

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

BANGLADESH AFTER ONE YEARIntroduction

Bangladesh, a delta land about the size of Nicaragua, has a population of 75 million, making it the most densely populated, and the eighth most populous nation in the world. It is also one of the poorest. Besides its huge and growing population and its widespread poverty, it faces other difficulties of staggering dimensions: inadequate food production, serious war damage, uncertain trade prospects, and a new, inept bureaucracy that is burdened with major new responsibilities. It has been estimated that 3 to 4 billion dollars will be required to raise Bangladesh to even its pre-war economic level.

Soviet Presence

The Soviet Union has made every effort to capitalize on this situation and to cultivate Bangladesh, although, in financial terms, its aid has been limited -- only \$120 million of an overall total of \$1 billion (An estimated \$70 million for relief and development, and more recently, approximately \$50 million in trade credits.)

The Soviets' major project has been the clearing and dredging of the port of Chittagong, where the Soviet Navy has had a salvage fleet working for over eight months. The USSR claims it will take another year to complete this work. (However, the Dacca correspondent of the Swiss newspaper, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, reported in early November that Prime Minister Mujib was pushing for an early end to this work and wanted a written agreement from the Soviets to evacuate the port.)

In addition to training and supplying some of the Bengali military forces, the USSR has sent large diplomatic and technical assistance missions to Dacca. The Soviets made obvious efforts to step up their relations in late 1972: among the groups that visited Bangladesh then was a cultural delegation headed by Dr. Vladimir Stanis, identified as Vice-Chancellor of Patrice Lumumba University and President of the Soviet-Bangladesh Friendship Society. The group visited various educational institutions, including Dacca University. At a press conference during the visit, Stanis announced that ties between certain Bengali and Soviet universities would soon be established. A radio-TV delegation also arrived in Dacca at about the same time. It was headed by A. Losev, deputy chairman of the Radio-TV State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers. He signed a two-year agreement providing for the exchange of radio and TV programs between the USSR and Bangladesh.

More recently the two countries signed a 12.10 million ruble contract providing for survey, mapping and exploration of oil and gas in Bangladesh. It was confirmed that the agreement provided for on-shore exploration only, not off-shore, where up to twenty different parties have bid for exploration rights. (This may be just as well for Bangladesh in view of the experience of Sri Lanka with off-shore oil exploration by the Soviets. According to a report in a Colombo newspaper of early October, large-scale Soviet blasting of the seabeds in the northern fishing grounds is destroying the marine life and threatening the fishing industry.)

Underlying motives of Soviet policy are subject to speculation, but the USSR is obviously interested in the continued cooperation of Bangladesh, which would serve its long-term goal of encircling China. Equally obvious is the Soviets' desire to gain access to repair and supply facilities for its Indian Ocean Fleet, and their work in Chittagong harbor could be an opening wedge. However, Prime Minister Mujib has repeatedly said that Bangladesh has no intention of granting such privileges to any foreign power. He has also made clear that for economic and political reasons Bangladesh wishes to remain non-aligned with respect to all the great powers.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid to Bangladesh represents the most massive disaster-relief effort ever mounted, with some thirty nations and more than fifty private organizations providing assistance to alleviate the effects of war and the natural disasters that have plagued this area over past years. Because of its increasing imports, especially of food, and its static export levels, Bangladesh was a deficit area with a steadily growing need for foreign aid even before the 1971 crisis.

In the year since then, however, it has received aid amounting to some \$900 million for relief purposes and long-term development. Of the five major donors, who have given bilaterally and through the United Nations, the United States has contributed \$320 million, India, \$270 million, the USSR, an estimated \$70 million, Canada, \$65 million, and the UK, \$50 million. Other donors, mainly the West European countries and Japan, have contributed \$115 million. Recent pledges from the International Development Association, and an additional approximate \$50 million trade credit from the USSR, have raised the total amount of aid to about \$1 billion. Between half and two-thirds of this total amount has been in grants, with the balance mainly in long-term development loans. The First Annual Plan of Bangladesh for the current fiscal year calls for spending about \$500 million of this aid. Approximately \$115 million had been spent prior to July 1972.

In addition, the U.S. has committed over one million tons of food grains, 75,000 tons of edible oil, and has resumed long-term development projects such as flood control, soil embankment, etc., which had been suspended during the fighting. All told, the U.S. has been the largest single source of outside assistance. India has provided 900,000 tons of food grains, transport equipment, money for refugee resettlement, a \$13 million foreign exchange loan and has assisted in repair of bridges. Canada has provided mostly food grains. The USSR has given some food, fishing trawlers and transport equipment. Besides their major Chittagong project (see Soviet Presence), they have been involved in a few other construction projects.

Plus Factors

Although Bangladesh has suffered from its seemingly overwhelming problems for some time, they have been more or less obscured because the area was considered as a part of larger Pakistan, and the true statistics on East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were not readily apparent. Now, with the breakup of Pakistan, Bangladesh can use its own resources for itself. The Bengali people have long since become accustomed to extreme hardship and have demonstrated an ability to adjust to privation and difficulties that would be intolerable to others. They are enthusiastic about their independence, and their Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), and his party, the Awami League, appear to be in control. Although Soviet-inspired radical groups are causing political disturbances, Mujib and his party are expected to win in the elections scheduled for 7 March.

In the midst of the generally negative and discouraging reports coming from Bangladesh, there have been signs of initial improvement in the economic area, principally in the progress of the past year toward recovery and reconstruction, made possible by massive foreign assistance and the efforts of the Bengalis themselves. Nearly all the refugees, estimated in the millions, who had fled to India in 1971 have returned and been resettled with few apparent difficulties. Emergency food shipments, which have been handled mainly by the United Nations relief mission in Dacca, have averted critical food shortages. Although the UN role in this operation is scheduled to be reduced at the end of March, there are reports it may continue its present control over the internal movement and distribution of imported food.

Jute production, a major source of revenue, has about reached pre-war levels. The industry as a whole is estimated to be operating at about 75 percent of capacity. Jute exports are rising as foreign buyers have resumed purchases interrupted by the war in Bangladesh. (However, tea production, another major source of export earnings, remains low as a result of obsolete and neglected plantations, and this has meant a poorer quality of tea and higher production costs.)

The transport network, which was seriously damaged during the war, has started to function again: ports have been restored to operating condition, as has road transport, although there are about one-quarter less trucks now than before the war. Rail transport is operating at only about 40 percent of pre-war capacity because of damage to bridges, rolling stock and signal equipment. But river craft have been successfully substituted, especially in moving goods from the ports to the interior.

Foodgrain Situation

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim recently appealed to member countries to donate 1.7 million tons of foodgrains to Bangladesh during 1973. This would supplement the 800,000 tons that Dacca will try to buy commercially, and would help meet its estimated need for 2.5 million tons of foodgrain imports this year. So far Bangladesh has arranged to buy about 450,000 tons. About 350,000 tons have already been donated, including 200,000 tons by the U.S.

The estimated need for 1973 is about equal to the amount imported in 1972. The Dacca government had hoped to reduce this figure, but the major winter rice crop was unusually low because of sporadic monsoon rains. Complicating the supply picture this year is the worldwide shortage of foodgrains, heavy pressures on world shipping, and the fact that India, one of the largest donors of foodgrains to Bangladesh last year, will be unable to contribute this year because drought has reduced its own crops.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

9 January 1973

Russians' long salvage job in Chittagong

CPYRIGHT WILLIAM DRUMMOND, Chittagong, January 8

The fences around the Soviet compound here are patrolled by Russian sailors clad in bright blue shirt and shorts, and carrying submachine guns. Inside jetty No. 1 there are 800 sailors who operate 26 vessels, ranging from large floating workshops and minesweepers to small launches.

Soviet naval penetration of the Indian Ocean area was mostly strategic speculation until last April when Bangladesh accepted Russia's offer to clear Chittagong, Bangladesh's main port, of sunken war wreckage. Almost immediately, the fleet from Vladivostok steamed in and prepared for a lengthy stay.

What the Russians are really up to here has been shrouded in mystery for the last eight months. Why has the pace of the work gone so slowly? Why the need for armed sentries? Is this the naval base that everybody seems to think Russia wants to solidify her southern flank against China?

To answer some of these questions, Rear Admiral Sergei Zuenko, chief of the Soviet salvage team, permitted an inspection in Chittagong. The fact that the Russians allowed such a visit seems to indicate that what they are really after is building goodwill among the Bengalis rather than securing a military foothold.

The Russians have turned a warehouse into a recreation hall for their crews, but there were no outward signs of preparations for a truly military presence in Chittagong — no submarine pens or anything not

directly involved with salvage.

Admiral Zuenko, aged 54, a veteran of 36 years in the Soviet Navy, is a massive Ukrainian, intelligent, stern, yet friendly.

"The very first question you should ask is why the Soviet military is doing this work and not a civilian salvage team," he said, speaking through a translator.

Answering his own question, he unrolled a map on his desk showing about 1,000 square miles of ocean in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Bangladesh.

"Minesweeping was the main work and this was strictly a military job," he said. "This had to be done to permit ships to enter the outer anchorage. If the minesweeping were not completed, we could not undertake any salvage work."

About half of the fleet was engaged in mine-sweeping, he said, and vessels from the Indian Navy helped. Admiral Zuenko disclosed that the Indian ships had been placed under his command to coordinate the effort.

The cooperation is significant because, so far as is known, independent India has never before submitted her vessels to a Russian commander. Bangladesh mine clearance was probably the first collaboration at the command level since the signing last year of the Indo-Soviet defence treaty. The Soviet salvage operation is scheduled to finish next December.

When hostilities ended last December in the Indo-Pakistan war there were 18 sunken ships

in Chittagong harbour. After eight months' work, the Russians floated 10 of the wrecks and towed them away. It will take a full year to clear the remaining 4 wrecks.

Periodically, the Bengali press has suggested that the Russians are stalling. Zuenko denies this. "At the end of the Second World War it took the Americans five years to clear the wreckage in Pearl Harbor, and there the visibility underwater was perfect and the Americans were accustomed to the climate."

Clearing Chittagong involves immense technical problems, he said. The water is more than 100 feet deep, and visibility is zero. The currents are swift and dangerous, severely limiting the amount of time that the 40 Russian divers can work below.

Conventional salvage methods involve blowing apart the submerged hulls and floating them, piece by piece. However, this cannot be done because the blasting would kill the river fish, a staple of the Bengali diet, and would scatter the oil still inside the wrecks, polluting the harbour.

The Russians are sinking pontoons, attaching them to the wrecks, and floating the pontoons with compressed air. This brings the wreck to the surface. "Many said this technique would not succeed, but fortunately they were mistaken," the admiral said.

On the armed guards around the compound he said: "Every military unit has to insist on rules and regulations. This is not for protecting our team,

because the Bengali people have never taken any actions against the Soviet team.

"But we have to control the gates and who goes in and out. The Bengali people are very curious. If there were no guards the jetty would always be crowded." He also suggested that the gear and vehicles on the jetty might fall prey to thieves if left unguarded.

The fact that the Russians operate a self-contained foreign military presence here is a source of bewilderment to the American Embassy in Dacca, which dares not even allow the US marine security personnel to appear in uniform for fear of provoking hostility. The Soviet Union gets away with these things because the Russians acted swiftly on Bangladesh's behalf, from her pro-Bangladesh vetoes in the United Nations last year to the prompt dispatch of the salvage fleet to Chittagong.

When the Russians arrived, Chittagong port was blocked with wreckage and clearing no cargo. Now it is clearing 500,000 tons a month. Russian prestige is high and the chances of the Soviet Union wooing Bangladesh into a collective security treaty, similar to that signed with India in August, 1971, appear very good.

Admiral Zuenko's fleet could be the precursor of some more permanent Soviet military presence here, but for the time being the Russians are engaged purely in salvage. — Los Angeles Times.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 December 1972

Russia Plays Mystery Role in Bangladesh

BY WILLIAM J. DRUMMOND
Times Staff Writer

CHITTAGONG, Bangladesh — The fences around the Soviet compound here are patrolled by Soviet sailors clad in bright blue shirts and shorts and carrying sub-machine guns. Inside jetty No. 1 there are 800 Soviet sailors who operate a fleet of 26 vessels ranging from large floating workshops and minesweepers down to small launches.

Soviet naval penetration of the Indian Ocean area was mostly strategic speculation until last April when Bangladesh accepted Moscow's offer to clear Chittagong, Bangladesh's main port, of sunken war wreckage.

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What the Russians are really up to here has been shrouded in mystery for the last eight months.

Why has the pace of the work gone so slowly? Why the need for armed sentries? Is this the naval base that everybody seems to think the Soviet Union wants in order to solidify its southern flank against China?

To answer some of these questions, The Times obtained an interview with Rear Adm. Sergei Zuenko, chief of the Soviet salvage team, who permitted a firsthand view of the operations in Chittagong.

No Submarine Pens

The fact that the Russians permitted such an

inspection seems to indicate that what they are really after is building good will among the Bengalis rather than securing a military toe-hold. The Russians have turned a warehouse into a recreation hall for their crewmen, but there were no outward signs of preparations for a truly military presence in Chittagong—no submarine pens or pillboxes or anything not directly involved with salvage.

Zuenko, 51, a veteran of 36 years in the Soviet navy, is a massive Ukrainian, intelligent, stern, yet friendly.

"The very first question you should ask," said Zuenko, speaking through an interpreter, "is why the Soviet military is doing this work and not a civilian salvage team."

And promptly answering his own question, the admiral unrolled a map on his desk showing about 1,000 square miles of ocean in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Bangladesh. "Mine-sweeping was the main work," he said, "and this was strictly a military job. This had to be done to permit ships to enter the outer anchorage. If the mine-sweeping were not completed, we could not undertake any salvage work."

Assist From India

About half of the fleet was engaged in mine-sweeping, he said, and vessels from the Indian navy also assisted.

Zuenko revealed that the Indian vessels had been placed under his command in order to coordinate the effort.

This cooperation itself is significant because as far as is known independent India has never before submitted its vessels to a Soviet or any other foreign commander.

Bangladesh mine-sweeping is the first collaboration at

the command level since the signing last year of the Indo-Soviet defense treaty.

The Soviet salvage operation is scheduled to end in December of next year. When hostilities ended last December in the Indo-Pakistan war there were 15 sunken vessels in Chittagong harbor.

After eight months' work the Russians had floated 10 1/2 of the wrecks and towed them away.

Periodically the Bengali press has suggested that the Russians are stalling.

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and there the visibility underwater was perfect and the Americans were accustomed to the climate," he said.

Technical Problems

Clearing Chittagong, he added, is plagued with immense technical problems. The water is more than 100 feet deep, and visibility is zero. The currents are swift and dangerous, severely limiting the amount of time that the 40 Soviet divers can work below.

Conventional salvage methods involve blowing apart the submerged hulls and floating them piece by piece. However, this cannot be done here because the blasting would kill the river fish, staple of the Bengali diet, and would scatter the oil remaining inside the wrecks.

Soviet Salvage Crews

What the Soviet salvage crews are doing is sinking pontoons, attaching them to the wrecks and floating them to the surface, bringing the

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"Many said this technique would not succeed," said Zuenko, "but fortunately they were mistaken."

Asked about those armed guards around the compound, he replied:

"Every military unit has to insist on rules and regulations. This is not for protecting our team, because the Bengali people have never taken any actions against the Soviet team."

"But we have to control the gates and who goes in and out. The Bengali people are very curious. If there were no guards the jetty would always be crowded."

He also suggested that the gear and vehicles sitting on the jetty might fall prey to thieves if left unguarded.

Americans Puzzled

The fact that the Soviet navy operates a self-contained foreign military presence here is a source of bewilderment to the American Embassy in Dacca, which dares not even have the U.S. Marine security personnel appear in uniform for fear of provoking hostility.

The Soviet Union seems to be getting away with these things because it has acted swiftly on Bangladesh's behalf—from its pro-Bangladesh vetoes in the United Nations last year to the prompt dispatch of the salvage fleet to Chittagong.

When the Soviet fleet arrived, Chittagong harbor was blocked with wreckage and clearing zero cargo. Now it is clearing 300,000 tons a month.

Soviet prestige as a result, is high and the chances of wooing Bangladesh into a collective security treaty similar to that signed with India in August, 1971, appear very good.

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CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

more permanent Soviet military presence here but for the time being the Russians appear to be engaged purely in salvage.

Zuenko had his steward lay out a repast of heavy Russian bread, butter from Vladivostok, tea from Georgia and tinned cherry jam.

These are but a few of the amenities to help the bear adapt to the Bengal.

MARCH OF THE NATION, New Delhi
23 September 1972

Soviet Union Sets Eyes On Bangla Port For Naval Base

By Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI: The Soviet naval fleet is very much in the Indian Ocean, berthed in Bangla Desh waters at the port of Chittagong. The Indian government seems to acquiesce with this Soviet move but sharp criticism and resentment is heard in Bangla Desh.

Most Bangla Desh politicians feel that the so-called "salvage operations" is a sinister and covert Soviet move to create a regular Soviet naval base in Chittagong.

Having signed a Friendship Treaty with India the Soviets allowed India to sign a similar one with Bangla Desh. This assured them an indirect access to the former Pakistani province.

MARCH learns that the Soviet "operation salvage", which began in April last, is progressing very slowly because of the Soviets refused to commit adequate equipment. This has evoked considerable resentment in Bangla Desh.

RELUCTANT MUJIB

High-ranking officials express concern over Soviet attempts to persuade Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman to allow them to construct a naval base in or near the port of Chittagong. Mujib, though under considerable Russian pressure, has thus far successfully refused to give in.

Before he left for London last month the Russians had escalated their demand. They reportedly expressed the desire to open a Soviet Consulate in Chittagong. The Consulate would be required to take care of the influx of Soviet sailors once their demand to establish a naval base was granted.

CLEAR TERMS

This prompted Mujib to publicly declare that Bangla Desh government will not allow the establishment of foreign bases. In fact this declaration is part of the Indo-Bangla Desh Joint Statement of March 19. The Statement states in unambiguous terms the "opposition to the creation of land, air, and naval bases in this area."

A feeling exists that the Russians are deliberately delaying the salvage operations in order to establish the semi-official presence of their naval fleet in the area and to gain time to negotiate with Shiekh Mujib.

This suspicion is reinforced by the knowledge that the Soviets are currently conducting a technical survey of the seabed, something absolutely unnecessary for their salvage operations. Despite protests from Bangla Desh officials they have fenced off a large area of the Chittagong jetty and have refused entry to all non-Soviets, including Bengali Officials,

CAUTIOUS

Further calls follow, but they are arranged cautiously so as not to create alarm. Finally, visits become quite frequent and so commonplace that the host country finds it difficult to deny access, particularly if their economic dependence on Russia has meanwhile grown significantly.

The Russians also involve themselves in the development of ports, shipbuilding, and repairing yards. Usually these facilities, after completion, are handed over to the recipient country but Communist advisers as a rule are stationed at these projects to look after Soviet interests.

The Russians also provide technical aid to the host country's navy and offer naval workshop and training facilities. They help in establishing fishing industry by constructing suitable shipyards and dry docks. The Russians also plan for port improvements designed to facilitate export of crude oil and promise oil exploration in off-shore areas.

Negotiations for Soviet naval base at Chittagong needs to be viewed against this background. Facilities at Chittagong are believed to be tied in with the reported Soviet offer of MIG fighter squadron to Bangla Desh and provision of experts to train Bangla Desh military technicians.

Mujib was expected to discuss these developments with Indira Gandhi. It is not known whether he did so during his talks with her last week.

Bangla Desh Foreign Minister, Samad is one of the Bangla Desh leaders who wants to caution Mujib against Russians. In his recent tour of some Arab and South East Asian countries Samad collected considerable information about the modus operandi of the Russians.

In this particular field, they first send their merchant ships or fishing trawlers to make friendly calls at target ports. Once this practice is established and the Soviet ensigns become familiar, a regular trade mission is sent to pay a formal visit.

While in London Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was cautioned about this covert Soviet naval presence in Chittagong port by British naval authorities, who expressed, not only concern but also apprehension over the expansion of Soviet naval presence and activity in the Indian Ocean.

Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and several other Arab and Mediterranean countries have been targets of such Soviet manoeuvres. Reports reveal that the Soviets are also in

terested in acquiring naval facilities in Burma.

Sri Lanka Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimao Bandaranaike has been increasingly wary of Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean. Recently she placed 30 Sri Lanka ships on alert following the detection of a foreign ship, believed to be Russian, operating close to Sri Lanka's territorial waters.

Soviet Union or its country's big neighbor, India.

There is an understandable fear of Indian domination here, and the Indians have been taking the blame lately — often unfairly — for many of Bangladesh's economic troubles. When the Bangladesh Government made a bad deal in ordering huge quantities of substandard emergency-relief clothing from India several weeks ago, for instance, many were quick to blame the Indians.

Indian Army accused

The Indian Army is accused by many of having hauled away Pakistani weapons, mill equipment, and a good part of the jute crop, thus contributing to the destitution of this new nation.

Bicycle-rickshaw drivers complain that tires provided by India cost more and wear out faster than those that used to be sold here by the Pakistani's.

The Indians are also often blamed for the cross-border smuggling that is draining Bangladesh. Some Bengalis conveniently ignore that it takes not only Indians but also Bengalis to make the smuggling a success.

The Russians, in the meantime, have suffered a bit from traits that are often associated with Americans in overseas positions — pushiness, heavy handedness, a lack of grace.

To some Bengalis, the extroverted — some would say aggressive — Soviet Ambassador here, Valentin F. Popov, comes across as an "ugly Russian." A number of Bengalis thought Mr. Popov showed terribly bad form when he tried at the very last minute to persuade Sheikh Mujib to accept Russian instead of British facilities for medical treatment last July. The sheikh chose to go to London, where he probably feels more at ease than he would ever feel in Moscow.

Because of past British influence, many educated Bengalis are simply more at home with Englishmen, or Americans, than they are with the Russians.

When the Russian Ambassador gave the sheikh's wife a Christmas present last December, Bengalis considered this a most peculiar thing for a supposedly godless Russian to do.

Suspicion grows

Some of the Bengalis who were at first impressed with the ability of Russian experts to speak their language now have become a bit suspicious of this talent.

The Russians have also been criticized for slowness in their efforts to clear the mines and sunken ships from the harbor at Chittagong, the country's largest port.

Many Bengalis were under the impression that the Russian Navy would get the job done quickly. But it has turned out to be an extremely difficult task.

India and the Soviet Union are still referred to here as the two great allies of Bangladesh. Not much is made of American aid in the local newspapers. And it appears that some newspapers have been made to understand

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 October 1972

Low-profile U.S. aid wins Bengalis over

Soviet and Indian popularity wanes

By Dantol Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Dacca, Bangladesh

Thanks to a massive aid program combined with a low-key approach, America's standing in Dacca has risen markedly over the past few months.

At the same time, the popularity of India and the Soviet Union — the two powers responsible for the liberation of Bangladesh — has dropped considerably.

The main cause for improvement in America's image is clearly the U.S. aid being poured into this new state. The United States now is the biggest provider of foreign aid to Bangladesh.

The United States has been channeling a good part of its aid through the United Nations and through voluntary agencies. The U.S. aid staff in Dacca is a small one. Bengalis say they've been impressed with this low profile and with the lack of political strings attached to the aid.

Lots to live down

Bengalis also say the United States still has a lot to live down because of its support for West Pakistan before and during the India-Pakistan war of last December. But all along, educated Bengalis have tended to distinguish between what they considered a bad policy of the U.S. Government and the good qualities of the American people.

This fund of goodwill for the American people has given the U.S. Government something to build on.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bangladesh Prime Minister, clearly wants American aid from becoming too dependent on either the

that they are not to criticize India or the Soviet Union.

Attitudes change

But underlying attitudes in Dacca, particularly among government officials, are obviously changing. In the capital city at least, word has filtered down that the Americans are engaged in a \$400-million aid program.

Russian aid amounts to only \$6.6 million.

At the United States Information Service (USIS) library, which was blown up during the war, the atmosphere has relaxed considerably. Demonstrators who used to march to the nearby Foreign Ministry to air their complaints also occasionally hurled rocks through the windows of the USIS building — just for good measure. But an American official recently noted with pride that "the last time we got stoned was four weeks ago." Things are obviously looking up.

THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
16 December 1972

A year of Bangladesh

Bangladesh, the eighth most populous nation on earth, is one year old tomorrow. Bangladesh is at political and communal peace, and has experienced little starvation for months past. The economy of Bangladesh, if still a thing of shreds and tatters, at least begins to contrive slow recovery. One year ago, in the wake of appalling carnage and wholesale destruction, none of this seemed remotely possible. The year of nationhood has proved, against the odds, a year for congratulations and thanksgiving. East Bengal can clearly manage its own affairs: it is not the incompetent land the Punjabi overlords so despised and stifled. This first birthday may not have fulfilled the most ecstatic hopes of the Dacca masses, but it remains a signal victory for decent human aspiration.

Nor, looking beyond generalities of idealism to the grind of daily subsistence, is there cause for more mundane depressions. Visiting commentators have repeatedly prophesied the imminent collapse of law, order and the economy. In fact, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's grip on his people has proved tough and charismatic. And the peasant economy (only rivalled in global impoverishment by Burundi and Upper Volta) has reacted to adversity with steely local resilience—small village units using rich soil to offset the buffeting of war. Bangladesh now does not face a swift slide into mass famine or anarchy. There is a chance to build.

But, washing over these rocks of certainty and questions. World opinion, for example, has underpinned Bangladesh to fine effect. Though the international aid business shows inevitable kinks, it has nursed the country to health, and this physical assistance has been paralleled by diplomatic sympathy. Only China and a few countries of the Moslem block have indulged in much open

criticism of Mujib's subcontinental policies. Yet the moment may be coming for a closer look at some tenets of Mujibism. Tomorrow—at another emotional, million-strong gathering—the Sheikh is expected to outline his current thinking on war crime trials, finally to choose between amnesty and a course that will put 40,000 or more Bengalis, Biharis, and captured Pakistani soldiers in the dock for collaboration and atrocities. If these trials go ahead at full spate they could remove, for many years, the possibility of President Bhutto recognising Bangladesh: this, in turn, will condemn the entire Indian arena to continued hostilities, huge expenditure on armaments and the existence, in all three countries, of embattled hostage minorities, prey to random vengeance and official persecution. Thus far, Sheikh Mujib has been able to argue stoically that it was for Pakistan, the principal aggressor, to meet his recognition terms—and Mr Bhutto, beset by his own internal political weaknesses, has let moment after moment slip away.

But now, with vicious student riots against Bangladesh being fermented in Sind and the Punjab, Bhutto's freedom of action does seem genuinely circumscribed. If the subcontinent wishes peace, the next practical step must come from Mujib. Bhutto knows as much and hopes for it. India, too, sees only harm coming from an epic of legalistic bloodletting. Friends know Sheikh Mujib is truly horrified by what his people endured, but there are the living to think about now—the 300,000 Bengalis stuck in Pakistan, the 90,000 Pakistan troops incarcerated in India, the restless 700,000 Biharis, the gaol'd 40,000. This is a formidable mountain of misery. Sheikh Mujib could begin moving it tomorrow, an act in tune with the early aspirations of a growing Bangladesh.

BALTIMORE SUN
16 December 1972

Bangladesh marks first birthday today; Mujib reviews the year's accomplishments

By PIRAN SARDHARWAL
Sun Staff Correspondent

Dacca, Bangladesh—A booming 31-gun salute will mark the end of the first year of Bangladesh's existence today. And then the new nation will begin its second year, which could be more challenging, with the euphoria of liberation yielding to despondency.

Sheik Mujibur Rahman, founder, leader and prime minister of Bangladesh, in an interview summed up the performance of his regime that took over power after a bloody upheaval and said: "Nobody has died of starvation in my country despite many predictions that there would be widespread famine."

Constitution is signed

"I have given my country a democratic constitution, in such short record time that nowhere else has this ever happened."

The constitution was finally signed yesterday by all the members of the Constituent Assembly, and that assembly now stands dissolved.

"I am giving democracy to my people and they will be able to elect a new government next March. I could have continued in office for another 10 years without any challenge from my people, but I want elections so that they can exercise their democratic rights."

