SECRET

Propaganda

PERSPECTIVES

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[redacted] March 1972

STAKES IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

The attached backgrounder attempts to put into global and European perspective the rather serious current Soviet detente effort in Europe, of which the initiatives for a European security conference appear to be an important part. Pegged to the Warsaw Pact meeting and European Declaration of 26-27 January, it presents the Western posture (expounded in part in a 1 December 1971 speech by Secretary of State William Rogers - excerpts attached), reviews Soviet expansionist foreign policy historically and places in this context the evolution of Soviet European policy. Finally, it points to the dangers and advantages to the West of the current Soviet detente drive and of participation in a European security conference.

Specific challenges to Soviet motives in calling for a European security conference are given in the final section of the Backgrounder.

[redacted]

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972

STAKES IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Renewed interest in a European security conference which developed following a recent Warsaw Pact meeting makes it worthwhile to re-examine the issues and stakes involved for both the Western allies and for the Eastern Bloc of Communist countries led by the Soviet Union --- particularly Soviet motivations in pushing the project.

January Warsaw Pact Meeting

The Warsaw Pact (WP) powers, consisting of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, met in Prague 26-27 January. In addition to a declaration routinely condemning U.S. policy in Indo-China, the WP Political Consultative Committee signed a separate Declaration on Europe (attached). The main purpose of the Declaration was to promote the long-standing Soviet project of convening a Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC) with the participation of all European countries, East and West, plus the United States and Canada. The Declaration suggested the conference take place in 1972, but most observers feel the Soviets would be content even with a preparatory conference (Helsinki would probably be the site) in 1972. While the Declaration contained nothing substantially different from many earlier proposals, hints at possible concessions and its generally optimistic, conciliatory tone can be regarded as a measure of the eagerness with which the Soviets are pressing the issue.

Western Posture

The Western allies have recently become more willing to explore the value of a European security conference as a means of seeking a genuine East-West detente. Among the factors contributing to the West's greater interest are a number of tension-reducing moves, such as the treaties the USSR and Poland recently concluded with West Germany, normalizing their mutual relations; the apparent progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), in which the Soviets indeed seem to be negotiating in good faith; and the successful Four-Power negotiations on Berlin, guaranteeing Western access to the city and thus removing the Berlin issue as the source of a possible East-West military confrontation. The Berlin issue is particularly important in that the Western powers had made it a kind of test of Soviet detente intentions.

Nevertheless, the Western allies have felt, and still feel, a certain skepticism about the value of a European security conference. Simply put, they would be pleased to see progress made on those specific issues that separate and create tensions

between East and West Europe, and would wish to avoid convening a conference merely for the sake of the appearance of detente, as a grand propaganda forum that did not address itself to the solution of practical issues. Among the issues calling for solution would be a mutual and balanced reduction of military forces (MBFR) in East and West Europe, reduction of the barriers to the free exchange of information and ideas, and freer movement of people across the boundaries that separate East and West Europe (see U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' statement, attached). The WP Declaration did not address itself directly to any of these issues.

Soviet Aims

What advantages do the Soviets see for themselves in the convening of a European security conference? During the 15 or more years the Soviets have proposed such a conference, changes on the international scene, especially the steady progress toward European integration and the intensifying Soviet conflict with Communist China, have forced the Soviets to modify their major objectives in Europe. However, there is reason to believe that their original motivations retain their essential validity today.

A major Soviet objective since World War II has been to vitiate U.S. influence in Europe, ideally by eliminating the U.S. military presence there. Of comparable importance has been the Soviet objective of preventing the military, economic, and political integration of West Europe. These objectives simultaneously served a defensive and an offensive Soviet strategy. There is little doubt that as a result of tremendous human and material losses in the conflict with Germany in World War II, the USSR acutely feared the emergence of a strong, united Europe which the Soviet Union considered might well fall under the domination of a powerful Germany. It seems likely that the early offer of an all-European security conference was designed in part as a defensive maneuver to preclude the formation of a West European military and economic organization including Germany and strongly supported by the U.S. (It should be remembered that early proposals for a European security conference made no provision for American participation.)

Motivations of Soviet Foreign Policy

But Soviet policy toward Europe (and the rest of the non-Communist world as well) has deeply-rooted, offensive, expansionist motivations as well. And here it will be necessary to digress briefly and review Soviet global strategy in order that Soviet European policy and Soviet aims with regard to a European security conference can be seen in proper perspective.

Regardless of the weight one attaches to the persistence of

the Russian Messianic tradition or Czarist imperialistic ambitions in Soviet foreign policy, there is little doubt that the modern-day Soviet leaders' view of the international arena in which the USSR operates is deeply influenced by Soviet-Marxist conditioning. From Lenin and Trotsky to Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev-Kosygin, Soviet leaders have regarded Soviet Communism as a universal form of society arising from an inevitable historical process. They have seen their own function as one of moving this historical process forward. Thus, they protect Soviet Communism where it has been imposed (in the Soviet homeland, and as in Czechoslovakia in 1968), support and encourage its growth wherever it manifests itself (primarily in local pro-Soviet Communist parties), cooperate with non-Communist forces which either show sympathy for the Soviet Union or antipathy to the capitalist camp headed by the U.S. (in Latin America or the Arab world), and seek converts among neutral and even anti-Communist states (Egypt or India). Finally, they resort to any means, short of a self-destructive war, to weaken, divide, or subvert those states which they consider incurably hostile, above all, the U.S. and its European allies, among others. (This last strategy is one proper way to describe what the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistence.")

Meanwhile, Communist regimes like Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, which at one time supported and cooperated with the Soviet Union, found their national interests or ideologies (or both intermixed) at cross purposes with the Soviet Union, and were successful (unlike Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) in pursuing a policy independent of (and when necessary, hostile to) the Soviet Union. Of these, only China, because of its sheer size and its proximity to the USSR, represents a potentially serious threat to Soviet global strategy and aims.

Soviet Post-War European Policy

Soviet expansionist policy in Europe has undergone considerable modification under pressure of events and successful Western policies. In the chaotic aftermath of World War II, there was a high likelihood of a Communist takeover in the key countries of France and Italy (the reason that Italy and France were the only non-Communist countries to be included in the Cominform, which was established in 1947, was that Stalin expected they soon would join the ranks of the other "people's democracies"). With the demilitarization of Europe, there was a constant danger of a Soviet military overrun, which NATO was eventually created to counter. When an indigenous Communist takeover failed to materialize (largely because of the Marshall Plan), and military overrun became too risky to the homeland of socialism, nuclear threats combined with pressure tactics, as in the Berlin blockade, were used in the attempt to force Europe to the Soviet will. Concurrently, using the Communist front World Peace Council as their main vehicle, the Soviets mounted a massive, long-term peace campaign. Though unsuccessful, it evidently was calculated to

convince the West Europeans that military defense measures were unnecessary. At various times since the mid-fifties, the Soviets have offered one or another form of a European security conference as an alternative to NATO, until recently with the hope of excluding the U.S. from such a conference. Eventually, all these maneuvers to prevent the strengthening of Europe and to eliminate the U.S. from Europe failed.

Strategy of Detente

Now, faced with the prospect of a full integration of Europe militarily, economically, and ultimately politically, the Soviets seem to have been forced in Europe to accept the path of real detente in which the current proposal for a European security conference appears to be one move.

The current detente campaign has both an offensive and defensive aspect. Its defensive aspect is clearly related to Sino-Soviet relations. An increasingly powerful, influential, and hostile China looms larger and larger in Soviet thinking, both as an immediate problem and as a long-range threat to Soviet security. Thus, it has become important for the Soviet Union to seek a stabilized, friendly atmosphere in Europe, in order to have a freer hand to deal with China.

As an offensive strategy, detente (and a European security conference) is designed to show Europe not only an air of reasonableness, but to grant judicious concessions which are either unavoidable, or limited but sufficent to convince a skeptical West of Soviet good intentions. In the long term, the detente strategy is calculated to soften Western resolve in its military defense posture, to soften Western resistance to Soviet foreign policy requirements, and to encourage Europe to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union, as much as possible at the expense of the U.S. It is not too far-fetched to see the following emergent strategy in Soviet European policy: unable to prevent European integration or to eliminate U.S. influence in Europe, the Soviets are seeking over the longer term what is coming to be known as the "Finlandization" of Europe. This may be defined as Soviet use of its multiple resources as a global super-power:

a) to erode the will of a people (Finns or Europeans) to resist encroachments on their legitimate claims to independence and sovereignty,

b) to exercise a veto power over a people's foreign and domestic policies which the USSR considers undesirable.

Thus, the Soviet Union seeks to create not a truly neutral area but a neutralized area which has a severely limited capacity to act in its own enlightened self-interest because it has to take prior

account of favorable Soviet reaction. "Finlandization" is a status of which West Europe and other areas close to Soviet power should be acutely aware for the long term. More immediately, the West should seek from detente and a European security conference whatever will enhance its own sovereignty, but at the same time beware of merely helping create an atmosphere in which avoiding offense to the Soviet Union becomes the touchstone of foreign policy (the attached analysis by Walter Laqueur describes how this "Finlandization" process is already beginning). The West should seek concrete achievements rather than pronouncements of good Soviet intentions.

Questions for the Soviets

In examining the seven main points made in the January Warsaw Pact Declaration for Europe (attached), the West European countries should first of all be aware that they are being asked to endorse Soviet hegemony over its East European satellites. Apart from the difficulty of accepting this proposition, the West should ask whether the Declaration's requirement for the renunciation of force, the inviolability of borders, and the recognition of the principle of sovereignty of nations as now constituted, means repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which would be a commitment by the Soviet Union never again to invade its neighbors as it did Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It should question whether a concept of true and equitable balance of conventional forces in East and West Europe is contained in the assertion that mutual reduction of forces should not be "to the detriment of countries taking part in such reduction."

If a European security conference can advance mutually profitable exchanges on such questions, it should be welcomed, but West Europe should not accede to a conference whose main purpose would be merely to create an atmosphere of euphoria which would begin a process of "Finlandizing" Europe. Finally, whatever moves the Soviets undertake in Europe, the West should not take the Soviets' detente campaign as the abandonment of their conception of the operation of the dialectic in international relations. Under the dialectic, conflict in one form or another, rather than peace, stability, and harmony, is the natural law of international relations in Soviet eyes.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1972

East Bloc Nations Suggest Cuts in National Armies

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 26 — Communist-bloc leaders, deferring slightly to the demands of the Western allies, declared today that any East-West accord to reduce forces in Europe should include the Euoropean nations' own armies as well as foreign ones.

In a conciliatory communique at the conclusion of a two-day meeting in Prague, the leaders of the seven Warwaw pact powers for the first time officially embraced the idea of including national troops as well as outside forces in eventual recudtions.

This will help ease Western rears thatthe reduction of Soviet and American forces alone would work to the disadvantage of the West because of the Soviet Union's proximity to Europe and the relative ease with which it could put its forces back into the center of the continent. To offset such an advantage, some Western powers wanted advance assurance that other East European forces could also be cut back.

New Formula Adopted

Moreover, the Warsaw Pact Communiqué said that any cutback in forces should not work "to the detriment of the countries taking part," which Western diplomats read as corresponding roughly to NATO's call for "mutual and balanced" reductions. The formula was used last September in a communiqué issued by the Soviet party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany, but the entire Warsaw Pact has never before adopted it.

The communiqué, carried in full by Tass, the Soviet press agency, also seemed to allow for the East-West arms talks to take place outside a European security conference as the West, especially the United States, prefers. But in keeping with Moscow's objections to bloc-to-bloc negotiations, it insisted that this topic "should not be the prerogative" of the existing alliances.

This comment appeared once again to rebuff NATO, which has demanded that Moscow begin preparations for East-West talks on force reductions by receiving Manlio Brosio, the Italian diplomat designated last October by several NATO countries as an emissary on the issue. The communiqué said merely that "appropriate agreement" could be reached on the "way of conducting talks" or force reductions.

As expected, the Communist powers called for the start of multilaterial preparatory talks for a European security conference to begin in Finland "in a very short time" and announced their decision to name delegates.

Early Conference Urged

The preparations, the Warsaw Pact leaders asserted, should promote the "Speediest Convocation" of a European security conference, a cherished objective of the Kremlin and its allies. They voiced confidence that the meeting could be convened in 1972, despite Western forecasts that it is not possible before 1973, but put less insistence on a conference this year than previously.

The leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union—took a generally positive view of developments in Europe and avoided any sharp attacks on Western powers in their official communique. They issued a separate declaration, however, condemning the latest American actions in Vietnam.

The absence of any direct criticism of Communist China, despite the current intensity of the Chinese-Soviet dispute, was taken as an apparent indication that Moscow preferred to retain Rumania's support on European issues rather than risk her opposition to a public attack on Peking.

Nor was there any public comment on the expansion of the west European Common Market or of the internal situation in Yugoslavia, topics presumed by Western diplomats to have come up in the talks.

West Germany was praised not only for having negotiated nonaggression pacts with Poland and the Soviet Union, but also for follow-up agreements with East Germany to the Big Four accord on Berlin, and for negotiations seeking to normalize relations with Czechoslovakia. The time has come, the communiqué asserted, for admitting both East and West Germany to the United Nations "without further delay."

WASHINGTON POST
27 January 1972

Reds Reject NATO Bid For Troop Cut Talks

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 26 — The Warsaw Pact powers today rejected Western ideas for preliminary discussions on troop reductions in Europe and presented a seven-point agenda for a European security conference.

Though today's proposals were more detailed than anything the Communist nations have said previously, none of their suggestions were surprising. Like previous statements favoring a security conference, this one points clearly in one direction—toward recognition of the status quo in Europe with a weaker role for the two military blocs, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

As if to emphasize this point, the senior leaders of the Soviet Union and its six East European allies said in a communique issued after a two-day meeting in Prague that talks on troop reductions in Eurpoe "should not be the prerogative of the existing military-politcal alliances in Europe."

Although the communique suggested reductions of "both national and foreign" troops in Europe, it sidestepped earlier Western proposals for preliminary talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact by saying that "appropriate agreement could be reached on the way of conducting talks on this (troop reduction) question."

This appears to be an outright rejection of the U.S. and NATO positions on the troop reduction issue. NATO has been trying unsuccessfully to get an invitation to Moscow for its former secretary general, Manlio Brosio, who was supposed to represent the Western allies in preliminary talks on troop reductions.

The Soviets have persistently avoided inviting Brosio to Moscow. Soviet officials and journalists have been telling Westerners in Moscow recently that they saw no reason to receive him. "He is out of office, he doesn't represent anyone," as one prominent Soviet commentator put it.

Today's Warsaw Pact communique seems to put the whole troop withdrawal question on a far distant back burner, though it does say that "reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, both foreign and national" would "correspond with the interest of strengthening European security."

The communique is also a strong restatement of the Soviet policy of detente in Europe. It says that the seven Communist powers "are of the opinion that European security and cooperation require the creation of a system of commitments precluding any use of force or threat of using force in the mutual relations among the states in Europe, a system of commitments guaranteeing all the countries that they are protected from acts of aggression, promoting the benefit and prosperity of every people."

The Warsaw Pact offered seven "principles of European security and relations among European states," including:

- "The frontiers existing now between the European states, including the frontiers that were formed as a result of the Second World War, are inviolable. Any attempt to violate these frontiers would threaten European peace. . ."
- "Force or threat of force must not be used in the mutual relations among the European states."
- "The existence of different (social) systems (in Europe) must not be an unsurmountable obstacle to the all-round development of relations among them. . ."
- "Good neighborly relations among the European states must develop on the basis of the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage . . . (to) make it possible to overcome the splitting of the continent into military-political groupings."

The Prague communique also advocated an improvement in relations between European states in fields ranging from trade and culture to tourism and environmental controls.

The communique added: "It would also be possible to agree at the all-European conference on concrete directions for the further development of reciprocally advantageous relations by European states in every sphere for the elimination of all discrimination, inequality and artificial barriers. Their cooperation in the rational utilization of the raw materials and power resources of Europe, in raising the industrial potential and improving land fertility, in utilizing the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution will allow the opportunities for raising the well-being of the European peoples to multiply. Mutual enrichment in spiritual values and acquaintance with each other's culture and art will assume still greater scope."

WASHINGTON STAR
23 January 1972

CROSBY S. NOYES

Two Grand Conferences That May Never Be Held

It is not accidental that the two most heavily ballyhooed diplomatic events scheduled for Europe in the coming year — talks on "mutual and balanced" force reductions on both sides of the Iron Curtain and a grand All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation — show no signs of getting off the ground any time soon.

The fact is that the more they are examined, the more dubious both of these projects appear. At this point, neither we nor the Russians seem particularly anxious to find out what the other side really has in mind.

Both sides, to be sure, have expressed an interest in the talks at one time or another. The West Europeans look on them as tying in with their general quest for "detente" with the East. The Russians have been clamoring for the security conference for years and last year Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev was saying he was all for force reductions as well.

The Nixon Administration has used the prospect of mutual force reductions as a convenient argument against repeated Senate efforts to force a unilateral withdrawal of American forces in NATO. It also has indicated that, once the status of Berlin is finally settled, it has no objection to taking part in the wider European security conference.

But no one seems in any hurry to get on with it. Last October, former NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio was assigned to go to Russia to explore Soviet views on the possibilities of troop reductions. He has been waiting in vain for an invitation from Moscow ever since and it is now considered highly unlikely to be forthcoming.

Everyone at this point seems to be having second thoughts.

When it comes to troop reductions, the Russians could very well be interested in lowering tensions along their western border and relieving themselves of some of the expense that their huge military garrisons in Eastern Europe entail. But the Russians also are very well aware that there are definite limits to the extent to which they can withdraw and still continue to exert effective political control in their East European domain. The lessons of Hungary and Czechoslovakia have not been forgotten.

Similarly, in Western Europe a sober reappraisal of the possibilities seems to be under way. As a talking-point, mutual force reductions are fine. As a practical proposition, they raise uncomfortable complications.

The Europeans are aware that the only meaningful force reductions that are likely to be made in Central Europe will be those of Russian and American forces. They also know that NATO forces are heavily outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact.

Whatever "balanced" may mean in the context of a mutual withdrawal, it is clear that the Americans would be pulling back 3,000 miles, while the Russians would move, at most, a few hundred. Europeans who have been arguing for years that any reduction in the present American force assigned to NATO would undermine the security of Western Europe are not happy about the prospects.

The same thing goes for the plan for an all-European security conference. In theory, everyone is all in favor of it. But as they define their ideas of what such a conference should produce in the way of results, it becomes less and less likely that the meeting ever will take place.

The purpose of the Russians is calling for the conference in the first place never has been in much doubt. The major objective from their point of view would be to confirm their own hegemony in Eastern Europe and perpetuate the present division of Europe, including Germany. Anything else that the meeting might accomplish, in the view of most experts, would be mere window-dressing.

The objectives of the West are quite different. In a little-noted speech last month, Secretary of State William P. Rogers spelled out in the hardest terms yet used what a security conference should and should not do.

What it should do, in Rogers' view, is to spike Leonid Brezhnev's famous "d o c t r i n e" which proclaims the right of the SovietUnion to interfere in the affairs of other socialist states. It should do this by affirming "the independence and equality of sovereign states, whether their political or social systems are different or similar."

Beyond this, the conference, according to Rogers, should take steps to encourage the freer movement of people, ideas and information throughout the European area.

"We would firmly oppose any attempt to use it to perpetuate the political and social division of Europe. We would see a conference not as a ratification of the existing divisions but as a step on the long road to a new situation. . ."

It is not overly pessimistic to predict that, if the Russians can prevent it, this is a step which will not be taken soon.

Excerpt from the NEW YORK TIMES,
31 January 1972

byline Bernard Gwertzman, dateline Washington, 30 January 1972.

Larger Soviet Cut

Mutual and balanced reduction of forces was first proposed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1968 as a way to reduce military spending without harming either side's security. It was argued that any reduction in the force of 310,000 Americans in Europe had to be matched by a larger Soviet cut because of geography. It was suggested, for example, that if the Americans withdrew a thousand men 3,000 miles to the United States, the Russians should pull back 6,000 men the 500 miles to the Soviet Union.

NATO has about a million men in Europe, with West Germany's 466,000 the largest contingent, but United States troops the best equipped and trained. The Warsaw Pact nations have about 1.2 million troops, of which about 275,000 are Soviet.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
20 December 1971

Our Permanent Interests in Europe

Following is an address made by Secretary Rogers before the 50th anniversary dinner of the Overseas Writers at Washington on December 1, together with the transcript of the questions and answers which followed.

Press release 279 dated December 1

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ROGERS

I was reminded recently that this Nation had a press before it had a foreign policy. Possibly this timing accounts for the belief in some quarters that with a press corps there is no need for a foreign policy. It should be mentioned, too, I think, that there is also a respectable body of opinion which believes that when you have a press corps it is not possible to have a foreign policy. And then there is a growing segment of public opinion that thinks the United States would be better off without either a press corps or a foreign policy. It is against this latter group that we must unite.

For this reason I am particularly honored to be asked to join you in marking the 50th anniversary of the Overseas Writers. It marks the durability of this distinguished association—and for those of us in public life, durability is a quality that is highly respected and too little honored.

I am honored, too, to be your guest at this public meeting. I understand that the Overseas Writers traditionally operates in secret. I applaud your new policy of openness. I knew that you would finally have to knuckle under to the public's right to know! We in the State Department empathize with you.

I think you will agree with me when I say that President Nixon came to office with an experience in foreign affairs matched by few of his predecessors. A review of his public statements shortly before and after he assumed office foreshadowed the major initiatives that this administration has taken. Yet few would have been willing to predict their sweep. They can be broadly stated this way:

First, maximum practical efforts in every forum to achieve a more peaceful world, as with the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], Berlin, and Middle East talks;

Second, concerted action to achieve a better balance of responsibilities to reflect the growing shift in political-economic power in the world; for example, the Nixon doctrine, which has resulted in the reduction of more than 420,000 men from East Asia, and the new economic policy;

Third, intensive diplomatic activity to improve relations throughout the world in order to provide a foundation for a generation of peace, as illustrated by the President's forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow.

Basic to this third point is a fundamental and often ignored concept in foreign affairs—that nations do not have permanent enemies, only permanent interests.

I will not attempt to cite the various initiatives the President has undertaken to carry out these objectives, because you are all well aware of them.

Rather, tonight I want to speak briefly about the U.S. relationship with Europe—about our permanent interests and, in the true sense of the word, our permanent friends. In each of the permanent interests of United States foreign policy—security, economic well-being, peace—Europe con-

tinues to play a central role. Europe's security is indivisible from our own. Europe's economic strength reinforces our own. And as the President has said, "if we are to found a structure of peace on the collaboration of many nations, our ties with Western Europe must be its cornerstone." [1] This statement is fundamental to our foreign policy. We hope it will not be forgotten by our friends in Europe.

It is more than symbolic, then, that the President has scheduled meetings with President Pompidou, Prime Ministers Heath, Trudeau, Caetano, and Chancellor Brandt and that within a few days I will be attending a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting. These consultations are all important aspects of implementing our foreign policy, in which our relations with western Europe remain of fundamental importance. They will give the President and members of his administration an opportunity to discuss in person the visits he will be making to Peking and Moscow, economic and monetary issues, and other matters of common interest.

Europe today is in an important period of transition, a transition embodying two processes. The first, the process toward integration of western Europe, is progressing rapidly. The second, a process toward reconciliation between countries in eastern and western Europe, appears to be beginning.

The United States Government fully supports both of these. Since the days of the Marshall plan the unity and strength of western Europe have been central objectives of American foreign policy; we will not cease to be active supporters of these objectives now that they are on the threshold of success. And we are no less determined to participate actively in the process of reducing the political and social barriers which still divide the European Continent.

In the process toward western European integration, we have always known that, as western Europeans developed collective policies and a collective identity, their views and ours would not always coincide and transitory differences would develop.

In the economic field this has happened from time to time over the years, but we have resolved our disputes without damaging the underlying strength of our relationship.

We realize that the international aspects of the economic policy announced by President Nixon last August directly affect the interests of western Europeans. We believe that they understand why we had to take drastic action to correct a balance of payments deficit running at three times the 1970 rate. It is not our intention, of course, to damage the economies of our allies and friends or to impair the system of economic cooperation which has served all of us so well over the past quarter of a century.

Since August 15, we have consulted closely with the principal industrial and financial nations about the measures we have taken. There is a wider measure of agreement among us than is evident from some of the public comment on the subject. There is a recognition that exchange rates had gotten out of line and that a substantial realignment is necessary if the international system is to function effectively. There is understanding that we have unfinished and urgent business of major importance in the area of trade rules and trade practices to insure freer and fairer trade. There is no disagreement that the burden of the common defense should be shared more equitably and that multilateral efforts must be intensified to accomplish this result. We believe that mutually beneficial solutions can and will be worked out.

U.S.-Western European Interdependence

Moreover, whatever our contemporary economic problems, the broadest interests of western Europe and of the United States remain inseparable. And neither these nor any other problems will cause us to abandon our support of western European alliance or our commitment to a strong NATO alliance.

First, there is, of course, no intention on our part—as has been suggested in some quarters—to exploit the economic situation

[1] The complete text of President Nixon's foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 appears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971.

to try to divide western European countries from each other. We hope western Europe will continue to speak with unity and cohesion in the economic as in other fields.

Second, while we firmly believe that defense burdens should be shared more equitably, economic differences and problems have not caused us to change our views on the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe. As President Nixon pledged a year ago: Given a similar approach by our allies, we will maintain and improve those forces and will not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action.[2] The administration's steadfastness of purpose on this point should be clear from the determination and success with which we have continued to oppose attempts in the United States Senate to cut U.S. forces in Europe unilaterally.

Third, we will not withdraw—in the economic field, in the security field, or in the political field—into remoteness or isolation from western Europe. Rather, in recognition of U.S.–western European interdependence in all these fields, we will remain committed and involved.

This, then, is the message that the President has asked me to take next week to the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels: that America's partnership with western Europe and America's commitment to its defense are undiminished.

At that meeting the allies will be concerned, too, with the second process I have referred to—the movement toward reconciliation in Europe as a whole. In particular, we will be discussing two elements in that process, the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and a conference on European security and cooperation.

We hope that it will soon be possible to move into more definitive preparations for a negotiation on force reductions. At the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in October, former NATO Secretary General [Manlio] Brosio was named to explore Soviet views on approaches to negotiation. We regret that the Soviet Government, despite its earlier public assertions of willingness to proceed at once to negotiations, has not agreed to receive Mr. Brosio. We hope it will do so soon.

Concern has been expressed in certain quarters in western Europe that the United States Government may consider the discussion on force reductions as little more than a cover for American troop withdrawals. This concern is without any foundation. We have no interest in an agreement which would alter the conventional-force balance in Europe to the West's disadvantage. Only reciprocal withdrawals which are carefully balanced could be contemplated. Only such withdrawals can contribute to the overall process of East-West reconciliation to which we and our allies are committed. Together with our allies we must make certain that all proposals for force reductions are carefully examined for their security implications.

Conference on European Security

Another step in the process of reconciliation which will receive active consideration at the coming NATO meeting is a conference on European security and cooperation.

NATO has made clear that it would not engage in preparations for such a conference until the Berlin negotiations were successfully concluded. The first phase of the Berlin agreement was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France in September. The second phase, the talks between East and West Germany, has now reached the point of decision. If those talks succeed—and there is now every reason to believe they will—the four powers would subsequently proceed toward the signing of a final protocol bringing the entire Berlin agreement into effect. When this would occur is uncertain at the present time because of the Soviet Union's insistence that it will not sign the protocol until the time of the ratification of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of

[2] For a message from President Nixon read by Secretary Rogers before the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Brussels on Dec. 8, 1970, see BULLETIN of Jan. 4, 1971, p. 1.

Germany. They insist that it be done simultaneously. The United States, for its part, would be prepared to sign the final protocol as soon as the results of the German negotiations have been found acceptable. And we expect this to occur very soon.

However, when the protocol is signed—so that a satisfactory solution to the question of Berlin is an accomplished fact—the way will be open for concrete preparations during the coming year for a conference. In this connection we would be prepared to support the convening of a special NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting to consider ways to proceed.

Let me outline the basic United States approach to such a conference.

In the first place, we believe that a conference should emphasize substance over atmosphere. It must attempt to mitigate the underlying causes of tension, not merely its superficial manifestations. It should therefore deal with any security issues on the agenda in a concrete way.

In the second place, we believe that the discussions could usefully address the basic principles that should govern relations among states. A conference should encourage the reconciliation of sovereign European states, not confirm their division. The conference could help make this clear by affirming—as President Nixon and President Tito affirmed in October—the independence and equality of sovereign states, whether their political or social systems are different or similar.

In the third place, we believe that a conference should give major emphasis to issues of cooperation on which East-West progress is attainable. While a conference might contribute to enhanced security, the progress achieved on Berlin and in the SALT talks suggests that detailed negotiation of individual security issues is more likely to be handled in less general and less highly visible forums.

A conference could, however, stimulate cooperation in Europe toward increased East-West trade, toward more frequent and more useful exchanges of science and technology, and toward common efforts to preserve the human environment.

In the fourth place, we believe that a conference should go beyond the traditional pattern of cultural exchanges between East and West. It should take specific steps to encourage the freer movement of people, ideas, and information.

In general, we would view a conference on European security and cooperation in dynamic rather than static terms. We would firmly oppose any attempt to use it to perpetuate the political and social division of Europe. We would see a conference not as a ratification of the existing divisions but as a step on the long road to a new situation—a situation in which the causes of tension are fewer, contacts are greater, and the continent could once more be thought of as Europe rather than as two parts.

Improving Relations With Eastern Europe

I have spoken of our efforts with our allies to lessen tensions and improve relations with the peoples and states of eastern Europe. In our bilateral efforts as well, we are seeking the same objectives and making progress. As you know, we have been making progress in the SALT talks. The success of Secretary [of Commerce Maurice H.] Stans' visit to the Soviet Union underscores the progress we are making in our relations. You know, for example, the progress that has been made in trade recently.

In May President Nixon will become the first American President to visit the Soviet Union in 27 years. As the official announcement of the trip made clear, both we and the Soviets had agreed that a summit meeting "would be desirable once sufficient progress had been made in negotiations at lower levels." [3] We are pleased that such progress is taking place.

The objectives of the President's visit—to improve bilateral relations and enhance

[3] For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1971, p. 473.

the prospects for peace—cannot be attained, nor will they be sought, at the expense of the other countries of Europe, eastern or western. Indeed, we are prepared to improve and expand our relations with the eastern European states at whatever pace they are willing to maintain. Good beginnings have been made. In bilateral trade, the area in which the Soviet Union's allies have shown the greatest interest, the total is expected to reach $415 million this year; although still small, it is an increase of more than 50 percent since 1967. We hope to increase it substantially in years to come.

We welcome the authority President Nixon was given by Congress to approve Export-Import Bank financing of trade with eastern Europe. Yesterday, as you know, the President notified Congress of his intention to apply this authority to Romania, and we have some possibilities under active consideration now to carry out in practice that authority.

Other eastern European countries, notably Poland and Hungary, have also shown a desire for improvement in their relations with us. We reciprocate this desire and are responding to it. With Poland, for example, our overall trade already approaches in volume our trade with the Soviet Union, and we hope further steps will soon be possible to increase it.

Our approach in eastern Europe, as elsewhere, corresponds to the words of President Nixon's inaugural address in 1969: "We seek an open world—open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people—a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation."

There are voices in this country calling for United States withdrawal from the affairs of Europe. Such withdrawal would be folly. It would not be in the interests of our allies. It would not be in the interests of a more peaceful and more open European Continent. It would not be in the permanent interests of the United States.

Therefore we will work to strengthen our partnership with our allies in western Europe. We will work to improve our relations with the states of eastern Europe. And we will work to help clear the way for more stable and cooperative relationships within the whole of Europe.

COMMENTARY JANUARY 1972

The Fall of Europe?

Walter Laqueur

I

NEVER in its history has Europe suffered from so large and perceptible a discrepancy between economic strength on the one hand, and political and military impotence on the other. It is true that economic predictions for 1972 are not too sanguine and that Britain for instance is still in the throes of a severe economic crisis, but the foreign visitor would be hard put to discover signs of it in the streets of London or elsewhere. Italy's economy has taken a downward turn, but a traveler crossing from Italy into Switzerland, or the other way around, would not observe a great difference in prices or in the standard of living on the two sides of the line. A heated debate recently held on French television between a leading Gaullist and the new Secretary General of the French Communist party focused on the issue of whether the average French income has trebled (as the Gaullist claimed) or only doubled (according to the Communist thesis) in the last two decades.

On paper, the new Europe is a major world power: with a total population of 250 million, a combined GNP of some $640 billion (about two-thirds of the American GNP and considerably larger than that of the Communist bloc), it accounts for some 40 per cent of world trade. But there is something profoundly askew about this continent which for the past twenty-five years has lived on borrowed time, incapable of mustering sufficient strength to overcome national particularism and establish some form of political unity. Europe now finds itself in a perilous political and military situation. It is usually said that 1973 will be the European year of decision, when the general elections that are scheduled to be held in France, West Germany, and Italy will produce new governments, armed with a mandate to engage in more decisive and far-reaching policies. Yet even if all should go well from this point of view in 1973, Europe will still find itself only at the start of a long-drawn-out march toward political unity, and if that march is not undertaken, it is doubtful whether even the Common Market will manage to survive.

In recent days there has been a great deal of movement in European politics. Only a few months ago the entire Continent was agitated over the issue of Britain's entry into the European Economic Community, but by early October the debate had fizzled out even in Britain itself, where the issue had been regarded as the gravest the nation had to decide upon in this century. When, on October 28, the House of Commons finally voted to join the Common Market, the rest of Europe hardly noticed, so many more important problems having intervened and taken precedence: Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, the impact of America's new economic policies, the Soviet drive for a European Security Conference. Still, had the vote on October 28 gone *against* joining the Market, it would have meant not just the further decline of Britain but very probably the beginning of the end for Europe as a whole.

