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
PERSPECTIVES

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1972

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
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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST BLOODBATH: MYTH OR REALITY?

From time to time controversy arises as to whether the Vietnamese Communists would perpetrate a bloodbath if they succeeded in gaining control of South Vietnam. The controversy has arisen again in the pages of the press because of an essay by one D. Gareth Porter, a young graduate student at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, known for his anti-Vietnam war views. The essay once again tries to dispute the well established fact that the North Vietnamese leadership in the mid-fifties conducted a bloodbath in liquidating great numbers of opponents of their regime during a "land reform" at the time. There have been other "Porters" in the past who have similarly tried to discount or minimize the fact of past Communist bloodbaths and the possibility of future bloodbaths.

The chief argument of "revisionist" historians like Porter rests on the idea that the exact number of persons liquidated is in doubt and cannot be proved. By this logic, Stalin's wholesale liquidation of real and imagined oppositionists during his land reform in the early thirties can also be called (and indeed for years was called) a myth by the Porters of the time since the exact number of his victims was in doubt and could not be verified. In a way, it comes down to a "numbers game": how many hundreds or thousands have to be arbitrarily murdered before one speaks of a bloodbath?

Other arguments of the revisionist historians are equally specious. They cite mistranslations and misinterpretations of North Vietnamese official pronouncements concerning such matters, but it is hard to see how their "corrected" translations are a warrant for believing the massacres did not take place. Also, while discounting voluminous non-Communist testimony and research as anti-Communist "propaganda," they, at the same time, typically take North Vietnamese accounts, for example of the land reform, at face value. They ignore the undisputed fact, acknowledged even by the Communist regimes, that their mass media are used primarily to influence opinion i.e. to propagandize, and only secondarily to impart factual information. Distortion of facts and out-and-out lies by Communist mass media as well as in official pronouncements of various kinds are familiar phenomena. While it is quite legitimate to re-examine the historical record, it is a patently unsound research practice (to put the most charitable view on it) to accept only the Communist version as being correct and either to ignore contrary views resulting from serious research, or denigrate them as mere "anti-Communist propaganda."

The revisionist historians' arguments are examined closely and at length, and effectively refuted in a New York Times Magazine article of 15 October 1972 by John S. Carroll, a U.S. correspondent for many years in Vietnam and now Washington correspondent of the Baltimore Sun. Revisionist views are also challenged by a number of other persons eminently qualified to address the problem by virtue of their first-hand experience in Vietnam and talks with numbers of North Vietnamese who fled South from the land reform terror. Their views, expressed in letters to the editor of the Washington Post, as well as Carroll's investigation, are attached hereto. See especially also Washington Star columnist Crosby Noyes' succinct and persuasive statement.

Reproduced as an attachment also are two sections of a booklet, The Vietcong Strategy of Terror by Douglas Pike, one of the ranking experts on North Vietnam and the Vietcong. In these sections he recounts carefully the 1968 mass murders by the Communists in Hue, and painstakingly catalogues cases of atrocities by Vietnamese Communists between 1960 and 1970. This record of Communist terrorism is supplemented by the attached newspaper accounts of Communist atrocities since the beginning of the invasion launched last March. Taken together, these public accounts provide a reliable and fairly comprehensive record of Communist terror from which each reader can decide for himself what would most likely happen in the event of a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
15 October 1972

AFTER WE GET OUT, WILL THERE BE A BLOODBATH IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

By John S. Carroll

What would happen if the United States cut off all the guns, bullets and bombs the Thieu regime needs to survive? George McGovern, who promises to do just that if given the chance, has a scenario.

First, President Thieu and his colleagues would clear out of Saigon. A coalition would emerge which would initially embrace all the major elements on South Vietnam's richly variegated political landscape and then negotiate a merger with the North. Yes, there would be bloodshed. Perhaps, McGovern says, several hundred people might be assassinated.

This opinion was not reached casually. It is grounded in a number of current writings in the press, plus scholarly publications and memos from such authorities as Prof. George McT. Kahin, head of the Southeast Asia program at Cornell. Taken together, it is a fascinating body of literature, one which attempts to uproot much of what pre-Nixon Administration historians believed about what happened in a similar situation—the Communist victory in North Vietnam in 1954.

This revisionism has come as a response to President Nixon's strident warnings of a bloodbath in South Vietnam. It was, as we shall see, developed hastily, and then eagerly seized upon by well-meaning writers, lawyers and politicians who wanted to believe that pulling the plug on the Saigon Government would be morally inexpensive, if not free. Today at least one of the principal assumptions on which the revisionist history rests is not even believed by its own author. Others are demonstrably false.

All this is interesting for the effect it could have on the election and, in turn, the effect on foreign policy. Perhaps the voters, after weighing the bloodbath of continued war against the probably smaller bloodbath of a Communist take-over, will choose the latter. But they should do so with eyes open. The choice should be painful.

As a pro- or anti-war issue, the bloodbath theory must naturally be considered along with other questions, such as the human cost of the bombing of North Vietnam and the possibility that the Saigon Government will ultimately crumble with or without our support. Taken alone, the bloodbath argument says something about the use of "history" in politics. Nixon uses the most extreme accounts of past killing to predict future mayhem. McGovern, in spite of his careers as historian and Vietnam spokesman, sweeps the whole problem under the rug by subscribing to shaky re-investigations of the past designed to reach predetermined conclusions.

Before dealing with the revisionists, we should look

quickly at what is being revised. Nixon argues that a Communist victory would bring death to "perhaps one million marked for assassination because they fought against North Vietnamese attempts to conquer South Vietnam." He bases his argument on captured Communist documents, broadcasts and publications which speak of "blood debtors," "tyrants" and "reactionaries" and on the belief that the Lao Dong (Communist) party of Vietnam has always consolidated power with the use of executions and terror. The Nixon Administration cites any number of incidents, such as the Vietminh's 1945-46 "coalition" period, or current reports of atrocities in hamlets captured since the North Vietnamese offensive began last spring. But for the most part Nixon aides rest their case on two events: the "land-reform" program in North Vietnam after the Communist victory in 1954 and the mass executions in the South Vietnamese city of Hue in 1968.

What took place after the 1954 take-over depends on which expert one consults. Speaking last year to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Nixon told of "half a million, by conservative estimates, in North Vietnam who were murdered or otherwise exterminated. . . ." (Nixon's estimates vary. His speeches suggest that he considers it bad luck, or perhaps bad politics, to use the same number twice. On the number of Catholics who fled the North in 1954, for example, he has used 1.5 million, 850,000 and 800,000, in that order. He is headed in the right direction; the correct number is generally believed to be 600,000 to 800,000.) The President's estimate is more than almost any to be found outside the White

House. Yet there is, in support of his underlying point, an impressive body of writing which says there were, indeed, executions on a mass scale in which so-called "land-reform" tribunals administered death penalties, often on the basis of death quotas for each village. For example:

Robert Shaplen, the respected New Yorker correspondent and author of several books on Southeast Asia, including "The Lost Revolution," estimates that between 40,000 and 50,000 people were killed during the land-reform period.

Hoang Van Chi, a North Vietnamese intellectual who fled in 1955 and is now in Washington with the Agency for International Development, has written that 100,000 died following a Central Committee order raising the death quota from one to five per village.

Prof. Gérard Tongas, a French Vietminh sympathizer who stayed in North Vietnam until 1959 and developed a loathing for the regime, wrote that 100,000 died under a formula of one execution per 500 inhabitants, "which meant easily an average of 5 or 10 per village."

P. J. Honey, a British authority, writes that "hundreds of thousands of patently guiltless people were done to death in the most cruel fashion. . . ."

Anita Lauve Nutt, now a Rand Corporation consultant, says that as an official in the United States Embassy in Saigon in the mid-nineteen-fifties she handled "stacks" of reports from Vietnamese families whose relatives were killed in the land reform.

Similarly, Robert F. Turner, a researcher at Stanford's Hoover Institute, writes that as an American official in 1971 and 1972, he interviewed witnesses from "widely scat-

tered parts" of North Vietnam, including two who had actually been judges in the tribunals. His conclusion: "Whether the actual bloodbath was 300,000 or 500,000—it is quite clear that a major purge did occur and that the casualties numbered in six digits."

The late Bernard B. Fall, one of the few scholars to be held in high regard by doves and hawks alike, wrote: "While it is obviously impossible to give precise figures, the best educated guesses on the subject are that probably close to 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed in connection with the land reform and that at least twice as many were arrested and sent to forced labor camps."

What is the revisionist response to such a barrage of testimony? There are several counterarguments, the first of which is:

Political reprisals after 1954 against those who had sided with the French simply never happened.

This is the contention of an article published in 1969 in *Christian Century* and widely repeated. The authors, D. Gareth Porter (a junior colleague of Professor Kahin at Cornell) and Len E. Ackland, rely on the absence of evidence of a bloodbath in reports of the International Control Commission, the peacekeeping organization set up by the Geneva Conference in 1954. "International Control Commission (I.C.C.) reports," the authors begin, "while not definitive, give us a reasonable account of the situation in North Vietnam after the 1954 accords." On this slender reed, the authors base their conclusion that nothing resembling a bloodbath took place then.

The publication of the *Christian Century* article was a case of rare timing. On Nov. 3, 1969, only two days before, Nixon had given a hard-line television speech in which he raised the bloodbath specter. (This time the figures were "dozens of

thousands" dead in "slave labor camps.") Those who wanted to refute the President made enthusiastic use of the *Christian Century* findings. Reports of the I.C.C. were soon being hailed as authoritative accounts of the post-1954 events in North Vietnam. The argument, couched in language almost identical to that in the *Christian Century*, was used in quick succession by Professor Kahin (*New York Times* Dec. 6, 1969), Tom Wicker (*The Times*, May 12, 1970), and Clark Clifford (*Life*, May 22, 1970). It also turned up in a book called "Atrocities in Vietnam: Myths and Realities" by Edward S. Herman. It was the lead-off argument in a study prepared by two Washington lawyers, Charles E. Hill and Frank W. Lloyd III, and inserted into *The Congressional Record* on Aug. 28, 1970, by Senator McGovern. The argument was used as recently as Sept. 23 of this year, this time in a column by Clayton Fritchey on the op-ed page of *The Washington Post*.

Apart from the I.C.C.'s structural infirmities—it was the cold war in miniature with Canada on one side, Poland on the other and a nervous India at the fulcrum—there are several well-known reasons why the land-reform deaths never turned up in the I.C.C. reports. One is a legal end run the Hanoi regime made around the Geneva regulations. By early 1955, the regime had made a very significant change in its laws to allow political reprisals to be carried out in the land-reform tribunals—a part of the civil administration which the I.C.C. could not touch. Wilfred Burchett, the pro-Hanoi Australian correspondent, who would certainly be the last journalist to fabricate unfavorable stories about North Vietnam, wrote that the legal changes were "partly made necessary by the 'no reprisals' clause in the Geneva Agreements. . . . The tribunals were abolished and replaced by the

People's Tribunals with judgments pronounced by the properly constituted provincial courts."

One needs only the most casual familiarity with the I.C.C. to appreciate the absurdity of considering its reports a "reasonable account." Bernard Fall provided two illustrations in an article in this Magazine ("How the French Got Out of Vietnam," May 2, 1965). In North Vietnam, the I.C.C. attempted to inspect Haiphong's Catbi airport, the largest airfield in the country, but permission was denied on grounds that Catbi "belongs to a private flying club." That was the end of that investigation. In South Vietnam, Fall recalled asking an Indian I.C.C. official about a U.S. aircraft carrier which was clearly violating the rules by unloading warplanes—within sight of Saigon's main thoroughfare. He was told that "officially [emphasis Fall's] we have not been informed of the presence of the aircraft carrier."

Recently I spoke by telephone with Gareth Porter, co-author of the *Christian Century* article which popularized the I.C.C. argument. He said then he was soon coming out with another article to prove Nixon wrong, but this one would be based on different evidence. He acknowledged that the original I.C.C. approach is weak: "I don't think I'd want to base the argument on the I.C.C. reports at this point."

The second thrust of the antibloodbath argument is as follows:

There were executions but they were connected with land reform—not with the Communists' assumption of power.

This theme, one of Senator McGovern's favorites, has been sounded again and again in the literature of the revisionists. To pluck out one example, the Hill-Lloyd study, which Senator McGovern put in the *Congressional Record*, contends that the land reform program was not that—land reform. The

deaths "actually took place in connection with Hanoi's efforts to mobilize the local peasantry and redistribute to peasants land held by landholders, not as planned reprisal for pre-1954 activities nor to eliminate potential opposition and consolidate control." McGovern recently repeated much the same statement, adding that the killings occurred two years after the Communists came to power.

There can be no serious doubt that the land-reform courts were used for purposes beyond land reform. The excesses, which eventually stirred rebellion among the peasantry, even included executions of people who were neither landowners nor collaborators with the French. Bernard Fall writes that "the lack of real landowners (those who indeed could be classed as such had of course fled southward in 1954 and 1955) compelled Hanoi to put on trial as 'reactionary landlords' men and women who were by no stretch of the imagination rich landowners. . . . In the hands of pro-Peking leaders such as the party secretary, Truong Chinh, every village felt compelled to produce its own 'quota' of such reactionaries. Perhaps 50,000 were executed." Is this really land reform?

Professor Kahin goes beyond most others in contending that the deaths were distinct from the take-over, not only in concept, but also in time. He repeatedly insists—in the face of writings which include a textbook he himself edited—that the deaths did not take place for more than two years after the end of the war. In his *Times* article, for example, he criticizes Nixon for an "appalling misunderstanding of what actually happened," and then goes on to demonstrate his own misunderstanding by stating: "It was in the fall of 1956, more than two years after the Geneva Armistice that violence occurred on a significant scale in the north." In another article, he goes so far as to misquote Joseph Buttinger on the timing, although Buttinger is

admirably clear on this point.

Buttinger and other historians believe the deaths began not two years after the takeover, but in some provinces, slightly before the 1954 victory and, after a hiatus to stem the southward flow of refugees, again in 1955. The violence was slowed by the regime in the summer of 1956 when widespread unrest became apparent, but the change in policy came too late to prevent the peasant rebellion that fall—which, it should be pointed out, took a good part of the North Vietnamese 325th Division to put down.

A third theme runs through the revisionist arguments:

The number killed was probably only 10,000 to 15,000—and that may be high.

The influential Christian Century article uses the 10,000-15,000 figures and attributes them to Buttinger. However, it is also pointed out that Buttinger's "sympathies lay with Diem," as if to suggest that he may have been overstating the misdeeds of the North.

Among the historians who are most respected in this country, Buttinger provides the lowest estimate—and the lowest by far, as we have seen. It is a fraction of the figure used by Bernard Fall and Robert Shaplen and a smaller fraction still of the figures provided by Gérard Tongas, Hoang Van Chi, Robert Turner and P. J. Honey. It should be regarded as a minimum not a maximum. There is and probably never will be any way of knowing the extent of the killing in North Vietnam or the exact manner in which it was carried out. There is no doubt, however, that a great many people died. If the Communists take control in South Vietnam and do not execute large numbers of people, it will be a very real departure from past practices. If by that time there are executions, it is doubtful that anyone would be able to do so again, even know about them for certain.

Another popular theme of the revisionists is that the potential victims are elements Vietnamese society might well be better off without:

General Thieu and his associates are the ones who are threatened.

Senator McGovern himself has probably done more than anyone else to spread this belief. Again and again he has declared that the sacrifices in Vietnam have been for the purpose of saving Thieu. Recently he said on television that if Thieu and "some of his friends feel endangered" they could be granted asylum in the United States. As for less prominent South Vietnamese, he has explained what happens when the Communists attain power:

"When they take over a village, they don't assassinate the people there. They set up a school and a road system and a tax system. They just move in and take over. They don't kill the people, even though the village may have been indifferent or hostile . . ."

Again, consider the land-reform tribunals. Many people did not live to enjoy those roads and the schools and the people executed were not generals and prime ministers.

To suggest that the bloodbath primarily threatens Thieu, Ky, the militarists, corrupt politicians and other unsavory characters is misleading. One must assume that the big operators have taken out life insurance policies in the form of emergency escape routes and European bank accounts. What the bloodbath theorists are talking about is the literally millions of people who have openly supported the Government by working as civilians in the national, province, district, village or hamlet apparatus, or in the military, or for the United States.

Having cleared away the debris from the first wave of the land reform, what is shaping up as the

new wave, again started by Gareth Porter of Cornell. Porter has now circulated his new paper, which attacks the bloodbath theory as being based on "propaganda and careless scholarship," and then, relying on the party newspaper Nhan Dan and other official North Vietnamese publications, concludes that only 800 to 2,500 persons were executed during the land reform.

Porter contends that, for one thing, Hoang Van Chi mistranslated North Vietnamese documents and speeches. The most serious case, he says, is Chi's translation of the 1956 speech in which Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap discussed the mistakes committed in the land reform program. Giap admits that the party "executed too many people" according to the Chi translation—but Porter says this should have said merely that there was an "unjust disciplining of innocent people." Chi also says the speech contains an admission that officials "resorted to terror." Here again Porter says the translation is wrong; it should have said, "used excessive repressive measures." These are two of eight examples.

At best, Chi seems guilty of failing to explain that his translations are not literal. At worst, his work is "fraudulent," as Porter asserts. But even if one reads Giap as translated by Porter, it is hard to believe that he isn't using elliptical language to describe terrible events. Chi, and others who speak both Vietnamese and English, say that loose translations are frequently used in dealing with Lao Dong party jargon, which is often euphemistic. "Unjust disciplining" does mean executions, they say, just as "excessive repressive measures" means terror.

There remains one other disturbing aspect of the Porter paper. After criticizing others for making use of propaganda, he repeatedly re-

sources as "official documentary evidence," or "the actual historical record." In these impressive-sounding sources he has found little evidence of a bloodbath. Hanoi has not accused itself of murder; therefore, it is innocent.

Apart from the historical arguments, McGovern bases his antibloodbath faith on his judgment of what the Communists intend to do today, not what they did 18 years ago.

In July of 1969 he said his then recent visit to Paris had been helpful in making this assessment. "When I suggested to Hanoi and N.L.F. (National Liberation Front) delegations that some Americans fear a bloodbath during or after an American withdrawal," he said, "they replied that just the opposite would happen—the killing would stop . . . as for reprisals against those Vietnamese who have stood with our forces, they said that it would be in the self-interest of any regime to try to broaden its support and unify the country, which would call not for reprisals but accommodation."

This August he said, "Any administration coming into power has to consolidate its position with the people. You don't do that by just widespread killing and terror. With the notion of a benevolent, all-embracing coalition, McGovern has come up with a particularly American solution to a Vietnamese problem. Franklin D. Roosevelt is part of our tradition, not theirs.

It is true that Ho Chi Minh himself publicly repudiated the excesses of the land-reform program, but the repudiation was not necessarily sincere. It was made in 1956 at the time of the peasant revolt, and was thus expedient. Writing about the repudiation, Ralph Smith of the University of London concluded that the results of the land-reform campaign were irreversible and were something "no one in the party's

Pollburo can seriously have wished to change."

The Administration's reply to those who say the Vietnamese Communists have changed their ways is simple: Look at Hue.

"We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year," Nixon said in 1969. "During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death and buried in mass graves."

There are several detailed studies of the Hue killings. The one best liked by the White House is by Douglas Pike, an officer of the United States Information Agency who has written extensively on the N.L.F. He concludes

that in addition to the initial executions of civil servants, police officials, military men and community leaders, there was an ominous phase during which the Communists thought they could hold the city forever, and set out to shape it to their liking.

"Orders went out," Pike writes, "to round up what one prisoner termed 'social negatives'." Pike estimates that 2,000 died in this period, including a significant portion of the intellectual community. He describes the destruction of a prominent "community leader" and his family. Not only was the man executed, but so were his wife, his married son and daughter-in-law, his young unmarried daughter, a male and female servant, their baby, the cat and the goldfish.

If Pike's analysis is sound,

the events in Hue portend brutal social engineering under a Communist regime.

The counterargument to Pike comes from Len E. Ackland, the co-author of the Christian Century article, who lived in Hue during 1967 and returned after Tet to reconstruct the occupation in Gia Hoi, a precinct of 25,000 residents.

Ackland agrees that there were some blacklist killings at first. He writes that during the first week and a half, the deaths included executions of people "as examples" for failing to report as ordered to meetings, as well as killings of selected individuals "because they had been particularly unpopular with Hue's population." The mass deaths came, Ackland goes on, when the Vietcong were being pushed out of the city. Sud-

denly "re-education" lists became liquidation lists. Ackland concludes that the deaths were a result of the destruction sown by an army in retreat.

Whether the Pike study proves that Communist rule would be a bloodbath, as the Nixon side insists, may be open to debate. Yet in reading the Ackland study, which tries to refute this idea, one can hardly be encouraged by the treatment accorded the people of Hue, even prior to the "army in retreat" period. Is there any reason that those killed for not showing up at meetings, or for being "particularly unpopular," would have fared any differently if the Communists had controlled the entire country and not just Hue? "A revolution," Mao Tse-tung once said, "is not a dinner party." ■

WASHINGTON STAR
28 September 1972

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CROSBY S. NOYES

Communists Wouldn't Be Merciful in the South

It is very reassuring indeed to be informed by a variety of Washington armchair experts on Vietnam that predictions of a "bloodbath" if the Communists take over in that country are a myth that need not be taken seriously by anyone.

This convenient finding — which is made in support of George McGovern's proposals to surrender South Vietnam to Communist rule — holds that President Nixon had it all wrong when he estimated in 1971 that perhaps a half-million people were exterminated by the North Vietnamese after they took over from the French in 1954.

Still another Vietnam "scholar," one Gareth Porter of Cornell University, has come forth to challenge the authority for that estimate. Its origin, he says, was a book published in 1964 by a North Vietnamese exile named Hoang Van Chi which was financed by the CIA. It was with "fraudulent documentation" and is a "totally unreli-

ble account, the intention of which was plainly not historical accuracy, but propaganda against North Vietnam . . ."

Hoang Van Chi himself, who now works for the training center of the State Department, admits that his figure of a half-million casualties was "just a guess — an estimate that nobody could figure." And so it is concluded by the armchair experts that the whole idea of a bloodbath in the South is a fake and a myth, concocted for propaganda purposes.

Well, on this basis, we have been living quite a while with a number of myths.

We can only guess, for example, at how many Jews were exterminated in Germany under Hitler's Third Reich. There is no one who can tell you within a few million or so how many Russians were liquidated by Joseph Stalin during the 1930s. There are no reliable figures — and much the same is true of the millions killed in China or North Korea as the Communists consolidat-

ed their power in those countries — or how many within a factor of 10 in Biafra and Bangladesh.

One may wonder, too, just how relevant what happened in North Vietnam after 1954 may be to what would happen in South Vietnam if the Communists took over there. However many were exterminated, it might be pointed out that these were people who elected to remain under the Communist regime. Under the terms of the Geneva agreement with the French, anyone who wanted to leave North Vietnam to live in the South was free to do so. And nearly 1 million, out of a population of 15 million, elected to leave their homes.

In 1954, then, Ho Chi Minh was consolidating his hold on a population presumably solidly united behind him in his fight against French colonial rule. Many others in addition to Hoang Van Chi have reached the conclusion that he did not go about it gently. A 1967 report of the Senate Republican Policy Committee (a report, incidentally, highly critical of

our involvement in the war) notes that:

"Those who opposed his rule were killed. At least 50,000, perhaps as many as 100,000, were slaughtered. A peasant uprising was put down brutally. Small landowners — many of them with only a tiny fraction of an acre — were treated as though they were absentee landlords: They were shot."

In any event, a Communist takeover in the South today would be a far different proposition. After some 16 years of bitter war and hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, the population in the South is overwhelmingly anti-Communist. It will resist a Communist takeover as long as it has the means to do so. And the Communists—who already have used every conceivable form of brutality against unarmed civilians in this war—will most certainly not be suddenly merciful in their moment of victory.

enough already of what could be expected. A far more rele-

vant portent is what happened in Hue in the course of the 1968 Tet offensive. The Communist forces held the city from Jan. 31 to Feb. 24 that year. And still today, mass graves are being discovered that so far have yielded more than 3,000 civilians who had been clubbed or shot to death.

The same thing on a lesser scale has happened in count-

less villages throughout South Vietnam where the North Vietnamese have temporarily taken over control. The Communists have provided far too many demonstrations of their techniques of population control in Vietnam and elsewhere to permit any illusions about what would happen if they came to power in Saigon.

To be sure, the armchair ex-

perts who proclaim that predictions of a bloodbath in Vietnam are a myth don't have much to worry about. If their predictions turn out to be regrettably inaccurate, they will be a comfortable 8,000 miles away from any unpleasantness. And it is very unlikely that anyone will be able to say with real assurance how many were killed.

WASHINGTON POST
20 September 1972

CPYRGHT

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Gen. Lansdale Replies

I was shocked to read the cruel statement of D. Gareth Porter, a Cornell student, in The Washington Post of 12 September. He claims that it is a "myth" that thousands of people died in North Vietnam's land reform program. His claim is a cruel one because it attempts to make "non-persons" of thousands of Vietnamese farmers who went through some savage hell, including getting killed by troops and being starved to death, only because they wanted some basic social justice from the authorities placed over them by Hanoi's Politburo.

I admit that I was unfashionable in the way I got my own information about this subject. I talked with survivors of these bloodbaths of North Vietnam's "land reforms." They were farmers who had stayed in North Vietnam after the great exodus of refugees from the North in 1954-1955 and

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

had fully expected to live the rest of their lives on the land of their homes. Most had only small farms by American standards, from 2 to 10 or 12 acres. By the mockery of the "people's courts" system, they were found guilty of owning land and were dispossessed. So many of these farmers refused to leave their homes that troops were brought in to help the police evict them. The farmers fought back with sticks and stones and hoes, which were no match for the firepower of the troops. Thousands died.