The national administrative apparatus is now effective throughout the country, despite communication difficulties in a terrain crisscrossed by rivers, where many of the war-damaged bridges still are unrepaired.

Sheik Mujib, as he is called by his people, added that there has not been any "genocide" of the non-Bengali-speaking Biharis, as many feared there would be. He made it clear, however, that the 260,000 out of half a million Biharis who have chosen, in a government-conducted survey,

Pakistan, will have to go there and the remainder will stay in Bangladesh as "my people on my responsibility."

Despite Mr. Mujib's remarkable performance, it should be realized that the armed challenge been very numerous. They could have been much worse, because of widespread distribution of automatic weapons last year for the war against Pakistan when the Indian Army, with the help of the

Bengali guerrillas, erased East Pakistan from the map and created the new Bengali nation of Bangladesh.

Prime Minister Mujib would like to believe that the growing number of political parties, of all ideological colorations, is due mainly to politicians' fears that he is about to initiate a government purge of all opportunists and also those who are corrupt.

According to observers, the national ruling Awami League will be returned to power in March with a massive vote, provided Mr. Mujib is able to campaign and crisscross the country.

The Bangladesh government is getting British helicopters, which Mr. Mujib could use in campaigning without much physical strain.

The national political issues for the first time in the 25 years since independence from Great Britain will be on domestic issues and not aimed at the outside power or forces in West Pakistan, against which Bengalis have fought all along.

However, the new Bengali nation still lacks the psychological fulfillment of nationhood, despite recognition by over 95 nations.

What the Bengalis want is recognition by their erstwhile rulers in West Pakistan, who now make up all of Pakistan. Their insistence on recognition before any dialogue with Pakistan's president, Zulfikar Ali

that Mr. Bhutto may try to talk them out of their independence.

In foreign affairs the country is seeking "friendship with all with malice to none." The United States, India, Britain and Russia are all considered necessary for help and aid. The nation survived the disasters of the last year only with a massive \$1 billion in economic and food aid. The nation's leaders are aware that that kind of money is not going to be available in future.

Aid groups to leave

As it is, most of the 50-odd volunteer organizations and agencies who are running aid programs here now are talking about moving to Vietnam, where they feel the need for help will be greater than in Bangladesh.

The traumatic experience of last year has made the Bengalis doubly wary of any influence which may suggest, however remotely, that their sovereignty is being compromised.

Mr. Mujib said, "I want friendship with all but I will not tolerate any interference in my country's internal affairs," in answer to a question as to how he viewed Bangladesh's relations in the future.

Mr. Mujib has reason to be wary of foreign powers interfering in his domestic affairs. Last week the pro-Moscow Communist party, which had been underground for the last 25 years, put up a very expensive show in the world's poorest country and attracted foreign attention.

Awami League leaders made no secret of who they believe was financing such an elaborate and expensive show and for what political ends.

Mr. Mujib is determined not have any truck with any political party, notwithstanding the fact that some of these parties joined his followers last year

consultative committee under Indian influence to guide the war of liberation.

There is an undertone of anti-Indian feeling voiced in private and public. This, many Indian officials say, is because of a Bengali desire—which the Indians say they share—for a separate identity.

Bangladesh is still adjusting to the new realities and is groping for ways to improve the lot of its poor, who are the world's poorest.

There is no mistaking that Bangladesh is Sheik Mujib's country. His portrait is everywhere and he is regarded as the supreme leader who is going to solve all the problems.

Mr. Mujib, at 55, looks healthy after his recent illness and operation. He enjoys his political power and the strength he has acquired after a long fight.

BALTIMORE SUN
14 December 1972

Bangladesh revisited: A young giant tries to make it on 16 cents a day

CPYRGHT
SUN STAFF CORRESPONDENT

Dacca, Bangladesh—This Bengali nation of 75 million people, having emerged from a bloody conflict a year ago as the world's eighth largest country, remains one of its poorest.

Bangladesh has one of the lowest per capita incomes (\$60 a year or about 16 cents a day) of any nation on earth.

Twenty per cent of the population has an average annual income of less than \$2. And the overpopulation is such that there are 1,360 people for every square mile.

The country's prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is making an effort to raise living standards, but the task seems formidable.

The nation's planners are giving top priority to agriculture since 95 per cent of the people depend on it. (Manufacturing accounts for only 6 per cent of the gross national product and employs less than 1 per cent of the labor force.)

Thus, the short-term objec-

tive—with the help of foreign aid—is to protect agriculture from the vagaries of weather

and produce enough to feed the people.

The planners realized, despite claims to the contrary, that Bangladesh does not have the raw materials and technical skills for large-scale industrialization.

And the nearly half billion dollars in foreign aid has been pumped into agriculture and fisheries. The govern-

ment also has given priority to restarting the jute, cotton textile and sugar mills that were closed down last year when the West Pakistanis abandoned them, in the Indo-Pakistani war.

The Bangladesh government has a modest plan for the current fiscal year (July 1972 to June, 1973), costing \$650 million. But again, the bulk of the funds are to be spent on agriculture, with industry getting a mere 5.5 per cent.

The country's major assets are 8 million cubic feet of natural gas, and the climate and soil to produce crops, particularly "golden fiber"

jute. The latter gets the country the most foreign exchange dollars, apart from leather and tea. Jute is used in making burlap bags and twine.

However, Bangladesh's jute crop is threatened by rising food prices, since farmers are finding it more profitable to divert their acreage to food grains, such as rice.

Natural gas question

The government has yet to decide what to do about the natural gas. It would take years either to pump the gas to Calcutta or set up a petro-chemical complex at the port of Chittagong.

The average Bengali seems to have few complaints. He feels that the country is so far down that the only place to go is up.

Meantime, there is an acute shortage of consumer goods, which has to be imported from abroad, preferably from England or Japan. Bengalis do not like Indian consumer goods which they believe to be "costly and

also shoddy."

The government is pledged to socialism—called 'Mujib-

ism—and has yet to make up its mind if it wants foreign capital for development. The few foreign-owned enterprises are not nationalized and their owners are allowed to run them.

However, the government has decided to bar private investments from India as it would revive past memories of Rajasthani Hin-

dus and Bengali Hindu land owners who exploited the Muslims here. That was part of the reason the Muslim Bengalis opted for Muslim Pakistan against predominantly Hindu India 25 years ago.

Sheikh Mujib himself now is looking into the price rise and shortages. He has banned strikes and threatened hoarders with serious punishment. The sheikh hopes to import enough consumer goods to bring down prices before the March elections. Needless to say, the economy has become one of the major campaign issues.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 January 1973

RICE CROPS DROPS IN RAVAGED ASIA

War and Weather Produce
Shortages in Many Areas

SINGAPORE, Jan. 13 (Reuters)—The green revolution in Asia seems about to come to an abrupt halt this year with rice crops ravaged by war, drought and floods.

Harvests are falling far short of forecasts in several countries, and of Asia's three principal rice exporting countries only Thailand is expected to have a large surplus.

Thailand, the foremost exporter, faces a shortage this

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year and the prospect of importing rice because of an estimated 20 per cent drop in production.

Stockpiles were wiped out last year when Thailand exported more than two million tons to countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh that experienced unforeseen shortages.

Adverse weather played havoc with rice crops in the Philippines, where the green revolution was born in the early 1960's with the development of a high-yield "miracle rice" that was expected to make most countries self-sufficient.

The worst floods of this century washed away much of the crop in the northern Philippines, while in the south Indonesia Needed Imports

Nevertheless the over-all outlook for the Philippines was

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not too grim, with production forecasts for 1972-73 down only 4.5 per cent. The shortage has been covered by imports from China, the United States, Italy, Japan and Thailand.

Indonesia was caught unaware by a serious shortage the last three months, which saw the price of rice nearly triple on the domestic market.

Months of harsh drought caused a drastic shortfall in the rice crop. Indonesia, striving to meet her own needs by mid-1974, had to import 1,500,000 tons. Indonesia is still trying to buy additional supplies.

With a forecast by an American expert, Dr. J. Norman Efferson, that world demand is likely to exceed output in five to 15 years, at least partly by catching up to domestic needs.

Malaysia's 1972 harvest was expected to produce a surplus

for the first time a mere 700 tons—mainly due to double-planting and increased irrigation.

An acute rice shortage led to riots and looting in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh in September, and a major food crisis looms this year as the war shrinks the average yield of paddyfields.

Peasants Desert Land

Statistics published recently by the Cambodian Interior Ministry showed the area under cultivation had fallen by nearly half over the last 12 months. Thousands of peasants have deserted their land and fled as refugees to Phnom Penh.

South Vietnam imported 200,000 tons of rice last year to fill the gap left by production resulting from the war.

Japan, by contrast, is this year in the position of consid-

ering a cutback in production to reduce her stockpile, which over the last few years has climbed to 2,700,000 tons.

South Korea was hoping to halve imports to 400,000 tons this year, but officials now concede that the country will need at least 500,000 tons because of the poor 1972 harvest.

Production figures are not available for North Vietnam, China and North Korea, but harvests in North Vietnam are thought to have been seriously affected by the war.

THE ASIAN, Hong Kong
13 December 1972

CPYRGHT

Granaries help

US retain a food-hold in the world

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SPECIAL TO THE ASIAN

WASHINGTON - North America is now the world's breadbasket, with the failure of grain harvests in the Soviet Union. With the strength the United States has militarily and in other aspects of its economy, this situation has serious political implications. The United States could, if it were so inclined to, use its potential capacity to grip the world by its throat and choke its alimentary canal to influence political decisions of the international community.

In the thirties the world's wheat deficiency areas were supplied by three regions: Latin America, North America and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union.

Today with its population boom Latin America is barely self-sufficient. The Soviet Union is now making large purchases of grain and many of the other countries of Eastern Europe are importing vast quantities of grain. Australia and New Zealand are only secondary suppliers.

Apart from its political implications the world's dependence on US supplies has serious dangers to the food situation.

A former US Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, has warned that it has become difficult for the United States to

achieve any abrupt increases in its food production to meet the extra demands on it.

US grain exports have been increased 12 times in less than 40 years, in spite of greater home consumption. The high protein diet of North Americans requires about one ton of grain a year per person to feed cattle and poultry as well as humans. European and Japanese needs have also risen.

As far back as 1967, a US agricultural economist warned that the foreseeable North American grain surplus was all that stood between the world's increasing population and starvation. Economists are nervously wondering what would happen if future crop failures in the Soviet Union coincided with Indian famines. Already India has had bad harvests from monsoon failures which are obliging it to go to the US for grain, despite its optimism last year it had reached self-sufficiency. In the late sixties when crop failures hit India President Nehru provided 15 million tons.

Organisation, efficiency, agriculture science and knowhow have enabled the US with scarcely six per cent of its people working on the farms to feed all of its own peoples and many other parts of the world. This year the US expects to harvest 260 million tons of grain and sugar, the

Soviet Union only 167 million tons.

The Asian's correspondent in Bangkok reports:

Rice experts from member-countries of the International Rice Commission were in agreement that greater attention must be placed towards the development of improved rice varieties which require only moderate management and have wider adaptability as 60 per cent of the area under rice in Asia is rainfed.

In the past, emphasis has been on the development of high yielding varieties for irrigated conditions. Little attention had been devoted to raise rice yields in unirrigated areas that depend for their water supply from rain.

The experts meeting here recently felt that as considerable success had now been achieved in raising rice productivity in irrigated areas, more emphasis should now be directed towards breeding varieties suitable for less favourable environment such as rainfed areas and marginal land.

Attention should also be given to suitable cultivation techniques and cropping patterns in these areas.

A FAO official drew the attention of the delegates to the fact that population in rice-consuming countries was steadily increasing at an annual rate of three per cent.

There was also increasing demand for rice by the existing population which was linked to urbanisation and increased incomes.

Apart from Asia, the demand for rice was also on the increase in Africa and South America.

the food problem of the developing countries in relation to rice production must come mainly from increased productivity of land already under cultivation.

The Deputy Regional Representative of FAO for Asia and the Far East, Mr Soestilo H. Prakoso, warned against any optimism that the rice problems would be solved in the near future.

He said that through the introduction of high yielding varieties coupled with both improvement in agricultural inputs and favourable weather conditions particularly in tropical Asia, rice production was increasing remarkably in many countries during the last quarter of the seventies.

He said that in 1970 the world paddy production had reached a record 300 million metric tons and this had led many people to express optimism that the rice problems would be solved in the near future. He said that, except for limited areas, rice production was still the subject of considerable fluctuations, consequently hampering both the desired steady increase in production and a stable supply of rice to an ever increasing population.

Mr Prakoso said that the shortage of rice has already been reported in some countries in Asia and this should serve as a warning that continuous efforts are needed for further improve

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LENGTHENING SHADOWS AND PYOTR YAKIR

Soviet counter proposals on the subject of a freer exchange of ideas between East and West have been restrained. Typical of this was their recent reaction to the concept of satellite television programming. It was this reaction, in fact, that resulted in the nearly unanimous United Nations vote prohibiting satellite television programming without the permission of the recipient government.

Ironically Lenin was the first proponent of influencing the peoples of the world via radio. Moscow became and remains one of the most powerful and busy of all the world's broadcasting centers with programs in all of the world's main languages -- and all directed at presenting the Soviet political point of view. Moscow is also one of the world's most paranoid listeners to foreign radio broadcasting and apparently fears television might prove even more effective in reaching a wider audience as yet apathetic but potentially dangerous.

Also indicative of the leadership's nervousness over the exchange of information or ideas is a recently adopted decree forbidding the use of the telephone for purposes contrary to the interests of the State and public order. This measure, too, is an additional weapon for use in the current campaign against the steadily weakening dissidence movement.

Evidence from telephone taps has already been used in the trials of dissidents. A switchboard operator testified at the trial last year of Vladimir Markman in Sverdlovsk that he had made anti-Soviet remarks in telephone calls to Israel. One of the charges against Vladimir Bukovsky was the possession of telephone numbers of Western correspondents. At this writing, it is anticipated that Pyotr Yakir may momentarily be subjected to public trial and the telephone can be expected to play no small role in the charges made against him.

Last June Pyotr Yakir, one of the Soviet dissenters' more outspoken members, was arrested. Five months later it was being bruited about Moscow that Yakir had been broken by the security police (KGB) and that he might be ready to go into court to denounce the "democratic movement" and to name his fellow dissenters and their Western contacts. Those credited with spreading this story assure their contacts that Yakir has not buckled under physical torture.

An article in the 14 December Soviet Analyst makes the telling point that though torture was employed on a tremendous

scale during the Stalinist purges in the Soviet Union and East Europe, it was not the physically tortured who were brought to confession in the great trials. Some were tortured at one stage or another during interrogation but usually before it had been decided to display them publicly. Others, such as M. Orakhalashvili, were so tortured they had to be done away with in secret.

Star confessors such as Nikolai Bukharin were not physically tortured but were methodically weakened by varying degrees of brutality such as inadequate diet and inadequate sleep, accompanied by very long, though not continuous, interrogations. Evzen Nebl who appeared at the Slansky trial in Prague in 1952 said that such interrogation techniques had in effect deprived him of his ego. Even when rested and fed it no longer occurred to him to withdraw his confession. "I was quite a normal person," he said, "only I was no longer a person."

The time taken to process prisoners in the public purge trials in Moscow and East Europe was usually from three months upwards. Pyotr Yakir, a sick man to begin with, has now been in the hands of the KGB since 21 June -- ample time for the interrogators to accomplish their task. In addition, as Amnesty International reminds us today's interrogator has the technical capability to produce "progressively more sophisticated methods of torture, including mind-shattering, audio-visual techniques that make the medieval thumbscrew and rack look like children's toys."

Opinions differ as to whether or not Pyotr Yakir has been broken under interrogation. As reported in the Baltimore Sun of 23 December, two highly trustworthy Moscow dissident sources have described the rumors of Yakir's collaboration with the authorities as misinformation skillfully planted by the KGB in order to damage or break the morale of other Soviet dissidents. Should it turn out that Yakir has denounced the activities of his fellow dissidents, one need only recall that long before his arrest he confided to London correspondent David Bonavia that if he were beaten he would "tell all." "I know that from my previous experience in camps. But you will know that it is not the real me who is speaking then. . ."

It is believed that Yakir will be brought to trial in the very near future and it may well be that the KGB will try to use his testimony to implicate others and denounce the dissidents as a whole. Undoubtedly the KGB will use the Yakir case to damn the chief "samizdat" publication of the dissident movement, The Chronicle of Current Events. The world should denounce this latest example of Soviet methods of intimidation and forced confession reminiscent of the days of Stalin.

Which in turn leads one to reflect on Western reaction to what is happening within the Soviet Union. We know that although the Soviet leaders are lured by the potential payoffs of detente,

orthodoxy will die hard for most of them. It is the instinctive tendency of a suspicious, conservative leadership to tighten internal controls at a time of increased foreign exposure. It is that leadership which reacts violently to foreign criticism of its treatment of dissidents and minorities as interference in its internal affairs. Nevertheless, that same leadership has in the past and can be expected in the future to make small compromises to appease its critics.

It is this potential of achieving even the smallest of compromises that makes Western reactions seem so cautious. For, with the exception of Western media, reaction to Soviet dissidents appealing for help has been generally negative. It was reported during the Brussels International Symposium on Human Rights held last December that over 100 documents appealing to the West for help had been sent out during the past year. They have met with total indifference and silence on the part of most international psychiatric organizations, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the United Nations secretariat. In fact, in 1969 the then Secretary General U Thant ordered the Moscow office of the United Nations to refuse to accept appeals locally. This was after Mr. U Thant had received five appeals through this channel. He suggested that those who wished to appeal should use the mails to address themselves to the UN Headquarters in New York.

The World Council of Churches, World Health Organization, International Red Cross, and international Baptist groups, all of whom have had appeals addressed to them have not even acknowledged receiving them. All that the dissidents of the Soviet Union want is serious, responsible intervention at the intergovernmental level and assistance from international organizations to ensure fair, public trials and less dehumanizing labor camp conditions.

So spoke Yuri Shtein, former Soviet film director and member of the unofficial Soviet Group of Initiative for Defense of the Rights of Man in the USSR and now in exile in the West, before the Brussels Symposium on Human Rights: "I do not nourish any illusions as to the power of world public opinion and its ability to compel a government to carry out drastic changes in its domestic policies. But to restrain, to put a brake on manifestations of anti-democratic trends, to eliminate the menace of physical repression hanging over innocent victims, those are among our possibilities."

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VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN UNDERGROUND

CBS TELEVISION NETWORK
Tuesday, July 28, 1970
10:00 - 11:00 PM, EDT

With CBS NEWS Correspondents Harry Reasoner and William Cole

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Perry Wolff

REASONER: Good evening. You are about to see some extraordinary films. They are interviews with three Russians, filmed in Russia, about their dissatisfaction and dissent, and there is also a moving voice message, recorded in a prison camp and smuggled out.

COLE: Well, the first man you'll see is Pyotr Yakir. He's 48 years old and a dedicated Communist. He wants change from within. He has spent 13 years in concentration camps, and he is what you might call the non-titular head of the democratic movement. He was put into a camp the first time when he was 14, because he was his father's son. His father was General Jan Yakir, a very celebrated general of the Soviet Army. Stalin decided that Yakir should be shot. He was taken out of bed one night and shot.

REASONER: Yakir begins by speaking of a famous recent trial.

COLE: Yes, Pyotr believes that a change came in Russian opinion in 1966, with the illegal trials of two well-known Russian writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel.

REASONER: He also, of course, speaks in Russian, but as we listen to him, and in these other interviews, the translation will be by David Floyd, of the London Telegraph, an expert on Soviet affairs. Let's listen to Mr. Yakir.

YAKIR: (Speaks in Russian)

FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): The most important turning point in the way people are thinking was when Daniel and Sinyavsky were arrested. Many educated people thought Daniel and Sinyavsky had done wrong by sending their writings abroad, and following their trial and after Samizdat - Samizdat refers to the system by which people simply reproduce and pass from hand to hand various writings - published the first speeches of Daniel and Sinyavsky, there came about a striking change, because both Sinyavsky and Daniel spoke about what they thought. They had written down what they believed, and didn't consider themselves guilty. And many people began to think: really, why should people be tried for their convictions? Why, simply for what he thinks, does a man have to be arrested? It was very similar to Stalin times, when people were sent to prison not even for what they thought, but for what they were thought to believe, and had not said to anybody, but it had somehow been proved that they were dissenters. So from that time on there were protests.

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And then there was the trial of Galanskov and Ginzburg, and that was the time of the greatest enthusiasm, because firstly a great many people protested against the fact that the trial was held illegally and behind closed doors. During the trial the situation changed a great deal. Whereas during the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel it had been impossible to approach foreign correspondents - the vigilantes would take people straight off to the police - at the Moscow City Court we all discussed the affair with the correspondents. True, they wouldn't let us in anywhere, but a certain contact was established, and everything we learned we passed on immediately to the correspondents. The trial ended, and against it there were a great many protests. More than 2,000 people put their names to various letters of protest against conviction of people for their beliefs. Sometime - about the same time, during the trial, Larissa Daniel and Pavel Litvinov handed correspondents a protest against the trial and appealing to world public opinion. That was the first, major step, which was a breach with all previous traditions. Never before in Russia had there been a case of people appealing to the West with a protest against unlawfulness in our country.

This is a great stride forward compared with Stalinism. Under Stalin there was always an iron curtain, and no one knew what was going on here. Millions of people were destroyed and nobody knew about it. Now we're trying to publicize every arrest, every dismissal. This we consider our main function - that is, informing people about what is going on and of those illegal acts. We consider this the main task of the day.

Here is what I think. We are all being arrested - those who took part in the democratic movement - but that's not the point. We are apparently being arrested because it doesn't suit the authorities to have people about who criticize them. But there's no going back. If we're not here there'll be others; there are already many of us, many young people, and no independent thinking people in the Soviet Union will go back to what used to be. They'll beat us and they'll kill us. All the same people will go on thinking differently.

CPYRGHT

THE NATION, Bangkok
25 December 1972

'IF THEY BEAT ME, I WILL SAY ANYTHING..'

By Alice Somerfield

REPORTS FROM MOSCOW suggest that a spectacular show trial may be in preparation, and that the principal exhibit and star witness will be Pyotr Yakir, one of the most prominent of all the Soviet Union's small band of dissident intellectuals. What is one to make of this rumour, and what does it indicate about the Soviet authorities' intentions?

Pyotr Yakir is 49 years old, a historian who worked as a librarian in the Academy of Sciences Library until his arrest in June this year. Since then his case has been investigated (Soviet law prescribes a maximum of nine months pre-trial investigation). At his arrest it was reported that he would be charged under article 70 of the Soviet Criminal Code, which covers anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and can carry a sentence of up to seven years in prison and five years exile.

Vladimir Bukovsky, whose case was reported earlier this year, received the maximum sentence under the same article. Appeals which contrasted the treatment of Yakir with that accorded to Angela Davis in the United States asked for him to be released on bail, but were rejected. Now rumours are rife that Yakir has been persuaded by his interrogators to confess to his guilt and help them in their investigations of the whole underground movement. With this information they apparently propose to mount a spectacular trial of dissidents.

Interrogation methods in the USSR are reasonably well-documented and although they can involve physical violence, do not necessarily do so. Yakir's own vivid picture of the

techniques of 30 years ago in his book, *My Childhood in Prison*, is confirmed by other accounts. Yakir is the son of General Iona Yakir who was purged and shot under Stalin in 1937. Pyotr Yakir, then 14 years old, and the rest of his family, were imprisoned after the fashion of the times for the crime of being related to an "enemy of the people." He spent 17 years in prisons and camps of various types under Stalin, and was finally released only after Stalin's death. Rehabilitation of both father and son followed, but the spectre of Stalinism has haunted Yakir ever since, and was the driving force behind his participation in numerous protests and appeals in recent years. These have included appeals to the United Nations commission on Human Rights, concerning the infringements of civil rights in the USSR, appeals to international Soviet Communist Party conferences, as well as letters to Soviet leaders and official bodies of all kinds concerning individual cases of injustice.

RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH

In 1969 Yakir and a number of like-thinking people, including Vladimir Bukovsky, the historian Andrei Amalrik and

banevskaya, founded the Action Group for the Defence of Civil Rights. It is not illegal under the Soviet constitution to found groups of this nature, but from the first it was frowned on by the authorities. Yakir insisted that he was not interested in forming underground organisations, as he believed in openly claiming the right to free speech, which, incidentally, is also guaranteed under the Soviet constitution.

Recently the trials of Bukovsky and of other dissidents less well known in the West have indicated that the Soviet authorities were making great efforts to silence the small group of dissidents. In 1970 Yakir could tell an American journalist, William Cole, that it did not matter if he and the others were arrested, as there were many more to carry on where they left off. Since then, however, the ranks of the dissidents have been sadly thinned. In an interview with a Western journalist this month the distinguished Soviet physicist, Academician Andrei Sakharov—himself a prominent member of the dissident movement—said that it had never been in worse straits. The impact of the movement is, in any case, largely moral—as dissidents exercise no direct political power.

It must have come as a particular blow, therefore, to liberal-minded Soviet citizens to learn that Yakir had cracked under interrogation and is now co-operating with his accusers. In poor

health and a heavy drinker before his arrest, the pressures may just have been too great. It was one of the more grotesque aspects of the Stalin period that apparently sane and intelligent people were brought to confess the most extraordinary crimes in court. It seems that Yakir is likely to do something similar. He has reportedly been convinced by his interrogators that, as a Marxist, he should not have tolerated the non-Marxist aspects of the civil rights movement in the USSR. He has confessed his guilt and has supplied a great deal of information about the movement.

Before leaping to any conclusions about this news, however, it is worth recalling what the British journalist David Bonavia wrote from Moscow at the time of Yakir's arrest last June, reporting a conversation they had had in the Soviet capital:

"These are Mr Yakir's words as accurately as I can remember them. 'If they beat me, I will say anything—I know that from my former experience in the camps. But you will know it will not be the real me speaking. Another thing, I shall never in any circumstances commit suicide. So you will know that if they say I have done away with myself, someone else will have done me in. Remember one thing: in this country it is progress when they put people in labour camps and psychiatric hospitals and prisons. It is progress because they are not shot.'

Nonetheless, many Union must be wonder- turn to some features of himself did his utmost to
 people in the Soviet ing if the Yakir case the Stalinism which he oppose.
 does not indicate a re-

DIE WELT, Hamburg
 6 December 1972

CPYRGHT

THE YAKIR CASE AND THE LONDON 'OBSERVER'

by Cornelia Gerstenmaier

It is one of the practices of the Soviet security service, the KGB, to circulate certain false reports, and to launch them in the Western press. In this column would come such things as the report in the illustrated Stern, which 2 years ago published an "Exclusive Interview" with an alleged aunt of Nobel prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In it, the aunt had said negative things about her nephew. The aunt's statements proved to be false, but Stern had done Solzhenitsyn's notorious enemies a service.

Behind Stern was the "Novosti" news service, which had provided the "aunt" and other "information." This was no isolated case, for "Novosti" is a purposeful and energetic institution, which is generally known, to be a branch of the KGB.

It is all the more amazing that many foreign correspondents are taken in again and again by the strange news arrangements of the agency. Western reporters seem now to have been taken in again by the KGB's pointed false reports. This time it is in connection with the coming trial of Pyotr Yakir, the prominent civil rights advocate.

Yakir was arrested on 21 June; this was surprising neither to himself nor to his friends. For years, Yakir has been considered the protagonist of anti-Stalinism, who fought like Bukovskiy and others for the realization of human rights in his country. Yakir is the son of the famous General Yona Yakir, who was shot in 1937 on Stalin's orders. According to the illegal principle of "arrest of kin," the son -- a child of 14 years -- was also put in prison. He describes the first part of the following 17 years which he had to spend in concentration camps in a moving book, which appeared in a German translation a few months ago. (Peter Yakir: Kindheit in Gefangenschaft, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1972, 187 pages). Like many other books on this theme, Yakir's report is written decidedly laconically, moderately, and it is just this dry mode of reporting which allows what is described to unfold plastically before the reader, like a film.