The debate over Britain's entry into the EEC is closely connected with the other problems facing Europe. West Germany's growing independence, both in economic matters and in areas of foreign policy, contributed decisively to Pompidou's decision to make British entry possible. To put it in somewhat oversimplified terms, whereas in the 50's and 60's the French needed West Germany as a counterweight to British influence, in the 70's Britain herself has become for France the counterweight to West Germany. Moreover, the French, notwithstanding official declarations, now share British skepticism with regard to Soviet intentions in Europe. In view of the near certainty of American troop reductions in the years ahead, it has become clear to the French government that only a common defense policy can prevent what is now commonly referred to as the Finlandization of Europe. In this respect, as in others, the pendulum has swung far since the era of Charles de Gaulle.

Though Parliament voted in favor of entry, the majority of Englishmen were against joining Europe. In this sense the decision was undemocratic, but before drawing alarming conclusions from

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his ... in mind that, according to recent polls, 77 per cent of the British electorate would also vote in favor of restoring capital punishment, and in addition would no doubt have stopped non-white immigration into Britain long ago. The opposition to joining the EEC consisted of a strange assortment of extreme right-wing Tories and extreme left-wing Labourites, both of which groups exploited all the free-floating conservatism, fear, distrust, envy, and xenophobia abroad in British society. For once Bernadette Devlin and Ian Paisley were on the same side of the barricade.

One of the basic arguments employed by left-wing critics was that British social services would suffer as a result of entry into the EEC. The Welfare State and the National Health Service have been the pride of Britain for several decades. What is less well known is that all the European Community countries have overtaken Britain and now spend a higher proportion of their GNP on social welfare. In absolute terms the discrepancy is even more striking: Britain spends $285 per person per annum, West Germany $507; a British worker gets between 16 and 20 paid holidays a year, an Italian worker between 29 and 47. No European government spends less on housing than Britain does, and France spends almost three times more. Family allowances on the Continent are more than double Britain's.

But, opponents argued, the Common Market was inward-looking, parochial, oblivious of its duty to the countries of the "Third World." Here too a closer look reveals that every European country contributes at least as much as Britain to the Third World, and many contribute more. The Common Market, these critics went on, is right-wing, reactionary, dominated by the super-cartels. This argument may have had some force five years ago, but West Germany, the most powerful European country, today has—what Britain does not—a socialist-dominated government; Social Democrats are also represented in the Italian government, as well as in Benelux. But, still another group of critics said, Britain is likely to lose the Commonwealth, or the special relationship with the United States, or above all its sovereignty, the time-honored traditions that have always set England apart from Europe. The truth is, however, that the Commonwealth has for a long time been a fiction, the special relationship with America was lost years ago, and the idea of British "apartness" did not even come into being until the 19th century.

THE economic argument (non-Communist variety) against entry can be summarized under two headings: (a) the scheme would not work; and (b) the price of Britain's entry was too high. It would not work because British industry, being outdated, poorly managed, and strike-ridden, cannot compete any longer with the rest of the world. For this reason Britain would not be in a position to exploit the economic advantages of the Common Market (the availability of a wider market, lower tariffs against industrial goods, etc.). There is no denying that this is a real consideration. But even assuming, on the basis of the defeatist argument, that Britain is destined to become Europe's depressed area, a second Ulster, the country would still probably be better off inside the European community than out in the cold. For, once inside, it can count on the help of the other members. The real nub of the matter is the price of Britain's entry, estimated by the government at $250 million in 1973 and rising to twice that sum in 1977. Will not this outlay devastate the country's recently-restored balance-of-payments position and thus inhibit economic growth? Why should Britain support the Common Market agricultural policy which, whatever its original intentions, has done nothing but subsidize inefficient farming at a ruinously high cost? Will not the British housewife end up paying the price of British entry into the Market?

There does seem to be general agreement that food prices in Britain are bound to rise substantially once entry into the Common Market is effected, though why this should be so is not altogether clear. During a recent visit to the Continent I found that, butter aside, food prices in France, Switzerland, and Italy are more or less the same as in Britain: fruit and vegetables are a bit cheaper, meat is a little more expensive but of better quality. It is taken for granted that whereas the benefits of having joined will not be felt for a long time, the toll, in the form of higher food prices, will make itself felt almost immediately. Maybe so, but on the other hand an increase of even a half of one per cent in Britain's growth rate would more than cover the membership fee. And since exports will unquestionably increase as a result of the merger, the inordinate amount of time being wasted in the debate over the future price of butter already seems a little ridiculous.

The Tory campaign in favor of joining was helped along by the fact that the Labour party had only two years earlier favored British entry into the EEC on conditions that were certainly no better than those finally obtained by Prime Minister Heath. If anything, the Conservatives were hampered by a lack of enthusiasm in their own ranks; their new Europeanism, however loudly proclaimed, is limited in scope and not altogether convincing. Certainly the propaganda put out by the Conservative Central Office in defense of joining Europe would be disquieting to anyone who regards Europe as something other than a free trade zone, an economic convenience. One pamphlet, in trying to allay public fears of a "faceless bureaucracy" and a reduction in the prerogatives of Parliament and the Queen, noted

comfortingly that there "has been no progress yet toward closer political unity," and that there was little likelihood of any pooling of sovereignty in the foreseeable future.

This argument is self-defeating because the case for Britain's entry rests in the last resort precisely on political, not economic, premises. The real issue is not the price of butter and sugar, not even the rate of growth, but the simple viability of the various countries of Western Europe. Taken one by one these countries do not count for anything politically, they are defenseless militarily, and they are economically highly vulnerable. European unity is the only way to overcome these weaknesses and to prevent the suicidal infighting which has so far in this century caused two world wars. In a recent article, Andrew Shonfield rightly complained about the apparent lack of concern with international relations manifest in the British debate over the Common Market. For if a slowdown should occur in the growth of international trade in the years to come, would there not be an overwhelming temptation for individual European nations to seize short-term advantages at the expense of other nations, unless a firmly established framework existed to contain and regulate economic tensions? The same goes, *a fortiori,* for the recrudescence of violent nationalism in any European country. Seen in this light, the trouble with the Common Market is not that it has moved too far and too fast toward supranationality, but that, on the contrary, movement in that direction has been agonizingly slow.

It is of course quite possible that political and military cooperation in Western Europe will proceed independently of economic development. In a press conference in early 1971, President Pompidou ridiculed the idea of Europe as a third force in world politics. But the fact of American disengagement from Europe, combined with traditional distrust of Soviet intentions and the fear of a deal between the two superpowers at Europe's expense, may well cause a quickening in the pace of cooperation outside the economic field. The political argument for British entry seems so overwhelming on the face of it that future generations will no doubt be puzzled that it took so long to accept the obvious and that England had to be pulled into Europe kicking and screaming. The cost of joining may be high, but the cost of not joining would in the long run be insupportable.

II

THE course of Soviet-German talks in recent months highlights the dilemmas involved in the current phase of European politics. For more than two decades Germany was the main battlefield of East-West confrontation in Europe. It is clear in retrospect that the official German attitude was too rigid: Bonn should have accepted long ago, unilaterally if necessary, such consequences of World War II as the Oder-Neisse line, and it should have renounced the Munich agreement of 1938. Instead of insisting on the Hallstein Doctrine (threatening to break with all countries recognizing East Germany) it should have put up with the fact that an East German state had come into being and would not disappear in the foreseeable future. It was argued for too long that for domestic reasons—the opposition mounted by refugee organizations—any accommodation with the East would have suicidal consequences for the party in power.

But if it was not really necessary to wait until the great coalition came into being in late 1966 for an initiative in German *Ostpolitik*, it is also true that up until that time the Soviet Union continued to threaten West Germany with military intervention (on the basis of paragraphs 53 and 107 of the UN charter) and had launched a massive propaganda attack (with accusations of "neo-Nazism," revanchism, etc.) against Bonn. Not until the spring of 1969, when the Soviet diplomatic offensive aimed at the establishment of a European Security Conference was stepped up, did hints emerge that the Russians were willing to engage in serious negotiations. This coincided with the advent to power in Bonn of a new government; when Willy Brandt became chancellor in September 1969 he devoted much of his energy to the discussions which led to the Soviet-German treaty of August 1970. This treaty, very broadly speaking, envisaged closer relations between the two countries on the basis of the recognition of the status quo in Europe. But it was to come into force, as the Germans insisted with full NATO support, only after a satisfactory solution had been found for the thorny Berlin issue; and this finally occurred in August 1971.

There is some promise in the new German *Ostpolitik*, and there are many dangers. Brandt can rightly claim that he did only what was in the long run inevitable, and what his predecessors, lacking courage and foresight, had failed to do—that is, to recognize, *de jure*, that Germany had lost the war. He can claim furthermore to have defused a potentially dangerous situation. West Germany is no longer the main villain of Soviet foreign policy; on the contrary, Brandt was praised in almost extravagant terms by Brezhnev in the latter's recent talks with Tito. This is a far cry from the past situation and it is only human for the architects of the *Ostpolitik* to believe that—far from having given anything away—they have restored to their country ("an economic giant but a political dwarf") much greater freedom of maneuver than anybody would have dreamed of even a year ago. Once the outcast, the pariah of European politics, Germany has

again become a respected member of the family of nations in East and West alike.

Yet West Germany may one day have to pay a heavy price for these achievements. However often Brandt and Scheel may profess their loyalty to their Western allies, there is a great deal of free-floating distrust in Europe of Germany's reemergence as a leading power. Some of this apprehensiveness is exaggerated if not downright hysterical; Brandt and his colleagues are good Europeans and they have had too many dealings with the Communists in their own lifetime to join a Popular Front on the interstate level, as a few commentators have implied they might. But the distrust persists; the recent French-British rapprochement was caused at least partly, as noted above, by French fears of Germany's growing role in Europe.

Potentially more dangerous than these relatively harmless rivalries, however, is the general climate of make-believe concerning Soviet intentions to which Brandt and his colleagues have succumbed and also contributed. The German Social Democrats may in fact have taken their stand on a slippery slope. For if Brandt and his government fail to live up to Soviet expectations in the political and economic fields, the Soviets will not hesitate to bring strong pressure to bear. Brandt realizes that but for a militarily credible American presence in Europe his deal with the Russians is bound to turn sour; his government has been among those protesting most loudly against any American troop reductions. But at the same time the *Ostpolitik* has given invaluable ammunition to American Senators and Congressmen who favor troop withdrawal below the point of credibility. After all, U.S. troops were kept in Europe mainly to defend Germany against Soviet encroachments; if Germany has reached an agreement with Russia which supposedly guarantees its security, what further need can there be for an American presence? According to a public opinion poll taken a few days after Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize, 50 per cent of the German people now favor neutrality and only 38 per cent support the Western alliance; why should they be prevented from having it their own way? Brandt knows of course that neutrality is just not practical so far as Germany is concerned, and that, the balance of power in Europe being what it is, the only alternatives are either close collaboration with the West or gradual absorption into the Soviet sphere of influence. But he has already to some degree fallen captive to the illusions nursed by too much loose talk concerning Soviet-German rapprochement.*

III

THE signing of the agreement on Berlin has been seen by some as an official acknowledgment, so to speak, that the post-war era is over. But periodization is an enterprise of dubious value at the best of times. And these are not the best of times. When, for example, did the previous postwar era end? The question is of course unanswerable. In one sense it ended in 1923, in another it lasted until the outbreak of World War II. With equal justice, it can be claimed that the second postwar period ended in 1948-9, when the European economy had once again attained its pre-war levels and the location of the Iron Curtain was fixed. Yet most of the problems created by the war remained unsolved. As a consequence of World War II the balance of power in Europe underwent a radical shift; the resulting situation has continued in force despite years of East-West dialogue, diplomatic activity, security conferences, unilateral and multilateral talks, and no end of new schemes, ideas, and approaches. In other words, to a very real extent the postwar era is *not* over: Europe remains divided, the Soviet Union is the dominant military power, and but for the military alliance between Western Europe and the United States it would be the dominant political power as well. Such are the harsh facts, and no new formulas, however ingenious, no theoretical legerdemain, can make them disappear.

The age of dialogue, we are told, has replaced the age of confrontation. This is only partly true. Western Europe no longer fears a Soviet invasion, but on the other hand neither the fundamental assumptions nor the political aspirations of the Soviet Union have changed. It is the age of détente—not, unfortunately, a détente that signals real peace and security, but a détente in the more narrow meaning of a "period that succeeds a period of crisis in the Cold War."† For European security since the end of the war has rested not on dialogues and mutual understanding but on the existence of a certain balance of military power, and this balance, never complete or perfect, has in recent years been radically upset.

The facts are not in dispute: the Soviet Union and its allies now have three times as many tanks in Europe as does NATO, and 3,500 more tactical aircraft. From 1962 to 1968 American forces in Europe were reduced from 462,000 to 300,000, whereas the number of Soviet divisions has grown during the last four years from 26 to 31. The number of American ICBM's has remained static since 1967 at 1,054, while during the same period the number of Soviet missiles has almost doubled,

* To provide but one example, Brandt's Foreign Minister declared in an interview in late November that "structural changes inside the Soviet Union in recent years" could provide a good basis for a further reduction of tension. Even Communists outside the Soviet Union have been hard put to discover the presence of any such "structural changes."

† Philip Windsor, *Germany and the Management of Détente*, London, 1971.

Soviet fleet is well publicized and need not be described in detail. In sum, between 1967 and 1970 the military expenditures of NATO decreased by ten billion dollars, those of the Warsaw Pact countries rose by five billion. The Soviet Union now spends two to three times more per capita than NATO on military affairs.

These facts, to repeat, are not in dispute. What is at issue is their significance. Thus, for example, it has been said that they are of no great political consequence: the Soviet Union is too engrossed with its allies and with domestic problems to desire any further expansion. All the Russians need in Europe—at any rate so long as the conflict with China continues—is security and recognition of the status quo. Having acquired the necessary strategic parity with the United States, the Soviet Union is unlikely to engage in a ruinous arms race in order to gain a superiority which, in the age of modern nuclear warfare, might well prove specious. On the contrary, proponents of this line of reasoning find much evidence that the Soviet Union wishes to expand trade relations with the West, and they suggest that the West make the most of the situation and work for a *modus vivendi* in Europe that will help establish a climate of mutual trust and security.

The argument is alluring but many of the premises on which it is based are debatable, and some are manifestly wrong. First, the Soviet military build-up is by now well in excess of what can be reasonably considered essential for Soviet security in Europe. Second, and more important, the argument rests on the assumption that the Soviet Union (like the United States) is now a status quo power. This is simply not the case, and those who think it is are merely succumbing to the escapism which these days pervades political thinking in the United States and Western Europe alike.

True, Chinese pressure may induce the Kremlin to make certain concessions—on SALT, for instance—and as a short-term goal the Russians do also wish closer economic ties with Europe. But beyond this, the Soviet Union has more ambitious plans of which it has never made a secret. As the greatest European power it aspires to political, economic, and military hegemony, and it hopes to achieve this goal by inducing Western Europe to relax its political cohesiveness and military vigilance, by encouraging an accelerated program of American disengagement, and by preventing all moves toward closer political and military cooperation or integration among European countries.†

THE main instrument of Soviet foreign policy in Europe in recent years has been the demand for the establishment of a European Security Conference.** The basic concept dates back a long time, having made its first appearance in the Soviet plan to prevent the consolidation of NATO in Europe. When this failed, various schemes for disengagement were introduced (such as the Rapacki plan), all of which were widely discussed but in the end discarded by the West because they were thought to contain no elements which would have contributed to real security in Europe. The Soviet aim all along was to dissolve both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to create something like a European co-prosperity sphere. But the scheme was too crude, the lack of symmetry all too apparent: the Communist countries of Eastern Europe were tied together by bilateral defense agreements which would have remained in force, whereas Western Europe had no such arrangement. Furthermore, if hostilities broke out, American forces would have had to cross the Atlantic, while Soviet divisions merely would have had to move two hundred miles eastward.

Gradually the scheme became more sophisticated: in July 1966 the Warsaw Pact leaders issued a declaration on peace and security in Europe which included some concrete proposals. But the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia two years later put an end, temporarily at least, to negotiations. It was only in October 1969 that talks began in earnest on an agenda proposed by the Soviets "to insure European security, to renounce the use or threat of force in mutual relations, to expand commercial, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations for the purpose of developing political cooperation among European states."

By this time the project had begun to make a more solid and thoughtful impression. Skeptics still argued that, given the character of the Soviet regime, vague talk about the renunciation of the use or threat of force lacked credibility. Moreover, since both the Soviet Union and the West European countries were already signatories to a declaration to the same effect—the United Nations Charter—what was to be gained by affirming these principles yet another time? As for expanding trade relations, the Soviet Union's interest in this matter was never in doubt; the Russians badly needed (and need) Western computers and other modern equipment. Cultural relations, the free flow of people and ideas across international borders, posed a more problematical issue, rais-

* The impact of nuclear parity has been discussed in considerable detail in Walter Slocombe's recent study, *The Political Implications of Strategic Parity*, London, 1971.

† Michael Palmer, *The Prospects for a European Security Conference*, London, 1971, p. 18.

** Several recent studies analyze Soviet policy on this matter in detail: Karl Birnbaum, *Peace in Europe*, London, 1970; "Europe and America in the 1970's," *Adelphi Papers 70/71*, London, 1971; Hans Peter Schwarz, ed., *Europäische Sicherheits Konferenz*, Opladen, 1970; Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe*, Baltimore, 1970.

ing, in the Soviets' view, the possibility of ideological infection, of peaceful invasion. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders have stressed time and time again (most recently at the 24th Party Congress) that there can be no coexistence in the ideological sphere. This raised the old problem which has bedeviled East-West relations for so long: if Soviet doctrine does not in the long run envisage coexistence with political systems differing from its own, how can anyone be expected to take seriously the constant Soviet invocation of an era of "mutual trust and security"?

Despite all these reservations and other, procedural, misgivings, NATO at its meetings in Reykjavik, Lisbon, and Rome (May 1970) decided to take up the Soviet suggestions and explore them further. The NATO Council made its participation conditional on the further improvement of the situation in Central Europe. Such improvement appeared to be rapidly forthcoming: with the Soviet-German treaty, the Berlin agreement, the prospects for further advance in the SALT talks, and Soviet hints concerning discussions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), it was decided last October to delegate Mario Brosio, the outgoing NATO Secretary, to explore Soviet intentions in Moscow.

The West has been strongly urged to participate in the European Security Conference, not only by the Soviets but by East European leaders as well. The interest of some of the latter is obvious: while the Soviets negotiate, any military initiative against Rumania and Yugoslavia, for example, would be self-defeating. Since the talks would last a long time, perhaps several years, Rumania and Yugoslavia would gain, at the very least, a breathing space. Other East European leaders, notably in Poland and Hungary, think that they, too, would gain more freedom as a result of ESC, but the position of these particular states would more likely worsen; for the Soviet Union, fearing that its allies might go too far toward rapprochement with the West, would be inclined to tighten rather than loosen its hold over them.

ANOTHER group of lobbyists for the ESC is made up of politicians from neutral countries. Some of these sincerely desire to act as mediators and bridge-builders; with others ulterior motives may be at work. Not much need be said about Finland in this context; in view of its relationship with Russia it cannot very well refrain from supporting its powerful neighbor. Swedish foreign policy has pursued a middle line between West and East which, if not morally reprehensible (as the late John Foster Dulles claimed), does not reflect either superior moral courage or wisdom: but for the existence of a balance of power in Europe, Sweden could not afford to be neutral. There is a tendency in Sweden to forget its unfortunate record of dealings with Nazi Germany [illegible]; there may or may not be lessons to be drawn from that record for the present time, but it might be hoped that study of the period would nevertheless serve to curb the Swedish habit of moralizing about situations involving the security of others.

The British and French attitude has been one of "polite reserve," in the words of one observer, though not necessarily for the same reason. The French prefer bilateral talks to mass circuses; de Gaulle certainly would not have approved of a scheme as lacking in substance as this one. In most British eyes, American disengagement from Europe seems likely to produce in the long run a situation more dangerous to peace than the present state of affairs. In Italy, Norway, and Denmark, on the other hand, the idea of ESC has found a considerably more friendly reception. The Italian government, in its insistence on responding to the Soviet initiative, has taken account of the fact that one-third of Italy's electorate votes regularly for parties which oppose NATO and which, in contrast to the situation in France, constitute a very real political factor. These parties are eager to find compromise formulas in their opening to the Left—and it is far easier to find them in matters of foreign policy than in matters of domestic policy. "Neutralism" is an important factor in Norway and Denmark as well; recent elections in both countries saw an increase of support for anti-NATO parties. While these two governments in general exhibit an awareness of just to whom it is they owe their independence, public opinion is not so clear on this point. Soviet intimidation too has had a certain effect here; Russia has tried hard, and not entirely unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that it is the strongest military power in the area and that American help cannot be relied upon.

The advocates of ESC in Western Europe maintain that dialogue with the East, even if limited at first to areas like oceanography and the environment, will gradually gather momentum and lead to an improvement in the general political climate. Some of the main obstacles toward such dialogue were removed by Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Brezhnev's announced approval last summer of the NATO proposals for balanced troop reductions seemed yet another step in the right direction. It is, however, by no means certain that the Soviet leadership has accepted the Western demand that troop reductions be asymmetrical (because the conventional forces of Western Europe are so much weaker than those of the East). Even so, the signals from Moscow encouraged President Nixon and other Western leaders to probe Soviet intentions further.

Nevertheless, it is not altogether certain that a conference is what the Russians really want. It is obviously in their interest to prolong the present

"talks about talks" for as long as possible; a conference that is bound to reveal disagreement on the one issue that really matters, namely who is going to dominate Europe, would constitute an anti-climax after the present upsurge of expectations.

IT CAN be argued that the pessimism expressed here is unwarranted. To be sure, the resolutions of the last Soviet Party Congress mention the "consolidation and *extension* of the Soviet ['socialist'] order"—but why take at face value the ritual invocations of a basically conservative leadership that has no use for revolutionary fervor and no expansionist aims? The answer is that a regime need not be revolutionary in character to aim at expansion, provided the temptation is strong enough and the risks involved not too high. It may well be that Soviet leaders are willing to make certain concessions in order to achieve their principal aim in Europe—the removal of American forces. They do not, for instance, insist any longer on the exclusion of the United States from the proposed conference. Similarly, as the threat from China increases—more Soviet divisions are now stationed on the Chinese border than in Eastern Europe—it is not unthinkable that the Soviet Union may evince a willingness to engage in more meaningful talks with the West. And it is also not impossible that if this state of affairs were to last long enough, the Soviet Union would give up its more ambitious aims in Europe altogether.

But this optimistic outlook presupposes one of two conditions, neither of which unfortunately exists at present: the continuation of a strong American presence in Europe, or alternatively, the existence of a strong Western European defense community. So far as the first is concerned, domestic pressures in the U.S. for disengagement from Europe are no secret to the Soviets; and as for the second, nobody in Western Europe seems ready to shoulder the cost in money and manpower necessary to bring West European conventional forces up to a level roughly equal to that of the Warsaw Pact forces.

It would take a Soviet invasion of Rumania or Yugoslavia, or Soviet participation in a Middle Eastern war, to galvanize West European public opinion on this point. This the Russians of course know, and they will no doubt refrain in the near future from actions which may cause disquiet in the West. In the meantime, while the Russians greet unilateral American troop reductions and cuts in American defense spending with polite and reassuring professions of good will and peaceful intentions, we may be sure that they are not about to make any far-reaching concessions of their own.

In the face of all this, the only alternative would seem to be appeasement or, in more refined language, "accommodation." Whatever the term used, the likely result will be the gradual growth of Soviet power in Europe. At present, there are not many outright advocates of Soviet hegemony in Europe, even among the Communist parties. But if the American retreat continues and if Western Europe proves incapable of strengthening its own defenses fairly rapidly, the argument will increasingly be heard that accommodation with the Russians, being inevitable, should be sought sooner rather than later.

What would Soviet hegemony mean in practical terms? Certainly not the physical occupation of Western Europe. Europe would be expected, however, to help with the economic development of the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union would not necessarily insist on the inclusion of Communists in every European government, but (as in Finland) it would surely demand that untrustworthy political leaders or parties be excluded from positions of power and influence, and it would expect a ban on any criticism of Soviet policies. To a limited extent it is possible to discern something of this pattern already emerging. Soviet leaders have declared unequivocally that they would take it as a threat to peace if the German *Bundestag* should fail to ratify the Soviet-German treaty. Broadcasting stations critical of Soviet policy have been called a danger to European security and Soviet demands have been issued for their removal from the air; needless to say, no such restrictions have been suggested with regard to Soviet broadcasts. Similarly, the Soviet Union regards interference with the activities of its intelligence agents in Western Europe as a hostile act; protests are brushed aside or dismissed as cold-war propaganda or even a threat to peace. (After the recent expulsion of some ninety Soviet agents from London, it was sadly observed in Bonn and Paris that such drastic action would now be almost unthinkable in any other European capital.)

There is still a chance that out of the present confusion a new European defense community will emerge, based on Anglo-French nuclear cooperation and the combined conventional forces of ten European countries. Attempts to establish a European defense force date back to the early 1950's; they were voted down by the French National Assembly while Pierre Mendès-France was Prime Minister and they failed to kindle much enthusiasm in any of the other countries in question. For twenty years Europe lay under the American nuclear guarantee, and by a stroke of unique good fortune resulting from the Soviet conflict with China, the Continent has now received a second respite. No one knows how long this breathing space will last, or indeed whether it can be successfully exploited. Pooling their resources, the West European countries could muster a sum total of $23 billion by way of a military budget (as against the $63 billion spent by the Warsaw Pact countries on

men and 300 combat vessels. Still, if one takes into account the forces [illegible] in other parts of the world the overall picture is not as hopeless as it appears at first sight.

But would a European defense community be of any consequence without an independent nuclear deterrent? The immensely complex issue of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation has recently been analyzed in some detail by Ian Smart.* Britain has had much longer experience than France with nuclear weapons, whereas the French have made more progress in producing their own missiles. The French tactical nuclear artillery (Pluton) will be deployed in Germany later this year. The main obstacle is not, as is frequently thought, an economic one; Britain has spent less than 0.2 per cent of its GNP on strategic weapons, France about 0.6 per cent. France's progress has been hampered in recent years above all by certain technical difficulties which will, no doubt, be overcome in due course. But there are immense political problems. Should Germany and other European countries participate in this program? Leaders of the German CDU have in the past welcomed the concept of a British-French pool as an important step toward an all-European deterrent. But it is doubtful whether the present German government would risk incurring Soviet displeasure and thus the achievements, real and [illegible] financial contribution. Moreover, how credible would an Anglo-French deterrent be? In Smart's view, the only threat such a deterrent could pose would be the threat of retaliation either for a Warsaw Pact military action which could be held to endanger vital British or French interests, or for a strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. "The former threat is one which entails suicide, the latter a blow from the grave." Nevertheless, a European capacity to retaliate, however small, would not be lightly dismissed by the Warsaw Pact countries.

Considerations of this nature will, of course, appear outdated and irrelevant (if not altogether heinous) to those who have decided to their satisfaction that the cold war has ended at long last and a new era of peace and cooperation is automatic and inevitable. But there is still a distinct danger that by unilateral concessions and disarmament those who strive for peace will undermine the very basis on which the prospects for peace and security in Europe rest—namely the ability of Europe to defend itself. A European Defense Organization could play a decisive role in bringing about a real détente. If, on the other hand, the Europeans put their trust in high-sounding but basically meaningless dialogues and security conferences, while at the same time failing to take adequate measures to insure their own defense, the outcome, short of a miracle, will be only too predictable.

* "Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation," *Adelphi Paper 78*, London, 1971.

TASS, Prague
26 January 1972

Warsaw Pact Declaration on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe

Prague January 26 TASS--Follows the full text of a declaration on peace, security and cooperation in Europe. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states held in Prague on 25-26 January, 1972, examined the course of recent events in Europe. They analyzed these events in the light of their steadfast goal of working to turn the European Continent into an area of permanent, lasting peace, into an area of fruitful cooperation between sovereign and equal states, into a factor of stability and understanding throughout the world. The meeting participants noted with satisfaction that further progress has been achieved in this direction.

The proposals of the socialist states for strengthening European security and convening an all-European conference with this purpose play a most important role in rallying all the forces that come out for peace and cooperation in Europe. These proposals

are contained in the Bucharest declaration of 1966, in the Budapest address of 1969, and the Berlin statement of 1970. These proposals of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as further actions and initiatives undertaken by them, constitute a broad peace program and promote the creation of a new political climate in Europe.

Other European states are also making an ever growing significant contribution to the common cause of European peace. The policies of some of them definitely put first the interests of European peace, which has a favourable effect on the situation in Europe.

I

The participants in the meeting point to the great positive significance of the contacts growing of late between European states belonging to different social systems, the development of political intercourse between them, particularly in the form of consultations on questions of mutual interest. This promotes mutual understanding between European states in regard to their common long-term interests in the sphere of peace and cooperation.

As a result of the efforts and the constructive contribution of the member states of the present meeting and also due to the efforts and constructive contribution of other states, the relations of peaceful coexistence between European states are asserting themselves more and more. In this connection the meeting participants note the importance of the principles of cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France which were adopted at the conclusion of the recent Soviet-French summit talks.

Relaxation of tension on the European Continent is also promoted by the expansion of economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other relations between European states.

The relationships between European peoples are growing stronger and are acquiring a more diversified content. There is growing activity by the European public in the struggle for deepening the relaxation of tension, for peace and security in Europe.

The states represented at the meeting expressed satisfaction over the fact that the results achieved in the process of easing tension in Europe are supported when necessary by appropriate documents, valid under international law.

The political consultative committee positively assesses the beginning of the ratification of the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, between the Polish Peoples Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The putting of these treaties into force will promote the interests not only of their direct participants, but of all European states as well, will lead to the consolidation of the foundations of peace in Europe.

The member states participating in the meeting stressed the positive significance of the four-power agreement of September 3, 1971, over questions related to West Berlin, and of the agreements between the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senat of West Berlin.

The widening international recognition of the German Democratic Republic is a major factor in strengthening peace. Further progress in this direction, including the establishment of relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany according to norms of international law, will be an important contribution to peace, security and cooperation.

The participants in the meeting come out for deciding without further delay the question of admitting the GDR and the FRG to the United Nations Organization.

The participants in the meeting point out with satisfaction that the governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany conduct an exchange of opinions on the unsolved questions in the relations between the two countries, above

all, on the question of declaring the Munich agreement null and void from the very start. They express the support for the just demands of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and believe that an achievement of an agreement will help improve the situation in Europe.

The implementation of these steps will promote the rapid and radical elimination of the consequences of the lengthy period of distrust and tension from the relations of the FRG with the socialist countries, will promote complete normalisation of these relations, which would, in turn, promote relaxation on the European Continent and the development of cooperation among all the European states.

The states taking part in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee welcome the prospects for further positive changes in Europe. At the same time, they are taking into account the fact that the forces that are interested in maintaining tensions, in opposing some European states to others, in preserving the opportunities for pushing the development of events on the European Continent to aggravation continue operating in Europe. These forces, as seen from the facts, including the latest facts, cannot imagine the European policy free from blocs, are striving to intensify the arms race in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty member states cannot but draw from this the definite conclusions for their security. But they are convinced that by now such a correlation of forces formed in Europe that it is possible to overcome the opposition of those who are against relaxation, if the efforts to consolidate peace are made jointly and consistently.

The states taking part in the meeting expressed the conviction that it is particularly important and quite possible at the present stage to achieve collective, joint actions of the European states towards consolidation of the European security. In this connection, they declare for the speediest holding of an all-European conference on security and cooperation in which all the European states and also the United States and Canada should take part on an equal footing.

At the all-European conference, its participants could work out practical measures for further easing of tensions in Europe and lay the foundations for the construction of a European security system.

The participants in the meeting are of the opinion that European security and cooperation require the creation of a system of commitments precluding any use of force or threat of using force in the mutual relations among the states in Europe, a system of commitments guaranteeing all the countries that they are protected from acts of aggression, promoting the benefit and prosperity of every people.

The states taking part in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee declare for general recognition and practical implementation in the political life of the European Continent of the following basic principles of European security and relations among European states:

Inviolability of the frontiers. The frontiers existing now between the European states, including the frontiers that formed as a result of the Second World War are inviolable. Any attempt to violate these frontiers would threaten European peace. Therefore, the inviolability of the present frontiers, the territorial integrity of the European states must continue to be observed unswervingly and there must be no territorial claims from some states to others.

Nonuse of force. Force or threat of force must not be used in the mutual relations among the European states. All the disputable questions must be solved by peaceful political means, through talks, in accordance with the basic principles of international law, so that the legitimate interests, peace and security of the peoples are not jeopardised.

Peaceful coexistence. The states of the two social systems--the socialist and the capitalist--have formed in Europe in the process of the historical development and exist now. The existence of the different systems must not be an insurmountable obstacle to the allround development of relations among them. Renouncing war as a means of their policy, the European states, belonging to different social systems,

can and must build their relations on the basis of accord and cooperation in the interests of peace.

The foundations for goodneighbourly relations and cooperation in the interests of peace. The goodneighbourly relations among the European states must develop on the basis of the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage. This approach must become the permanent policy in the relations among the European states, the permanent factor in the life of all the European peoples and must lead to the development of goodneighbourly relations and mutual understanding among the states in different parts of Europe. It is necessary to strive for such a transformation of relations among the European states that will make it possible to overcome the splitting of the continent into the military-political groupings.

Mutually advantageous relations among the states. Diversified mutually advantageous relations among the European states in economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields, in tourism and environmental control must be widely developed in the conditions of peace. The development of these relations, in turn, adding material content to the striving of the European peoples for peace, calm and efflorescence, will consolidate the stability of the system of security and cooperation forming in Europe.

Disarmament. In the interests of consolidating the world peace, the European states must promote in every way the solution of the problem of universal and complete disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, and implementation of measures for limitation and ending of arms race.

The support for the United Nations. The goals of the European states on the international arena are in keeping with the articles of the United Nations Charter calling for maintenance of the world peace and security, for the development of friendly relations and cooperation among the states. The European states declare in support of the United Nations, for its consolidation in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

By taking these lofty principles and goals as a basis for relations between the states of Europe, the all-European conference will adopt a decision of great historical scope. This will set the beginning to joint fruitful work, capable of turning Europe into a truly peaceful continent.