This was the farmer's revolt of North Vietnam that came out of the North Vietnamese land program of the Fall of 1956. With farms idle in the years following this revolt, there was great scarcity of food in the farm areas of North Vietnam and the Politburo, despite all of its rhetoric, did little to relieve the suffering. Thousands more died of starvation. Survivors tried to flee out of these tragic areas. Road blocks were set up by troops and police to keep them in place. Many were stopped. Others, however, man-

aged to escape and, after incredibly dangerous journeys overland or by small boat, managed to reach South Vietnam.

If any American scholar is sufficiently interested in the truth, he can collect many hundreds of eye-witness stories from the survivors now living in South Vietnam. The survivors represent the whole spectrum of the Vietnamese social structure and its varied religious beliefs, not just a few displaced, wealthy Catholics as some propagandists have pictured from a distance. Two villages where I know there are survivors of the land reform bloodbaths of North Vietnam are Gia Nghia in Quang Due and Ho Nay in Bien Hoa. It's no great trick to get to either from Saigon.

I now sadly await the day when some American student, under what apparently are current standards for our scholarship, will try to make similar "non-persons" of the American farmers who fought at Lexington and Concord.

WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1972

CPYRGHT

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The North Vietnamese "Bloodbath": Myth or Reality?

Land Reform Facts

General Lansdale's letter (Sept. 20) conspicuously avoids the central issue of the falsification and distortion of evidence by the primary source for the administration's allegations of a massive "bloodbath" in North Vietnam during the land reform program. But it does raise serious questions about the general's comprehension of the most basic facts of the land reform.

In the first place, the owner of 10 or 12 acres could not have "fully expected" to retain all his land in 1955. A holding of that size, more than 20 times the size of the average peasant's holding, had to be rented out to several tenants, since it was too much for one family to farm. As early as 1953, land-

owners were well aware that such land would be confiscated, except what was needed for their own subsistence.

Secondly, the "people's courts" did not confiscate land; they only tried landlords on specific charges. The landowners were not, in fact, "found guilty" of owning land, as Lansdale alleges.

As for the "farmer's revolt," which Lansdale tries to link with the confiscation of land during the land reform, it occurred in November, 1956—more than three months after all the land had been redistributed and the "people's courts" had begun to operate. The villagers who allegedly escaped from Nghe An province and made their way to South Vietnam in November 1956 were well-

publicized at the time, and their story was completely different from Lansdale's. According to the Vietnamese Embassy's publication "News From Vietnam" (Dec. 1, 1956) they reported that "hundreds were injured by Viet Minh rifle butts and bayonets before the 3-day revolt was crushed." The thousands of deaths which Lansdale mentions are therefore his own creation.

The same is true for his story of mass starvation for several years following the land reform in North Vietnam. A recent study of North Vietnamese rice production by a North Vietnamese official—certainly no friend of North Vietnam's government—admitted that there had been a "small but significant

breakthrough" in rice production in 1956, rather than starvation as Lansdale charges.

The general's ignorance of the basic facts of the land reform is easily explained, since he was less interested in learning the truth than he was in creating a false impression of the North Vietnamese government's intentions through the use of "false propaganda" during his operations in North Vietnam in 1954 and 1955.

D. GARETH PORTER,

Research associate at Cornell University, and author of a monograph characterizing the North Vietnamese blood bath as a "myth."

Ithaca, N.Y.

Academically Unsound

It was very easy for me to understand as I read Mr. Porter's paper that he has never experienced the real world in Communist Vietnam in which I have lived. Of particular significance in this regard is his patent refusal to accept any statement as valid unless he could find supporting "evidence" in "Nhan Dan," the official organ of the Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam. That is tantamount to saying that if the Communists chose not to record it — it did not happen and that everything they have recorded is true.

On the other hand, it was not easy to understand why Mr. Porter fails to realize that a basic requirement of academic research is to look for information from as many sources as possible. After all, common sense would dictate that as far as any totalitarian regime such as North Vietnam's Stalinist "peoples dictatorship" is concerned, one should not overlook the facts brought out by the opposition papers whenever available. And concerning the Land Reform in North Vietnam, opposition papers abounded in Hanoi during the Hundred Flowers Movement when relative freedom of the press was tolerated. It is sad that this very valuable source of information was apparently neglected.

Most deplorable of all, however, is that in his personal and untruthful attacks on me, Mr. Porter is engaged not in an academic pursuit in search of the truth, but in a thinly veiled attempt to distort history while also seeking to draw me into a political polemic during a U.S. presidential election campaign. I will have no part of it! I came to this land in search of peace and I do not want to become involved in the process of an American election. Throughout my life, I have always tried to avoid politics and I do not now intend to enter the political arena with Mr. Porter or anyone else.

In my book "From Colonialism to Communism," I narrated what I witnessed in North Vietnam . . .

HOANG VAN CHI.

The writer is course chairman in Southeast Asia orientation at the State Department's Washington training center.

Blood-Debt Lists

During 1971, the North Vietnamese Affairs Division of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office—a branch of

the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, I followed the North Vietnamese and Vietcong radio and press, read thousands of classified captured documents, interviewed scores of important North Vietnamese and Vietcong defectors, and traveled widely throughout the country investigating incidents of Vietcong terrorism. I have discussed the "land reform" bloodbath with Dr. Chi, with North Vietnamese defectors who witnessed the program in various parts of the country, and with two senior defectors who actively participated in the campaign as "People's Court" judges and Communist party members. I have found nothing in my numerous interviews with witnesses to contradict Dr. Chi's excellent account . . .

In my conversations with witnesses from widely scattered parts of the DRV, I have concluded that the total number of deaths from the "People's Courts" and the "policy of isolation" (which in spite of Mr. Porter's ignorance very clearly did take place) averaged something over 3 per cent. Whether the actual bloodbath was 300,000 or 500,000—it is quite clear that a major purge did occur and that the casualties numbered in six digits. This conclusion is also shared by P. J. Honey—a British scholar generally considered to be the most knowledgeable Western authority on North Vietnamese affairs—and by Gerard Tongas, a French professor who prior to 1959 probably had more freedom of movement inside North Vietnam than any other Westerner and most Vietnamese.

Porter charges "there was no such policy of isolating families, even of those landlords sentenced for serious crimes during the land reform . . ." If Porter is right, why did North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap express his concern after the "land reform" by noting "We showed no indulgence towards landlords who participated in the Resistance, treating their children in the same way as we treated the children of other landlords." (See Nhan Dan (Hanoi) 31 October 1956).

"Nhan Van" . . . featured in its issue number four (5 November 1956) an article by Nguyen Huu Dang which noted that the "agrarian reform" had "left innocent children to die of starvation." This was the policy of isolation which Dr. Chi discusses, and Chi is right when he notes that this part of the "land reform" produced the majority of the casualties. The Lao Dong Party knew that these children, old people, and other relatives of "landlords" (and certainly a large percentage of those executed were in no way true landlords) would be unlikely to support the regime after having seen their relatives murdered by the "People's Courts." Rather than allow potentially hostile children to grow up and challenge the party's leadership, the children were forced to starve to death.

About 18 months ago, a friend and I got together a group of the most senior defectors of the Vietnam war. Our group included three North Vietnamese army colonels, security specialists, and probably the most important propaganda leader to abandon the Communist cause in the entire war. We showed these men a Vietnamese lan-

guage translation of an article Mr. Porter had written, suggesting that there would be no bloodbath and denying that large numbers of civilians had been executed by the Communists in Hue during the 1968 Tet Offensive. We wanted to see how these real "experts"—men who between them had perhaps 80 years of Communist party membership and experience—would react. Every single one of them said that Porter was wrong. They spoke of the "Blood-Debt" lists which the Vietcong have been making of their "enemies." I knew of these lists, because I had personally read dozens of captured documents from all over South Vietnam giving instructions on their preparation. We asked North Vietnamese Army Colonel Tran Van Duc (also known as "Tam Hia"), how many South Vietnamese citizens were on the lists. He estimated there were between three and five million names on the lists, and Duc's estimate was confirmed by the other defectors. Colonel Duc mentioned some of the people who are likely targets: all village and hamlet officials (elected or appointed), and government officials at higher levels; policemen and soldiers; members of religious and political organizations; defectors; people who have worked for the Americans or for other foreigners; landlords; and people who are directly related to any of the above. This last point is important, because it was on this basis that so many children and old people were starved in North Vietnam. Duc's list has been corroborated at least a dozen times by captured Vietcong directives and other documents concerning the "Blood-Debt" lists . . .

It would be nice if Mr. Porter's assessment of the situation was related in some way to reality. It would be nice if the United States could just abandon South Vietnam and be confident that peace would return to that part of the world. The history of Vietnamese communism—the betrayal and execution of thousands of non-Communist nationalists during the 1920s, 30s, and 40s; the "land reform" massacre of hundreds of thousands of "class enemies"; the assassinations of tens of thousands of non-combatants in South Vietnam; the Hue massacre—does not support such an optimistic conclusion. Neither do the thousands of captured Communist documents, the statements of high-ranking defectors and prisoners, or the public statements of North Vietnamese Communist leaders.

ROBERT F. TURNER,

Research Associate, Hoover Institution.

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A Neat Shell Game

Your columnist, Clayton Fritchey, has played a neat shell game before your reader audience in this morning's (Sept. 23) op-ed page. He starts out with what could be summarized as 'Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm going to talk about the foolish notion that if the N. Viets ever took over in the South they would massacre thousands' and then substitutes "the N. Viet blood bath of their own making in the North just didn't happen back in the 60's, it's a myth. You see how foolish the notion is that they would do any such

thing in the South, Ladies and Gentlemen?" Could Mr. Fritchey be induced possibly to investigate the details of the Hue massacre?

ERRETT C. ALBRITTON.

Bethesda.

Vietcong Terror

Your articles concerning damage to Hanoi, and to the North Vietnamese people are interesting and complete. Most people abhor the terrible destruction that has occurred and is occurring in both Vietnams. It does seem strange however, how little news is

printed in your paper concerning the actions of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

I was fortunate enough to have lived for several years with the Vietnamese people in a small community about a hundred miles south of Saigon. A typical Vietcong effort to "reunify" Vietnam would be a 20 kilo charge of explosives in the fish market, effectively converting 20 or 30 housewives and children. Since the school was such a large target, it became the recipient of Vietcong propaganda — in the form of mortars and rockets. North Vietnamese patrols promoted elections by tying up half a village chief at one end of his village and the other half about 50 meters away.

today and tomorrow. I do not support the "eye for an eye" theory but find it difficult to understand the glossing over the fact that the North Vietnamese are in South Vietnam; that most South Vietnamese don't want them there; that the Vietcong is a revolutionary movement attempting to overthrow the elected government.

Another simple solution to this complicated problem would be for the North Vietnamese to remove troops from Southern soil, stop financing the Vietcong, and comply with the accords which they signed in 1954.

KARL L. MAHLER.

Arlington.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1972

CPYRGHT

The stories go on endlessly, yesterday.

CPYRGHT

Vietnamese Tell of Grim Life After Communists Came

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Special to The New York Times

BONGSON, South Vietnam,

AUG. 6—When the Communists came a lot of people here were very happy," the hony-jawed old farmer said bitterly. "Only now, people have had their eyes opened. The Communists made nice speeches. But look at what happened."

In the nearly three months that the Communists held unchallenged control of Bongson and the rest of northern Binh Dinh Province on the central coast, this quiet farming region was transformed into a harshly regimented work camp, many of its people say.

In numerous interviews, people who lived through the occupation have told of public executions, groups of people being led away, forced labor, enormously high taxes, stiff controls on everyday travel between hamlets and mandatory nightly political lectures.

Time to Shape Area

From the end of April until late July the Communists controlled the northern part of the province without interference from Saigon troops and they were thus able to begin shaping the region in their own mold.

Local Communists replaced the Saigon government, hamlet and village chiefs and immediately began working on plans to defend and finance their communities. They also initiated their system of discipline.

In the view of some American officials, the events in

northern Binh Dinh provide a rare picture of how the Communists would probably proceed in the initial stages of a complete take-over in South Vietnam.

In the three months since the Communists moved in, allied intelligence officials say, 250 to 500 Saigon government officials have been killed and about 6,000 are being held in crude prisons in the forbidding Anlao Valley, which for years has been a Communist stronghold. Reports of these killings and arrests were carried in a dispatch in The New York Times last Friday. Among the victims in the executions were several policemen who had worked as counterintelligence agents, trying to kill and capture key political and military figures in the Communist organization.

Many of the more than 200,000 people of Northern Binh Dinh were shocked by the harshness of the Communists when they took over, those interviewed indicated. The area had a long history of Communist activity and many of the people had known members of the Communist organization for years. Some even had relatives fighting with the guerrillas. Memories of mistreatment at the hands of the Communists had been few and blurred by time.

Earlier Sorties Recalled

On the other hand, everyone could vividly remember the destructive sorties through the villages by American and South Vietnamese troops with their bombs and artillery.

Otherwise, though, to the peasants here as in some other parts of rural South Vietnam, the Communists were more a name than a reality.

The local officials represent-

ing Saigon provided very few services and many of those, the residents say, could be obtained only by a bribe. Sometimes there were nasty scenes with petty officials throwing their weight around. But the officials did not bother to enforce most of the laws and they rarely tried to collect the small taxes on income and property. The high levies imposed by Saigon on importers and manufacturers reached the peasants in the form of higher prices for fertilizer and canned milk. So they complained about higher prices, not taxes.

Residents were supposed to tell officials when they were traveling from one village to another, but often they did not and nothing happened. Once in a while there would be a political lecture. Attendance was a matter of choice.

Men between the ages of 18 and 39 were eligible for the draft, but bribes and false identification papers kept some in their rice fields.

Sweeps in Villages

Sometimes there were sweeps through the villages by Saigon troops or policemen, and people who were suspected of having something to do with the Communists were taken away. But, like almost everything done by the Saigon Government this happened much less in the countryside than in the cities.

Under the Communists there were no bribes and no short cuts around regulations. The Communists meant business and they used death to bring home the point dramatically.

Le Thi Hong, a thin, delicate-boned woman with almond eyes, tells how one evening in May she and her neighbors in Hoaiyuan village were called to the village administrative office by the Communist cadre. A militia platoon leader

and a deputy hamlet chief were brought before the group, denounced as "criminals" and, as the frightened villagers watched, shot dead.

Next, Mrs. Hong said, the Communists pointed to 20 people in the crowd—hamlet chiefs, members of the village council and policemen — and said they had committed crimes, too. These people, she said, were told they would be punished with 20 to 30 years in prison and were led away. Mrs. Hong said her husband, the chief of Thailai hamlet, had been taken away earlier.

Many Such Stories

As Saigon Government troops disrupt the Communist occupation, many stories like Mrs. Hong's are being told in refugee camps, along the roadsides and in the hamlets abandoned by the Communists.

Under the Saigon Government, the people had paid scarcely any taxes. But Phan-Ty, a 45-year-old farmer with dark, wrinkled half-moons under his weary eyes, said the Communists demanded half his annual crop of about 400 pounds of rice. Nguyen Thanh Buong said he was taxed more than one-third of his crop. Some wives of soldiers and government officials said they had had to sell their jewelry and other belongings to get enough rice to meet the Communists' demands.

In addition to the heavy tax, each family was ordered to set aside a pot of "rice for the combatants." Whenever the women prepared to cook rice they were supposed to set aside a handful from their sacks in this pot. Every two weeks someone would come around

The strongest men and women were forced to carry rice

and ammunition long distances. Phan Ty, for example, said he was given two 20-pound sacks of rice and marched for 15 days—into Laos, he thinks.

Mr. Buong was assigned to dig trenches. The Communist plan, as he understands it, was to connect every hamlet and subhamlet with trenches so that the "liberation" soldiers could move great distances, undetected and safe from bombs and artillery. The trenches also formed a part of the hamlet defense system. In some instances the people were also ordered to string American-made wire along the roadways.

After long, backbreaking days of work without pay, the villagers had to sit through evening political meetings. The people of Binh Dinh are no more politically minded than other Vietnamese peasants and those interviewed indicated they found the long meetings boring and tiresome. Sometimes, after the meetings, the people were told to go out and dig more trenches.

The political lectures were described as unsophisticated and rambling, more an opportunity for cadres to pour out their enthusiasm than an indoctrination into Communist political thought. In some cases the sessions amounted to a Communist-hamlet version of an evening news report.

Cooperation Asked

"They informed us of their victories in liberating the country and asked us to cooperate with them so that the country could be totally liberated," one man recalled.

"They said the country had been liberated from the domination of the Americans," he went on. "They said, 'Now you are a citizen in a liberated area. You have to cooperate with the liberation forces to liberate the rest of the country.'"

At one meeting, a young mother recalled, the people were told they could cooperate by "sending your sons to join the revolutionary forces."

There apparently were some volunteers, but many people said they knew of youths who had been given no choice but to serve in Communist military units.

Girls Taken Away

Pham Thi Doa, a lively 19-year-old girl with a broad, open face and sad eyes said that she and five girl friends who had worked on bases of the American First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were among those forced to join the Communist soldiers.


She gave this account in broken English:

"In April VC come to my house and take me away. They make me go spend 20 days for indoctrination. They teach me how to use weapon—M-16—how to lean weapon, how to crawl on ground and shoot. Also how to throw hand grenade. They also show us how to plant mines."

Miss Doa, who said she escaped after two and a half months with the Communists, is now being held with the other young women in a government camp for defectors in Quinhon. After being screened by intelligence officers, they will probably be released. But one said that she did not know where her family was now and that she was not eager to leave the camp.

Some Are Favored

While relatives of the Communists were given preferential treatment and sometimes asked to participate in the administration of the hamlets and villages, relatives of Saigon Gov-



The New York Times/Aug. 10, 1972

ernment soldiers and officials were regarded with suspicion and sometimes were required to attend special indoctrination sessions.

Le Thi Lieu, another girl in the Quinhon camp, said that she and some of the others who were forced into Communist military units were also required to attend extra political classes.

Half way through a five-day political course in Bongson, she said, the Communists asked for volunteers to attend a higher-level class. Then, instead of taking the volunteers, they took those who had not volunteered.

One of the first things the Communists did was to collect the identification cards issued by the Saigon Government. As a part of a population control program, American officials say, and may have

been an indication that they planned to issue their own identification papers.

Change in Currency

The Communists also told some people that beginning on Aug. 1, currency of the Saigon Government would be worthless and that new money would be issued.

Shortly after the South Vietnamese recaptured Bongson, Lieut. Col. Don Stovall, an American adviser, showed a sheaf of crisp green and purple bills that he said Government troops had recovered. The bills bore this legend, "The Central Bank of China promises to pay the bearer on demand at its offices here 50 custom gold units. American Bank Note Co. Shanghai, 1930."

In many hamlets people who wanted to visit another hamlet or village had to get a pass from the local Communist security office. On the pass was written the person's name and description and a comment on his connection and apparent attitude toward the Communists and the Saigon Government. The pass also included the time and date of departure and the expected time of return. One woman said that the passes she saw in Binh Dinh hamlet were signed and stamped by village, district and province level officials. Some people said they regarded the passes as "too much trouble," and simply stayed at home.

Movements Blocked

The Communist security force maintained checkpoints between the hamlets and some troops were assigned to the Phucu Pass south of Bongson to prevent people from leaving the occupied area.

"Many people tried to leave Bongson, but as soon as they reached the Phucu Pass they were told by the liberation forces to go back," one man said. "We were not punished. We were just told to go back."

As another element in their population-control program the Communists told some people they had to return to their native hamlets. Huynh Thanh, a gnarled man of 81 with a shock of white hair, said that even though he had lived in Bongson for seven years he was ordered to move two miles away to Binhbinh, where he was born. He ripped down his house and had just finished rebuilding it in Binhbinh when Government troops returned and flattened it with bombs.

While the Communists were strict and harsh, they impressed many people with their discipline. One man in his

thirties said he knew of no random looting. He said that when he returned to his home after hiding in a field during the initial fighting, "All our belongings were there. There was not a chicken lost, not a cucumber."

Household Confiscated

In a number of reported instances, however, the Communists confiscated entire households of Saigon government officials. They went a step farther with Do Dam, the chief of Laikhanh hamlet, according to his neighbor, Nguyen Thanh Buong.

Mr. Buong said that after Mr. Dam had been taken away, all his belongings, including a four-horsepower pump and his motorcycle, were carted off. The Communists told his wife that they understood Mr. Dam had received 50,000 plasters from the Saigon Government in payment for his crops that had been damaged by defoliation. The Communists said they believed the claim had been false and demanded that Mrs. Dam turn over the money to them. She did.

In Hoaiduc village the Communists insisted that the people show proof of ownership of their bicycles. "No one could prove anything," one man said, "so we just lost the bicycles."

In the nearly four weeks since Saigon troops started a counteroffensive to recapture north Binh Dinh, roughly 130,000 people have broken away from the Communists.

Many Unable to Leave

Allied officials believe there are still more who have been unable to get away. But they feel that several thousand have chosen to stay with the Communists.

"I believe many fled to the mountains and most of them were relatives of the liberation forces," said one man in Phumy. He added that in trying to convince people to go with them, the Communists had said, "Maybe the troops who come back here will not be South Vietnamese but South Koreans. They are very tough and bloodthirsty and if they come they will kill everybody, young and old."

Some American officials believe that the experience with the Communists will swing many people behind the Saigon Government. But some of the most astute South Vietnamese in Saigon say that the people may show less of a commitment than ever, pushed either path by two armies, neither of which can they depend upon for security.

A man in Phumy refugee center explained the peasants' situation this way:

"When the 'nationalists' come they claim they are the government and when the 'liberation' forces come they claim they are also the government. So both sides are our government. Both sides have guns."

"To answer your question, 'Who is to blame for all the suffering?' We don't know. You have a better position to know than us."

Finally, the question, "Which government to you prefer?"

And the simple answer, "Our presence here shows our choice."

CPYRGHT

The human cost of Communism

By Sir ROBERT THOMPSON

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
7 September 1972

Since the start of the Vietnam war thousands of innocent civilians have been killed as part of Viet Cong policy

THE invasion of South Vietnam earlier this year and the intense but still inconclusive fighting of the past five months draw attention once again to the human cost to the Vietnamese people of the continuing war. I am not here referring to battle casualties which, though terrible, can at least be regarded as "legitimate" in war. Nor am I including those refugees who, though their plight may be tragic, are at least still alive. South Vietnam has had, in fact, a remarkable record over the years in coping with refugees and has maintained it yet again in respect of the 750,000 who fled before the invader from the fighting zones.

What should most concern us is the number of civilians who have been intentionally killed in both halves of Vietnam, and those who may yet die in the future as part of the human cost of Communism. The Western conscience is immediately pricked by an American-committed atrocity, such as My Lai, and by civilian casualties caused by the bombing of the North (though such casualties are now far less than during the 1965-68 bombing campaign because of the development of the extremely accurate laser-guided bomb).

Little or no attention, however, and certainly no equivalent reporting, has been devoted to similar Viet Cong or North Vietnamese atrocities which have occurred on a scale which makes My Lai and the casualties from bombing of the North almost insignificant by comparison.

These have not occurred because of some aberration, accident or

inaccuracy of bombing or shelling. They have occurred, both selectively and indiscriminately, as a matter of deliberate policy.

At the time when Hanoi complained of six civilian casualties as a result of the first American raid on the North after the invasion began, her troops were firing 122mm rockets indiscriminately into Saigon and Phnom Penh, killing more than 10 times that number. Her artillery and mortars have pounded An Loc, Quang Tri and much of Kontum, including their hospitals, to rubble. They would have done the same to Hue, if they could have got within range, without any consideration whatsoever for the civilian population.

Hanoi's Russian 130mm guns literally shredded the civilian refugee columns fleeing from Quang Tri in May and killed or wounded over 20,000 of them. This was the most calculated act of butchery during the whole war. Such tactics, combined with 36,000 selective assassinations in the past 12 years, are designed, through terror, to soften the will of the people to resist. Hanoi is faithfully following Mao's infamous dictum that there should be no concern for "stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war."

Everyone has heard of My Lai, but who has heard of Cai Be, where the Viet Cong, after its capture, lingered only to murder the wives and children of all the local militia, or of the Montagnard villages of Day Son where flame-throwers incinerating more than 250 villagers, two-thirds of them

women and children?

Most people have heard of the massacres at Hue in 1968 where the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, after its capture, executed 5,700 people (as assessed from the mass graves found afterwards), but who knows that in captured documents they gloated over these figures and only complained that they had not killed enough?

These incidents were not the work of undisciplined soldiers acting in violation of instructions, but part of a ruthless, deliberate policy designed to break a people who would not otherwise bend to their will.

Too red for Fulbright

The world cannot plead ignorance, because it has all been well documented (from almost entirely Communist sources) by Dr Stephen Hosmer in a book on "Viet Cong Repression" (their own word) and by Douglas Pike in his book on "The Viet Cong." The evidence has now been authoritatively put together in a compendium prepared for a United States Senate Committee—surprisingly, the Committee on the Judiciary (the meat was obviously too red for Senator Fulbright and the Foreign Affairs Committee).

The question as to what the bloodbath would have been if the invasion had succeeded is fast becoming hypothetical. But there are distressing implications for the future if Senator McGovern is re-elected. I estimated that the bloodbath would have been several hundred thousands. I now wish to amend

that figure to well over a million (out of 19 million people), because if the North is to digest the South then it must eliminate all those at every level who have played any positive part in its defence, not just in the armed forces but also in the villages.