In 1956, Pyotr Yakir was officially rehabilitated. A little later, his executed father was also reaccepted in the ranks of respected heroes by party resolution. The son received a post as a scientific worker at the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences. He lost this work in 1969, not least because he warned publicly against a revival of Stalinism.

Pyotr Yakir had become one of the most courageous spokes-
men of the young "democratic movement." But while his friends and comrades of like mind disappeared in the prisons one after another, the officials hesitated to arrest Yakir. He was protected at first by his own and his father's fate; the historic guilt of the regime connected with it disconcerted even the authorities.

After repeated house searches and massive threats ("we'll put an end to you in every imaginable way"), finally Yakir too was arrested. His will be perhaps the most important political trial since Stalin. Yakir's wife, Valentina Savenkova, was told by the KGB that the investigation could possibly take up to a year; that is, more than the legal limit. On 13 November, Valentina Savenkova was also arrested. Nothing is known of her present fate. The assumption is, that they hope to put pressure on her husband through her imprisonment.

Apparently the authorities think that they have now found a way out of the embarrassing "Yakir case." Referring to Moscow dissident circles, the London Observer recently reported that Yakir had "recanted," and in addition had given the investigation commission material against other members of the opposition. The correspondent from the Observer comes to the astounding observation that Yakir "as a Marxist," could not "sanction the non-Marxist aspects of the civil rights movement." The reporter expects that Yakir will be the chief witness "in a trial" of other dissidents.

Many a reader of the Times will perhaps remember that Yakir, shortly before his arrest, had commented on this to David Bonavia, the Moscow correspondent from the Times who was later expelled, as follows: "If they beat me, I will tell all. I know this from my previous experience in camps. But you will know that it is not the real me who is speaking then..."

More likely, however, the Observer report is a fabricated KGB report. One like it was also circulated immediately after Yakir's arrest, as Western news services reported that Pyotr Yakir had been arrested for "unconstitutional activity." (This version was exactly contrary to the actual facts, since Yakir was finally arrested for demanding observance of the constitution.) At that time the Western press also referred to Soviet dissident circles. Actually, however, official sources ("Novosti"?) had informed foreign correspondents of the arrest of the civil rights advocate, and had added that fictitious justification.

A report which the BBC recently announced in connection with the Yakir case seems even more contestable. There too, with reference to "reliable sources," it was said that Yakir had "given way" under investigation. At the same time, it was learned that Yakir had to count on 4 years in prison, and in the event that the famous Samisdat periodical "Chronicle of Current Events" continued to appear, he would be sentenced to another year of prison for every issue which came out.

This seems to completely confirm the are purely KGB special reports. The "Chronicle of Current Events," the news organ of the "democratic movement," is already in its fifth year, and the authorities have yet to succeed in eliminating the bimonthly publication. Numerous people have been arrested in connection with the "Chronicle," which is published anonymously, and the 27th issue has nonetheless just appeared, although considerably late. If Yakir is now to pay for the continuation of the magazine with his freedom -- and this could mean with his life -- then behind this is an attempt to place moral pressure on the publishers of the magazine, after other means have failed.

It would be conceivable that the authorities will thus succeed in suppressing the most impressive Samisdat product, and in robbing the "democratic movement" of its most important means of communication at the present time. What is sure is that a defeat exacted in this way would not be to Yakir's liking, for he and his friends have gone their way ready -- if necessary -- to pay a high price.

CPYRGHT

Der Fall Jakir und der „Observer“

CPYRGHT

Lancierte Meldungen sollen den Bürgerrechtler diffamieren

Eigenbericht der WELT
Hamburg, 8. Dezember

Es gehört zu den Praktiken des sowjetischen Sicherheitsdienstes KGB, gezielte Falschmeldungen in Umlauf zu setzen und diese in die westliche Presse zu lancieren. In diese Rubrik fiel zum Beispiel ein Bericht der Illustrierten „Stern“, die vor zwei Jahren ein „Exklusiv-Interview“ mit einer angeblichen Tante des Nobel-Preissträgers Alexander Soltschenizyn gebracht hatte. Darin hatte die Tante Nachteiliges über ihren Neffen gesagt. Die Angaben der Tante erwiesen sich als falsch, der „Stern“ jedoch hatte Soltschenizyns notorischen Feinden einen Dienst erwiesen.

Hinter dem „Stern“ hatte das sowjetische Nachrichtenbüro „Nowosti“ gestanden, das die „Tante“ und andere „Informationen“ zur Verfügung gestellt hatte. Dies ist kein Einzelfall, denn „Nowosti“ ist eine ebenso zielbewußte wie tatkräftige Institution, die allgemein als Zweigstelle des KGB bekannt ist.

Um so erstaunlicher ist es, daß viele Auslands-Korrespondenten immer wieder auf die seltsamen Nachrichtenarrangements der Agentur hereinfliegen. Erneut scheinen jetzt westliche Berichterstatter gezielten Falschmeldungen des KGB aufgesessen zu sein. Diesmal im Zusammenhang mit dem bevorstehenden Prozeß gegen den prominenten Bürgerrechtler Pjotr Jakir.

Jakir war am 21. Juni verhaftet worden; für ihn selbst und für seine

Freunde nicht überraschend. Denn seit Jahren gilt Jakir als der Protagonist des Anti-Stalinismus, der wie Bukowkij und andere nachdrücklich für die Verwirklichung der Menschenrechte in seinem Land gekämpft hat. Jakir ist der Sohn des berühmten Generals Jona Jakir, der 1937 auf Befehl Stalins erschossen wurde. Nach dem ungesetzlichen Prinzip der

„Sippenhaft“ kam damals auch der Sohn — ein Kind von 14 Jahren — ins Gefängnis. Den ersten Abschnitt der folgenden 17 Jahre, die Pjotr Jakir in Konzentrationslagern verbringen mußte, schildert er in einem ergreifenden Buch, das vor einigen Monaten auch in deutscher Übersetzung erschienen ist. (Peter Jakir: „Kindheit in Gefangenschaft“, Insel-Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1972, 187 Seiten). Wie viele andere Bücher zu diesem Thema, ist Jakirs Bericht betont lakonisch, nüchtern geschrieben und es ist gerade diese trockene Art der Berichterstattung, die das Geschilderte wie einen Film ganz plastisch vor dem Leser abrollen läßt.

1956 wurde Pjotr Jakir offiziell rehabilitiert. Wenig später wurde durch Parteibeschluß auch sein exekutierter Vater wieder in die Reihen der verehrungswürdigen Helden aufgenommen. Der Sohn erhielt einen Posten als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Historischen Institut der Akademie der Wissenschaften. Diese Arbeit verlor er 1969, nicht zuletzt, weil er öffentlich vor einem Wiederaufleben des Stalinismus gewarnt hatte.

Pjotr Jakir war zu einem der mutigsten Wortführer der jungen „demokratischen Bewegung“ geworden. Aber während seine Freunde und Gesinnungsgenossen nacheinander in den Gefängnissen verschwanden, zögerten die Behörden, Jakir zu verhaften. Ihn schützte zunächst sein eigenes und des Vaters Schicksal; die damit verbundene historische Schuld des Regimes machte wohl selbst die Machthaber befangen.

Nach wiederholten Hausdurchsuchungen und massiven Drohungen („Mit Ihnen werden wir auf jede erdenkliche Weise Schluß machen“) wurde schließlich auch Jakir verhaftet. Seine Verhandlung wird der vielleicht wichtigste politische Prozeß seit Stalin sein. Jakirs Frau, Valentina Sawenkowa, wurde vom KGB mitgeteilt, die Untersuchung werde möglicherweise bis zu einem Jahr dauern, also das gesetzlich festgesetzte Höchstmaß überschreiten. Am 13. November wurde auch Valentina Sawenkowa verhaftet. Über ihr derzeitiges Schicksal ist nichts bekannt. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, daß man mit ihrer Inhaftierung ihren Mann unter Druck zu setzen sucht.

Offenbar glauben die Behörden, jetzt einen Ausweg aus dem für sie peinlichen „Fall Jakir“ gefunden zu haben. Unter Berufung auf Moskauer Dissidentenkreise berichtete soeben der in London erscheinende „Observer“, Jakir habe „widerrufen“, überdies habe er der Untersuchungskommission Belastungsmaterial über andere Oppositionelle zu Verfügung gestellt. Der Korrespondent

CPYRGHT

des „Observer“ kommt zu der erstaunlichen Begründung, daß Jakir als „Marxist die nichtmarxistischen Aspekte der Bürgerrechtsbewegung nicht billigen“ könne. Der Berichterstatter erwartet, daß Jakir „bei einem Prozeß“ als Kronzeuge gegen andere Dissidenten vorgeführt werden wird.

Mancher Leser der „Times“ wird sich vielleicht erinnern, daß Jakir kurz vor seiner Verhaftung im Hinblick auf diese dem wenig später ausgewiesenen Moskauer Korrespondenten der „Times“, David Bonavia, Folgendes gesagt hatte: „Wenn sie mich schlagen, werde ich alles sagen. Ich kenne das aus meiner früheren Lagererfahrung. Aber Sie werden wissen, daß dann nicht mein wirkliches Ich spricht ...“

Wahrscheinlicher ist allerdings, daß bei dem „Observer“-Bericht eine fabrizierte Zweckmeldung des KGB vorliegt. Eine solche war auch unmittelbar nach Jakirs Verhaftung in Umlauf gebracht worden, als westliche Nachrichtendienste meldeten, Pjotr Jakir sei wegen „verfassungswidriger Tätigkeit“ verhaftet worden. (Diese Version stand in genauem Gegensatz zum eigentlichen

Sachverhalt, denn Jakir war letztlich verhaftet worden, weil er die Einhaltung der Verfassung gefordert hatte). Auch damals hatte sich die westliche Presse auf sowjetische Dissidentenkreise berufen. Tatsächlich hatten aber offizielle Quellen („Nowosti“?) ausländische Korrespondenten über die Verhaftung des Bürgerrechtlers informiert und jene fingierte Begründung hinzugefügt.

Noch anfechtbarer als der Bericht des „Observer“ erscheint eine Meldung, die kürzlich die BBC im Zusammenhang mit dem Fall Jakir verbreitete. Auch dort hieß es unter Berufung auf „zuverlässige Quellen“, Jakir sei in der Untersuchungshaft „umgefallen“. Gleichzeitig sei in Erfahrung gebracht worden, daß Jakir mit vier Jahren Haft zu rechnen habe, und daß er — im Fall, daß das berühmte Samisdat-Periodikum „Chronik der laufenden Ereignisse“ weiterhin erscheine, für jede Nummer, die noch herauskomme, zu einem weiteren Jahr Freiheitsentzug verurteilt werde.

Dies behämt den Verdacht, daß man es hier mit reinen Zweckmeldungen des KGB zu tun hat, vollens zu bestätigen. Die „Chronik der laufenden Ereignisse“,

das Nachrichtenorgan der „demokratischen Bewegung“, erscheint nun bereits im fünften Jahr, ohne daß es den Behörden gelungen wäre, die Zwangsmaßnahmen auszuschalten. Zahlreiche Personen sind im Zusammenhang mit der anonym erscheinenden „Chronik“ verhaftet worden, dennoch ist soeben, wenn auch mit erheblicher Verspätung, die 27. Nummer erschienen. Wenn jetzt Jakir mit seiner Freiheit — und das heißt unter Umständen mit seinen Leben — für den Fortbestand der Zeitschrift zahlen soll, dann steht dahinter der Versuch, auf die Herausgeber der Zeitschrift moralischen Druck auszuüben, nachdem andere Mittel versagt haben.

Es wäre denkbar, daß es damit den Behörden gelingt, das eindrucksvollste Produkt des Samisdat zu unterdrücken und die „demokratische Bewegung“ ihres zur Zeit wichtigsten Kommunikationsmittels zu berauben. Fest steht, daß eine solche erprobte Niederlage nicht im Sinn Jakirs wäre, denn er und seine Freunde haben ihren Weg beschriften in der Bereitschaft dafür — wenn nötig — auch einen hohen Preis zu zahlen.

WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1972

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Dissident Said to Aid KGB

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Dec. 2—Pyotr I. Yakir, a prominent Soviet dissident arrested last June, is cooperating with Soviet authorities and providing information about former colleagues, according to reports circulating in reliable dissident circles here.

Yakir's help has kept busy more than a dozen representatives of the secret police (KGB), who have been following up leads he has provided, the sources report. At least 25 people in Moscow and other cities have been called in by the secret police as a result of Yakir's statements, the sources said.

Apparently, none of these people has been arrested. The sources said they had no idea what might be the ultimate consequence of the affair.

Before his arrest in June, Yakir, 49, was probably the single most active member of Moscow's tiny dissident community, circulating documents and promoting the dissidents' causes. He had many acquaintances among the dissidents' correspondents here, and was a

source of much information about the dissident movement.

He was also an extremely heavy drinker, presumably an alcoholic. He told the correspondent of the London Times in Moscow last winter that he didn't know what he might confess to if he was ever arrested.

"If they beat me I will say anything," he told David Bonavia, the Times correspondent who has since been expelled from Moscow by Soviet authorities. "I know that from my former experience in the camps. But you will know it will not be the real me speaking."

According to one report circulating here, the deprivation of alcohol in prison forced Yakir into prison hospitals twice. After the second hospitalization, it is said, he began cooperating with the KGB.

Some of those questioned by police because of Yakir's statements have met the former dissident in personal, officially-supervised confrontations, according to dissident sources. In such confrontations, the sources said, Yakir says that it would be best to

admit what went on in the past, and that he now sees the errors of his ways.

In one session with an outsider, Yakir reportedly said he realized that he had gone too far in his dissident activities by establishing connections with emigre groups in the West, the sources said.

Some of the people called to the KGB because of Yakir's statements hold official jobs in academic institutes and elsewhere, dissident sources reported. Several had known Yakir some years ago, but had not seen him in a long time, the sources said.

According to these sources, Yakir is also telling the authorities about his contacts with foreign correspondents.

Many of Yakir's activities are undoubtedly well-known to the police, who have been monitoring his activities for years. Before he was arrested, many dissident intellectuals refused to have any dealings with him, because they thought this was unsafe.

Yakir is the only Soviet dissident with a name that is widely known inside the country. His father, Gen. Iona

Yakir, was a hero of the Russian Civil War and member of the Communist Party Central Committee. He was killed in Stalin's purges in 1937.

Yakir and his mother were sent to prison camp at that time. He stayed inside for 17 years. The whole family was rehabilitated by Nikita S. Khrushchev.

The younger Yakir has written a book about his youth in prison camps. It was published last month in London.

The charges against Yakir have not been publicly stated. Dissidents assume he will be charged with anti-Soviet activities. An unofficial report circulating at the time of his arrest said he would be accused of systematically providing anti-Soviet material to foreign propaganda agencies.

BALTIMORE SUN
23 December 1972

CPYRGHT

Soviet informer reports doubted

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A rumor that the one-time head of the Soviet dissident community is collaborating with the authorities is a bit of misinformation skillfully planted by the secret police, in the view of recent Soviet emigres who maintain ties with Moscow.

According to the emigres, the account of Pyotr Yakir's alleged co-operation with the secret police probably was spread by a dissident who was attempting to ingratiate himself with the authorities in order to get an exit visa.

Moscow call transcripts

They base their theory on telephone calls they made recently from New York to members within the dissident community in Moscow. They made transcripts of the conversations.

The transcripts do not conclusively establish the source of the rumors—a difficult task any place and an almost impossible one in the context of Moscow's nervous and instinctively secretive underground—

but coming as they do from two highly trustworthy Moscow sources, they do give reason to question the reliability of the earlier rumors about Mr. Yakir.

Mr. Yakir, the 49-year-old son of a high Soviet Army General executed during Josef J. Stalin's purges, was arrested last June, presumably to be tried on charges of anti-Soviet agitation. Early this month some Western newsmen—one quoting "reports circulating in reliable dissident circles"—reported that Mr. Yakir had given evidence against dozens of his old friends.

25 reported called in

At least 25 former associates of Mr. Yakir were reported to have been called in for interrogation by the police on the basis of information he gave. He was reported to be present personally at some of the sessions, apparently to challenge his friends' denials of the charges against them. He was quoted as having told his daughter, Irina, at a meeting in prison that materials published by the dissidents had been used by "anti-Soviet" forces abroad.

Several things about the rumors struck people who had known Mr. Yakir as particularly strange. He is a man with a sense of strong personal loyalties, not the type to needlessly endanger friends. The remarks attributed to him were not in keeping with his

perce belief in the need for free and open discussion of all issues.

Psychological blow

Strangest of all was the question of how the rumors originated. Even if there were any truth to them, what member of the democratic movement would spread the damaging news, particularly to the Western press?

The rumors about Mr. Yakir, one of the most active and most respected members of the movement, were a major new psychological blow to a group already decimated by prison sentences and exile to the West. That was the aim, the emigres argue, and the rumor was a bit of clever psychological warfare against the dissidents.

In one of the telephone conversations, as reported by the emigres, the Moscow source called "nonsense" the report that 25 people had been summoned because of Mr. Yakir. The source said that "without the slightest doubt" only three persons had been called in—Mr. Yakir's daughter, another woman close to the dissidents, and a man called Dubrov.

"Weasels and lies"

It is Mr. Dubrov, the emigres, think, who is the source of the stories about Mr. Yakir. The Moscow source said Mr. Dubrov "weasels and lies—each time he tells a different story."

The source said Mr. Dubrov once had permission to leave the country, but that it was rescinded by the authorities. He then was used by the police in an effort to discredit Mr. Yakir, the source suggested.

The second telephone conversation was with Zinaida Grigorenko, the wife of former Red Army Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko, who before his incarceration had preceded Mr. Yakir as de facto leader of the dissidents. "I think it is advantageous to someone to spread these absurd rumors," she was quoted as saying. "The investigation has not even finished, how could anyone know anything?"

Mrs. Grigorenko, a close friend of the Yakir family, described the meeting between Mr. Yakir and his daughter as a simple visit between father and daughter, having nothing to do with the investigation or politics. Irina was eight months pregnant at the time and ill. "At that meeting," Mrs. Grigorenko said, "all he said was, 'My daughter, have the baby and live a peaceful life now.'"

LOS ANGELES TIMES
21 January 1973

CPYRGHT

A MAN BOWS, ENDING A CHAPTER OF SOVIET DISSIDENCE

He is a short, thick-bodied man with a bush of dark hair. In his heavy face the eyes are vigilant and grave. He is the protagonist in one of the most wretched and unexpected episodes in the history of the little band of Russian dissidents, for Pyotr Ionovich Yakir is said to have collapsed during his arrest and turned state's evidence against those who were his friends.

*

Yakir's whole life has been a succession of personal and political

tragedies. He is the son of Gen. Iona Yakir, one of the army leaders who was shot in Stalin's purge of senior officers in 1937. Pyotr Ionovich himself then spent 16 of the first 30 years of his life in labor camps, and was released and rehabilitated by Khrushchev in 1951.

He is of Jewish origin, but refused to contemplate becoming a Zionist or applying to emigrate to Israel. Instead he has been one of the most formidable and courageous of those who have agitated for the application of civil rights officially guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.

He signed letters of protest, petitioned the party congress against what he called the creeping installation of neo-Stalinism and, while working at the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, maintained many contacts with Western journalists in Moscow.

After joining the Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights, Yakir was expelled from the Communist Party and lost his post, retaining only the job of librarian at the academy. Last year, the KGB, after long and unexplained hesitation, si-

nally began a serious campaign to root out the dissenters, and in particular to find and close the various underground *samizdat* publications which were finding their way to the West.

Yakir's flat was searched in January last year, and again in May, and he was eventually arrested in June to be charged with "anticonstitutional behavior." Early in December it became gradually known in Moscow that Yakir had apparently cracked up in confinement and was making statements incriminating those he had worked with.

There are various reports about what has happened. It is said that some 25 persons have been interrogated on the basis of his statements, including old colleagues from the Historical Institute. Several have been confronted with him in prison.

The most detailed report comes from Mrs. Adel Naidenovich, whose husband had been producing an underground publication called VYECII. Shortly before Christmas she was taken to the Lefortovo prison for two days of interrogation, and on the second day found herself facing Yakir with several interrogators, headed by a Maj. Kislich.

She found Yakir looking plump, pink and unusually healthy, but with a "glazed look" about the eyes.

Without any sign of embarrassment, Yakir proceeded to make a statement about his clandestine work with Mrs. Naidenovich and her husband. Maj. Kislich, smiling to himself, took it all down.

Mrs. Naidenovich could contain her horror no longer. She asked Yakir—according to her own version—how he could go on living "when you have trampled on our banner and dishonored our ideal." She added: "I would rather kill myself."

One of the interrogating officers observed: "Go ahead. Who needs you?" Yakir seems to have said nothing more.

★

It now seems possible that Yakir will be produced as a state witness in trials against selected dissidents. His former friends speculate desperately on his motives. Some suggest that he has been given drugs, others that he has been given alcohol --Yakir was a powerful drinker—has broken him physically.

One version has him telling his wife, when she visited Lefortovo, that although he still stood by the principles of the civil rights movement, he had come to understand that it was being used by anti-Soviet forces abroad to harm his country.

(This is unconvincing: He told an American reporter in 1971 that "we" deliberately used Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corp.

to act as a sort of megaphone relaying the civil rights message back to a much larger audience in the Soviet Union than the dissenters themselves could reach.)

More significantly, he did warn a Western journalist recently that "if they beat me I will say anything . . . but it will not be the real me speaking."

All Europeans have learned in the last 30 years that there is just so much which one man can take in his own lifetime. Even in Soviet terms, Pyotr Yakir has had more than most.

Whatever has happened to him, his collapse confirms the growing impression abroad that the present wave of dissidence in the Soviet Union is coming to its end, worn down by the combination of intensified repression and—it must be said—almost total lack of success in communicating with the masses. But the general conditions which produced it—the contradiction between a nervously restrictive regime and a steadily more restless and ambitious white-collar intelligentsia, in a society which increasingly needs the fruits of their inventiveness—these remain.

In that sense the Yakir affair probably marks only the end of a chapter.

SUNDAY NEW YORK TIMES
26 November 1972

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Vital witness

AMONG the twelve political prisoners chosen by Amnesty International as their "Prisoners of Conscience" last week was the name of Pyotr Ionovitch Yakir. Arrested on June 21 this year, Yakir is still "under interrogation" in Moscow's Lefortovo prison. This brutal century has taught us what those words mean. In a message to the West Yakir has said that if he "confesses" it will be the result of torture; if he is reported as committing suicide, it will in fact be murder.

Yakir's present crime is his continuing refusal to heed KGB warnings to keep his mouth shut on civil rights issues. His crime when he was first arrested was that at the age of 57, he was that of being the son of his father. Army

A CHILDHOOD IN PRISON by Pyotr Yakir, edited and introduced by Robert Conquest/Macmillan £2.50

THE MAN DIED by Wole Soyinka Rex Collings £3.50 pp 315

JEREMY BROOKS

Commander Ion Yakir was a hero of the Revolution, and one of the most powerful and respected figures in the Red Army. He was arrested and shot in June 1937, on charges fabricated with the aid of the German secret police, at an early stage in Stalin's lunatic purge of the Red Army. His wife, exiled immediately after her husband's arrest, disappeared into the detainees' camps, never to be heard of again. His son, Pyotr Yakir, was charged with forming and training a band of Anarchist cavalry "to be active behind the lines of the Red Army in the event of war"—a fantasy based upon young Pyotr's fondness for catching and riding the horses which grazed the Kalmyk steppes. This particular charge was eventually abandoned—too ridiculous, perhaps, for even the NKVD to live with—and instead Yakir was sentenced to five years in the Gulag.

A Childhood in Prison is Pyotr Yakir's account of those years.

The litany of miseries to which he was subjected—beatings, torture, the bestialities and sufferings of other prisoners, attempts to escape and subsequent punishment, the desperate expedient of hunger strikes against gross injustice—have by now become all too hideously familiar in the literature of twentieth century tyrannies. What is special about Yakir's recounting of his experiences is not in the events themselves but in his attitude towards them. There is no dramatisation, no emotionalism. Facts are recounted as facts, with no attempt to place a value structure around them, but with an attention to vivid detail which insists that we store away these facts as treasured clues to some yet-to-be-revealed truth.

"Imagine," said a camp doctor to the young Yakir, after treating his frost-bitten feet, "that you're part of an expedition which is going to the South Poles. Try to grasp the meaning of people's actions, observe and try to make sense of it all." Yakir lived by

this credo throughout the rest of his term, and undoubtedly the attitude contributed to his survival then, as it contributes to his cool and somehow inspiring objectivity in this book.

The book ends with his release in 1942; but, as Robert Conquest tells us in a lucid and informative introduction, "it was only in 1934 that he emerged from the grip of the NKVD . . . the fate of his family, his own experiences, the facts which he had learned in labour camps, left him a determined opponent of what Pasternak calls 'the inhuman power of the lie.'" It is for that opposition that Pyotr Yakir is once more in prison, and the lie-machine is busy devising a new detachment of "Anarchist cavalry."

WOLE SOYINKA is also a witness, and a very formidable one, against the power of the lie. An opponent both of Biafra's attempted secession from the Nigerian Federation, and of General Gowon's military "solution," Soyinka was imprisoned soon after the beginning of the Nigerian civil war. The original charge against him—that of espionage for the Biafran leader Ojukwu—could never have been made to stick in the courts, and Soyinka was not brought to trial.

But the public lie was sufficient excuse, in Gowon's military dictatorship, to keep him safely confined and, they hoped, silenced.

An ingenious plot to have him "shot while escaping" was foiled by Soyinka's own prison-sharpened wits, and thereafter he was kept, largely in solitary confinement, in a maximum security prison. But even from here he was able to smuggle in and out, by means which even now he dare not reveal, the books between whose printed lines much of *The Man Died* was written.

Lies make Soyinka very angry, his determination to nail them is an objective passion. Being a dramatist and a poet, he dramatizes both the causes of his anger and their effect upon his own prison-induced states of mind, balancing blocks of poetic introspection against fierce and sometimes scathingly humorous observation of the way small corruptions flourish in the devil's sunshine of a large corruption. It is a courageous, eccentric, moving book, and through it there thunders—the word is not too strong—the theme to which Yakir, in his drier way, is also a witness: "the man dies who keeps silent in the face of tyranny."

WASHINGTON POST
28 June 1972

KGB Harasses, Then Arrests Russian Liberal
The Yakir Case: Dissent vs. Authority

CPYRGHT

By Anthony Astrachan

PYOTR IONAVICH YAKIR, for years one of the best-known members of the tiny Moscow dissident community, used to say that the chief prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Secret Police had warned him three times that only respect for the memory of his father had kept them from arresting him for anti-Soviet activity.

"They did not explain," Yakir wrote last year in an open letter to the Presidium of the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, "why anti-Stalinism is equated with anti-Sovietism. Until now the difference between these things has been clear to me, and I tried with all my strength to underline this difference—prompted precisely by respect for my father's memory."

Yakir's father was Army Commander Iona Yakir, whom Stalin executed in 1937 as part of his purge of Red Army leaders. Judging by photographs and the recollections of those who knew him, Iona Yakir was the model revolutionary portrayed in Soviet propaganda of that era—youthful, brisk but warm, with the eyes of an idealist and the hands of a practical man.

The son of a Jewish pharmacist in Kishinev, the elder Yakir organized a Bolshevik guerrilla band in the Ukraine when the revolution broke out. He was then 21. Three years later he was commanding an army group in the Bolsheviks' war against the Poles. In 1926, he became commander of the important Ukrainian military district. When Stalin had him killed at the age of 41, Yakir was genuinely popular in the Ukraine—where streets are named after him today in Kharkov and Kiev—and was the only professional soldier on the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the true focus of power in the Soviet Union.

Pyotr Yakir, then 14, and his mother went into prison camps when his father was executed, as did the families of many purge victims. She was later "liquidated": He stayed in camp for 17 years. That record, as

well as his father's memory, made foreign correspondents in Moscow believe that the authorities, although they harassed him, would be reluctant to arrest Yakir despite his frequent protests against injustice in the Soviet Union—and despite his open activity in keeping the world informed of those injustices.