It would also be possible to agree at the all-European conference on concrete directions for the further development of reciprocally advantageous relations by European states in every sphere, for the elimination of all discrimination, inequality or artifical barriers. Their cooperation in the rational utilization of the raw materials and power resources of Europe, in raising the industrial potential and improving land fertility, in utilizing the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution will allow to multiply the opportunities for raising the wellbeing of the European peoples. Mutual enrichment in spiritual values, acquaintance with each others culture and art will assume still greater scope.

It would be expedient to set up at the all-European conference a permanent body of all the participating states concerned that after the conference could continue joint work to agree on further steps in this direction.

In the opinion of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty all these questions should be high on the agenda of the all-European conference.

The states represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee believe that an all-European conference can be convened in 1972 and regard the statements by a number of West European states to the effect that they adhere to the same view as a factor in favour of this.

The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee regard with understanding the reasoning of many states who favour the carrying out of necessary preparations for an all-European conference in order to promote its speediest convocation and its success. They believe that the Finnish Government's proposal to conduct in Helsinki multilateral consultations with the participation of all interested states of Europe, as well as of the United States and Canada, should be realized.

The member states participating in the meeting reiterate that they decided to appoint delegates for taking part, together with the delegates of other states, in multilateral consultations aimed at reaching agreement on questions related to the preparations for and the organization of an all-European conference. They note that the proposal on multilateral consultations as a form of preparing for an all-European conference is now meeting with the agreement of all the states concerned, and call for starting the multilateral consultations in a very short time.

The member states of the Warsaw Treaty believe that achieving agreement on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe would also correspond with the interests of strengthening European security. In this they proceed from the fact that the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, both foreign and national, ought to be solved in such a manner as not to be to the detriment of the countries taking part in such reduction. The examination and determination of ways toward solving this question should not be the prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe. Appropriate agreement could be reached on the way of conducting talks on this question.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic believe that historical development has brought Europe up to an important juncture, apart from a new hope for lasting peace and security the year 1972 may bring the European peoples a real advance towards translating that hope into life. The supreme duty of all states is to vigorously help in bringing this about.

The declaration is signed:

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: by Todor Zhivkov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; by Stanko Todorov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

For the Hungarian People's Republic: by Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party; by Jeno Fock, chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Government of Workers and Peasants.

For the German Democratic Republic: by Erich Honecker, first secretary of the Central Committee of Socialist Unity Party of Germany; by Wolfgang Rauchfuss, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic.

For the Polish People's Republic: by Edward Gierek, first secretary of the Central Committee of Polish United Workers Party; by Piotr Jaroszewicz chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic.

For the Romanian Socialist Republic: by Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania; by Ion Gheorghe Maurer chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: by L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; by A.N. Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: by Gustav Husak, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; by Ludvik Svoboda, president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; by Lubomir Strougal, president of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED

The attached backgrounder provides current information on the situation in Yugoslavia. Tito's measures to restore order in Croatia are apparently succeeding; however his ability to find long-range solutions to regionalism, economic stagnation and the problem of his own succession remains in doubt.

In treating the Yugoslav situation, we should suggest:

a. that Croat leaders had lost their persepective and had become swept up in the tide of the extreme nationalist demands of their constituents;

b. that Moscow is working with Croat refugees in West Germany and elsewhere to overthrow Tito and establish an independent Croat state under Soviet control;

c. that Tito's purge of Croat party leaders was necessary and that the Yugoslav president did not over-react;

d. that despite some harsh words for "rotten liberalism" and "legal niceties" (used for the purpose of goading somnolent party leaders into action), Tito wants the essentials of his decentralization program to survive and has no intention of bequeathing his regime to discredited hard-liners;

e. that nationalist difficulties, while serious, are not inevitable, permanent or incapable of solution;

f. that Croat leaders were -- with possible exceptions -- guilty of no more than reflecting the excessive national enthusiasms and aspirations of their constituents and will not be the victims of traditional Communist purge trials;

g. that the Yugoslav system is strong enough that even when President Tito (who currently enjoys excellent health) eventually leaves the scene, the commitment to his unique form of socialism and federalism will not be in doubt.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972

THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED

For over twenty years Yugoslavia has been involved in a political experiment which seeks to combine Communist state socialism, individual freedom and capitalist production methods. Last summer a constitutional reform granted almost complete autonomy to the six republics and two autonomous regions that comprise the Yugoslav federation. However, decentralization has not worked out as planned, and the Yugoslav experiment is currently challenged by acute problems relating to the erosion of federal authority, regional separatism, economic stagnation and the question of what to do when Tito is no longer around to hold things together.

The immediate crisis has been posed by Republic of Croatia efforts to obtain a larger share of federal funds. In the political marketplace in Belgrade where federal policy is formed and funds disbursed, the bargaining power of a regional party representative is proportionate to the amount of mass support and pressure he can generate in his local republic. In mobilizing such support, the regional representative has all too frequently chosen to play upon the chauvinism of his constituents. Swept up in the tide of nationalism and local interests, he has increasingly assumed the role of the defender of these interests at the expense of the federation as a whole. For, pace Marxist orthodoxy which holds that national rivalry is a bourgeois aberration and that by eliminating capitalism and building a classless society national contradictions will disappear, the substitution in Yugoslavia of the Communist political system for the monarchy has not resolved the nationalist appetites of either the party bureaucracy or the regions they represent.

In the case of Croatia, local party leaders felt strongly that their republic was not getting a fair share of federal funds and their demands on Belgrade were reinforced by student demonstrations. The actions of student organizations and the voices of Croat extremists who were publicly demanding the real prerogatives of independence (such as a Croat army, customs service and foreign office) alarmed and angered President Tito. However, when he called upon the central party apparat to intervene, he discovered that decentralization had eroded federal authority to the point that neither government nor party was capable of taking effective action.

Faced with the intransigence of top-level Croat leaders and the paralysis of central party organs, Tito was obliged to engage his personal authority and prestige to cope with the situation.

Castigating chauvinist forces at work in all the republics, he specifically accused the party leadership in Croatia of "rotten liberalism" and a lack of vigilance which permitted counter-revolutionary elements to thrive. Subsequently he forced the resignation of Croat party president Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Mika Tripalo, a Croat representative on the federal party executive bureau and a member of the collective presidency set up by Tito last summer to resolve the succession problem. All together the purge in Croatia has affected at least 400 persons. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against one outspoken Croat delegate to the federal parliament and pre-trial hearings have begun for 11 Croats suspected for counter-revolutionary activity. These procedures may presage the first Yugoslav treason trials in over twenty years.

A Conference of the League of Yugoslav Communists, which met from 25 - 27 January, cut the decision -making party executive bureau from fourteen to eight members. It also reduced the size of basic party organs and resolved to increase the workers role in the party. However, despite Tito's exhortations, the Conference was unable to formulate a program for dealing with the resurgence of national antagonisms. The meeting did affirm the validity of Yugoslavia's self-management principles and Tito made a point of disclaiming any intent of encouraging the party to reassume its former omnipotent role. Nonetheless, Conference decisions and the tone of Tito's own remarks indicate the Belgrade will continue to take measures against national dissension.

In Croatia the new party leadership is proceeding to restore public order and party discipline. It has asserted that the basic liberal orientation of the Croat party is not in question. And the position of the new leaders has been strengthened by a federal decision to allow the individual republics to retain a greater share of their own currency earnings. On the other hand, in trying to reassert party control, these leaders will be working against the dominant mood of the party and people of Croatia which favors more independence and resents the dismissal of their most popular leaders.

Events in Croatia have obliged Tito and his lieutenants to re-examine the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslav life. The concept of a party that guides but does not direct has been tried and found wanting. In calling for a more compact, disciplined party led by men dedicated to the principles of socialism and federalism, Tito wants an organization which can bring its authority to bear on the regions whenever local interests impinge on the unity and well-being of the federation as a whole. However, the erosion of federal authority was not accompanied by the development of alternate power centers and Tito is discovering that it is much easier to surrender authority than to take it back again.

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Events in Croatia have obliged Tito and his lieutenants to re-examine the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslav life. The concept of a party that guides but does not direct has been tried and found wanting. In calling for a more compact, disciplined party led by men dedicated to the principles of socialism and federalism, Tito wants an organization which can bring its authority to bear on the regions whenever local interests impinge on the unity and well-being of the federation as a whole. However, the erosion of federal authority was not accompanied by the development of alternate power centers and Tito is discovering that it is much easier to surrender authority than to take it back again.

During the Croatian crisis Tito has had the unequivocal support of the Yugoslav military and he made it clear to Croat nationalists that he was prepared to use force if necessary to restore order in the republic. As a result the role of the military has been strengthened. Should the party prove incapable of regaining its authority, the Yugoslav military would remain the only force capable of holding the country together. Its influence will be felt even more strongly after Tito's demise.

Since World War II Yugoslavia has withstood the threat of regional separatism internally and external pressure from Moscow which dates from the time of Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. The country's survival attests first of all to the ability and prestiage of President Tito. It also attests to the flexibility of Yugoslav socialism and to the pervasive fear of Soviet intervention. Tito has made it clear that he expects the economic and administrative essentials of his decentralization program to survive. He obviously does not wish to bequeath his regime to those who would attempt to reimpose authoritarian rule. Moreover, liberal elements in Croatia, Tito's home province, have always been the strongest supporters of his reforms.

The fate of the Yugoslav experiment has an influence transcending its own borders. As a leader of the non-aligned nations, Yugoslavia can exert considerable influence on the developing countries of Asia and Africa. As such it constitutes a relevant and unique example of a regime which seeks to combine participating social democracy (the self-management principle), individual freedom, a market economy and a large measure of autonomy for its component republics.

The Soviet Union, ever fearful that the Titoist heresy is infecting its East European empire, is an interested observer of Yugoslavia's problems. Tito and the new leadership in Croatia have already accused Moscow of abetting nationalism and separatism. While this accusation cannot be confirmed (it is probably the only point on which Yugoslavs of whatever nationality or political persuasion can agree on), there is ample evidence that the Soviet leaders are exerting economic and psychological pressure to achieve their aims. Thus, Tito's recent problems in attracting western capital have not gone unnoticed by Moscow which is offering attrative loans and credits to hard-pressed Yugoslav firms in an effort to increase their trade with the Soviet bloc. And a January article in the Soviet Pravda, observing the Croat crisis with obvious satisfaction, compared the current climate in Yugoslavia with that which existed in Czechoslovakia during the period of the Dubcek reforms; that is, before the Soviet-led invasion.

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CROATIAN NATIONALISM

A fly in the federal ointment

By MILOVAN DJILAS

The Yugoslav Communists are guided by the same doctrinal and practical considerations in handling the question of national groups as in dealing with all other problems.

In orthodox Marxist terms nationalities are the product of capitalism and national rivalry is a bourgeois conflict. So by eliminating capitalism and the bourgeoisie, and "building" the classless society, national contradictions should gradually disappear. The operation of building this classless society is presided over by a monolithic and internationalist party which, by the same token, is the embodiment of nationalistic life and tendencies.

As this same doctrine holds that there are no differences between national groups except language, cultural traditions, psychological characteristics, and economic conditions, the Communists—once they are in power—do not permit anything more than cultural and administrative autonomy when they recognise the rights of national groups.

The Yugoslav Communists abandoned this position only when they were forced to. But there is no denying that they have gone a step further than the Soviets, who pioneered in this terrain, by giving official recognition to the rights and special characteristics of national groups. There is no "Big Brother" among Yugoslavia's national groups, no single party bureaucracy leading the others.

This departure from Soviet practice stems not from principles but from the Yugoslav reality. If this reality is discounted there is no way of understanding the policy pursued by the Yugoslav Communists in handling national problems, nor the nationalistic rivalries which are today shaking up and eroding socialist structures just as they once did in a monarchist and bourgeois Yugoslavia.

What happened? What is happening today? How is it that there has been a resurgence in Yugoslavia of nationalist movements and antagonism? These stirrings have taken the whole world by surprise, and some, especially the Communist countries, view them with concern.

The Serbs and Croats constitute the largest national groups in Yugoslavia. There is a very close similarity between their languages and their ethnic origins and they live side by side in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia. These resemblances may well bring the two groups closer together, but they also give rise to fears of losing their identities.

The complexity of their relations is better seen against the background of their differences. Their traditions and their mentalities are different, as are their religions (the Serbs are Orthodox, the Croats Catholic). Between the two world wars, political parties were formed on the basis of national differences, unleashing irrational forces, reviving old myths, destroying legal order, and delaying social progress. In 1929, King Alexander I tried to save the country from breaking up by resorting to personal rule, and by promoting the idea of a "Yugoslav nation" and of "Yugoslavism."

His action did stave off the country's disintegration, but there was no way of injecting life into the idea of one Yugoslavia. The entire Croat population challenged this concept, the Serbs' democratic parties made a futile attempt to head it off, while extremist elements in all camps sharpened their axes for the day when they could settle old scores.

That day came with the Nazi invasion. Croat Fascists (the Ustachis) got the German invader to set up a so-called independent state, and used it as a basis for an attempt to exterminate the Serbs. Reactionaries and fanatical chauvinists from the ranks of the Serbs hit back using similar methods.

All the ingredients were there for a revolution, and the time seemed ripe for the Communists to play a decisive role in safeguarding and restoring the Yugoslav State. They did this by launching a revolt against the occupying forces and their collaborators. They won the struggle because — albeit in their own way — they were the embodiment of the Yugoslav idea, that is to say the idea of a common Yugoslav State grouping a variety of nationalities. It is worth noting here that this vision is at the root of Yugoslavia's quarrel with Stalin and its determined opposition to Moscow's attempts at extending Soviet control.

The Communists were prepared to grant equal rights to all the national groups, but they were confronted with more than the bewildering variety of national traditions and the problems posed by fostering the various groups. There were also the nationalist appetites of their own party bureaucracy. The fact is that some of these bureaucracies seemed to be — to borrow Orwell's phrase — more equal than others.

For the first time in their history Slovenes and Macedonians were given the right to set up their own State, and this could not but please them. The same right was given the Montenegrins, although they were an integral part of the Serbian national group. Both the Komintern and the Yugoslav Communist Party regarded Yugoslavia as something artificially created by the Treaty of Versailles.

The Montenegrins, in their view, constituted a special national group because they had had their own State until 1918, and since then had represented a separatist tendency in the Yugoslav kingdom. During the Second World War, the Serbian counter-revolutionary movement (the Chetniks) was the most active group in Montenegro. By turning this region into a State, the centralist and hegemonistic tendencies of Serbian nationalism which constituted the most serious threat to the Communists, were weakened. Besides, during the war, bases of party structure and administration were laid which took Montenegro's special characteristics into consideration. Equality with other republics which the new structural order bestowed could only help the newly created Montenegrin party machines.

So it was that a region which had every ground for demanding autonomy found itself elevated to the rank of a nation and State. This peculiarity created no problems as long as ideological and party unity ensured a de facto centralisation. Today, with the party hold loosening and republics enjoying near-sovereign power the "Montenegrin nation" assumes great significance for the Croats — whose own nationalism is in full flower.

Republic status

The Serbs, on the other hand, even when they are not nationalistic, see in the very existence of the Montenegrin nation a dismemberment of their own group. Before the war, the Communists were inclined to give a measure of autonomy to Bosnia Herzegovina. With the revolution they decided to go further and give the region instead the status of a republic, although half the population is Serb and the rest Croat and Moslem.

They thus effectively blocked the historic aspirations of Croatian nationalism and the ethnic hopes of Serbian nationalism while at the same time meeting the wishes of Moslems anxious to affirm their own identity. An outburst of nationalistic fervour could turn Bosnia Herzegovina into a battlefield. Apart from the six republics, the Communists also created two autonomous regions inside the Serbian republic—Voivodina and Kosovo.

These provinces have identical constitutions, although the Serbs form the majority in Voivodina, which also has a large Hungarian minority, and the Albanians predominate in Kosovo, where the Serbs constitute a little more than a third of the population. As far as I can recall, the question of the Hungarian minority played only a secondary role in the granting of autonomy to Voivodina.

Decisive

There was an autonomist current, admittedly weak, among the Serbs of this region before the war. But during the revolution the party supported the idea of setting up an autonomous party apparatus. All this had a decisive influence when the question of granting autonomy to Voivodina was taken up.

It was different with Kosovo. The Communists had also set up autonomous structures in this region, which borders on Albania. Since at that time the Yugoslav and Albanian Communists were hoping to unite the two countries, Kosovo's autonomy was considered an intermediate step towards such a union.

When the Yugoslav constitution was amended last year, Voivodina and Kosovo were nearly awarded the status of republics, and this in the teeth of Serbian opposition. The

solution finally decided upon was bizarre: in order to meet the demands of the Albanians, the same rights were granted to Voivodina — which had not asked for any of them.

Although they represented almost half the Yugoslav population and Kosovo was part of their republic, the Serbs found themselves coming under increasing pressure. The dream of uniting Albania and Yugoslavia gave way to a threat of Albanian irredentism.

It would be wrong to conclude from the present resurgence of nationalism that the Communists have done nothing here or that they have made serious mistakes. The truth is that the substitution of social and political systems does not do away with nationalist problems. In a multinational State these can be solved, even given optimum conditions, only for a particular period and within the framework of certain social and political structures. Each time these structures are altered, the relations between the national groups change, and vice versa.

This is what has happened in Yugoslavia.

The party monolith and its ideology have been gradually transformed, largely as a result of changes in social structures. The break-up of the party bureaucracy was accompanied by the emergence of a middle class.

Officials installed by the revolution were replaced — before their usefulness expired — by men less dogmatic and more ingenious. The social and intellectual climate resembles that of Louis Philippe's time, as seen by Balzac and Stendhal. True, the middle class in Communist countries is not properly speaking a bourgeoisie because there is no bourgeois ownership of property. It has, however, certain things in common with the bourgeoisie, such as its goals of technical progress and aspirations towards a high standard of living. It is made up of all social classes — managerial and professional men, party bureaucrats, petit bourgeois, even workers and peasants.

The beliefs and outlook of this class, with its reliance on what are in fact modern "capitalist" production methods, impregnate every fibre of the nation's life. This transformation of society and the party is built on a natural, and the only possible, foundation — that of national groups. It is evident in claims made by the party bureaucracies in the national groups, and in other aspects of "bourgeois" nationalism.

Disintegration

There are as many Yugoslav Communist parties as there are republics, and the disintegration has been accelerated by differences in social and other tendencies of their members. As national bureaucracies — bureaucratic nationalisms, that is to say — began to press their special claims, there also appeared an "ideology" of superiority and intolerance among national groups. "Scientific" studies have been published, especially in Croatia, on the exploitation of one national entity by another and the "limitless" possibilities for development in the exploited national group.

Dark, illogical forces were thus set in motion by the charges of exploitation and hegemony. There was, of course, exploitation, not as a result of the predominance of this or that national group, but because of waste and the exercise of privileges in the party bureaucracy at the expense of the rest of the Yugoslav national entities. In this context, the criticism directed against Belgrade can be justified, not because it is the Serbian capital, but because it is the common capital of the federal bureaucracy. The reality of national relations and national claims remains well hidden.

This is true of society as a whole and of the various tendencies which exist in it. For the changes that have taken place in society have not been backed up by a renewal of ideas and institutions. In many respects, the political structures have not changed since the end of the revolution.

The party bureaucracy may well have been unable to stop social change, but it was strong enough to suppress new and more democratic tendencies. The changes have been limited to reshuffles within its own ranks. It gave legal recognition to the independence and equality of the party bureaucracies in the various nations, but it refused any liberalisation in other domains.

In view of the traditional and legendary aspirations of its people, it was inevitable that Croatia should become the theatre of the most serious outburst of nationalism. Contributing to it were both actual and potential economic difficulties in the area. The party bureaucracy's "progressive" wing struck a nationalist posture. But it was weak, and all it did was open the door to the traditional sort of nationalism, which led to the merger of two nationalist structures — the party and the bourgeoisie.

Croatian slide

The policy was pursued in seemingly democratic fashion, with leaders paying lip service to "Yugoslavism." But quite clearly Croatia was sliding towards separatism and authoritarian nationalism. It could hardly have been otherwise: not a single popular or democratic measure was sanctioned in the republic. Although the party's nationalism came to be identical with that of the bourgeoisie, it was neither dynamic nor inventive.

The bureaucrats were stunned when students from Zagreb University went on strike last month. Marshal Tito reacted by getting rid of the nationalists in the party and arresting student leaders. The drive has been contained, but the Croat question and the other problems afflicting the system have yet to be solved.

By and large, Yugoslav society has been liberalised, but its political structures remain authoritarian. It is for this reason that a crisis like that of Croatian nationalism seems to involve the whole of Yugoslavia.

Yet the basis of the Yugoslav State and its society is far sturdier than appears at first sight. Note that the outburst of Croat nationalism was isolated — and led to unfavourable reactions from the other republics. Officially, these reactions came from top-level "revolutionaries." In fact, however, it was the entire post-revolutionary consumer society, down to its humblest levels, that insisted upon and obtained the vitally essential maintenance of the State's unity.

Authoritarian

As long as Yugoslavia's present bureaucratic structure remains, the country will continue to be shaken by crises. No one can say just when or where they will end. There seems no possibility of renewing or stabilising the party bureaucracy, nor does a political democracy of the sort known in the West seem likely. Yugoslavia is tending towards a political State which is not dogmatic, but continues to be authoritarian. The structures which came into being as a result of the revolution, including the national structures, nevertheless continue to be modified, and in some instances are even disappearing.

But all this is being done without disturbing the foundations of society, particularly nationalist rights. There is every indication that the country's social and economic life is evolving towards greater liberty, thereby offering the national groups greater opportunities for their individual development. The vision of confederation of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians all enjoying wider civil rights begins to take on the dimensions of something more solid than a pipe dream.

MILOVAN DJILAS

BALTIMORE SUN
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Fourteen Centuries Apart

Croatia and the 'Yugoslav Idea'

By JOSEPH R. L. STERNE

Zagreb

For those who prefer the long view of political affairs, the latter years of the Fourth Century might be a good starting point for assessing the upsurge of Croatian nationalism that is now roiling Yugoslavia.

In that distant epoch, the Roman Empire finally broke in two along a line roughly comparable to a division perceptible in Yugoslavia even to this day. To the south and east, the Byzantine Empire with its Orthodox Church and Cyrillic alphabet held sway; to the north and west, the power of Rome persisted in the Catholic Church and the Latin alphabet.

When Slavic tribes migrated from the northeast into the Balkans in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries, their political and religious fates were determined by the cleavage between East and West. The Serbs became subject to the Byzantine Empire and later to its Turkish successors. The Croats after a heady period of independence fell under the domination of Hungarians, Venetians and Austrians, all of whom reflected European civilization.

Thus these two Slavic tribes, though speaking a common language with no greater differences than "English" and "American," remained politically apart through fourteen centuries—from the days of the migration until 1918.

In that year, as World War I came to an end, Yugoslavia, or the Union of the South Slavs, was

formed by big-power decision from the debris of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.

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From the beginning, Yugoslavia has never been an easy Union. Not only the Serbs and the Croats, but the Slovenes, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Macedonians and Hungarians who live within its borders have nurtured nationalist passions quite contrary from the assimilationist ideal that has shaped the American Union.

The Serbs, who by 1918 had been nominally independent for a century and fully independent for half a century, were the dominant force in Yugoslavia from the outset. Although leading Croats had long supported the "Yugoslav Idea," they were quickly disillusioned after the 1921 constitution established a centralist monarchy with power firmly entrenched in Serbian hands.

Political turbulence prevailed in the period between world wars. Croatian parliamentarians often boycotted meetings of the Skupstina in Belgrade and then withdrew altogether after their leader, Stjepan Radic, was shot dead during a debate in 1927.

One product of Croatian disillusion was the assassination in 1934 of King Alexander by a member of Ustashi, an extremist, separatist group which considered him the embodiment of Serbian hegemony. Another result was the creation during the Nazi occupation of a separate Croatian state, led by Ustashi, which committed atrocities against Serbs comparable to the bloodiest deeds of Hitler's henchmen.

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As a result, the resistance movement in Yugoslavia deteriorated into a civil war between Serbs and Croats—with only the Communist partisans under the redoubtable Josip Broz Tito holding firm for the "Yugoslav Idea."

When World War II ended and Tito took power, the new regime made the historic decision (after a decade of Communist theoretical indecision) to make Yugoslavia a federation with considerable power vested in the nation's six republics and two autonomous provinces. . . .

The purpose was to defuse nationalist passions, but in practice difficulties have never ceased. In the early postwar years, the Communists imposed a Stalinist rule from Belgrade in which Croatia was treated almost as an occupied state despite Tito's Croation origin. After the Tito-Stalin break in 1948, there was quite a change. To court popular support in the struggle against the Soviet threat, Tito preached national rather than international communism and instituted a more democratic, "self-management" style of socialism.

Since that time, political life in Yugoslavia has been characterized by constant experimentation, with the pendulum almost dancing in response to a myriad of nationalist, economic, ideological and foreign pressures.

The early 1950's brought the democratic heresies of Milovan Djilas, an old Tito ally who flirted with the unforgivable idea of a multi-party system. The mid-1960's saw a return of Serbian centralism in the form of Aleksander Rankovic, another old Tito ally who used his control over the secret police to reinstitute a touch of Stalinism.

Now, today, Yugoslavia is going through its third internal crisis since the break with Stalin. In many ways, it is the most serious crisis because it is the most pertinent to Yugoslavia's peculiar problems.

What Djilas and Rankovic reflected, after all, were the basic dilemmas of Communist regimes everywhere: democratization versus repression, stability through relaxation or through control.

In the present case, Tito is dealing with a fervent Croatian nationalism which grew to proportions he bluntly defined as a threat to the entire Yugoslav state.

Accordingly, Tito has deposed a number of Communist Party leaders who had made themselves quite popular by appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the Croatian population. And he has tacitly approved the indictment of eleven members of "Matica Hrvatska" (Mother Croatia), a cultural organization now being charged with promoting a political mass movement and having links with "Ustashi" separatist groups in exile.

While the deposed Croatian leaders, Miko Tripalo and Mrs. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, proved no more capable of surviving Tito's wrath than Djilas and Rankovic were, they reflect a force that will buffet Yugoslavia for years to come.

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The Croatian people, it must be remembered, have clung to their separate identity and heritage through the vissitudes of centuries.

Soon after they migrated into the Balkans they were in conflict with the Vatican over the use of their own language instead of Latin. Then, in the year 925 A.D., Duke Tomislav of the Dalmatian town of Nin declared himself King of an independent Croatia that remained a major Balkan power until 1102 A.D. An imposing statue of Tomislav astride a bronze horse can be seen today outside the Zagreb railway station.

After 1102, the Croats were never fully independent again although they frequently enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Until the Sixteenth Century the Hungarian monarchy held sway only to be replaced by the House of Habsburg and Austrian influence. For considerable periods, the Venetians controlled Dalmatia and at one point the Turks pushed within 35 miles of Zagreb.

During the Nineteenth Century, while the Serbs already were in the process of gaining independence, Croatian nationalism in its modern form took shape. It is a heady phenomenon, marked by romantic memories of Tomislav, by jealous rivalry with the Serbs and by conflicting political theories.

Some Croats want "pure" separatism, an idea harking back to Tomislav. Others dream of a highly autonomous political connection with undefined western powers, a concept reflecting the years of Habsburg rule.

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Among the majority that has accepted the reality and durability of the Yugoslav state, differences remain over the degree of control from Belgrade that should be permitted.

President Tito, perhaps realizing this is an age of nationalism from Northern Ireland to the Ukraine, made major constitutional changes last year to decentralize governmental authority. It was a bold move to appease jealousies within Yugoslavia, and it may yet prove to be a major achievement.

But as an instant defusing mechanism, the granting of greater powers to the various republics just did not work.

Blaming Croatia's continuing economic problems (one tenth of its 4 million people have to go to Western Europe to find work), nationalist elements put forward escalating demands: complete control of foreign currency earnings, a separate banking and marketing system, a Croatian seat in the United Nations and even a Croatian army.

Tito's response—mass arrests of striking students, the firing of leading party and government figures, the indictment of eleven intellectuals on treason charges—reasserted the cohesive power of the party (and the army, if necessary).

Over the short run, popular support of the "Yugoslav Idea" will regain strength in Croatia only if there is economic recovery. Over the longer run, mixed marriages and common interests may erode separatist sentiments. But it is a process of decades, one that could be accelerated only if the danger of outside intervention becomes urgent.

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SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN THIRD WORLD WATERS

Introduction

Until the mid-1960's the Soviet Union limited its approaches to the Third World to diplomatic ties, economic and technical assistance arrangements, military aid and training agreements, trade relations and educational exchanges. The military power factor was a relatively small part of the overall Soviet posture and policy in its dealings with Third World areas. Only within the past decade have the Soviets become more consistent in trying to project military power into distant areas, and to do this they have depended primarily on naval deployments.

Although the focus of this paper is mainly on the major buildup of Soviet naval power and facilities, there has also been a spectacular increase in the merchant fleet, making it the third largest in the world. The USSR has likewise developed highly sophisticated oceanographic ships which operate throughout the world, and it has built up a tremendous fishing fleet, with an estimated total of over 4,000 vessels, many of which frequently become involved in international incidents because of illegal fishing operations within territorial waters.

Along with this expansion in sea power, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, other East European Communist countries, have been involved in developing ports and obtaining shipbuilding and repair facilities in some twenty-five countries throughout the world. Most recently the USSR entered into a commercial agreement with Malta which was signed on 27 December 1971. According to the Soviet news agency, TASS, by terms of the agreement Soviet vessels will be able to use drydocks in Valletta for repairs in return for "definite payment," plus assistance in developing Malta's light industry. In August 1971 TASS had reported that during talks between Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff and Mikhail Smirnovsky, Soviet Ambassador to London and Malta, Mr. Smirnovsky had promised "total" Soviet support in "liquidating colonial domination and liberation from commitments imposed from outside." At stake in the Malta issue is the balance of power in the Mediterranean which would be drastically altered if the USSR were to acquire rights to the naval and air bases located on the island.

The Mediterranean and Egypt

The Mediterranean, especially the Middle East, is where the Soviet Union has attained its greatest prestige and influence through

a combination of diplomacy, trade, military and economic aid, military advisors, the presence of some military personnel, and a growing naval presence. In the Mediterranean it maintains a squadron of some fifty surface ships and submarines, and an estimated 16,000 Soviet citizens are stationed in Egypt alone. Activities of the Mediterranean Squadron are directed mainly against NATO naval forces and the U.S. Sixth Fleet in particular. In these activities the Squadron is in effect an extension of the Black Sea Fleet's defense of the maritime approaches to the southern flank of the USSR. Since the Soviet Union is also interested in extending the range of its naval operations into the western Mediterranean, it is therefore working to develop its relations with the North African states as well as with Malta.

Moscow has concluded a number of arrangements for use of Egyptian facilities, including repair facilities in Alexandria and storage and billeting facilities in both Alexandria and Port Said. They make more limited use of the port at Mersa Metruh, which is still being developed.

The Soviets have apparently not acquired other Mediterranean port facilities similar to those they have in Egypt. Most of the Soviet visits to the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and to the Algerian ports of Algiers and Annaba have been brief, probably to "show the flag" and to take on provisions and fuel. The geographic location of Mers-El-Kebir in Algeria would be suitable for ships operating in the western Mediterranean, but it is unlikely the Soviets will obtain use of its facilities since the Algerians increasingly oppose the presence of any great power fleets in the Mediterranean. However, a small number of Soviet naval and technical personnel are assigned to this base to assist the Algerian navy. Likewise, Tunisia and Libya have accepted Soviet assistance in port construction but have consistently refused Soviet requests for repair and refueling facilities. Elsewhere, units of the Squadron make occasional formal visits to the Yugoslav ports of Split and Kotor. Moscow has been putting increased pressure on Tito for port and supply facilities at Kotor, but to date Tito has steadfastly refused.

A number of anchorages are used by the Soviets in the Mediterranean, ranging from one located in the area of Gibraltar, and used by vessels in the western Mediterranean, to one south of the Peloponnesus which is reported to be the principal eastern Mediterranean anchorage for combat ships. Others are located off Tunisia's east coast, one within Egyptian territorial waters, one near Malta and two located in the area of Cyprus and Crete.

The Indian Ocean Fleet and Activity in Contiguous Waters

The Soviet Union's increased visibility in the Indian Ocean includes not only its growing naval presence, first established in 1968 and now considered to have attained fleet status, but also its civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for the Soviet fishing

fleet and increased diplomatic and trade relations. There are more ports open in the Indian Ocean than in the Mediterranean for short naval visits and the frequency and duration of these have generally increased. In the Gulf of Aden alone, Soviet naval units have made at least six appearances since the British announced their intention to withdraw. But the Soviets have not obtained access to or use of facilities comparable to those available in Egypt or in Cuba. Naval activity has apparently been limited to their port visits, "showing the flag," hydrographic research and space support. There has been no indication they engage in operational exercises to the extent they do in the Mediterranean.

Other Soviet activity complementing the naval presence has been important and includes the following: signing a friendship treaty with India, in which they probably requested the use of naval facilities; signing a trade agreement with Thailand; dispatching military aid to Ceylon following the latter's insurgency crisis and also signing a fishing agreement; negotiating with Singapore for use of commercial and perhaps port facilities; continuing to supply military and economic aid to many countries in the area; extending their civil air routes and increasing their fishing operations.

The Soviets' prompt use of expanding naval power was exemplified by the fact that Soviet naval units began calling at Persian Gulf ports within three weeks after the British announced in 1968 that they would withdraw from east of Suez by 1971. These deployments have ranged from a single missile destroyer and a tanker of the Pacific fleet to surface combat ships, submarines and auxiliaries from all four Soviet fleets. They have made calls at Abadan, Kuwait, Basra and Umm Qasr. In this area Soviet activity in construction or improvement of port and shipyard facilities has been most extensive in Iraqi ports, where the leftist regime has favorably received such aid.