There has been no mass uprising in support of either the Viet Cong or the North. The people of the South are fighting for their survival, sometimes poorly, but more often, as at An Loc, with convincing resolution. The conqueror could not hope to hold and govern such a country without a bloodbath on a massive scale.

We have the precedents in similar circumstances in Soviet Russia and China, where the minimum figures are now put respectively at 20 million and 34 million. But, closer to home in North Vietnam, between 1946 and the agrarian reform revolts of 1956, the estimates are over 500,000 killed and

executed.

The critics of the war may claim that the forecasts are exaggerated, but in Hoi Thanh village alone, in northern Binh Dinh province, after its capture by the NVA 3rd Division in May this year, a hamlet chief and 47 other villagers were buried alive—and this in an area which many American journalists have written off as being pro-Viet Cong. In that case, what would have happened in the thousands of pro-government villages?

Fortunately we have more reliable and authoritative sources than Senator McGovern. Col Tran Van Duc, a North Vietnamese officer who defected after 24 years in the Communist party, stated that the Communists, if they win, will slaughter up to three million South Vietnamese, and another colonel, Le Xuan Chuyen, who defected after 21 years, stated that five million people in South Viet-

nam were on the Communists' "blood debt" list and that 10 to 15 per cent. of these would pay with their lives.

When asked in an interview if the possibility of a bloodbath had been exaggerated he replied: "It could not be exaggerated. It will happen." Asked whether world opinion would deter it, he laughed and said: "Who would be around to report it? It happened in North Vietnam and nobody cared. You Americans would not be here to see it. Once out, you would never come back. It would just happen. World opinion? It doesn't even grasp what is going on here right now."

Distressing though the thought of a bloodbath may be, it is more disturbing to think, as Douglas Pike expressed it, "The Communists in Vietnam would create a silence." Senator McGovern would call it peace.

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22 May 1972

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Liberation—Communist Style

**20,000 CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES, MORE
THAN 700,000 HOMELESS**

SaIGON

Vietnamese living in the South are paying a terrible price to be "liberated."

President Nixon, using figures supplied by the U. S. Mission here, said on May 8 that 20,000 civilians have been killed or wounded in the current Communist offensive.

Actually, no one knows for sure what the figure is. The feeling is that it is probably higher.

The Red offensive, especially in the Northern Provinces of South Vietnam, has created a massive refugee problem. More than 700,000 persons have left their homes to seek safety.

Communist terrorism also is up. In the first 35 days of the offensive, about 650 persons were assassinated,

1,200 wounded and 2,100 kidnaped. There were reports that Viet Cong execution squads killed hamlet officials in areas where the North Vietnamese Army was in strength. Viet Cong agents replaced them.

Of those kidnaped, some probably were pressed into service as porters; some were "recruited" at gunpoint. Others may have been slain.

There was a breakdown in normal law and order in some localities. South Vietnam has about 2,000 police stations. During the offensive, nearly one tenth of these were either overrun or abandoned, mostly in the northern regions.

Enemy sappers and Allied warplanes combined, for different reasons, to destroy 49 bridges. Portions of 15 major highways were torn up by mines or bombs.

In Quang Ngai Province, there was what one American official described as a not untypical event: Local force Viet Cong sappers burned 15 villages to the ground. Thirty thousand persons were esti-

mated to have lost their homes.

The fury of combat in Quang Tri Province made it difficult to distinguish whether losses were from conventional warfare or from terrorism. But officials believe terrorists alone destroyed homes that had housed at least 10,000 persons.

Enemy artillery, firing indiscriminately into beleaguered Quang Tri City, took a heavy toll. During the four days before the city fell, 3,000 shells a day rained down. According to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird: "Then, on the last day, they put 4,600 rounds of artillery on that civilian population center."

At An Loc, 60 miles from Saigon and under siege almost from the start of the invasion, 35,000 rounds of enemy artillery have been poured into a 2-mile-square area—another civilian center. Reported Secretary Laird: "They sprayed artillery into those civilian centers just as if they were using a water hose."

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
7 August 1972

WHEN REDS TAKE OVER— THEIR STYLE OF "JUSTICE"

SAIGON

Recurring reports of atrocities committed against South Vietnamese caught up in the early days of the Communist invasion are for the first time being documented by official Allied investigations.

Villagers freed by advancing South Vietnamese troops tell of murders, executions, kidnappings and imprisonment into Communist labor gangs.

The evidence so far discloses no consistent pattern in the enemy's campaign of terror. In Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam's northernmost region, few instances of Communist terrorism have been confirmed.

But in the provinces of Binh Long, north of Saigon, and Binh Dinh on the central coast, virtually every enemy-occupied village has a tale of horror.

Officials give these examples:

In Binh Dinh Province, a Communist-organized "people's court"—with 300 villagers forced to participate—convicted a group of government workers and policemen of being "enemies of the people." As many as 45 persons were executed, and the others were sentenced to life imprisonment.

An eyewitness said "those condemned to death were marched to a nearby sand bank where digging their graves was "quick and easy."

In another part of the Province, a Viet Cong guerrilla chief led three men—also convicted by a "people's court"—to a sports stadium, shot

them and then bayoneted the bodies "many times."

Another 45 officials and soldiers were reported to have been buried alive in Tam Quan district.

The Viet Cong are said to have headed a policeman in Bong Son village and strung up his body in front of the military-police headquarters to avenge the death of a Communist soldier.

The full scale of terrorism may never be known. In Binh Long Province, for instance, the protracted fighting for An Loc has made it impossible to determine the fate of many government employees. Says one official:

"We may have to replace 40 per cent of the officials in Binh Long. We simply do not know how many were taken away or executed."

CPYRGHT

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW Hong Kong, 3 June 1972

FORNIGN-devil pressmen have been admitted to Hanoi and can visit Haiphong and selected areas of "indiscriminate and barbarous" US bombing. (It has been sagaciously — if cynically — remarked that any army general would prefer the enemy to drop bombs on schools and hospitals than on his advancing columns or war supplies.)

So far, however, there have been no bylined reports from Quang Tri or the South Vietnamese hamlets which have been "liberated" by the North Vietnamese invaders. We await even Party-blessed reports of the "tumultuous welcome" accorded the liberators by those villagers who did not flee and whose fate and future remain a grim riddle.

This decent interval — if the sick jest is permitted — between liberation and propaganda is inevitable, but the still unwritten local stories can be reconstructed from the specific orders and directives issued by the Vietcong Security Agency of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in Hanoi. These documents are available in abundance; their authenticity is undoubted; their message is a warning for the possible future as well as an indirect report on the unwritten present.

As a basic directive declares, "we must destroy the enemy's oppressive machine

ry there and establish our security system so as to meet the requirements in repressing and purging undesirable elements and preserving power."

"Repression" is a cover-all for public trials, executions and imprisonment, terror and revenge. Decisions on life or death are vested in the Party cadres who dig in after the army has blown through. There are delicate synonyms and amusing Annamese slang phrases for the customary death sentence by a people's court. That formal judgment in Vietnamese is *dief* — "to end the existence of." But it can be translated more humanely — for the ear — as *tu ly tai cho*: "to solve a problem on the spot." And in hearty socialist idiom — which might have made Marx scratch his haemorrhoids in embarrassment — the message of democratic justice can be presented as "to cancel," "to sleep with the worms," "to punish severely," "to go diving for shrimp," "to punish with a fully extended arm," "to feed him copper candy."

A typical security directive for the Que Son district stipulates: "Each area of activity should establish a record of reactionaries who should be arrested. Specific cases must be submitted to courts for trial. Death penalties will be given by the court to heighten the pride of the revolutionary movement." "Socialism or fascism, what's the difference? — is called by a stern instruction

(issued to liberators operating in the Sa Dec special zone) that "a general specific norm must be set for successful eliminations": two to seven executions, and 15 to 20 "warnings" in each sub-ward; "death quotas" of two to five, and 10 to 30 "warnings" for designated city inner-areas.

To facilitate court procedure, death sentence forms, already approved, signed, stamped and sealed, have been distributed to commissars of the liberation forces, leaving convenient blank spaces for the names and crimes to be legally filled in.

Errors, the Party bravely concedes, do occur. "For instance," one penitent provincial report discloses, "in some areas we killed entire families, teenagers and even friendly personnel. We have put more emphasis on killing than on indoctrination of culprits. Consequently, this has badly affected the prestige of the Party."

Finally, if we lack reports of the current people's trials in the liberated villages around Quang Tri, we have the testimony of Bui Cong Tuong, a Vietcong defector, who was chief of Propaganda, Culture, Teaching and Education for Ben Tre and who reports a "purge movement" trial in Tan Hao village:

"I had to write down different motives for each of 25 death sentences that night. The signed condemnations had to be read to the people, and I had

to write them in such manner that they would be approved by the people. The condemnation had to stir the people so that they would shout, asking for the death sentence... The condemned were immediately shot and buried in a mass grave. Their families were not allowed to bury them."

NEW YORK TIMES
4 August 1972


Enemy Is Said to Execute Hundreds in South Vietnam

Allied Officials Describe Slayings of Government Aides in Binh Dinh — Thousands Reported Imprisoned

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 3 — Allied intelligence officials say that Communist political officers have publicly executed hundreds of Saigon Government officials and imprisoned thousands during their occupation of Binh Dinh Province, on the central coast of South Vietnam.

The allied officials say that they have confirmed the deaths of about 250 persons through eyewitness reports and have additional information that



The New York Times/Aug. 4, 1972

leads them strongly to believe that the total number of dead is about 500.

People who have escaped have pinpointed three large prison camps in the rugged Anlao valley of central South Vietnam, which are said to hold about 6,000 persons, the officials say.

The main victims of the enemy were said to be hamlet and village chiefs and their deputies, pacification workers, policemen and militiamen. But teachers, doctors, nurses and minor administrative staff workers, as well as some soldiers, were among those reported imprisoned.

Lengthy interviews with people who lived in northern Binh Dinh during the nearly three months of unchallenged Communist occupation generally corroborated the findings of the intelligence officials.

The reported executions in Binh Dinh appear to be the most sizable deliberate assault on individuals connected with the Saigon Government since the massacres in Hue during the 1968 Lunar New Year offensive when, according to allied officials and independent journalists, more than 2,600 people were killed.

Some American officials see the reported executions in Binh Dinh as a sample of the kind of bloodbath that President Nixon has predicted if the Communists succeeded in tak-

ing over South Vietnam by force.

Such violence, these officials say, especially would be expected if a Communist victory were "sudden and decisive."

Other American officials, however, say that history would suggest that a sudden and decisive victory "just isn't in the cards for either side."

These officials feel that if the North Vietnamese Communists were eventually to gain control of South Vietnam through a gradual political settlement, they might well adopt a conciliatory attitude toward their former opponents in hopes of uniting the country.

But those who most firmly subscribe to the "bloodbath theory" are convinced that any kind of enemy take-over would result in the execution of many officials in the Government in Saigon.

Some Americans with considerable experience in studying North Vietnamese and Vietcong affairs say that they have been surprised by the particularly harsh tactics of the Communists in Binh Dinh province which has a long history of party activity.

Revenge Suggested

They suggest that some of the reported killings may have been inspired by a sense of revenge toward former party members who, for one reason or another, have worked with the Saigon Government in recent years. Another possibility, they say, is that the reported killings represent some sort of interparty conflict, perhaps between northern and southern factions.

While a few executions have been reported in the other areas captured by the North Vietnamese in their current offensive, there has been nothing of the magnitude of the events reported in Binh Dinh.

This is so, authoritative officials say, because the districts in Binh Dinh fell rather suddenly — in a few days as compared with a few weeks in Quang Tri — and many Saigon Government officials were "caught in place."

After the fall of northern Binh Dinh Province in April, nearly three months passed before Government troops tried to retake the territory. Thus, left alone, the Communists were able to carry out their programs in some detail among the more than 200,000 people of the region.

In most of the other captured areas, the fighting never fully subsided. In Loc Ninh district, however, in Loc Ninh district, north of Anloc, and that is

where some of the other executions were reported.

Hundreds Shot to Death

The enemy gunned down several hundred South Vietnamese civilians who tried to flee from their control in Quang Tri Province, the northern most province in South Vietnam, and they used the same tactic at Anloc, but apparently killed fewer civilians there.

American intelligence officials believe that these slayings were more likely to have been the outcome of local battlefield decisions than the results of high-level policy, as the reported executions apparently were.

Government troops began to disrupt Communist programs in northern Binh Dinh with a counteroffensive late in July. Within two weeks, Saigon's troops had re-entered the principal town in each of the three northern districts — Hoanhon, Tamquan and Hoalan—and had encountered little resistance. In the last several days, though, the enemy has been striking back, and large sections of the area remain contested.

The territory in northern Binh Dinh was captured by North Vietnamese regulars. But after they had secured the area they withdrew and left administration of the "liberated" communities to local Communists, some of whom had been living in the mountains for years.

Installation of Officials

The Communists are believed to have installed chiefs and administrative staffs in each of the villages and 138 hamlets in the three districts.

According to allied intelligence officials and residents of northern Binh Dinh province, this is how the Communists proceeded:

Communist security officers had compiled dossiers on everyone in the region. They quickly classified the population into several categories according to physical capabilities, financial position, occupation, age and relationships to the Communists and the Government in Saigon.

Those who had worked directly for the Saigon Government were brought before "peoples' courts," denounced as "tyrants," and condemned to death or sentenced to prison.

Relatives of the Communists were often offered jobs in the administration of the hamlet, while relatives of Government employes were watched closely, restricted in movement and forced to attend special indoctrination classes.

In organizing the "people's courts," the Communists would assemble 30 to 40 persons to the entire hamlet of several hundred. The courts were held during the day and the night, usually outside administrative offices or schools but sometimes on a road or in a rice field.

'Frozen With Fear'

Sometimes the residents were urged to join in hurling charges against the accused. But in other cases a death sentence was read while the people stood—in the words of a farmer—"frozen with fear."

In many cases, there were fewer than half a dozen victims in the reported executions in Binh Dinh. This is in contrast to the killings in Hue during Tet, when scores of people were herded together and shot as the Communists apparently tried to eliminate the entire community of Saigon Government workers and anti-Com-

munist leaders.

American intelligence officials say that the Communists appear to have been generally more "selective" in their killings in Binh Dinh than in Hue in 1968, intending them as "object lessons" to discourage future cooperation with Saigon and to reinforce loyalty to the Communist side.

For this reason, the intelligence officials say, only the worst "tyrants" were killed. Others were given stiff prison terms ranging up to 30 years, and still others were required only to attend intense political-indoctrination courses for a month or so, where they were expected to learn that the salvation of the Vietnamese lay in Communism.

Despite the general pattern of small-scale executions reported, the intelligence officials said that they had sketchy details on a few mass killings. For example, they say, on May

18 in the evening, 100 Government officials were reported to have been killed and buried in Andong hamlet.

In another instance, 42 policemen and Government workers, including an officer, Tran Van Luc of Dinh Binh, were said to have been shot to death on the outskirts of Vinhphung hamlet at about 9 P.M. May 27. They were reported buried in a sandbar nearby.

Rifle fire was the most common method of killing, but intelligence officials say that a hamlet chief and 46 other village and hamlet officials and soldiers were buried alive south of Tanthanh hamlet sometime in May.

They also said that a policeman, a pacification worker and an assistant village chief had been stabbed "many times" with a bayonet affixed to a rifle after they had been shot before 1,000 people at the Anphong village sports stadium

May 29.

On May 21, the intelligence officials say, an unidentified South Vietnamese military policeman was beheaded in Bongson and his body was hanged in front of the military-police station there.

According to allied intelligence officials and northern Binh Dinh residents, the charges that brought the death penalty were usually vague but reflected the Communists' puritanical nature and their intolerance for "crime" against their own people.

Those who died were reportedly accused of taking bribes, violating unmarried women, making love to wives of "revolutionary cadre," capturing and killing "legal agents of the revolution," and providing information to the "enemy." Some were reported also cited as simply "corrupt" and "domineering" over the people.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 August 1972

Vietnam: CPYRIGHT

'Shoot Him! Said the People

SAIGON—On the evening of May 20, Communist cadres assembled about 500 people in the hamlet of Binhchuong in northern Binh Dinh province and recited a list of "crimes" they said had been committed by Nguyen Xuan Phong, the Social Affairs Commissioner of Hoaiduc village. As Mr. Phong, his arms tied behind him, knelt on the road that runs through Binhchuong, the chairman of the Hoaiduc People's Revolutionary Committee asked the crowd: "Is this man worthy of being shot dead?"

According to an eyewitness report received by American intelligence officials and made public last week, the people replied: "Shoot him dead." Thereupon a youth stood in front of Mr. Phong and put three rifle bullets into his chest.

Mr. Phong was one of several hundred Saigon Government officials reported to have been executed by the Communists during the nearly three months that they had unchallenged control of the northern part of Binh-

Dinh province on the central coast of South Vietnam. Allied officials say they have eyewitness reports confirming the death of about 250 persons and other information leading them to believe that the total number of deaths is in the vicinity of 500. In addition, the officials say, escapees have told them that about 6,000 persons are being held in prison.

Some American officials here regard the reported executions in Binh Dinh province as an example of how the Communists would behave if they succeeded in taking over all of South Vietnam. Many of the officials say that the term "bloodbath," which has been used by President Nixon in describing such an eventuality, is too emotionally charged and probably is not what would happen. "But I don't think any reasonable person doubts that there would be a large number of South Vietnamese Government officials killed," one American official said. "I'd say it would be a few thousand."

The widespread feeling is that after a take-over the Communists would be selective in their killing, as they generally appear to have been in Binh Dinh. American specialists in North Vietnamese and Vietcong affairs say they would expect the Communists to go after key officials who had been particularly effective against them and who appeared reluctant to cooperate with the new government. The idea would be to get rid of the troublemakers and impress others that they had better snap into line, as appears to have generally been the case in Binh Dinh. "Of course," one American said, "you would also have the revenge factor."

American intelligence officials say that in the past week they have received information that some Communist operatives have been directed to "eliminate" Saigon Government officials who might be able to identify them in the event of a cease-fire. The targets would be primarily members of the South Vietnamese intelligence service and national police.

The Communists in the Vietnam war have always employed terrorist tactics, aiming at eliminating specific leaders to weaken the Government side and, at times, tossing random hand grenades to intimidate the population and discourage them from standing with the Government.

According to allied officials, there was a surge in terrorist incidents across the country with the start of the North Vietnamese offensive in late March. By the end of July, 2,762 South Vietnamese civilians and officials were reported to have died in these incidents. The total for all of last year was 4,000, down from an average of about 6,000 for each of the three earlier years.

By comparison, the number of deaths in Binh Dinh may seem small. But there, as would probably be the case in any noncontested area, random terror might have had a negative effect for the Communists. Instead, in the "liberated areas," the Communists carried out their killings with deliberate calculation, hoping to make each one an object lesson.

—JOSEPH B. TREASTER

SAIGON POST
25 August 1972

No Semblance Of Trial Red Forces Executed 1,700 In Binh Dinh

CPYRGHT

By QUANG MINH

The NV/VC forces who occupied northern Binh Dinh executed a total of 1,700 militia and cadre personnel and have concentrated some 7,000 more in the An Lao and An Huu areas.

Contrary to earlier reports there was no semblance of a trial and the victims were summarily executed as they were fingered by the VC with the knife, gun or spear and in some instances by being buried alive.

This was disclosed Wednesday by Deputy Le Van Dien, congressman from one of the northern Binh Dinh districts, in an interview in the Lower House.

Deputy Dien's revelations were considered significant in view of reports in the Western press tending to minimize the scope of Communist atrocities during their occupation of northern Binh

Dinh and to dismiss these as the result of small town goossips and hatreds.

«The police authorities have the records,» the congressman said when asked if a tally has been made of the executions.

Dien makes frequent visits to his constituency; he arrived two days ago from his last trip. And he was one of two congressmen who made the first reports on the executions in Hoai An where more than a score of civil servants were strung up by the feet and their throats cut.

«Bosom Friends»

Deputy Dien also identified the VC equivalent of Province Chief in Binh Dinh as Nguyen Xich Nhan whom he described as his «bosom friend» when they parted 18 years ago.

According to Dien, Nhan was a hamlet cadre in Binh Dinh, where they both

lived, before Nhan decided in 1954 to go to North Vietnam. Dien said they went to school together.

Dien said Nhan returned to the province about two years ago. They haven't seen each other since Nhan left the hamlet 18 years ago.

Dien also disclosed that many of the VC cadres in the occupied areas in the province are women who also left South Vietnam in 1954 and have returned with the NVA invasion forces.

Indoctrination

When the NVA/VC forces occupy an area, they immediately try to organize the local administration. This is followed by mobilization of procurement of supplies and the third and last activity is political indoctrination which they call «training.»

According to Dien, government militia and cadres who refuse political indoctrination are killed outright; cadres with pro-Communist leanings

are given an indoctrination course of 10 days to one month while those with anti-Communist leanings are sent from one month to three months.

Dien said the NVA/VC forces captured a total of 5,000 and 3,700 cadres. Of that number, 1,000 militia men and 700 cadres were executed.

The rest, for all Dien knows, are still undergoing «training» in small groups in the An Lao and An Huu areas. He said that a group of 50 such «trainees» were liberated lastweek by an ARVN helicopter operation.

He confirmed that hundreds of women were raped by the NVA/VC during the occupation of northern Binh Dinh. The women were made to choose one of two tasks to gather supplies or «boost troop morale.»

Dien talked to three women who chose to «boost» troop morale. They said they were assigned to a house where, at an appointed time, NVA/VC troops came in and violated them.

Dien said that as a result of these atrocities, the people of Binh Dinh today are «now absolutely anti-Communist.»

WASHINGTON STAR
14 August 1972

Massacre in Binh Dinh

CPYRGHT

It is a fervently held article of liberal faith that if the United States will just get out of Indochina, all will be sweetness and light among the Vietnamese people, North and South, Communist and non-Communist. Those who chant this doxology ignore the execution of thousands of Vietnamese and flight of tens of thousands more when the Communists took over in the North in 1954. They ignore the mass graves containing the bodies of more than 2,600 South Vietnamese civilians murdered at Hue during the 1968-69 offensive. They should have no difficulty whatsoever in glossing over the less numerous casual-

ties of the more calculated reign of terror which has taken place at Binh Dinh province on the central coast of South Vietnam, the past three months.

Binh Dinh fell quickly to the North Vietnamese in early April and it was not until July that Saigon's forces launched a serious effort to retake it. So the Communists had plenty of time. There was no need to hurry, as there was in Hue in 1968, when American and South Vietnamese forces counterattacked within days of the city's fall.

According to intelligence reports and the popular news views, when the Communists were extremely methodical. They rounded up hamlet and

village chiefs, pacification workers, policemen, militiamen, teachers, doctors, nurses, clerical workers, literally anyone who had had any connection with the Saigon government. "People's courts" executed several hundred (perhaps as many as 500) and shipped an estimated 6,000 others off to "people's prisons" in remote areas of the Communist-held Anlao valley. Most of those killed apparently were executed by rifle fire but others were buried alive, beheaded or hacked to pieces.

None of this represents any new departure in tactics on Hanoi's part. Aside from the general massacres in the North in 1954 and in the South during the 1968 Tet offensive, the murder and kidnaping of South Vietnamese officials has been part and parcel of Communist "liberation" since the war began. In the past four and a half years, nearly 25,000 South Vietnamese civilians and officials have been executed by the North Vietnamese Communists and the Viet Cong.

There have, of course, been atrocities on the Allied side. But anyone who is still prepared to maintain that a Communist takeover in South Vietnam would not lead to a bloodbath of major dimensions is simply ignoring the evidence at hand. A politician like Senator McGovern, who advocates a quick and unilateral American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, need look no farther than the shallow graves of Binh Dinh province to see where the policies he advocates would lead those who have placed their trust in the United States.

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NEW YORK TIMES
9 September 1972

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Defector Tells of Massacre by Enemy at Quang Tri

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam,

Sept. 8—A defector from the North Vietnamese Army said today that his unit had gunned down civilian men, women and children and South Vietnamese soldiers without discrimination as they fled south from Quang Tri City in late April and early May.

The defector, Le Xuan Thuy, 22-year-old private first class who had served as a radio operator in a battalion of the 324th North Vietnamese Division, was presented this morning at a formal press conference in the national press center here by officers of the South Vietnamese Army's political warfare department.

In what appeared to be a prepared statement, Private Thuy said that his unit had maintained an ambush position along Route 1 south of Quang Tri for six days as other Communist troops assaulted and eventually captured the province capital.

"Our unit commander told us that those who moved southward were our enemy," Private Thuy said.

"All vehicles, civilian and military, were fired on by the North Vietnamese Communists," Private Thuy said, inexplicably referring to his former colleagues in the phrase the South Vietnamese Government most often uses.

He continued: "The people moving on were a mixture of all social strata. They were all fired at because the North

Vietnamese Communists considered them to be followers of the enemy. That is why they all had to be killed."

The ambush was widely reported as it was taking place, but some newsmen suggested that the civilians had been killed inadvertently because they had mingled with fleeing soldiers.

In response to a newsman's question today, Private Thuy

said: "The civilians and the military were sometimes separated, sometimes together. But all had to be destroyed by order of the North Vietnamese Communists because they were fleeing south toward the enemy."

In August a spokesman for the United States Department of State described the incident as "a deliberate North Vietnamese massacre of helpless civilians."

The State Department spokesman estimated that as many as 2,000 persons had been

killed. Independent newsmen estimated the dead at between 200 and 600. Private Thuy said that he could not offer a figure.

So far, 258 dead have been accounted for by South Vietnamese searching for remains in the area.

The comments by Private Thuy, who indicated that the main reason for his defection was his revulsion over the ambush, purportedly represented the Vietnamese rationale concerning the civilian deaths.