The authorities have overcome their reluctance. On June 21, the KGB arrested Yakir, now 49, on charges under Article 70 of the Russian Republic Criminal Code, which prohibits "agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime or in order to commit particularly dangerous crimes against the state, [or] the dissemination for the said purposes of slanderous inventions defamatory to the Soviet political and social system."

The penalties are up to seven years in prison and up to five years' exile. "Exile" in this sense has meant exile from the place of residence since the Stalin era, but Soviet sources have been hinting that the Kremlin might revive exile to foreign lands as a treatment for dissenters.

Leon Trotsky was the last Soviet oppositionist to be physically deported against his will, but a number of dissidents have recently been allowed to leave under cover of the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. The poet Iosif Brodsky was recently told to emigrate or expect a prison sentence. Yakir told an American caller a few days before his arrest that he had received an invitation to Israel from people he did not know, but that he would never use it.

The foreign observer is often bewildered that the Soviet authorities should go to such lengths to repress dissenters who are unlikely ever to change the Soviet system—because they are so few, so disunited, so atypical of the Soviet people. But they keep the possibility of change alive, and that alone seems to be more than the Soviet leaders can stand.

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Yakir saw his prime function as spreading information. In 1970, he and other dissidents gathered in the Moscow woods so CBS correspondent William Cole could film them. He told Cole, "Under Stalin, there was always an Iron Curtain and no one knew what was going on here. Millions of people were destroyed and nobody knew anything about it. Now we try to publicize every arrest, every dismissal. We see in this our most important role—that of informing people about what is going on in our country and about those illegal acts."

Yakir knew that when he and his friends told Western correspondents about events like the forcible confinement of the biologist Zhores Medvedev in a psychiatric clinic, their stories would soon be broadcast back to the Soviet Union in Russian by Radio Liberty, The Voice of America and the BBC. He believed that by making a return to Stalinist secrecy impossible, he was helping to make a return to Stalinist terror impossible.

Yakir's letter to the Party Congress, which was not widely reported in the West, challenged the leadership more directly.

"For the last few years a dangerous tendency toward the rebirth of Stalinist methods of government has become apparent, he wrote, "and a tendency toward the rehabilitation of Stalin himself—one of the biggest criminals of the 20th century . . ."

Yakir claimed that this alarmed "a huge, if not overwhelming part of our creative, scientific and technical intelligentsia." He said a "flood" of letters had been written to party and government offices in the previous five years expressing loyal criticisms, which the government should have answered by showing which criticisms were just and which unjust.

The only answers that came, Yakir said, were "at the best silence, and at the worst, judicial and extra-judicial repression," which he called "akin to the Stalinist anti-democratic style." He cited imprisonment of political dissenters, the confinement of others in psychiatric hospitals, demands for public confessions, demotions and losses of jobs.

"To answer criticism with persecution—

whose method is this? he asked. "Is this the way to prove one's case to fellow citizens and the world? . . . Who would think of writing to the United Nations, or appealing to world public opinion, if his own leadership gave him a convincing answer to serious questions bothering serious people?"

The Kremlin's ultimate answer to such criticism was Yakir's arrest. Since January, the authorities have been trying to suppress the underground chronicle of current events, and they may have thought Yakir was its "editor," though it has never been proven. Perhaps they blamed him for the recent samizdat (self-publishing) leaflet charging the Soviet leaders with economic sins. But in the past, Yakir has signed his names to the specific protests he made. This one was anonymous.

Many western observers believe that increasing repression may be the price that party leader Brezhnev had to pay to get hard-liners to go along with his plans to meet President Nixon at the summit despite Mr. Nixon's escalation of the war in Vietnam.

Yakir might smile at the thought that he could be the target of such reasons of state. He is a burly figure whose bravery was never questioned by either foreign or Muscovite acquaintances. He has the high specific gravity that comes from long years of "sitting," as Russians call life in prison, which showed through his explosive thought processes, his frustration at being barred from his profession as a historian, his hard drinking and his frequent hospitalization for bodily ills. But one day on a remote Moscow streetcorner, when he started to apologize for dragging me out of my way to meet someone who had not shown up, I saw an overwhelming resemblance between Yakir and Sholom Aleichem's "Tevye the Milkman," resilient in survival despite his apotheosis in "Fiddler on the Roof," smiling at the thought that the Tsar might be readying a thunderbolt for him in Anatevka.

His arrest shows there is nothing to smile about. The KGB has won the inheritance it claimed. A few years ago, one of its interrogators told Yakir, "You think that you are your father's heir? No. We are his heirs."

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NEW YORK TIMES
12 July 1971

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Dialogues between KGB and Pushkin Square demonstrators show the irony, bitterness and defiance behind Russian protests

Son of Stalin's victim warned not to 'look backwards'

From David Bonavia
Moscow, Dec 6

The KGB (Soviet Security Police) have undertaken to put an end to public protest demonstrations of the kind which took place briefly last night on Pushkin Square, in Moscow.

Dissidents who had planned the demonstration marking Soviet Constitution Day were detained by security men and told this would

be "the last December 5," and "the last Pushkin Square demonstration".

The annual demonstration became a tradition after 1965, when a group of people gathered to protest against the arrest of Andrei Sinyavski and Yuli Daniel, the Russian writers who were subsequently imprisoned and some 50 to 60 demonstrators would converge on the square at a pre-arranged moment, stand for a while

The Soviet constitution assures Soviet citizens of the right to demonstrate, but in practice only pro-government demonstrations are permitted. All others can be used as pretexts to prosecute the participants.

Interviews between dissidents and security men after the attempt at a demonstration last night provided some insight into the relationship of the KGB and its relationship with the hard-core protesters.

Mr Pyotr Yakir, regarded by the KGB as the leader of the protest movement, was shadowed all day yesterday and several times warned not to go to Pushkin Square for the demonstration usually held at 6 pm.

Mr Yakir, whose father was a senior military commander shot himself spent many years in prison camps during the Stalinist era. He has devoted much of his life to ex-

Soviet Union. But apparently because of regret felt by some people at the execution of his father, and a certain grudging respect for him personally, the KGB have tended in recent years to treat him more cautiously than some other less well-known protesters.

Two KGB men accosted him at a bus stop yesterday. According to Mr Yakir's own account, they said: "Hello, Petya (a familiar form of the name Pyotr). So everyone around you has been arrested, and you are still sitting at home, torturing yourself."

Later, after being seized and taken to a police station for trying to take part in the demonstration together with his wife and daughter, Mr Yakir was asked by a KGB official why he continued to protest. "Let us talk man to man", the official said. "Why did you have to go there today? What is it you need? Are you not happy in your work?"

Mr Yakir replied that he had been banned from working as a professional historian. "We can put that right," the KGB man said. Mr Yakir said his daughter had been expelled from her institute. "We can have her reinstated," the official replied.

Then he added: "Which way do your eyes face? Forwards or backwards? You are always looking backwards. We understand, of course. You have had a hard time. But you ought to look to the future. Everything's fine."

As the direct successors to the police organizations which carried out Stalin's purges, the KGB have a vested interest in making people "look forwards, not backwards". The fundamental point which Mr Yakir and people like him are trying to make is that there can be no true legality in the Soviet Union until past abuses of it have been exposed and understood.

At the same time, there seems to be a sense of restraint on the KGB's part, probably dictated by senior officials of the Communist Party who fear a return to the Beria terror. Arbitrary arrests, searches and political prosecutions are still carried out. But some attempt is usually made to make them conform to existing laws, and it is possible to use the country's legal system as some sort of defence, however flimsy, against KGB persecution.

One of Mr Yakir's friends, who was detained on Pushkin Square by people representing themselves as members of the "voluntary law enforcement squads" (*Druzhinniki*) protested that he had been wrongly arrested and demanded an apology. "We did not arrest you", he was told. "We invited you to come to our office for a chat." The detained man then explained that he did not want a chat, and got up to leave. Thereupon two *Druzhinniki* seized him and forced him back to his chair.

He again demanded an apology. The only answer from the disgruntled security man was: "Get out of here."

Such encounters, full of irony, bitterness and defiance, are characteristic of the relationship between the Soviet authorities and all who question the wisdom or justice of their policies.

Dispute over defence counsel for dissenter's trial

By Peter Reddaway

A dispute is developing over the defence of Mr Vladimir Bukovsky, the Moscow dissenter, whose trial on charges of alleged "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" is soon due to open.

The case is already becoming a *cause célèbre* like those of the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel in 1966 and Yuri Galanskov, the poet, and Alexander Ginsburg, the writer, in 1968.

The arrest in March of Mr Bukovsky, who is 29, has provoked protests from Soviet dissenters, which have multiplied as his period

of detention without either trial or any contact with his relatives has lengthened.

This month, nine months will have expired since his arrest, which is the maximum period of pre-trial detention permitted under Soviet law. It can be further prolonged only by a special act of the Supreme Soviet.

The present dispute, details of which have just reached the West, concerns Mr Bukovsky's insistence that he should be defended by Mrs Dina Kaminskaya, the lawyer of his choice, who in 1968 skillfully defended Mr Galanskov.

The KGB, however, are barring Mrs Kaminskaya from the case on the grounds that although a member of the Moscow Collegium of Lawyers she does not possess the "security pass" granted by the KGB to lawyers whom they trust.

This system of "passes" has no standing in Soviet law, and its application has therefore provoked strong criticism from dissenters, including the Committee for Human Rights led by Dr Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet nuclear physicist.

Mr Bukovsky's mother, Mrs Nina Bukovskaya, has now sent a

complaint to Mr Markov, the Moscow prosecutor, protesting against the KGB's attempt to force her son to accept a lawyer not of his own choice. The attempt has so far been unsuccessful.

On September 16 a group of 44 psychiatrists appealed to the Soviet authorities, in a letter to *The Times*, to deal leniently with Mr Bukovsky. Earlier this year he had sent to western psychiatrists numerous materials concerning the forced internment of Soviet dissenters in mental hospitals, including copies of six official diagnoses by Soviet psychiatrists.

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January-February 1973

ATTACKING THE PROBLEM OF DRUGS

Introduction

Latin Americans are beginning to realize that they, too have become major producers, traffickers and consumers of drugs. Sensational news accounts of arrests of important drug traffickers have obscured the dangers to Latin American governments and societies arising from increased cultivation of narcotics-producing plants and from increased traffic in drugs. Drugs have become, in fact, a subversive influence with potentially far-reaching effects: they can hinder, and in some cases even prevent, political, economic and social development, as well as jeopardizing the gains already made in these areas; they threaten the attainment of social and national goals that ultimately depend on ambitious, educated youth; and when the power structure becomes involved or is manipulated for illicit purposes, then drugs become an even more direct barrier to progress and may, in fact, become a threat to government stability. It is therefore the responsibility of all citizens to be aware of the scope of this problem and it is the specific responsibility of government and civic leaders to examine its dimensions closely, and to consider carefully the related problems of prevention, control and law enforcement.

Significance for Governments

It is openly acknowledged that traffic in drugs has corrupted elements of public authority, including customs officials, the police and the judiciary. To date, this traffic has been dealt with in the manner of traditional contraband, but the international connections and the huge sums of money involved in drug traffic add a new dimension to the problem and extend its corruptive influences still further. For it becomes apparent that not only does drug traffic on such a scale probably involve other criminal and financial elements, but also that large scale traffic requires the protection of officials at the highest levels. The result is that in the face of such powerful, combined interests, honest and dedicated officials are hampered, if not barred outright, from carrying out any serious program of prevention or control. And, on a higher level, the implications are broader and more serious because the scale of the threat and its political significance increase. Where there is corruption of any kind within a government whose higher officials are involved, the danger is that either the government will be unresponsive to the need for rooting out this corruption or, if the government takes positive action, it risks exposure of key officials and, in all likelihood, its own collapse.

Although the campaign against drugs in Latin America is scarcely two years old, there have already been serious accusations against several governments for their failure to take positive action against important drug traffickers. And as citizens become educated in this problem and begin to realize that some of their governments are influenced by international criminals and local corrupt officials, the issue will become a matter of primary political importance.

Corruption of government officials carries international repercussions for a country whose government is so involved; diplomatic officials suspected of smuggling under the protection of diplomatic immunity, or a travelling president whose government is suspected of, or known to be harboring, corrupt officials, are unlikely to obtain the kind of international hearing their nation may deserve.

Implications for Society

Although the bulk of heroin transiting Latin America, and much of the cocaine produced there, have been smuggled to Europe and the U.S., there is mounting evidence of efforts to create a market within Latin America itself. Furthermore, the general inclination to tolerate corruption facilitates the establishment of such a market. With fifty percent or more of the population 25 years of age or younger, there is a huge potential traffic in drugs; and increase in local consumption has already been noted in several countries, among them Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru and Uruguay.

Coca leaves have been used traditionally by the Andean peasants, especially in Bolivia, to alleviate suffering and hardship, but the latter day users of narcotics are the young, whose immaturity and inexperience lead them to experiment with drugs. Beyond the immediate harm to themselves, their families and friends, the long-term effects may be even more significant. Drugs are currently considered fashionable among urban youth and university students; but even the mildest drugs eventually drain the young of intellectual and physical vigor, fantasy is substituted for ambition, and the victims are ultimately driven into an expanding counter-culture. Thus, instead of contributing to progress, the young create additional social and economic problems. Since they are the future of Latin America, it is urgent that they develop into dynamic, able and well-educated citizens with a capacity for progress and leadership.

Conclusion

It is obvious that the threat arising from the traffic and use of drugs is more significant than is generally realized, especially by those who have hailed a few recent arrests as a great victory. The real problems are, in fact, just beginning, and they must be dealt with before it is too late. Although to date a number of

foreigners have been arrested in the region, important local traffickers have been allowed to carry on their business. This situation, combined with the fact it is becoming increasingly difficult to smuggle narcotics to the U.S., will make it easier for the traffickers to reap all their profits locally without fear of official action. And Latin America will then have its own established drug market.

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January-February 1973

TRADE UNIONS: INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY

In the Soviet Union and other communist countries the central government wields absolute control over wages, hours, and conditions of work using trade unions as appendages to the Communist Party to discipline and indoctrinate the work force. Trade unions, considered by the Soviet Union as instruments of control in the communist world, are used as tools of subversion in the free world. Participation in strikes, boycotts and demonstrations, which communist labor leaders advocate in non-communist countries, is subject to severe punishment in the Soviet Union on the notion that the interests of workers in a socialist state must be identical with the decisions of the political and economic power elite. Inconsistencies between the communist attitude toward trade unions in the free world and trade unions in the communist world should be of concern to union leader inclined to succumb to the communist call for unity of action. Acceptance of this persistent siren call attests to the success of communist trade unionists in masking their subordination to the Kremlin while posing as defenders of legitimate trade union demands.

The distinction between free world and communist world trade unions is made clear in an article which appeared in the Zurich Neue Zurcher Zeitung of 6 November 1972 (attached): "On this side, there are free and autonomous associations for the protection of the material and ideological interests of its membership; on the other side, there are organizations controlled by the state and the party with compulsory memberships, which in addition to their function as employee associations also play the role of an instrument of power of the ruling class."

The subjugation of Soviet trade unions to the communist party is spelled out in a resolution adopted at the 15th Congress of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) held in Moscow in March 1972: "...the Communist Party's concern is that trade unions successfully perform their role as a school of control, economic management and communism... The trade union congress adopts for guidance...the provisions...formulated by the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)... The Soviet trade unions are doing everything possible to assist the cohesion of all the forces of the world workers and trade union movement in the struggle against imperialism's aggressive actions and against the monopolies' exploiting policy... The Soviet trade unions participate actively in the work of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and promote the increase of the WFTU's international prestige as the working peoples' most mass-based and militant class organization... The Soviet trade unions will continue to support the WFTU and to make an active contribution to its activity, which is aimed at strengthening the trade unions' unity of action in the struggle against imperialism..."

The Zurich Schweizerische Handels-Zeitung of 19 October 1972, in an article entitled "Labor Union Strategy in Western Europe" (attached), notes that the goal of the Moscow-controlled WFTU is to ruin the economies of Western Europe by expanding and internationalizing strike activities. Further, the article states that these plans also appeared on the agenda of the Conference of the West European communist parties held on 27 June 1972 in Paris, saying that this duplicity casts a dark shadow on the European Security Conference.

(The ideological basis for communist leaders to advocate and use trade unions as instruments of Soviet policy is found in the writings of Lenin -- "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder.")

Soviet Trade Unions -- Organization, Leadership and Role

There are 25 trade unions organized along industrial lines in the Soviet Union which come under the aegis and control of the all-powerful All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) whose leadership is elected at the nationally held All-Union Congress of Trade Unions. The congress in theory meets every four (since 1972 -- every five) years but in fact the intervals have been somewhat longer. At the most recent 15th Congress held in March 1972, Aleksandr N. Shelepin was re-elected chairman of the AUCCTU. Former KGB (secret police) Chief Shelepin, like his predecessor, AUCCTU Chairman V.V. Greshin, is a party man who had had no experience in the field of organized labor. Shelepin's previous government positions included First Secretary of the Komsomol (1952-58), Chairman of the KGB (State Security Committee) from 1958-62, Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee (1962-65), and CPSU Central Committee Secretary.

Each of the 25 industrial unions (Aviation Workers; Food Industry Workers; Textile and Light Industry Workers, etc.) has a central committee organization with a chairman, secretaries and departments as well as territorial branches at various levels ranging from republic, kray, oblast, town and/or rayon. The industrial unions are then represented in the work complex (industrial plant, cooperative, business enterprise) by a committee -- a shop committee -- with group organizers to fulfill their union tasks. The shop committee, the primary unit of the union's administrative structure, is in theory elected by a general meeting of the membership in the complex. In reality, however, these elections are dominated by the factory officials; the "elected" committee members take their orders from the trade union hierarchy, the party and the state-controlled management. All aspects of labor-management relations are affected by the dominance of the Communist Party and its monopoly of the decision-making process, and any attempt by trade unions to approach close relations with workers is deemed hostile and therefore equivalent to undermining the party's leadership role.

Soviet Trade Unions and Worker Discipline

In practice, the interests of the party and of the unions have never coincided and given the nature of the Soviet system it was inevitable that the trade unions would become subordinate to party role. Within the framework of a Leninist-Marxist society, workers cannot rely upon trade unions for protection against economic and social abuses inflicted upon them by those who occupy positions of authority. Strikes, boycotts or other expressions of labor unrest, though not explicitly prohibited by law, are branded as "counterrevolutionary" (anti-state and anti-party) activity. Penalties of up to 3 years' imprisonment for organizing or taking part in "group actions" are meted out to ensure discipline among workers. Unauthorized absenteeism is subject to disciplinary measures -- at the discretion of management. Questions regarding wages and salaries are settled within the confines of Soviet bureaucracy. Collective contracts adopted at the plant level are uniform throughout the Soviet Union -- since each agreement is based on a model contract issued by the central authorities. Each contract contains a preamble that defines the objectives of the labor/management participants with regard to the fulfillment of state plans, maintenance of labor discipline and the raising of material standards. The main task of the trade union in the plant is to mobilize all workers for increased discipline and efficiency. A regular feature of Soviet factory life is to have the factory committee punish "anti-Socialist" behavior by ridicule and sarcasm, and to use wall newspapers to criticize workers who do not adhere to prescribed behavioral patterns.

A basic premise of Soviet economic policy is that unemployment does not exist. Therefore no provision is made for unemployment benefits. Workers may voluntarily leave their jobs by giving two weeks' notice but, in the process, they lose their term of continuous service if unemployed for more than 30 days -- an important consideration in determining social security benefits. In addition, frequent job changes may be considered absenteeism. Despite these "incentives", unemployment does exist in the Soviet Union -- a fact the government acknowledged in 1967 with the establishment of "labor commissions" in various cities to help "redeploy the nation's manpower resources more efficiently." As long as a job is available within the USSR - albeit in a remote and distant place - a worker cannot justly claim to be unemployed. Under Soviet labor decrees, management may deprive workers of their right to earn a bonus, may transfer them temporarily to lower paid jobs, and may make large deductions from their wages for damaged tools or waste of materials caused by neglect. The power enjoyed by the industrial manager in the Soviet Union is considerable. "The most autocratic manager in non-communist countries would look with envy at the authority possessed by their counterparts. Industrial managers in

the Soviet Union can count on the support of the trade union representative in the plant to assist them to fulfill and over-fulfill their production norms."*

Soviet Trade Unions and Productivity

Soviet trade unions are concerned with fulfilling production norms and therefore place emphasis on "socialist competition" which is merely tolerated by most Soviet workers to avoid harassment by both management and trade unions. Socialist competition started with the much publicized Stakhanovite movement in 1935 and is currently exemplified by the "Mamai brigades," the "communist labor brigades" and the "Gaganov movement." Under the Mamai system, the worker has to overfulfill his daily output plan. However, since higher productivity results in higher pay, the government introduced a change in 1958 known as the "economically rational labor payment" which ensured that the great mass of Soviet workers would not receive pay increases in proportion to the increased output demands. The communist labor brigades, formed in 1958, were regarded as a higher form of socialist competition. The brigades, primarily composed of elitist young workers, are required to supervise all aspects of workers' lives, both on and off the job, in order to raise all workers to the level of the most efficient. The Gaganov movement, started in 1959, is based on the somewhat improbable story of a working woman who "requested" permission to transfer to a backward work brigade in a factory in order to bring it up to the norm of the most advanced. In summary, "socialist competition" has been implemented by the trade unions to ruthlessly increase production norms.

Soviet Trade Unions as Propaganda Weapons

In the mythology of the communist world, the workingman is placed on center stage as the most privileged of socialism's beneficiaries. The facts belie this for workers' wages are held down to finance "crash programs" or to fight inflation or to carry out "rational investments." Communist-style trade unions do not protect the material and social interests of their membership. In practice, the communist party maintains a monopoly of the economic product and the bureaucracy retains the profits. Without an independent trade union movement, the workers have no way to gain a realistic share of the profits. Soviet trade unions are so integrated into the government apparatus that their officials are in reality communist party functionaries who are solely responsible to the party. Party bureaucracy uses a large portion of profits for its

*"Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in the Soviet Union", B. Roberts and M. Feingold, The Workers' Education Association, London.

own upkeep, at a standard of living 'many times higher than the average wage and salary scale. With the proceeds of the workers' labor, this new privileged class has acquired luxurious homes, numerous servants and bank accounts worth millions of rubles and maintains a military and police force to keep itself in power.'*

Although Soviet-style trade unions do not serve as protectors of the organized work force, they are an essential part of the vast, intricate and highly financed propaganda machine used for communist party control. The unions publish 10 major newspapers, most of which are sponsored jointly by individual industrial unions and the corresponding ministries. Among the largest newspapers in the USSR are TRUD (Labor), circulation 3.5 million and Sovetskiy Sport (Soviet Sport), circulation 2.7 million. In addition, the unions publish 11 mass-circulation magazines such as Soviet Trade Unions, New Times, and Soviet Woman which of course contain significant political commentary. Ironically, trade unions in the communist world -- where the leaders rule in the name of the revolutionary proletariat -- are deprived of the power to protect their membership against the excesses of high norms, low wages and poor working conditions. Instead, trade unions serve primarily to discipline and indoctrinate the organized work force to fit the goals of the regime. Communist-inspired trade unions are centers of power which remain under Kremlin domination whether operating in communist-dominated countries or in the free world.

*"Trade Unions & Labor in the Soviet Union", Fedir S. Hayenko, Institutè for the Study of the USSR, Munich.

NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
6 November 1972

THE EASTERN CONTACTS OF THE TRADE UNIONS

A meeting in East Berlin between the Chairman of the (West) German Trade Union Federation (DGB), Heinz Oscar Vetter and the Chairman of the so-called Free German Trade Union Federation of the DDR (FDGB), Herbert Warnke, took place recently. The meeting was probably overshadowed by the exposure a few weeks ago of an East German agent in the Dusseldorf headquarters of the DGB and was therefore probably not as open a discussion as had been expected.

The meeting in East Berlin -- the first all-German summit meeting on the trade union level since 1948 -- was preceded by a series of contacts between individual trade unions of West Germany and other West European countries on the one hand and those of various Soviet Bloc states, particularly the Soviet Union, on the other. The motivation for such East-West contacts is usually explained in terms of the search for an exchange of ideas on the question of trade unionism. Trade unionism in East and West is fundamentally different; a fact that becomes immediately evident when one examines the attitude and the structure of trade unions on both sides of the ideological demarcation line in Europe. On this side, there are free and autonomous associations for the protection of the material and ideological interests of its membership; on the other side, there are organizations controlled by the state and the party with compulsory memberships, which in addition to their function as employee associations also play the role of an instrument of power of the ruling class.

If one poses the question where, from the Western viewpoint, the benefit of such Eastern contacts in the labor field derives, it hardly suffices to speak of seeking to evaluate East European "experiences" in the trade union area. The argument raised by the trade unions that employer organizations are also in the Eastern contact business is not quite relevant, since these contacts are conducted in terms of measurable self interest, specifically to determine the possibilities of the intensification of exchanges and trade or the direct solicitation of business.

What remains as a quite defensible argument for the Western side is that contacts with the East per se are to be welcomed since they widen the horizons on both sides and therefore contribute no matter how modestly to the lessening of tension. Swiss trade union leaders hold this view but with various nuances. The president of the trade union congress, Mr. Wuthrich, does not support such contacts if the danger exists that they will be exploited politically by the communists. He consistently declines the frequently extended invitations from the East since it is his belief that a visit by a president of a Western trade union federation could be exploited for the communists' political purposes. Leaders of various trade unions -- in contrast to the metal and watchmaker unions which Wuthrich has headed for many years -- have shown much more progressive tendencies in their attitude on the question of Eastern contacts.

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When searching for East European regimes' motivation in bringing about contacts between their state trade unions and Western workers' groups, reference to the "European Security Conference" appears again and again in recent months. While Swiss trade unionists emphasize that the question of the convocation of a Conference for European Security and Cooperation has heretofore never been raised in their discussions with East European representatives, the DGB makes it quite clear that it would welcome the holding of a security conference. The DGB stresses that it sees its policy of contact with the East as an integral part of the normalization of relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe and the consequent lessening of East-West tensions.

To what extent the DGB's foreign policy is a reflection of its own political orientation or a surrogate for the foreign policy of the Brandt government is less important than the fact that the trade union headquarters of the most powerful industrial nation of Western Europe is supporting "Moscow's initiative," the purely political, even geo-political motivation of which is obvious. The claims that these Eastern contacts are merely for the exchange of information, and that they benefit both sides, are open to serious question.

The September issue of the DDR trade union organ, FDGB - Rundschau has published a report on a propaganda meeting recently held in Brussels on the subject of a security conference. This report shows clearly that the East is intent upon using its contacts with Western trade unions to further its overall strategy of detente. This private Brussels meeting, which was attended principally by communists and progressives, passed a resolution calling for the convocation of an All European Trade Union Conference -- as a sort of labor corollary to the European Security Conference. Looking toward the preparatory meeting of the European Security Conference on 22 November in Helsinki, West European trade unions must anticipate a much intensified communist propaganda campaign in the field of labor.

It should be added that the roof organization of democratic labor, the Informational Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU) in Brussels, rejects all contacts with trade unions from communist countries. Paragraph 64 of this year's resolutions of the ICFTU congress in London states "as a matter of principle the ICFTU does not permit engaging in relations with international or regional organizations whose policies are diametrically opposed to the objectives of free and democratic trade unions."

WASHINGTON POST
26 December 1972

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Russia's Changing Empire-IX

Who Speaks for Worker in Workers' State?

By Robert G. Kaiser and Dan Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service

In the art and mythology of the communist world, the working man is as glorified as the sinewy athlete of ancient Greece or the dashing knight of the Middle Ages.

Newspapers record his exploits on page one; posters and statues cast him in heroic poses. The communist states, the leaders repeat faithfully, are workers' states, and the communist parties are workers' parties. Why all claim to

rule in the name of a revolutionary proletariat. This claim has always legitimized their power.

In December, 1970, tens of thousands of Polish workers rioting in Gdansk and Szczecin did their best to shatter the old slogans. They left behind an eerie monument: a burnt-out building in Gdansk which had been the local office of the communist party, before angry dockers vented their frustration on it.