Shore facilities along the Red Sea, at Aden, or along the coast of the Horn of Africa would facilitate Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean. Probably with the aim of obtaining these, the Soviets have helped with the construction of port facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia, where it is also rumored they have obtained some access to the port of Alula at the strategic tip of the Horn. They have also been involved in similar activity in Aden where they are known to have used the airfield in past years. It is not known, however, if they have applied for permanent facilities in these areas. The island of Socotra, belonging to Southern Yemen, has been reported used as a Soviet forward base because of its position near the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. So far, however, it appears that nearby anchorages are being used more by the Soviets, and these are in international waters. In Yemen, the port of Hodeida was built by the Soviets in 1968-1969, but there are no indications that they have actual port or other base facilities there.

On the island of Mauritius, further south in the Indian Ocean, Port Louis has been used for visits and supply purposes by Soviet naval and space support ships. A recent fishing agreement will enable Soviet fishing boats to use these facilities also.

So far the Soviets have been refused the right of unrestricted access to shore facilities in India, although they are assisting in the improvement of the east coast naval base at Vishakhapatnam. Ceylon, with suitable facilities at Colombo and Trincomalee, would also probably refuse such a request in view of Prime Minister Bandaranaike's campaign to make the Indian Ocean a neutral area. Through a 1971 fishing agreement, however, Soviet fishing boats have access to the port of Colombo and the smaller port of Galle on the southwestern coast. In Singapore, the Soviets have been trying for over a year to gain access to important dockyards for naval and merchant ships, but no firm agreement is known to have been reached. Apparently, however, the Soviets have obtained permission for short, informal naval visits to Singapore.

In addition to the anchorages in the vicinity of Socotra, which are reported to be used frequently by both combat and support ships, two or three other anchorages in the Indian Ocean are allegedly used more by space support and hydrographic research ships.

West African Coast

Although sporadic Soviet naval operations off West Africa are known to have started as early as 1967, for the past three years Soviet ship operations have been related to political events: a Soviet task force patrolled the Ghana coast in the spring of 1969 to effect the release of two Soviet fishing vessels that the Ghanaian government had impounded. Since 1970, the date of an attempted coup against Sekou Toure, the frequency, duration and conspicuousness of naval ships visiting at Conakry has mounted to the point which suggests the Soviets have now established a floating naval presence off the Guinea coast. The vessels reportedly include one or two destroyers, a landing ship and an oiler. There is no evidence that Moscow intends, or that Guinea would agree, to the Soviets' building a naval base at Conakry or on the nearby islands, but both obviously have a mutual interest in a standing Soviet patrol of Guinean waters.

In view of the Soviets' apparent success at having won entry into Conakry, which they will certainly seek to consolidate and expand, this will probably become a model for similar operations along the African coast in the future. Already Soviet ships have called at least twice at Freetown, Sierra Leone, the first time in May 1971 when President Stevens claimed to fear a plot against his regime. Since the Soviets have no strategic need for a naval base on the West African coast, and the cost of operating such a base would most likely outweigh any defense gains, their naval presence

serves primarily their political aims of establishing and defending Soviet interests in the area.

The Caribbean, Cuba and Latin America

After the missile crisis in 1962, Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean were negligible until July 1969 when Soviet surface ships and submarines began to visit the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos, Havana and Mariel. Although the purpose of these visits has been mainly political, the ships had access to supply facilities and were known to engage in a few basic exercises with Cuban navy ships. Most recently a Soviet task force visited Cuba in late 1971. A repair and supply facility for both surface vessels and submarines is known to have been established at Cienfuegos, but to date the Soviets, apparently aware of possible U.S. reaction, have been very careful as to the type of ships which they deploy to the Caribbean and which use the Cienfuegos facility. Other Soviet aims in the Caribbean are similar to its aims elsewhere; to enhance its international prestige and to improve its operational capabilities. Specifically, such activity demonstrates Soviet support for Cuba and increases Soviet prestige in Latin America where it doubtless sees, in the trend toward radical nationalism, an element which will strengthen its position in the area and, over a period of time, draw a number of countries into a pro-Soviet posture.

In Chile, the former Christian Democratic administration of Eduardo Frei was offered $50 million in credit by the Soviet Union to modernize the port of Valparaiso, but as far as is known, that credit has never been used. More recently an agreement for use of the port by fishing vessels was reportedly signed, and a similar agreement has been drawn up with Peru.

TIME
31 January 1972

Reaching for Supremacy at Sea

SINCE early in 1970, U.S. intelligence experts have been particularly interested in satellite photos of a ship with an exceptionally long keel being constructed at the big Soviet naval shipyard in the Black Sea port of Nikolayev. In recent months, as the hull began to take shape, the photos disclosed a number of significant details—large shafts for elevators, huge fuel tanks, a flattop deck. Last week some Defense Department experts were finally willing to make a striking prediction: the Soviet navy, which for years scorned U.S. attack carriers as "floating coffins" and "sitting ducks," is now building one of its own.

The Pentagon's leak about the mysterious ship at Nikolayev was obviously timed to coincide with President Nixon's request for more defense funds. It is possible that the vessel, which is about half complete, may turn out to be a tanker or a big cargo freighter. But some Allied naval experts are already willing to bet that the Pentagon is right, and that the ship really is Russia's first attack carrier (it already has two cruiser-sized helicopter carriers). If so, the decision to build an attack carrier represents a dramatic and fundamental shift in Moscow's naval strategy, with profound consequences for the rest of the world. "It changes the whole ball game," says retired U.S. Commander Robert Waring Herrick, a onetime naval attaché in Moscow who wrote the authoritative book, *Soviet Naval Strategy*. "It could be an event of historical significance that would change the entire mission of the Soviet navy."

Throughout its rapid buildup during the past decade, that navy has remained basically a defensive force. Its chief military mission has been to deny the U.S. unrestricted freedom of the seas, especially in waters within Polaris-missile range of the Soviet Union, and to limit U.S. options for intervention in areas where the Soviets also have an interest. A decision to build attack carriers, however, would shift the capabilities of the navy from defense to offense. It would show that the Kremlin is determined to extend its own global reach by equipping its navy with seagoing airpower that could contest the U.S.'s dominance at sea. That could open a potentially [illegible] and more perilous era of competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Alarming Rate. Even without a carrier force, the psychological and political impact of the Soviet navy is far greater than its actual power and potential would warrant. In terms of firepower and megatonnage, the other Russian services are more awesome. Moscow's arsenal of 1,510 nuclear-tipped ICBMs, which outnumber the U.S.'s Minutemen by 3 to 2, remains the major Russian strategic threat. Its superbly equipped army (2,000,000) is still the biggest worry to the U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe. Russian airpower, which is continually probing the air defenses of Western Europe and the U.S. (Britain alone made 300 intercepts of Red bombers last year), is developing at a rapid and alarming rate.

On the world scene, though, the Red fleet is the most dramatic and assertive manifestation of Russian will and determination to make its presence felt. Russian men-of-war are far more visible symbols of national power than the barely visible contrails of a high-flying jet bomber or the remote exploits of a spaceflight. Though the U.S. Navy still holds a sizable edge over the Soviets in firepower, technological prowess and mobility, the Russians have cleverly managed to project an image of rapidly shifting balance of naval power that has had a sizable impact on much of the world. Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, the deputy director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, jokingly taunts American friends by saying, "Remember, you still have the second most powerful navy in the world."

Moscow's naval buildup began in 1961 as a response to the U.S. decision to deploy its Polaris subs within missile range of major Russian targets. It gained considerable momentum after the Cuban missile crisis; the performance of the U.S. Navy convinced the Russians of the political and diplomatic value of seapower. Under the brilliant leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (TIME Cover, Feb. 23, 1968), the Soviet navy has been able to apply pressure on points that would cause the U.S. the most political discomfort. In less than a decade, for instance, it has started a sweeping pincers maneuver to outflank NATO on both its southern and northern sectors. With Russian warships [illegible] North Atlantic outnumbering those of NATO by a 6 to 1 margin, Denmark and Norway are understandably anxious about continued membership in an alliance that in times of war could hardly be expected to effectively protect them. In the Mediterranean, Moscow's armada now outnumbers the powerful U.S. Sixth Fleet, 61 ships to 40. Not only are Turkey, Greece and Italy uneasy, but Yugoslavia is worried that in the event of a new outbreak of fighting in the Middle East, the Russians might try to seize one of its ports on the Adriatic as a base. The strategic value of Yugoslavia as a naval outlet for the Mediterranean heightens the temptation for the Russians to intervene in that country's affairs in the uncertain situation that may well follow Tito's resignation or death.

Russian warships are frequently at anchor in Egyptian and Syrian ports, in part to inhibit Israel from making air attacks. The Russians are building huge new naval facilities on the Egyptian coast midway between Alexandria and the Libyan border. In the event of a new Middle East war, the Soviet fleet might try to blockade Israel, cutting it off from possible help from the West—even though such an act could mean a confrontation with the Sixth Fleet. Moscow justifies its looming presence in the eastern Mediterranean as a sign of its determination to protect the developing nations from imperialist machinations. Admiral Gorshkov has declared that "the protection of the fraternal and peace-loving peoples of the Arab world is a sacred mission of the Soviet navy."

At the Doorstep. In Washington's eyes, a recent ominous development in the Kremlin's naval strategy has been the increase in the number of its ships in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Defense and State Department officials believe that sooner or later India, in return for support during the Indo-Pakistani war, will allow the Russians to construct port facilities on its territory, as Egypt has done. (The Indians, who are intensely proud of their own muscular little navy, have persistently denied any such deal.) As a response to the expanding Soviet presence, the U.S. announced that units of the Pacific-based Seventh Fleet would make more frequent patrols of the Indian Ocean. That decision worries the Japanese, who fear that the Seventh Fleet may eventually be lured away from its role as part of Japan's defense. In addition, the Jap-



anese fear that the growth of Soviet naval presence near the Chinese mainland will spur Peking into building up its own navy, and thus trap Japan between two naval powers hostile to each other.

The most audacious challenge is taking place almost literally on America's own doorstep. Five new Russian subs are now stationed off the U.S.'s East and West Coasts, their nuclear missiles aimed at American targets. During the past two years, Soviet task forces, in conjunction with Cuban naval units, have conducted antisubmarine exercises in the Gulf of Mexico, cruising at times to within 30 miles of the U.S. coastline.

The Nixon Administration insists that this naval presence in Cuba is not permanent. But U.S. Navy commanders in the Caribbean believe that the fleet will stay. The Russians have built a modern logistics base at Cienfuegos on Cuba's south coast that includes three large docks, a deepwater anchorage, repair facilities and, interestingly, a radio tower for communicating with subs. Russian fishing ships, merchantmen and oceanic research vessels operate from other Cuban ports. "In the 1970s," predicts Robert A. Kilmarx of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, "we may expect to see a Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean comparable to that which the Soviet Union now deploys in the Mediterranean."

Fast and Young. In its style and [illegible] Soviet navy might almost have been inspired by the prophetic writings of the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), who contended that seapower is essential to a nation's economic well-being and political prestige. Russia's new approach to the sea, moreover, is not limited to building warships. Its merchant fleet is now even with the U.S. in tonnage. Its fishing fleet, which is three times as large as second-place Japan's, provides one-fifth of the country's protein supply.

The Soviets have also built up an oceanic research fleet of 200 ships —larger than the combined research fleets of all other maritime powers. In nearly every major body of water, their sea scientists are plumbing the depths for data on currents, water temperature and the sea bed that are vital to fishermen and submariners alike. Although responsible to different chains of command, the commercial and armed navies often work in tandem. A visit to a neutral port by a Russian freighter, for instance, may be followed by a request for docking privileges by a trawler fleet—then by the flag-showing appearance of a rakish, gray-hulled missile cruiser.

Russia's navy is divided into four geographically grouped fleets—the Baltic, the Northern, the Black Sea and the Pacific—of 270 to 350 vessels each. It is second in overall size only to that of the U.S., and in some categories of ships, it is far ahead (*see chart*). In general the Russian ships—which range in size from swift 83.7-ft. *Komar* missile boats to the 19,200-ton *Sverdlov* cruisers, no longer in production—are faster and younger than the U.S.'s (an average of about eight years, *v.* about 18 for American ships).

Fleet for the '80s. The Soviets are developing great momentum. At present, they are outbuilding the U.S. in naval vessels by the impressive ratio of 8 to 1. In addition, major Polish and East German builders are producing merchant ships for Russia, and the Soviets have ordered others from foreign yards from Japan to The Netherlands. In the front-line, high-sea naval squadrons, some classes of ship are being replaced by more advanced designs after only eight years of operational duty. The *Kresta II* cruisers (*see picture box, next page*), whose design is much admired by U.S. naval architects, will apparently be replaced in the near future by the smaller, cheaper but more heavily armed *Krivac* destroyers. "The Soviets," says British Military Expert John Erickson, "are building a fleet for the '80s."

That fleet will certainly include a powerful armada of nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines. Currently the Russians' most potent undersea weapon is the Y-class submarine, Yankee in American navy parlance, which is comparable in size and speed to the U.S. Polaris. As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird will probably disclose in testimony to Congress this week, the Soviets now have in commission or under construction 42 Yankees. They are adding new ones at a present annual rate of twelve a year while the U.S. years ago leveled off its Polaris fleet at 41. The Russians are developing a new 3,000-mile undersea missile that would require the construction of an even larger sub. In response to the Soviet buildup, President Nixon last week requested funds from Congress for the start of development of a 5,000-mi. undersea missile called ULMS (for Undersea Long-Range Missile System). Russia's desire to strengthen its position in underwater missile-delivery systems is a major reason for the lack of progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Meanwhile, the Soviets are engaged in a buildup of hunter-killer submarines, which the Russians regard as the best weapon against the Polaris subs.

The emergence of Russia as an ocean superpower has touched off a gigantic global war game on the seas. Sometimes the game is played with a dash of old-style chivalry and locker-room humor. As the rival ships maneuver, often coming within only meters of one another, the commanders exchange congratulatory signals on smart seamanship and derogatory remarks on poor shows. "Gorshkov wouldn't be impressed with that performance," one Sixth Fleet captain recently signaled to his counterpart after a particularly awkward maneuver. Sometimes close is too close, and the warning goes out: "You are interfering with my right of freedom of the seas."

Crucial Factor. Russian ships often cut across the bows of U.S. carriers as they launch and retrieve aircraft, mostly to annoy and distract. But they also come close to learn. As a possible preparation for starting up carrier operations of their own, the Soviets have filmed hours upon hours of U.S. and British carriers in action. Last summer, a Soviet destroyer in the Eastern Mediterranean was rammed and badly damaged by the British carrier that it was watching conduct nighttime landings and takeoffs.

In time of peace (or at least of non-war), the most important aspect of the high seas game is surveillance, which could be the crucial factor in victory or defeat if a real war broke out. While the Russians deploy a larger surveillance fleet of trawlers jampacked with electronic gear, U.S. technology is vastly far ahead of its rival's in the highly sophisticated field of submarine detection. Russian subs are what U.S. Navy men call "clankers"; their "signature"—the distinct and definable rumble of their engines, propeller shafts and other machinery—is noisier than that of U.S. submarines. To the

great irritation of the Russians, whose sonar-laden "fishing trawlers" periodically tear up international cables in an effort to find America's undersea listening devices, the U.S. has criss-crossed parts of the ocean depths with lines of supersensitive acoustic receivers that pick up sub sounds (as well as whale songs, grouper grunts, and shrimp crackles) and flash them to a land-based central computer that can instantly identify the vessel's particular signature.

In addition to the cable systems, which are known as Sosus and Caesar, the U.S. also tracks submarines with sonar buoys dropped by aircraft and floating robot platforms that maneuver around the ocean surface. Currently under construction, at an initial cost of $1 billion, is an even more sophisticated system called SAS (for Suspended Array System). It consists of a towering triangular frame, its three legs situated ten miles apart, which will rest somewhere in the Atlantic on the abyssal plain, about 16,000 ft. below the surface. SAS will take advantage of the oceanic phenomenon that sound travels vast distances horizontally through the ocean's chilled lower layers. With ultra-acute hydrophones, which will be strung along its structure, SAS will be able to detect submarine noises in the deeper reaches throughout the entire Atlantic. A similar listening system is planned for the Pacific.

Bird Farms. In the unlikely event of an outbreak of war, which navy would win? Many U.S. Navy men are no longer so cockily confident of America's overwhelming superiority. Says one ranking naval officer: "Take the Mediterranean. If we lost those two bird farms (attack carriers), we would be in big trouble. It would be the 5-in. gun [the U.S. destroyer's basic weapon] against the 300-mile cruise missile. Sure we might beat them. But it is not certain, particularly if we lose the bird farms right off."

Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, commander of the Sixth Fleet, is considerably more optimistic. "I'm not running for Gibraltar yet," he says. A "brown shoe" admiral who still wears his pilot's wings, Miller believes that America's air superiority gives his fleet a decisive advantage over the larger Russian flotilla. The Sixth Fleet has about 160 A-6 Intruder and Phantom jets stacked aboard its two attack carriers, the *John F. Kennedy* and the *Independence*. Miller's Russian counterpart has only the limited aerial support of fighters and medium bombers at airfields in Egypt.

Test of Will. In the event of war, the Soviet navy would be a prisoner of its geography. Ships that were not already at sea might never get there. With the exception of the Northern Fleet's base at Severomorsk near Murmansk, the principal bases of the other three fleets are located in tactically difficult positions. A few hundred well-placed mines in the Kattegat and the Dardanelles would serve to bottle up both the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. In addition to having shallow and often ice-clogged approaches, the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok is located on the Sea of Japan, which has only four narrow straits opening to the Pacific and is relatively easy to keep under surveillance.

The Soviet navy also has some severe shortcomings as an offensive force. In view of its growing global role, Britain's Erickson regards it as "overstretched." It badly needs air cover at sea and more permanent and developed bases near its new areas of operation. Though it might be able to deliver a powerful first blow, the Russian navy still is basically a one-shot outfit that would be virtually defenseless after it had emptied its quivers of missiles and torpedoes.

Admiral Gorshkov, who has run the navy for 16 years—considerably longer than the other service chiefs—is trying to remedy these shortcomings. Exactly how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in its quest for dominance of the oceans will become more evident after the mystery ship in Nikolayev is completed. If it is indeed an attack carrier, naval experts would then feel that four to eight more must be in the planning stage if each of the major fleets is to enjoy the protection of seaborne aviation.

Even so, the carriers could not be truly operational until the end of the decade. It would probably take even longer to acquire proficiency in the complex business of running the floating airfields. If the carriers are anything like the ship at Nikolayev, they are only in the 30,000-ton range. They would be no match for the nuclear-powered 75,700-ton *Enterprise* and the other big U.S. carriers.

Still, the creation of a carrier fleet would be a test of Russia's intentions in decades ahead. The cost of building even one is so enormous and the requirements are so taxing for the already strained Soviet technological capacity that this decision must have ranked in the minds of the Soviet leaders as a crucial and historic choice. Moscow's political strategy holds that the outcome of the struggle between capitalism and Communism will be decided not by a clash between the U.S. and the Soviet Union but by the ability of the respective superpowers to create dissent among their opponent's allies and to exert influence upon the uncommitted nations. Russian policy toward Western Europe and Moscow's treaties with Egypt and India seem to bear out that theory. For the U.S. it would be a stunning irony of the nuclear age if such traditionally old-fashioned objects as naval ships should serve as the force that helped to tip the balance of power away from the world's most technologically advanced nation.

U.S. NAVY

Soviet Guided-Missile Cruiser: Kresta II class



LADEN with a fearsome array of missiles and electronic gear, the two operational *Kresta II*-class guided-missile cruisers reflect the skill of Soviet naval architects in putting the maximum punch in the smallest package. Equipped to operate without long range air cover, the 6,000-ton *Kresta II* has a crew of 500 and a cruising speed of 33 knots. It carries one pair of surface-to-air missile launchers forward and another aft, each pair with its individual radar-guidance and fire-control unit. Towering atop the *Kresta II* is its big Top Sail surveillance radar, designed to spot enemy ships and planes. One back-to-back search radar unit tracks targets for *Kresta II's* principal weapons: eight surface-to-surface missiles housed in tubes on either side of the ship's bridge. The missiles reportedly have a range of 150 miles and can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. On a landing platform aft, the *Kresta II* can accommodate two helicopters, which are used for submarine detection and act as target spotters for missiles.

The Sailor's Life

THE life of the average Soviet sailor—at least by comparison with that of his counterpart in the U.S. Navy—is austere, uncomfortable, constrained and boring. Some U.S. experts feel that if American sailors had to live under the same conditions, they would all mutiny.

Despite the sleek, functional modernity of their lines, Soviet ships are not designed for living. Armaments and electronic equipment take up all available space, and 20 Russians must hang their hammocks in quarters that would house ten U.S. sailors. Few Russian ships have air conditioning. Thus vessels on duty in tropical waters are frequently rotated not so much for maintenance as to provide relief for "roasted crews." At the bitterly cold bases of the Northern and Pacific fleets in Murmansk, Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Peninsula, crews spend uncomfortable winters ashore in badly heated, uninsulated barracks.

Nonetheless, Soviet sailors are among the elite of Russia's armed services, ranking in prestige with the men of the missile forces. Although there are periodic shortages of staple foods in Russia, sailors have a plentiful but monotonous diet of borsch, meat, potatoes, bread, butter and tea, supplemented by vitamin pills to make up for the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables.

The base pay of a seaman is six rubles per month (about $7). Sailors on duty at northern bases get an additional two rubles per month, and base pay is doubled for submarine crews. A specialist, like a sonar technician, earns about $10 per month, a chief warrant officer about $55, a lieutenant $65 and a captain $135, which is doubled if he commands a ship. There are enormous differences between the life-styles and privileges of the various ranks. Officers above the rank of commander, for instance, are provided with housing near bases for their families; enlisted sailors—mostly three-year conscripts who quit the service for jobs at home when their enforced tours are ended—get neither a housing nor a [illegible] allowance for their families.

RUSSIAN SEAMEN RELAXING ABOARD CRUISER

Unlike most of their countrymen, the sailors get a chance to visit foreign lands on shore leave, but even then their liberty is severely restricted. Sailors travel in groups of six while ashore, under the supervision of an officer; seldom do they have enough money for anything more than the price of a sandwich and a bus trip back to port.

Aboard ship, the sailor is even more subject to discipline and ideological indoctrination than his civilian brothers at home. "Recreation time" is filled with Communist Party lectures, propagandistic books and films. TV shows visible in foreign ports are often banned as "corrupting." Ashore or at sea, the sailors' activities are closely watched by the ship's *zampolit* (political officer), a combination cheerleader, disciplinarian and father confessor. [illegible] captain, with full authority to punish any wayward salt.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 February 1972

Iranian port gains strategic power position

Bandar Abbas, Iran

Big-power naval politics, in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani war and Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, have moved this subtropical port into the spotlight of strategy.

Iran's 15,000-man Navy — already the strongest in the gulf and now building a strike force of destroyers, frigates, and hovercraft — will shortly move its main headquarters here from Khorramshahr, 1,500 miles to the north on the Shatt al-Arab river boundary with Iraq.

Up to now these subordinate naval headquarters have kept watch on the gulf islands and on the area beyond in the Gulf of Oman, adjoining Pakistan.

The impending move of the main Iranian naval headquarters here from Khorramshahr, where it is within rifle shot of Iraqi territory, reflects more than just the perennial and recently sharpened Iraq-Iran tensions.

Clearly a shift

It is clearly a shift in the entire center of gravity of Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's defense effort southward toward the Strait of Hormuz—through which more than half the Western world's oil supplies must pass—and toward the Indian Ocean, where large American and Soviet fleets have been watching one another since December's Indo-Pakistani war.

Observers here believe the next Iranian port to be developed will be the excellent natural harbor of Shah Bahar on the Arabian Sea about a hundred miles from the Pakistan border.

Iranian officers in this booming city of 70,000—where Iran is using its huge oil revenues to build an air and naval base, low-cost housing for the growing labor force, and will soon begin a naval dockyard —are well aware of the new emphasis.

But there seems to be no feeling here of an impending Arab-Iranian clash or of any other emergency in the Persian Gulf area.

"We are not particularly worried just now about an enemy getting control of Oman," said one officer.

Islands occupied

One reason for Iranian self-confidence is recent Iranian possession of the islands of Abu Musa and Big and Little Tunb, west of here. Iranian marines occupied Abu Musa and Big Tunb despite a wave of Arab protest and Iraqi diplomatic action.

"This," explained one senior Iranian official, "changes the whole navigation picture in the gulf. Formerly, our 12-mile territorial waters extended outward from our coastline and our inner gulf islands, such as Lavanema, Farur, and Hindarabi.

"Now, the channel between Qeshm Island and the outer islands, Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, has become indisputably Iranian territorial waters.

"Of course, the right of innocent passage by all ships through these waters is recognized. But this does not include warships, for which there have to be special clearances and arrangements."

Statements studied

The Shah's government has been carefully studying U.S. and Bahraini statements about U.S. naval rights in Bahrain. In an exchange of letters, the Sheikh of Bahrain agreed with Washington to continue port facilities extended to U.S. naval units during the last 25 years, while Bahrain was under British protection. Bahrain denies that it granted the U.S. any new base rights since it became independent last year.

U.S. officials repeatedly have been assuring Iran and Arab governments that Washington has no wish to take over Britain's former senior naval and political role here.

These assurances were given formally by the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Roger Davies, during a gulf tour in December, shortly after Iran's occupation of the three outer islands.

Settlement urged

Diplomatic sources say he urged a discreet diplomatic settlement of the disputed three outer islands. U.S. overtures were made to Iran and, through Saudi Arabia, to the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which claims the Tunb islands.

Washington also reportedly proposed its good offices in settling an old dispute over the Buraimi oasis area, which is partitioned between Oman and Abu Dhabi, but also claimed by Saudi Arabia.

Sultan Qabbus of Oman visited King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in late December. They announced agreement in principle on Buraimi. But the United States is reportedly replacing the British in representing Abu Dhabi in detailed talks to follow, to the annoyance of Saudi Arabia.

The senior U.S. diplomatic mission in the gulf area is the Embassy in Kuwait. A new Embassy in Bahrain is headed by U.S. chargé d'affaires John Tatch. The U.S. Embassy to the new six-state Federation of Arab Emirates will be in its capital, Abu Dhabi, and a consulate general is soon to be opened in Muscat, the capital city of Oman.

NUSANTARA, Djakarta
28 January 1972

ARAB LANDS SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIET UNION

By A.H. Shahab

"Egypt will not go communist and we will strangle any effort to bring the communist party to life." This was what an Egyptian diplomat told me in Djakarta. This statement by the diplomat is indicative of Egypt's annoyance, for Egypt feels that its lack of success in winning the war against Israel is due to the hesitant attitude of the Kremlin.

The general attitude in the Arab world toward the role played by the Soviet Union was quite evident following the India-Pakistan war, for nearly all of the Arab press criticized the "policy of imperialistic intrigue" of Moscow.

"Russia is an aggressor and opposes Islam" -- this was the title of articles and editorials in the dailies An-Nadwah, Al-Madinah, and Al-Bilad, which are published in Saudi Arabia.

Setback

Soviet diplomacy really experienced a setback following the abortive coup d'etat in the Sudan (1971) and the large-scale arrests of communist leaders in Syria by General Hafes Asad at the end of 1971. The failure of the communists in the Sudan was followed by the suppression of communist elements not only in the Sudan but also in Libya, North Yemen, Morocco, and in Egypt -- where there was also an attempted pro-Moscow coup d'etat under Ali Sabry.

The most diligent anti-communist is Prime Minister Muammar Qaddafi, who has prohibited the circulation of a communist book defaming Islam which was written by Klimovich. Last year Qaddafi convened the Conference of Islamic Scholars. Here he said, "Our religion, Islam, is far more progressive than communism. Islam was teaching the fulfillment of life and the happiness of man long before Marx. We do not need communism, or another party which is obedient to a foreign power."

Faisal's Victory

When between 1960 and 1967 the Kremlin wind blew across the barren stretches of the Arab Sahara and heated the minarets of the mosque, Faisal constantly declared that danger lay in the Soviet role in the Arab world. Official voices in Saudi Arabia declared, "Russia will not bring victory to the Arabs but to communism in the Arab world."

Now, one by one, the Arab states are encountering disappointment in their relations with the communist bloc. Some, like Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria, have had bitter experiences in the industrial sector because of accepting machinery of poor quality. Some have been subjected to political pressure: Egypt was pressed to free or at least change the sentences of the Ali Sabri-Fawzy conspirators who plotted to overthrow Sadat.

The rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has resulted in warm relations between the two countries and now Egypt is more active in Islamic conferences than in leftist conferences. Even more, the Egyptian press and publications are printing more religious articles and more films with a religious tenor are being produced.

Anti-Islam Campaign

Some two or three months ago the dailies in Saudi Arabia exposed Soviet attacks on Islam, covering both the Moscow broadcasts which defame Islam and also the condition of the Moslem population behind the Iron Curtain.

For some time most of the press in Saudi Arabia has paid little attention to the condition of the Moslem population behind the Iron Curtain, but now articles on this subject appear regularly. Soviet dailies, like the Turkmenskaya Iskra, which attacks Islamic principles, are opposed. The dailies An-Nadwah and Al-Madinah have revealed how Moslems are pressured and forced to leave the Islamic religion.

The young prime minister of Libya certainly was angry when Soviet books defaming Islam were circulated in his country. This colonel said, "We don't need communism."

Trapped

The Soviet naval forces and fleet are making the Mediterranean into their own lake, and they are not having much difficulty in doing it. One of the recipes they use is: Maintain tension and don't reach a settlement in the Middle East. The existence of a state of permanent tension has lured several Arab countries into obtaining aid, but the fact is that this aid is for (the Soviets) themselves. The Arab countries are beginning to realize this even though it is rather difficult to change overnight, although Algeria and Libya did succeed early on in freeing themselves from the Soviet trap and dared to say, "Soviets, leave the Mediterranean."

Anwar El Sadat, a pragmatist, gradually is loosening his ties with the Kremlin and has begun purging his apparatus of pro-Moscow men even though he still needs weapons from the Kremlin because, until now, it is his only source of supply.

Arab Tjurigai Sovjet Uni

Oleh : A.H. SHAHAB.

"Mesir tak akan djadi komunis dan apabila ada usaha menghidupkan partai komunis akan kita tjekik". demikian berkata seorang diplomat Mesir pada saja di Djakarta. Utjapan diplomat itu menggambarkan kedjenkelan Mesir jg selama ini merasa dirinja tak berhasil memenangkan perang terhadap Israel, disebakkan sikap ragu2 Kremlin.

Sikap umum didunia Arab terhadap peranan Uni Sovjet terasa sekali setelah perang India-Pakistan, dimana hampir semua pers Arab mengkritik "politik intri kimperialistis" Moskow.

"Rusia agressor dan anti Islam" demikian djudul berita2 dan tadjuk rentjana harian An-Nadwah, Al-Madinah dan Al-Bilad jang terbit di Saudi Arabia.

Setback.

Diplomasi Soviet benar2 mengalami Setback, setelah usaha kudeta gagal di Sudan (1971) dan penangkapan besar2an terhadap pentolan komunis di Syria oleh Djenderal Hafes Asad diachir tahun 1971. Kegagalan kaum komunis di Sudan diikuti dengan penindasan anasir komunis bukan hanja di Sudan tetapi djuga di Libya Jaman Utara, Marokko dan Mesir, jang djuga mengalami pertjobaan kudeta pro-Moskow dibawah Ali Sabry.

Jang paling getol anti-komunis adalah PM Muammar Qaddafi, jang melarang beredarnja buku komunis karangan klimovich jang menghina Islam. Pada tahun jang lalu Qaddafi menjelenggarakan Muktamar [illegible] berkata : "Agama kita, Islam, djauh lebih progressif daripada komunisme. Islam mengadjarkan kesempurnaan hidup, kebahagian ummat djauh sebelum Marx. Kita tak butuh komunisme, atau partai lain jang taat pada kekuatan asing.

Kemenangan Faisal.

Ketika antara 1960-1967, Angin Kremlin menghembusi padang sahara Arab jang gersang dan membuat menara2 Mesdjid mendjadi gerah, Faisal terus tak henti2nja menjatakan bahwa peranan Sovjet didunia Arab adalah berbahaja. Suara2 resmi Saudi Arabia menjatakan bahwa : "Jang akan dimenangkan Rusia bukanlah Arab, melainkan komunisme didunia Arab".

Kini satu demi satu negeri Arab mengalami pengalaman pahit dari hubungannja dgn [illegible]. Ada jang berkedjelek kwalitasnja seperti Irak, Mesir dan Aldjazair. Ada jang menerima tekanan2 politik seperti Mesir, jang ditekan agar membebaskan atau paling tidak merubah hukuman terhadap komplotan jang akan menggulingkan Sadat dibawah komplotan Ali Sabri-Fawzy.

Rapprochemen Mesir-Saudi, membut hubungan kedua negara ini mesra dan Mesir kini lebih giat dalam muktamar2 Islam darinada muktamar2 jg berbau kiri. Malahan pers dan penerbitan2 Mesir kini banjak dihiasi artikel agama serta produksi filmnja penuh selera keagamaan.

Kampanje anti-Islam.

Kira2 dua tiga bulan bela kangan ini harian2 Saudi Arabia giat mengungkapkan kedjahatan2 Soviet terhadap Islam. Baik berupakan siaran2 Moskow jang menghina Islam

ataupun keadaan ummat Islam jang berada dibelakang tirai besi.

Sedjak lama, umumnja pers Saudi Arabia tak begitu mengiraukan keadaan ummat Islam dibelakang tiradi besi, namun kini setjara periodik keadaan ummat Islam mendjadi topic. Harian2 Sovjet seperti "Turkmenskaya Iskra" jang menjerang akidah2 Islam, dilawan. Harian An-Nadwah dan Al-Madinah mengungkapkan bagaimana keadaan Muslimin ditekan dan dipaksakan untuk meninggalkan agama Islam.