BALTIMORE SUN
8 August 1972

Massacre of civilians reported

Washington (M)—A State Department spokesman said yesterday that U.S. military advisers and other eyewitnesses estimated 1,000 to 2,000 South Vietnamese died last April 23 to 30 in what was described as "a deliberate North Vietnamese Army massacre of helpless civilians."

The action was said to have taken place near the Ma Chan River bridge on Route 1 when thousands of refugees fleeing from Quang Tri were caught in the open by Communist artillery fire.

Women and children

A State Department press officer, John King, said the estimates of deaths were probably closer to the higher figure of 2,000 noncombatants, composed mainly of women, children and older people.

He said another column of refugees was caught five days earlier a few miles south of Quang Tri April 24. He gave no estimates of the casualties in the earlier incident.

According to official reports received by the State Department, Maj. Donald L. Price and Maj. Robert F. Sheridan of the U.S. Marine Corps said they had seen the civilians brought under fire by 130-mm. artillery shells fired over their heads with delayed-action fuses.

The two Marine advisors said that "literally shredded the refugee column."

"It was the worst sight I have ever seen," Major Sheridan reported. "It was a massacre."

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SAIGON POST
10 September 1972

CPYRGHT

'Too Many To Count'

NVA Defector Relates Massacre Of Civilians

SAIGON (AP)—The government put on display Friday a North Vietnamese defector who said he was involved in a massacre of South Vietnamese fleeing from Quang Tri city last April and May.

Le Xuan Thuy, a 22-year-old draftee who said he served about one year in the North Vietnamese army, said the Highway One slaughter was a major factor in his decision to defect to the South Vietnamese, which he accomplished on July 31 in Thua Thien province just south of Quang Tri.

The ambush on Highway one between April 28 and May 3 just before and after the fall of Quang Tri city was reported at the time by newsmen on the northern front and in greater detail when the South Vietnamese retook that section of the highway at the end of June.

In August, the U.S. State Department called the incident a deliberate North Vietnamese army massacre of helpless civilians and estimated that 1,000 to 2,000 nonmilitary refugees were killed. Interviews with sur-

By MICHAEL PUTZEL

vivors and inspection of the sight indicated the figure was more likely between 200 and 600 dead.

Thuy, at a news conference sponsored by the Saigon command, refused to estimate the number killed but said there were too many to count.

The defector said he was a radio operator with the 4th battalion, 2nd regiment, North Vietnamese 321st division, which took up positions 100 to 150 yards from the Highway on April 28.

The next day, he said, the battalion commander told his troops that anyone moving south from Quang Tri was the enemy.

'Very Horrible'

Thuy said many soldiers and civilians were fleeing down the Highway, and the North Vietnamese opened fire with 61mm and 82mm mortars and with automatic rifles.

«The people were moving on bicycles, motorbikes and buses,» he said, «but no one was able to escape.»

Thuy said he and other

soldiers in his unit went up on the highway later. «It was very horrible. Many were killed, including old people, children and pregnant women. The dying were screaming and begging for water.»

«Soldiers stripped the corpses, taking watches, rice, money and clothes.»

Dragged, Shot

The defector said his fellow soldiers dragged some survivors from shelters along the road, ordered them to move out of the area, then shot them as they fled.

Asked if the South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians moved in separate groups on the highway or whether they were bunched together, Thuy said they were sometimes separate and at other times intermingled. But no distinction was made, he said, because the order was to shoot at anyone moving south.

Two North Vietnamese soldiers put on civilian clothes found on the highway, took bicycles from the ambush site and started riding toward Quang Tri city, Thuy said.

They pedaled into an area covered by another unit and were shot to death by their own troops. The defector didn't elaborate on why the soldiers tried to go north or why they pretended to be civilians.

Executions

Thuy said on two occasions in Quang Tri province he witnessed the execution of couples who were said to be servants of the Saigon regime.

The first time, he said, a woman found in a village was shot by her captors and her husband was beheaded shortly afterward on another occasion, a man and wife were attempting to flee to Thua Thien after Quang Tri had fallen, and they were shot after they had tried to stay behind when the province fell, Thuy said.

A military spokesman said the news conference was called because there had been considerable publicity about the Highway One ambush and Thuy, as a witness, was qualified to speak about the incident.

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WASHINGTON STAR
8 September 1972

Red Defector Tells S. Viets Of Massacre

SAIGON (AP) —The government brought forward today a North Vietnamese defector who said he was involved

in a massacre of South Vietnamese fleeing from Quang Tri City last spring.

Le Xuan Thuy, 22, served about one year in the North Vietnamese army. He said the Highway 1 slaughter was a major factor in his decision to defect to the South Vietnamese July 31.

The ambush on Highway 1 between April 28 and May 3 was reported at the time by news men on the northern front and in greater detail when the South Vietnamese retook that

section of the highway at the end of June.

Thuy, at a news conference sponsored by the Saigon command, said the victims were "too many to count." He said a battalion commander told his troops that anyone moving south from Quang Tri was the enemy.

Thuy said many soldiers and civilians were fleeing down the highway, and the North Vietnamese opened fire with 61mm and 82mm mortars and with automatic rifles.

Thuy said he and other soldiers in his unit went up on the highway later. "It was very horrible. Many were killed, including old people, children and pregnant women. The dying were screaming and begging for water. Soldiers stripped the corpses, taking watches, rice, money and clothes."

The defector said his fellow soldiers dragged some survivors from shelters along the road, ordered them to move out of the area, then shot them as they fled.

SAIGON POST
16 August 1972

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Witnesses Tell Of NVA Massacre Of Civilians Fleeing From Q. Tri

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By NICHOLAS RUGGIERI
IPS Correspondent

SAIGON. Two U.S. Marine corps officers have provided eyewitness accounts of the North Vietnamese slaughter of about 2,000 persons, including sick and elderly adults and children, who sought to flee from the Communist invasion of Quang Tri last April.

The accounts furnished by Major Robert F. Sheridan and Major Donald L. Price make it clear that the North Vietnamese action was deliberate.

"We just said there and couldn't believe it," said Major Sheridan. "The North Vietnam Army knew what they were doing. They had forward observers who were probably within a couple of hundred meters from the refugees. There would have been seen that there were no weapons, no vehicles, and indeed hardly any men at all except very old ones. I used to have some respect for the North Vietnam Army with regard to their alleged discipline toward the local population, but this was just criminal

slaughter of the old and the

weak. Majors Sheridan and Price were members of U.S. Marine advisory team assigned to a South Vietnamese battalion trying to stem the initial Communist sweep into Quang Tri province from positions not far from the scene of the massacre. The Americans and their Vietnamese companions were powerless to do anything but watch the horrifying spectacle. They say three of four foreign correspondents were with their team, and some took motion pictures of the carnage.

The assault on the helpless refugees apparently began on April 21 when they boarded a variety of vehicles, including three-wheeled Lam-brettas, and civilian and military trucks at a point on Highway number one.

Major Price said the North Vietnamese troops ambushed the column on the highway and raked it with small arms fire and shrapnel. The column was voy and blown to pieces, he said, and the road and surrounding fields soon were

littered with the bodies of women, old men and children.

Five days later, on April 29-30 thousands of other civilians fleeing from the occupied province were hit by North Vietnamese artillery fire further south on the Highway.

Major Sheridan said; "It was the worst sight I have ever seen."

He said the refugees were primarily small children and elderly people, many of the latter stooped from arthritis and unable to walk more than a few meters without pausing for a rest. Some of the old people were carrying children or belongings gathered in baskets suspended from poles slung across their backs.

The American officer said there were no South Vietnamese soldiers among the refugees and no sign of weapons. A few of the men appeared to be members of the People's Self Defense force. He said that in the incidents he witnessed the refugees had no vehicles, either military or civilian.

From his own position in a small village just off Route

One. About one kilometer north of My Chanh Bridge, Major Sheridan said he could see a North Vietnamese regiment firing 130mm. Artillery shells with variable-time fuses over the heads of the refugees. The shells exploded between 30 and 40 meters above the refugee column, tearing the refugees limb from limb.

"The North Vietnamese artillery kept firing on the trapped refugees the entire day.

"We counted the shells coming in by hundreds. When the victims fell under the terrible overhead blasts, there was no one to pick up the wounded. When an explosion blew a hole in the refugee column those following pressed on over the broken bodies. There was no strength to do more than move dumbly on..."

Major Sheridan said the South Vietnamese Marines with him wept at the carnage in anger, grief and frustration over their inability to do anything. He said they gave all their food and money to those refugees who came stumbling and staggering out of the murderous zone of fire.

Major Sheridan said he was unable to estimate the killed by North Vietnamese artillery during the incidents on April 29 and 30. He could only say that the total was in the

NEW YORK TIMES
10 September 1972

Attack on Refugee Camp Near Danang Is Reported

Vietcong Raid Is Said to Have Killed 20, Wounded 94 and Left 200 Families Homeless—U.S. Jets Bomb North

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By The Associated Press

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sunday, Sept. 10—A Vietcong demolition squad reportedly attacked South Vietnam's biggest refugee camp yesterday, taking a heavy toll in life and property.

Reports from the camp, which is on the northwestern edge of Danang, said that 20 refugees were killed, 94 were wounded and 200 families left homeless after undergoing a barrage of mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, rifle fire and explosive charges.

One Government militiaman also was reported killed. The attackers were said to

have withdrawn after the raid on the lightly guarded Camp Books compound, once a United States Marine supply base, without losing a man.

The attackers also hit two adjoining South Vietnamese militia outposts, but there was no immediate word on casualties or damage at these sites.

It was the closest ground attack to Danang, South Vietnam's second largest city, in more than a year, although the northern port city has been a target of frequent shellings.

The refugee camp houses more than 50,000 civilians who fled Quangtri Province, which was overrun by enemy forces, on May 1.

The camp is built on white sand flats just off Route 1 and contains hundreds of dilapidated military barracks. It was considered too large to be occupied by the South Vietnamese Army after United States troops withdrew from Danang.

In the air war, American jet planes carried out more than 310 strikes across North Vietnam yesterday, but the raids cost two planes and an airman is missing, the United States command said.

A Navy A-7 crashed from unknown causes 15 miles northeast of Vinh and the pilot is missing, the command said. Other sources said initial reports indicated the plane may have been hit by lightning.

2 Ball Out Near Carrier

A Navy F-4 was hit by anti-aircraft fire after attacking a supply convoy 32 miles north

of Vinh, the command said. The jet headed back toward the carrier Saratoga but was unable to make a landing. The crewmen bailed out two miles from the carrier and were rescued by a helicopter.

The latest losses raised to 88 the number of United States planes reported by the United States command downed over North Vietnam since the start of the enemy offensive on March 30. The command lists 97 airmen missing over the north in the same period. The Defense Department lists 37 of the 97 missing as captured and prisoners in the fort along with 388 other airmen captured before the March 30 offensive.

The main raids were directed against the northeast rail line connecting Hanoi with China.

Rail Bridge Is Attacked

The Air Force said F-4 Phantoms attacked the Vuchua rail-

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BALTIMORE SUN
5 October 1972

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Viet Cong raids leave 100 missing

By The Associated Press

At least 100 civilians were reported missing yesterday in the aftermath of Viet Cong attacks on 2 fishing villages along South Vietnam's northern coast. Whether they were abducted or had defected was not known, field sources said.

The United States reported that F-111 swing-wing jets returned to war action yesterday after being withdrawn from combat because of the loss of one plane last week over North Vietnam.

Typhoon Lorna dissipates

The U.S. command ordered stepped-up B-52 raids in the Saigon region, where an upsurge in battlefield activity in recent days has marked the latest Communist command "high point."

American bombing raids were cut by more than half because of bad weather resulting from Typhoon Lorna, which was dissipating in the coast about midnight Tuesday. The Thailand-based U.S.

fighter-bombers flew only 120 raids over the North Tuesday, compared to 280 the previous day, the command reported.

The U.S. command in Saigon had refused to confirm or deny reports by informants that the F-111's, which came back to Indochina last week, had been withdrawn from a combat role after the loss of one in the North last Thursday.

But the Pentagon in Washington acknowledged that the F-111's had been withdrawn and said they returned to combat yesterday with new attacks on North Vietnam.

Following the Washington report, a U.S. command spokesman finally did acknowledge that the F-111's did return to combat but added he had no immediate report on their mission.

In another development, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise arrived off Vietnam, relieving the Hancock, an older ship. Despite the bad weather that extended well south of the demarcation

WASHINGTON POST
25 September 1972

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Hanoi's Forces Renew Assaults in the North

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, Sept. 24—Communist forces backed by tanks and heavy artillery renewed their assaults Sunday along the northern coast below Danang.

Official sources said the attacks in Quangbin and Quanggal provinces were part of a harassing operation aimed at destroying the Saigon government's credibility in protecting the population it claims it controls.

The fighting has created thousands of new refugees, and one massacre was reported.

Refugees from a Communist-occupied district in south-

ern Quangngal Province said Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops killed more than 40 civilians when they apparently refused to denounce the Saigon government.

The refugees said that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese gathered more than 100 civilians in a building in a hamlet in Moduc district last week and interrogated them.

Those who expressed anti-government feelings were allowed to leave. Between 40 to 50 persons were still inside at the end of the interrogation. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong then planted explosives in the building and blew it up, killing all inside, the refugees said.

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WASHINGTON POST
7 October 1972

Vietcong Raid on Mission Kills 1

From News Dispatches

DANANG, Oct. 6—A 71-

year-old Scottish woman missionary conceded she was "jittery" during a Vietcong attack on an isolated leper colony and orphanage near here early today. "But it certainly wasn't panic," she added.

According to Mrs. Sally Haverson, who has been in Vietnam for 12 years for the United World Mission:

"When you get to be my age, you don't get so excited about things."

The attack, carried out by an estimated four Communist terrorists, killed one woman tuberculous patient and left 20 patients seriously wounded.

Mrs. Haverson was the only European at the seaside colony of wooden shacks and concrete dormitories when the raiders crept down rugged cliffs to

the leprosarium and set off nine satchel charges, destroying one building, wiping out a generating station and damaging seven other buildings.

Lepers' homes and hospital wards were blown up in the Happy Haven complex, which houses 100 lepers and 50 orphans. The colony, built with the help of U.S. servicemen, is operated by the United World Mission of St. Petersburg, Fla.

zone, officials said, some of the Enterprise's 75 jets flew raids in South Vietnam.

In the northern region of South Vietnam, the coastal villages of Xuyen Tho and Xuyen Phuoc, which together have about 10,000 people, were attacked by Viet Cong sappers before dawn.

About 18 civilians and 2 militia soldiers were killed and 6 civilians wounded, with 8 of the attackers also slain. But at least 100 other villagers were listed as missing, and local officials were trying to determine whether they had been kidnaped or had accompanied the invaders willingly.

Activity frequent

The Viet Cong frequently abduct civilians to work as porters, laborers or even as soldiers.

The 2 villages are on an important river estuary near Hoi An, the Quang Nam province capital about 20 miles south of Da Nang. The area is one where Viet Cong activity remains frequent and where Saigon government security has never been strong.

Hoi An itself was hit by a 13-round mortar attack simultaneously with the assaults on the 2 villages, and 6 civilians and 1 soldier were wounded. Sixty miles farther south, an explosion in a school killed 1 person and wounded 19, the Saigon military command said.

Although considerable enemy activity is still being reported in the north, senior U.S. commanders say the Communist forces there are now largely in a defense status following months of heavy fighting and the emphasis is now on the 3d military region, which includes Saigon and 11 surrounding provinces.

CPYRGHT

THE VIET-CONG STRATEGY OF TERROR

By Douglas Pike

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Chapter III: Hue

The city of Hue is one of the saddest cities of our earth, not simply because of what happened there in February, 1968, unthinkable as that was. It is a silent rebuke to all of us, inheritors of 40 centuries of civilization, who in our century have allowed collectivist politics to corrupt us into the worst of the modern sins, indifference to inhumanity. What happened in Hue should give pause to every civilized person. It should be inscribed, so as not to be forgotten, along with the record of other terrible visitations of man's inhumanity to man which stud the history of the human race. Hue is another demonstration of what man can bring himself to do when he fixes no limits on political action and pursues uncautiously the dream of social perfectibility.

What happened in Hue, physically, can be described with a few quick statistics. A communist force which eventually reached 12,000 invaded the city the night of the new moon marking the new lunar year, January 30, 1968. It stayed for 26 days and then was driven out by military action. In the wake of this Tet offensive, 5,800 Hue civilians were dead or missing. It is now known that most of them are dead. The bodies of most have been found in the past 20 months, in single and mass graves throughout Thua Thien province which surrounds this cultural capital of Viet-Nam.

Such are the skeletal facts, the important statistics. Such is what the incurious world knows, if it knows anything at all about Hue, for this is what was written, modestly, by the world's press. Apparently it made no impact on the world's mind or conscience. For there was no agonized outcry. No demonstrations at North Vietnamese embassies around the world. Lord Russell did not send his "war crimes tribunal" to Hue to take evidence and indict. In a tone beyond bitterness, the people there will tell you that the world does not know what happened in Hue or if it does, does not care.

The City

Considered by Asian standards, Hue is not old, less than two centuries. The ancient imperial capital was Hanoi. A dynastic breakup in the early 1800's afforded a powerful court noble the chance to seize the mantle of power, which he did. He proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long and went on to become one of Viet-Nam's most famous rulers. One of Gia Long's first acts was to move the capital far to the

south, to the banks of the meandering Perfume River half way between Hanoi and Saigon. There he settled his court behind the newly-built walled fortification now called the Citadel. Inside his artisans erected buildings, working with sketches of the palaces of Peking. The city of Hue grew up around the Citadel.

As the years passed Hue became the center of religious and intellectual leadership, while Hanoi assumed the political and Saigon the commercial leadership. Throughout the days of French rule, Hue maintained what neither Viet-Nam's two other major cities could manage, and that was dignity. In Hue the French hand was behind a facade, the Court, but a facade is better than nothing and in Hue pride could grow. Confucianism and Buddhism mingled harmoniously, first in the temples and later in the university, each reinforced steadily by the growing power of nationalism. Traditionalism became a means of affronting the French, and Hue specialized in tradition. So the old classics were read and revered, the ancient musical instruments taught and played and each new building went up according to time-honored architectural precepts. Hue came to regard itself as the repository of a great esthetic and cultural inheritance with the special task of defending and transmitting this to the future. Hue as guarantor of culture was a concept held even by the illiterate cyclo driver in the street. Gradually Hue assumed a personality, then character, then ambience.

Each emperor before joining his ancestors carefully constructed his own tomb, fine gardened areas which now grace the river valley behind the city. The tombs of Tu Duc, Minh Mang, Khai Dinh and Dong Khanh are treasured national landmarks known to every Vietnamese school child.

Now Hue has a new tomb, Nui Ba Vanh (Three Hills Ringed). It is destined to become a hallowed national shrine, for here are buried the unidentified victims of the Hue Massacre, all civilians. It is appropriate somehow that in this kind of war the tomb of the unknown should contain a civilian.

The Battle

The Battle of Hue was part of the communist Winter-Spring campaign of 1967-68. The entire campaign was divided into three phases:

Phase I came in October, November, and December of

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1967 and entailed "coordinated fighting methods," that is, fairly large, set-piece battles against important fixed installations or allied concentrations. The battles of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, Dak To in Kontum Province, and Con Tien in Quang Tri Province, all three in the mountains interior of South Viet-Nam near the Cambodian and Lao borders, were typical and major elements in Phase I.

Phase II came in January, February, and March of 1968 and involved great use of "independent fighting methods," that is, large numbers of attacks by fairly small units, simultaneously, over a vast geographic area and using the most refined and advanced techniques of guerrilla war. Whereas Phase I was fought chiefly with North Vietnamese Regular (PAVN) troops (at that time some 55,000 were in the South), Phase II was fought mainly with Southern Communist (PLAF) troops. The crescendo of Phase II was the Tet offensive in which 70,000 troops attacked 32 of South Viet-Nam's largest population centers, including the city of Hue.

Phase III, in April, May, and June of 1968, originally was to have combined the independent and coordinated fighting methods, culminating in a great fixed battle somewhere. This was what captured documents guardedly referred to as the "second wave". Possibly it was to have been Khe Sanh, the U.S. Marine base in the far northern corner of South Viet-Nam. Or perhaps it was to have been Hue. There was no second wave chiefly because events in Phases I and II did not develop as expected. Still, the war reached its bloodiest tempo in eight years then, during the period from the Battle of Hue in February until the lifting of the siege of Khe Sanh in late summer.

American losses during those three months averaged nearly 500 killed per week; the GVN losses were double that rate; and the PAVN-PLAF losses were nearly eight times the American loss rate.

In the Winter-Spring Campaign, the communists began with about 195,000 PLAF main force and PAVN troops. During the nine months they lost (killed or permanently disabled) about 85,000 men.

The Winter-Spring Campaign was an all-out communist bid to break the back of the South Vietnamese armed forces and drive the government, along with the Allied forces, into defensive city enclaves. Strictly speaking, the Battle of Hue was part of Phase I rather than Phase II since it employed "coordinated fighting methods" and involved North Viet-

name troops rather than Southern troops. The battle was fought, on the communist side, largely by two veteran North Vietnamese army divisions: The Fifth and 324-B, augmented by main force battalions and some guerrilla units along with some 150 local civilian commissars and cadres.

Briefly the Battle of Hue consisted of these major developments: The initial communist assault, chiefly by the 800th and 802nd battalions, had the force and momentum to carry it across Hue. By dawn of the first day the communists controlled all the city except the headquarters of the First ARVN Division and the compound housing American military advisors. The Vietnamese and Americans moved up reinforcements with orders to reach the two holdouts and strengthen them. The communists moved up another battalion, the 804th, with orders to intercept the reinforcement forces. This failed, the two points were reinforced and never again seriously threatened.

The battle then took on the aspects of a siege. The communists were in the Citadel and on the western edge of the city. The Vietnamese and Americans on the other three sides, including that portion of Hue south of the river, determined to drive them out, hoping initially to do so with artillery fire and air strikes. But the Citadel was well built and soon it became apparent that if the communists' orders were to hold, they could be expelled only by city warfare, fighting house by house and block by block, a slow and costly form of combat. The order was given. By the third week of February the encirclement of the Citadel was well under way and Vietnamese troops and American Marines were advancing yard by yard through the Citadel. On the morning of February 24th, Vietnamese First Division soldiers tore down the communist flag that had flown for 24 days over the outer wall and hoisted their own. The battle was won, although sporadic fighting would continue outside the city. Some 2,500 communists died during the battle and another 2,500 would die as communists elements were pursued beyond Hue. Allied dead were set at 357.

The Finds

In the chaos that existed following the battle, the first order of civilian business was emergency relief, in the form of food shipments, prevention of epidemics, emergency medical care, etc. Then came the home rebuilding effort. Only later did Hue begin to tabulate its casualties. No true post-

attack census has yet been taken. In March local officials reported that 1,900 civilians were hospitalized with war wounds and they estimated that some 5,800 persons were unaccounted for.

The first discovery of communist victims came in the Gia Hoi High School yard, on February 26; eventually 170 bodies were recovered. In the next few months 18 additional grave sites were found, the largest of which were Tang Quang Tu Pagoda (67 victims), Bai Dau (77), Cho Thong area (an estimated 100), the imperial tombs area (201), Thien Ham (approximately 200), and Dong Gi (approximately 100). In all almost 1,200 bodies were found in hastily dug, poorly concealed graves. At least half of these showed clear evidence of atrocity killings: hands wired behind backs, rags stuffed in mouths, bodies contorted but without wounds (indicating burial alive). The other nearly 600 bore wound marks but there was no way of determining whether they died by firing squad or incidental to the battle. Among these victims were three West German doctors, a medical technician who was the wife of one of the doctors, and two French Catholic priests, one of whom was buried alive.

The second major group of finds was discovered in the first seven months of 1969 in Phu Thu district—the Sand Dune Finds and Le Xa Tay—and Huong Thuy district—Xuan Hoa-Van Duong—in late March and April. Additional grave sites were found in Vinh Loc district in May and in Nam Hoa district in July.

The largest of this group were the Sand Dune Finds in the three sites of Vinh Luu, Le Xa Dong and Xuan O located in rolling, grass-tufted sand dune country near the South China Sea. Separated by salt-marsh valleys, these dunes were ideal for graves.

On the discovery of the Sand Dune Finds a story is told that a local farmer, walking over the dunes one morning, tripped over a piece of wire sticking out of the sand. In ire he jerked at the wire and out of the sand, at the other end of his wire, came a bony hand and arm. The find was made. Excavation work was ordered, and 809 bodies were uncovered.

A fixed procedure then developed, now used in all the excavations. Four-person teams, usually young people, operate as a unit. They wear surgical gloves well-doused in alcohol, their faces masked to avoid odor. They dig systematically, using sound archeological principles. The area is marked off into a grid. Digging is done with flat shovels used

in a peculiar sideward motion that slices away layer after layer of sand until a strike is made. Then, with the aid of a small garden trowel, the body is uncovered. It is removed and placed on a sheet of plastic. Then comes registration: a number painted on the skull and a description (dental impression, color of hair, identifying papers, clothing, jewelry, religious artifacts, etc.) listed in a record book. The body is then carted away to a central clearing station where the information gathered is posted before waiting relatives. It is slow work, averaging six man-hours per body.

The teams are now experienced and even specialized. Some are assigned the task of probing the sand with long iron rods and have developed an almost sixth sense as to where the bodies are. Others specialize in removing bodies intact, important in terms of later identification. One old man has gained fame for his ability to identify persons he has known by the shape and feel of skulls.