The violence, the bloodshed, the "worker's Soviets" set up by dissident communist workers in Szczecin—none of them will be quickly forgotten in Eastern Europe.

The message of the Polish December was not subtle: something had gone very wrong with the old myth that centralized communist parties represented the best interests of the workers.

All the East European communist parties are now searching for ways to respond to worker interests. Some

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leaders now concede that workers had become isolated, and often underprivileged in the societies ruled in their

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Poland's Edward Gierek and East Germany's Erich Honecker have donned hard hats and met personally with workers in what seems to be more than a propaganda show.

President Tito in Yugoslavia has called for a counterattack against middle class privileges and growing power of banks, on behalf of the working class.

Some of the old rhetoric crops up in all of this, as when Tito calls for a "revolutionary working class." But there is an underlying element of common sense in his appeal. Tito and the other reformist leaders are trying to achieve stability based on prosperity.

Long-term prosperity demands innovation, but innovations create social tensions. The price increases and incentive system that helped trigger the Polish riots were themselves reforms—imposed by the central bureaucracy. The message seemed to be that reform could only be undertaken after the workers' basic needs were satisfied.

Providing social justice has become the indispensable precondition to economic reform. But for all their rhetoric, the politicians and economists of East Europe probably have few illusions that working class "rule" provides social justice automatically.

A Polish sociologist has written that "workers are still hired labor; the socialist revolution does not change their relationship to the machine . . . or their position within the technological structure of the factory . . ."

As this comment suggests, the real problems facing workers under communism are those of the technological revolution, not the proletarian one: The incessant push for efficiency; the shift of power to technocrats; the leveling out of pay (and opportunities) for the unskilled, and the frustration of life in new urban areas—these are the problems.

None of these things appear to be issues in the Soviet Union, however. Stalin himself moved away from the Utopian ideal of a perfectly egalitarian society by introducing incentives and bonuses. But Soviet ideology respects Lenin's dictum that the interests of the industrial proletariat embody the interests of the whole society.

In effect, the Soviet Union is insisting that it is a workers' state because it is a workers' state.

There is no evidence that this formula upsets many Soviet workers. If there have been major workers' protests in the Soviet Union, the secret is

well-kept. The available evidence suggests a relatively contented Soviet worker who does not share the frustrations of his Polish comrades in Gdansk.

This can be partially explained by a steady improvement in his situation. Wages and pensions are going up, modestly but steadily, and a handsome raise is promised for 1975. The current Five Year Plan emphasizes production of consumer goods, housing, and more meat.

This isn't enough to satisfy everyone, apparently. Alcoholism among Soviet workers is a problem of gigantic proportions, as official statements have revealed. But vodka is a safer outlet than street demonstrations.

From all appearances, the material aspirations of East European workers are far higher than those of their Soviet comrades. Eastern Europe is closer to the West, and more conscious of the relative poverty of the Socialist countries. The gap between old rhetoric and present realities was obviously strong in Poland two years ago, and the gap has not been closed.

There is another sort of gap between rhetoric and reality in the Communist world; it separates claims of egalitarianism from the facts of special privileges for a small elite.

In Moscow, working wives stand in long queues in food shops, while the wife of a Central Committee official can do her shopping by telephone at a special "closed" store, like the one a block from the Lenin Library. In Eastern Europe many of the most glaring privileges, such as the closed "yellow curtain stores" for party card holders, have been abolished. But senior party officials enjoy enormous advantages.

Communist diplomats and foreign trade ministry representatives receive hard currency allowances when they travel abroad, enabling them to buy Western cars and clothing unavailable at home immediately, without the usual waits of up to five years or more required for purchasers using local currency. Their children learn foreign languages, they enjoy educational advantages no workers' child could hope for.

In Moscow there are special shops in which purchases can be made only with foreign currency or special coupons. They are stocked with basic commodities like high grade beef that are not available in regular shops.

No worker ever shops there. Foreigners do. So do certain Soviets. They are artists, diplomats, technical assistants and anyone else who has earned money abroad. And some of them are employees of the security police, who receive part of their pay in coupons.

Provincial party secretaries in Eastern Europe enjoy almost feudal au-

thority. Their positions enable them to live in villas, arrange repairs on their home and have their groceries delivered to their house by state enterprises, free of charge. Some also accept money from people for whom they do small favors. In the Soviet Union a regional party leader can assign priorities on the waiting lists for automobiles.

Several years ago, a foreigner asked a worker: "Who runs Poland?" "Five-hundred families," he answered. "They don't change." True or not, the worker's attitude reflected his sense of isolation from an impervious power structure. The privileges vary from country to country, and men like Poland's Gierek are taking steps to reduce some of the frictions caused by their existence.

These privileges are in themselves marks of the "social differences" which party officials so often condemn. The workers' position in the communist countries is evident from a single fact: the average salary of workers in all these countries is a subsistence wage. Few ordinary working men could support a family of four comfortably on their salary alone.

Surveys published in Hungary place the salary of average workers far below those of intellectuals and white collar workers, and only slightly above that of pensioners.

In some Soviet factories, executives earn 10 or 20 times as much as workers, according to a new book by Roy Medvedev, the dissident Soviet historian.

In Yugoslavia there are now 400,000 unemployed persons, and a third of all workers earn less than \$84 a month. That wage places the consumer goods that glitter in the country's store windows beyond the reach of many workers.

The Yugoslav worker receives many non-cash benefits, of course, as do workers in the other communist countries, but he pays for them. Forty-four per cent of a Yugoslav's monthly paycheck is eaten up in contributions to health insurance, pension, children's allowances, disabled veterans, disability insurance, education, housing, even earthquake-reconstruction funds.

Workers all over Eastern Europe also have to endure a chronic housing shortage. Many of them live in hostels near factories, separated from their families for years at a time because there is no accommodation at the job

More housing was one of the leading demands of the workers. But they also sought improvement in basic conditions: better laundry service, public transportation and warm showers.

One group in communist society seems to reject the proposition that workers are a privileged "first among equals": the workers themselves. The chief aspiration of many of them is to see their children move into a higher social position.

That goal is getting harder to achieve. Hungarian studies have concluded that the rapid upward mobility caused by post-war industrialization is slowing down. Henceforth, upward mobility will depend on educational qualifications. But a Yugoslav study has concluded in turn that "a worker's child, regardless of talent, has only 1 chance in 9 of becoming a specialist or a manager, while the likelihood is 20 to 1 against a specialist's child moving down the ladder and becoming a worker."

Soviet research has shown—hardly surprisingly—that workers' jobs rank low in the career aspirations of young boys and girls.

The regimes of the communist world have acknowledged workers' grievances. They have reoriented economic production to provide more consumer goods, to satisfy rising workers' demands. The Soviet Union, too, has provided steadily improving benefits for its citizens.

But the East European regimes are following a different approach than Russia. They are concerned with greater efficiency through economic reform, which in East Europe seems essential if these regimes are to achieve the long-term prosperity necessary for stability.

Reform is tricky, for its first victims tend to be the humblest workers, who therefore rebel against it. To protect workers' interests and to avoid alienating them when progressive innovations are introduced, the East European regimes are looking for new ways to allow workers to express their wishes.

The Russians have shown no real interest in reform. In an economy that will indulge inefficiency, such labor-pleasing devices as payroll padding and equal pay for all, can be tolerated.

In Czechoslovakia, where attitudes similar to those in Russia often prevail, a worker said of his factory:

"There is a bonus system here, but no director would dare apply it for

fear of alienating employees. So the bonus system is dead. Everybody gets an equal share. Nobody dares apply a reform here."

But in Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Yugoslavia such attitudes are under fire. For example, the secretary-general of Hungary's union movement has said: "We must take more effective steps against egalitarianism, to safeguard just differentiation (of salaries, so that responsibility and initiative can be rewarded).

The East Europeans are aware that measures taken to heighten efficiency can create tensions among workers. This is especially evident now in Hungary, despite painstaking preparations for the 1968 economic reform there. Old-guard conservatives have tried to exploit worker dissatisfaction, so far without much success.

The tensions have been partly dissipated by a package of social welfare measures, and by new opportunities for workers to change jobs and increase their earnings.

The trend in East Europe is toward strengthening the institutions that were supposed to look after worker interest all along.

Since 1967 Hungary's trade-unions have been under orders to actually represent workers, rather than merely pass along party decisions.

Poland has also made changes in its labor code.

Romania has increased the number of workers on the factory "workers' committees," though they are still in a minority and the committees don't have such crucial powers as control over hiring and firing of directors.

A proposed new code in Yugoslavia would legalize strikes, and proposed constitutional changes are aimed at "strengthening the position of the workers."

Poles have been quoting Lenin as saying "trade unions should defend the interests of the working masses." In practice, Lenin discouraged trade-union independence, but the Polish unions are really trying to become moderators between workers on one hand, and management and the political leadership on the other.

Since 1970, the workers' councils in Polish factories have been empowered to approve or veto the appointments of new directors. They are even able to force out existing management.

No such trend can be detected in the Soviet Union. There is no movement to strengthen Soviet trade-unions, or to open new channels of direct communication between the party leaders and the working class. Nor is there any

evidence that these steps are necessary.

The revisionist (and totally heretical) Yugoslav system of worker control of factories continues to be denounced in Moscow.

The Yugoslav experiment, which began 20 years ago, was intended to achieve what no other communist state ever has: a system in which the proletariat really controlled the means of production. In Yugoslavia the ownership of nationalized industry was turned over to "society as a whole," and councils of elected workers assumed the executive power in every factory and enterprise.

Nobody has copied the Yugoslav model. But neither have there been riots and demonstrations in Yugoslavia as violent as those in East Germany, Poland and Hungary. If the system is not perfect, the Yugoslavs say, it is still the best one yet devised for giving workers a stake in their factories and in the overall prosperity.

But critics reply that there is an element of illusion in the Yugoslav model.

"Workers live under a misconception that in controlling their factories they are also controlling the destiny of society as a whole," said a sociologist.

But they are not, he added. The destiny of Yugoslavia is still ultimately controlled by its party — called the League of Communists—and furthermore, another Yugoslav sociologist has reported that only about 1 out of 7 members of the Yugoslav party is a real worker.

There are paradoxes in the Yugoslav system as well. In many factories, workers have gone without pay for weeks at a time because their colleague worker-managers have mismanaged the factory. There is the additional paradox of Yugoslav workers going on strike—ostensibly against themselves.

Nevertheless, former communist Milovan Djilas, who helped devise the system, and American management consultants who have been invited into Yugoslav factories, both think the system works, even though it is sometimes bumpy going.

Whatever its problems, the Yugoslavs seem to be assured that their system is better than the traditional Russian communist model.

A leading ideologist, Prof. Svetozar Stojanovic, probably spoke for the Yugoslav leadership when he wrote recently: "One must really have a very rich imagination to believe that in the Stalinist system the proletariat is the ruling class."

SCHWEIZERISCHE HANDELS-ZEITUNG, Zurich
19 October 1972

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LABOR UNION STRATEGY IN WESTERN EUROPE

In the Prague center of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WGB), which is controlled from Moscow, there is a special department which is concerned with the expansion and internationalizing of strike activities in Western Europe, aimed at ruining the economies of Western European countries. The plans for an internationalization of the strike movement, worked out by the WGB and serving Soviet power interests, gain special significance in view of the steadily spreading political strikes, above all in Italy and Great Britain where the question is already being asked as to who in fact runs the country -- the government or the labor unions. This significance is accentuated by the fact that, among other things, these plans also appeared on the agenda of the European Communist Party conference held on 27 June in Paris, behind closed doors.

Philips, Nestle, and Ford Are Next

The international strike called at the beginning of June in plants of the Pirelli-Dunlop Concern in both Italy and England simultaneously was the first attempt, so to speak, to organize strikes on an international plane. Now, similar intra-corporation strikes are slated to be carried through in Philips, Nestle, and European Ford Motor Company plants. According to East European news reports, secret talks on that subject were held among labor union functionaries of the corporations in question during May in Holland and Switzerland.

Moreover, negotiations are currently under way among the iron and steel workers' unions of Western Europe -- initiated by the French Federation of Trade Unions, an affiliate of the WGB -- concerning an international strike to be held simultaneously in all plants belonging to these branches of industry. Various trade union groups from the Federal Republic, France, Italy, England, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden have already pledged their participation.

On April 30, Nepszabadsag, the official organ of the Hungarian Communist Party, and quite often the mouthpiece of Moscow, stressed in an editorial entitled "Workers' Struggle Against Monopolistic Capitalism" that wage earners in EEC-member countries have begun "to organize their international struggle for safeguarding their interests." At this time, possibilities for wage and labor struggles "on a continental scale" are being studied. "This, in practice, means that a start has been made in organizing international solidarity and international unity of action, the latter being an absolutely vital ingredient in the struggle against monopolistic capitalism," wrote the paper and continued: "Politi-

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 cal measures with others even in the (EEC) scale are being worked out within the frame work of the action cited."

The same newspaper advocated a uniform international strike strategy on the part of labor unions in an article published on 10 June under the heading "International Strikes Against International Trusts": "Struggle within the mammoth corporations is no longer sufficient. What is needed is an international and unified strike strategy which is directed against individual governments." Similar demands are also being made, or propagated, by other Communist Party papers and pamphlets.

Western Trade Unions Said No

One learns in this connection from Prague that the Russians appear to be willing to make considerable concessions in return for being able to schedule the "European Labor Union Conference", which has long been urged by the WGB, in such a fashion as to have this congress predate the European security conference on a governmental level slated to take place in Helsinki in 1973. Soviet plans for convening a "European Labor Union Conference" go back to 1970, when the Polish Federation of Trade Unions made a proposal to this effect during a WGB congress. However, Western labor organizations rejected this proposal.

Faced with the negative attitude of Western labor unions, the Russians deem it necessary this summer to modify in certain regards their previous stance on convening a "European Labor Union Conference". A conference of Western and Eastern union officials took place in Helsinki at the end of June, 1971; it was attended by Heinz Vetter of the German Federation of Trade Unions, among others, and the secretary general of the Soviet trade unions, the former KGB chief Alexander Shelyepin. Mr Shelyepin emphasized that the Soviet labor union federation was still very much interested in the convening of a "European Labor Union Conference". But he also gave to understand that the Soviets had changed their original ideas regarding this issue in several respects.

ILO Sponsorship

After the Helsinki conference it appeared as if a certain agreement had been reached with regard to the question of convening a "European Labor Union Conference". Both sides had come out in favor of such a congress, to be held under the auspices of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Western trade union representatives insisted on this arrangement in the hope of thereby being able to restrict the conference agenda to those issues which are directly relevant to the labor union movement and of immediate interest to unions.

This proposal received new impetus when the managing director of ILO, Mr Jenks, went to Moscow in July of this year where he had talks with Mr Shelyepin. Mr Shelyepin reiterated the necessity of holding a regional European labor union conference

under ILO sponsorship, which should convene prior to the conference on "European security and cooperation" as agreed upon in Helsinki.

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Establishment of a Common Labor Front

In demanding this kind of all-European labor union conference, the Russians clearly pursue long-term goals which go beyond the mere propagandizing of the often cited "European Security Conference." They apparently seek to bring about a situation where Western European unions as a block would support all proposals made within the context of the inter-governmental "European Security Conference" which fit in with Moscow's political viewpoint. They probably also hope to drive a wider wedge between U.S. labor unions and those of Western Europe through this kind of trade union conference. Finally, the conference would also afford them an opportunity for stepping up their efforts to establish a communist-controlled common labor front in Western European countries, thus to be able to bring to fruition plans for internationalizing strike actions on the sector level designed to erode the West European economy.

On 18 July, in a Radio Moscow broadcast to Western Europe, Vladimir F. Stratonovich, a member of the Soviet Institute for World Economics and International Relations, stressed that today West European labor unions must no longer limit themselves to "mere resistance against governments, but rather must offer a political alternative of their own to the policies of the bourgeois state."

Moscow's Financial Aid

That Moscow actively and financially supports this trend is clearly evident from a TASS report of 24 March of this year, among other sources, which states that Alex Kitson, president of the Scottish Labor Union Federation, had thanked the Soviet workers for their generous financial support without which the dock workers of Upper Clyde could never have persevered in their months-long struggle and won it."

James Reid, secretary of the Scottish Dock Workers' Union, was in Moscow and Budapest in August for the purpose of conducting talks. On 11 August, he emphasized in an interview broadcast in English by Radio Moscow, that strikes were unnecessary in the Soviet Union since, in his words, "there was no longer an exploiting class in that country." At the same time, he expressed his gratitude for Soviet help in the amount of 17,000 pounds sterling given to his union for strike actions -- to name but a few examples.

All this casts a dark shadow on the "European Security Conference" advocated by the Soviet Union, for it demonstrates what the Russians understand in practice by "peaceful coexistence" and "ideological struggle". It shows that despite the continual assertion of their allegedly friendly intentions they are out to destroy the economy, and thus the internal security, of Western European countries by subversive and in all respects subtle means.

BALTIMORE SUN
29 December 1972

Soviet economy shows signs of sinking into red

By MICHAEL PARKS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

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with milk and honey," Mr. Brezhnev said. "But the most organized and most industrious society in human history. . . .
"The people living in that society will be the most industrious, conscientious, organized and politically conscious. We are thus faced with enormously important work, and it will evidently take quite a long time because human psychology is remade much more slowly than the material foundations of life."

Hold down budget

As it is, more than 60 billion rubles (a ruble equals \$1.22 at the official but inflated rate) have accumulated in Soviet banks because there is nothing that Soviet consumers want to spend them on.

Real per capita income grew

3 per cent less than the plan called for, 5.2 per cent over last year, and the minimum raises planned for next year suggest to some Western economists that the Kremlin is not only trying hard to hold down its budget but also to reduce inflationary trends on the country's two free markets.

Linked to cutbacks

Mr. Brezhnev strongly condemned the widespread "unconscientious attitude to work,

slackness, lack of discipline. . . ."

Cutbacks in planned increases in the production of consumer goods are being directly linked by local Communist leaders to the failure of Soviet workers to increase their output.

"The increase in consumer goods," a Communist party official in Odessa said last week, "was predicated on an increase in labor productivity. . . . Labor productivity has not increased nearly as much as was planned so it is logical that the consumer goods and light industry sectors will have to suffer."

Less work incentive

Labor productivity was supposed to grow by 6.1 per cent this year, but provisional figures show it increased only 5.4 per cent.

Some Western economists studying Soviet plans suggest that cutbacks in the production of consumer goods will result in even poorer performance next year because there will be less incentive to work harder.

"It may be a vicious circle," said one Western diplomat here. "Greater labor productivity, which implies both harder work by the individual and more advanced mechanization and automation, is the key to long-term growth. But what's the use of working harder if there is nothing to spend your money on?"

peasants produce and second hand commission shops, and various illegal black markets. The few pay boosts planned range from 2.7 per cent for factory and office workers to 4.4 per cent for farmers.

The reversal of the priority given to heavy industry versus light industry and consumer goods, putting consumer goods production back in its traditional second place, was the most dramatic change in the Soviet economic plan because of the country's current problems.

Economic rationality

There are important long term changes, many of which went unnoticed in the first reading of the speeches.

Mr. Brezhnev said, for example, that Moscow will no longer make decisions about economic development on the basis of political need but rather on their economic rationality.

He was speaking specifically about the past method of building up the Soviet Union's many unindustrialized areas and developing its vast hinterlands.

Built in Russia

"The task of leveling the economic development of the national republics has been in the main completed," he said. "We have the possibility of approaching economic problems principally from the standpoint of the interests of the state as a whole, from the standpoint of raising the effi-

Moscow — The Soviet economy appears to be in serious trouble.

Production of both industrial and consumer goods, according to official statements, is lagging substantially behind the Kremlin's plans.

Instead of "saturating" the consumer market with new goods, the government has indicated there will be continued shortages.

There are also shortages of essential items for industrial growth—machine tools, natural gas and oil—as outlined in the 1971 to 1975 economic development plan.

Many of the development projects and production goals for next year were scaled down or dropped entirely at last week's meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliament.

Most of the industrial and agricultural goals of the current five-year plan, the blueprint for the Soviet Union's economy, now appear unattainable.

There are growing signs of economic stagnation—a large drop in planned capital investment, for example—and some Western economists are reading them as indicators of an approaching Communist-style recession with the Soviet Union on the brink of a difficult-to-stop downward spiral.

The economic situation, which Soviet leaders are publicly discussing with the utmost gravity, raises serious questions about the Soviet Union's internal political situation, the stability of its leadership, its relations with Eastern Europe and its competition with the United States, the rest of the West and China.

"The ramifications of an economic downspin in the Soviet Union go far beyond just reworking the plan," said one Western economist here. "In

the Soviet Union, the plan is the key public element of not only the economy but also defense policy, foreign policy, domestic politics and, to the extent that the leadership is divided over these policies, relations among the members of the Kremlin hierarchy."

Plans unclear

So far, most of the blame for the country's economic problems has been put on agriculture and bad weather—the worst weather in a century devastated the Soviet grain and potato crops—but uncorrected economic and industrial mismanagement and lazy, poorly motivated Soviet workers appear equally at fault, judging from the latest official assessments and statistics.

What the Soviet leadership plans to do to get the economy back on the track is not clear yet.

There are no indications of major reforms or novel approaches in the speeches at the Supreme Soviet and in the review of the domestic situation given by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party, at the 50th anniversary celebration of the country's existence as a federal state last week.

Worst shortcomings

The remedies seem confined to a limited purge of party and government officials deemed responsible for economic deterioration, more centralized control, stricter priorities for economic development and new projects and tougher labor discipline.

The failure to increase labor productivity—the value of goods produced for each worker—is one of the worst shortcomings of the economy in the last two years, Soviet officials said.

"We are building not a land of idlers where rivers flow

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ceacy of the entire national income of the Soviet Union. . . ."

In practical terms this probably means that labor intensive industries will now be built primarily in European Russia rather than scattered through Siberia and less-developed areas where power intensive industries will be located.

The move toward more centralized control was seen most clearly in the orders to government ministries, departments and the state bank and construction agency to limit the number of new construction projects, particularly those initiated by local officials, and give priority to completing projects that can be in operation in 1973 and 1974.

Premier Alexei Kosygin had said earlier that more than 61 billion rubles (officially about \$75 billion) in government construction projects remained unfinished, not including those at collective farms. This is 2 1/2 times that of 10 years ago.

Nikolai K. Baibakov, the chairman of the State Planning Commission and deputy premier, called for "daily control over the expenditure of money" for both new and existing projects—an admonition that Western economists understood to underline the gravity of the current situation.

The starkest indicator of the Soviet economy's failure to grow as planned came in the official estimate of the growth in the country's national income, an index measuring the total value added by labor through manufacturing. Soviet

economists tend to use it as the general measure of national growth rather than the growth in gross national product used in the West in analogous estimates.

Worst rate

The country's national income was to grow 13 per cent in the first 2 years of the current 5-year economic plan but grew only 10 per cent—8 per cent last year and 4 per cent this year.

The target for this year was for an increase of 6.2 per cent above 1971, and the 4 per cent rate achieved is the worst growth rate in a decade.

Industrial output was to increase 6.9 per cent this year, but preliminary figures show it grew by 6.7 per cent. Next year's growth rate has been cut back from 7.0 to 5.8 per cent, far below the 8 per cent envisioned as an annual average by the 5-year plan.

Little fluctuation

Consumer goods and light industry, which were to grow 35 to 40 per cent over the 5 years, will grow only 4.5 per cent next year compared with the original goal of 8.1 per cent.

Some of the cut, Soviet sources indicated, was due to the failure to complete new factories on schedule, but a significant portion stems from a deliberate Kremlin decision to maintain the growth rate in heavy industry with as little fluctuation as possible.

The revised 1973 plan calls for a 6.3 growth in heavy in-

dustry compared with the original 7.6 per cent.

Soviet officials hope to put their agricultural production back on schedule, calling for a grain harvest of 197.4 million metric tons, nearly 30 million more than reaped in this year's disastrous harvest that Mr. Brezhnev frankly labeled "a failure."

But capital investment is scheduled to increase only 10 per cent in the agricultural sector of the economy, and there is no substantial increase reported in the delivery of fertilizers and other chemicals. Increases of 12 to 20 per cent in the number of farm trucks and machines are planned.

Western commercial sources here reported that the Kremlin, which has usually bought for cash in the West, is now seeking to arrange long-term credit to finance its importation of advanced Western machinery needed to modernize Soviet industry.

Improved management

"There is particular concern about the lack of growth in the oil and natural gas sectors," said one West European businessman with extensive dealings with the Russians. "These are both growth areas and both help finance their foreign purchases. They are also both areas in which they want foreign investment, and continued inefficiency and shortfall will be very discouraging to Western businessmen."

Improved management ap-

pears to be the key to many of the current economic problems, judging from the remarks of Mr. Brezhnev and other officials last week.

"The central task today," Mr. Brezhnev said, "is to effect a radical change of orientation, to switch the accent to intensive methods of economic management and thereby achieve a considerable rise efficiency in the economy."

Profit Incentive

The party chief was calling in short for "intensive management"—a drive for intensive growth based on new management methods and scientific and technological advances in industry.

The economic reforms of the mid-1960's were intended to achieve this by introducing in modest form the profit incentive, which in turn was supposed to spur innovation and initiative. But this has been dead in fact if not in name for the last three or four years when the Communist party organization was supposed to take the lead in innovation.

All this led to one of the most pessimistic assessments of the Soviet economy ever given by a Kremlin leader. Mr. Brezhnev, speaking of the country's long range plan for 1990, said that he hoped by that time the Soviet living standard would have been raised "to a level that would vividly show everybody, even the most die-hard skeptics, the possibilities and advantages of our system."

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MILOVAN DJILAS ON THE SPECTRE OF STALINISM

In two articles published by Corriere della Sera (Milan), Milovan Djilas, heretical Yugoslav communist author of The New Class and The Unperfect Society, has once again provided original and compelling insights on politics in East Europe. Mr. Djilas reminds us that, despite the disappearance of ideological blocs and the detente in Europe -- or precisely because of these phenomena -- genuine freedom in East Europe and the Soviet Union is being gradually but inexorably restricted. The people recognize in this coercion and repression the weight of the Stalinist heritage. According to Djilas, the return to Stalinism is evident in the state's reassertion of its monopoly of political power rather than in an ability -- which it no longer possesses -- to break the ties which link the individual to the social community. This in turn constitutes a serious threat to the existing political order in East Europe and the Soviet Union, since, having lost their creative impulses, these regimes have also lost the capacity to transform themselves into stable autocratic bureaucracies. Mr. Djilas cites the persecution of writers, such as Solzhenitsyn in Russia and Chosic in Yugoslavia as indicative of a general attack on cultural elites who, in the current ideological vacuum, are rediscovering and proclaiming time-honored national values.

This latest contribution of Milovan Djilas to our appreciation of East European communism is noteworthy not only for its trenchant political analysis, but as an act of personal courage. Mr. Djilas, who has spent many years in jail for expressing similar opinions, makes it clear that his criticism does not exclude Yugoslavia.

Hope for a Socialism with a Human Face Disappears

THE GHOST OF STALIN REAPPEARS IN EAST EUROPE

A Campaign of Repression that Extends from Moscow to Belgrade -- Widespread Purges Strike Cultural Elites -- In the Ideological Vacuum Intellectuals Re-emphasize National Values -- Two Writings of Milovan Djilas on the Problem.

THE NEW CLASSES

A spectre, the spectre of Stalinism is stirring again in East Europe, assuming a different spirit and shape in each individual country. The East European regimes are working not only against expectations and official instructions but also against all logical hopes and judgments. Aspirations for freedom are gradually but inexorably being crushed by the forces of bureaucratic reaction, despite -- or perhaps precisely because of -- the "de-ideologizing" of culture and the stratification of society in new classes, the disappearance of ideological blocks, and the detente in Europe.

This darkening of the sky in East Europe warns of dangers much more serious than any that currently threaten the existing political order.

Above all, a noisy campaign is being waged against efforts to obtain additional freedoms, even where such efforts are neither subversive nor organized. The action taken against counter-revolutionary or extreme leftist groups is exaggerated out of all proportion. Even if such groups are extremely tenacious and addicted to anarchist incitement, they have neither the adequate ideological foundations nor the popular support which would permit them to resist a strong and modern state apparatus.