Keruan sadja PM Libya jang muda marah2 ketika dinegerinja disebarkan buku2 Sovjet jang menghina Islam dan berkatalah kolonel itu: "Kita tak butuh komunisme".

Terdjebak.

Kekuatan laut Sovjet dan armadanja mendjadikan lautan Tengah sebagai danaunja, dgn tak banjak usaha atau bersusah pajah. Satu resep dipakainja adalah: "Pelihara ketegangan tanpa penjelesaian di Timur Tengah". Dengan adanja ketegangan permanen, maka didjiratnja beberapa negeri Arab untuk mendapatkan bantuan, tetapi njatanja bantuan itu hanjalah buat dirinja sendiri. Dan negara2 Arab mulai menjadari ini, walaupun agaknja sukar untuk merubah sekaligus, ketjuali misalnja Aldjazair dan Libya jang sudah pagi2 berhasil melepaskan diri dari diebakan Sovjet dan berani berkata: "Sovjet tinggalkanlah Lautan Tengah".

Anwar El Sadat jang merupakan orang pragmatis, setjara bertahap mengendorkan ikatan2 dengan Kremlin, dimuali dengan pembersihan aparatur dari orang2 pro Moskow, namun dia masih butuh sendjata dari Kremlin karena hingga kini masih merupakan satu2nja sumber.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 January 1972

RUSSIANS PROLONG SYRIAN PORT CALL

Warships at Latakia Upset Shipping and Arab Trade

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jan. 16—A visit by units of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean to the Syrian port of Latakia has played havoc with Arab trade and affected international shipping in this area.

Since late last month, two Soviet destroyers, two cruisers, a submarine and a supply ship have been taking up much of the space in the small Latakia Harbor, forcing Syrian authorities to turn away some private shipping and to divert other vessels to neighboring Lebanon, to the already congested port of Beirut.

Foreign owners of the affected ships have complained that the situation has upset their worldwide schedules and caused costly delays. According to shipping sources, the situation for the companies has been rendered worse by the fact that the Syrian authorities have said, in reply to inquiries, that they do not know how long the Soviet naval craft intended to remain in Latakia.

Previous Visits Were Shorter

In the past, such visits did not last more than five days. Some diplomatic sources have reported that the Soviet units on the current port call are either undergoing repairs or buying supplies from Syria for the rest of the winter.

Syria, like Egypt, has been providing Soviet warships in the Mediterranean with facilities at her ports in part payment for Soviet assistance, including weapons.

The Beirut port authorities have accepted the extra business that has come their way, but ships diverted here from Latakia have had to dock outside the pier area and wait their turn. Workers and officials at the port have been put on double shifts to accommodate the added work load.

Most of these ships are bringing commodities from Europe or the United States for Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries. Diversion of the unloading from Syria to Lebanon means extra transit costs and delays for the Arab importers.

Meanwhile, press reports today told of the arrival here of 40 Chinese Communist businessmen to promote commodities from their country in Lebanese and Arab markets.

According to the reports, the Chinese will form a commercial community in advance of the establishment of an embassy representing the Peking Government here. The embassy is expected to be functioning either at the end of this month or early next month. An agreement in November establishing diplomatic relations between Lebanon and China set three months as a deadline for setting up embassies.



The New York Times/Jan. 17, 1972

Visit to Latakia (1) by Soviet ships has diverted port traffic to Beirut (2).

THE ECONOMIST
15 January 1972

A vacuum that's filling up fast

The Americans may have rescued Mr Heath from his problem about selling arms to South Africa. The American aircraft-carrier *Enterprise* and its seven attendant ships, which sailed into the Indian Ocean during the India-Pakistan war, have now rejoined the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific this week.

But on January 7th it was announced that the *Enterprise* had gained "operating experience" in the Indian Ocean and that there would be frequent patrols of the same sort in the future. The Seventh Fleet already had a thin slice of the eastern part of the Indian Ocean as part of its area of

domain. But last summer, it is said it was decided to extend its responsibilities from the start of 1972 up to a line drawn due south from the western border of Pakistan.

For a long time the United States has had three warships operating out [illegible] Bahrain in the Gulf, and now that Bahrain is inde-

pendent the Americans have negotiated a new agreement to allow them to stay on. The Americans have already leased from Britain the tiny atoll of Diego Garcia, plumb in the middle of this vast ocean, and are busy building a communications centre and airstrip which are due to be finished late next year. The difference from now on is that the Seventh Fleet will presumably send some of its ships into the Indian Ocean whenever it feels that the gap between the size of the Russian fleet there and that of the western navies is getting dangerous. According to American intelligence sources, the Russians now have some 15 combat and support ships in the area, and an unknown number of submarines, against the five or six British frigates which are based in Singapore along with one Australian and one New Zealand frigate and an Australian submarine.

Australia is building a fairly substantial base at Cockburn Sound on its west coast, which will be completed by 1975. There are also several airfields in western Australia that maritime reconnaissance planes can operate from. So eventually Australia will be able to make a sizeable contribution to the defence of the area even if Mr Gough Whitlam's Labor party does win this year's election and fulfil its promise to withdraw the Australian share of the force in Singapore. But in the shorter run it is the new American contribution that will cancel out the Russians' advantage.

With the Seventh Fleet coming in to reinforce the British squadron at Singapore, the Russians will no longer have local naval superiority unless they greatly expand their presence in the Indian Ocean. This makes it less necessary for the British to rely on the co-operation of the tiny and increasingly ancient South African navy. Anyway, in December South Africa placed orders for the hulls of six corvettes to be built in Portugal, that will keep the South African navy going for some years. But the unpalatable fact is that the weakness of the British—and the other Europeans—has made it necessary for the United States to redress the balance of power in the Indian Ocean at a time when most Americans want to limit their commitments abroad, not expand them.

WASHINGTON POST
2 February 1972

U.S. Seeking Indian Ocean Naval Curbs

By William Greider

The Nixon administration has approached the Soviet Union about arranging a mutual limit on naval armaments in the Indian Ocean, a top State Department official disclosed yesterday.

Without providing any details, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. government has no intention of competing over military installations on the South Asian subcontinent, comparable to what has occurred in the Mediterranean.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the committee, asked Johnson: "Has your department ever approached the Russians concerning mutual restraint on the naval race in the Indian Ocean?"

"We have made such an approach," Johnson said. "There have been discussions."

Johnson added that, while the United States will continue to keep its naval vessels passing through the Indian Ocean regularly, "We do not plan a regular presence in the Indian Ocean. . . . We have no intention of engaging in competition or maintaining a regular force."

The question arose out of the Senate committee's fear that the United States is again inching into major new defense commitments via "executive agreements" which are not submitted to the Senate for ratification as treaties.

The hearings yesterday and today focus on two new agreements for U.S. military facilities, one with Portugal to renew an airbase on the Azores and another to establish naval support facilities on the oil-rich island of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. Johnson, in his testimony, insisted that both were properly handled as executive agreements because neither involves any new American defense commitment.

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) warned, however, that both agreements "represent significant foreign policy moves. They both involve the stationing of American military forces abroad. As we have learned in the past, this can lead ultimately to war."

Case is sponsoring a Senate resolution which would call on the President to submit both issues to the Senate as treaties. This represents a new round in the Senate's continuing struggle, so far largely unsuccessful, to regain control over foreign commitments under its constitutional authority to ratify treaties.

Last year, the Foreign Relations Committee challenged a new agreement on U.S. bases in Spain. In recent years, the committee has scrutinized secret executive agreements with Asian nations and their close relationship to the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Johnson argued, in general, that the Azores and Bahrain agreements are essentially continuations of current U.S. practices and fall within

the President's constitutional authority as commander-in-chief to arrange for troop facilities.

Sen. Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.) asked Johnson if this means the President can station troops anywhere in the world, without consulting the Congress, and the diplomat replied: "The powers are very broad. I would not like to be quoted as saying they are unlimited. At the same time, I would not want to say where those limits are."

Fulbright remarked testily, "For practical purposes, that amounts to—he can do anything he likes. You don't want to say that because it won't look good in a headline."

The Bahrain agreement, Johnson said, was necessary because the United States formerly "subleased" docking and supply facilities from the British who are terminating their protective military presence in the sheikdom. Now the United States is continuing the arrangement for a "modest naval presence" directly with the Bahrain government but he stressed "we have no intention of replacing the British in the area. We are not increasing our force."

Sen. Fulbright portrayed the arrangement as the beginning of another costly round of escalation in which, now that the United States has established a base, the Soviets will follow, and then the United States will seek to outdo the Russians. "What do we gain by this constant escalation?" he asked. "I don't think we gain anything in security. All we do is deplete the Treasury."

Johnson was asked what would happen if U.S. personnel stationed in Bahrain were attacked by nationals there and he replied: "If trouble were to break out on Bahrain and our personnel were threatened, the thing to do would be to put them on a ship and sail away."

WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1972

U.S. Squadron Leaves The Indian Ocean Area

A carrier-led naval task force that maintained a strong U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean for nearly a month during the India-Pakistan war steamed out of the area yesterday, the Pentagon announced.

Defense spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said the nine-ship squadron, including the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise, has "returned to normal operating control of the commander, Seventh Fleet."

He said the Enterprise is due to arrive Wednesday at Subic Bay in the Philippines where the crew will be given five days of liberty after spending two months at sea.

Last week the Pentagon indicated that the visit of the Enterprise marked the beginning of regular U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean. This is something that has been urged by U.S. naval leaders ever since the British began pulling out and the Russians sent their first naval squadron into the area more than three years ago.

The departure of the Enterprise came rather suddenly. As of Friday, "they had not been directed to move," Friedheim said. Asked why, he replied, "liberty for the crew."

Friedheim said 15 to 20 Soviet ships remain in the Indian Ocean, including five or six combat vessels. The Soviets normally maintain 10 or 12 ships in the area.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 January 1972

Whose lake?

By Paul Wohl

The Soviet media are accusing the United States of gunboat diplomacy and of trying to turn the Indian Ocean into an American lake.

From recent Russian naval movements, however, it would appear that it is Moscow that regards the Indian Ocean as a Soviet lake.

On Dec. 29, Hsinhua, the official Chinese news agency, reported, "When the American aircarft carrier Enterprise and some other warships of the United States Seventh Fleet appeared in the Bay of Bengal, the Soviets countered by moving cruisers and other warships of their Pacific fleet also into the Bay."

Intelligence gathering

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is not normally in the Indo-China area, so the new units must have come from the China Sea several thousand miles away. Thus it would appear that the Russians must have had advance knowledge and have reacted with surprising speed.

The mobility of the Soviet fleet and its speed of communications may have its explanation in the presence in the Indian Ocean of naval vessels disguised as fishing trawlers.

For several years, the Soviets have been reaping the fish riches of the Indian Ocean. Their vessels genuinely are engaged in fishing, as are their large factory ships in processing the catch. But since every economic activity of the U.S.S.R. is directed by the state, it is only natural that the fishing fleet acts as an auxiliary to naval intelligence operations.

The Soviets also have had, and still have, several oceanic scientific research ships in the Indian Ocean. These, too, probably are used for naval intelligence.

According to the Chinese news agency, the Soviet Union in 1968 purchased from India against delivery of the number of aircraft a right for their naval vessels to use the ports of Madras and Bombay. In exchange for the right to use India's naval bases the Soviets already also gave several

naval ships to India.

Moscow makes no bones about its interest in the Indian Ocean. Last year, the cruisers of the Soviet Pacific fleet carried out a naval exercise there. Earlier, Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said, "Our ships sail in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans . . . wherever it is required by the interest of our country's security."

A political chief of the Soviet Navy, Adm. Vladimir A. Kasatonov added defiantly on Navy Day that "the flag of the Soviet naval forces is today flying in all latitudes, even on waters traditionally considered as preserve of the British and American navies."

Now that Britain no longer controls the most convenient access to the Indian Ocean—through the Suez Canal and by way of Singapore—the Indian Ocean for all practical purposes has become an open sea.

Its coastlands which once were in the Western orbit now are held largely by third-world countries. China, as well as the Soviet Union, has begun to establish strong points along its shores.

The Indian Ocean carries more traffic than the North Atlantic. The defense of its supply lines is thus vital for the West.

Naval visits

For the past six years units of the Soviet Black Sea and Pacific fleets have appeared from time to time in the Indian Ocean visiting almost every country from the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea down to Mombasa and Zanzibar.

Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, serves several routes which either have relay stations or terminate in Indian Ocean ports. During the recent Indo-Pakistani conflict the Soviet Union, according to the Japanese paper Mainichi Shimbun, airlifted large quantities of weapons to India.

According to another Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, "The prevailing Indo-Pakistan situation offered Moscow a golden opportunity to realize its Indian Ocean strategy," which is to use India as a "pawn" to ensure a passage through the Indian Ocean for expansion in Southeast Asia.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 January 1972

If British Go, Maltese Ask, Who'll Help Us?

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

VALLETTA, Malta, Jan. 7—Royal Navy helicopters dangling heavy bundles have been busy over this island in the last few days. Royal Air Force transport planes have been sitting at Luqa Airport and hundreds of families of British military personnel have been packing amid arguments over what to sell off and what to leave behind. On the old battlements of Valletta small knots of Maltese have been standing day after day, staring glumly at the British cruiser Blake lying 200 feet below in the Grand Harbor.

The Talk of Malta

"I just can't believe they're pulling out," an elderly man said. "I hope there'll be an agreement at the last minute. If the British leave we'll have an awful lot of unemployment here. Who'll help us? The Russians? The Arabs?"

Despite the possibility that negotiations might still be reopened, Operation Exit was already under way. "It is not our naem," said eRar Adm. John Templeton-Cotill, commander of British forces in Malta, 3,500 men in all. "It's Mr. Mintoff's."

Mr. Mintoff, the short sulphuric Prime Minister of this island state five times the size of Manhattan has indeed coined his own sarcastic code name for the British withdrawal. On Dec. 31 he set Jan. 15 as the deadline by which the British forces must leave because London had rejected his demand for a $45-million annual rental for military bases.

The last offer by Britain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, after lengthy, pokerline bargaining was for a $35-million annual rent and some supplementary payments. Mr. Mintoff said no and London announced that it would recall its remaining forces—the fleet left in 1969, five years after Malta became fully independent—by March 15.

NATO maintains that it does not really need Malta's facilities and defers to the British. The alliance's Southern Naval Command, formerly here, was transferred to

Now, it seems, the time has come for the British to go. "Fifteen days to get out after we have been here for 170 years," Admiral Templeton-Cotill mused in an officers mess still hung with Christmas decorations. "We are acting out a very sad story."

In Aden, Singapore, Libya and other places from which Britain has recently withdrawn her military presence, he explained, there had been hardly any contact with the local population. But Malta was different—"here we have deep roots."

A real-estate agent said: 'Can you imagine what it means for a tiny country with 320,000 population when 3,500 decently paid men who have been living with their families—more than 10,000 people altogether—leave suddenly? Want to buy a $20,000 home overlooking the sea at half that price?"

The spending power of the British forces and their dependents is placed at nearly $40-million annually. The possible loss is just one of the many problems faced by Mr. Mintoff, a Socialist.

Right after his Labor party won a one-seat majority in Parliament in the election last June and he was back in power for the first time in 13 years, he had to ration butter and milk. Now the new Miami-style hotels with their heated swimming pools just west of here on St. Julian's Bay are nearly empty although there is plenty of sunshine.

30,000 British Residents

On the other hand there are still 30,000 British civilians living permanently in the tax haven on these windswept islands—Malta, Gozo and Comino—which lack any rivers and mountains, and have only a few trees but do have 300 Roman Catholic Churches.

The 1600 policemen look more genuinely British than London bobbies these days. Restaurants still serve the joint with two vegs, both limp. Tea is excellent and coffee abominable.

The Maltese still queue up for their buses with a discipline totally unknown in nearby Italy. However, the "Cinderella" pantomime, normally a standby at this time of year, has canceled this week because of events.

A taxi driver growls: "I used to make $25 a day, but most of this island's 200 taxis will be idle now. Three of my girls married British boys and the fourth an American from Cincinnati, so you can imagine how I feel."

Frank Brizzi, a bartender at a British club, said: "My wife has been worrying for months—will I keep my job or lose it?" Joe Robbins, a Royal Air Force ground crewman, said: "It's kind of hard on the wife—I married a Maltese girl, you know. She has been to England only once for a week and we don't know where we are going to live."

The British Government prepared this week to fly out more than 5,000 women and children by Jan. 15. The five schools for the 1,800 British children were closed last week.

The British informed Malta that they would withdraw the military forces "with all reasonable speed" but did not feel bound by Mr. Mintoff's deadline. Britain contends that her $12-million payment in September covered use of the bases until March.

"If the British didn't pull out now, they would have to pull out in three or four years," a trade-union official who backs Mr. Mintoff said. "It's inevitable."

"For years," he continued, "we have been told that the strategic value of our island



The New York Times/Jan. 8, 1972

is gone in the era of nuclear warfare. So Mr. Mintoff asks for more money to develop new nonmilitary industries. If Britain and NATO don't want to shell out a few lousy millions, we'll have to turn elsewhere."

He conceded that if the 5,000 Maltese civilians employed by the military lost their jobs, the unemployment figure would rise to 11,000, a whopping 11 per cent of the labor force.

"Mr. Mintoff has assured us that no worker will suffer any hardship," the union man said. "I hope he knows what he's doing. He clearly needs a lot of cash now, and I'm confident he has a firm pledge from the Libyans."

Ready Cash From Libya

Libya, a major oil producer, has plenty of ready cash and the head of the military regime, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has come to Mr. Mintoff's aid with loans in recent months. When the two men met again in Tripoli last week, Colonel Qaddafi reportedly promised more money to tide Malta over the crisis that British withdrawal will cause.

Over the weekend two dozen or so men in civilian clothes with large crates arrived in a Libyan military aircraft and were whisked to a compound of the 500-man Maltese Army. The official explanation is that the newcomers are Libyan technicians who will take over flight control at Luqa Airport, but many Maltese are convinced they are Egyptians —or Russians.

An Italian who knows much about Malta observed: "People here don't care for us although they avidly watch Italian television— Sicily is less than 60 miles away. We mustn't allow Malta to become our Cuba. Valletta still has one of the finest deep-water ports in all the Mediterranean, and if it is of no use to the Western alliance, can we permit the Soviet Navy to install itself here just half-way between Suez and Gibraltar?"

Backers of Mr. Mintoff insist that he does not want the Russians in Grand Harbor and that Colonel Qaddafi doesn't either. However, a Soviet economic mission was here over Christmas and had talks with the Prime Minister on construction and repair of ships, industrial cooperation and tourism. Malta has also concluded trade agreements with Poland, Hungary, Rumania and North Korea.

The island saw Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs, Normans, Germans, Spaniards, the multinational Knights of Malta and Frenchmen as its masters before the British came. A young left-wing intellectual, recalling the past and noting the possibilities, said: "I hope we are left alone and don't see any new faces around here when the British go."

WASHINGTON POST
8 January 1972

CPYRGHT CPYRGHT

Huge New Soviet Ship Is Under Construction

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Construction is under way on the largest surface ship ever built in the Soviet Union.

It is still too early to tell what type of vessel is being built, but the prospects outlined in recent intelligence reports — reflecting the latest U.S. reconnaissance satellite photos — are said to focus on either an oil super-tanker or a much more startling development: the first Soviet aircraft carrier.

The Russians have made no secret of the fact that they intend to build their first giant oil tanker. But a Soviet news agency dispatch last February indicated that the ship would be built at Baltic Sea shipyards near Leningrad.

The new ship construction spotted recently by the U.S. satellites is at Black Sea shipyards.

While U.S. officials refuse to provide any more details, it is known that the largest shipyards in the Soviet Union are at Nikolaev on the Black Sea. That is where the only two helicopter carriers in the Soviet fleet—the Moskva and the Leningrad—were built.

The Soviets have said that they intend to build a fleet of the large new tankers, and there is the possibility that the work at the Black Sea yards is the beginnings of a second such tanker.

However, there is enough uncertainty about this to lead some members of the intelligence community to wonder if the Russians may have made a decision to build a true aircraft carrier, big enough to carry fighter and attack planes, not just helicopters.

While the carrier possibility is said to be advanced, not surprisingly, by Navy analysts, civilian intelligence specialists are not discounting it at this point.

The Russians do not have any planes that are designed for carrier use in the style of the U.S. Naval air arm that is with folding wings, tail hooks and specially designed fuselages to take the jolt of carrier landings.

But some intelligence sources speculate that if the Russians have overcome their disdain of the carrier's military usefulness, they may well be planning to use vertical and short take-off jets (V/STOL), rather than the type of U.S. planes which require either rolling down the deck or catapult shots.

The Soviets have built at least two experimental V/STOL versions of Sukhoi and Yak fighter-attack planes.

The only operational plane of that type is the British-built Harrier jet, which the U.S. Marines are buying and intend to use from aircraft carriers and amphibious ships outfitted with special platforms.

Though the carrier has been the backbone of the U.S. fleet for decades, and the U.S. still maintains 16 of the floating airbases, the Russians have always downgraded their effectiveness.

Those holding the theory that the Russians may have changed their mind, claim there is also some evidence of a "more positive tone" about carriers reflected in recent Soviet internal military publications and an alleged Soviet Navy concession that these ships may be "a valuable political tool."

If these reputed hints of a Soviet shift in position are true, they would tie in neatly with the U.S. Navy's massive [illegible] in large measure by a strong bloc in

Congress—to greatly expand and modernize the U.S. fleet in reaction to the Soviet naval modernizations of recent years.

It is estimated that it will be several months, or perhaps a year, before construction is far enough along to identify the type of vessel being built.

THE ECONOMIST
8 January 1972

The unending war

The British of all people should know what sea power means: it gave them their century of predominance in the world, and it saved them from defeat by Napoleon and by Hitler. And yet it seems that even the British are in danger of forgetting. The argument about Malta this January, like the argument last January about selling naval arms to South Africa, has shown how difficult it is for public opinion to come to grips with the idea of sea power: what it is, what it can do, why it still matters in the last third of the twentieth century.

The real reason for not giving Mr Mintoff the amount of money he wants for the British base on Malta (see page 28) is that Malta is no longer particularly important for the control of the Mediterranean. It is not that it has stopped mattering whose navy is the strongest in those waters. Sea power does still matter, in the Mediterranean and in every other sea that is not either for all practical purposes a private lake or too frozen to be worth sailing through. The curious thing is that people who understand what an armoured division can do, or an intercontinental missile, have come to find it hard to grasp the meaning of command of the sea.

How sea power still gets used

Of course, sea power alone can never again do for any country what it once did for Britain. It is too easy for ships to be sunk by aircraft, unless they have aircraft of their own to protect them. It is too easy for almost every movement of almost every warship to be kept under inspection, by radar and radio, like a snail in a torch beam. It will never again be possible to say of any navy what Mahan said of the British navy's frustration of Napoleon:

> Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.

The limitations that sea power has to work under in the twentieth century are obvious enough: it is the hope of regaining invisibility, and safety, that is making the navies go under water to do more and more of their job in submarines. But even the ships that have to crawl across the surface are still much more useful things than many people realise. It is worth remembering what they can do, an[illegible]d: out the warship.

After all, there is no need to look any further back than the past month to find examples of the use of naval power. The most basic way of using it is simply to put it on display in order to persuade a foreign government to do something you want it to do, or not to do what you don't want it to do. The Americans sent the aircraft-carrier *Enterprise* into the Indian Ocean last month partly to divert the attention of the Indian navy from the Pakistani one, and partly to discourage the Indian government from attacking West Pakistan after it had won the war in Bengal. The Indians say that they never intended to do anything of the sort, although their defence minister, Mr Jagjivan Ram, has been saying things that cast some doubt on that; but if they were thinking of it the *Enterprise* was one good reason for abandoning the idea. It is easier to use a detachment of warships for dropping this sort of hint than to put your air force into the sky or to send your army clumping up and down. The sea is open to everybody, and you can always say afterwards that you sent your ships that way just to give their crews a change of air. It is a technique every aspiring naval power has used in its time, from Commodore Perry's arrival in Tokyo bay in 1854, and the *Panther's* at Agadir in 1911, to the first visit by a Soviet squadron to the Gulf in 1968.

If the mere demonstration of strength turns out not to be enough, you can then move to the next step up the ladder, which is to stop the other man's ships. That is what President Kennedy did in the Cuba crisis in 1962, which was the cleanest-cut success of American foreign policy in the past quarter of a century, and he was able to do it because he had local naval superiority; if the Russians could have sent a naval escort with the ships that were carrying missiles to Cuba it would have been far more dangerous to give the order to intercept them. It is what the Indians did to the Pakistanis in the Bay of Bengal last month, and what the British have been doing off Beira since 1966, and what Nasser tried to do to the Israelis in the Straits of Tiran in 1967. If that is not enough, the next move is to use your command of the sea to put troops ashore. The Americans did that in Lebanon in 1958 and in the Dominican Republic in [illegible] African countries in 1964. Every time it was enough to settle the argument: the government that could move its soldiers across the

sea without interference, with a bit of help from air power, achieved almost everything it had set out to achieve.

It can do it so quietly

Those are all examples of the use of sea power in the past few years, at a time when many people in the west were being encouraged to believe that sea power was obsolescent. It is worth noting that in most of them the ships involved never had to fire a shot. Of course, there are more brutal ways for a navy to make its presence felt. The British navy used its guns against the Indonesians off Borneo in 1966. The American aircraft-carriers off Indochina provide something like half the bombers that are keeping up the American part of the Vietnam war. It might even be argued that the most brutal means of enforcement of all is passing into the hands of the navies, because the nuclear powers are increasingly coming to look on missile-carrying submarines as the best way of keeping the nuclear deterrent safe from enemy attack. But the point is that sea power can often achieve its purposes with remarkably little violence. The trouble with armies and air forces is that they almost always have to use their weapons in order to establish that they are stronger than their adversaries; there are not many countries that will tell their soldiers, as Czechoslovakia did in 1968, not even to try to put up a resistance. In the wide open sea, once a naval squadron has shown that it is the strongest force around the place, it has a tolerably good chance of being able to go about its work unchallenged.

The other point that needs to be made is about the relationship between sea power and air power. Certainly, in a straight fight between aircraft and ships, the aircraft will generally win. But the only places where a straight fight is likely to happen are those parts of the world where the aircraft have bases to operate from, and where they cannot be prevented from getting at the ships by the other side's air power. Nowadays the two kinds of power work in tandem, and indeed where local naval superiority is established its instrument is often an aircraft carrying bombs or a helicopter carrying troops.

In the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean, both the Soviet fleet and those of the western countries have to spend most of their time with unfriendly eyes watching them from above their heads. But there are other parts of the world's seas—the south-western Pacific, and large stretches of the Indian Ocean—which are still outside the range of the land-based aircraft of the major powers. It is here that aircraft-carriers may still have a few years of useful life left in them, as providers of a local monopoly of air power. It is here too that even a fairly small naval force can still hope to establish a local superiority of power—the command of that bit of the sea—and use it to do all the things, from showing the flag to putting the marines ashore, that are the prerogatives of naval supremacy. And even in the other parts of the world, which do lie within range of the great powers' airfields, it is worth bearing in mind that aircraft work under one major handicap. The advantage of ships is that they do part of their job simply by being where they are, and by reminding people of the power that lies behind them. The snag about planes is that the only way they have of cancelling out the ships' advantage is by actually attacking them. That is a major act of war, and a government is not going to order its aircraft into action against somebody else's fleet unless it is prepared for a major confrontation.

Sea power does still count. It is no longer the final arbiter of relations between the powers, even the powers that need the sea most for the purposes of trade; the invention of the aircraft has turned that page of history. But it still matters too much for any major country willingly to leave the command of any important piece of ocean in the hands of a potential adversary. This is the unending war. It is why the Russians in the past 10 years have put so much of the money they can ill afford into an attempt to match the naval strength of the United States. It is why the rival fleets in the various oceans still shadow each other, and the planes keep watch on the surface ships, and the hunter-killer submarines try to hang on to the heels of the missile-carrying submarines in the terrifying game of underwater tag that goes on beneath the surface. Above all, it is why neither side wants the other to establish a clear superiority in naval power in any of the world's major oceans.

Can Europe even look after its own?

The curious thing is that a western Europe which now lays claim to a separate identity of its own should be willing to remain so dependent on the United States on and over the seas around Europe. It is the Americans, as much as the Europeans, who guarantee the shipping routes across the north Atlantic. The Europeans rely upon the American Sixth Fleet to hold the balance against the Russians in the Mediterranean even more than they rely on the American troops in central Europe to keep things even there. If the Sixth Fleet went away the political effect on southern Europe and north Africa—not to mention the Middle East—would be stunning. The Pacific, of course, is left almost entirely to the Americans. And the one sea where the Americans do not yet have a permanent presence, the Indian Ocean, has seen the Russians establish a local superiority within the past four years over the one Nato country—Britain—that does keep a regular force there. If Mr Heath and M. Pompidou and Herr Brandt mean what they say, when they talk about taking some of the burden off the Americans' backs, they will have to include sea power, especially the submarine sort, on their list of things they have to tackle. There is something not quite serious about a Europe that talks of unity but does not take the main responsibility for the sea and air around itself.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
4 January 1972

Soviet air base near Aswan dam

LONDON, Jan. 3 (UPI) — The Soviet Union is building an important air base near the Aswan dam in Egypt, and its completion is expected by the middle of this year, diplomatic sources said today.

The base has been under construction for some time under strict secrecy, sources said.

Diplomatic sources said Soviet-operated and piloted planes to be based on this new air base are primarily intended for protection of the Soviet-built Aswan dam.

Egypt and Russia are worried lest the Aswan dam be a prime target for Israeli attack in the event of a new war.

Attack on the Aswan dam, experts warned, could result in disaster on a big scale, drowning hundreds of thousands or even more were the waters held back by the dam released.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
5 January 1972

POLITICAL AIMS OF SOVIET AID

By STEPHEN CONSTANT
Communist Affairs Staff

RUSSIA'S export of major weapons to underdeveloped countries has shown a drastic rise over the past decade. Total value of Russian weapons exported over the past 20 years is estimated to be over £2,101 million.

The aim is political rather than commercial. Major recipients of Russian weaponry in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, the Far East and Latin America (Cuba), have all been countries whose military postures were seen as bringing benefits to Moscow's global anti-Western aims.

A direct benefit to Moscow of arms shipments to sensitive areas is that they are accompanied by Russian technicians. These remain to train local forces in the use of the weapons and to indoctrinate them. Cuba and Egypt are glaring examples, with 10,000 Russian technicians reported in the latter country.

Long-range aims

A survey of Russia's arms-supplying policy shows that the Moscow leaders are prepared to forgo immediate benefits to establish long-range strategic footholds.

Cuba can thus be seen as something of an "old-age pensioner" of Russia's. The island has received £115 million in weapons since 1959. It is estimated to cost Moscow an average £135 million a year to underpin its "skid-row" economy.

The size of Russian spending abroad by means of weapons and other aid-with-strings shows clearly that Russia would find Malta a cheap proposition should it consider the Mediterranean island as a useful foothold for its Mediterranean and Middle East ambitions.

Malta's economic and military requirements would represent a minute fraction of Russia's total spending on the subversion of the Free World.

Among the earliest and loudest warnings about Russia's designs on Malta were those by Communist Albania, China's tiny ally by the Adriatic.

The official Albanian news agency has declared that the British Government's announcement about preparations to withdraw forces from Malta had caused the "Soviet revisionist clique" to intensify its efforts to gain influence on the island.

Malta, said Albania, was a "very good strategic position for the Soviet Navy, which is sabre-rattling in the Mediterranean alongside the American Fleet." The recent trade agreement between Russia and Malta "will ensure Soviet warships a port or, to put it better, a base in the Mediterranean."

NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 1971

Malta, Moscow and the West

By C. L. SULZBERGER

PARIS—A new allied crisis over Malta, at any rate, another flare-up of the old one, can be regarded as probable. The strategically located island republic has not figured much in recent news—but only because it has been negotiating with Britain and NATO. These negotiations appear to have failed.

Dom Mintoff, the Socialist Prime Minister elected this year, is a fiery and emotional man who has the praiseworthy idea of seeking to raise Maltese living standards and alter Malta's economy to such a degree that by 1977 the island will no longer need to rely on its naval base for support and jobs.

The trouble is that Britain, former colonial ruler and still Malta's source of military sustenance, sees no point in paying heavily to finance this goal simply in order to prepare its own permanent expulsion from Maltese facilities. And Britain's allies—particularly interested in the Mediterranean—share this view.

Mintoff, after early hints that he might turn to Moscow if he could not come to terms with the West, originally proposed that Britain and NATO pay thirty million pounds annual rent for continued use of facilities—a staggering increase from the previous fee of slightly over five million pounds.

The British, the North Atlantic allies and the Maltese have been consulting intermittently for months, seeking an acceptable compromise. They haven't succeeded. Mintoff reduced his original asking price to 18 million pounds a year. Britain and NATO came back by upping their original offer to 10 million—half British, half from the alliance.

Since Mintoff spurned this, London suggested he negotiate bilateral aid agreements with other NATO members on an individual basis. The Maltese have had little luck with this idea. The gap between what is being demanded and what is being offered remains apparently unbridgeable.

The British maintain Mintoff is being unrealistic by not taking into account expenditures—separate from and additional to rent payments but which benefit from use of the island's facilities by Britain and its allies.

London estimates such disbursements amount approximately to 13 million pounds a year and provide jobs for seven thousand of Malta's labor force of one hundred thousand. It is notable that unemployed workers in Malta now total roughly seven thousand.

In a sense, therefore, London feels it has a strong bargaining position because if a crunch were to come Mintoff might be faced with double an already high unemployment rate. But the excitable Prime Minister also has trump cards in his hand. While he appears to have once held hopes that Libya might take up the financial burden if Britain were expelled, he now seems to mistrust the reliability of support from that wealthy oil-producing land.

Nor has Libya any navy that could conceivably require the services of Maltese shipyards; but this is by no means the case with the Soviet Union. Both Britain and NATO are acutely conscious of the danger to their western Mediterranean position should the Russians sign a pact gaining access to Malta's facilities.