Vegetation is one indicator, the presence of bright green grass is an almost certain sign that a body is beneath. Young children are another source of information. A fourteen-year-old buffalo boy with a sharp eye and a good memory pinpointed the location of more than a dozen bodies, which he had watched the communists bury a year and a half ago.

In the Sand Dune Find, the pattern had been to tie victims together in groups of 10 or 20, line them up in front of a trench dug by local corvee labor and cut them down with submachine gun (a favorite local souvenir is a spent Russian machine gun shell taken from a grave). Frequently the dead were buried in layers of three and four, which makes identification particularly difficult.

In Nam Hoa district came the third, or Da Mai Creek Find, which also has been called the Phu Cam death march, made on September 19, 1969. Three communist defectors told intelligence officers of the 101st Airborne Brigade that they had witnessed the killing of several hundred people at Da Mai Creek, about 10 miles south of Hue, in February of 1968. The area is wild, unpopulated, virtually inaccessible. The Brigade sent a search party, which reported that the stream contained a large number of human bones.

By piecing together bits of information, it was determined that this is what happened at Da Mai Creek: On the fifth day of Tet in the Phu Cam section of Hue, where some three-fourths of the City's 40,000 Roman Catholics lived, a large number of people had taken sanctuary from the battle in a local church, a common method in Viet-Nam of escaping

war. Many in the building were not in fact Catholics. A communist political commissar arrived at the church and ordered out about 400 people, some by name and some apparently because of their appearance (prosperous looking and middle-aged businessmen, for example). He said they were going to the "liberated area" for three days of indoctrination, after which each could return home. They were marched nine kilometers south to a pagoda where the communists had established a headquarters. There 20 were called out from the group, assembled before a drumhead court, tried, found guilty, executed and buried in the pagoda yard. The remainder were taken across the river and turned over to a local communist unit in an exchange that even involved handing the political commissar a receipt. It is probable that the commissar intended that their prisoners should be re-educated and returned, but with the turnover, matters passed from his control. During the next several days, exactly how many is not known, both captive and captor wandered the countryside. At some point in Phase III (see below) the local communists decided to eliminate witnesses. Their captives were led through six kilometers of some of the most rugged terrain in Central Viet-Nam, to Da Mai Creek. There they were shot or brained and their bodies left to wash in the running stream.

The 101st Airborne Brigade burial detail found it impossible to reach the creek overland, roads being non-existent or impassable. The creek's foliage is what in Viet-Nam is called double-canopy, that is, two layers, one consisting of brush and trees close to the ground, and the second of tall trees whose branches spread out high above. Beneath is permanent twilight. Brigade engineers spent two days blasting a hole through the double-canopy by exploding dynamite dangled on long wires beneath their hovering helicopters. This cleared a landing pad for helicopter hearses. Quite clearly this was a spot where death could be easily hidden even without burial.

The Da Mai Creek bed, for nearly a hundred yards up the ravine, yielded skulls, skeletons and pieces of human bones. The dead had been left above ground (for the animists among them, this meant their souls would wander the lonely earth forever, since such is the fate of the unburied dead), and 20 months in the running stream had left bones clean and white.

Local authorities later released a list of 428 names of persons whom they said had been positively identified from the creek bed remains.

The fourth or Phu Thu Salt Flat Finds came in November 1969, near the fishing village of Luong Vien some ten miles east of Hue, another desolate region. Government troops early in the month began an intensive effort to clear the area of remnants of the local communist organization. People of Luong Vien, population 700, who had remained silent in the presence of troops for 20 months apparently felt secure enough from communist revenge to break silence and lead officials to the find. At this writing, excavation work is under way. Based on descriptions from villagers whose memories are not always clear, local officials estimate the number of bodies at Phu Thu to be at least 300 and possibly 1,000.

The story remains uncompleted. If the estimates by Hue officials are even approximately correct, nearly 2,000 people are still missing. Recapitulation of the dead and missing:

After the battle, the GVN's total estimated civilian casualties resulting from Battle of Hue	7600
Wounded (hospitalized or outpatients) with injuries attributable to warfare	-1900
subtotal	5700
Estimated civilian deaths due to accident of battle	- 944
subtotal	4756
First Finds-Bodies discovered immediately post-battle, 1968	-1173
subtotal	3583
Second Finds, including Sand Dune Finds, March-July, 1969 (estimated)	- 809
subtotal	2774
Third Find, Da Mai Creek Find (Nam Hoa district) September, 1969	- 428
subtotal	2346

Fourth Finds-Phu Thu Salt Flat Find, November, 1969 (estimated)	— 300
	<hr/>
subtotal	2026
Miscellaneous finds during 1969 (approximate)	— 100
	<hr/>
TOTAL YET UNACCOUNTED FOR	1946

(A map of the Hue area showing locations of major body finds is inside the back cover of this monograph.)

Communist Rationale

The killing in Hue that added up to the Hue Massacre far exceeded in numbers any atrocity by the communists previously in South Viet-Nam. The difference was not only one in degree but one in kind. The character of the terror that emerges from an examination of Hue is quite distinct from communist terror acts elsewhere, frequent or brutal as they may have been. The previously noted objectives for communist terror (see page 21) scarcely fit for Hue. The terror in Hue was not a morale building act—the quick blow deep into the enemy's lair which proves enemy vulnerability and the guerrilla's omnipotence and which is quite different from gunning down civilians in areas under guerrilla control. Nor was it terror to advertise the cause. Nor to disorient and psychologically isolate the individual, since the vast majority of the killings were done secretly. Nor, beyond the black-list killings, was it terror to eliminate opposing forces. Hue did not follow the pattern of terror to provoke governmental over-response since it resulted in only what might have been anticipated—government assistance. There were elements of each objective, true, but none serves to explain the widespread and diverse pattern of death meted out by the communists.

What is offered here is a hypothesis which will suggest logic and system behind what appears to be simple, random slaughter. Before dealing with it, let us consider three facts which constantly reassert themselves to a Hue visitor seeking to discover what exactly happened there and, more importantly, exactly *why* it happened. All three fly in the face of common sense and contradict to a degree what has been written. Yet, in talking to all sources—province chief, police chief, American advisor, eye witness, captured prisoner, *hoi*

chanh (defector) or those few who miraculously escaped a death scene—these three facts emerge again and again.

The first fact, and perhaps the most important, is that despite contrary appearances virtually no communist killing was due to rage, frustration, or panic during the communist withdrawal at the end. Such explanations are frequently heard, but they fail to hold up under scrutiny. Quite the contrary, to trace back any single killing is to discover that almost without exception it was the result of a decision rational and justifiable in the communist mind. In fact, most killings were, from the communist calculation, imperative.

The second fact is that, as far as can be determined, virtually all killings were done by local communists cadres and not by the PAVN troops or Northerners or other outside communists. Some 12,000 PAVN troops fought the battle of Hue and killed civilians in the process but this was incidental to their military effort. Most of the 150 communist civilian cadres operating within the city were local, that is from the Thua Thien province area. They were the ones who issued the death orders. Whether they acted on instructions from higher headquarters (and the communist organizational system is such that one must assume they did), and, if so, what exactly those orders were, no one yet knows for sure.

The third fact is that beyond "example" executions of prominent "tyrants", most of the killings were done secretly with extraordinary effort made to hide the bodies. Most outsiders have a mental picture of Hue as a place of public executions and prominent mass burial mounds of fresh-turned earth. Only in the early days were there well-publicized executions and these were relatively few. The burial sites in the city were easily discovered because it is difficult to create a graveyard in a densely populated area without someone noticing it. All the other finds were well hidden, all in terrain lending itself to concealment, probably the reason the sites were chosen in the first place. A body in the sand dunes is as difficult to find as a sea shell pushed deep into a sandy beach over which a wave has washed. Da Mai Creek is in the remotest part of the province and must have required great exertion by the communists to lead their victims there. Had not the three *hoi chanh* led searchers to the wild uninhabited spot the bodies might well remain undiscovered to this day. A visit to all sites leaves one with the impression that the communists made a major effort to hide their deeds.

The hypothesis offered here connects and fixes in time the communist assessment of their prospects for staying in Hue with the kind of death order issued. It seems clear from sifting evidence that they had no single unchanging assessment with regard to themselves and their future in Hue, but rather that changing situations during the course of the battle altered their prospects and their intentions. It also seems equally clear from the evidence that there was no single communist policy on death orders; instead the kind of death order issued changed during the course of the battle. The correlation between these two is high and divides into three phases. The hypothesis therefore is that *as communist plans during the Battle of Hue changed so did the nature of the death orders issued*. This conclusion is based on overt communist statements, testimony by prisoners' and *hoi chanh*, accounts of eye witnesses, captured documents and the internal logic of the communist situation.

Hue: Phase I

When the communists were preparing their attack on Hue, their cadres at the sand table exercises deep in the jungle told officers they would be in the city seven days and no more. This word was passed on to most of the attackers on the eve of the battle. It was stated more or less openly in public pronouncements. Radio Hanoi, on February 1 for example, described the attack as an effort "to remove Saigon power at certain levels, accelerating the process of decomposition of the Saigon administration."

Thinking in Phase I was well expressed in a PRP resolution issued to cadres on the eve of the offensive:

"Be sure that the liberated . . . cities are successfully consolidated. Quickly activate armed and political units, establish administrative organs at all echelons, promote (civilian) defense and combat support activities, get the people to establish an air defense system and generally motivate

1. Including one Son Lam (Party name), the highest ranking civilian prisoner taken who was part of the Hue offensive; he was a combination political commissar, district chief and local guerrilla unit leader in Hue at the start of the battle as well as during most of the subsequent period. He was not captured until much later.

them to be ready to act against the enemy when he counter-attacks. . ."

This was the limited view at the start—held momentarily. Subsequent developments in Hue were reported in different terms. Radio Hanoi on February 4 said:

"After one hour's fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces occupied the residence of the puppet provincial governor (in Hue), the prison and the offices of the puppet administration . . . The Revolutionary Armed Forces punished most cruel agents of the enemy and seized control of the streets . . . rounded up and punished dozen of cruel agents and caused the enemy organs of control and oppression to crumble . . ."

During the brief stay in Hue, the civilian cadres, accompanied by execution squads, were to round up and execute key individuals whose elimination would greatly weaken the government's administrative apparatus following communist withdrawal. This was the blacklist period, the time of the drumhead court. Cadres with lists of names and addresses on clipboards appeared and called into kangaroo court various "enemies of the Revolution." Their trials were public, usually in the courtyard of a temporary communist headquarters. The trials lasted about ten minutes each and there are no known not-guilty verdicts. Punishment, invariably execution, was meted out immediately. Bodies were either hastily buried or turned over to relatives. Singled out for this treatment were civil servants, especially those involved in security or police affairs, military officers and some non-commissioned officers, plus selected non-official but natural leaders of the community, chiefly educators and religionists.

With the exception of a particularly venomous attack on Hue intellectuals, the Phase I pattern was standard operating procedure for communists in Viet-Nam. It was the sort of thing that had been going on systematically in the villages for ten years. Permanent blacklists, prepared by zonal or inter-zone Party headquarters have long existed for use throughout the country, whenever an opportunity presents itself. Quite obviously not all the people named in the lists used in Hue were liquidated. One meets today a surprisingly large number of people who obviously were listed, who stayed in the city throughout the battle, but escaped. Throughout the 24-day period the communist cadres were busy hunting down persons on their blacklists, but after a few days their major efforts were turned into a new channel.

Hue: Phase II

In the first few days, the Tet offensive affairs progressed so well for the communists in Hue (although not to the south, where Party chiefs received some rather grim evaluations from cadres in the midst of the offensive in the Mekong Delta) that for a brief euphoric moment they believed they could hold the city. Probably the assessment that the communist were in Hue to stay was not shared at the higher echelons, but it was widespread in Hue and at the Thua Thien provincial level. One intercepted communist message, apparently written February 2, exhorted cadres in Hue to hold fast, declaring: "A new era, a real revolutionary period has begun (because of our Hue victories) and we need only to make swift assault (in Hue) to secure our target and gain total victory."

The Hanoi official Party paper *Nhan Dan* echoed the theme: "Like a thunderbolt, a general offensive has been hurled against the U.S. and the puppets... The U.S.-puppet machine has been duly punished. The puppet administrative organs... have suddenly collapsed. The Thieu-Ky administration cannot escape from complete collapse. The puppet troops have become extremely weak and cannot avoid being completely exterminated."²

Of course, some of this verbiage is simply exhortation to the faithful, and, as is always the case in reading communist output, it is most difficult to distinguish between belief and wish. But testimony from prisoners and *hoi chanh*, as well as intercepted battle messages, indicate that both rank and file and cadres believed for a few days they were permanently in Hue, and they acted accordingly.

Among their acts was to extend the death order and launch what in effect was a period of social reconstruction, communist style. Orders went out, apparently from the provincial level of the Party, to round up what one prisoner termed "social negatives," that is, those individuals or members of groups who represented potential danger or liability in the new social order. This was quite impersonal, not a blacklist of names but a blacklist of titles and positions held in the old society, directed not against people as such but against "social units."

As seen earlier in North Viet-Nam and in Communist China, the communists were seeking to break up the local

social order by eliminating leaders and key figures in religious organizations (Buddhist bonzes, Catholic priests), political parties (four members of the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Quoc Dan Dang, a pro-government political party in Central Viet-Nam), social movements such as women's organizations and youth groups, including, what otherwise would be totally inexplicable, the execution of pro-communist student leaders from middle and upper class families.

In consonance with this, killing in some instances was done by family unit. In one well-documented case during this period a squad with a death order entered the home of a prominent community leader and shot him, his wife, his married son and daughter-in-law, his young unmarried daughter, a male and female servant and their baby. The family cat was strangled; the family dog was clubbed to death; the goldfish scooped out of the fishbowl and tossed on the floor. When the communists left, no life remained in the house. A "social unit" had been eliminated. (Appalling though it was, one stands in that family's living room and, as a parent, thinks perhaps this was the kindest way, for in Hue one is haunted by the feeling that bereavement is worse than death).

Phase II also saw an intensive effort to eliminate intellectuals, who are perhaps more numerous in Hue than elsewhere in Viet-Nam. Surviving Hue intellectuals explain this in terms of a long-standing communist hatred of Hue intellectuals, who were anti-communist in the worst or most insulting manner: they refused to take communism seriously. Hue intellectuals have always been contemptuous of communist ideology, brushing it aside as a latecomer to the history of ideas and not a very significant one at that. Hue, being a bastion of traditionalism, with its intellectuals steeped in Confucian learning intertwined with Buddhism, did not, even in the fermenting years of the 1920's and 1930's, debate the merits of communism. Hue ignored it. The intellectuals in the university, for example, in a year's course in political thought dispense with Marxism-Leninism in a half hour lecture, painting it as a set of shallow barbarian political slogans with none of the depth and time-tested reality of Confucian learning, nor any of the splendor and soaring humanism of Buddhist thought. Since the communist, especially the communist from Hue, takes his dogma seriously, he can become demonic when dismissed by a Confucian as a philosophic ignoramus, or by a Buddhist as a

2. Radio Hanoi, February 7.

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trivial materialist. Or, worse than being dismissed, ignored through the years. So with the righteousness of a true believer, he sought to strike back and eliminate this challenge of indifference. Hue intellectuals now say the hunt-down in their ranks has taught them a hard lesson, to take communism seriously, if not as an idea, at least as a force loose in their world.

The killings in Phase II perhaps accounted for 2,000 of the missing. But the worst was not yet over.

Hue: Phase III

Inevitably, and as the leadership in Hanoi must have assumed all along, considering the forces ranged against it, the battle in Hue turned against the communists. An intercepted PAVN radio message from the Citadel, February 22, asked for permission to withdraw. Back came the reply: permission refused, attack on the 23rd. That attack was made, a last, futile one. On the 24th the Citadel was taken.

That expulsion was inevitable was apparent to the communists for at least the preceding week. It was then that began Phase III, the cover-the-traces period. Probably the entire civilian underground *apparatus* in Hue had exposed itself during Phase II. Those without suspicion rose to proclaim their identity. Typical is the case of one Hue resident who described his surprise on learning that his next door neighbor was the leader of a *phuong* (which made him 10th to 15th ranking communist civilian in the city), saying in wonder, "I'd known him for 18 years and never thought he was the least interested in politics." Such a cadre could not go underground again unless there was no one around who remembered him.

Hence Phase III, elimination of witnesses.

Probably the largest number of killings came during this period and for this reason. Those taken for political indoctrination probably were slated to be returned. But they were local people as were their captors; names and faces were familiar. So, as the end approached they became not just a burden but a positive danger. Such undoubtedly was the case with the group taken from the church at Phu Cam. Or of the 15 high school students whose bodies were found as part of the Phu Thu Salt Flat find.

Categorization in a hypothesis such as this is, of course, gross and at best only illustrative. Things are not that neat in real life. For example, throughout the entire time the

blacklist hunt went on. Also, there was revenge killing by the communists in the name of the Party, the so-called "revolutionary justice." And undoubtedly there were personal vendettas, old scores settled by individual Party members. (How else can one explain one body found at Phu Thu in which every principal bone had been broken?)³

The official communist view of the killing in Hue was contained in a book written and published in Hanoi:

"Actively combining their efforts with those of the PLAF and population, other self-defense and armed units of the city (of Hue) arrested and called to surrender the surviving functionaries of the puppet administration and officers and men of the puppet army who were skulking. Die-hard cruel agents were punished."⁴

The communist line on the Hue killings later at the Paris talks was that it was not the work of communists but of "dissident local political parties". However, it should be noted that Radio Liberation April 26, 1968, criticized the effort in Hue to recover bodies, saying the victims were only "hooligan lackeys who had incurred blood debts of the Hue compatriots and who were annihilated by the Southern armed forces and people in early Spring." This propaganda line however was soon dropped in favor of the line that it really was local political groups fighting each other. The line on Hue much later is exemplified by this Radio Hanoi broadcast of April 27, 1969:

"According to LPA; in order to cover up their cruel acts, the puppet administration in Hue recently played the farce of setting up a so-called committee for the search for burial sites of the hooligan lackeys who had owed blood debts to the Tri-Thien-Hue compatriots and who were annihilated by the Southern armed forces and people in early Mau Than spring.

"The local puppet administration sent its lackeys to carry

3. A theory widely circulated in Hue but without foundation is that Ho Chi Minh, having been socially rebuffed when teaching high school in Hue years ago, hated the place much as Hitler hated Stalingrad and personally ordered mass slaughter in Hue.

4. *South Viet-Nam: A Month of Unprecedented Offensive and Uprising*, Giai Phong Publishing House (Hanoi); March, 1968. 87pp.

out searching activities in city wards and to force compatriots to pay for ritual presents. The compatriots in the Dong Ba city ward, especially the small merchants, were forced to collect the greatest sum of money. Profoundly indignant, the Hue compatriots cursed and violently opposed the puppet administration agents. Faced with this, on 19, 20 and 21 April, the Hue puppet administration was forced to broadcast a communique denying this act by its lackeys and cast the blame on others for pocketing money in the name of the above-mentioned committee. Well aware of the Thieu-Ky-Huong clique's cheating and crafty tricks, the Hue compatriots told one another to resolutely boycott its searching and memorial service force."

HYPOTHESIS IN SUMMARY

TIME	COMMUNIST ASSESSMENT	PATTERN OF LIQUIDATION
First few days of Tet.	We have our orders to stay in the city for no more.	Drumhead Court Phase. Black-lists, advertised trials, public executions, bodies not hidden. "Tyrants, enemies of the revolution" liquidated, especially those whose deaths weaken the structure of the Hue establishment.
Middle period	We can hold the city. We are in Hue to stay.	Social Reconstruction Phase. Purge the old social order and begin to build a new one. Liquidate the "social negatives, all imperialist lackeys." Killing done quietly and bodies usually hidden.
Final period	We cannot hold; we are going to be driven out.	Leave No Witnesses Phase. Liquidate anyone in communist hands who could identify individual Party members. Kill secretly and hide bodies carefully.
Throughout:	Liquidation on grounds of vendettas; also, of course civilian casualties incidental to Battle of Hue.	Liquidation on grounds of Party retribution by individual Party members;

The number of deaths probably would have been higher but for limitations of time and circumstance. Consider the milieu in which the communists were operating: The population of the city at the time of the attack was about 180,000; the surrounding districts, where many victims were found, contained another 326,000. Some 16 communist battalions in and out of the city battled 14 Allied battalions. People were fleeing, chaos and confusion were on all sides. The communist civilian cadres numbered about 150, aided by several hundred local communists who had surfaced. The communist population control and organization plan was to divide the city into *phuongs* or precincts, a geographic unit containing up to 8,000 persons each. A ten-man cadre team was to run each *phuong*, charged with the task of locating, organizing, identifying and sorting out people in its area. After the first few days, allied military action divided the communist forces and denied them roughly half the population. They maintained this control for about three weeks. One cannot but conclude that the number of civilian victims would have been much larger than the 5700 currently estimated had the communist grip been tighter and longer.

The only statistics available yet, and they are lamentable, suggest this rough breakdown of the 5,700:

Military or para-military men or officers	30% ⁵
Government officials or civil servants	10%
Women	5%
Children under age 16	5%
Unknown or unidentified (male, over 16)	50%

Beyond these crude figures, and they are based on study of about 800 bodies, lies a vast ignorance. We do not know who the dead are, nor even how many.

Answers to these, and other questions await the coming to Hue of a good historian who will piece together the mosaic of information into a coherent picture.

Aftermath

In the days after, when awareness gradually spread, the attitude of the people of the city moved from surprise to

5. That is, the military who lived in Hue, were in the city on leave, etc., but not in the units which took back the city.

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shock to horror to a kind of numbness. The effect on the men and officers of the First Division was perhaps most striking. It is a generally accepted fact in military circles in Viet-Nam that the ARVN First Division in terms of spirit and fighting elan has changed from one of the worst divisions in the Vietnamese Army to perhaps the best.

The civilians of the city will tell you that in the months after communist departure they were gripped by a social malaise, strange but understandable. The huge wound inflicted on them healed only slowly. An all-pervasive mood settled over the city. Fear lingered in every quarter. Activity in the streets was subdued and even the children played quietly. It was an atmosphere compounded of sadness, remorse, bitterness, perhaps a little guilt mixed in, but most of all it was a pathetic desire of each to rid his mind of memories too dreadful to hold. Blot out the past, each seemed to say, for this is the way back to light. "Don't look for the graves," was the unspoken rule. Only the families of the missing were determined to face reality. They were the ones who persisted in the search and in most cases their children were the ones who did the actual digging.

Parenthetically it might be noted that, outwardly, this mood in Hue largely has evaporated. The city once again is alive, a beehive of construction work with business flourishing and people filled with ongoing projects and future plans. Physically Hue has almost completely recovered. Materially all economic indices are up. But one senses deep recesses in the mind of Hue that will never again know the sun.

As might be expected an undercurrent of irrational bitterness developed among people of Hue against the outside—the Americans because they did not somehow prevent the massacre, the Vietnamese government for what is viewed as insufficient subsequent assistance. Both are unreasonable, of course. Had it not been for the Americans the slaughter in Hue would have been infinitely worse. The government has poured many recovery resources into the area in the past 20 months and its efforts to rebuild are wholly commendable. Such bitterness slowly will dissipate. This attitude, of course, in no way even touches the measure of hatred for the communists and all they stand for. In listening in the evening to a flood of words from survivors about what happened at Hue, one is submerged in a hate that is almost a fog. Gone from Hue are the *attentistes*, the fence sitters, the advocates of non-involvement. Hardly a person exists in the city who did not find a blood relation or intimate friend

in a communist grave: the implacable hatred for communism by the people of Hue has become a function of mathematics.

The meaning of the Hue Massacre seems clear. If the communists win decisively in South Viet-Nam (and the key word is decisively), what is the prospect? First, all foreigners would be cleared out of the South, especially the hundreds of foreign newsmen who are in and out of Saigon. A curtain of ignorance would descend. Then would begin a night of long knives. There would be a new order to build. The war was long and so are memories of old scores to be settled. All political opposition, actual or potential, would be systematically eliminated. Stalin versus kulak, Mao versus landlord, Hanoi communist versus Southern Catholic, the pattern would be the same: eliminate not the individual, for who cares about the individual, but the latent danger to the dream, the representative of the blocs, the symbol of the force, that might someday, even inside the regime, dilute the system. Beyond this would come communist justice meted out to the "tyrants and lackeys." Personal revenge would be a small wheel turning within the larger wheel of Party retribution.

But little of this would be known abroad. The communists in Viet-Nam would create a silence.

The world would call it peace.

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Appendix: Terror—The Record

To provide the reader with a sense of the all-encompassing nature of communist terror in Viet-Nam, representative, but by no means comprehensive, examples have been selected from books, government files, newspaper morgues and International Control Commission reports.

Viet Minh Terror

The Viet Minh war against the French was marked by considerable use of terror, not only against the French but against Vietnamese who did not support the Viet Minh.

Beginning in the final days of World War II, the communists, under Vo Nguyen Giap, destroyed all non-communist nationalist leaders they could run to earth.

In the Viet Minh controlled areas during the war, "enemies of the Resistance" were systematically eliminated.

Something of a blood bath took place following victory in 1954, one which would have been greater had not some 900,000 North Vietnamese escaped to the South in Operation Exodus.

Terror again surged upwards in 1956 with the so-called land reform program, which actually was destruction of the natural leader class in the North Vietnamese villages. A conservative figure of the number who died at this period is 50,000; some estimates run as high as a half-million (population of North Viet-Nam at the time was about 14 million).

Accounts of various communist terror activity are found in the standard works on the Viet Minh war, including: Bernard Fall, *Le Viet Minh*; Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*; Lucien Bodard, *The Quicksand War*; George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina*. The later terror, during the so-called land reform period, is detailed in Harvey Smith et al, *Area Handbook for North Viet-Nam*; Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism*; Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indo-China*; and Dennis Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Viet-Nam*.