Above all, even though the embers of the cold war have died out, the capitalist threat from outside continues to be exaggerated. (At a time when the romance between the great capitalist and great socialist powers is in full flower.)

The tendency to exaggerate the strength of the enemy -- or actually to invent an enemy -- typifies ideological movements and totalitarian states and is a consequence of their closed and exclusive attitudes. These attitudes originated at a time when such movements had to struggle for survival and dominance. But now this phenomenon, despite all the rhetoric, stimulates other tendencies and produces results of a different kind.

The forced "de-ideologizing" currently in progress (or, to put it better, the use of violence to force the acceptance of fossilized dogma and lifeless conventions) must be interpreted for the most part as a secondary manifestation of the erosion of ideology.

The current erosion of ideology is critical. The totalitarian forces not only are losing their drive and their capacity for practical action, but, deprived of the illusion of ideological omniscience and infallibility, they are no longer able even to transform themselves from totalitarian systems into stable and autocratic bureaucracies.

Obviously such a conclusion is oversimplified because, in fact, it is not possible to assert that all East European countries -- for example Yugoslavia and Poland -- are completely totalitarian. But this does not invalidate the deduction that the erosion of ideology affects all the forms inspired and generated by it, and above all, authority and the ownership system.

In addition, the process of erosion involves the entire administration which, in fact, has already reached the stage of total dissolution. The top levels of the establishment -- or rather those levels that think they are anchored on ideologically meaningful pedestals -- are experiencing a crisis, and their administrative and decision-making system is also in crisis. Something similar can be said for ownership: it is trying to free itself from the monopoly exercised over it by ideology and state power, in the hope of becoming national and socialist rather than capitalist. Those who hold power, the theoreticians of dogmatism, impute the erosion of ideology to the "revisionists" or to the "liberals". In reality there is no culprit.

The guilty are society' itself, the spread of knowledge through modern means of communication which break down the borders of closed societies, as much in the West as in the East. The ideology of the steam engine had to give way to that of the atomic era: and this would have happened even if this ideology had not manifested political deficiencies and incongruities.

For those who love power, for the dogmatists, there remains no other justification or consolation but to find those "ideologically responsible" and to strive to save what can be saved of their own ideological monopoly. In this situation they are not even capable -- nor do they show any inclination to develop and to adapt ideology to the new situation. This is the case not only because conditions are such as to destroy every absolute system and a fortiori every system of political ideology, but above all because the representatives of the system lost every free, creative impetus. Free creativity and exclusive political power do not go together, especially today. The world is moving ahead and men are impelled to seek new social forms of coexistence and not of miraculous "eternal truths." The tendency to emphasize ideology is today a form of nostalgia for a myth, a myth that was once a reality, a faith, a religion, a revolutionary act, as was in its day the industrial revolution.

But today there is no such faith, nor can it exist. The society "built" today by those who belong to it arose neither in accordance with ideology's expectations nor in conformity with the desires of the builders. The original sin was committed by the custodians of the dogma of "infallibility." It was committed by the party which arrogated to itself the monopoly of power and other privileges.

Later the rest happened. The need for increased production and international trade favored the emergence of a new class, socialism's "middle class."

It is no longer possible, now, to destroy this class. To attempt to do so would mean to cause the collapse of the very foundations of the socialist economic system and even the party, whose most vital elements were grafted from this same "middle class". The development of these processes has been slower in the Soviet Union because the more solid roots of its bureaucracy descend to a despotic tradition and imperialistic privilege. But even their ideology is ritual, a liturgical function.

The benefits of modern life are instead, by their nature, outside the realm of dogmatism and its manifestations. What is known as liberalism is born spontaneously from society, from life. It is possible to attack this urge to freedom and to retard it, but it is not possible to destroy it.

The nostalgia for revolutionary myths, for "ideological unity" would be grotesque if, because of its effect on society and freedom of thought, it were not also tragic. For revolutionary enthusiasm and for "unity", a single revolutionary goal is necessary. Such a goal no longer exists. Moreover, coercion by violence, oppression, and the monopoly of power, if they are nothing more than consequences of raisons d'etat coincident with the state's own need for survival, are not and cannot be revolutionary. Even less can they be the goal of a certain category of society. The bloody Stalinist purges were in their day the apogee of ideology and of ideological violence, and also the beginning of its decline. In a society divided into groups and strata, a society that admits no restraints, there is no reason for violence. In such a society ideology becomes superfluous and senseless.

However, while the revival of the revolutionary party and ideology is only a nostalgic illusion, the prohibitions, limitations, and prisons are a reality which cannot be remedied. For the common man, the man in the street, this does not constitute a revolutionary revival. It is nothing but the return to Stalinist violence.

If those in power are not so incautious as to openly identify with Stalinist precedents, neither are those who are subject to this power so ingenuous or forgetful as not to recognize in the monopoly of oppression all the weight of the Stalinist heritage. Even if the instinctive opinion of the man in the street is not infallible, a simple analysis of the facts shows that the regimes of East Europe have neither the ability nor sufficient strength to return to Stalinism, if by Stalinism is meant not only a monopoly of political power, but a totalitarian authority aimed at neutralizing the action of various social groups in such a way as to break the ties which link the individual to the social community.

Monolithic leaders no longer exist. There are no thinkers able to carry away the masses by means of their creativity. Preachers who believe in the word preached have disappeared. There is glory only in remembering, in the distant purposes of ideology. But in the naked power structure there are only the intrigues among cliques, nationalistic jealousies, abstract and theoretical games among princes. However, if myths cannot be revived, it is already happening that those few rights won by the "liberals" from the "Stalinists" are being limited and suppressed. In reality, the countries of East Europe are becoming police regimes which no longer have any ideological characteristics. This is an evil. It represents a retrogression with respect to the hopes of the democratic spiritual leaders, with respect to what was, until a short time ago, the hope of the world.

INTELLECTUALS OF THE NATIONAL RENAISSANCE

In the countries of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, writers adopted an enlightened and critical attitude a long time ago. This is a new factor in communism. But it is not new in history: A similar role was played by writers during the Enlightenment in the liberation from dogmatism and feudal privilege.

It seems however that the first phase of this anti-dogmatic criticism, inevitably abstract and largely doctrinaire, is waning and is being replaced by one of national purpose: a second phase, in which more concrete problems are faced with attitudes and viewpoints that are closer to life.

In truth, the past has always been, and still is, a frequent, very frequent literary theme, as in the time of Stalin, when writers had no other way to safeguard their own spiritual integrity, and to avoid eulogizing the official reality.

Life of the Nation

The way in which the past is viewed and relived is now entirely different. It is no longer a question of passive "objective" descriptions, but of investigation and search for sources of inspiration, cut off but not dried up, which once rediscovered break into the arid dogmatic conscience in order to free the flux of life. The nation, the life of the nation are illuminated and appear as a pluralistic and complex process that does not fit the dialectic of materialism and is not susceptible to interpretation according to this blueprint.

As far as form is concerned, the manner in which the past is viewed is linked with the classical Tolstoyian models. However the treatment is living, not "scientific" or relativistic or dogmatic. The past, if interpreted only by means of Marxism, turns out to be emasculated, reduced to a stereotyped model, lifeless. Eastern European artists are rediscovering the existence of their own peoples, re-creating the national conscience, crippled but not destroyed. It sounds absurd, but it is as if the people had forgotten that they had lived, struggled, formed and forged themselves prior to the advent of communism. Art reveals and rediscovers it for them.

In my opinion, the most outstanding and vigorous writers, the ones richest in substance to have assumed this mission are Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in Russia and Dobrica Chosic in Serbia. This re-emphasis on national values and national spirit emerges spontaneously and most completely in their recent novels: in August 1914 of A. Solzhenitsyn and in Time of Death of D. Chosic.

It is definitely not by chance that both Solzhenitsyn and Chosic have taken war as their theme and specifically the First World War. Because war is the final and fatal proof of the strength of political orders and of nations. For Russia, World War I marked the beginning of the collapse of the Czarist regime; while for the Serbs and Serbia it represented the apex of national development, tragic but inevitable. Russian disasters accumulated and were visible even at the beginning of the war, in the battle of Tannenberg, where Hindenburg and Ludendorff fought and routed a much more numerous, but badly led, badly armed and badly trained Russian force.

Self-Awareness

On the other hand Chosic, in the first two books of his novel, describes the victory of Serbia over the Austro-Hungarian army in the battle near Kolubara in November and December 1914, a victory of incalculable value for the prestige, self-awareness and morale of the Serbs, and hence of great importance for the subsequent creation of Yugoslavia (the new state that arose from the original Serbian nucleus). In the third book, Time of Death, on which Chosic is still working, he depicts the collapse and withdrawal of the Serbian army through Albania toward the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915. In the end, having paid their price in turbulence and suffering, the Serbs matured enough to create an independent democratic state.

Both novels abound in historic personages and historic situations. The main character in Solzhenitsyn is the fictional Colonel Vorotinchev, who represents Russian idealism and patriotism. In Chosic there is a Serbian condottiere, General Milich, the leading figure and personification of the Serbian nation and of its national and moral characteristics.

The two works differ, naturally, in style and composition. But, despite differences in artistic awareness and viewpoint, both authors, abound in vast and powerful epic descriptions and are filled with a tragic sense of life.

I will leave to professional critics the task of speaking more technically and specifically about this very important aspect of their work. I want to stress that aspect which, for the present and future history, is of the greatest importance: that is, that the works of Solzhenitsyn and Chosic presage a spiritual revival, a regeneration of a sense of national identity within the Communist world. This undoubtedly can be seen more clearly in the differences than in the similarities of the two works. The similarities relate to period and situation: from the failure of the political systems and from national and artistic dissatisfaction with the dogmatic precepts of "just" or "unjust."

Solzhenitsyn is a Russian patriot, deeply and traditionally religious. As an artist-visionary, it matters little for him whether Russia before Peter the Great (that is, before the reforms), was as he imagines it. What matters for him is to believe that, in that Russia, lay the roots of its authenticity and of its future freedom.

The Russia -- or to put it better the aspect of Russian life -- which existed before Peter the Great is represented in his writings as indestructible, absolutely immutable, incapable of essential change. Regimes and ideologies, invasions and civil wars come and go; "perennial Russia" survives, suffers, grows, and expands. This occurs despite shame and ruin, despite concentration camps and massacres, in death and beyond death.

Chosic, on the other hand, is a communist, a former war-time political commissar, an atheist, and today an anti-dogmatist and non-conformist. According to his conception, Serbia and the Serbs have no specific future, except their tragic existence, their fateful need to confirm their existence by the negation and synthesis of antithetical influences. The universal, humanitarian message of Chosic is more sustained than that of Solzhenitsyn, because his strength lies in understanding intuitively the moments when destinies are decided rather than in visions of the future.

The works of Solzhenitsyn and Chosic resemble one another in that which they negate -- or to put it better in that from which they are detached -- in the realm of art and ideas. From this point of view Chosic, as a communist-idealist, had to make a greater effort, had to free himself from a dogmatic sociology and the daily pressures of politics, while Solzhenitsyn had only to overcome the barriers and dangers of prohibitions and threats. Both Solzhenitsyn and Chosic contradict and negate, by their work and by their personality, the relationships existing in the system: for the former they are a chastisement and a misfortune; for the latter they are an anachronism and an enslavement.

Forbidden Writings

Both writers, Solzhenitsyn in the Soviet Union and Chosic in Yugoslavia, are today in "disfavour." The works of Solzhenitsyn are all prohibited in the Soviet Union. In Yugoslavia a campaign was set in motion to denigrate Chosic as "nationalistic" and the distribution of a volume of his essays has been prohibited. This has happened perhaps because his revelations and his experiences with the life of the nation break out of the framework of the false and dogmatic motivations of everyday politics, and perhaps also because he found the source of inspiration in himself and in the soul of the nation rather than in ideology. Authenticated by the life and personality of their authors, August 1914 and Time of Death are not only contemporary, but inform the present efforts and aspirations of the Russians and the Serbs.

artistic work of Solzhenitsyn and Chosic. Besides, the import and content of their works are oriented toward that which, in the final analysis, is the natural objective of all politics: freedom, the freedom toward which the economies and cultures of the East European nations are pushing and gravitating. They are the message and the confirmation that the storms of war and revolution, the ideologies and oppressions, while admittedly changing the forms of power and the systems of ownership, cannot change the nature of peoples and of men.

Solzhenitsyn and Chosic need not worry: they are what their people have been. They are and they possess that on which their people are still nourished, and which makes them part of the universal community of all men.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA

Giovedì 7 dicembre 1972

SCOMPARE LA SPERANZA DI UN SOCIALISMO

DAL VOLTO UMANO

Riaffiora all'Est lo spettro di Stalin

CPYRGHT

Una campagna repressiva che si estende da Mosca a Belgrado - Profonde epurazioni colpiscono le élites culturali - All'assenza dei contenuti ideologici gli esponenti del pensiero contrappongono gli antichi valori nazionali - Due scritti di Milovan Gilas sul complesso problema

Le nuove classi

Uno spauracchio, lo spauracchio dello «stalinismo», circola di nuovo attraverso l'Europa orientale adattato per ora nello spirito e nella forma ai singoli paesi e nazioni interessati. Accade nei paesi dell'Europa orientale che i regimi si muovano non solo contro le aspettative e contro le istruzioni ufficiali, ma anche in contrasto con tutte le attese e conclusioni logiche. Le aspirazioni alla libertà vengono gradualmente ma inesorabilmente cancellate e sostituite

dalla reazione burocratica, nonostante o forse proprio a causa del processo di «disideologizzazione» della cultura, e di quello della differenziazione sociale in nuove classi, della dissoluzione dei blocchi ideologici e della attenuazione delle tensioni in Europa. Questo oscuramento dell'orizzonte nell'Europa orientale ha la caratteristica di essere denso di segni premonitori e di tensioni ben più gravi di qualsiasi pericolo che insidi, da

Una rumorosa campagna viene indirizzata soprattutto contro i movimenti tendenti ad ottenere maggiori libertà, anche se essi, in dove sono diffusi e dove hanno abbastanza radici, non abbiano caratteri sovversivi o la forma di azioni organizzate. Viene esagerata in modo sproportionato anche l'azione contro i gruppi contro-rivoluzionari o di estrema sinistra, benché essi, per quanto profondamente radicati e

ro ad un forte e moderno apparato statale. Soprattutto viene ingigantita la minaccia capitalista dall'esterno, nonostante che dappertutto siano spenti i focolai della guerra fredda (nello stesso tempo invece sono in pieno sviluppo l'idillio e la collaborazione fra le grandi potenze capitalistiche e socialiste). Si sa che la tendenza a ingigantire la forza del nemico, a corrispondere alla natura dei movimenti ideologici e dell'

precisamente dall'atteggiamento di chiusura e di esclusione che è loro proprio. Ciò ha origini all'epoca in cui tali movimenti hanno combattuto per il sopravvento e per il dominio. Ma ora il fenomeno, nonostante la retorica e motivazioni simili tenderebbe a produrre altri impulsi e, a giudicare dalla situazione complessiva, a dare risultati di diversa natura.

La forzata «ideologizzazione» in atto nei nostri giorni, o, per meglio dire, la costrizione con la violenza ad accettare dogmi fossilizzati e forme prive di vita, è da interpretare in massima parte come una manifestazione secondaria della decomposizione organica dell'ideologia.

La decomposizione dell'ideologia si rivela oggi decisiva. Le forze totalitarie non solo stanno perdendo gli impulsi vitali e la capacità di orientamento pratico, ma una volta private dell'ausilio della «omniscienza» e «infallibile» ideologia, non saranno più in grado nemmeno di trasformarsi da sistemi totalitari in ordinamenti burocratici stabilizzati e autocratici.

Una simile conclusione è ovviamente molto semplificata, poiché non è infatti possibile affermare per tutti i paesi dell'Europa orientale, per esempio per la Jugoslavia e la Polonia, che essi siano del tutto totalitari. Ma ciò non toglie nulla alla validità della deduzione che la dissoluzione dell'ideologia colpisce tutte le forme da essa ispirate e generate, e soprattutto il potere e il sistema della proprietà.

Oltre a ciò occorre rilevare che il processo di decomposizione interessa tutta l'amministrazione: anzi essa è già in piena fase dissolutiva. Sono in crisi i vertici istituzionali, per meglio dire i vertici che hanno la presunzione di essere ben ancorati su piedistalli ideologici e ideologicamente conseguenti. Ed è in crisi il loro sistema di amministrazione e decisione. Qualcosa di simile può essere detto per la proprietà: la quale al sforzo di liberarsi dal monopolio esercitato su di essa dall'apparato dell'ideologia e del potere statale, nell'aspirazione di poter diventare nazionale, socialista, e non di trasformarsi in capitalistica.

I detentori del potere statale, i teorici del dogmatismo attribuiscono la colpa del decadimento dell'ideologia ai «revisionisti», ai «liberali». In verità in tutto ciò non esiste un colpevole. I colpevoli sono la società stessa, la diffusione delle conoscenze col moderni mezzi di comunicazione, che spezzano i limiti dei sistemi chiusi, tanto in Occidente quanto all'Est. L'ideologia della macchina a vapore ha dovuto cedere il passo, e dissolversi, all'avvento dell'era atomica: e ciò sarebbe accaduto anche se essa non avesse rivelato deficienze e incongruenze.

altra giustificazione e consolazione che cercare i «responsabili ideologici» e affannarsi a salvare il salvabile del proprio monopolio ideologico. In questa situazione essi non sono nemmeno in grado, e d'altra parte non dimostrano di avere alcuna disposizione per farlo, di sviluppare e rispettivamente di adattare l'ideologia alla nuova situazione.

Ciò accade non solo perché le condizioni sono tali da distruggere ogni sistema di assolutizzazione, e a maggior ragione ogni ordinamento ideologico politico, ma soprattutto perché gli esponenti del sistema hanno perduto ogni libera spinta creativa. La libera creatività e il monopolio non vanno d'accordo, soprattutto oggi. Il mondo si muove, e gli uomini sono spinti alla ricerca di nuove forme sociali di convivenza, e non di tauturgiche «verità di vita». La tendenza ad insistere sull'ideologia è oggi una forma di nostalgia per il mito: un mito che una volta era una realtà, una fede, una religione, un atto rivoluzionario come a suo tempo l'industrializzazione.

Ma oggi non c'è, né può esistere una simile fede. La società «edificata» oggi da coloro che ne fanno parte, non è sorta né secondo la previsione dell'ideologia, né in conformità dei desideri degli «edificatori». Il peccato originale venne commesso dai custodi del dogma dell'«infallibilità». È stato commesso dal partito che si è appropriato il monopolio del potere e con ciò di altri privilegi. In un secondo momento, è accaduto il resto. La necessità di una produzione intensificata e di scambi internazionali ha favorito il sorgere di una nuova classe, la «classe media» del capitalismo.

Non è più possibile, per un nientare quella classe. Voleto fare, significherebbe far crollare le stesse basi del sistema economico socialista e persino il partito, le cui parti più vitali sono state saturate dalla stessa «classe media». Lo sviluppo di questi processi è più lento nell'Unione Sovietica, poiché le radici, più solide, della sua burocrazia affondano in una tradizione dispotica e nei suoi privilegi imperialistici. Ma anche là l'ideologia è rituale, è apparato liturgico.

Il benessere nella vita moderna è invece, per sua essenza e natura, al di fuori del dogmatismo e della sua fenomenologia. Il così detto liberalismo nasce spontaneamente dalla società, dalla vita. È possibile aggredire questa spinta alla libertà per frenarla, ma non è possibile annientarla.

La nostalgia per i miti rivoluzionari, per «l'unità ideologica» sarebbe grottesca, se per la società e per la libertà del pensiero non fosse anche tragica. Per l'entusiasmo rivoluzionario e per «l'unità», è ne-

cessario. Un tale stato non esiste più. D'altra parte la costrizione nella violenza, la sopraffazione e il monopolio, se sono il risultato unicamente della «ragion di Stato» coincidente con la necessità della propria sopravvivenza, non sono né possono essere rivoluzionari. Né, tanto meno, possono essere il fine di una categoria sociale. Le sanguinose purghe staliniste sono state a suo tempo il culmine della ideologia e della violenza ideologica, ma anche l'inizio del suo decadimento. In una società divisa in gruppi e strati, una società che non ammette limitazioni, non si dà motivo alla violenza. In essa l'ideologia diventa superflua e senza senso.

Ma, mentre il rinnovamento del partito rivoluzionario e dell'ideologia è soltanto una illusione nostalgica, i divieti, le limitazioni, le carceri diventano una realtà senza possibilità di rimedi. Per l'uomo comune, l'uomo della strada, questo non costituisce un rinnovamento rivoluzionario: questo non è altro che il ritorno alla violenza stalinista.

Se coloro che detengono il potere non sono così incauti da richiamarsi apertamente ai precedenti di Stalin, nemmeno coloro che sono soggetti al potere sono tanto ingenui o smemorati da non riconoscere nel monopolio della sopraffazione tutto il peso dell'eredità staliniana. Anche se il giudizio istintivo dell'uomo della strada non è infallibile, una semplice analisi dei fatti rivela che i regimi dell'Europa orientale non hanno la possibilità, né la forza sufficiente, per tornare allo «stalinismo», se per «stalinismo» si intende non solo il monopolio nella politica, ma un potere totalitario volto a soffocare l'azione dei vari gruppi sociali, talo da spezzare i rapporti che legano l'individuo alla comunità sociale.

Non esistono più capi «monolitici». Non esistono pensatori capaci di trascinare le masse con la loro «creatività». Sono scomparsi i predicatori persuasivi del verbo predicato. La gloria è soltanto nel ricordo, nelle intenzioni remote delle ideologie; ma nella nuda struttura del potere non ci sono che intrighi di camarille, gelosie nazionalistiche, giochi astratti e teorici di principi.

Se non è possibile che i miti rinascano, accade già però che quei pochi diritti imposti dai «liberali» agli «stalinisti» vengano oggi limitati e soppressi. I paesi dell'Europa orientale si muovono in realtà verso regimi polizieschi, che non hanno più nulla di ideologico. È questo un male. Si tratta di un regresso rispetto a quello che erano i desideri degli spiriti democratici, rispetto a ciò che fino a poco tempo fa erano le speranze del mondo.

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Gli intellettuali della rinascita nazionale

Nei paesi dell'Europa orientale e nell'Unione Sovietica gli scrittori hanno assunto già da lungo tempo un atteggiamento critico e illuministico. E' questo un fattore nuovo nel comunismo. Ma non è nuovo nella storia: un ruolo simile svolsero già gli scrittori nell'epoca dell'illuminismo, nella liberazione dal dogmatismo e dai privilegi feudali.

Sembra però che, di tale critica antidogmatica, inevitabilmente astratta e in buona misura dottrinarla, si stia esaurendo il primo periodo e stia subentrando uno nuovo di missione nazionale: una seconda fase, in cui vengono affrontati problemi più concreti, osservati con atteggiamenti e da punti di vista più aderenti alla vita.

In verità il passato è sempre stato, ed è ancora un motivo letterario frequente, molto frequente, come al tempo dello « stalinismo », quando gli scrittori non avevano altra via di scampo al di fuori di questa per salvare alla men peggio la propria integrità spirituale, ed evitare l'incensamento della realtà ufficiale.

Vita della nazione

Il modo in cui viene guardato il passato, e in cui tale passato viene rivissuto, è del tutto diverso. Non si tratta più, ora, di « obiettivi » descrittivi passivi, bensì di indagini e ricerche delle sorgenti di ispirazione, di una vita ma non inaridita, che, una volta riscoperta, rimpompa nella « risecchita » coscienza dogmatica, per liberare il flusso della vita. La nazione, la vita della nazione, vengono illuminate e mostrate come un molteplice e complesso processo, non inseribile nella dialettica del materialismo, né suscettibile di essere interpretato con questo schema.

Per quanto riguarda la forma, si tratta di un collegamento con i modelli classico-tolstojiani. L'atteggiamento è però esistenziale, non « scientifico », o relativistico, o dogmatico. Si dimostra che il passato, se viene interpretato soltanto per mezzo del marxismo, risulta evitato, ridotto a un modello stereotipato, lasciato senza vita. Gli artisti dell'Europa orientale riscoprono l'essere dei propri popoli, rinnovano la coscienza nazionale, mutata ma non distrutta. Suona come un assurdo, ma è proprio così: accade come se i popoli abbiano dimenticato di aver vissuto, lottato, di essersi formati e forgiati più prima del comunismo. E l'arte lo rivela e riscopre per essi. Da quanto mi risulta gli

scrittori di maggior rilievo, i più vigorosi e ricchi di contenuto, che si assumono questa missione, sono Aleksandr Solgenitsin in Russia, e Dobrica Ciosic in Serbia. Tale tendenza verso una rivalorizzazione del caratteri nazionali e dello spirito nazionale emerge spontaneamente e nella forma più piena dai loro più recenti romanzi. Per A. Solgenitsin « Agosto 1914 », e per D. Ciosic « Tempo di morte ».

Absolutamente non per caso, tanto Solgenitsin quanto Ciosic, prendono per tema la guerra, e precisamente la prima guerra mondiale. Perché la guerra è la verifica estrema e fatale della forza degli ordinamenti e delle nazioni. La grande guerra fu per la Russia l'inizio del crollo del regime zarista, mentre per i serbi e la Serbia rappresentò l'apice dello sviluppo nazionale, tragico ma inevitabile. Le sciagure della Russia si sono accumulate e manifestate, già all'inizio della guerra, nella battaglia di Tannenberg, dove Hindenburg e Ludendorff batterono e sbaragliarono le forze russe, di gran lunga più numerose, però male comandate, male armate e male preparate.

Autocoscienza

Cosic invece descrive, nei primi due libri pubblicati del suo romanzo, la vittoria della Serbia sull'esercito austro-ungarico nello scontro presso Kolubara, nel novembre e dicembre 1914: una vittoria di valore incalcolabile per il prestigio, l'autocoscienza e il morale dei serbi, e quindi di grande importanza per la successiva creazione della Jugoslavia (il nuovo grande Stato sorto dal nucleo originale serbo). Nel terzo libro, « Tempo di morte », sul quale Ciosic ancora lavora, è presentato il crollo e la ritirata dell'esercito serbo attraverso l'Albania, verso la fine del 1914 e il principio del 1915. Alla fine, pagato il pedaggio di turbolenze e sofferenze, i serbi diventano maturi per creare uno stato indipendente democratico.

Tutti e due i romanzi abbondano di personaggi e situazioni storiche. Il principale personaggio in Solgenitsin è il non storico colonnello Vorotincev, figura di idealista e patriota russo; mentre in Ciosic è un condottiero serbo, il generale Mihic, protagonista oltreché personificazione della nazione serba e delle sue caratteristiche nazionali e morali.

Le due opere si differen-

trambe, nonostante la diversa sensibilità e la diversa ottica degli autori, abbondano di ampie e potenti rappresentazioni epiche, e sono cariche di un tragico senso della vita.

Lascio ai critici di professione il compito di parlare con maggiori mezzi tecnici e in modo più particolareggiato di questo, forse, più importante aspetto. Io vorrei sottolineare ciò che in questo momento, e per l'epoca storica futura, è di maggiore importanza. Cioè vorrei porre in rilievo il fatto che le opere di Solgenitsin e di Ciosic annunciano un rinnovamento spirituale, una rigenerazione delle nazioni

dentro il mondo comunista. E questo senza dubbio si vede più chiaramente nelle diversità, che nelle affinità delle due opere. Le affinità derivano, come ho detto, dai tempi e dalle situazioni: dall'insuccesso dei sistemi e dall'insoddisfazione delle nazioni e degli artisti nei confronti dei precetti dogmatici di « giusto » o di « erroneo ».

Solgenitsin è un patriota russo profondamente e tradizionalmente religioso. E' di poco conto per lui, come artista-visionario, se la Russia prima di Pietro il Grande, cioè prima delle riforme, fu come egli l'immagina: pregiudiziale per lui è credere che, in quella Russia, si trovavano le radici della sua autenticità o della sua futura libertà. Quella Russia anteriore a Pietro il Grande, o per meglio dire quella parte della vita russa, si manifesta nei suoi scritti come indistruttibile, addirittura immutabile, non suscettibile di cambiamenti sostanziali. I regimi e le ideologie, le invasioni e le guerre civili, vengono e vanno; la « Russia perenne » sopravvive, soffre, cresce e si estende. E ciò accade nonostante l'onta e le rovine; nonostante i campi di concentramento e i massacri; nella morte e oltre la morte.

Ciosic è invece un comunista, ex-commissario politico del tempo di guerra, ateo, e oggi antidogmatico e non conformista. La Serbia e i serbi, nella sua concezione, non hanno una « prospektiva » definita, se per questa non si debba intendere il loro tragico esistere, la loro fatale condanna a dover fermare la propria esistenza con la negazione e la sintesi di influssi antitetici. Il messaggio universale, umanitario di Ciosic è più sostenuto di quello di Solgenitsin poiché la sua forza è più grande nell'intuizione dei momenti in cui si decidono i destini, che nelle visioni del

Le opere di Solgenitsin e di Ciosic somigliano in ciò che negano, o per meglio dire in ciò da cui si staccano, come arte e come idea. Sotto questo aspetto Ciosic come comunista-idealista ha dovuto compiere uno sforzo maggiore, ha dovuto liberarsi dagli impulsi della sociologia dogmatica e dalle pressioni quotidiane della politica, mentre Solgenitsin ha dovuto soltanto superare gli sbarramenti e i pericoli dei divieti e delle minacce. Tanto Solgenitsin quanto Ciosic contraddicono e negano, con la loro opera e con la loro personalità, i rapporti esistenti nel sistema: per il primo essi sono come un castigo e una stentura, e per l'altro sono un anacronismo e un asservimento.

Opere proibite

Entrambi gli scrittori, Solgenitsin nell'Unione Sovietica e Ciosic in Jugoslavia, sono oggi « in disgrazia ». Le opere di Solgenitsin sono tutte proibite nell'Unione Sovietica. Contro Ciosic è stata scatenata in Jugoslavia una campagna denigratoria che lo definisce « nazionalista », mentre è proibita la diffusione di un suo volume di saggi. E ciò forse perché le sue dichiarazioni e le sue esperienze nella vita della nazione straripano dal quadro delle false motivazioni dogmatiche della politica di ogni giorno, e forse anche perché egli ha trovato la fonte dell'ispirazione in sé e nell'anima della nazione, anziché nell'ideologia. Convallati dalla vita e dalla personalità degli autori, « Agosto 1914 » e « Tempo di morte », non diventano soltanto attuali, ma si immettono negli sforzi e nelle aspirazioni esistenziali dei russi e rispettivamente dei serbi.

E' prematuro voler conoscere le implicazioni politiche dell'opera artistica di Solgenitsin e di Ciosic. Le tendenze e il contenuto delle loro opere sono d'altronde orientati verso quello che in definitiva è l'obiettivo naturale di ogni politica: la libertà verso cui premiano e gravitano le economie e la cultura delle nazioni dell'Europa orientale. Sono il messaggio e la conferma che le buiere delle guerre e delle rivoluzioni, le ideologie e le sopraffazioni, mutano sì le forme di potere ed i sistemi di proprietà, ma non possono cambiare i caratteri dei popoli e degli uomini.

Solgenitsin e Ciosic non devono preoccuparsi: essi sono quello che è stato il loro popolo, essi sono ed essi hanno ciò di cui il loro popolo vive ancora oggi, inserendoli in un messaggio universale di

Profilo di Milovan Gilas

Riprendiamo per gentile concessione dell'editore Einaudi, dal libro «La montagna più alta» dello storico inglese F.W.D. Deakin, questo ritratto del giovane capo partigiano Milovan Gilas, conosciuto personalmente dall'autore al tempo della guerra di liberazione nella Jugoslavia occupata. Deakin faceva parte a quel tempo di una speciale missione britannica di collegamento, distaccata, per ordine di Churchill, presso il quartier generale partigiano di Tito.

Milovan Gilas era dotato dello straordinario coraggio fisico delle tribù montenegrine, che, organizzate in komitadji, avevano dato l'assalto — per intere generazioni — alle guarnigioni turche e respinto la penetrazione austro-ungarica nella loro aspra e quasi inaccessibile regione.

Eravamo appena riusciti a sfuggire alla distruzione, e già Gilas ripartiva verso sud con un pugno di compagni, per raggiungere nuovamente il desolato campo di battaglia. Per adempiere a tale compito, Gilas una sera si sottrasse discretamente alla nostra compagnia; altri montenegrini facevano parte di quella missione, ma noi assistemmo soltanto alla sua partenza. Col bel volto bruno velato di mestizia, egli ci apparve l'incarnazione della leggendaria storia del suo paese tormentato e diviso. Fu quella la prima impressione che Gilas lasciò in noi.

Qualche tempo dopo, egli riapparve al quartier generale di Tito, in una zona più interna della Bosnia. Portava con sé una balonetta, strappata a un soldato tedesco che aveva fatto parte di una pattuglia annientata dalla banda partigiana durante il viaggio di ritorno. Gilas era membro di un'organizzazione politica che ebbe un ruolo di importanza decisiva nel

movimento partigiano: la Lega della gioventù comunista (le cui cellule più attive erano quelle universitarie, in particolare le cellule dell'università di Belgrado).

Egli proveniva da un clan familiare della regione di confine fra il Montenegro e l'Albania e aveva frequentato l'università di Belgrado, studiandovi legge e filosofia. In qualità di dirigente dei nuclei studenteschi clandestini della SKOJ (l'organizzazione della gioventù comunista), aveva preso contatto personalmente con Tito e, nel 1940, era entrato a far parte del ristretto gruppo dirigente del partito, operante nella clandestinità. Era stato uno degli organizzatori della rivolta del Montenegro.

Uomo di carattere intransigente, superbo delle superficiali certezze di un marxismo semplificato e scolastico, Milovan Gilas aveva partecipato all'insurrezione montenegrina del luglio 1941 con idee e atteggiamenti estremistici, ostili a qualunque compromesso. La sua personalità era, al tempo stesso, semplice e complessa: le rigide convinzioni politiche dell'intellettuale di formazione urbana si sovrapponevano in lui, con uno sforzo volontaristico, al realismo e all'onestà morale di un uomo appartenente a un'antica società di clan. I suoi conterranei erano i naturali eredi di un mondo da epopea, nel quale i rapporti umani si ispiravano a sentimenti di lealtà semplice e schietta e a un rigoroso codice d'onore: un mondo illuminato da una visione poetica dell'uomo.

La tragedia di Gilas, che doveva scoppiare molto tempo dopo gli avvenimenti narrati in questo libro, è lo scontro di un conflitto inconciliabile fra il dottrinario rigido e implacabile e l'artista meditativo e ricco di immaginazione, figlio di un popolo di montanari dalle antichissime tradizioni epiche.

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REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE COMMUNIST
POLICY OF TERROR

SAIGON
December, 1972

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C O N T E N T S

THE COMMUNIST POLICY OF TERROR

	Page
<i>Part One :</i>	
— STRATEGY OF TERROR	7
<i>Part Two :</i>	
— THE RECORD	19
I. — The Huê Massacre (1968) — A communist crime against humanity	21
II. — The Highway of Terror (Quang-Tri) — 1972	23
III. — Communist Atrocities in An-Loc (1972)	45
IV. — The Bloodbath in Binh-Dinh (1972)	49
V. — Samples of Communist Acts of Terror.....	53
<i>Part Three :</i>	
— INTERNATIONAL OPINION ON COMMUNIST ATROCITIES	57
<i>Appendix 1 :</i>	
— Two samples of death sentences pronounced by the so-called « People's Courts » and « Revolutionary Committees »	75
<i>Appendix 2 :</i>	
— Civilian victims of Communist terrorism and Sabo- tage	93
<i>Appendix 3 :</i>	
— Official protests to ICSC against Communist Atro- cities	95
<i>Appendix 4 :</i>	
— North Viet-Nam infiltration system into the Repu- blic of Viet-Nam	107

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200090001-5

PART I

STRATEGY OF TERROR

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The Communist Strategy of Terror

There is all the difference between acts of individual savagery in war time and atrocities which result from the deliberate policy of a government.

The Hue Massacre (1968) or the recent atrocities committed by the Communists in Quang-Tri and Binh-Dinh (1972) were not acts of individual savagery. They were indeed a deliberate communist tactics designed to spread terror among the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The policy had been laid down by COSVN, The Central Office for South Viet-Nam of the Viet-Nam Workers Party — the ruling party in North Viet-Nam.

Most people have heard of the massacres in Hue in 1968 where the Communists, after its capture, executed 5,800 people but captured communist documents show that they not only gloated over these figures and only complained that they had not killed enough. These were part of a policy designed to subjugate a people who would not bend to their will.

Little attention, however, has been given to communist atrocities. This document is destined to enlighten public opinion on

the strategy of terror put to use by the Communists in Viet-Nam as part of their policy of aggression aimed at taking over South Viet-Nam by force and violence.

There are those who predict that a ruthless bloody massacre of all people the communists regard as their enemies would be inevitable. Others discuss estimates in terms of the human cost of a communist victory in Viet-Nam. However, no one could challenge the well-documented fact that the communists would resort to terror as means of control over the population for it has been their strategy long before any world public opinion focused onto Viet-Nam.

I. — THE USE OF TERROR : AN ADVOCATED POLICY OF THE COMMUNISTS.

It has been long noted that communist doctrine from Lenin to Stalin, from Mao-Tse-Tung to Ho-Chi-Minh -- has consistently emphasized the imperative need for mass terror and violence. Lenin once told his followers that « not a single revolutionary government can dispense with the death penalty for exploiters », and before the Leningrad Party in June 1918 he reiterated : « the energy and mass nature of terror must be encouraged ».

Mao-Tse-Tung, an ardent Leninist has added some refinements of his own to the pioneering terrorism of Lenin. In one of his works published in March 1927 he wrote that a revolution cannot be « kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous ». For the revolution to be succeeded, he continued : « to put it bluntly, it is necessary to create terror for a while in every rural area ».

Ho-Chi-Minh, a dedicated disciple of Lenin, used terrorism to liquidate his political opposition, not only the nationalist groups but also the Trotskyist movement. Truong-Chinh, in his book *The August Revolution* (Hanoi : Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962) remarked that in the August revolution, the communists had killed too few people. He put it this way :

« We admit that because of the extremely intricate situation in our country and the relatively limited strength of the Vietnamese revolution, it was not possible to carry out a systematic elimination of the counter-revolutionary elements on Jacobean or Bolshevik lines... We regret that the repression of the reactionaries during the August period was not carried out more fully, within the framework of the possibilities... For a newborn revolutionary power to be lenient with counter-revolutionaries is tantamount to committing suicides. »

In the present conflict, communist statements and directives given to cadres as shown in captured documents bear their own testimony to the practice of repression and terror.

From the COSVN *Resolution Nine* of July 1969, one notes that among their set objectives is the effort

« to destroy the various political, social, economic and militia-type programmes of the Government of Viet-Nam which are under way in the country's 2,500 villages — collectively known as the Pacification Programme — thus destroying any faith and trust villagers might have in the Saigon Government. »

In pursuing this objective, the communists have intensified the use of what they call « armed struggle », « armed reconnaissance » or « sapper work » which are just coating words meaning nothing more than terror and violence. COSVN, the Central Office of South Viet-Nam of the Viet-Nam Workers Party is the body which has since 1961 directed the war in the Republic of Viet-Nam. Its policy statements, like Resolution Nine are the Viet-Cong's guidelines.

Indeed, the communists always choose their words most carefully when writing or talking about what we all know as violence, terror, elimination and retribution. Therefore, one has to be familiar with their language to catch them advocating vengeance and terror in their own published statements and documents.

In communist jargon, one is seldom shot or decapitated, he is — as always described by the communist — « punished » or « the Front has exercised its power ». The victim is never a civil servant or a rural development cadre but a « puppet repressor », a « cruel element » or a « tyrant » ; never a policeman but a « secret agent » or a « lackey henchman ». Never is one a member of the political or religious group opposing the communists, but a « key reactionary or recalcitrant element in an oppressive organization ». Always « cruel fascists are brought to justice » or « criminal acts against patriots avenged » or « the Front has carried out its severe verdict against the aggressors » not that non-combatants have been slaughtered.

In a Viet-Cong document captured in VC Military Region 3, called *Resolution Concerning Security Tasks to be Performed*

from October 1970 to June 1971, one finds this « specific mission » set out to be fulfilled by communist cadre :

« ... in enemy controlled rural areas and disputed areas where we are weak, ...we must actively arrest and destroy enemy ring-leaders and tyrants and disorganize the enemy oppressive machinery which includes such elements as village and hamlet administrative personnel, leaders of the People's Self-Defense Force, reactionary landlords, reactionaries in various religions and political parties and ethnic minority people, surrenders, traitors and pacification personnel, etc. We must expose from two to five enemy secret espionage networks and kill or arrest from one to three ring-leaders in the hamlets... If they are worthy of being condemned to death, we must kill them without delay. As for those who do not deserve to be killed, apply on-the-spot repressive measures... »

The Resolution concluded in these words :

« We should make our comrades fully understand the guidelines and policy of repressing anti-revolutionaries. In the repression of anti-revolutionaries, we must have specific plans for each target and each area of operation. We must resolutely destroy the cruel ring-leaders and break up the ranks of their henchmen to serve the Party's political purposes... »

One aspect of the Communist strategy seems to be that terror is required to achieve three major objectives :

— Terror to diminish the opposing force, both in terms of eliminating key individuals and in reducing the power which the other side has accumulated. Terror weakens greatly and that is the single most important gain the communists achieve in its use. COSVN's Directive No 19-CT : *Plan For Intensifying the Repression of Counter-Revolutionaries and Gaining Control of the People*, captured in June 1970, reads :

« Kill one (enemy) official in order to shake the entire clique. Conduct political attacks continuously to cause dissension among enemy ranks and isolate enemy ring-leaders in order to destroy the morale and organization of the enemy. »

— Terror to sustain communist morale. This is to the communists a serious objective, for a guerrilla leader knows that his men often see themselves alone, beleaguered, surrounded and outnumbered and that nothing could send guerrilla morale soaring and wiped out past feelings of despondency and doubt as a shattering blow delivered to the « enemy » in his lair. Initially this terror builds confidence, later it sustains morale.

— Terror to disorient and psychologically isolate the individual. Terror corrodes the social fabric. An assassination in a village not only frightens villagers but destroys part of the structure which previously was a guarantee of security for the people. Terror removes the underpinnings of the orderly system, creates and sows confusion as much as fear. A civilian expects safety and

order in his society and when these are destroyed he becomes disoriented, for he can no longer draw strength from social support. Instead he becomes fragmented completely within while desperately trying to fix his own personal security.

In a Viet-Cong document : *Security Mission during the first six months of 1969* captured at Que-Son District in January 1969, one finds the following directive on carrying out the « mission of destroying tyrants and eliminating traitors », this set quotas of killing : « Specific norms for destroying tyrants of each village :

Phu Phong	35	officials
Phu Dien	40	—
Phu Hiep	20	—
Son Thanh	30	—
Son Trung	10	—
Son Lanh	20	—
Phu Huong	40	—
Phu Thanh	30	—
Son Khanh	10	—

etc... ».

This proves that killing is not due to rage, frustration or panic, but it is a planned tactics of systematic murder, a rational and justifiable decision in the communists' mind.

The communist targets of terrorism are all those they called « enemies of the people », who are listed in a Viet-Cong document captured in Ben-Tre Province on October 15, 1968 as follows :

« 1. — Personnel who work within or outside enemy organizations of espionage, police, public security, special forces, and psywar including disguised organizations.

« 2. — People who are members of reactionary parties, reactionary political organizations and reactionary organizations disguised under religious covers.

« 3. — Those who have joined enemy paramilitary and military organizations (including puppet troops under the French domination).

« 4. — Those who have served as puppet government officials from Chief of Inter-families level upwards.

« 5. — Leading and key members of popular organizations set up by the enemy.

« 6. — Members who engage in the enemy's cultural, art, information, propaganda and press activities.

« 7. — Leading and key members of religions and their followers who still remain deeply superstitious.

« 8. — Thieves, robbers, assassins, prostitutes, black-marketeers and those who trade in popular superstitions.

« 9. — Individuals captured by the enemy, who disclosed important information to him, those who accept enemy missions and those who did not disclose anything to the enemy but are still suspicious to us because of their activities.



Picture of Highway no. 1 in Quang-Tri taken about a week after the killing.

« 10. — Exploiters, those whose original class was exploiters, those whose wives or husbands came from the exploiter class and those whose ideological stand is vague, who do not firmly side with the labouring class.

« 11. — Individuals who display a backward political ideology or display dishonest concept and actions.

« 12. — Those whose relatives are participating in enemy espionage, security, cruel special forces, and psywar organizations ; those who are the key and leading members of reactionary parties and organizations disguised under religious covers, puppet armed forces servicemen from corporal up, and enemy government officials from village level up.

« 13. — Those whose relatives were condemned to death, imprisoned by the Revolution or who had been victims of mistakes committed during the land reform campaign and who still bear a grudge against the Revolution despite the rectification campaign, or those who were jailed by the Revolution.

« 14. — Deserters or missing individuals who return without a clear explanation for their absence.

« 15. — Individuals with suspicious past activities or whose background warrants an investigation. »

(15 Categories to be kept under watch : from a VC notebook captured in Ben-Tre Province on Oct. 15, 1968).

According to the criteria set in this list, at least three to five million of South Vietnamese are on the communist surveillance list, and so are potential candidates for execution. To implement their policy of repression on these « targets », the communists generally resort to five different forms of pressure that can be identified as : (1) private warning, (2) public warning, (3) house arrest, (4) reform camp and (5) execution.

Warning which is the mildest form of repression, may be verbal or written, and delivered by a courier or sent through the mail. Mr. Luc Hoang, a reporter with the *Tan Van* daily newspaper, received on Sept. 10, 1970 this warning from the « Special Action Company C.106 of the People's Revolutionary Committee Saigon — Gia-Dinh ».

« We send you this letter to warn you seriously to put an immediate end to your running-dog acts of betraying the people... If you fail to observe this warning, your life and property will not be secure ».

Repressive missions are the role of the communist Security Forces which are

« a sharp tool for the class struggle of the Party, an absolute tool of the revolutionary government, a combat force and a spearhead element to attack the enemy. Its mission is to continue actively the destruction of intelligence and espionage agents of the U.S. imperialists, their anti-revolutionary and obdurate lackeys, the hired spies of capitalist-imperialist countries and the common law criminals in order to contribute substantial efforts to destroy the reactionary Puppet Government and to seize complete power for the people ».

(Viet-Cong captured document : *Training Document Concerning Directive 17/CTNT of the Standing Committee of NT-COSVN, 1968*).

The Security Branch whose primary task is to carry out non-military violence and terror programmes, is usually organized in three types of functional units. The « Para-Military Cell » which is the least professional of the three, engages in sabotage, small strike operations and « punishment » missions in villages of the rural area. Members of the cell tend to be very young. The « Special Activities Cell » being the most efficient terrorist unit, is in charge of abductions, assassinations, extortions and intimidation in both rural and urban areas. Its members are highly motivated and many have long experience in terrorism. The « Sapper Cell » operates chiefly in urban areas and engages in terrorist attacks against non-military targets such as Revolutionary Development teams, pacified villages, refugee centres, People's-Self Defence Force units, etc... Its members are mostly Northerners, party members and highly specialized in the handling of explosives, dynamite or plastic. The main targets of the « sapper cell » are government buildings, communication and transportation centres, port and storage facilities, people and vehicles in urban areas.

All those who engage in terrorism as parts of the three categories of cells are trained in Camp Ba-thu which is located in the « Parrot's Beak » of Cambodia. The curriculum at Ba-thu includes political indoctrination and techniques of assassination, kidnapping and ambush. The mission set to individual is :

« To eliminate tyrants, local administrative personnel, betrayers, those who undermine our movement and those who terrorize the people... In order to oust the puppet government and seize power for ourselves, we must resort to revolutionary violence, both military and political... ».

(From a captured notebook from a communist agent who attended the course at Ba-Thu early 1969).

By and large, the communists' own literature has revealed to us that the Hue massacre of 1968 and the recent slaughters in Quang-Tri and Binh-Dinh were no more accidents of war, but a part of a calculated communist tactic to suppress the opposition and control the population. In these two symbolic cases one could see how faithfully the Viet-Cong have carried out their directives and what is the human cost of communism in Viet-Nam.

PART II

THE RECORD

- I. — THE HUE MASSACRE (1968)
 - A COMMUNIST CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

- II. — THE HIGHWAY OF TERROR (Quang-Tri 1972)
 - THE WILFULL KILLING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS BY THE COMMUNISTS

- III. — COMMUNIST ATROCITIES IN AN-LOC

- IV. — THE BLOODBATH IN BINH-DINH

- V. — SAMPLES OF COMMUNIST ACTS OF TERROR

I. — THE HUE MASSACRE (1968) —

A COMMUNIST CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

During the communist offensive against Hue in February 1968, and their temporary occupation of this city, the Communists proceeded to an elimination on a massive scale of all those whom they suspected would not be favourable to them. The number of murdered victims by the Communists during a period of 4 weeks in Hue is 5,800 civilians.

Mrs Nguyễn-thi-Binh, the self-styled « Foreign Minister » of the self-created « Provisional Revolutionary Government » once sought to attribute the murders to local rival factions, but Hanoi Radio (April 27, 1969) stated that « hooligan lackeys in Hue had been annihilated ».

Who are those people whom the Communists consider as hooligan lackeys ?

From various communist documents fallen into the hands of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, one can build a grim picture of what would happen to the population in South Viet-Nam if ever the Communists succeeded in their invasion. The emphasis will be of some 15 different categories (see Part I). All

those who have been deeply involved in the war against the Communists (Armed forces, civil servants, local authorities...) would be singled out as being members of the first half dozen categories to be eliminated at the top of the list.

Then come members of religious groups and those who « remain deeply religious ». Further down in the list are those who display a backward political approach, those being relatives of people who were condemned to death during the land reform campaign.

Most ominous is the last category which embraces « all suspicious people ».

THE MEANING OF THE HUE MASSACRE.

« The meaning of the Hue massacre seems clear. If the Communists win decisively in South Viet-Nam... what is the prospect ? First all foreigners would be cleared out of the South, especially the hundreds of foreign newsmen who are in and out of Saigon. A curtain of ignorance would descend. Then would begin a night of long knives... All political opposition, actual or potential would be systematically eliminated ».

« But little of this would be known abroad. The Communists in Viet-Nam would create a silence. The world would call it peace ».

(Douglas Pike — The Viet Cong strategy of terror)

II. — THE HIGHWAY OF TERROR — QUANG-TRI (1972):

THE WILFULL KILLING OF UNARMED CIVILIANS BY
THE COMMUNISTS.

About two thousand persons had been killed on that portion of Highway no. 1 between a bridge and the hamlet of La-Vang. Most of the dead were women, children and old men. Communist artillery opened deliberate fire on clearly marked civilian vehicles.

1. — « The terror was beyond imagination » said Nguyễn-Kinh-Châu, a representative of the Song Than Daily paper, who had accompanied ARVN paratroopers on the first day they returned to Quang-Tri in an attempt to recapture it. That was in early July.

Mr Chau and the paratroopers were among the first to discover the bodies of the dead still lying along the road. « There are no words to describe that terrible scene along the road », Mr Chau said :

« These were mostly women, children and old people who were only trying to find refuge. They were encircled and deliberately killed. The wounded were left to die where they fell. Such an act cannot be tolerated. History will remember the other side (the Communists) for their inhuman actions ».

Mr Chau organized a volunteer group of civilians to search for bodies. Finding the bodies was difficult, because numerous sand storms had covered many of them and the rainy season had further complicated the search process. The volunteers also came under communist shellfire from the mountains and hills overlooking Highway no. 1.

2. -- Former NVA Corporal Le-Xuan-Thuy's account provides additional elements :

(a) that the North Vietnamese Commanders of the ambushes were perfectly aware of what they were doing,


(b) that some of the NVA troops participating objected to the killing of civilians,

(c) that the attacks took place over a period of five days -- April 29 through May 3 -- rather than two-day period originally reported.

Former Corporal Thuy, who rallied to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on July 31, was a member of a signal platoon attached to 4th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 32th North Vietnamese Division. He had been assigned the task of establishing communications between his battalion headquarters and North Vietnamese Forces operating in the area of Can-Dai Bridge, near Highway no. 1, and witness the action occurring in his particular area.



Buddhist nuns and priests are united in pity and outrage as they seek to insure decent disposal of the remains of the civilians massacred outside Quang-Tri city last April-May. Here a nun-scoops sand out of the hole into which an unidentified body will soon be lowered, while a Buddhist priest awaits the moment for the ceremony.



Showing their complete disregard for the population the Communists continue to lob indiscriminately shellings into population centre. The toll in human misery is extremely high. The above photograph shows that a school has been damaged by Communist shellings in Quang-Tri.

Here is how former NVA Corporal Thuy tells his story :

« We had been ordered to shoot on anybody escaping to the South along the Quang-Tri Thua-Thien road. I saw many vehicles hit. All kinds of vehicles ranging from bicycles to armoured cars were attacked by the Communists. The Regiment Commander had ordered the Battalion Commander to do so. We were ordered to shoot at all young men, whether they rode on bicycles or walked. We were not to shoot at women who walked separately. »

« But a civilian car full of civilians was nevertheless attacked. They (the Commanders) said if these people were fleeing to the South, then they were on the enemy side. So they fired at the civilians. The Communists also shot at two armoured cars full of young men, soldiers as well as civilians. The Battalion Commander ordered the firing of 60 mm and 82 mm mortars at those armoured cars ». « The 82 mm mortars were about 20 metres from the targets and the 60 mm about 100 metres. People moving in groups which included men were attacked with machine-guns... »

« The Communists shot at all men who walked. But they had received orders not to shoot at old people. Nevertheless, when there were men among the old people, all of them are attacked ».

« After shooting them, the Communists went to inspect the bodies and took all the victims' belongings which were considered war booty. I saw many old women and children falling on the spot. »

Replying to a question on the reason for the indiscriminate firing and shelling, the rallier said :

« In my opinion the Communists considered all people fleeing Quang-Tri to the South, were pro-government people. As such, they were considered anti-communists and had to be shot at. Those who had stayed behind in Quang-Tri city were compelled by the Communists to go to Vinh-Linh. »

He was asked :

« When you ventured out on the road, did you see the bodies of any children ? »

« Yes, about 10 children... dead and scattered along the road for about one kilometer. »

« How many female bodies did you see ? »

« About 10, but a greater number were wounded. They sat in the gutters or under the bushes. »

« Did you see many old people dead or wounded ? »

« Many... »



« The Communists considered all people fleeing Quang-Tri to the South were pro-government people. As such they were considered anti-communists and had to be shot at. » (Defector Le-Xuan-Thuy, NVA Corporal, an eyewitness of the tragedy on the Highway of terror).

« Were there many young men dead ? »

« A lot of young men died. »

« In your judgment were they civilians or servicemen ?
Were they villagers or city people ? »

« In my opinion they were young men from all walks
of life... students or young men who were not in the
army... »

He added :

« When we returned to our unit for critiques, the men
complained to the leaders about the indiscriminate firing
and said it was wrong, but the leaders did not agree. They
said the civilians were part of the enemy population, and
that if they were allowed to flee they would later take up
arms and shoot us. We were under orders to fire on every-
one, and we had to carry out those orders. »

He refused to hazard an estimate of how many were killed ;
there were « too many to count », he said. But he was positive
no one was able to escape.

He is Le Xuan Thuy, a 22-year-old North Vietnamese Army
draftee and he was speaking not of the ARVN (Army of the
Republic of Vietnam) soldiers his regiment did battle within
Quang-Tri five months ago but of civilian refugees who lost out in
their bid for safety in the North's invasion of the South last Easter.

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CPYRGHT

(EXCERPTS FROM VIET-NAM MAGAZINE Vol. V. No. 10, 1972)

by Le Ngoc



**NVA Corporal Le-Xuan-Thuy relates details of massacre
at press conference.**

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The slaughter, he told a press conference in Saigon on September 8, was the major factor why he decided to defect to the South. He made it last July 31 and for the first time, a skeptical western press confirmed « from the horse's mouth », the truth of the NVA massacres on Highway 1 heretofore treated only lightly as « unsubstantiated claims ».

Defectors there have been, but none with as crucial a story as Thuy, a radio operator of the 4th Battalion, 2nd Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army's 324th Division which executed the slaughter.

Allied officials, as early as August, protested both at the forum of the Paris peace talks and in official statements to the press, about the slaughter of « 1,000 to 2,000 » innocent refugees fleeing beleaguered Quang-Tri but the charges were met with deafening silence by the North Vietnamese.

An unbelieving western press abetted the situation and were it not for Thuy, the crime would have been consigned to limbo. In part, it was probably the monstrosity of the slaughter, its magnitude, that prompted open skepticism even among the hard-bitten Saigon press corps.

AMBUSH SET UP

Thuy, a short, medium built fellow who could not keep still as he faced the press, recalled that his division took up positions 100 to 150 yards from Highway 1 on April 28. Only a year earlier, he was drafted into the NVA.

The following day, his battalion commander told them that anyone moving southward from Quang-Tri was « the enemy ». From that date to May 3, just before and after the fall of Quang Tri city, many soldiers and civilians were pouring south out of the fallen city. It was then that the slaughter took place, according to Thuy.


« The people were moving on bicycles, motorbikes and buses. Thuy said. Then his unit poured 61 mm and 82 mm mortar and automatic rifle fire. « No one was able to escape », he said.

Thuy and some of his comrades went up to the highway after the barrage. « It was horrible... many were killed including old people, children and pregnant women... the dyings were screaming and begging for water... Soldiers stripped the corpses, taking watches, rice, money and clothes ».

MOPPED UP

« Thuy recounted that his fellow soldiers dragged some of those who still showed signs of life from shelters along the road, ordered them to move out of the area then shot them as they ran. »

« He revealed that two NVA soldiers donned civilian clothes they found on the highway, got on bicycles and started riding towards Quang-Tri city. When they reached an area which was covered by another NVA unit, they were also shot. Thuy could not explain the incident. »



Villagers carry remains of North Vietnamese fire
Viet-Nam Magazine Vol. V. 10, 1972

EXECUTIONS WITNESSED

« There were other outrages Thuy witnessed. He recounted that before the massacre on Highway 1, he also saw the execution of people in Quang-Tri reported to be « servants » of the Saigon regime. »

« The first one, he said, was when NVA soldiers found a couple in a village whose name he could not recall. The woman was immediately shot by her captors and her husband was beheaded. »

« Shortly afterwards, an NVA unit seized another couple trying to flee from Quang-Tri to Thua-Thien. They were summarily shot » according to Thuy.

III. — COMMUNIST ATROCITIES IN AN LOC.

The execution and torture of anti-communist civil servants of the Viet-Nam Government is hardly new in the conduct of the communist struggle for power in South Vietnam. In An-Loc, they have practised the form of terror and revenge as they did elsewhere constantly and ruthlessly to frighten people into submissiveness.

The following testimony of refugees and escapees from An-Loc, as recorded by correspondent Nicolas Ruggieri of IPS, is considered fragmentary but sufficient to picture how the communists have applied their « proselyting program » and « leniency » to their innocent other-siders.

The dispatch went like this :

« ... A woman refugee who declined to give her name told of three officials slain by the communists in the area.

— How did they kill them ?

— They gunned them down.

— Did you see how they gunned them down ?

— They shot them in the head.

— How many bullets ?

— Three bullets, one for each man.

— Did the communists call upon the people to come and witness the executions ?

— Yes, they call upon the people to go there, but the people are afraid of seeing the killing... nobody wants to go. First those communists planned to carry out the execution at the bus station, later they did it at the police station. The people do not want to see these bloody executions...

Lê-Van-Can, a rural development cadre from An-Loc, said :
« If one of us was captured, it's sure he would be severely punished. The communists would kill him in the most miserable way, such as cutting up his hands and his feet and arrange the pieces of hands and feet on the ground so that they would spell out « rural development cadre. »



Indiscriminate shelling of civilian quarters in Binh-Long by the North Vietnamese Communist troops.

— In your opinion, are civil servants and cadres particular targets of the communists ?

— They called us wicked pacification and considered us their number one enemies. They would kill us immediately if we were captured. Next to us (rural development cadres) are policemen and security agents.

Tran-Van-Hoa, a youthful An-Loc refugee who is a polio victim said :

— My father was an interfamily chief. He ran for hamlet chief and was placed on the communists' black-list. When he became security officer of our hamlet he was again marked for death. Knowing this, he decided to join the army. One night he came back to see our family, and the communists tracked him down and burned the house. He managed to escape but was soon captured and after 30 minutes of investigation the communists killed him on the spot... »

IV. — THE BLOODBATH IN BINH-DINH.

The communists always talk about their « War of Liberation » and their sacred mission of « Liberating the South ». They had the chance to control the northern part of Binh-Dinh for two months and here is one among many stories of how people are « liberated » --- to the extend from --- by them :

« ... Mrs Nguyễn-Thi-Chin, the mother of three children, recounted for us the events which made her a widow. Her husband, Mr Ho-Nguu, the elect hamlet chief of Tai Luong on Highway 1 a few kilometers north of Bong Son in Hoa-Nhon District, was with the 40th Regiment in position close to his hamlet. At the time the regiment abandoned their camp under heavy communist attack, Mr Nguu was unable to leave with the soldiers because during the withdrawal he was badly burned by napalm which hit close to his position. The communists let his wife take him back to their home in Tai-Luong where she nursed him.

« Then on May 25, just about the time he was able to get out of bed and walk slowly, the cadres came to the house and arrested both Mr Nguu and his wife. Their arms were tied behind them and they were led to the Hoai-Thanh Primary School on Highway 1 where some three hundred people had been gathered.

« Again it was a night time setting. Mrs Nguu was forced to kneel behind him. As the « People's Court » proceeded, Nguu was accused of being a « running dog » of the enemy, « oppressing » the people and « serving the illegal government of the enemy instead of serving the revolution ».

« One of the cadre shouted, « What the fate of the husband is to be must also be the fate of the wife ». But

another cadre spoke up and said since it was only her husband who had committed the crimes she should not suffer the same fate but could be « re-educated ».

« There were five cadres sitting at the court table. They were VC, including a provincial level cadre, a district level cadre, a hamlet level cadre and one other. Nearby there were three NVA cadres in uniform. She recognized three of the local cadres, Pham Giang, De Quy and Doan Thuong. She could see about fifty armed VC and cadre all together and those not participating in the court proceedings were interspersed among the crowd.

Mr Nguu's assistant Mr Phan-Duc in charge of security was also tried (just proceeding Nguu's trial) but he was only sentenced to « re education » — this « lenient » sentence was decided, she was told later, because Duc had an uncle who had « regrouped » to the North in 1954. Some days later the people in the hamlet said that actually Duc was « taken up the mountain » and executed. The cadre explained that « he tried to escape ».

« During the time of the trial Mr Nguu was in great pain, his wife told us, because his badly burned knees had not fully healed and the kneeling caused the skin to break open. When he would try to shift his position to ease the pain a cadre would grab him by the hair and thrust him down onto his knees again.

« The court added a number of other charges to his list of crimes. He was denounced for having paid a reward to a government soldier who had killed an important VC in battle, and they demanded that he paid back the reward to them. They also demanded that he paid back all the registration and other fees which the hamlet had collected from the people and the money people paid for their ID cards. (The cost of ID cards was twenty piasters per person to pay for the photograph and this fee, which is standard, was actually collected by the police as provided by law and Nguu was never involved in the collection). Since the cadre had confiscated all of the family's money, valuables and many of their belongings, he was, of course, unable to pay back anything.

« The cadre then polled each member of the estimated three hundred persons in attendance one by one asking them to give their verdict for life or death and inviting them to make additional charges. As the lantern was held up to each one (with cadre at their elbow) the entire group one by one said « death ». This procedure took about one and a half hours and Mr Nguu nearly fainted from pain several times.

« After the last member of the crowd had been polled the court announced that the people had decided the ver-

dict of death and that he was to be executed forthwith. The cadre then pulled him, stumbling and falling to the market place about two hundred and fifty meters south of the school on Highway 1. There they ordered his wife to stay there and they took Mr Nguu to the small bridge (culvert) near the market and he was killed by automatic weapon fire... »

V. — SAMPLES OF COMMUNIST ACTS OF TERROR.

During the massive North Vietnamese invasion which began at the end of March, the communist forces have been committing atrocities almost daily with the unmistakable purpose of terrorizing the civilian population into submission. These tactics of terror have been employed in the familiar pattern which has characterized communist policy in Indochina for decades.

Following are some representative examples which may be cited to illustrate the point :

(A) On september 9, enemy sapper attacks on refugee camps near Da-Nang left 27 defenceless refugees dead and 75 wounded. These precision attacks on the very people made homeless by the North Vietnamese invasion obviously were aimed at psychological impact through the use of sheer terror.

(B) On September 13, the enemy blew up a ferry boat carrying a bus crowded with civilians in Chuong-Thien province in the Mekong delta killing 13 people and wounding 12.

(C) VC terrorists staged a sapper attack against a leper colony in the early hours of October 6. The director of the colony stated that two sappers ran from house to house throwing concussion grenades. Fortunately casualties were held to one killed and 19 wounded because by first attacking an outlying building, the enemy gave an early warning. A time delay bomb planted under the school went off during school hours but class was not in session — The leper colony which is situated in an isolated location Northwest of Da-Nang, has no defence. The purpose of the attack could only be terror pure and simple.

(D) Over the years the placement by communist forces of explosive mines on public highways has taken a tragic toll of civilian lives. Two recent examples :

On August 20, a civilian bus traveling just North of Cheo-Reo in Phu-Bon province struck a communist mine killing 40 and wounding 30. Two days later another civilian bus struck another enemy mine on the same road, just South of Cheo-Reo, killing 21 and wounding 2.

(F) Various instances of systematic executions and reprisals have been reported from those areas which fell under VC/NVN control following the North Vietnamese invasion. Most of this information comes from the debriefing of refugees.

(1) At a meeting in May, the deputy secretary of the communist Hoai-An district committee produced dossiers on thousands VN officials and employees who had been captured and accused of crimes. The communists attending

the meeting reviewed the charges and decided to condemn 35 of them to death. They also decided to hold a public district people's court to announce the verdicts.

(2) Sometime during the period April/May 1972, the communist forces buried alive approximately 47 GVN employees and soldiers South of Tan-Thanh hamlet, Hoai-Hao village, Tam-Quan district, Binh-Dinh province. One of the victims was Dan-Tam, a GVN hamlet chief.

(3) In early August reports reached from Binh Dinh province of the deaths at the hands of the communist forces of between 250 and 500 non-combatants. Among those killed were doctors, nurses, teachers, GVN technical service officials as well as ordinary civilians. These assassinations were often conducted in public and sometimes followed brutal torture. The purpose was clearly to intimidate the population; witnesses were, in their own words, « Frozen with fear. »

(4) These and other attacks on innocent civilians have resulted so far this year in 3,459 known murders. An additional 7,261 civilians have been wounded and approaching 12,000 have been abducted (mostly to be impressed as laborers to serve the communist forces.)

(5) Some individuals have attempted to challenge the prospect of a « Blood Bath » should South Viet-Nam fall a prey to the invaders; all men of good will recoil at the thought. But, as demonstrated by these further authenticated instances of deliberate terror and systematic assassination, the record is tragically clear.

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PART III

INTERNATIONAL OPINION
ON COMMUNIST ATROCITIES

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THE UTILITY OF HATRED

If there was an essence of the NLF indoctrination effort, if there was an élan vital that permeated its system, if there was an emotion the leadership found of greater utility than all others combined, if there was any personality trait that differentiated the Vietnamese of the two camps, indeed if one were obliged to write the history of the NLF in a single word, it would be **hate**. Every NLF act was surrounded by an aura of hate.

Excerpt from the Viet-Cong by DOUGLAS PIKE
The M.I.T. Press.

« Some American officials see the executions in Binh-Dinh as a microcosm of the kind of « bloodbath » that President Nixon has indicated would occur if the Communists succeeded in taking over South Viet-Nam by force..

« Some Americans studying North Vietnamese and Viet-Cong affairs say they have been surprised by the particularly harsh tactics of the communists in Binh-Dinh province..

« There has been nothing of the magnitude of the reported event in Binh-Dinh... ».

JOSEPH B. TREASTER

New York Times and Washington Star Sept. 1972.

« ... We have reported Viet-Cong attacks on civilians on many, many occasions. There is, unfortunately, nothing unusual in the report of a headman's being assassinated in a village, or reprisals against a peasant reluctant to cooperate with the Viet-Cong. Such reports are too common to attract more than cursory notice by the news agencies. »

Testimony from BINGSON

The Press Christchurch

New Zealand, November 23, 1971.

Supporters of the Saigon régime, military or civilian, are considered « traitors » and « enemies of the people ». Thus North Vietnamese and Viet-Cong troops do not feel themselves bound by the Geneva Convention, and anyone living in a Government controlled area is a potential target.

South Vietnamese troops have been known to shoot prisoners, but there is no evidence of Government soldiers killing civilians in reprisal for real or imagined collaboration with North Vietnamese occupation forces.

Excerpts from Atrocity Stories reinforce fears of Viet-Cong bloodbath.

HOLGER JENSEN

Daily American, September 26, 1972.

Forces of the North Vietnamese Army, who had infiltrated into the South had in the beginning of May deliberately fired with grenades and machine-guns into an unarmed group of refugees, fleeing from the city of Quang-Tri. More than one hundred children, women and old people died in the shooting...

The number of Asians is huge. Families are large. But this does not mean that the loss of a son is more bearable for a Vietnamese mother than for a Finnish one. There are no meaningless corpses in Viet-Nam...

Excerpts from Aftermath of a massacre
RAULI VIRJANEN.

Of course you want the Viet-Cong to take over the Government in Saigon: that is what the war is all about. But the South Vietnamese have no desire to be ruled by the Communists. If in doubt, as the tens of thousands of refugees who fled before your advancing troops rather than face the systematic executions with which you celebrated your brief triumph at Hue and other places during the Têt Offensive four years ago...

Open letter to General Giap,
BRIAN CROZIER
Forum World Feature, July 1972

« There could be no greater atrocity than that at Hue ».

Sir DINGLE FOOT

Debate at the House of Commons

Dec. 8, 1969.

I should like to pay tribute to the courage of the people of Viet-Nam — both the fighting-men and the civilians — in the face of an enemy as ruthless and brutal as any to which the forces of justice and humanity have ever been opposed...

*Excerpt from the speech made by Mr IAN SPROAT, M.P.,
at a reception hold in London on July 22nd, 1972.*

Even more civilians have been hurt than the statistics show... There have been no report for example, from the worst battlegrounds, such as those at Quang-Tri and An-Loc — Furthermore, the reporting system is based on the records of South Vietnamese hospitals. Many of the civilians wounded never reach these hospitals and therefore are not counted...

JOSEPH B. TREASTER

The New York Times

August 27, 1972.

« The killing was so awful, according to reports from men this reporter is in contact with, that the citizenry of Hue remembered the communists with hatred to this day.

« Thus though the Saigon Government perhaps would win no popularity contest in Hue, the citizens there hate the communists far more... »

Excerpt from Two red invasions leave legacies of hate
The Evening and Sunday Star, August 21, 1972.

« *Mots d'ordre communiste :*

« *Pas de quartier aux fonctionnaires Sud-Vietnamiens.* »

« *L'exécution systématique des fonctionnaires Sud-Vietnamiens qui leur sont hostiles est de règle chez les Communistes. Tout récemment, dans leur tentative de s'emparer de An-Loc, ces derniers ont de nouveau appliqué cette politique inhumaine.* »

« *Les déclarations de la plupart des évacués et de personnes qui ont réussi à s'échapper des zones occupées par les communistes le montrent clairement...* »

RADIO PHNOM-PENH

Emission du 18-8-1972.

QUANG-TRI REFUGEES

A steady stream of refugees has been moving South from tiny hamlets and villages between Dong-Ha and the DMZ since the North Vietnamese invasion of Quang-Tri province...

They could remain at home to welcome the self-proclaimed « *liberators* » from the North or flee to the South. They choose the South, despite all the misery and sufferings they will undergo as refugees... By walking away from the « *liberators* », the people of Quang-Tri are virtually « Voting with their feet ».

All the time Communist soldiers from the North have carried with them death and destruction to the South.

It is worth recalling that throughout the war, South Vietnamese troops have never marched over the DMZ into North Viet-Nam.

THE BANGKOK POST

April 7, 1972.

CPYRGHT

On ne gagne pas une guerre révolutionnaire psychologique par l'assassinat délibéré de 20.000 civils innocents : on la perd définitivement. Les charniers de Huê et d'ailleurs, les populations de Dakson incendiées au lance-flammes, les milliers d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants libérés par la rapide méthode des rafales et des égorgements ordonnés par les cán-bộ (commissaires politiques) tout ce macabre spectacle sonnait en réalité le glas des forces nord-vietnamiennes, qu'elles soient classiques, maquisardes ou subversives.

BERNARD MOINET

Le Libéral No. 198.

George McGovern's view of Viet-Nam is so incredible as to be almost beyond belief...

The Senator from South Dakota says the Communists would be generous victors. He knows nothing about Communists. He ignores the evidence of North Vietnamese mass murders and other atrocities within the last few months.

George McGovern is not a bad man but he is ill-informed and badly advised...

CHINA NEWS

August 21, 1972

The Western conscience is immediately pricked by an American committed atrocity, such as My-Lai, and by the civilian casualties caused by the bombing of the North (although such casualties are now likely to be far less than during 1965-68 because of the development of the extremely accurate « smart » bomb).

Little or no attention, however, and certainly no equivalent reporting, has been given to similar Viet-Cong or North Vietnamese atrocities which have occurred on a scale that makes My-Lai almost insignificant. These have not occurred because of some aberration, accident or inaccuracy of bombing. They have occurred, both selectively and indiscriminately, as a matter of deliberate policy...

Most people have heard of the massacres at Hué in 1968 where the Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese, after its capture, executed 5,700 people (as assessed from the mass graves found afterwards) but who knows that in captured documents they gloated over these figures and only complained that they had not killed enough ? These were not aberrations, nor savagery for savagery's sake, nor the work of undisciplined soldiers acting in violation of instructions, but part of a ruthless deliberate policy designed to break a people who would not otherwise bend to their will.

There are distressing implications for the future. If the invasion succeeds and the North takes over to South, what will the bloodbath be ? Four years ago I estimated that it would be several hundred thousands.

I now wish to amend that figure to well over one million (out of eighteen million people).

Excerpts from The Human Cost of Communism
SIR ROBERT THOMPSON
The New York Times
June 19, 1972.

« Hanoi's forces systematically attack innocent civilians and civilian population centers as part of a deliberate policy to terrorize people into submission. The attacks have been characterized by some of the most brutal actions directed against civilians. These actions constitute as I have said a deliberate policy undertaken by the North Vietnamese Armed Forces, endorsed and directed by the leadership in Hanoi... »

Excerpt from the Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN before The U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 28, 1972.

« The fact is, quite simply, that the Viet-Cong want to assassinate or abduct many more people than they are able to, and their leaders have manifested continued dissatisfaction with the success of repression... »

Excerpt from Viet-Cong repression and its
implication for the future
STEPHEN T. HOSMER

CPYRGHT


« It is, of course, impossible to provide material proof for the proposition that a Communist victory in South Viet-Nam would result in a bloodbath. But there are documents and historical indices that permit one to make an intelligent assessment of what is likely to happen if a Communist regime ever should come to power in Saigon. And an examination of the totality of these documents and historical indices point to the almost certain probability that a Communist victory would be followed by a bloodletting that would rival the worst bloodlettings that have taken place in Communists countries to date... »

JAMES O. EASTLAND

U.S. Senator



Special technique of killing by the Communists. Most of their victims had the arms tied behind, displaying holes in the heads or necks.



A Church in District of Hai-Lang (Quang-Tri) destroyed
by Russian-made artillery during the invasion of North
Vietnamese forces in 1972.



The destruction of this Buddhist Temple in Quang-Tri was caused by Communist's indiscriminate shelling.

APPENDIX I

**TWO SAMPLES OF DEATH SENTENCES PRONOUNCED
BY THE SO-CALLED « PEOPLE'S COURTS » AND
« REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES »**

Following are two death sentences among thousands of cases pronounced by the so-called « People's Courts » and « Revolutionary Committees » in areas temporarily occupied by the Communists.

I. — DEATH SENTENCE.

Against 65 year-old farmer TRUONG-VAN-KHAM, condemned to death by Communist « People's Court » on June 12, 1968 and summarily executed by the « Revolutionary Committee » on the same day at the hamlet of Phu-Le, village of Quang-Thuan, District of Quang-Diên, in Province of Thua-Thiên.

HỒ SƠ

CPYRGHT

của Trương Văn Phẩm

Họ và tên: Trương Văn Phẩm 65 tuổi, Phù Lữ, Quảng Thuận
Quảng Niệm Thừa Thiên.

Thành phần: Thu nông.

Liên hệ: Sở Công giáo.

Giống nhau: Không.

Đến từ: Khánh.

Con: Trương Văn Jai 10 tuổi, tr. huyệt công hoa, cây bìa
trung tâm.

: Trương Văn Luân 17 tuổi, tr. huyệt công hoa, cây bìa
trung tâm.

: Trương Thị Tâm 15 tuổi, lấy chồng tr. huyệt công hoa
cây bìa trung tâm.

: Trương Thị Diệu 10 tuổi, lấy chồng tr. huyệt công hoa
cây bìa trung tâm.

Hành động quá khứ: trước chi đội Trương Văn Phẩm là tên gọi của bộ huyệt này là tên nhân, bắt nhân dân xây dựng gia đình của y.

Trong thời kỳ chống Pháp y cũng với tư cách nhân dân đã tiếp tay cho Pháp cũng như thời nhân dân đã sẵn sàng chiến đấu rất ác liệt, cũng như thời kỳ hiện nay.

Hành động hiện tại: Từ ngày 31/12/68 cuối cùng tên y

cuối ta về thôn Phú là ý không cho họ hưởng gì
cả thêm chi' cho ru rỗi vào mỗi ý tưởng tốt gần
này không họ hưởng gì cả, ta biết rồi". Sau trận
Đau ở Đai-Tô "Đai ta nói nguy chết nhiều"
lý tuyên truyền là Việt - cũng nói Lào nói thoát, chết,
Việt cũng chết như tôi tôi đi ra đây.

- Một buổi giờ: Trùng-vân - Khảm nói với là em là,
mấy năm trước ở với quốc gia yên ổn tôi làm đến
bãi học chưa năm, nhưng hiện nay Việt cũng về
hầu cả tan' ở với Việt - cũng không sung sướng gì nữa,
tôi chỉ làm vài năm qua loa mà thôi, và em cũng
hầu cũng phải CM như em đang gặp mỗi quân,
họp hầu lý vấn cũng nên đã liệt ra. cái tạo
một tuần tại xa' rồi cho vì. Từ ngày về ở như
Đài này lý chúng có tiến bộ chút vào như
họp hầu không đi, gặp mỗi quân không sung, vẫn
từng quân cũng cũng sản xuất ra ngoài tình lý
vì hầu chết, hết có súng cũng mua lại cho nhiều.
Mới gần đây tại thời địa cũng quân do tên Trung
lý là chi' họp là của Trùng-vân là
văn thuận gặp 2 cái hôm ta họp đi? ở và
một máy cũng sung. thì lý với rồi cũng báo là:
Quần mũ, xa' mũ và thôn mũ gần yên rồi.
biểu này ở tháng là chán rồi nó giờ qua'
đi đến tháng 10 giết Việt - cũng nhiều và làm

việc này, hiện nay nó ở Tây vãn một số
 nhà Việt cũng như bắt Trung gạo nuôi quân và
 nó giết hết số dư việc này lúc yên bề
 đã hàng ngày ở thường gặp từ Niệm và Tân
 Thanh công an không nó nơi gì. mọi gặp ở
 báo thì nó hàng ở số người là gởi tiếp.
 Các cơ quan họ ở địa điểm cũng như các địa
 điểm ở số và nhân dân viết luận đề Trung-vãn
 và làm là một tên phản động cũng thời và gián
 tiếp cho nên cấp uỷ ở địa điểm cũng ở số và
 nghỉ, một một phiên tòa cho kết án tử hình
 và hình phạt là xử bắn cũng như trước nhân
 số làm giáng cho số phản động và gởi tiếp báo.
 Cho nên chúng tôi đã viết một phiên tòa tại
 thời phu' là'. Phiên tòa gồm có 45 chủ tọa là
 Lê - Hưng - Tô cũng hơn 90 người dân ở thời phu' là
 và xử tử Trung-vãn. ~~Không cần 12 giờ~~
28 giờ cũng vậy, có lập hình ảnh và đưa lại
 cho nhân dân cả đại hội đến các phiên tòa này.

Chủ tọa phiên tòa: *[Signature]*
 Lê - Hưng - Tô

Chủ tịch UBND CTYNA
 Trần - Việt.
[Signature]
 Chủ tịch UBND CTYNA
 Hoàng Phúc Hoa

Excerpts from the above sentence (translated into English).

FILE

of

TRUONG-VAN-KHAM

Name and surname : TRUONG-VAN-KHAM, 65 year-old

Birth place : Phu-Lê, Quang-Thuân, Quang-Diên, Thua-Thiên.

Category : Rich farmer

Religion : Confucianism

Political affiliation : none

Ethnic origin : Vietnamese

Children :

— Truong-van-Tai, 40 year-old, ARVN,
rank : Sergeant.

— Truong-van-Luân, 39 year-old, ARVN,
rank : Sergeant.

— Truong-thi-Ram, 35 year-old, married to Regional
Forces sergeant.

— Truong-thi-Diu, 30 year-old, married to ARVN
sergeant.

.....« Since our offensive on December 31, 1968 at the Hamlet of Phu-Lê, he did not come to our meeting, although our guerilla came to invite him, he said that he was too old to attend the meeting that « I already know what's the meeting about ». After the battle of Dakto, our Radio broadcast that many American troops were killed. He said that « Viet-Cong distorted the truth... » and he had other anti-revolutionary activities : he refused to contribute rice to feed our troops and to come to our meeting, therefore we had sent him for a one-week-reeducation course at the village level. After the course, he made no progress... »

« ... Recently his nephew, Lieutenant Lo of the Regional Forces carried out an operation in Nam-Thuan and uncovered an arms cache. We lost 4 people killed and some weapons. On that opportunity, he said : « My nephew is a wonderful guy, he kills a lot of Viet-Cong guerillas and seizes many weapons », when he is here, we can count on him and the Viet-Cong are not able to force us to contribute rice to feed their troops ».

« Everyday he met two security agents NIEM and THANH we do not know what he was talking to them about but he is believed to be a spy ».

« All our local agents and people of the village concluded that TRUONG-VAN-KHAM is an overt reactionary and spy therefore session be held to condemn him to death. He must be shot before the people to warn other reactionaries and spies ».

Therefore we held a trial session at the hamlet of Phu-Lê, this session was presided over by Lê Hồng-Tu in the presence of 90 inhabitants of the Phu-Lê Hamlet. The sentence was executed at 22:00 hours on June 12, 1969...

President of the trial session
(Signature)

LE-HONG-TU

Chairman, People's
Revolutionary Committee of village

(Signature)

TRAN-VIET

Chairman, People's
Revolutionary Committee
of the hamlet

(Signature)

HOANG-PHUOC-HOA

II. --- DEATH SENTENCE.

Delivered by the People's Committee of Liberation of the village of My-Cat, District of Phù-My, Binh-Dinh Province on October 1, 1970 against 17 local officials ordering all people of the village to execute them with any available weapons (guns, swords, etc.) at any place.

Bảng án tội tử hình

Lê Đạt, Nguyễn Chánh, Phan桂, