For a fuller discussion of Chile's economic situation, see the December 1971 issue of Perspectives on "Chile's Deteriorating Economy.")

* * * * *

A New Year's Greeting from the FCP

A New Year's speech by French President Pompidou to the diplomatic and press corps prompted the first French Communist Party (FCP) criticism of government foreign policy since Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France last October. FCP Assistant Secretary General, George Marchais, took strong exception to Pompidou's characterization of U.S. raids over North Vietnam as "preventive measures."

Writing in the editorial columns of the party daily, l'Humanité, Marchais went on to ask whether this "cynical support" was the price for the financial agreement reached during the Nixon-Pompidou meeting in the Azores. According to Marchais the question was legitimate since "several other recent stands of the Pompidou government--re the Near East, Europe and military matters--had confirmed the regime's slide toward 'Atlanticism.'" According to Marchais, "the national independence, dignity, and security of France are at stake."

In an 11 January radio interview, the French Communist leader returned to the attack, charging Pompidou with attempting to re-integrate France militarily in NATO. He also returned to de Gaulle theme, claiming that the positive aspects of the General's foreign policy were rapidly disappearing.

What occasioned this New Year's tantrum from the FCP? Presumably, the French comrades have been nettled by the success of the Azores meeting, the continuing expansion of the European

community and the softening of the French position on Vietnam and Israel. The recurrent evocation of de Gaulle may indicate the Party hopes to win back some of the voters who defected to the General during his incumbency. Above all, however, Marchais and the French Communist Party, faced with the Socialist challenge, are concerned to retain their role as spokesman for the French Left. In any case, the Moscow-imposed moratorium on attacking French government foreign policy has apparently been withdrawn.

* * * * *

The New Admirals

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union began building a modern naval fleet capable of operating far from the shores of the motherland. These new Marxist ships have been praised by the world's leading naval experts who assert that many of them are of 'novel design.' The same experts now report that the Soviet Union may be building its first aircraft carrier at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. Some estimate that the ship, when completed about two years hence, will be in the 20-30,000-ton class and thus the largest warship in the Soviet fleet. Other specialists disagree, saying that it is not an aircraft carrier but a supertanker.

However, naval expertise accords on one point: the great-power status of the Soviet Union will suffer if it does not operate its warships in all the ocean seas simultaneously, including the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean as well as the Atlantic and Pacific where it is already well represented.

The scholarly and prudent efforts of the experts to separate Soviet naval capabilities from Soviet naval intentions were somewhat upset by a recent report that a 3,000-ton Soviet naval support vessel, the IRGIZ, ran aground in the Sea of Marmara. Turkish tugs were unable to haul the IRGIZ free and port officials said it was so fast aground it might never be refloated. (See attached press clip reprints.)

Given the proven Soviet capability of running aground a 3,000-ton support vessel, the naval experts are now weighing the possibility and the consequences of the new 30,000-ton dreadnought getting stuck sideways in the Bosphorus.

Postscript: Actually, press reports to the contrary, the reason the Turkish tugs were unable to budge the IRGIZ was because the Soviets wouldn't let the Turkish rescue ships near their bemired mystery ship. And now, given inclement weather, high seas and blustery winds---even salvage operations (which the Soviets insist they do themselves) cannot begin until spring (by which time the IRGIZ' oil leaks and cargo spoilage will make it a salvage op no one else would want to do).

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WASHINGTON POST
19 January 1972

Soviet Ship Runs Aground

Reuter

ISTANBUL, Turkey, Jan. 18—The crew of the 3,000-ton Soviet naval support vessel Irgiz, which ran aground in the Marmara Sea, were taken off by another Russian ship today after initial attempts to refloat it failed, port officials said.

Turkish tugs were unable to haul the Irgiz free and port officials said it was so fast aground that it may be impossible to refloat it.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 January 1972

Soviet May Be Constructing a Carrier

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 17—United States military analysis said today that they believed the Soviet Union might be building its first aircraft carrier.

Under construction at a shipyard at Nikolayev on the Black Sea, they say, is a very large vessel containing what appear to be aircraft elevator wells and large tanks for aviation fuel.

Current estimates are that the ship, when completed in about two years, will be in the 20,000 ton to 30,000 ton class. That would approach the size of the American Essex Class aircraft carrier and would be the largest warship in the Soviet fleet.

Since construction is still in the relatively early stages, analysts say they cannot be sure what kind of ship it will be. Some say the only other kind of ship it might be is a petroleum supertanker.

Carrier Indicated

But several factors lead most analysis toward the view that it will be an aircraft carrier. These factors include the following:

¶The ship is being constructed not at one of the commercial yards, but at Nikolayev, where the Moskva and the Leningrad, the two Soviet helicopter carriers, were built.

¶Large hull openings were not seem appropriate for a supertanker. And the wells

are wider than those on the Moskva and Leningrad, suggesting they are designed for lowering planes rather than helicopters to repair shops.

¶Early construction appears to be that of a warship, with several decks, rather than of a tanker, which would have very deep storage areas and only a top deck.

¶Finally, analysts believe that if the Russians are determined to operate fleets of warships in places such as the Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the Indian Oceans, they would need aircraft carriers to help protect the surface ships from air attack and to project tactical air power ashore.

The vulnerability of American carriers to attack has long been asserted in Soviet military literature. Indeed, the Russians have developed a variety of relatively long-range missiles that can be fired from bombers, surface ships and submerged submarines against carriers.

What is not well known, however, is that in the late 30's, as part of an effort to design and build a large ocean-going navy as opposed to one for territorial defense, Stalin unsuccessfully attempted to get United States help, in the form of blueprints and some components, to build carriers.

Plans for construction were planned for completion by 1948.

But when World II erupted, the money destined for carriers was diverted to other military programs, according to Robert W. Herrick in his book "Soviet naval strategy," published by the United States Naval Institute in 1968.

After the war the Russians started a major effort to build a modern navy capable of operating far from home. American Navy men regard the new Soviet ships, many of novel design, as first-rate.

American analysts say they have seen no evidence that the Russians are developing and testing jets with folding wings—to allow them to fit in the ship's elevators—or low stall speeds—to enable them to slow sufficiently to land on a carrier's short flight deck. However, this does not mean such development efforts are not under way, they point out.

But many of them feel that if the Russians do intend to add one or more carries to their navy, they probably will employ, initially at least, so-called vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft, V/STOL in the military vernacular.

Experiments With Jets

The Russians, since about 1967, have been known to be experimenting with such jets. A Yakovlev jet, code named Freehand by Western analysts, was flown at an air show at Domodedovo in July, 1967.

One Sukhoi short take-off fighter also have been seen

over the last several years, the analysts report.

The main limiting factor in such aircraft is that because of the great amount of fuel necessary to take off on short decks, the planes are thought to have relatively short ranges.

The United States Marines, however, are buying quantities of the British-made Harrier V/STOL jet for use aboard helicopter carriers, amphibious ships and perhaps even specially equipped destroyers.

One way the Russians might want to get around the limited-range problem, one analyst suggested, is to use steam catapults to launch the planes from their carrier, instead of having them take off under their own power.



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