Some typical quotations follow:

"That city (Saigon) was in the hands of the Viet-Minh. For a month on end life there was a nightmare. During the

day everything seemed quiet . . . Fear came back with the twilight. The darkness outside was full of prowling Viet Minh. . . . It was an endless vigil. In every house the waiting had the same aspect. The rooms were lit for sake of face. The men played cards with their only weapons, the kitchen knives, within hand's reach. From time to time they broke off to calm their wives overtaken by hysteria. The children, all put into the same bed in a next-door room, trembled with fear and were sick on the mosquito netting. The terror mounted. From mouth to mouth ran the names of men who had been hacked to pieces, of women who had been raped and cut open, of children who had been maimed. The shrieks of those who were being tortured to death could be heard. The Viet-Minh had set up Resistance camps in the suburbs and there they took their hostages, burying them alive, with only their heads showing above the ground. The horror reached its culminating point . . . when some one hundred men were dismembered, slashed to pieces in unimaginably horrible circumstances."

Lucien Bodard. *The Quicksand War: Prelude to Viet-Nam*. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press. 1963. p. 11

"To make force a Viet Minh monopoly required a great deal of preventive violence . . . Like all fanatics whether political or religious who believe that they are called upon to save souls or to realize great worldly projects, the communists had no qualms when it came to advancing their cause by assassination . . . It was not difficult for people convinced of the virtue of their cause to kill others and feel they had performed a good deed . . . Success was achieved through a political strategy in which terror, always subordinate to tactical considerations, played a secondary though at times a rather important role . . ."

"The Communist policy of killing all true nationalist opponents of the Viet Minh also had deep and lasting political consequences for the future of Viet-Nam. It is one of the reasons for the weakness of the non-Communist national movement which, its best and most promising young candidates murdered, was deprived of scores of qualified leaders, enough to guide it for many years to come."

Joseph Buttinger, *Viet-Nam: A Dragon Embattled*, New York Praeger, 1967. pp 275-6, 412.

"In 1955 North Viet-Nam launched a *three-year* program of economic rehabilitation and land distribution . . . motivated in part by the regime's attempt to strengthen its control over the population by purging the landlords whom they regarded as reactionary. In implementing the redistribution measures the Communist regimes used terror and other coercive means resulting in the death of more than 50,000 persons between 1954 and 1956."

Harvey Smith, et al. *Area Handbook for North Viet-Nam*, Washington, D.C.: American University Foreign Area Studies. 1967. p 63.

"The Land Reform was carried out in two successive campaigns (1953-1956) . . . The second campaign was interrupted in 1955 owing to the mass exodus of nearly a million people from North to South Viet-Nam. . . . The communists temporarily halted the terror in order to avoid an even larger exodus. . . . But after the closing of Hai Phong, the last seaport through which people could escape, they at once resumed their campaign. . . . The number of victims in this campaign has never been made public, but if we are to believe M. Gerard Tongas, a French professor who remained in Hanoi up to 1959 and who claims to have accurate information: 'This indescribable butchery resulted in one hundred thousand deaths.'"

Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Viet-Nam*, New York: Praeger 1964. (The Tongas citation is *L'enfer communiste du Nord Viet-Nam*. Les Nouvelles Editions. Debress, Paris 1960; p. 222).

"These 'mistakes' (in the DRV Land Reform program) had been committed by the Communist cadres in charge of this operation who, when they were faced with disconcerting discovery that no landlords existed in many of the (Red River) delta villages, had proceeded to create such a class by resorting to murder and torture in order to wring the statutory confessions of past ill-treatment of tenant farmers from villagers who either cultivate their own meagre holdings or in some cases possessed no land at all. The cost in lives and suffering of this somber farce was revealed in December 1956 when 12,000 victims of the operation were released from the forced labor camps to which they had been unjustly condemned; the number of those who had been

murdered was unofficially estimated at between ten and fifteen thousand."

Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indo-China*, Oxford University Press, 1961. pp 377-8.

"The periodical campaigns of systematic terror, to ensure obedience and loyalty, followed the succession of ideas put into practice in China (on land tenure problems). . . . In 1954 village murders of alleged traitors had been perpetrated out of hand as acts of vengeance; from 1951 onward the purpose of terror became indoctrination in this sense and victims were picked out by denunciation, more or less at random, according to their social standing, to be made examples of at people's trials. But the greatest of the terror campaigns in the DRV did not begin until 1953. . . . The intention seems to have been less the elimination of any particular class of people than eradication from everybody's mind, without distinction of class, of any desire to own private property or to pursue any private purposes. . . . People's courts, set up by the visiting teams of cadres and conducted with similar cowardly hysteria to those of China, demanded quotas of denunciations by the villagers and ordered on-the-spot destruction of property and execution of the owners by various unjudicial barbarities; besides tens of thousands who lost their lives many more were made outcasts from their village communities. . . ."

Dennis T. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Viet-Nam*. London Oxford University Press, 1968; pp 173-4.

"Hard times lay ahead for the people of North Viet-Nam (late 1954). . . . Colonialism was dead but misery and un-freedom continued to be the people's lot. . . . And in the political conflicts that these conditions were bound to produce, terror would still remain the government's chief weapon against popular discontent."

Joseph Buttinger, *Op. cit.* p. 896.

February 2, 1960—Terrorists sack and burn the Buddhist temple at Phuoc Thanh, Tay Ninh province. They stab to death 17-year old Phan Van Ngoc, who tries to stop them.

April 22, 1960—Some 30 armed communists raid Thoi Long, An Xuyen province. They attempt to take away villager Cao Van Nanh, 45. Villagers protest en masse. Farmer Pham Van Bai, 56, is particularly argumentative. The communists, angered, seize him. This arouses the villagers who swarm toward the Viet Cong and their prisoner. The communists fire into the crowd. A 16-year old boy is shot dead.

August 23, 1960—Two school teachers, Nguyen Khoa Ngon and Miss Nguyen Thi Thiet, are preparing lessons at home when communists arrive and force them at gun point to go to their school, Rau Ran, in Phong Dinh province. There they find two men tied to the school veranda. The communists read the death order of the two men, named Canh and Van. They are executed, presumably to intimidate the school teachers.

September 24, 1960—An armed band sacks a school in An Lac, An Giang province. It piles seats and desks together and fires them and the school. All that remains is four bare walls.

September 28, 1960—Father Hoang Ngoc Minh, much beloved priest of Kontum parish, is riding from Tan Canh to Kondela. A communist road block halts his car. A bullet smashes into him. The guerrillas drive bamboo spears into Father Minh's body, then one fires a submachine gun point blank, killing him. The driver Huynh Huu, his nephew, is seriously wounded.

September 30, 1960—A band of ten armed communists kidnap farmer Truong Van Dang, 67, from Long Tri, Long An province. They take him before what they call a "people's tribunal." He is condemned to death for purchasing two hectares of rice land and ignoring communist orders to turn the land over to another farmer. After the "trial" he is shot dead in his rice field.

December 6, 1960—Terrorists dynamite the kitchen at the

Saigon Golf Club, killing a Vietnamese kitchen helper and injuring two Vietnamese cooks.

December, 1960—The GVN reports to the ICC that during the year the communists destroyed or damaged 284 bridges, burned 60 medical aid stations and, through destruction of schools, deprived some 25,000 children of schooling.

March 22, 1961—A truck carrying 20 girls is dynamited on the Saigon-Vung Tau road. The girls are returning from Saigon where they have taken part in a Trung Sisters Day celebration. After the explosion terrorists open fire on survivors. Two of the girls are killed and ten wounded. The girls are unarmed and traveling without escort.

May 15, 1961—Twelve Catholic nuns from La Providence order are traveling on Highway One toward Saigon. Their bus is stopped by communists who ransack their luggage. Sister Theophile protests and is shot dead on the spot. The vehicle is sprayed with bullets seriously wounding Sister Phan Thi No. The ambush takes place near Tram Van, Tay Ninh Province.

July 26, 1961—Two Vietnamese National Assemblymen Rmah Pok and Yet Nic Bounrit, both Montagnards, are shot and killed by terrorists near Dalat. A schoolteacher, traveling with them on their visit to a Montagnard resettlement village, is also killed.

September 20, 1961—One thousand main force communist soldiers storm Phuoc Vinh, capital of (then) Phuoc Thanh province, sack and burn government buildings, behead virtually the entire administrative staff. They hold the capital for 24 hours before withdrawing.

October, 1961—A U.S. State Department study estimates that the communists are killing Vietnamese at rate of 1,500 per month.

December 13, 1961—Father Bonnet, a French parish priest from Konkala, Kontum is killed by a terrorist while visiting parishioners at Ngok Rongei.

December 20, 1961—S. Fukui, a Japanese engineer at the Da Nhim dam, a Japanese government war reparations proj-

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ect to supply electric power to Viet-Nam, is kidnaped after being stopped at a road block. His fate is never learned.

January 1, 1962—A Vietnamese labor leader, Le Van Thieu, 63, is hacked to death by terrorists wielding machetes near Bien Hoa, in the rubber plantation on which he works.

January 2, 1962—Two Vietnamese technicians working in the government's anti-malaria program, Pham Van Hai and Nguyen Van Thach, are killed by communists with machetes, 12 miles south of Saigon.

February 20, 1962—Terrorists throw four hand grenades into a crowded village theater near Can Tho, killing 24 women and children. In all, 108 persons are killed or injured.

April 8, 1962—Communists execute two wounded American prisoners of war near the village of An Chau in Central Viet-Nam. Each, hands tied, is shot in the face because he cannot keep up with the retreating captors.

May 19, 1962—A terrorist grenade is hurled into the Ater-bea restaurant in Saigon, wounding a Berlin circus manager and the cultural attache from the German Embassy.

May 20, 1962—A bomb explodes in front of the Hung Dao Hotel, Saigon, a billet for American servicemen, injuring eight Vietnamese and three Americans who are in the street at the time.

June 12, 1962—Communists ambush a civilian passenger bus near Le Tri, An Giang province, killing the passengers, the driver and the driver's helper, a total of five men and women.

October 20, 1962—A teen-age communist hurls a grenade into a holiday crowd in downtown Saigon, killing six persons, including two children, and injuring 38 persons.

November 4, 1962—A terrorist hurls a grenade into an alley in Can Tho, killing one American serviceman and two Vietnamese children. A third Vietnamese child is seriously injured.

January 25, 1963—Communists dynamite a passenger-

freight train near Qui Nhon, killing eight passengers and injuring 15 others. The train is carrying only rice as freight.

March 4, 1963—Two Protestant missionaries—Elwood Forrester, an American, and Gaspard Makil, a Filipino—are shot dead at a road block between Saigon and Dalat. The Makil twin babies are shot and wounded.

March 16, 1963—Terrorists hurl a grenade into a Saigon home where an American family is having dinner, killing a French businessman and wounding four other persons, one of them a woman.

April 3, 1963—Terrorists throw two grenades into a private school near Long Xuyen, An Giang province, killing a teacher and two other adults. Students are performing their annual variety show at the time.

April 4, 1963—Terrorists throw grenades into an audience attending an outdoor motion picture showing in Cao Lanh village in the Mekong Delta, killing four persons and wounding 11.

May 23, 1963—Communists mine the main northern rail line, killing five civilian passengers. Twelve other passengers and crew are injured.

May 31, 1963—Two powerful explosions set off by terrorists on bicycles kill two Vietnamese and wound ten others in Saigon. Police believe the explosion was accidentally premature.

September 12, 1963—Miss Vo Thi Lo, 26, a schoolteacher in An Phuoc, Kien Hoa province, is found near the village with her throat cut. She had been kidnaped three days earlier.

October 16, 1963—Terrorists explode mines under two civilian buses in Kien Hoa and Quang Tin provinces, killing 18 Vietnamese and wounding 23.

November 9, 1963—Three grenades are thrown in Saigon, injuring a total of 16 persons, including four children; the first is thrown in a main street, the second along the waterfront, and the third in the Chinese residential area.

February 9, 1964—Two Americans are killed and 41

wounded, including four women and five children, when a communist bomb is set off in a sports stadium during a softball game. A second portion of the bomb fails to explode. Officials estimate that if it had, fifty persons would have died.

February 16, 1964—Three Americans are killed and 32 injured, most of them U.S. dependents, when terrorists bomb the Kinh Do movie theater in Saigon.

July 14, 1964—Pham Thao, chairman of the Catholic Action Committee in Quang Ngai, is executed when he returns to his native village of Pho Loi, Quang Ngai province.

October, 1964—U.S. officials in Saigon report that from January to October of 1964 the communists killed 429 Vietnamese local officials and kidnaped 482 others.

December 24, 1964—A Christmas eve bomb explosion at the Brink officers' billet kills two Americans and injures 50 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

February 6, 1965—Radio Liberation announces that the communists have shot two American prisoners of war as reprisals against the Vietnamese government, which had sentenced two terrorists to death.

February 10, 1965—Terrorists blow up an enlisted men's barracks in Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans.

March 30, 1965—A bomb explodes outside the American Embassy in Saigon, killing 2 Americans, 18 Vietnamese and injuring 100 Vietnamese and 45 Americans.

June 24, 1965—Radio Liberation announces the execution of an American prisoner.

June 25, 1965—Terrorists dynamite the My Canh restaurant in Saigon, killing 27 Vietnamese, 12 Americans, two Filipinos, one Frenchman, one German; more than 80 persons are injured.

June, 1965—Vietnamese officials report the rate of assassinations and kidnappings of rural officials has doubled in June over May and April; 224 officials were either killed or kidnaped.

August 18, 1965—A bomb at the Police Directorate office in Saigon kills six and wounds 15.

October 4, 1965—One of two planted bombs explodes at the Cong Hoa National Sports Stadium, killing eleven Vietnamese, including four children, and wounding 42 persons.

October 5, 1965—A bomb goes off, apparently prematurely, in a taxi on a main street in downtown Saigon, killing two Vietnamese and wounding ten others.

December 4, 1965—In Saigon a terrorist bomb kills eight persons when it explodes in front of a billet for U.S. enlisted men; 137 are injured, including 72 Americans, three New Zealanders and 62 Vietnamese.

December 12, 1965—Two terrorist platoons kill 23 Vietnamese canal construction workers asleep in a Buddhist Pagoda in Tan Huong, Dinh Tuong province; wound seven others.

December 30, 1965—Saigon editor Tu Chung of the newspaper *Chinh Luan* is gunned down in point blank fire as he arrives home at noon for lunch. Earlier he had published the texts of threatening notes he had received from the communists.

January 7, 1966—A Claymore mine explodes at Tan Son Nhut gate (entrance to Saigon airport), killing two persons and injuring 12.

January 17, 1966—Communists in Kien Tuong detonate a mine under a highway bus, killing 26 civilians, seven of them children. Eight persons are injured and three are listed as missing.

January 18, 1966—Communists mine a bus in Kien Tuong province, killing 26 civilians.

January 29, 1966—Terrorists kill a Catholic priest, Father Phan Khac Dau, 74, at Thanh Tri, Kien Tuong province. Five other civilians, including a church officer, are also killed. The marauders desecrate the church, destroying its statuary and religious artifacts.

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February 2, 1966—A communist squad ambushes a jeep load of Vietnamese information workers, killing six and wounding one; in Hau Nghia province.

February 14, 1966—Two mines explode beneath a bus and a three-wheeled taxi on a road near Tuy Hoa, killing 48 farm laborers and injuring seven others.

March 18, 1966—Fifteen Vietnamese civilians are killed and four injured by the explosion of a homemade mine on a country road eight kilometers west of Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen province.

May 22, 1966—Terrorists kill 18 sleeping men, a woman and four children during an attack on a housing center for canal workers in the Mekong Delta province of An Giang. "We are doing this to teach you a lesson," a communist cadre is reported to have said just before he pulled the trigger.

September 10, 1966—On the eve of South Viet-Nam's Constituent Assembly elections, communists stage 166 separate incidents of intimidation, abduction and assassination. Polling places also are destroyed.

September 11, 1966—On election day, communists kill 19 voters, wound 120, in fire on polling places, mining of roads, and in individual assassinations.

September 24, 1966—American troops free eleven persons from a communist "jail" in Phu Yen province who report that 70 fellow prisoners were deliberately starved to death and 20 others tortured until they died.

October 11, 1966—Acting on information from a 14-year old boy, allied forces discover a prison complex in Binh Dinh province containing the bodies of 12 Vietnamese who had been machine gunned and grenaded by fleeing guards.

October 22, 1966—A youth worker in Binh Chanh, Gia Dinh province, is shot and killed by raiders while asleep in his home.

October 24, 1966—The Hue-Quang Tri bus runs over a mine in Phong Dien district, Thua Thien province; 15 passengers are injured.

October 27, 1966—A grenade is thrown into a home in Ban Me Thout, Darlac province, killing a 63-year old man and a nine-month old child; seven other persons, six of them women, are wounded.

October 28, 1966—An alert policeman arrests a female communist agent who is about to place a time-bomb under the reviewing stand at a festival in Khanh Hung (Soc Trang), Ba Xuyen province.

November 1, 1966—Communists direct long-range recoilless rifle fire into downtown Saigon during National Day celebration killing or wounding 51 persons.

November 2, 1966—A grenade is thrown by a terrorist at Phu Tho racetrack, Saigon, killing two persons and wounding eight others, including two children.

November 2, 1966—A squad of armed guerrillas attacks a hamlet in Chau Thanh district, Phong Dinh province, then withdraws after detonating a 10-kilogram charge which wrecks a steel bridge across the Dau Sau canal. An aged woman and two children are wounded.

November 3, 1966—Communist squads infiltrate the outskirts of Saigon, fire 24 recoilless rifle shells on the city. Among the buildings hit are Saigon Central Market, Grall Hospital, Saigon Cathedral, a seminary chapel and several private homes. Eight persons are killed and 37 seriously wounded.

November 4, 1966—Communists lob mortar shells into a village in Hau Nghia province, killing one civilian and wounding eight.

November 4, 1966—Communist attack an outpost in Tay Ninh province, killing six civilians and wounding Revolutionary Development team members.

November 7, 1966—A communist squad on Provincial Road 8, Quang Duc province, abducts a hamlet chief and deputy chief.

November 8, 1966—In Chau Doc province, a 53-year old woman is tortured and shot to death; a note pinned to her

body accuses her of supporting the South Vietnamese government.

November 16, 1966—A terrorist bomb-laden bicycle on Nguyen Van Thoai Street, Saigon, explodes; two South Vietnamese soldiers and a civilian are wounded.

November 19, 1966—Eight mortar rounds on Can Giuoc, Long An province, kill two children; 12 civilians are wounded some 20 mortar rounds drop on Can Duoc, wounding five civilians.

November 20, 1966—Two policemen are wounded when they attempt to remove several communist banners equipped with explosive devices.

November 23, 1966—Three terrorists dressed in South Vietnamese army uniforms kill a policeman guarding a bridge at Khanh Hung (Soc Trang), Ba Xuyen province. While escaping, they throw two grenades, wounding seven civilians and two soldiers.

November 26, 1966—A Claymore-type mine is set off in the playground of the Trinh Hoai Duc boys' school, An Thanh, Binh Duong province. Korean troops are using adjacent area as a training site. Three Koreans are killed and a Vietnamese student is wounded.

November 30, 1966—Communist shell Tan Uyen market, Bien Hoa province, killing three civilians and wounding seven.

December 4, 1966—A village chief in Gia Dinh province is abducted from his home in Phu Lam by four men and assassinated by rifle fire.

December 7, 1966—Tran Van Van, Constituent Assemblyman, is assassinated while en route to the National Assembly building; death weapon is a .32 caliber East German pistol; his killers are captured.

December 10, 1966—A terrorist throws a grenade into the Chieu Hoi district playground, Binh Duong City, severely injuring three children.

December 10, 1966—A taxi on Highway 29, Phong Dinh province runs over a mine. Five passengers, all women, are killed and the driver badly wounded.

December 13, 1966—Revolutionary Development personnel attend a course at the Ca Mau school, An Xuyen province; a charge explodes in the classroom, killing three and wounding nine.

December 20, 1966—A squad infiltrates a hamlet in Quang Tin province, kidnaps a former Viet Cong member who recently defected, carries him to another location and shoots him.

December 27, 1966—National Constituent Assemblyman, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, narrowly escapes death when his car explodes in Gia Dinh province. A charge is concealed beneath the vehicle and detonates as Dr. Dan opens the door. Dan escapes with minor wounds but a woman passerby is killed and five civilians wounded.

January 6, 1967—A South Vietnamese policeman in Tan Chu, Kien Phong province, is shot and killed while members of his family look on.

January 7, 1967—An explosion destroys a school and health station in Hong Ngu district, Kien Phong province.

January 8, 1967—In An Xuyen province, terrorists throw a grenade into the house of a hamlet chief. One of the children is killed and three other civilians are wounded.

January 12, 1967—Three civilians are killed and three South Vietnamese soldiers are wounded in an ambush of a truck on National Highway 14, two kilometers south of Tan Canh village.

January 15, 1967—At Thanh Tho, Quang Tin province, communists shoot a merchant when he refuses to give them two oxen.

January 21, 1967—Several communists force their way into Buon Ho, Darlac province, gather the people for a propaganda lecture; kidnap six young men.

February 6, 1967—Communists raid Lieu Tri, Quang Tin province, and abduct a teacher and a local official. The teacher is killed.

February 6, 1967—A grenade is thrown onto the porch where Kontum deputy province chief is entertaining a group of South Vietnamese officials. The provincial Chief of Education is killed instantly; the Chief of Montagnard Affairs and another official die of wounds the next day. Eight others are seriously wounded.

March 4, 1967—Only two badly wounded prisoners survive as communist prison guards near Can Tho tie 12 South Vietnamese captives together, shoot and stab them before fleeing from advancing South Vietnamese troops; both survivors live despite having their throats cut.

March 5, 1967—In an nocturnal raid, terrorists murder two young Revolutionary Development workers in Vinh Phu, Phu Yen province. Seven additional Revolutionary Development team members are killed in the ensuing gunfight and four are wounded. The raid is the 113th attack on Revolutionary Development workers since the first of the year.

March 30, 1967—Recoilless rifle fire directed at homes of families of South Vietnamese troops demolishes 200 houses and kills 32 men, women and children in the capital city of Bac Lieu province.

April 13, 1967—A South Vietnamese entertainment troupe is the target of nocturnal raid in Lu Song hamlet, near Da Nang. The team chief and his deputy are killed; two team members are wounded.

April 14, 1967—Terrorists kidnap Nguyen Van Son in Binh Chanh district, Gia Dinh province; he is a candidate in the elections for village council.

April 16, 1967—A squad enters Cam Ha, Quang Nam province and murders an election candidate. One child is killed and three civilians are wounded.

April 18, 1967—Sui Chon hamlet northeast of Saigon is attacked by assassins and arsonists who slay five Revolutionary Development team members, wound three, abduct seven;

three of those slain are young girls, whose hands are tied behind their backs before they are shot in the head. One-third of the hamlet's dwelling is destroyed by fire.

April 26, 1967—Nguyen Cam, chief of Ba Dan hamlet, Quang Nam province, is shot and killed by a terrorist. Cam had been a candidate in recent elections.

May 10, 1967—A bus loaded with South Vietnamese civilians runs over a land mine near Than Bach Thach, Phu Bon province. One passenger is killed; the driver and five passengers are wounded.

May 11, 1967—More than 200 doctors and medical workers of the Republic of South Viet-Nam have been victims of the communists in the past 10 years, State Health Secretary Dr. Tran Van Lu-Y tells the World Health Organization in Geneva. He says 211 members of his staff have been killed or kidnaped; 174 dispensaries, maternity homes and hospitals destroyed; 40 ambulances mined or machine-gunned.

May 16, 1967—In two separate attacks in Quang Tin and Quang Tri provinces, communists kill eight Revolutionary Development team members and injure five.

May 24, 1967—The information officer of Phu Thanh, Bien Hoa province, and his two children are killed by grenades thrown into their home at 3 a.m.

May 29, 1967—Frogmen emerge from the Perfume River in Hue to blow up a hotel housing members of the International Control Commission. No member of the Indian-Canadian-Polish team is hurt, but five South Vietnamese civilians are killed and 15 wounded. The hotel is 80 percent destroyed.

June 2, 1967—Armed with automatic weapons, two platoons make a post-midnight raid on a Chieu Hoi camp in Long An. They injure five South Vietnamese soldiers and five civilians.

June 27, 1967—Twenty-three civilians are killed when their bus strikes a mine in Binh Duong province, southeast of Lai Khe.

July 6, 1967—Several children walking on the road to a pagoda at Cam Pho hamlet, Quang Nam province, are wounded when a passing truck explodes a Viet-Cong anti-tank mine. One child dies of wounds.

July 13, 1967—An explosion in a Hue restaurant kills two Vietnamese. Twelve Vietnamese, seven Americans and one Filipino are injured.

July 14, 1967—Terrorists dressed in Vietnamese Army uniforms capture a prison in Quang Nam province, releasing about 1,000 of the 1,200 inmates; they execute 30 in the prison yard. Ten civilians are killed and 29 wounded as the terrorists fight their way out of the area.

July 25, 1967—Communists appear at homes in Binh Trieu, Long An province and kidnap four men, a woman and the woman's 16-year-old son. All six are found the following morning along Highway 13, hands tied behind their backs, a bullet in each head.

August 5, 1967—During a special civics class in a secondary school in An Xuyen province, part of the September election "get out the vote" campaign, a terrorist gives a small girl a hand grenade with the pin extracted and tells her to carry it carefully to her teacher. At the classroom door the child drops the grenade, killing herself and injuring nine children.