The island republic is not quintessentially important to allied navies—including the U.S. Sixth Fleet—but it is considered strategically vital that it be denied to Moscow's admirals. Were Malta open to Soviet vessels, the U.S.S.R. would be well on its way to penetration of the western Mediterranean as it has already penetrated the eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, there is a lurking fear in West Europe that, in the latter case, the United States might thin out or pull back its Sixth Fleet rather than risk seeing it bottled up. Such a precaution would have strategic logic and would also be consonant with the present American mood for military retrenchment.

The Maltese problem—although no longer as flamboyant as when Mintoff first took power—represents a matter of urgent seriousness. The Russians have not recently been expanding in the Mediterranean. Indeed, their aircraft have been expelled from Algerian Mers-el-Kebir.

Nevertheless, Soviet strength in the inland sea is extensive and well backed up by a ring of bases to the east. Should Malta open its arms, Moscow is in a position to take immediate advantage of the break. Mintoff knows this and is going to bargain hard when the next round starts—quite possibly preceded by at least another minicrisis.

WASHINGTON STAR
24 November 1971

Soviet Risk in the Mediterranean

NAPLES — Soviet diplomats are running so far behind the Soviet navy in Moscow's penetration of the Mediterranean that the show of force must be counted, in military terms, an extremely high-risk venture.

However, Russian rhetoric is running ahead of the cold facts of Mediterranean life. Boasting in July that the new Soviet fleet "ties the imperialists' hands," Adm. Grashkov said the skill of Soviet shipbuilders is attested by the navy's ability to spend long periods at sea without using overseas bases.

But the Soviets' lack of Mediterranean bases outside Egypt is a deficiency that will leave the shiny new ships dangerously exposed if hostilities develop. Even their peacetime purpose of "showing the flag" is restricted by their lack of access to ports. They can't pour vodka for visiting dignitaries as long as they must anchor at sea.

Greshkov is rated brilliant by American admirals for his success at pulling together political support, hardware, and crews to float, almost overnight, a modern navy. But he badly miscalculated when he decided that the aircraft carrier was an obsolete weapon, and intelligence photographs, which closely scan the Russian shipyards, disclose no evidence of any effort to correct his mistake.

A lack of carriers and bases along the North African coast means that Soviet ships sailing beyond the defense radius of the Egyptian bases have no air cover. They carry the offensive sting of surface-to-surface missiles which can inflict first-strike damage on the NATO fleet. But outnumbered and trapped in a sea with narrow outlets, they would be easy prey for NATO aircraft.

Wisely the top American admirals in the Mediterranean, NATO Comdr. Horacio Rivero and 6th Fleet Comdr. Gerald Miller, are taking a cool, unexcited view of the Soviet presence. There was a time when the navy seemed to magnify its implications. But these admirals candidly balance their concern at sharing the sea with 10 Soviet submarines and a shifting number of capital ships against the power which they can call into action.

Miller even explains the psychology which produces incidents when Soviet ships or helicopters brush close to 6th Fleet units. "There are squareheads in the Russian navy like there are in all navies," he says, "and when they get orders to ascertain the identity of an American ship, they sometimes take foolish risks to be sure they don't make a mistake."

Most incidents of Russian brashness are like the exuberance of a man driving his first sports car. They want to show off their navy, but they are well enough aware of its vulnerability to avoid great risks. In fact, the stubborn presence of a sinkable Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is something of a promise that Moscow intends to behave. It is even a reassurance in regard to the Middle East.

So the real significance of the Mediterranean confrontation lies in the fragile politics along the shore. It is hard for Americans to understand how a ship can affect political attitudes, but this reporter is satisfied, after a swing through most of the fragile countries, that the outlook of peasants in places which have known much aggression is colored by the flags they see flying on ships offshore.

This floating American presence grows more important at a time when this part of the world is unclear on the implications of the Nixon doctrine and the daily press carries exaggerated accounts of the isolationist intentions of the United States. The fleet sails as a refutation of fears that a shift is occurring in the balance of power.

Even at its cost of $2 billion a year, the 6th Fleet is a good investment. And it will be a secure investment as long as the Soviet diplomats find no new bases.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 December 1971

East Mediterranean NATO Fleet Asked

By DREW MIDDLETON
Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, Dec. 8—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird proposed today the formation of a permanent allied naval force operating in the eastern Mediterranean in cooperation with the United States Sixth Fleet.

Mr. Laird also told the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the United States would make available to other members of the alliance weapons systems, especially those related to electronic warfare, that have been tested and proved in South Vietnam.

The emphasis at today's meeting of the Defense Planning Committee was on progress in strengthening the alliance and on programs for build-ups in this decade.

The object of this exercise in what American and British sources call "realism" is apparently to convince the Soviet Union and its allies that there will be no unilateral disarmament by the Atlantic allies and that the East's only hope for force reductions lies in negotiations.

American officials, military as well as civilian, praised the alliance's "new spirit" and reported some results. The Danish Defense Minister, Kjeld Olesen, for example, told Mr. Laird that the new Socialist Government would not carry out a campaign promise to reduce the Danish Army from 24,000 to 7,000 or 8,000 men during 1972.

The connection between a steady increase in Western strength and negotiations with the East on mutual and balanced reductions of forces, which the Atlantic alliance first proposed three years ago, was stressed by United States officials. They said that the Soviet Union was likely to begin talks when it was convinced that the West was determined to maintain its strength.

This determination was shown yesterday by 10 European nations, which pledged to raise their defense expenditure in 1972 by a billion dollars, and today by a series of reports by defense ministers of "significant" additions and improvements in equipment of forces.

U.S. Troop Level Rises

Mr. Laird reported that the United States had increased its troops in Europe by 20,000. This results from the Defense Department's ability to bring units in Europe up to strength as the Vietnam war winds down and its call on draftees decreases.

There are now about 310,000 American servicemen in Europe, including those of the Sixth Fleet.

Ships of six NATO navies, those of Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and the United States, operate in the Mediterranean. But only the American Sixth Fleet operates at will into the eastern Mediterranean, where Soviet naval and air forces are strongest.

The United States proposal calls for a "standing" force comprising Greek, Italian, Turkish, British and United States vessels to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The French Mediterranean fleet cooperates with other allied squadrons in exercises. But national policy forbids military integration of the type proposed by Mr. Laird. France, because of her rejection of military integration in the alliance, is not represented on the Defense Planning Committee.

The alliance has a standing force in the Atlantic, made up of Canadian, Dtuch, Norwegian, British, Portuguese and American vessels. Iits political purpose is to show alliance solidarity by visits to ports. The military aim is to provide joint training in antisubmarine warfare and escort duty.

The United States is pressing West Germany, whose fleet is mainly concerned with the defense of the Baltic Sea, to detach a destroyer for service in the North Sea. The West German Defense Minister, Helmuth Schmidt, apparently was more amenable to this proposal today than in the past.

American officials did not specify the types of weapons the Defense Department is ready to make available to European allies. They are understood to include some of the newest sensor systems, tactical air-control systems and other electronic equipment designed to improve control and command functions in battle.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 November 1971

Frigid Reception for the Soviets

TRIPOLI, Libya—Outside of Egypt and largely because of its experience with the Russians, the revolutionary regimes on the north coast of Africa are supplying no assistance to the Soviet aim of penetrating the Mediterranean.

When Chairman Kosygin visited Algiers in October, he elicited warm avowals of the bonds which link the two socialist governments. But when he asked for a Soviet naval base at Merselkebir, he was, according to sources deemed reliable, politely told no. When he asked for docking rights for Soviet ships, he was again refused. He reportedly succeeded only in persuading his hosts to let a few local Communists out of prison.

Here in Libya the Soviets have so far met a frigid reception. The wife of the new Soviet ambassador relates how she pleaded with her husband to ask Moscow to install central heating and air conditioning in their uncomfortable residence. The Central Committee could not be expected, he replied, to make even that modest investment in the current state of relations with Libya.

The uptight regime of Col. Qaddafi offers no levers for Soviet diplomacy. Bursting with oil revenues, the government has no need for financial aid. Qaddafi did buy some Soviet tanks and military equipment from the Russians, but he would let no Soviet technicians come in to teach his soldiers how to use the hardware. He used Egyptian instructors instead.

Qaddafi has in fact made no secret of his dismay over the extent to which the Egyptians have grown dependent on the Soviet Union. The bristling Soviet presence in Egypt and their success at squeezing a base at Alexandria out of their hosts affront this purist Moslem as ground lost in the Arabs' struggle to get the Europeans off their back. He also scorns the Soviets' lack of religion.

The urgency of the Russian quest for holds on this coast is indicated by their earnest courtship of West-oriented regimes in Tunisia and Morocco. They have exerted their wiles, but they have done no better than to secure occasional access for Soviet ships in Tunis and a fueling anchorage well [illegible] Libya. They have been turned down cold on repeated requests for a naval base at Bizerte.

None of this can be attributed to the brilliance of Washington's diplomacy or love of the United States.

These Arabs, like the rest, count the Nixon policy as solidly pro-Israel. Tunisians feel they have gotten nowhere in pleading with the State Department to give Egypt's President Sadat more encouragement as a counterweight to the Russians. Qaddafi is cool with American officials and tough with the 19 American oil companies that have concessions here.

As with the Algerians, whose hostility has been mellowed by their anxiety to market frozen [illegible] in America, Qaddafi tolerates the American concessionaires only

to the extent that he can squeeze them for revenues to develop his country. But he says frankly to Americans, we need your technology, and more Libyans are studying in the United States now than were there in the days of King Idris.

The black and white view of the world which emerged in the early days of Algerian independence has matured into a pragmatic study of how the colonialists can be useful.

Recently Qaddafi even brought American rainmakers to Libya. But the dusty, shabby streets of Tripoli exude the essential isolationism of the regime's mood. Tourists are treated miserably, and the absence of the Italian community which kept things running is reflected in a discomforting lack of maintenance.

But Qaddafi wants a pure, prohibitionist, unfrivolous Arab state, and he is willing to pay the price for it. Outsiders and the outside way of life were chief targets of the revolutions in Libya and Algeria, and the Russians will find it hard to dent the stability and standoffishness of the regimes they produced.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 October 1971

NATO seeks stronger Mediterranean defense

By JOSEPH R. L. STERNE
Sun Staff Correspondent

Brussels—Defense ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided yesterday to seek improvements in the West's tactical nuclear deterrent against increasing Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean.

They instructed military and technical experts to make studies comparable to those nearing completion for the central and northern land fronts in Europe.

At a meeting of the alliance's nuclear planning group, there was stress on the possible need for tactical nuclear defenses should the Warsaw Pact launch an underwater, surface or air strike in the Mediterranean.

If the study about this southern flank of the alliance should follow the pattern set for projected East-West conflict on land, there would be planning about initial Western responses to an enemy strike plus potential follow-on measures.

It was assumed that the Mediterranean studies could be applied, with modifications, to the Baltic and North Eeas, where the Soviet Union also has stepped up its naval strength considerably.

With the exception of the projected Mediterannean study, the review of the East-West nuclear balance by the seven nations assembled here was basically an updating operation.

According to officials, Melvin R. Laird, U.S. Secretary of Defense, cautioned against any numerical change—up or down—in the estimated 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads that form a key part of NATO defense.

He reportedly stressed to his colleagues that it would be a grave mistake to make a change in the mix of weapons at a time when NATO and the Warsaw Pact are moving toward negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

As he had signaled clearly even before leaving Washington, Mr. Laird warned the European allies that if they really want detente they should meet and improve their commitments to the alliance.

U.S. officials reported that the secretary voiced concern that some nations—not including Britain and Germany—may not be making this total commitment.

Lord Carrington, British defense secretary, reportedly welcomed Mr. Laird's warning and said NATO members must be prepared to make greater contributions to their own defense.

Reduction expected

British authorities were said to be of the view that Europe must begin to face up to the possibility that after the end of President Nixon's present term in office some reduction in the number of U.S. forces in Europe is to be expected.

Helmut Schmidt, the West German defense minister, used the occasion of the Brussels meeting to make a cash offer worth "several hundred million deutsche marks" to improve dilapidated barracks occupied by U.S servicemen in his country.

The Schmidt offer would be part of a new West German-American agreement now under negotiation to help offset the U.S. balance of payments costs of keeping 300,000 servicemen in Europe.

American officials described this move by the Bonn government as very important—probably the largest cash offer that has been formally presented.

The Pentagon, which has long been worried about the run-down condition of barracks in Europe, would welcome improvements as a means of making military service more attractive.

But final agreement on the details of a new offset agreement, it was noted, will be a matter for negotiations being conducted by the State Department.

SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
November 1971

Risks of the Soviet Naval Buildup

The Soviet naval buildup, which actually began in the 1930s and has been taken note of in the West during the last decade, is causing some alarm. In the last twenty years the Soviet navy has developed from an insignificant marine force which was a mere unsuccessful coast guard fleet in World War II, to the world's second strongest maritime power (after the USA) which already has more combat ships and personnel than the leading Western naval power. Even more important is the fact that, as far back as 1968, 521 of the U. S. navy's 894 warships were more than 19 years old, while of the 1,575 Soviet combat ships only two were that aged; of 146 American submarines, 68 were more than 20 years old while all 375 Soviet submarines were built less than 14 previously. Depending on the class of ship, the Soviets are currently building between three and five times as many units as the Americans, while the construction of warships by the other NATO powers serves merely to replace obsolete units. As the Soviet navy grows in size and strength, the number of NATO warships with genuine combat capability, and particularly the still-decisive aircraft carriers, steadily diminishes.

The Soviet navy must also be given credit for the fact that in recent years it has built quite a number of solid, seaworthy craft of completely original design, with interesting armament, and thus has freed itself from its partial dependence on other countries for certain equipment and electronic apparatus, a dependence which was observable until about 1960. The Soviet navy is now pursuing a completely independent and original policy of organization and ship-building, which is claimed by Soviet ideologists to be disproof of the classical "capitalist" theory of maritime domination by the mere presence of superior surface and air forces. This typically Soviet doctrine, which in a certain sense was already applied during Word War II though it had extremely slight success, comprises a mixture of new weaponry (primarily a wide range of missiles), the mass utilization of submarines, and the subversive influencing of the personnel of opposing navies. The Soviet navy today unquestionably has a richer arsenal of missiles than the NATO fleets, at least in terms of variety—though it remains to be proven whether, under combat conditions, missiles have any greater accuracy than naval aircraft over long distances and naval guns over short range. At any rate even the most modern Soviet cruisers, such as ships of the Cresta, Kynda and Kashin classes, have no chance outside the operating radius of land-based Soviet aircraft of successfully combating for a long period of time an opponent with a ship-based, flexible naval air arm. Moreover it is known in the West that certain Soviet weapons systems, particularly those involved in anti-submarine warfare, lag far behind those of the West technologically. On the other hand the formerly grossly lacking seamanship of Russian sailors has improved sharply, a fact which is linked to the worldwide activities of the Soviet navy.

In terms of numerical strength and geopolitical factors, the Soviet navy in the North Sea, the Black Sea, the Barents Sea and in general along the Siberian coast, is greatly superior (by a ratio of up to 10:1) to all non-Communist coastal states and therefore, at least at the start of a conflict, would largely dominate these waters, particularly since in this area the land-based Soviet air force can provide the necessary cover. It is another question, however, whether the Soviet navy's surface forces in their current make-up could operate successfully in those far-reaching oceanic regions in which they have been constantly cruising in recent years, such as the Mediterranean, the North and Middle Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. As long as the NATO alliance remains intact, Soviet surface combat operations in the Atlantic would have little chance of success; to keep this situation unchanged, however, it is necessary that the bases in Iceland remain firmly in Western hands and the theoretically available air and marine bases in the Middle Atlantic, such as those on the Cape Verde Islands, Ascension, St. Helena, the Bermudas and the Falkland Islands, be improved and better supported. The exclusion of the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean from NATO for political reasons seems militarily dangerous today, in an age of worldwide Soviet naval policy and strategy. Another obstacle is that the political reservations of certain Scandinavian countries, which are themselves making inadequate contributions to the defense of their own territories, are compelling NATO to adopt a strategy vis-à-vis Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and South Africa which can benefit only the Soviets.

The action potential of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet is also limited, although it unquestionably now has its own air forces operating from Egyptian and Syrian bases and its reconnaissance aircraft can in some cases also make use of Algerian, Yemenite and Iraq airbases. The West no longer has any bases on the African shore of the Mediterranean. As to Malta, it should not be overlooked that in the event of a

third world war, particularly if it is fought with nuclear weapons, because of its small size the island would be useless to either party as a naval and airbase in the classical sense. In contrast to Iceland, Malta's great importance is exclusively in terms of the present political "war" in the Mediterranean region.

The Soviet capability to wage successful war in the Mediterranean depends largely on the reliability and operational capacity of its Arab allies and friends. On the basis of recent events in the Sudan, the attitude of Libya and Soviet experiences with Arab politicians and military in general, the Kremlin probably reckons that the Soviet Union could hardly count on the active help of the Arabs in a war with NATO. This would eliminate the utilization of "neutral" Arab ports and airbases, without which the Soviet fleet would not be secure against attacks from superior NATO air and sea forces. The Mediterrancan is spatially too small for Soviet surface naval units to be kept supplied and operating for very long without discovery. Similar considerations also apply to the Soviet surface naval forces which are now more or less constantly present in the Caribbean, the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Of its six most important tasks in the event of a war against NATO, despite its great numerical strength and the modernity

BALTIMORE SUN
1 November 1971

Soviet Union's efforts to fill seapower void in Indian Ocean luring U.S. into competition

By MICHAEL PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Singapore—The Soviet's Union's efforts to establish itself as the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, one of the world's most important trade routes, is luring the United States into a contest for naval supremacy there.

Five years ago, there were no Soviet warships operating regularly in the ocean. Three years ago, there were a half dozen. Now, the number averages from 12 to 15 and has run as high as 30 at a time.

This growth has accompanied extensive Soviet efforts to increase its political and economic influence in the developing nations of East Africa and South Asia that border the Indian Ocean.

Only major power

While Russia's ships in the Indian Ocean account for only a tenth of its Pacific fleet, the Soviet Navy is, in fact, the only major navy operating regularly in the ocean in significant strength.

With the once-mighty British Far East Fleet reduced to six frigates and a submarine and only three aging U.S. Navy surface ships stationed in the area, the Russians are approaching naval domination of the ocean, an event that would bring significant political benefits in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.



Soviet naval vessels are welcome at many ports near Indian Ocean though they have no bases. Western naval bases in area are underlined.

Alarmed American naval officers plan to send U.S. 7th Fleet ships into the ocean as they are freed from duty off Vietnam so that Russia does not go unchallenged. The latest such exercise involved the 90,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise and a guided-missile frigate in September.

The United States began construction earlier this year of a $15 million communications station on Diego Garcia atoll, a [illegible] miles south of India in the middle of the Indian Ocean. It will be finished in 1974.

Although establishment of the base runs counter to the Nixon doctrine of lowering the American profile in Asia, Navy officers say it is the minimum the United States can do in what is becoming a race to keep up with the rapidly expanding Soviet Navy.

The 250-man, Seabee-built station, the first U.S. base in the area, will make it easier for American submarines to operate in the Indian Ocean. It will also improve [illegible] Russian activities.

Navy officers also note that Diego Garcia's harbor could be dredged to accommodate an aircraft carrier. Its 8,000 foot landing strip is already handling four engine cargo planes.

If the United States fails to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean, says Vice Adm. Maurice F. Weisner, the deputy chief of naval operations for air and a former 7th Fleet commander, "we turn it over to the Soviets. I think it's that simple." Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., whose Pacific Command was recently expanded to include most of the Indian Ocean, said in an

interview: "We are in a global competition with the Russians, and we must not allow any portion of the world to fall under their exclusive influence. This is the danger in the Indian Ocean."

The United States, in fact, is the only nation able to balance the Soviet presence in the ocean.

The British fleet has shrunk under economic pressures. The Indian Navy is concerned only with the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea in case of war with Pakistan. The Japanese Navy is kept close to home as a self-defense force. The Australian fleet is modern but small.

The 1,001-ship Chinese fleet is primarily coastal but several ocean-going warships have recently traveled to East Africa, where China has aid programs. A greater Chinese presence is expected in the next two years when Peking test-fires its intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Major power struggle

A U.S. congressional committee, predicting that the Indian Ocean will soon be the site of major power struggles between Russia, Japan, China and the United States, urged that "diplomatic finesse" and negotiations be used in the area rather than sheer military and naval power.

India and Ceylon, expressing similar worries, have asked the major powers to make the ocean a "zone of peace." The Russians have said they are willing to study the proposal with other powers.

The American congressional committee was told last summer by two former assistant secretaries of state, William Bundy and Phillips Talbot, that trying to match the Russians would be counterproductive.

Because of nuclear weapons, Mr. Bundy said, "I don't think any foreseeable level of Soviet power makes that much difference. . . . Naval gunboat diplomacy has less and less relevance."

Russian diplomats in the region say, however, that it is the United States that is practicing gunboat diplomacy in the ocean.

They say the initial Soviet move into the ocean was prompted not by some grand geopolitical design but by the earlier entry of American submarines carrying Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads. Soviet diplomats have shown elaborate charts of the submarines' movements to some of the area's governments to justify the Russian presence.

American officials refuse to discuss the Polaris program, but the submarines are presumed to be operating in the Arabian Sea and, according to Russian sources, the Bay of Bengal, from where their missiles could reach targets in the Soviet Union and mainland China.

Tends to confirm presence

The construction of the communications station at Diego Garcia—far too elaborate for the three surface warships operating from the Persian Gulf—tends to confirm the presence of Polaris submarines as does the American acceptance of an Australian offer to base U.S. submarines at Cockburn Sound, a new facility in Western Australia on the southern Indian Ocean.

The Soviet ships in the ocean generally sail from the Russian Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok. A few have come from the Black Sea port of Odessa, a 13,000-mile trip around Africa with the Suez Canal closed.

Western intelligence sources report that the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean generally includes two guilded-missile cruisers, two missile-bearing frigates, two to three missile-bearing destroyers, two to three conventional destroyers, a landing ship and four or five oilers and supply ships. They are often accompanied by submarines, some of which are nuclear powered and missile equipped.

The ships make regular calls at 30 ports in 18 countries bordering the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Soviet merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean is also increasing. A quarter of the ships rounding the Cape of Good Hope are Russian, and another 15 per cent are from East European countries. The increase is partially due to economic assistance and trade agreements Russia has negotiated with at least 14 countries on the ocean's shores.

Russian fishing and whaling fleets—including several of the famous spy trawlers—operate continuously in wide areas of the Indian Ocean. Twelve countries have signed special fishing agreements with the Soviet Union.

Establishing base

To service these ships the Soviet Union is lining up a chain of facilities from the Red Sea down the African coast. It is admittedly eyeing ports in Ceylon, India and the Indian Nicobar and Andaman islands off the Burmese coast in the Bay of Bengal. But both Colombo and New Delhi say they are wary of the Russians, and Indian officials say they are trying to minimize Russian influence on their heretofore British-equipped Navy.

Western intelligence officials believe that the Soviet Union is establishing several bases of its own—at Ras Banas in Egypt on the Red Sea, on the South Yemen islands of Perim and Socotra (where Soviet marines have landed) and, for its fishing fleet, on Mauritius.

Two large bouys, seven feet in diameter, have been placed in the Indian Ocean, apparently to turn supply ships and submarine tenders into floating bases.

American naval officers warn that Soviet activity will increase sharply if the Suez Canal is reopened, permitting Russian ships to sail from the Black Sea through the cannal and the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean.

Threat to shipping

A Western naval attache here commented, "I would not be surprised if the Russians increased their activities—political and economic as well as naval—by a factor of five within three years of the opening of the canal."

American naval officers speak of the Soviet activity as a threat to Western shipping—50 per cent of Europe's oil moves across the Indian Ocean as does 90 per cent of Japan's—but any Russian attempt to interfere with shipping is likely to be general rather than regional.

"Interference with ships on the high seas would be pretty close to war, actually," says one British staff officer.

The British, however, have used this potential threat to justify the sale of arms to South Africa despite widespread protests from black Africa.

Japan, one of the countries that would be most affected by Soviet domination of the ocean, has aodpted a wait-and-see attitude. "We are still talking about potential not actual domination," says a Japanese ambassador.

Despite its numbers, the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean has only limited battle capacity. With no aircraft carriers and no established naval airfields in the area, the Indian Ocean fleet lacks both tactical air support and aerial reconnaissance. Western naval units moving into area would have both.

Western-dominated waters

With the Suez Canal closed, the most practical access to the ocean is through areas dominated by Western navies—the South China Sea and around the Cape of Good Hope.

Soviet sailors are gaining experience operating major naval task forces for long periods of time thousands of miles from home ports, but hot-weather sailing in tropical waters still presents problems, according to Western naval sources.

Finally, the Soviet Navy currently lacks a secure base on the ocean itself, although it has the use of repair and refueling facilities in a number of countries.

Western naval officers note that these barriers would be quickly removed with the opening of the Suez Canal and the establishment of one or two naval bases and airfields on the ocean.

Number of obstacles

A European diplomat, assessing the growing Soviet political as well as military influence in the region, commented, "there are a number of obstacles to Russian naval activity right now. But it is only a matter of time until they have the facilities they need because of the way governments in the area are welcoming them as a counterweight to the Chinese."

Most diplomats in the area, in fact, see the Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean as part of a broader effort to fashion a crescent or influence beneath China.

Vice Adm. William P. Mack, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, said in an interview: "How do you influence a country as to whether she signs a treaty with you? I am thinking specifically of India (which recently signed a twenty-year friendship treaty with Russia).

"The Soviets do it by putting more ships in the area and visiting these countries more often. In the Orient, countries are influenced a lot more if you present yourself to them in a big, new guided-missile cruiser than if you sail in with a little World War II destroyer."

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
15 November 1971

A LOOK AT U.S.-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Interview With V. Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.

With Soviet and U. S. warships maneuvering at close quarters in the Mediterranean, could an accident lead to war? How good is Russian surveillance? Would reopening the Suez Canal add significantly to Moscow's global might?

For answers, Alex Kucherov of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report" interviewed Admiral Kidd shortly before he relinquished command of the Sixth Fleet last month. The interview now has Defense Department approval.

Aboard U.S.S. *SPRINGFIELD* in MEDITERRANEAN

Q Admiral Kidd, would reopening the Suez Canal give the Soviet Union a dramatic new advantage in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean?

A From the Soviet point of view, there would be less a tremendous advantage than a tremendous convenience.

The largest single Soviet fleet in numbers of surface ships is their Black Sea Fleet. Their "locker room" in the Black Sea is convenient to the "playing field" in the Mediterranean. Thirty-six hours after their ships leave Odessa or Sevastopol, they can pass through the Dardanelles and be off Egypt. Or they can reach the entrance of the Suez Canal in about 40 hours.

The Suez would be a fine short cut to the Indian Ocean: They could avoid the long way down, out past Gibraltar, around West Africa and up the other side. So, from the Soviet point of view, opening the Suez Canal would be a tremendous convenience. As you know, the Russians already keep some ships in the Indian Ocean.

Q Is the U. S.—and specifically the Sixth Fleet—in any danger of being pushed out of the Eastern Mediterranean?

A No—absolutely no. We can't be forced out of any place. Someone might try to drive us out by fighting—or try to bluff us out. That simply hasn't happened here.

Q What do these two big fleets—U. S. and Soviet—do in the Mediterranean? Is it mainly a matter of keeping tabs on each other?

A That is certainly part of it. They keep tabs on us, but this business of watching works both ways.

I'm intensely interested, for example, in their new designs, the new systems that we see installed in their new ships—their implied new capabilities. We watch their ships—not all of them, but those I select, based upon a combination of things. A new device: What is it? How does it work? We follow that ship—and watch and learn.

When a Soviet ship comes down with one of their more advanced weapons systems installed—one that could pose a serious threat to our ships—it stands to reason that we want to keep an eye on that ship and know what he is about all the time. This we do.

Q Do the Soviets harass you—try to interfere with your fleet movements?

A There are indeed occasions when such occurs, but not regularly here in the Mediterranean. There have been incidents in the past where perhaps exuberance and carelessness have caused some pretty close shaves.

A change has taken place, incidentally. Ten years ago the Russians used small trawlers or ex-fishing craft to trail us. Now you see a guided-missile frigate doing the job. This is a good indicator of the growth of their navy.

Q Is this continuing surveillance dangerous?

A Their motivations, I'm sure, are very similar to ours—curiosity, a desire for close-in photography—and if the weather is bad, if the ceiling is low, they've got to come low to see.

I've operated up in Norwegian waters on large exercises where the Soviets were intensely interested in what we were doing. The weather is absolutely abominable up there. The ceiling is low, it's rough, it's windy, it's cold. I tell you our aviators there had nothing but admiration for Soviet airmanship. These great big long-range Bears and Badgers came down low over the water to observe our ships. The ceiling was under a thousand feet, and they had to be that low to see.

Q When Soviet ships approach yours and you warn them, do they respond? Do they keep clear?

A The question implies they come too close. The signals we send are more often signals of intent: "I'm going to turn to the right," "I'm going to turn to the left," "I'm going to begin refueling; please keep clear." Generally, they do.

Q Could an accident in the area escalate into war?

A We pride ourselves on being very, very circumspect and careful professionals. One of the absolute orders of the day in the Sixth Fleet is to guarantee that we deport ourselves accordingly.

When their aircraft approach our ships and we intercept them far out from the ships that they might be reconnoitering, there's no nonsense, no playing around, pointing things at one another—absolutely none. They will open the bomb bays, and we go under and look up inside—no bombs.

I would reassure you most carefully and thoroughly on that point—most carefully. Anyone who believes that World War III is about to start over here because there are confrontations by irresponsible people is just looking for a headline.

Q How powerful a force do the Soviets have here?

A They have an absolutely first-rate force here, and we would be fools to underestimate their potential. They are professionals. Their ships are quite obviously well built.

The Soviets are not 9 feet tall by a long shot, but they are good. They have made it their business to learn from the best in the business—and that's us.

They've been following us around for years—watching, learning, copying. We make mistakes, sometimes in tactics, in evolutions, in ship designs, in techniques, in such simple things as replenishing at sea. They watch. Then within a very short time we see, reflected from their watching, the adaption of what would work best for them in installations on their own ships.

Side-to-side refueling is an example. They started out using the astern method of refueling, which we used early in World War II, and then progressed to the more efficient alongside refueling method.

Q Is the Soviet submarine fleet in the Mediterranean much larger than yours?

A Indeed it is—to the tune of about 4 or 5 to 1. If you want to know why there is this tremendous concentration, I think the answer can be found somewhere among the following:

First, they have large numbers of submarines in their military inventory. If you have a job to do and you've got a toolbox filled with one kind of tool and are limited in some of the other kinds of tools, you will use what you have. So they bring in submarines.

Secondly, we have abominable sound conditions in the Mediterranean. It's probably the worst body of water on the face of the earth in which to locate a submarine, bar none. The hot winds off the desert rapidly evaporate the surface water. The residual salt sinks. That causes great turbulence, and variations in salinity. This in turn affects the paths of sound waves: They bend. The fish down here, the marine life, are very chatty creatures and create a very high noise level. The number of commercial ships at sea adds to the problem. On any one day the density of shipping per square mile of Mediterranean water is fantastic—perhaps not as high as in the English Channel, but close to it. This makes noise. All of these factors affect the ability of antisubmarine ships to find submarines.

Thirdly, the Russians have a "choke point" philosophy. That is, they want to be sure that they have enough submarines to control the natural choke points in the Mediterranean. There are seven of them: moving from west to east—Gibraltar, the waters between Sardinia and the African coast, the Strait of Sicily, the Strait of Messina, the area between Crete and Africa, and the two passages at each end of Crete leading into the Aegean Sea.

If you and I are playing in the line of the Chicago Bears and we want to stop the runner from getting through the line, we line up shoulder to shoulder so he can't squeeze through. And I think that's why they've got so many submarines. They line them up side by side so that nobody can get through—at least not undetected.

Q Do they have underwater ballistic missiles?

A Yes, we give them credit for that—not with all these submarines but with their new boats and their new missiles.

Q Do the MIG-23s recently introduced into Egypt tilt significantly the balance of power in the Mediterranean?

A Yes, the Russians have MIG-23s in Egypt. I don't think it will have any great effect. No one weapon or weapons system of this type—no matter what it is—can be that important.

Q Does the U.S.S.R. have amphibious forces here?

A Yes, they have their naval infantry in the Mediterranean and a lift for that infantry ready in Egypt. They have enough amphibious lift down here to haul a battalion—a battalion landing team. That force of a half dozen or so amphibious ships, LST's and smaller landing craft they keep here all the time.

Q Does this Soviet expansion of naval power concern you?

A I don't think we should suddenly reach for the panic button. They are behaving the way many countries have behaved over the centuries in pushing their trade frontiers—and their flag—as far as they can.

The Phoenicians' merchantmen sailed far and wide, and their countrymen in the rowing-machine warships, with shields hung over the side next to the oarsmen, and spears in the seats beside them, were not far behind. This is the way maritime-oriented and economically motivated nations have operated for centuries. It's what the Russians are doing now.

The disquieting thing is their rate of growth and, of course, their ultimate goals: How will they use what they have, and to what purpose? It's clear to me that they are no longer interested in parity at sea. I believe they have set their sights on naval supremacy.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971

WHERE RUSSIAN THREAT KEEPS GROWING

Interview With Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Chief of Naval Operations

If there were a showdown between U. S. and Soviet power at sea, who would prevail? That's a vital question at a time when U. S. strength is dwindling—in manpower, ships and planes—and Russia is showing more muscle.

How big a worry is this? Just what is Moscow up to? What comes next?

Admiral Zumwalt came to the conference room of "U. S. News & World Report" to answer these and other questions in this exclusive interview.

Q Admiral, [illegible] U. S. Navy?

A There are pluses and minuses.

With regard to personnel, we are generally better off from a quality standpoint. Our re-enlistment rates have improved. However, we're not as strong in numbers because we've been required to make major reductions in personnel—down from 692,435 officers and men a year ago to 622,500 now.

Nor are we as strong from the standpoint of ships, because we have also made major reductions there as well. Whereas we had 769 naval ships a year ago, we are down to 700 today. We also have 770 fewer aircraft than a year ago.

So we have gained qualitatively with regard to people; lost quantitatively with regard to people, ships and aircraft.

Q Has this been because of the cost of the Vietnam war?

A The effect of the Vietnam war has been, in essence, to cost us the equivalent of about a generation of shipbuilding. What increases there were in Navy budgets have been spent largely on attrition aircraft, bombs, bullets and increased operating expenses.

If you look at the years 1962 through 1972, in its shipbuilding appropriations the Navy was down to less than a billion dollars per year at a time when we should have been spending 3 billion dollars a year on new ships. We need that much if we are to replace our 75-billion-dollar plant every 25 years.

Q Compared with 10 years ago, is the Navy a stronger or a weaker force?

A Weaker in some categories and stronger in others.

With regard to the submarine force, the Navy is stronger than it was 10 years ago because we've been able to continue our nuclear-construction program, using nuclear submarines to replace the much less capable diesel submarines.

On the other hand, the number of aircraft carriers has been dramatically reduced, and this has meant major reduction in our strength. We are down from 24 to 16 carriers.

The number of escorts has been dramatically reduced. And although there have been qualitative improvements as new ships have been built, the improved quality has not been adequate to make up for the reduction in numbers that we've lost.

Q Against that background, Admiral, what has happened to the Navy's responsibilities worldwide? Have they tended to shrink in this period?

A No. In my judgment, the Navy's responsibilities are greater than they've ever been before. We've always been the nation's first line of defense.

You will recall that during the Korean War it was the Navy carrier air support that made it possible for us to hang on to the Pusan perimeter as our bases were overrun in South Korea, and it was the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious landing at Inchon that outflanked the North Koreans and drove them out of the South Korean Peninsula.

During the Southeast Asia war, naval carriers carried the large fraction of the action while we were building our air bases ashore in the first year.

At the present time, under the Nixon Doctrine it is clear that the high-technology services—air and naval power—are going to be required increasingly to come to the support of indigenous armies of our allies. I would have to say that the Navy's mission is greater than it has been in the past, as I understand the Nixon Doctrine.

Q Does the Soviet Navy worry you?

A The Soviet Navy is dramatically more powerful than it was 10 years ago. You can trace, almost to the moment, the point at which the Soviets began their tremendous construction program in two fields: one to achieve strategic nuclear parity, and the other to achieve a strong naval capability with the results of the lessons they learned in the Cuban missile crisis.

In the ensuing years since that Cuban missile crisis, they have devoted a tremendous amount of their resources to the acquisition of a submarine fleet which outnumbers ours by 3 to 1 and which is outbuilding us at an appreciable annual rate. They have acquired air power increasingly capable of coming to grips with ships at sea because they are increasingly picking up airfields around the Eurasian littoral. They have built surface ships that have been optimized with the surface-to-surface missile against our surface ships.

Q If there were a showdown with the Soviet Navy at sea, what would be your prediction as to the outcome?

A This is, of course, a very speculative question, but I think that no matter who does the analysis he would conclude that if the U. S. continues to reduce and the Soviet Union continues to increase, it's got to be inevitable that the day will come when the result will go against the U. S.

Mr. Nixon pointed out in a press conference on July 30, 1970, a point that I think is most perceptive about sea power, and that is the dramatic difference between what the Soviets need—as basically a land power—and what we need—as basically a maritime power.

Their vital interests require a large Army and Air Force to protect the Eurasian heartland. Our vital interests require a capability to control and use the seas to hold together the maritime alliance of which we're a part.

The Soviets don't need a Navy superior to ours to protect their vital interests. They only can aspire to have a Navy larger than ours for purposes of interfering with our vital interests.

Q Is the Soviet Union doing well in the Mediterranean—challenging our superiority?

A Yes. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has just recently—on May 27, 1971—negotiated, probably for some very suitable price, a 15-year treaty of friendship and co-operation that may well assure their continued use of Egyptian naval and air bases in the United Arab Republic. They may not be successful in communizing the Government of the U.A.R., but they have been successful in achieving a very firm geopolitical position.

Q We keep hearing that the Soviets want to drive east of Suez into the Indian Ocean, an area the U. S. has stayed pretty clear of. Is that your appraisal?

A Yes. It's exactly what I would be doing if I were running the Soviet empire and if I had the same ideology that they have. They have several goals in going into the Indian Ocean:

In the first place, the presence of their ships there in much larger numbers than ours gives them the same opportunity to convert this presence, coupled with an aggressive foreign policy, into the acquisition of port capabilities that they've been able to achieve in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea.

Second, it helps them complete the encirclement of Communist China, which I'm sure is a national objective of theirs.

Q Would opening the Suez Canal help that purpose?

A Definitely. It would bring their Black Sea Fleet many thousands of miles closer to its home ports.

Q Wouldn't use of the Suez Canal bring the Indian Ocean closer for the U. S. fleet, too?

A The figures are roughly 9,000 miles closer for the Soviets and roughly 2,000 miles closer for us. That would be the case if one believes that we could get through the Suez Canal in times of crisis. I'm not sure that we could.

Q Is it also true that some U. S. aircraft carriers are too big to go through the Suez Canal?

A That's also correct.

Q There are reports that, as the Vietnam war winds down, some of our Pacific Fleet may go into the Indian Ocean. Is this likely?

A This is a political judgment that has to be made—and hasn't yet been made. U. S. naval ships are able to go anywhere any time.

Q What do you have in the Indian Ocean area now?

A We have maintained a World War II seaplane tender and two World War II destroyers there for a number of years.

The Soviets have come from a presence much less than that to maintenance, on the average, of eight to nine ships at any one time in the Indian Ocean.

Q What kind of new base are you building on the atoll of Diego Garcia, south of India?

A A very austere communications facility.

Q Could it be developed into something more substantial if the decision were made?

A There are no plans to do so.

Q When you talk about the presence of our fleet and their fleet in the Indian Ocean, what do these ships do—call at ports and generally show the flag, or sail around in maneuvers?

A They do both. It's the visible presence of naval power that has such tremendous impact on littoral nations.

For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations on the southern flank of Europe all unanimously feel that the presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet is their guarantor against encroachment by the Soviet Union, and that's why it's so desperately important for this country to maintain sufficient naval strength to keep our commitments in the Sixth Fleet—and also in the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.

Q In this regard, it is said that if a situation similar to the 1958 Lebanon crisis recurred, the U. S. Sixth Fleet would not be able to act as forcefully now as it did at that time because of the presence of the Soviets in the Mediterranean. Do you agree with that?

A No. You will recall that during the Jordanian crisis last year President Nixon made the decision to reinforce the Sixth Fleet with a third carrier task force, and the U.S.S. *Guam* embarked Marines—and the crisis abruptly abated.

There were, of course, other things that happened at the same time that made a contribution, but it's clear to me that, as the President stated on Sept. 29, 1970, "the power and the mobility, the readiness of the Sixth Fleet in this period was absolutely indispensable in keeping the peace in the Mediterranean."

This was one of those cases where the capability of the United States to deploy naval and Marine power on the international seas, without having to obtain base rights from anybody, made the difference.

Q Admiral, getting back to relative strengths, is it true that the Soviet Navy outguns the U. S. Navy, except for carrier-based aircraft?

A Let me answer this way:

If the United States today suddenly decommissioned all of its aircraft carriers, we would lack any capability whatsoever to control and use the seas. We have a very, very capable weapons system in the aircraft carrier—particularly in the nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier with its ability to maintain very high speeds at all times and to be constantly ready—100 per cent ready—to go the minute the decision is made and with the capability to outrange the surface-to-surface missile of the Soviet ships.

Q Of the 16 U. S. carriers in commission, how many are nuclear-powered?

A We have one operating, two building. We badly need a fourth. We're going to be making the most vigorous possible case for it. It's obvious the decision rests on higher authority both in the executive branch and within the Congress.

Q Do you have enough escort ships capable of keeping pace with these nuclear carriers?

A We need more escort ships as well.

Q Do you have any interest in using helicopter carriers, the way the Soviet Union does?

A We're in the process of designing at present a sea-control ship—a ship that will be in the 12,000 to 20,000-ton range and will carry helicopters and vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft.

These can in no way be considered a substitute for aircraft carriers. They will have a very limited—practically zero—capability to project our power inland, as our carriers have had to do to save us in Korea and Southeast Asia. But they will make a significant contribution to the protection of convoys and of task forces which are confined to a given geographical area—by defending against both the submarine and the aircraft, and the missile coming from either that aircraft or that submarine.

Q Is it possible that weapons are coming along that will make the carrier much more vulnerable than it is now?

A One of the most overstated claims, in my judgment, is the vulnerability of the carrier. None of the oldest class of carriers which we have remaining in the fleet today—the *Essex*-class carriers which were in World War II—was ever sunk.

Many of them took as many as five or six hits by the first guided missile in history—the Japanese kamikaze aircraft—carrying payloads equivalent to the warheads of the current surface-to-surface missiles. And many of them took several torpedo hits. In every case, within a relatively short period, they were back in action—frequently an hour later. When the time came, they went back to port for repairs.

Since that time, the modern class of carriers, all but three of which are of postwar construction, has been given much more protection—heavier armor, more compartmentation, much better damage control—so that, although our carriers will take hits, they will have a very high degree of survivability.

The nuclear carrier *Enterprise* suffered a fire, you will recall, and nine 1,000-pound bombs exploded. Had the *Enterprise* needed, she could have been back in action within a couple of hours.

Q A new nuclear carrier is priced at 800 million dollars. How do you justify spending that much for one ship?

A One has to ask oneself how much we have spent for the privilege of having the equivalent of the aircraft carrier —that is, a land-based airfield—in an overseas area where we need it.

For example, Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya had a relatively brief lifetime before the U. S. was asked to leave, and yet the costs for that airfield during its lifetime were probably very comparable to the costs of a nuclear aircraft carrier for its 40-year life cycle.

Furthermore, that aircraft carrier has the capability to be anywhere in the world as the geopolitical situation changes, and not just in one portion of the African desert.

As we consciously shift to a posture in which we expect our allies to provide their own indigenous capability, the best way to have the assets rapidly capable of concentration to support one particular ally which may be beleaguered is to have your airfields seaborne.

Q Do most members of Congress share this feeling?

A No. There are many who do, but many are not convinced.

I think the thing the Navy has to do is to continue to make the case. The facts clearly speak for themselves. In the Jordanian crisis, as an example, the only airfields capable of [illegible] carriers.

Could I take two or three minutes to deal further with

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this? I think it is important to look at the capabilities that the Navy has.

The first capability is our contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the nation. In the past this has been the Polaris-missile-carrying submarine. It is being converted now to Poseidon, which will give us an invulnerable component of the over-all deterrent through the '70s, and we are designing a follow-on system for the '80s. Increasingly in the future, we are going to have to rely on our sea-based systems.

We then have conventional rôles which we carry out. One is our peacetime overseas presence—the kind of thing we have been talking about: sea control and the projection of power overseas.

We control the seas with our aircraft carriers, capable of sinking surface ships, surfaced submarines, shooting down aircraft and, with our F-14 aircraft, shooting down the missiles from any one of those enemy sources. We use our killer submarines, our attack submarines, our destroyers.

We project our power also with the aircraft from our carriers capable of projecting 600 and 700 miles inland, with our Marines capable of being projected from our amphibious force, and with our merchant marine, which in Southeast Asia had to carry 96 per cent of the millions of tons required to support ourselves and our allies and which, even after the completion of the purchase of the very fine C-5A aircraft, will be required to carry 94 per cent of the logistics to go on the surface of the seas. Even the aviation gas to get that C-5A aircraft home so that it can carry a usable load overseas has to go in surface ships.

Q Admiral, if the aircraft carrier is so important, why don't the Soviets have any?

A The Soviets started out way behind. Their first priority was to scramble frantically to get a capability to deal with our superior Navy. That meant building submarines, and it meant building surface ships which would be expendable but capable of firing a surface-to-surface missile in a first strike against our carriers—hopefully to create enough damage that they could try to come in and finish up with submarines and aircraft.

We are doing a number of things to negate this—a whole host of things such as our own surface-to-surface missile. We're working hard on antimissile defense, and of course our carriers have a very high degree of invulnerability.

Q Is the biggest threat still the Soviet submarines?

A Yes, because they have 3 times the number of submarines that we do, and they are building at roughly 2½ times the rate we're building.

Q What progress has been made in antisubmarine defenses?

A We continue to improve our techniques. In my judgment, we know everything that we need to know in order to deal with the threat. Our problem is to retain adequate forces to deal with it.

We have the antisubmarine aircraft—the aircraft operating from land bases, the antisubmarine aircraft operating from our aircraft carriers—we have the antisubmarine escorts, we have our attack submarines, all of which are capable collectively of dealing with this threat if we are permitted to retain adequate numbers.

Q Are you going to have adequate numbers under the budget that you now are preparing?

A The Congress reduced the Navy budget submitted by the President by 2 billion dollars in 1971. That represented a serious setback in our capability.

There are indications that the Congress will reduce the President's budget in 1972. If that happens, then once again our capability will take a further reduction. I don't know the size of [illegible] addition we will lose.

Q [illegible] submarine force make the defense problem vastly more difficult?

A Yes. They are faster, they're capable of remaining submerged for longer periods of time, and they are therefore more of a threat than the diesel submarines.

Q Does that suggest that we might be losing ground?

A The question has to be answered in two frames of reference: We have made the qualitative progress, and we have the know-how. The question is whether or not we will be permitted to retain the force levels necessary to do the job—and that is a question that I can't answer.

Q Talking about know-how, are you satisfied with the Navy's research programs?

A I am. We need to continue always a vigorous research-and-development program in order to stay ahead, because the Soviets are always making improvements in their submarine capabilities. But qualitatively I am satisfied with our present superiority. If we had the force levels to go with it we would have no problem.

Q A couple of ideas have been talked about recently: first, putting the land-based Minuteman missile at sea and, second, possibly sending our antiballistic missiles to sea to make them less vulnerable to a surprise attack. Do you see any virtue in either of these ideas?

A Both of these ideas get into the field of strategic nuclear balance, and that is something that is currently under negotiation in the strategic-arms-limitation talks with the Soviets. I think it would be preferable for me not to discuss that.

Q Is there an official policy against your talking about strategic systems?

A None other than the obvious fact that when you have diplomatic negotiations going on, the better part of valor for a military man is to keep his mouth shut.

TRAWLERS THAT NET INTELLIGENCE—

Q Admiral, what do you think about these Soviet trawlers operating off our coasts?

A They are there to collect all kinds of intelligence—everything from the most sophisticated kind of electronics intelligence to picking up debris dropped over the side of our ships.

Q What do you mean by "electronics intelligence"?

A They record everything that they can hear in the electromagnetic spectrum—that is, our radars, radios and so forth. They're interested in getting information on everything we have in our order of battle ashore and at sea and in the air: what kinds of radios we use, what kinds of frequencies; what kinds of radars we use, what their frequencies are—things of that nature.

Q Has the Navy been keeping a pretty close watch on the possibility that the Soviets may still try to build a submarine base in Cuba? And why did they try to build one in the first place?

A We keep a constantly close eye on it.

What the Soviets would have gained had they achieved a base in Cuba is a capability to maintain about one third more missile submarines on station than they are now able to maintain.

They also would have violated the agreements originally arrived at between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. And, therefore, I think President Nixon took a very important and bold and courageous step in insuring that these understandings were not violated.

Q Are you sure that the Soviet Union in fact doesn't have a submarine base in Cuba?

A Quite sure.

Q [illegible] of Soviet subs in the Gulf of Mexico or off our other coasts?

A I think I should limit myself to the statement that we do know that they are there—that the Soviets do maintain missile submarines off our coasts.

Q Are they increasing the number of missile submarines off our coasts?

A They obviously have, since they used to have none and now they have some.

They are also building the new *Yankee* class at a fantastic rate.

Q If a Soviet submarine were to fire a missile from 100 miles offshore in the Atlantic toward Washington, D. C., would there be any defense against that kind of attack?

A Yes. The best defense is to have your own missiles at sea where they can't be damaged by such an attack. I'm speaking about the threat of retaliation. In my judgment, it is the very best answer we have.

Q Do you mean that antisubmarine-warfare devices won't really protect you 100 per cent of the time?

A No—because it takes time to sink submarines, and it takes only a very few seconds to get missiles off. Therefore, if an enemy nation decides to strike first it is going to be able to get its missiles off before you're able to move in for an antisubmarine kill.

Q On another subject, Admiral: If we go to an all-volunteer military service, is this going to affect the kind of recruiting you've been able to do? Can the Navy maintain the kind of qualitative improvement you talked about if there's no draft to encourage men to enlist?

A First, it's absolutely clear that we had to have a two-year draft extension. There was zero prospect of achieving an all-volunteer force while continuing to fight the South Vietnam war with the large number of men required at its peak.

Second, having gotten the extension, all of the service chiefs must do their very best to try to achieve the capability to get nothing but volunteers by 1973. We all know that the three services that are all-volunteer at the present time—Navy, Marines and Air Force—are only all-volunteer because there is a draft.

Third, I'm not able to perceive how rapidly the country will recover from its typical, cyclical postwar syndrome which involves a considerable number of our people having a rather negative image of the military. And unless that is corrected there will be lots of disinclination for the young man to volunteer to join the military force. He's got to feel that it's an honorable, worthwhile profession.

Fourth, I don't know whether or not the pay scales will have been made adequate by that time.

Q Doesn't the pay-scale increase in the proposed extension of the selective service act seem to be a fairly healthy one?

A The pay increase is very heavily oriented to attracting the new man—and hasn't yet made a significant increase in the pay of the man who has finished his first tour and is considering whether or not to re-enlist.

Q Can you give us any idea of how many men do re-enlist after completing one tour?

A During the last six months of calendar 1969 it was 9.5 per cent. During the last six months of calendar 1970 it was up to 16 per cent. In February and March of this year it was 20 or 21 per cent. We need 35 per cent.

Q How do you account for the increases so far?

A I think it's a combination of factors: continuing emphasis on the need to improve conditions of life, begun by my predecessor and continued by me—both of us working for a Secretary of the Navy who is very interested in this field; in part the result of the economic downturn, and in part the result of the fact that there is a certain percentage of men who, when their country gets into the kind of trouble we're in, are patriotic enough to decide, "By golly, I'm going to give it another go!"

Q Are you getting those higher retention rates in the highly skilled ratings that you need?

A No—that's one of our problems. We're doing better in the less-skilled ratings and not as well in the ratings involving much more technical education because those young men obviously can draw much higher salaries on the outside, and it's more difficult to compete with civilian industry. This is true of all the services.

Q What about the officer corps?

A In the officer corps we have three primary categories in the line—submariners, aviators and surface officers.

The retention of submarine officers has been improving as a result of some improvements in the conditions of their detailing and as a result of a bonus we're now able to pay nuclear submariners as a result of legislation passed a year or so ago.

In the case of our aviation officers, retention rates are also improving.

As for the surface officer, the retention rates are not improving. These are the officers who take the largest impact from the continuing long deployments of our surface ships in foreign waters.

"PEACE BY MILITARY STRENGTH"—

Q You spoke a moment ago about a "postwar syndrome" as a matter of concern. Would you elaborate on that?

A I think there is a significant minority who feels that the military services and military personnel are simply no longer relevant in the modern world.

Fortunately, I believe that a respectable majority still continues to understand that, as the President has suggested, you can only have a generation of peace by maintaining the necessary military strength.

Q Is this minority feeling gaining ground?

A We have been going through a period when it has been spreading. I'm not able to perceive when the pendulum will swing back.

We do know that historically we've gone through this kind of period after each war. Vietnam is now the longest and most unpopular war in our history. It may take a little longer for the pendulum to swing, but I believe that it clearly will, given the tremendous efforts that the President and the Secretary of Defense are making to insure that the people understand, and given the fact that if we continue to weaken ourselves it will be quite obvious from the way in which the world community begins to destabilize that we must do more to maintain our military strength.

Q [illegible] can you reduce your shore establishment and save money which you could put into new weapons systems?

A Yes, we could and should reduce our shore establish-

ment as our fleet comes down in size. We cannot, however, save great amounts. One of the problems is that during some year you save almost nothing because there are significant closing costs. But I would say, as a crystal-ball guess, that if we were able to close all those bases that we ought to close, we could save something on the order of a quarter of a billion dollars per year.

"WE NOW EXPECT MORE FROM ALLIES"—

Q Does the Nixon Doctrine hold out some substantial hope of being able to abandon some of your bases in the Far East, for example? Could you scrap them all and move back to Pearl Harbor?

A I would hope that the day would never come when the United States is forced to fall back to Pearl. You remember that's where we started when we had to begin the long, costly fight all the way back across the Western Pacific after the attack against us at Pearl Harbor.

The forward basing that we now have is going to change somewhat in concept. That is, under the Nixon Doctrine we've come to expect much more from our allies' contributing to their own strength.

But we are always going to want bases in some areas overseas as a substitute for a much larger and more expensive number of forces that we would have to maintain in order to keep our ships supplied, and so forth.

Q So you're not seriously thinking of falling back over the next three to five years?

A No. As far as the Navy is concerned, I believe we're going to want to maintain bases in most of the countries where we're now based. There will be some retrenchments, but none of major proportions.

Q Several years ago there was talk of building some fairly large bases in Australia. Has this gone by the board?

A There's nothing currently on the horizon with regard to [illegible] some base improvements on their own.

Q Some Australians talk about an alliance—a naval grouping of Japan, Indonesia, Australia—to protect trade routes through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. Is that at all feasible?

A Under the Nixon Doctrine we will make every use of Allied forces that are available in any kind of a crisis situation.

If, for example, there were a crisis involving, say, the Indonesian area and if the President determined that our national interest required it, or the Indonesians felt threatened and joined with us in management of that crisis, certainly any forces they had would be welcomed.

We have treaty commitments with the Japanese and with the Australians, and the President has stated that treaty commitments would be honored.

Q Are you happy about the pace at which the Japanese are picking up their naval defenses?

A I think the Japanese Navy has made significant progress. They started from a very, very low figure, as you know. I would hope to see them do more in the years ahead.

Q One final question: Is it not a fact, Admiral, that the Russian Navy has not been tested in battle since the Russo-Japanese War almost 70 years ago?

A Not quite a fact. The Russian Navy had some engagements in World War I and in World War II. They did a relatively pitiful job.

They have certainly demonstrated a much greater degree of professionalism in the last quarter of a century, and a very rapidly increasing degree of professionalism in the last 10 years.

I consider them a first-class professional outfit.

SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
August 1971

The Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean

Arnold Hottinger

The Soviet-Egyptian pact of May 27 will help retain for Soviet warships their docking, supply and repair facilities in the harbors of Alexandria and Port Said. The Syrian harbor of Latakiya will doubtless also remain open to them, although on a less secure footing. In Egypt the Soviets also have airbases which are completely in their hands, manned by Russian troops and ground crews. It is known that there are at least four such bases, three near the Mediterranean coast between Burj al-Arab and Alexandria and at least one to the south near Luxor. From these bases Soviet pilots, flying Mig aircraft with Egyptian markings, undertake regular flights over the Mediterranean. In an emergency situation they could fill the gap created by the absence of aircraft carriers in the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. In Luxor, which is now barred to tourists, the Soviet pilots reportedly begin operations daily at 5 a. m. and finish at about 4 p. m. Word is also circulating in Cairo about lively construction activity by Soviet marine engineers near Marsa Matruh on the coast of the western desert, where Rommel once had his headquarters. This area is also barred to foreign travellers. It seems that, in a narrow rocky bay, a harbor is being constructed which could serve as a refuge for submarines. In addition to the purely Soviet-run facilities there are also joint Soviet-Egyptian airbases, missile stations, training camps and so forth.

The Soviet Union's intentions must doubtless be seen in connection with the old Russian dream of "access to the warm seas." This is an eminently imperialist dream. For the Czarist empire, it meant competing with the great European colonial powers. Colonial policy in the 19th century was based on the proverbial gunboats. The Russian dream meant that the Czarist empire also wished to send its gunboats out into the seas of the world as instruments of expansionist policy. In the 20th century, however, there is no "classical" colonial policy any longer.

But there is that which the Soviet ideologues and the politicians of the Third World term "neo-colonialism." By this they mean the economic and power superiority which the industrially developed nations have over less developed or underdeveloped lands. The Soviet Union partakes of this superiority. Its navy is an instrument designed to make that superiority felt for its own benefit.

In the political sphere an ultimate issue is whether the Third World, in the more or less distant future, will attach itself to or incline toward the Soviet power bloc or whether it will prefer and manage to establish a free political system which would automatically bring it into closer contact with the democratic Western world and make it view the Communist system with mistrust. The presence of a combat fleet of one or another great power near the coasts of developing countries can have an important influence on the decisions taken there.

This process is well illustrated by the present case of the Mediterranean island of Malta. Poor and over-populated, the island is compelled to cooperate with great foreign powers. As long as the Western powers had the Mediterranean to themselves, Malta was constrained to seek its partner in the West despite severe friction between the Maltese, or at least important groups among them, and their former British colonial masters. Financial support from London could only be obtained, or at least kept at a high level, if the British maintained their bases on the island. Now, following a change in government, Malta has decided to regard its agreements about those bases as null and void. Dom Mintoff, the island's new prime minister, can afford to do this because of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. Malta's strategic value for Great Britain and NATO is no longer so great today. Sicily is not far off, where airbases are available free of charge. But there is a serious danger that Malta may eventually give the Soviet Union the right to maintain strategic bases on the island and the NATO powers cannot afford to ignore this possibility.

Mintoff is probably trying to exploit this situation in order to extract higher compensation for the use of the bases. Great Britain and NATO are faced with the choice of yielding to this blackmail or rejecting it. Without the Soviet presence they could easily turn thumbs down—in fact the whole matter would probably never have arisen. Malta is forced to sell its strategic position in order to live, and the Russians are possible buyers. The island could easily take a "neutralist" course, leaning toward Moscow, and finally it might even form an alliance with the USSR based on the Egyptian model.

There are other countries in the Mediterranean in which [illegible] power relationships are sufficiently unstable so that, in the long run, similar developments might be possible. Aside from the Arab countries, where feelings are getting progressively deeper about Israel and Western support for the Jewish state, there are dictatorially governed states such as Greece and Spain in which, although they are presently dominated by the extreme right, there is always the danger of a domestic political swing to the other extreme, because the moderate forces in these countries are suppressed and in the event of a shake-up would have a much more difficult time gaining prominence than the groups of the extreme left, which are always present and working underground. Turkey too is undoubtedly heading for a difficult period just now and it cannot be predicted with certainty that the moderate forces which are present there and currently dominate in the government and the military will be able to continue in control.

The Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has an eminently political task. This means, however, that the Mediterranean itself cannot be its final goal, representing merely a way-station along a route of penetration which runs through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea and on to the Indian Ocean. The number of potential political objectives beyond Suez is incomparably greater. On the Red Sea there is Sudan, if Moscow chooses to make the effort to penetrate such a large and heavily populated country. Saudi Arabia may sooner or later experience a revolution, and this would open the way to the Persian Gulf for whichever great power would be on the spot at the right time and offer its protection to the "revolutionaries" on the Arabian Peninsula or impose it upon them. Further to the south lies restless Eritrea, where a stubborn though small-caliber guerrilla war is already in progress against the Ethiopian emperor and his army. In general Ethiopia, one of the last multi-ethnic empires in the style of old Austria, will doubtless be faced by difficult times when Emperor Haile Selassie dies. And just to the south, the "Issa and Afar" of Djibouti are waiting for the end of French colonial rule to leap at each other's throats, a conflict in which Somalia wants to have its say.

On the western side of the Red Sea, Yemen has developed into a momentarily stable country which is making rapid progress with Western aid. But in South Yemen (Aden) the Chinese enjoy significant political influence and are using it to maintain a guerrilla movement in Dhofar (Muscat and Oman) which, should it develop further, cannot fail to have an effect on the already disorderly—and apparently irrevocably so—conditions in the interior of the Persian Gulf, with its antagonistic sheikdoms. And beyond there spreads the Indian Ocean.

Once it can sail through the Suez Canal, the Soviet fleet will be faced by an embarrassment of riches in choosing the point at which it should first try to bring Soviet influence to bear in favor of one or another local "progressive" force. But as long as the Canal remains closed there is hardly another part of the world so remote from the Soviet Union as the politically promising Red Sea and financially luring Persian Gulf. In view of these rewarding possibilities the Soviets might even temporarily reduce their pressure on the Mediterranean if they could thereby gain access to the Red Sea. This may be part of Washington's calculations in an effort to open the Canal. The USA would apparently like to thus dampen the danger of an explosion in the Mediterranean, although this would admittedly mean a tremendous expansion of the Soviet radius of action on the world seas.

However, as long as efforts to reopen the Canal remain fruitless the Mediterranean will doubtless continue to be the main field for maneuvering. On the Arab coasts of the Mediterranean the Americans are at a severe disadvantage because of their support of Israel. This might be another reason for America's desire to open the Canal. With Suez reopened, the struggle for influence would be transferred to regions where, aside from the important Arab coasts of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the Western camp would not be burdened by Arab resentment about Israel.

The proposals of Tunisian foreign minister Masmoudi, which have recently been repeated and which suggest more active economic assistance from the European countries to the Maghreb states, must be understood in the context of the present power struggle. If it would be possible to transplant "European prosperity" to the Maghreb, the possibility of future Soviet influence there would be partially eliminated. Today it seems rather a utopian concept, but nevertheless a fully prospering Mediterranean might become such an unrewarding political objective for the Soviet Union that it could possibly evolve into that "Sea of Peace" about which the advocates of a "European" or a "neutralist" Mediterranean policy speak so avidly.

NEWSWEEK
19 July 1971

A Mediterranean Tide Runs for the Russians

BY ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE
Senior Editor



Russia vs. the U.S. in the Mediterranean: A tireless drive to change the balance of power

Aboard the U.S.S. Springfield last week, a young naval intelligence officer could hardly contain his admiration for the latest Soviet warships steaming in the Mediterranean Sea. "That's a beauty," he said, pointing to a photographic blowup of a Kresta-class guided-missile cruiser. "There's nothing like it on our side." Standing nearby, Vice Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, readily agreed. "A humdinger," he said of the Soviet ship. "Only 3,500 tons. But it's got the punch of a pocket battleship."

Nowadays, the Soviet Union packs quite a wallop in the Mediterranean. On a typical day last week, the wall-to-wall situation room (map) at NATO's surveillance headquarters in Naples bristled with symbols for Soviet men-o'-war: 55 versus the 44 in the Sixth Fleet (map). And Russian political influence in the strategically important inland sea has grown apace with its fleet. Last week, the Kremlin dispatched Ambassador Mikhail Smirnovsky to the Maltese capital of Valletta in hopes of securing an embassy in the onetime British possession. Both British and American spokesmen professed to see no threat to the NATO installation on Malta, doubting that its newly elected leftist Premier will turn over those naval facilities to the Russians. But there was no mistaking their fear—expressed also by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan last week—that the successful Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean is bringing about a fundamental change in the balance of power in the area.

There is no question in my mind that the Russians see America's loss of taste for international leadership as the opportunity to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean and, ultimately, in the entire Eurasian land mass and adjacent oceans.

U.S. admirals in the Mediterranean claim to be confident that, in the event of a military showdown, the Sixth Fleet could still overwhelm the Soviet fleet and fulfill its "second strike" nuclear mission against assigned targets in East Europe and southern Russia. This claim to naval superiority is evidently based on the American fleet's two aircraft carriers, ships whose firepower the Soviet fleet cannot match on a ship-to-ship basis. But it is worth remembering that the newly installed Russian tactical air force in Egypt—which has recently been dug into 220 hardened sites—can fly cover for the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and, if need be, attack the U.S. flattops. Moreover, some military experts are convinced that the two U.S. carriers have already been effectively neutralized by the latest Soviet guided-missile cruisers to arrive in the sea. Finally, the ships of the U.S. fleet are of much older vintage than the Russian vessels, and at the present rate of deployment [illegible] the Soviet Mediterranean fleet will clearly surpass the American armada in potency by mid-1972.

In the eyes of West Europeans, this expansion of Soviet power is directly related to critical changes in the American home front. The Europeans realize that the bitter taste of the Vietnam war has soured the U.S. on overseas commitments, and they are coming to believe that they may soon have to fend for themselves. But with the proliferation of Soviet power in the Mediterranean and along Europe's oil-supply routes, Moscow hopes to discourage a separate European defense effort as futile, thereby encouraging a trend toward West European neutralism. The combination of neo-isolationism in the U.S. and neutralism in Europe could be the mix that removes the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean without a shot being fired.

Raymond Cartier, one of Europe's most widely respected journalists, recently wrote: "America has given Europe a quarter of a century of invulnerability but Europe has not had the foresight to transfer some of its opulence to the problem of its own security. The withdrawal of American forces in the relatively near future is a certainty. The Mediterranean is now blanketed by Soviet naval power lapping against Europe's southern coastline. The northern front has also been outflanked by the same Soviet naval power reaching into the Atlantic."

Disarray: If Europe existed as more than a geographic expression, there might be an alternative to U.S. power. But many countries that now might wish to reduce their dependence on one or the other of the two superpowers regretfully conclude that there will be no European alternative for a long time to come. The European monetary union project, a prerequisite for an integrated European defense community, was dealt yet another blow in the Franco-German summit meeting last week when Chancellor Willy Brandt and President Georges Pompidou failed to reach agreement on the status of the floating Deutsche mark (page 69). This kind of European disarray, coupled with the fact that the U.S. is already in retreat—at least psychologically—means that things will continue to go Russia's way in an area of vital concern to the entire Western world.

Many Western officials and commentators, convinced that gunboat diplomacy is dead in an age of multi-headed nuclear missiles, have dismissed the Soviet effort in the Mediterranean as wasteful and useless. But the Soviets know better. When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat purged pro-Soviet plotters from his entourage two months ago, Moscow managed to more than offset its losses; it swiftly extracted from Sadat a new fifteen-year treaty that tied Egypt even closer to the Soviet Union. Among the many reasons that led Sadat to sign the treaty, presumably [illegible] the massive Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was visible proof of Moscow's commitment to the Arab cause.

Vacuum: The same kind of gunboat diplomacy [illegible] used in countries all along the North African and European littorals of the Mediterranean in the years to come. Nonalignment is tantamount to a power vacuum in the Soviet book, and with the withdrawal of Western influence from North Africa, the Soviets are making a determined effort to move in. Morocco, the last remaining monarchy in North Africa, is ripe for revolution—as last week's attempt to remove King Hassan showed—and the Soviets would be happy to help. Europe-oriented Tunisia, squeezed between revolutionary regimes in Algeria and Libya—and heavily dependent on ailing President Habib Bourguiba—would be another likely target.

This Soviet power in the Mediterranean basin will also make itself felt in the critically important Persian Gulf area once the Suez Canal is reopened. The gulf area supplies 60 per cent of West Europe's and 90 per cent of Japan's fuel needs. The British are phasing out of the gulf later this year and the U.S. has no intention—or desire—to fill the power gap. Moreover, London's plan for a gulf federation has collapsed and the oil sheikdoms are about to opt for independence. "A few modern Soviet warships calling regularly at these ports and entertaining impressionable sheiks will work miracles," a longtime gulf resident told me. "Especially if there is no countervailing U.S. force."

It won't be long before the sheiks realize where the real power lies. The Soviets already have twenty new warships on station in the Indian Ocean (as against two U.S. ships). Anticipating the reopening of the Suez Canal, they have also just completed construction of a new naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea (in return for free MIG's and tanks for the Sudanese), halfway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Should the Soviets successfully expand their Mediterranean presence into this part of the world, they would be able to exercise additional political leverage on Western Europe by controlling its sources of oil.

Détente: No one suggests that the Soviets [illegible] Mediterranean in whatever force they wish, and in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf for that matter. But what is needed is a credible countervailing force. Instead, America is pulling out, and Europe is dithering. In the past five years, NATO forces in Central Europe have been allowed to run down by 25 per cent (including the loss of 500 aircraft). During the same time, Soviet forces alone, on the same front, have increased by six divisions. Despite U.S. pledges to maintain and improve its strength in Europe, it was revealed two weeks ago that two Air Force squadrons were pulled out of Europe in 1970 without a word being said to America's European allies. "The very prospects of détente," commented the outgoing NATO civilian chief, Manlio Brosio, last week, "have created a climate in Western opinion in favor of unilaterally reducing NATO force levels." Moscow, of course, remains unencumbered by the restraints of public opinion, and whenever anyone in the West tries to halt the drift toward a lax defense posture, the Russians fire off accusations that such talk impedes détente.

Even more important than Soviet intentions, however, is the American trend toward introspection and isolation. "The steady encroachment of Congress on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy," one of Europe's leading policymakers told me recently, "means that a formal pledge isn't what it used to be." Moreover, the release of the Pentagon papers has, in a sense, vindicated those in the U.S. who regard power politics as evil and un-American. But that doesn't mean that the power realities will oblige us by simply disappearing.

Under these circumstances, Europeans are keeping their options open. Even Franco Spain and the colonels in Greece are doing what they can to improve relations with Moscow. For by conveying the impression that over the next few years domestic affairs will enjoy priority over foreign affairs, America is, in effect, telling Moscow: "This is your round in the Mediterranean. Make the most of it." It is an absolute certainty that the Russians will do just that.

TIME
28 June 1971

Soviet Thrust in the Mediterranean

NOW the spy will appear," murmured the signal officer of the cruiser *Dzerzhinsky* as the Soviet vessel cautiously approached the Bosporus on its voyage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

"What spy?" asked the man at his side, an *Izvestia* correspondent who was aboard the cruiser because Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov and General Aleksei Yepishev, the top political commissar for the Soviet military, were paying a visit to Moscow's Mediterranean fleet.

"The American destroyer," said the signal officer. "It always glues itself to us as soon as we pass through these narrows." Sure enough, the *Dzerzhinsky* had no sooner passed Istanbul when a Sixth Fleet destroyer, the U.S.S. *Ricketts*, took position alongside. Surveillance was so close that the exasperated captain of the *Dzerzhinsky* finally flashed a message: "Sir, this is not Broadway. Please find a safer place for your promenade."

Formidable Force. The skipper of the *Ricketts* was acting out of habit. Since World War II, the Mediterranean has been an American promenade from the Dardanelles to Gibraltar, 2,330 miles to the west. A formidable task force of warships and combat-ready Marines was posted in the Mediterranean to protect the southern flank of NATO, to "project force ashore" in the event of political crises,* and simply to show the U.S. flag. For a long time the Mediterranean was an American lake; any warship sighted was bound to be either friendly, neutral or innocuous.

Since 1964, however, the U.S. has increasingly had to share its *mare nostrum* with a constantly growing Russian fleet. Today the two forces are very nearly equal. The Sixth Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Isaac C. Kidd Jr. (who will shortly move upward to become head of the Naval Material Command and be replaced by Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller), consists of 45 ships, including three aircraft carriers, along with four submarines, 200 planes and 25,000 men. Under Vice Admiral V.N. Leonenkov, the Soviet force, an arm of the Black Sea fleet, consists of 40 to 60 ships, ten to 13 submarines and as many as 10,000 men—but no aircraft except those aboard the helicopter carriers *Moskva* or *Leningrad*. U.S. combat ships on the average are 19 years old; the Russian fleet averages only seven years. Of all Soviet warships serving in international waters, fully one-half are assigned to the Mediterranean. Says Kidd: "We walk a tightrope of adequacy."

In the Battle Zone. U.S. officers are understandably alarmed by this shifting of balances. Soviet naval strength on all oceans has been growing with remarkable rapidity for several years now (TIME cover, Feb. 23, 1968). "Nothing stops them," admits Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "They are moving in everywhere." Nowhere is this more true than in the Mediterranean. Warns U.S. Admiral Horacio Rivero Jr., the diminutive (5 ft. 3 in.) commander of NATO forces in southern Europe: "What was traditionally NATO's southern flank has developed into its southern front. The Mediterranean, which was for NATO part of the zone of the interior, a rear area, is now within the battle zone." Concern filters down to officers at sea with the fleet. "There is no feeling now of being on a second team," says Captain John E. Hansen, skipper of the 62,000-ton carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt*. Says Commander Richard Hopper, who heads the *Roosevelt's* 75-plane air group: "This used to be a sunshine cruise. Pilots volunteered from here for Viet Nam. Now the action is here."

The Russians have become a constant threat in the Mediterranean because they have learned to keep their ships on station and, as the U.S. does, resupply them at sea with the four essential *b*'s—bombs, bullets, beans and black oil. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy has carved out several important auxiliary ports for the fleet along the Mediterranean coasts. Among them are Latakia in Syria and Alexandria and Port Said in Egypt. The Russians, who now sail the western Mediterranean more frequently, have also shown an interest in using the Algerian seaport of Mers-el-Kebir. Last week they got another potential port of call when Malta's Labor Party won a one-vote majority in the island's Parliament. Malta has long been the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the British Mediterranean defense system, but Labor Party Leader Dom Mintoff won the election partly by promising the island's 320,000 inhal[illegible] to the West. The Russians do not really need another naval base, but they may find irresistible the idea of just showing the red flag on an island that was long a NATO bastion and won Britain's George Cross for heroism in World War II.

Historic Roles. In connection with Grechko's visit last week, *Izvestia* emphasized Russia's ancient historic role in the Mediterranean, tracing its beginnings to a navigation treaty signed by the Principality of Kiev in the 10th century. The Russian presence in the Mediterranean was forcefully reaffirmed in 1770 when Admiral Orlov defeated the Turkish fleet at Tchesme. Later the Russians made a series of amphibious landings on the Ionian islands and even captured Corfu in 1799. "No, we are not guests in this sea," crowed *Izvestia*. "Many glorious victories of our people are connected with it." (*Izvestia* conveniently forgets, of course, that soon afterward the Russians gave up Corfu and were bottled up behind the Bosporus by the Crimean War.) The U.S. is equally insistent on its Mediterranean rights, which date back to Stephen Decatur's arrival in 1803 to fight the Barbary pirates.

With both superpowers patrolling the Mediterranean in force, the grim game of surveillance is played in dead earnest. Both sides are particularly vigilant for submarines, which are difficult to detect in the shallow waters where thermal layers and the screws of some 2,000 merchantmen on any day distort sound. The watch is most intense at six main "choke points," or "ticket gates," as Admiral Kidd calls them, through which maneuvering submarines must pass. These are Gibraltar, the sea south of Sardinia and Sicily, and the areas between Crete and Greece, Crete and North Africa, and Crete and Turkey. Both sides keep watch on the choke points. At the same time, surface ships frequently shadow one another. Cruising aboard the *Roosevelt* recently, TIME Correspondent John Shaw was startled to come on deck one morning to find that during the night a Soviet *Kashin*-class destroyer had taken station 500 yds. away.

Triple Trailers. The same shadow game is played aloft, but there are very special rules. Soviet TU-16 Badger bombers with Egyptian markings fly out of Cairo West airbase to follow the Sixth Fleet and look for Polaris submarines. Whenever they get

* It happened only once, in 1958, when Marines waded onto Beirut beaches strewn with Coca-Cola b[illegible] ties to protect a pro-Western Lebanese government from a coup.

near the U[illegible] alert" is sounded, and Phantom jets are catapulted off the carriers to keep the Badgers from getting too close. The Phantoms always approach gradually and at an angle, sometimes drawing abreast of the Soviet planes. On one such occasion, a Phantom pilot was surprised to see his Soviet counterpart hold up a centerfold from, of all things, *Playboy* magazine.

The two fleets have one mission in common. Kidd estimates that much of his time, like that of the Soviets, is spent in showing the flag around the Mediterranean. Beyond that, however, the two forces have vastly different roles. The U.S. carriers and their Phantoms still have an offensive nuclear capacity against East bloc targets. Half the fleet's planes are kept in the air at all times in order to make certain that a surprise Soviet missile attack would not sink the entire Sixth Fleet strike force. The Russians, on the other hand, appear to be primarily intent on neutralizing the Sixth Fleet. For this purpose they have assembled an impressive array of missile power aboard their ships, including the 22-mile-range Styx aboard small gunboats, the 100-mile Strela aboard destroyers, and the 400-mile, supersonic Shaddock aboard Soviet cruisers.

To defend itself against the Russian missiles, the Sixth Fleet has patched together new responses in recent months. Two 240-ton patrol gunboats superpowered by jet engines have been transferred from Viet Nam as an experiment. The gunboats move so swiftly (top speed: 40 knots) that their crews must be strapped into their stations. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., who is Chief of Naval Operations, has dubbed them "triple trailers" because they are assigned to lurk behind the Soviet vessels that trail U.S. ships.

Rethinking Roles. The U.S. is also fitting out some ships with surface-to-surface standard missiles that have 35- to 60-mile ranges. In two or three years, after further research and development, more efficient Harpoon missiles will be introduced. In addition, in an unusual move for a nation that has traditionally developed its own weapons, the U.S. is considering buying either the Israeli surface-to-surface Gabriel missile or the French Exocet.

Ultimately the Navy and the Administration will have to make some new decisions about the Sixth Fleet's makeup and mission. It now defends NATO's supply lines, provides a small but sinewy landing force, supports and protects the Polaris nuclear submarines that operate out of the U.S. bases of Rota, Spain, and Holy Loch, Scotland, and furnishes a nuclear punch in case of war. With aging ships and outmoded ordnance, it is difficult enough to carry out those assignments. Since the fleet is taking on the added mission of neutralizing the Russians, the job may be growing close to impossible.



March 1972

UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS?

In the attached backgrounder and press reprints is evidence to support the contention that UNCTAD-III, scheduled for Santiago in mid-April, will produce little but rancor. If anything, with President Allende running the show (and abetted by Cuba, the latest "non-developed" to join the club), this session of UNCTAD promises to be pointedly anti-the-developed and more particularly, anti-U.S. Delegates are expected to come from some 140 countries; the topic has world-wide appeal. During the period between now and the opening of the conference, we suggest exploitation of points made in the backgrounder with the aim of somewhat muting the astringent propaganda that can be expected from UNCTAD III: the pro-government and government-controlled media of Chile can be relied on for thoroughly subjective reporting of conference proceedings.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972

UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS?

The third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD-III) is scheduled for mid-April to meet in Santiago, Chile, where President Salvador Allende will use the occasion, as he says himself "to break the deliberate campaign of lies and calumnies launched against our people from within and without." That Allende is pouring some $9 million into constructing a theatrical showcase to house the conference is indicative of the importance he attaches to UNCTAD-III.

Allende wants to use the conference to show the world his government's "progress on the democratic road to socialism" and to prove that his government is attacking Chile's economic problems intelligently. Now some Chilean officials are saying that construction of the theater-office complex and provision of adequate accommodations -- in less than a year -- is too ambitious an undertaking, particularly given other domestic economic problems. Allende has already called off an international trade fair that was to run simultaneously with the meeting. He had envisioned a sumptuous display of Third World products, but only the developed nations responded. And now, construction of the conference hall is lagging so far behind that there is doubt it can be finished before UNCTAD convenes.

In addition to Allende's stated aim of using UNCTAD as a propaganda forum, other new factors are likely to have considerable bearing on the political climate at UNCTAD. In October, under the sponsorship of Chile and Peru, Cuba joined the so-called "Group of 77" -- made up of the 95 developing countries which participate in UNCTAD. Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Cuba's delegate to the October preparatory meeting of the "Group of 77" held in Lima, told that assembly that Cuba was participating in the Lima meeting "because it was Latin American and Socialist. . .Cuba will continue to support, through international agencies and outside them, the just demands and revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia." The Third World, Roa said, would have to change its structure and outline a proper policy of liberation and development, though this change would not necessarily have to be socialist.

Another new factor will be the first delegation from Peking to attend such an international gathering. China's possible influence on the "Group 77" remains a question mark, but at the time of the Lima meeting, New China News Agency said on 5 November that the Group's call for unity against "big-power hegemony" had become the main current of the conference. It also quoted at length from Raul Roa's speech.

It is anticipated that some 2,600 delegates plus 500 journalists will come to UNCTAD-III representing some 140 countries, 50 intergovernmental organizations and 40 nongovernmental groups. Santiago, a city of three million people, has hotel rooms to house 1,600 delegates. The other 1,000 or so will go to furnished apartments or private homes. A correspondent's visit to UNCTAD headquarters revealed considerable confusion as to who would sleep where or with whom.

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NEW YORK TIMES
9 November 1971

80 Poor Nations Warn Rich Gap Cannot Remain Indefinitely

LIMA, Peru, Nov. 8 (Reuters) — Developing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America told the rich countries today that "indefinite coexistence between poverty and affluence is no longer possible."

The warning came in a preamble to a Declaration of Lima, adopted by delegates of 80 countries who have been meeting here since Oct. 25 to develop a joint strategy for the next confrontation with the industrialized nations. The indications were, however, that they have not succeeded in resolving regional differences to the degree that had been hoped in preparation for the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, due in Santiago, Chile, in April.

With that conference in mind, the delegates also adopted a "program of action."

African delegates appeared particularly upset by the results. One said that the that the action program only "papered over the cracks" of the interregional disputes.

The countries represented at the Lima meeting belonged to a loose organization called the Group of 77. Actually, there are 95 countries in the grouping, which got its name from the number of nations represented at the founding meeting in Algiers four years ago.

'Intensification of Protectionism'

LIMA, Nov. 8 (AP) — Delegates of the Group of 77 today criticized the "intensification of protectionism" among the developed countries and called on the United States to lift its 10 per cent surcharge on imports.

In a program drafted for presentation at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in April, they also called on the developed nations to establish a generalized system of trade preferences favoring the developing nations.

The delegates, who asked that any modification of the international monetary system take into account the interests of the developing nations, said they recognized the authority of the International Monetary Fund in dealing with such problems, but they asked for increased voting rights for the developing nations.

Lag in Per Capital Income

The group pointed out that while average per capita annual income increased by $650 in the developed nations during the nineteen-sixties, it grew by only $40 in the developing countries.

The participation of the developing nations in world exports diminished from 21.3 per cent in 1960 to 17.6 per cent in 1970, according to the final document.

The group agreed to intensify efforts in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity to bring about the reopening of the Suez Canal, closed since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The Afrikan delegates had sought a demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied during the 1967 war, but Asian and Latin-American nations refused to support the proposal on grounds that it was too political.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 October 1971

CUBA IS ACCEPTED IN ECONOMIC BLOC

Becomes the 95th Member of Influential Group of Developing Countries

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 20—Cuba has been accepted as the 95th member of an influential but loose grouping of developing countries that seek to formulate a joint strategy to protect their economic interests.

This decision was made last night at a meeting held in a conference room here. However, Israel failed to gain admission because of the opposition of Arab members.

Although there now are 95 members in the group of developing countries, they continue to refer themselves as the Group of Seventy-seven, the number that first joined in 1968 to seek a common economic strategy. They are mainly from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yugoslavia is the only European member.

The admission of Cuba to the group suggests that her relations with some Latin-American countries have continued to improve, but the move is not expected to please the United States.

In 1962, mainly at the urging of the United States, the Organization of American States suspended Cuba from its membership, charging that the Government of Premier Fidel Castro was aiding and instigating revolts in hemisphere countries. In 1964, the organization called on its member to cut diplomatic and trade ties.

Mexico did not heed the resolution; Chile resumed relations last November and there have been clear indications here that others are moving in the same direction.

In the General Assembly debate on this item, Mr. Mercado Arrin of Peru deplored the "prolonged isolation" of Cuba and urged that members of the O.A.S. be free to resume relations with Havana at whatever level they wished.

Peru is scheduled to be host to the next meeting of the group in Lima beginning Monday. Conference planners say that 82 countries have so far said they would send delegations headed by government ministers.

Cuba reportedly intends to send a 10-member delegation, possibly headed by Foreign Minister Raul Roa.

The conference is certain to give a high priority to the effects of President Nixon's new economic policies and particularly the 10 per cent surcharge on imports—a move most have attacked in speches here.

Before last night's session, Peru had sought to persuade Latin members that they could admit Cuba to the group without a major political shift for those reluctant to act.

The Peruvian formula, which was agreed to, admits Cuba as a developing country to the group but with the understanding that Dr. Jose Mora, who is qualified to join the subgroup made up of Latin members or the Latin-American caucus, which meets here from time to time on political and other matters.

At one point, the negotiations were nearly wrecked when Dr. Ricardo Alarcón, Cuba's chief delegate, in an assembly speech attacked Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.

Dr. Alarcón, who was waiting outside the room where the meeting was held last night, appeared undismayed by the qualified welcome being extended. Invited to enter, he delivered his first remarks in a moderate tone praised by one Latin listener as "muy tranquilo." He emerged smiling saying that "Cuba's legitimate rights have been recognized and a wrong has been rectified."

Although United States officials did not comment on the development officialy, it was clear they were unhappy, saying that Cuba had not demonstrated any change of policy but continued to support subversive groups.

WASHINGTON POST
27 January 1972

Showcase Lags, Allende Frets

SANTIAGO — Chilean President Salvador Allende put on his hard hat recently and lectured construction workers at the site of UNCTAD III, where 2,600 delegates from 140 nations are to meet in April:

"I came because, despite the persistence and energy of everyone working here, I have been afraid that the promise made would not be kept . . . Chile is internationally committed. Think what it would be if the conference could not open on the appointed day."

The nervous betting here is that the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development will open April 13 as scheduled, but that it will be close. If there is paint on the theater walls, it will be wet.

At the UNCTAD council meeting in Geneva last March, Chile requested that the conference, which will discuss economic problems of developing countries, be held here so that the world could see Allende's progress on the democratic road to socialism.

Now some officials concede that construction of a theater-office complex and provision of adequate accommodations—in less than a year—was too ambitious an undertaking given other economic problems here.

Allende has called off a trade fair that was to have run simultaneously with UNCTAD. He said that he had envisioned a showcase for Third World industry, but that only developed nations responded. Local difficulties were the tacit and probably determining factor in the cancellation.

Along with Allende and the workers under the bare beams of the UNCTAD theater the other day was the owner of the construction company. "We would be much further along if instead of 35 per cent voluntary work in Saturdays, we would have had 90 per cent," he said.

On weekdays, 1,100 workers put in three shifts. But to keep within range of the budget approved by Congress, Allende asked the unions for voluntary turns on the weekend.

Voluntary work gets much publicity in Chile these days, yet the attendance has been slack. "We ought to work 48 hours . . . constructing the new Chile," said the site boss of the Workers' Confederation, the Communist-led right arm of Allende's government.

"It hurts me that the figure for Saturday work is so low," said Allende. He announced that from now on the minister of labor would put in volunteer work at the site. He added with a smile, as the workers applauded: "I am going to come on a Saturday, too, and I'm not going to tell you which Saturday it will be."

Chile's committee for the UNCTAD preparations is headed by Felipe Herrera, former president of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington. He told the several hundred workers that there were enemies of UNCTAD, and the way to defeat them was to finish the building. Applause. Then he asked for more voluntary work, and at that point he had to ask for applause.

Later Herrera explained some of the difficulties in the project, which was budgeted at 100 million escudos ($6 million at the official rate) and $1 million for imported materials.

One imported item was asbestos plates, from the United States.

"They arrived on time, but by mistake only half were unloaded," he said.

"When we found out, we radioed the ship but it didn't want to return. So the boat was escorted into port in northern Chile. We could have lost months."

Herrera said that work schedules are being met, but while the dedication day of the site is to be March 31, he is talking in terms of early April completion.

Postponement of the conference was out of the question, he said, as the precedent could be disastrous for future international conclaves.

But there is a precedent of sorts.

Algeria was to have hosted a meeting of the Afro-Asian bloc in 1965 at a center that was hopelessly behind schedule. At that point the Algerian government fell, the meeting was forgotten and the bloc dissolved.

The first UNCTAD, in Geneva in 1964, was a forum for the underdeveloped nations to put their case for preferential trade and assistance policies to the industrial states.

Four years later, in New Delhi, the same countries met to denounce the developed nations' failure to respond to the needs set forth in Geneva. The conference was lengthy, and even its enthusiasts concede it produced little but rancor.

At the meeting here, pointed references will be made to the rich countries' previous acceptance of the goal of transferring 1 per cent of gross national product annually to the developing world—and to the general failure to meet this UNCTAD standard.

Other topics on the agenda are disarmament, shipping patterns, transfer of science and technology, environmental control and economic integration, all from the point of view of the underdeveloped world.

The closing date, like the opening date, is not certain. The conference could run well into May. This will be the first international economic conclave under the United Nations to be attended by Peking's delegates.

A major target of the ire of the underdeveloped countries, and especially of Chile, will be the United States. A fundamental point of Allende's foreign policy is that U.S. imperialism is the major cause of retarded growth throughout the hemisphere.

The United States will send a delegation, though the level of it has not yet been revealed.

Allende said the meeting "will be a great opportunity to break the deliberate campaign of lies and calumnies launched against our people from within and without."

Accommodations will be a problem for the visitors. This capital of 3 million people has hotel rooms to house 1,660 delegates The other 1,000 or more will be placed in furnished apartments and private houses. A visit to the UNCTAD offices showed considerable confusion as to who would sleep where.

Chileans are paying for the big theater through special taxes on cars, liquor and luxuries. It is to become a cultural center after the conference.

The adjoining 23-floor office building—which was actually four stories into the air when Chile was named UNCTAD host last March—is part of a renewal project. After Chile was named host of the conference the theater was added to the project.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

March 1972

DATES WORTH NOTING

March	USSR/International	70th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's What Is To Be Done. April is the 55th anniversary of Lenin's "April Theses."
March 5	USSR	Anniversary of Stalin's death in 1953.
March 6-Arpil 7	New York	28th session of the UN Commission of Human Rights.
March 8-15	USSR	55th anniversary of the February Revolution (February 23 - March 2, Old Calendar) which overthrew the Tsar, broke up the Tsarist Empire, and started Russia's short-lived attempt at free elections and parliamentary democracy, which ended with the Bolshevik seizure of power the following November.
March 11	Italy	13th Party Congress of the Italian Communist Party.
March 19	Poland	Parliamentary elections are to be held; the elections will be a year ahead of schedule.
March 20	USSR	15th Congress of the Soviet All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. Held every four years.
March 25	Brazil	50th anniversary of the Brazilian Communist Party.

March 29	USSR	1st anniversary of the arrest of Vladimir Bukovsky on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda. Bukovsky was recently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a forced labor camp. He had drawn attention to the Soviet Union's use of psychiatric imprisonment and "medical" torture for sane people who are dissidents.
April 13-May 17	Santiago	UNCTAD III meets (See article in this issue).
April 15	N. Korea	Kim Il Sung's 60th birthday, a landmark in Korea.
April 28	Japan	20th anniversary of the Japanese Peace Treaty (World War II). The treaty did not resolve the status of the Northern Territories seized by the USSR in the closing days of the war. By contrast, Okinawa is to revert from the U.S. to Japan on May 15.

SHORT SUBJECTS

UNCENSORED RUSSIA

Two March events can serve as pegs for focusing attention on the Human Rights Movement in the USSR and on the official Soviet disdain for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One, the publication in London of "Uncensored Russia" and the other, the 28th Session of the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights which opens in New York on 6 March.

"Uncensored Russia," edited and with an introduction by British author and Sovietologist, Peter Reddaway, was published by Jonathan Cape, 30 Bedford Square, London (£5.00). It is the documented story of the Human Rights Movement in the USSR -- the annotated text of the unofficial Moscow journal "A Chronicle of Current Events" (no.'s 1-11).

In his introduction, Peter Reddaway describes the growth of samizdat in the USSR over the last few years, stimulated partly by the tightening of censorship. He shows how contacts have formed between the different factions of dissent as they are revealed in the pages of the "Chronicle." Each chapter has an introduction by Mr. Reddaway, linking its theme to related passages; the items on a given subject appear chronologically and the text is generously annotated. A special feature of the book is its unique collection of 78 illustrations: photographs taken under difficult and dangerous conditions, in camps and prisons and during civil disturbances and smuggled out of Russia at considerable risk to the couriers.

"This is a most important book," writes Leonard Schapiro. "Mr. Reddaway's work lays finally to rest any doubts that anyone may have harboured about the authenticity of this material, which no student of Soviet society, or indeed anyone who follows the survival of the human spirit in diversity can now ignore." Enough said! (Watch "Press Comment" for reviews. U.S edition to be published in March by American Heritage, $10.00.)

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ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PROTESTS TREATMENT OF JOURNALISTS IN PRAGUE

The Italian Communist Party was the only major party in the West to unequivocally condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Since that time, it has continued to criticize the new Czech leadership for its dogmatism and for its repression of the freedoms enjoyed under Dubcek. Prague has again aroused the ire of the Italian comrades by its heavy-handed treatment of Italian journalists, including an Italian correspondent of l'Unita, a party member since 1938, who was arrested and summarily expelled from Czechoslovakia.

The official daily of the Italian Communisty Party (PCI), in its 9 February issue under the heading "An Absurd Court Order" protested the expulsion from Czechoslovakia the first week in February of its Prague correspondent, Ferdi Zidar. Zidar -- who is also a member of the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists, a Communist front headquartered in Prague -- was charged by Czech security organs with contacting former party members now accused of an "anti-state activity." Emphasizing that Zidar was doing no more than carrying out his newspaper duties as instructed, l'Unita wrote: "As an activist of our party, comrade Zidar adhered most strictly to the political line of the Italian Communist Party... Our protest is sharp and resolute." l'Unita pointed out that Zidar has been a PCI activist since 1938 and that he had previously been imprisoned by Italian fascists and by the Nazis. Presumably, this allusion to Zidar's other jailers was not lost on Czech (and Soviet) authorities.

The following day, 11 February, l'Unita ran a lengthy news item reporting the steps taken by the Italian National Press Federation on behalf of Valerio Ochetto, a left-wing journalist employed by Italian radio and television, who was arrested in Prague in early January. An Italian "Committee to Free Valerio Ochetto," supported by the Communist-dominated CGIL among other labor and media organizations, appealed to international public opinion through large ads in Le Monde and the New York Times. The ads said that Ochetto is probably the only journalist in the world who is in prison because of his work. As a result of this pressure Ochetto was finally released in mid-February.

Another l'Unita article on 11 February served to raise the temperature level between Rome and Prague by several degrees. This time the PCI took Prague to task for the way it treated its own intellectuals and journalists. Quoting the PCI theoretical monthly, Rinascita, l'Unita wrote: "We know some of the comrades who were attacked, for example, Karel Kosik, Karel Batosek, Karel Kaplan and Milan Huebel, and we consider them to be communists by training and by their activist spirit, by their rich contribution to the search and the struggle for ideas free from dogmatism, as intellectuals of high standards strongly committed to a socialist society in Czechoslovakia. But, the serious news from Prague raises questions of a broader nature. When the new methods (Ed.: a reference to the Prague "spring") came to an end, we did not approve -- and expressed our dissent in these columns -- with methods which tried to resolve severe political disagreement by exile, by the humiliation of Communist activists who were forced to find whatever work they could in order to live. In all this difficulty, one point appeared to have been gained: the pledge that there would be no reprisals and that no political trials would take place. Do the arrests this week mean that this pledge is to be defaulted? Do they presage the triumph of a rationale the price of which has already been so high?

Certainly, the class struggle is a bitter one and the confrontation between imperialism and socialism harsh. The task of socialist change is difficult in any country. But precisely because we have a clear awareness of this, because we know how many positive things have been set free for humanity through communist achievements, we believe that a critical examination of the past and present is worthwhile. Worthwhile because it tells us that force used by the working class in power can never be the arbiter, that the moment of coercion must never betray the substance and form of socialist legality, that revolutionary discipline must never aim at silencing dissent, particularly where -- as in this case -- events have been somewhat unusual."

* * * * * *

P.S. TO SOLJENITSYNE

"A Year in the Life of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn," which was included in the February Perspectives called special attention to Leopold Labedz' excellent compilation of documents pertaining to the Solzhenitsyn case, published by MacMillan. The same work is also available in French, entitled "Soljenitsyne Accuse" and published in Paris, 1971, by Dominique Wapler. The French edition was translated by Guy Piquemal and also includes an introduction by Armand Lanoux of the Académie Goncourt.

1'UNITA, Rome
9 February 1972

Measures taken against Comrade Zidar
by the Czech Security authorities

An Absurd Court Order

Comrade Ferdi Zidar, member of the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists, headquartered in Prague, last week was arrested and subsequently asked to leave Czechoslovakia. This happened after comrade Zidar had been asked (on the basis of Article 16 of the Public Security Law) to explain his connections with former members of the Czech Communisty Party who previously occupied leading positions and who now have allegedly been accused of anti-state activity. Comrade Zidar firmly rejected the accusation of having participated in any illegal activity and of having in any way abused the hospitality of the Czech state.

Since Comrade Zidar was called upon to be a member of the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists in his capacity as a democratic Italian journalist and since he comes from the editorial staff of 1'Unita, our newspaper asked the International Organization of Journalists to protest vis-a-vis the Czech security authorities responsible for this incident. Comrade Zidar has been an activist in our Party since 1938; he was jailed first by the Fascists and then deported to Buckenwald by the Nazis. He has been working for the Communist press since 1943 and since August 1969 has been on the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists.

We strongly hope that -- as could have happened -- the action taken vis-a-vis comrade Zidar was unauthorized. However, even in such a case, our protest is firm and sharp. Comrade Zidar has always carried out his assignments with the greatest integrity even in the recent difficulties concerning the case of the journalist Ochetto.

As a PCI militant, comrade Zidar -- as was his duty -- has adhered most loyally to the political line of our Party in all circumstances. This line includes non-interference in the internal political affairs of other parties.

1'UNITA, Rome
9 February 1972

Preso contro il compagno Zidar

da parte delle autorità di sicurezza cecoslovacche

Un assurdo provvedimento

Il compagno Ferdi Zidar, membro della segreteria dell'Organizzazione internazionale dei giornalisti che ha sede a Praga, è stato nella settimana scorsa fermato e quindi invitato a lasciare la Cecoslovacchia. Ciò è avvenuto dopo che al compagno Zidar sono stati chiesti chiarimenti (in base all'art. 16 della legge di pubblica sicurezza) sui rapporti avuti con ex membri del Partito comunista cecoslovacco i quali ebbero in passato funzioni dirigenti e sarebbero oggi accusati di svolgere attività antistatale. Il compagno Zidar ha respinto con fermezza l'accusa di aver partecipato a qualsiasi attività in contrasto con le leggi cecoslovacche e di avere in qualsiasi modo abusato della ospitalità dello Stato cecoslovacco.

Poichè il compagno Zidar era stato chiamato a far parte della segreteria dell'Organizzazione internazionale dei giornalisti nella sua qualità di giornalista democratico italiano e proviene dalla redazione dell'*Unità*, il nostro giornale si è rivolto alla Organizzazione internazionale dei giornalisti perchè esprima la sua protesta verso quelle autorità di sicurezza che sono responsabili di questo episodio. Il compagno Zidar è militante del nostro Partito dal 1938, è stato incarcerato e confinato dai fascisti prima, è stato — poi — deportato a Buchenwald dai nazisti. Egli lavora nella stampa comunista dal 1943 e dall'agosto del 1969 era membro della segreteria dell'Organizzazione internazionale dei Giornalisti.

Noi ci auguriamo vivamente che, com'è possibile che accada, la misura assunta nei confronti del compagno Zidar sia il frutto di una iniziativa incontrollata. Anche in tal caso, tuttavia, la nostra protesta è ferma e recisa. Il compagno Zidar ha assolto sempre i compiti cui è stato chiamato con lo scrupolo più assoluto, anche nella recente vicenda riguardante il caso del giornalista Ochetto.

In quanto militante del PCI, il compagno Zidar ha naturalmente mantenuto — com'era suo dovere — la fedeltà più ferma alla linea politica del nostro Partito in ogni circostanza. Di questa linea fa parte la non ingerenza negli affari interni degli altri partiti.