August 24, 1967—Terrorists kill one and wound four when they detonate a charge at the home of a Vietnamese policeman in Can Tho, Phong Dinh province.

August 26, 1967—Twenty-two civilians die and six are injured when their bus strikes a mine in Kien Hoa province.

August 27, 1967—A week before presidential and senate elections, terrorists step up their activities. A recoilless rifle and mortar attack on Can Tho kills 46 and injures 227. Ten die and ten are injured in an attack on a Revolutionary Development team in Phuoc Long province. Fourteen civilians, including five children, are wounded by mortar fire southeast of Ban Me Thuot, Darlac province. Two civilians die and one is wounded in an attack on a hamlet in Binh

Long province. Six civilians are kidnaped from Phuoc Hung village in Thua Thien province.

August 29, 1967—Groups of communists infiltrate four hamlets in Thanh Binh district, Quang Nam province, kill two civilians and abduct six, including an inter-family chief.

September 1, 1967—Terrorist explosives blast six craters in National Route 4 in Dinh Tuong province, stopping all vehicular traffic except a South Vietnamese army ambulance bus which runs over a pressure mine, killing 13 passengers, injuring 23.

September 3, 1967—Shortly after polls open in Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen province, communists detonate a bomb hidden in a polling place. Three voters are killed and 42 are wounded. Election morning attacks, including long-range shellings, claim 48 lives.

November 8, 1967—The Ky Chanh refugee center in Quang Tin province is infiltrated by terrorists who kill four persons, wound nine others and kidnap nine more; they also fire the camp's school.

December 5, 1967—A name that should be remembered as long as Lidice is Dak Son, a Montagnard village of some 2,000 in Phuoc Long province, the scene of what in some ways remains the worst atrocity in the entire atrocity-ridden war. Some 300 communists stage a reprisal raid on Dak Son. The chief weapon: the flame thrower, 60 of them. The purpose: purely to terrorize. The result: a Carthaginian solution, all but sowing of the salt. After breaking through the flimsy hamlet militia defense, the communists set about systematically to destroy the village and the people in it. Families are incinerated alive in their grass-roofed huts or in the shelters dug beneath their beds. Everything combustible is put to the torch: houses, recently harvested grain on the ground, livestock, fences, trees, people. One of the first Americans to approach the scene the following day: "As we approached the place I thought I saw charred cordwood piled up the way you pile up logs neatly beside the road. When we got closer I could see it was burned bodies of several dozen babies. The odor of burned flesh, which really is an unforgettable smell, reached us outside the village and of course got stronger at the center. People were trying to

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breathe through cabbage leaves... I saw a small boy a smaller girl, probably his sister, sort of melted together in a charred embrace. I saw a mother burned black still hiding two children, also burned black. Everything was burned and black. The worst was the wail of the survivors who were picking through the smouldering ruins. One man kept screaming and screaming at the top of his lungs. For an hour he kept it up. He wasn't hurt that I could tell. He just kept screaming until a doctor gave him a shot of morphine or something. . . . Fire bloats bodies I learned, and after a few hours the skin splits and peels and curls. . . . The far end of the village wasn't burned; the communists ran out of flamethrower fuel before they got to it. . . ." Estimated toll: 252 dead, about two-thirds of them women and children; 200 abducted, never to return.

December 14, 1967—Bui Quang San, member of South Viet-Nam's lower house, is gunned down in his home near Saigon. Two days before his murder, San told friends of receiving a letter from the communists threatening his life. His mother, first wife and six children were killed in an earlier Viet Cong raid in the city of Hoi An.

December 14, 1967—Saigon reports a total of 232 civilians killed by acts of terrorism in one week.

December 16, 1967—During the intermission at a classical drama at the University of Saigon, a communist appears on stage and begins a propaganda speech about the NLF. A student attempts to climb to the stage and is shot in the stomach. Two other students are shot in the melee that follows.

January 20, 1968—An armed propaganda team enters Tam Quan, Binh Dinh province, gathers 100 people for a propaganda session; one prominent village elder objects and is shot to death.

April 6, 1968—A band of communists enters That Vinh Dong, Tay Ninh province; they sell several thousand piasters worth of "war bonds" and then depart, taking with them a school teacher, the hamlet chief's two daughters and nephew and six other males age 15 or 16.

May 5-June 22, 1968—Some 417 rockets are fired indiscriminately into Saigon, chiefly in the densely-populated

Fourth District. The rockets are 107mm Chinese-made and 122mm Soviet-made. Result: 115 dead, 528 hospitalized.

May 29, 1968—A band of communists stops all traffic on Route 155 in Vinh Binh province; 50 civilians are kidnaped, including a Protestant minister; 2 buses and 28 three-wheeled taxis are burned.

June 28, 1968—A major attack is made against the refugee center and fishing village of Son Tra, south of Da Nang. In all, 88 persons are killed and 103 are wounded by mortar and machine gun fire, grenades and explosive charges. Some 450 homes are destroyed leaving 3,000 of the 5,000 persons there homeless. Later, villagers gather bamboo to rebuild the center are fired on from ambush.

July 28, 1968—Four gun-wielding terrorists, two of them women, detonate a 60-pound *plastique* charge in city room of *Cholon Daily News*, most prominent of city's seven Chinese-language newspapers, after ordering workers out of building; the four escape before police arrive.

September 1, 1968—Doctors at the American Division's 27th Surgical Hospital report two Montagnard women have been brought in for treatment for advanced anemia. It is determined that the North Vietnamese had been systematically draining them of blood for treating their own wounded.

September 12, 1968—A communist report (captured in Binh Duong province) from the Chau Thanh district Security Section to the provincial Party Central Committee says that seven prisoners in the district's custody were shot prior to an expected enemy sweep operation: "we killed them to make possible our safe escape," the report says.

September 26, 1968—A grenade is thrown into the crowded Saigon central market, killing one person and wounding 11.

December 11, 1968—A band of terrorists appears at the home of the provincial People's Self-Defense Force chief in Tri Ton, Chau Doc province; they bind his arms with rope and lead him 50 yards from his home where they fire a burst from a submachine gun into his body.

January 6, 1969—The Vietnamese Minister of Education, Dr. Le Minh Tri, is killed when two terrorists on a motor-

cycle hurl a hand grenade through the window of the car in which he is riding.

February 7, 1969—A satchel charge is exploded in the Can Tho market place, killing one and wounding three.

February 16, 1969—Communists invade and occupy Phuoc My village, Quang Tin province, for several days. Later, survivors describe a series of brutal acts: a 78-year old villager shot for refusing to cut down a tree for a fortification; a 73-year old man killed when he could not or would not leave his home, pleading that infirmities prevented him from walking; an 11-year old boy stabbed; several families grenaded in their homes.

January 19, 1969—A bicycle bomb explodes in a shop in Kien Hoa province (Truc Giang), killing six civilians and wounding 16.

February 24, 1969—Terrorists enter the Catholic Church in Quang Ngai province, assassinate the priest and an altar boy.

February 26, 1969—A bicycle bomb explodes near a pool hall in Kien Hoa province, killing a child and wounding three other persons.

March 4, 1969—Rector of Saigon University, Professor Tran Anh, is shot by motorcycle-riding terrorists; previously he had been notified that he was on the "death list" of something called the "Suicide Regiment of the Saigon Youth Guard."

March 5, 1969—An attempt is made to assassinate Prime Minister Tran Van Huong by hurling a satchel charge against the automobile in which he is riding. The attempt fails and most of the terrorists are captured.

March 6, 1969—An explosive charge explodes next to a wall at Quang Ngai city hospital, killing a maternity patient and destroying two ambulances.

March 9, 1969—Terrorists enter Xom Lang, Go Cong province, take Mrs. Phan Thi Tri from her home to a nearby rice field where they behead her, explaining that her husband had defected from the communists.

March 9, 1969—A band of communists attack Loc An, Loc My and Loc Hung villages in Quang Nam province, killing two adults and kidnaping ten teenage boys.

March 13, 1969—Kon Sitiu and Kon Bobanh, two Montagnard villages in Kontum province, are raided by terrorists; 15 persons killed; 23 kidnaped, two of whom are later executed; three lang-houses, a church and a school burned. A hamlet chief is beaten to death. Survivors say the communists' explanation is: "We are teaching you not to cooperate with the government."

March 21, 1969—A Kontum province refugee center is attacked for the second time by a PAVN battalion using mortars and B-40 rockets. Seventeen civilians are killed and 36 wounded, many of them women and children. A third of the center is destroyed.

April 4, 1969—A pagoda in Quang Nam province is dynamited, killing four persons, wounding 14.

April 9, 1969—Terrorists attack the Phu Binh refugee center, Quang Ngai province and fire 70 houses, leaving 200 homeless. Four persons are kidnaped.

April 11, 1969—A satchel charge explodes in the Dinh Thanh temple, Long Thanh village, Phong Dinh province, wounding four children.

April 15, 1969—An armed propaganda team invades An Ky refugee center, Quang Ngai province, and attempts to force out the people living there; nine are killed and ten others wounded.

April 16, 1969—The Hoa Dai refugee center in Binh Dinh province is invaded by an armed propaganda team. The refugees are urged to return to their former (communist dominated) village, but refuse; the communists burn 146 houses.

April 19, 1969—Hieu Duc district refugee center, Quang Nam province, is invaded and ten persons kidnaped.

April 23, 1969—Son Tinh district refugee center, Quang Ngai province, is invaded; two women are shot and 10 persons kidnaped.

May 6, 1969—Le Van Gio, 37, is kidnaped and later shot for refusing to pay "taxes" to a communist agent who entered his village of Vinh Phu, An Giang province.

May 8, 1969—Communist sappers detonate a charge outside the Postal-Telephone Building in Saigon's Kennedy Square, killing four civilians and wounding 19.

May 10, 1969—Sappers explode a charge of *plastique* in Duong Hong, Quang Nam province, killing eight civilians and wounding four.

May 12, 1969—A communist sapper squad attacks Phu My, Binh Dinh province, with satchel charges, rockets and grenades; 10 civilians are killed, 19 wounded; 87 homes are destroyed.

May 14, 1969—Five communist 122mm rockets land in the residential area of Da Nang, killing five civilians and wounding 18.

June 18, 1969—Three children are wounded when they step on a communist mine while playing near their home in Quan Long (Ca Mau) city, An Xuyen province.

June 19, 1969—In Phu My, Thua Thien province, communists assassinate a 54-year old man and his 70-year old mother.

June 24, 1969—A 122mm communist rocket strikes the Thanh Tam hospital in Ho Nai, Bien Hoa province, killing one patient.

June 30, 1969—Communist mortar shells destroy the Phuoc Long pagoda in Chanh Hiep, Binh Duong province; one Buddhist monk is killed and ten persons wounded.

June 30, 1969—Three members of the People's Self-Defense Force are kidnaped from Phu My, Bien Hoa province.

July 2, 1969—Two communist assassins enter a hamlet office in Thai Phu, Tay Ninh province, shoot and wound the hamlet chief and his deputy.

July 17, 1969—A grenade is thrown into Cho Con market, Da Nang, wounding 13 civilians, most of them women.

July 19, 1969—A communist unit attacks the Chieu Hoi center in Vinh Binh province killing five persons, including two women and a youth, and wounding 11 civilians.

July 18, 1969—Police report two incidents of B-40 rockets being fired into trucks on the highway, one in Quang Duc province in which three civilians were wounded and one in Darlac province which killed the driver.

July 19, 1969—Communist seize and shoot Luong Van Thanh, a People's Self-Defense Force member, Tan Hoi Dong, Dinh Tuong province.

July 30, 1969—Communists rocket the refugee center of Hung My, Binh Duong, wounding 76 persons.

August 1, 1969—A sapper team detonates a *plastique* charge at the base of an electric transformer tower in Saigon, cutting the line.

August 5, 1969—Two grenades are thrown into the elementary school in Vinh Chau, Quang Nam province, where a school board meeting is taking place. Five persons are killed and 21 are wounded.

August 7, 1969—Communist sappers set off some 30 separate *plastique* charges in the U.S. Sixth Evacuation Hospital compound, Cam Ranh Bay, killing two and wounding 57 patients.

August 7, 1969—A series of explosions is detonated outside an adult education school for Vietnamese military in Cholon, killing eight and wounding 60.

August 13, 1969—Officials in Saigon report a total of 17 communist terror attacks on refugee centers in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces, leaving 23 persons dead, 75 injured and a large number of homes destroyed or damaged.

August 21, 1969—Communists infiltrate Ho Phong, Bac Lieu province, and kill three People's Self-Defense Force members, wound two others.

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August 26, 1969—A nine-month-old baby in his mother's arms is shot in the head by terrorists outside Hoa Phat, Quang Nam province; also found dead are three children between ages six and ten, an elderly man, a middle-aged man and a middle-aged woman, a total of seven, all shot at least once in the back of the head.

September 6, 1969—Communists rocket and mortar the training center of the National Police Field Force in Dalat, killing five trainees and wounding 26.

September 9, 1969—South Vietnamese officials report that nearly 5,000 South Vietnamese civilians have been killed by communist terror during 1969.

September 20, 1969—Communists attack Tu Van refugee center in Quang Ngai province, killing 8 persons and wounding two, all families of local People's Self-Defense Force members. In nearby Binh Son, eight members of a police official's family are killed.

September 24, 1969—A bus hits a mine on Highway 1, north of Duc Tho, Quang Ngai province; 12 passengers are killed.

October 13, 1969—A grenade is thrown in the Vi Thanh City Chieu Hoi center, killing three civilians and wounding 46; about half those wounded are dependents.

October 13, 1969—Communists kidnap a Catholic priest and a lay assistant from the church at Phu Hoi, Bien Hoa province.

October 27, 1969—Communists booby trap the body of a People's Self-Defense Force member whom they have killed. When relatives come to retrieve the body the subsequent explosion kills four of them.

Statistics (See Chart Below)

In May, 1967 the GVN-U.S. began employing new and more sophisticated systems, some using computers, for the collection and analysis of statistical data, including data on terror incidents. Under the new systems, categories were changed some what and therefore the pre-1967 figures below are not strictly comparable to those later (hence the drop in total number of terror acts for 1968 and first ten months of 1969).

With respect to the general matter of the Viet-Nam war and statistics, experienced writers in the mass media, the academic community and in government have learned, often from personal and bitter experience, not to try to quantify the Viet-Nam war. As a result they reflexively eschew statistics, not because they do not recognize them as a valuable tool, but because they know the conditions and circumstances under which they are collected make them, at best, untrustworthy, and at worst, dangerously misleading. With respect to terror acts, the data processing system is chiefly dependent on reports from the 2500-village countryside, a shaky base indeed.

Like most people in developing societies the Vietnamese are not great record keepers and particularly are not keepers of precise numbers, usually seeing no need. (Belief in the imperative need for figures, indeed simply to become statistics-conscious, seems to be a characteristic that develops as does the society.) Beyond this unperceived need to collect statistics of any sort, including those on terror, there is in Viet-Nam a fog of war which by its disruptive nature virtually prohibits systematic and patient collection of data. War is often responsible for the destruction of such data as has been assembled. This is the case, for example, of records of land surveys, title deeds and other legal documents on holdings in the Mekong Delta, a jurist's nightmare, one which the courts will be sorting out for a generation.

Thus in Viet-Nam there is the triple problem of indifference to the collection of statistics, inability because of war to collect them, and incomplete reporting even when collected. Therefore this chart is to be treated cautiously. Its benefit, if any, is simply to suggest the scope and general order of magnitude of communist terror acts over the years; the error probably is not more than plus or minus 25 percent.

Year	Terror Acts ¹	Assassinations ²	Kidnapings ³	Attacks ⁴
1957 to 1960	NA	1,700 (est.)	2,000 (est.)	Negligible
1961	NA	1,300 (est.)	1,318	NA
1962	20,000 (est.)	1,118	1,118	5,484
1963	25,280	827	1,596	3,735
1964	21,733	516	1,525	15,500
1965	18,300 (est.)	305	1,730	15,200
1966	15,000 (est.)	1,732	3,810	—
1967	23,000 (est.)	3,707	5,357	—
1968 ⁵	9,617	5,389	8,759	—
1969	10,765	6,202	6,289	—
1970 (7 mos.)	7,473	4,126	5,791	—

This table was updated as the manuscript was going to print and covers the period through July 1970.

1. Includes sabotage, harassing fire, visits by armed propaganda teams to villages, "VC War Bond" sales, confiscation of food, but not the other acts of terror listed in subsequent columns.

2. Until May 1967 the figures are for assassinations of government officials only, and not killings of other civilians (records were kept only on officials and even these are incomplete.) Based on a 1964 study it probably is safe to conclude that for every official Vietnamese assassinated, at least four non-officials were killed.

3. As in the case of assassinations, the only records of kidnapings kept prior to May 1967 were kidnapings of government officials; in light of a 1964 study, it is safe to conclude that for every government official kidnaped, two non-government persons were seized. The GVN reported to the ICC in 1966 these kidnaping figures (government and non-government) totaled: 1962, 10,000; 1963, 7,200; 1964, 10,450; 1965, 11,500.

PITY THE SOVIET FARMER

There has been a tendency to blame this year's poor showing by Soviet agriculture almost wholly on the weather. Granted, the extremes of climatic conditions in the USSR of the past few months have been the most horrendous of the last quarter century. But climatic adversities cannot explain why Soviet agriculture which gets the world's largest inputs of labor (nearly one-third of the Soviet labor force) and financial investment (over the last 20 years a capital investment of some \$600 billion and today about one-fourth of all investment in buildings, structures and equipment) is unable to meet consumer needs and is gradually transforming the Soviet Union from a grain exporter into a grain importer. The main message in the attached Backgrounder and accompanying press reprints is that as long as Soviet agriculture continues to operate under its present system of collectivization, as long as the Soviet "economic model" persists, so long will Soviet agriculture remain in its present precarious condition.

PITY THE SOVIET FARMER

Perhaps indicative of Soviet sensitivities about the plight of agriculture in the USSR is the leadership's preoccupation with "overtaking the U.S." in farm production. Last November, for example, Soviet Premier Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet that "the general volume of ... agricultural production in the USSR in 1975 will exceed the present level of ... agricultural production in the United States." However, the way things are going at the moment, the Soviet Union looks to be unable to overtake its own agricultural production rate for the next several years --- let alone by 1975.

In the Soviet Union, national Farmers' Day is celebrated on October 8th. This year in Moscow the weather was gloomy and skies overcast. It was fitting backdrop for the officially announced estimates that came over radio and TV to the effect that this year's grain harvest will come only to about 167 million metric tons. Officials emphasized that this harvest will be roughly at the average level for the previous five-year plan. What the officials' statements ignored was that this year's harvest will fall about 30 to 35 million tons below what their planned target was for this year and about 25 percent below last year's harvest.

Granted, one of this year's biggest bogeys has been the weather. First, winterkill damaged about 10 percent of the winter crop. Next, scorching weather cut sharply into the harvest of the breadbasket of European Russia as that area went through its hottest, driest summer in 26 years. Finally, harvesters in the late-grain-ripening areas of Siberia were faced with a cold, wet autumn harvest season and a race against frost to get the grain cut. Chances are that because of extreme dampness and the slim possibility of fully drying the grain, the Siberian area crops will have an unusually high spoilage rate. Thus, despite official forecasts of a healthy 167 million ton intake, the tonnage of actually useable grain will be something far below that figure.

Even though climatic conditions this year have again exposed the fragility of Soviet agriculture, weather cannot be blamed for most of the ills that continually plague that sector of the economy. Weather does not account for irrational planning practices, tractor and tractor parts shortages, the insufficiency of combines for harvesting, inadequate storage facilities, and the ever-too-low fertilizer input. Bad rural roads and lack of adequate transport continue to hamper both fertilizer delivery and grain collection. All this in spite of the enormous investments that have been poured into agriculture, particularly during the current five-year plan.

Agriculture is probably the saddest victim of the Soviet penchant for forcing growth by heavy doses of investment aimed at increasing the quantity of production as quickly as possible without regard to efficiency or quality. In fact, there is nothing that sheds more light on the use of resources under the "Soviet economic model" than an analysis of its agricultural methods. Soviet investments in agriculture (using American prices at 1970 purchasing power) were over \$50 billion in 1956-1960, over \$270 billion during the 1960's, and are scheduled to surpass \$260 billion during the current five-year plan. In other words, during the course of 20 years agriculture will have received close to \$600 billion in capital funds. This figure does not include investments in farm supply industries such as chemicals or highways or central warehouses. This extremely high cost of Soviet agriculture goes far beyond the subsidizations prevalent in any Western country.*

In addition to the tremendous capital fund investment that Soviet agriculture has been getting, the farm sector now gets about one-fourth of all investment in buildings, structures, and equipment. And lately, deliveries of fertilizer, spare parts, fuel, and electric power from industry have been increasing. But despite all this attention, the farm sector cannot keep up with demands arising from new consumer programs and Soviet grain buyers have again been forced to scrape the barrel for imports from the Americas, Canada, and Western Europe.

Most experts stress that Soviet agricultural returns would be greater if investments were made in intensive improvement --- in quality, in technology, in skilled labor, in yield per acre and weight per animal --- rather than as is being done in more construction, more acres, and more head of livestock. But Mr. Brezhnev has put his money on gross expansion. Yet today, in spite of some expansion, agriculture continues to be the weakest and least productive sector of the Soviet economy and its huge collective and state farms, the most poorly managed and inefficient organizational form in the country. Nearly one-third of the labor force is still employed on farms and the cost of producing grain and meat is still far above world market prices.

During 1971, even with their second largest crop in Soviet history, the USSR was forced to buy heavily on world markets. At this writing, purchases of grain from Western markets for delivery in 1972 and 1973 are over 27 million metric tons (valued at \$1.8 billion) and can be expected to increase. Payments must be in hard

*In the United States, for example, agriculture in 1970 invested \$5.8 billion. Capital stock at the end of 1970 was valued at \$66 billion after depreciation and at \$145 billion undepreciated.

currency and will not be offset by Soviet grain exports which bring in either soft currency from East European clients or practically nothing, as in the case of Cuba or Bangladesh.

The forecast is that in the short run the Soviet Union will be able to finance its foreign grain purchases without trouble through gold sales and cutting back on other hard currency imports. But in the longer run, when payments of principal and interest begin to fall due, the chronic Soviet trade imbalance with hard-currency trade partners will become ever more severe. Western experts say it is highly questionable whether the Soviet Union will be able to recover soon or fully from its current agricultural setbacks.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES

CPYRGHT

25 September 1972

Soviet Fear Over Harvest Rises as First Snow Falls

BY THEODORE SHABAD
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 24—As the

grain deal with the Soviet Union continued to stir political controversy in the United States, a new urgency appeared to creep into front-page harvest reports in the Soviet press today.

The wheat harvest is only one-third completed in some key areas, but the first snow of the season was reported from northern Kazakhstan, one of the principal theaters of operations in what has been portrayed here as the "battle for grain."

Press reports painting a chaotic situation in the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan have been the sole source of information on the harvest for Western newsmen because Soviet authorities have prevented them from traveling to the areas for a first-hand appraisal. All travel by foreigners must

be officially approved in the Soviet Union.

The harvest is always page-one news in the Soviet press, but the emphasis given to it this year after both a bad winter and summer has struck many newspaper readers as unusual.

The continual exhortations to farmers to get the crop in, combined with the travel ban imposed on newsmen, has been interpreted as an indication that this year's crop may be poor indeed. Western estimates have ranged 10 to 20 per cent below the year's goal of 190 million tons, but no official data have been published so far.

The impact of the presumed small wheat crop has not yet been felt by the consumer, with flour, a good crop indicator, still plentiful in Moscow stores. But lines have been forming

in front of potato stores as a result of press reports that an unusually hot summer has reduced the crop in the Moscow region, a major producer of potatoes, which are a staple in the Russian diet.

The queues have prompted officials to go on television with appeals against hoarding and with assurances that extra shipments of potatoes from Byelorussia and the Baltic republics will provide enough potatoes for all.

"There are some Muscovites," Deputy Mayor Leonid V. Deribin told television viewers recently, "who despite the obvious facts still believe the capital will run short of potatoes and now seek to stash away their own supply."

Asserting that such panic buying was "totally unjustified," Mr. Deribin said that Government storage facilities were far superior to those available in Moscow homes and he warned bulk purchasers of spoilage.

The first snow from Kazakhstan was reported in Pravda, the Communist party daily, under the headline "Time is pressing the grain farmer."

Alluding to the lateness of the harvest this year, a dis-

patch from Tselinograd, in the heart of the Kazakhstan wheat lands, said:

"We are in the last 10 days of September—that says everything. And the first snow should be a stern warning."

The report depicted mismanagement and poor organization, with wet wheat being gathered under drizzly skies and being refused by grain elevators lacking the necessary drying equipment. Although thousands of trucks from cities have been commandeered for the grain areas, more appeared to be needed.

Pravda said that the Chelyabinsk region, with a commitment to deliver about one million tons of grain to the Government, had met only 30 per cent of its goal so far.

"A large part of the crop is still in the fields or is waiting to be threshed," Pravda said.

Under the Soviet system of agriculture, collective and state farms are expected to deliver fixed quotas to state agencies for marketing through Government channels. The rest of the crop may be retained by the farms for their own needs, including livestock feed and seed stocks. This year's delivery quota is 78 million tons out of the planned harvest of 190 million.

WASHINGTON POST
20 September 1972

CPYRGHT

Bad Harvest Threatens Soviet Economy

CPYRGHT

Crop Sabotaged by Nature, Bungling, Inefficiency

"This summer has been capricious and difficult."

—Pravda

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Sept. 19—For millions of

Russians, from Leonid Brezhnev to a Muscovite with a few apple trees around his suburban dacha, this has been a lousy month. The fall harvest, one of the biggest events in the year for the Soviet Union, has been poor. The consequences of its failures will be felt all year.

It is difficult for Americans to imagine the significance of the harvest in Soviet life. Judging by the press, it has been a topic of concern for some time. The front pages of virtually all So-

viet newspapers have been filled for weeks with exhortations to bring in a good crop. Television repeats the message. "Don't lose a single stalk, a single grain!" Pravda's main headline urged the other day.

Tens of thousands of ordinary citizens are pressed into duty to help with the harvest. Thousands of trucks and boxcars are diverted from their normal work to help move the crop from the fields.

The exhortations are serious. So is the extensive reporting in the Soviet press about mistakes, bad management and even thievery that have hindered the harvest. But the major problem this year was not mismanagement or thievery, as it has been in the past. It may have been. This year nature sabotaged the Soviet harvest, long before

the reaping and threshing began a few weeks ago.

The ramifications of an inadequate harvest are vast. They begin with the gloomy look on the face of a Saturday gardener in a village near Moscow who dug up his potato patch last weekend. He found that a stingy mother nature had given him a small harvest of shrunken, unappetizing spuds.

In Moscow's Central Market, where farmers sell the produce from their private plots of land, prices have shot up. Cauliflower that cost about 90 cents a pound (at the inflated official exchange rate) a year ago now costs \$1.80. The price of lettuce has risen to \$1.50 a pound. Lettuce is rare and selling at winter prices of \$1.00 a pound.

In state shops, some limits have been imposed on the quantity of potatoes each customer can buy at one time. Lines for potatoes—a staple in the starchy Russian diet—are common, and the potatoes themselves are small.

The situation in the provinces is undoubtedly worse, because Moscow has the highest priority in the country for consumer goods of all kinds. For example, Moscow's butcher shops always have meat to sell, but the state stores in some small towns haven't sold fresh meat for five years. (Such towns get their meat from farmers' markets. Private plots produce more than a third of the food eaten in the Soviet Union.)

Bread Waste

Officials have assured the public several times that there is no cause to fear a bread shortage, but the press has also carried articles criticizing people who waste bread.

The government has already taken steps to assure the bread supply by contracting for vast quantities of foreign wheat, mostly American and Canadian. By Western estimate, the Soviet Union will spend \$1.5 billion or more on foreign grain purchases. At this level, the poor harvest becomes an important factor for the entire Soviet economy.

The Soviet Union operates on a five-year plan whose parts are all interconnected. The plan for this year foresaw production of about 200 million tons of grain. Western experts here predict the harvest will be 20 to 30 million tons short of that goal.

Western scholars assume that the five-year plan does not allow much margin for error. When a crucial factor

like the harvest falls so far below expectations, adjustments throughout the economy are probably inevitable.

The first of these may come in the hard currency budget. If the Soviets do spend more than \$1.5 billion for grain this year, far more than they had planned, they will have to cut back other purchases of foreign goods, or perhaps sell off some of their vast gold reserves.

(The Soviet ruble is a "soft" currency — it isn't traded on international money markets, and Western businessmen won't accept it).

The principal product the Soviet Union now seeks abroad is modern technology. So a bad harvest can hinder the modernization of this country's enormous but uncompetitive economy, though this may be the single most important goal that the Soviet leaders have set for themselves.

Brezhnev and his colleagues may well feel that this is an undeserved trick of fate. Their plan was not unreasonable, assuming relatively normal weather. But the weather here has been wildly abnormal since last winter, and it has frustrated the country's farmers in almost every imaginable way.

First the weather was dry and extremely cold. The winter wheat harvest was unsuccessful. The ground was dry when planted, and got drier as July and August became months of drought. Then, when the harvest began, heavy rains in many sections ruined much of the crop.

Leap Year

Even relatively carefree crops, like apples, did poorly this year. One Muscovite reports that his friend's little orchard in the country "didn't produce a single

apple, not one." This same man explained the bad weather with a typical piece of Russian folk wisdom: "It's a leap year — leap years are always bad."

If nature was the principal cause of the poor harvest, it was not alone. The Soviet press has provided abundant, vivid examples of agricultural mismanagement and malfeasance in recent weeks.

The reports detail cases of bad maintenance of machinery, inefficient allocation of resources, lack of official foresight and imagination. "In the Sverdlysk administrative district," Pravda reported, "there is a good crop of potatoes, but they can't be harvested properly — there aren't enough sacks to hold them. The district needs three million sacks, but has been promised only 900,000."

In another report, Pravda disclosed: "In the Ukraine, grain elevators' capacities are smaller than the amount of grain harvested in some districts . . . Thousands of railroad freight cars are not fit for the transportation of grain . . ." In one section of wheat-growing Kazakhstan, the newspaper "Rural Life" reported, "more than 500 trucks have not been repaired on local farms. The local repair shop has not yet fixed 70 truck engines sent to it last June . . ."

At the same time, motor pools in big cities including Moscow, were depleted to a fraction of their normal size, and thousands of trucks were shipped by rail to help with the harvest—especially in that same area of Kazakhstan.

One of the biggest scandals of the harvest season was reported by Komsomolskaya Pravda, whose correspondent in Kazakhstan saw dozens of new, 11.5-ton

trucks parked on a road and decided to find out why they were not in use.

Spare Parts

The trucks, he learned, had been shipped from the factory that made them on flat cars. They arrived to cheers from the local population, and men got into them to drive them off the train. The first one would not start. Neither would the second, third, fourth — or any of them; apparently, there were more than 60 trucks, and important parts had been stolen from every one, the paper reported, although the shipment was supposed to be guarded the entire way.

A local official told the journalist that the trucks could not be repaired, because the stolen parts were simply not available in that part of the country.

The press has also reported special incentives for farmers and local trading officials to get more potatoes into the state warehouses this year. Farmers are being offered 5 per cent higher prices for all potatoes they deliver above plan, and purchasing agents are being tempted to find more potatoes to buy with bonuses of a full month's salary or more.

One subject that the press has not mentioned is the Soviet government's extensive purchases of foreign grain. Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow taxi drivers will tell you, squandered Soviet gold on Canadian wheat. Perhaps Khrushchev's successors don't want to be remembered similarly. Whatever the reason, the Soviet news media have never reported the \$750 million grain deal with the United States, or Moscow's other grain purchases.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 September 1972

Soviet farm lag prods reforms

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

The 1972 Soviet crop failure, now believed by Western experts to be even more severe than previously anticipated, may catapult the Soviet Union into major agricultural reforms.

Western specialists, who had earlier estimated the Soviet grain harvest at around 170 million tons, instead of 195 million called for by the plan, now think the crop may not even reach 160 million tons.

They deduced this figure from an article by Politburo alternate member and Byelorussian Party Secretary Pyotr M. Masherov in Byelorusskaya Pravda of Aug. 19.

Rains, which delayed the harvesting in Siberia and North Kazakhstan, have daunted hopes of a late but abundant yield in these eastern regions. Heavy frost and snow may hit the fields before the grain can be brought in.

The supply of potatoes, another staple, also will be very tight this year.

Climate blamed

Officially the setback is attributed to the vagaries of the climate, but low farm labor productivity compounded the unfavorable weather conditions.

Poor labor productivity in the countryside is not the fault of the farm workers. It is caused by the unwieldy setup of the collective and state farms.

According to economists Michael E. Bradley and M. Gardner Clark, writing in the spring issue of the British Journal Soviet Studies, the average size and labor force of Soviet and American farms compare as follows:

	U.S. farms	Collec- tives	State farms
Acre per farm	351.6	26,508	99,578
Workers per farm	1.9	506	635

Work on farms as huge as the collective and state farms takes on an impersonal character. The peasant is no longer interested in the land, and management becomes so complicated that effective supervision of labor is nearly impossible.

Soviet farm managers and economists have come up with various proposals to subdivide and decentralize the large farms. The most successful and popular experimental approach has been to place a small acreage, approximately the size of the average American farm, in the hands of two or three families for several years.

Freedom expanded

These "leaseholders" are given equipment and allotted land. These so-called independent mechanized teams — the Russian word is

zveno, or link — have brought encouraging results wherever they have been tried.

Only a few hundred zvenos have been set up thus far because Communist dogmatists fear that they might let in capitalism by the back door. But the zveno system has supporters. The strongest zveno advocate is Politburo member Genady I. Voronov, formerly premier of Russia proper.

In the past, Mr. Voronov's suggestion to introduce zvenos on a larger scale has been overruled. A speech he made two years ago, championing the zvenos, was published only in a small provincial journal.

Soon thereafter he lost his position as premier of the Russian Federation though he remains a full member of the Politburo.

Recently the idea has again come to the fore. Its favorable discussion in Pravda and Izvestia, against the background of this year's grain calamity, may point to a larger application of the zveno system.

Russian consumers, meanwhile, are not expected to feel the present crop failure as severely as the one of 1963-1964, which preceded the ouster of former Premier Nikita S. Krushchev.

The party and government have boldly decided to import enough food grain to keep the public's breadbasket filled, at least in metropolitan areas. While the people are urged not to waste grain, nowhere have they been admonished to tighten their belts.

Another favorable factor is the party leadership's decision of last year to concentrate on meat and dairy farming rather than on field production.

Larger units preferred

Concentration on meat and dairy farming has the advantage in Soviet conditions that it lends itself to production in bigger farm units, which the Communists prefer.

The farm predicament is likely to come up at the party Central Committee session that will precede the meeting of the Supreme Soviet on Sept. 19. Once again General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev is expected to present the main report.

His recent swing through the eastern territories indicated concern for the weak spots of Soviet agriculture: its extreme dependence on the vagaries of the weather, its immobilization of a huge labor force, and the built-in handicaps to labor efficiency and management.

Solutions sought

It can hardly be expected that Mr. Brezhnev will scrap all the time-honored tenets of Communist agriculture. But he and his associates in the Politburo will try to find a way out of the present calamity.

The big imports of food grains to tide the Soviet Union over a difficult winter show that the Kremlin is keenly aware of the possibility of political repercussions at home.

While these imports may lead to a raising of eyebrows by Moscow's financial experts, for the public at large they are a sign that their leaders are taking practical measures to cushion the impact of the crop failure and that reforms of agricultural policy may be on the way.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR CPYRGHT
7 September 1972

CPYRGHT

East Europe's farms in trouble

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

There are problems down on the farm in Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union this year.

Czechoslovakia, whose daily bread anyway depends largely on Soviet grain, and Hungary have both had small crises of their own.

In parts of Czechoslovakia, continuous rain storms flattened crops, with heavy losses. Combines bogged down in mud, and harvest workers had to fall back on grass mowers and even scythes.

It was the same in some of Hungary's normally crop-heavy Trans-Danubian areas. Thanks to a July rainfall twice that of the country's yearly average, these areas had their most difficult harvest of the century.

Government agencies had to mount a major rescue operation, including a rail-lift, to move combines and drying units cross-country to stricken regions, and brigades of weekend helpers from the towns.

Bad weather invariably exposes the continued weakness of the collectivized farm organization. It still is ill-equipped to cope with such dire emergencies as the elements can offer. It still is seriously under-mechanized.

Thus Czechoslovakia, for example, one of Eastern Europe's industrial leaders, is still talking of "widespread mechanization" of agriculture by 1980-85.

Now, however, a grave new problem looms ever more sharply for these countries. For centuries their largest work force has been on the land. But now they face a shortage of able-bodied farm labor.

Postwar industrialization and urban growth increasingly have lured younger folk to the towns. The big state farms and collectives have increasingly been left to an aging peasantry.

This is a sociological trend known to most of the modern world. But in the once predominantly agrarian countries of Eastern Europe it now is causing more concern than

any other factor in agriculture.

Czechoslovakia had 2 1/4 million farm workers 25 years ago. Collectivization plus intensified industrialization reduced the number to about a million. Another quarter million are expected to leave by the mid-1970's.

The average farm worker's age already exceeds 40. In the Czech lands, 25 percent are over 60 years of age.

Mechanization has come nowhere near to catching up with this labor drain.

Two-fifths of Hungary's cooperative farmers are at pension age. Only 1 in 5 of the cooperative's new members is around 20. Twenty-five percent of all agricultural workers are over 55, compared with only 9 percent in industry.

Recent surveys sought to discover why so few youngsters are drawn now to farming and how to improve rural life in order to persuade more to remain there.

Sociologists had no difficulty in providing answers:

Long, arduous working hours (including 3:30 a.m. rising to tend the family's private plot), disparities in pay compared with industry, inferior fringe benefits, and lack of the amenities and facilities which industrial areas enjoy.

Though it is "heresy" to the fathers, youngsters would gladly relinquish the private plots in return for permanent and settled cash incomes and the same social security for agriculture as industry.

"Modern village youth no longer is prepared to go home smelling of the stable or to eat sandwiches sitting on a feedbox," the survey found.

"It is educated and has been brought up on television. But long farm hours prevent it taking part in amusement and cultural amenities the same as townsfolk. And today's young villagers," concluded one report "are claiming the same rights."

East European governments, however, still are focusing their priorities on industrialization.

THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 16, 1972

Russia

Brezhnev's battle for bread

The Russian press in recent weeks has had a wartime look about it. Everywhere there is talk of "winning the battle." Even sober Pravda tries to convey the excitement, highlighting dispatches from its front-line correspondents in Siberia and Kazakhstan, carrying articles full of military metaphors and splashing pictures of war heroes and their assault vehicles. No, not tanks, combine harvesters: the battle today is for bread.

This year's harvest has had to compete against the natural perils of a frosty winter followed by a very dry summer. The damage done to the crop in western Russia makes the yield from the new granaries of Kazakhstan and Siberia of vital importance. But, judging from its eager shopping for grain, from the United States, Canada, France and Australia, the government seems to be preparing for the worst.

The problems of this year's harvest are a stage in the protracted battle to modernise farming, and to put agriculture, which even today employs more than a quarter of all Russian workers, on a par with industry. The struggle has been going on for nearly 20 years. Khrushchev tried to restore the balance by shock tactics, the magic of maize and the mass reclamation of virgin lands. Since he disappeared from the scene the battle has been less spectacular but not less expensive: farming is to absorb 21.5 per cent of total capital investment in the current five-year plan.

Targets have become more realistic than they were in Khrushchev's day. The aim for 1971-75 is an average yearly grain crop of 195m tons compared with 167.5m tons in the previous five years. Total agricultural output is to go up by about 21 per cent over the same period. Or at least that is the plan. Although Russian farming output has, on average, been rising steadily over recent years, the increase in production does not correspond to the money poured in.

This apparently unbridgable gap between what goes in and what comes out has led westerners to suggest two alternative courses for Russia's planners. The first is that Russia should follow the example of nineteenth-century Britain and rely on industrial exports to pay for a large part of its food. But the analogy does not really apply. Britain, at that time, could afford this policy from its sale of manufactured goods; the Soviet Union is still mainly exporting raw materials. Its problem is not how to pay for foreign food but how to increase its own yield from the land.

Mr Brezhnev has several times admitted that it will take many five-year plans to overcome the difficulties. He has also made it plain that the basic problem is not so much bread as grain for livestock and a resultant major expansion in meat and dairy farming. This is where the deal with the United States, with its emphasis on animal feed-stuffs, comes in. But a change in approach is needed. Hitherto the outside world has provided Russia with stopgap supplies in years of bad harvest. If Russia's planners could pluck up the courage to accept the necessity of regular outside supplies of animal fodder, the cattle-

rearing programme would be enlarged beyond the scope of present plans.

The second suggestion put out by westerners is that Russia should shift its farming towards smaller holdings and more private enterprise. This, too, is an unlikely development. It is true that in their recent efforts to boost farm production the Russians have paid greater heed to financial incentives. Prices for farm produce were raised, bonuses were introduced and wages have gone up on both state and collective farms. But over the past 20 years the unmistakable trend is away from smaller units of production and private holdings towards larger estates under closer control. In 1950 there were some 125,000 collective farms. By now these have been merged into 33,000 larger units, each *kolkhoz* averaging 7,400 acres under cultivation.

Despite present troubles and past failures, Russia's agricultural planners have not altered their ends and hardly their means. They are still banking on more equipment, more fertilisers, and on land improvement and a bigger electricity supply, to bring them closer to western levels of productivity. How far they still have to go is reflected in manpower figures. In 1970 no less than 26.4 per cent of the total Soviet labour force was still employed in farming; this was twice the French and five-times the American proportion. Without a radical change in this pattern, and the plan for 1975 forecasts a proportion still as high as 23.1 per cent, Russia will continue to be seriously handicapped in its economic race with the west. But this is the long-term problem. Mr Brezhnev's mind is no doubt on more immediate issues: Russia's last disastrous harvest, in 1963, preceded Nikita Khrushchev's fall.

CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1972

SOVIET PURCHASE OF GRAIN FROM U.S. MAY TOTAL BILLION

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 9—The

Agriculture Department estimated today that the Soviet Union would purchase a billion dollars worth of farm products from the United States over the next 12 months. This would

raise Soviet-American trade to unprecedented heights.

The forecast was compiled by leading department officials on the basis of recent talks with private commercial dealers negotiating with the Russians and of reports from Moscow indicating a bad Soviet harvest this fall.

The spring harvest was called a "disaster" by many officials and it was reported from Moscow today that Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, had held a new press conference today to discuss, evidently in an effort to spur the harvest. [Page 9.]

The Agriculture Department's

projection of a billion dollars in sales goes far beyond the \$200-million in grains that Moscow agreed to purchase as part of a \$750-million three-year deal announced by the White House on July 8.

Department officials said that about \$500-million of the billion-dollar sales would probably be in wheat. This indicates that Moscow is anticipating shortfalls in its chief crop, vital to the bread supply that is a staple of the Soviet diet.

The rest of the total will probably be in corn, sorghum, rye, barley, oats and soybeans,

the Agriculture Department estimated.

Department officials said that an American company, Cook Grains of Memphis, had just about completed arrangements for the first sale of soybeans to the Russians—one million tons, valued at about \$100-million.

These products are used in producing animal feed. Soybeans in particular are valued for their high protein content, useful for the growth of cattle. Under the current Soviet five-year plan, Moscow is committed to a 25 per cent increase in protein consumption, to be achieved primarily

through an increase in the amount of meat and dairy products in the Soviet diet.

Imbalance of Trade

The large sales to the Soviet Union will cause a severe imbalance in trade between the two countries. Last year, the United States exported about \$125-million to the Soviet Union and imported about half that amount. The disproportion will grow with the extensive agricultural purchases as well as with a step-up in Soviet purchases of American industrial equipment for a truck factory on the Kama River.

Because of this anticipated trade imbalance, Moscow will have to find ways of paying for its purchases. Under the original \$750-million three-year deal, the Administration, through the Commodity Credit Corporation, had agreed to extend a maximum of \$500-million in credit.

Agriculture Department officials said that the additional purchases would be paid for "privately," meaning, in most cases, by cash.

Gold Sales Possible

Some officials here believe that the Russians may have to sell gold on the world market to cover the heavy agricultural

purchases.

It is believed that under the terms of the deals, some of the farm products will be delivered by third-country ships and the rest by Soviet and American ships.

The Russians, aware of the trade imbalance, have been seeking to persuade the United States to participate in joint efforts to exploit the untapped oil, gas and metal resources of Siberia.

This was a major topic discussed by Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson and Mr. Brezhnev when they met two weeks ago in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Peterson was there as

head of the American delegation to the first session of the newly created Soviet-American commercial commission.

So far, American companies have expressed an interest in such joint ventures, but the Government has been wary of a drain on Government credits that would be needed for such large undertakings.

The Soviet Union would probably be able to sell its products more successfully in the United States if a trade agreement is signed and it receives regular tariff treatment. But such an accord has been held up pending resolution of the lend-lease negotiations to settle the Soviet Union's World War II debts.

WASHINGTON POST CPYRGHT
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Experts Say Soviets Face Disaster in Grain Harvest

CPYRGHT

By Murray Seeger
Los Angeles Times

MOSCOW—Revelations of new grain purchases and new domestic indicators here suggest that the Soviet Union is facing a disastrous agricultural year this year.

"It appears that their crop losses will be phenomenal," one analyst observed.

Other observers noted that the country's crop problems started during the winter when there was little snow to nourish the winter wheat crop. The summer growing season has seen record temperatures and a drought.

"Their grain is ripening all at the same time," one expert said. "Usually, they move their machines from the south to the north and east as the crop develops. This year, it has come on all at the same time and they cannot follow their schedules."

Last week, the official press revealed that Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev held an unusual meeting of the party Central Committee, agricultural officials and important editors to discuss the

grain harvest.

Editors Included

Although the substance of the meeting has not been disclosed, diplomatic observers said the unusual inclusion of editors in such a meeting suggested that the party was preparing to tell the public of a major short fall in the 1972 farm output.

Soviet authorities admit they do not have enough modern harvesting equipment to meet their annual needs. The newspaper *Rural Life* reported last week that 21,000 trucks were being sent to the Altai region in southwestern Russia to help bring in the local harvest.

"The harvest front is speedily transferring to the east of the country," the newspaper said. "The fate of the crop of 1972 will be settled there in counted days and hours. All efforts must be exerted for successful conducting of the harvest and increased grain sales to the state."

Although Russia has often had major crop failures in the past, the 1972 problem is especially acute because the party

and government leaders have been conducting a campaign to increase the supply of meat to the people.

The grain purchases outside the country must therefore include more expensive fodder grains as well as bread grains in order for the leaders to keep their promise of a better diet for the people.

Butcher Cattle

An alternative to spending valuable hard currency or gold for grain would be to butcher the nation's new developing cattle herds prematurely.

"I don't think they are prepared politically to do that," one Western observer said.

It was reported earlier this month that the Soviet Union has decided to buy about 10 million tons of wheat and 4 million tons of feed grains from the United States for delivery next year.

One million tons of soybeans were also believed to have been sold to the Soviet Union. It is estimated that these purchases from the United States cost Moscow

some \$900 million. The Soviets were granted the right to buy as much as \$500 million worth on three-year loans at 6% per cent interest.

Sales now being arranged are expected to be largely for cash since it would otherwise use up in one year all the credit made available by the U.S. Commodity Credit Corp. The soybean sale must be for cash.

In addition to the purchases from the United States, it was learned here, the Russians have recently completed a grain purchase deal with France and tried unsuccessfully to make a big buy in Canada.

Canadian officials said they were approached by Soviet grain buyers twice in recent weeks but had to turn down the bids because Canada's ports are operating at capacity to deliver a current contract to Russia for 5.2 million tons of grain worth \$330 million cash.

The French deal is for 1 million tons, half wheat and half barley, to be delivered in the coming year.

SHORT SUBJECTS

SOVIET-DANISH MISUNDERSTANDINGS

The last member of the Soviet Embassy's unwelcome trio finally departed as Anatoliy A. Lobanov, one of three Soviet diplomats whose recall the Danish government suggested in April, left Denmark on 31 August. The three diplomats in question First Secretary Lobanov, Third Secretary Anatoliy N. Illarionov and Attache Mikhail K. Makarov, were charged with committing actions incompatible with their status.

On 7 April the Danish Foreign Ministry informed the Soviet Ambassador Nikolai G. Egorychev that the Danish government would not expel the free-wheeling "diplomats" if they would quietly leave the country. The Soviet Ambassador rejected all allegations of wrongdoing on their part and none of the accused diplomats made any apparent move to leave his post.

But what the three had been up to is well documented in the Danish press. Makarov attempted to bribe a member of the Danish Folketing (parliament), known for his anti-European community views by offering to underwrite the expense of publishing and distribution of an anti-Common Market pamphlet. Makarov also tried unsuccessfully to buy an Asian Embassy's diplomatic code; his fellow diplomat, presumably Illarionov, posing as a Latin American, then offered the Asian diplomat ten thousand kroner for the code. All this unwanted publicity forced the two men to leave during the summer. Lobanov remained in Copenhagen and the Soviet Ambassador indicated that he had no intention of ordering Lobanov's departure. But parliamentary inquiry to the Danish Foreign Minister concerning Lobanov's status seems to have precipitated his overdue departure: Five months after the fact, the last of the miscreants left the Danish scene. Ambassador Egorychev remains behind to handle another "misunderstanding" in Danish-Soviet relations.

The latest incident occurred in early September when a Danish fishing trawler in international waters picked up a Russian trying to flee across the Baltic to Sweden. Shortly after the rescue an armed Soviet naval vessel came alongside the Danish trawler which was then boarded by pistol carrying Soviet sailors. The hapless Russian was forced to leave his refuge. The Danish Foreign Ministry says it is investigating the incident and intends to officially protest to the Soviet Union.

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MOSCOW BLENDS INTO THE LOCAL SCENE

An unusual story has filtered out of Burma -- one which Moscow's TASS correspondent there would not file to his hometown newspaper. The story concerns TASS correspondent Yuriy Grigoriev's conversion to Buddhism. According to several newspaper accounts Grigoriev, a thirty-three-year-old newsman, returned to Burma for the second time in October 1971 as a correspondent of the official Soviet news agency TASS. In April of this year Grigoriev was ordained a Buddhist monk, assumed a Burmese name for himself and his wife and daughter who also became converts. One of the more intriguing aspects of this story is that Grigoriev's conversion ceremony was attended by various members of the Soviet embassy, an uncommon official blessing at best. One might surmise that Moscow had given its approval for its own political reasons. The Vientiane newspaper Xat Lao viewed the episode with due skepticism. "As is well known most Soviet diplomats and news correspondents assigned to perform duties abroad are members of the communist party who do not believe in God. The ideals of the communist party is their religion. Therefore, there have been doubts whether Grigoriev had resigned from the party before he became a Buddhist monk; whether he really had faith in Buddhism; whether he just wants to serve propaganda purposes; whether he wants to spy; or whether he wants to destroy Buddhism."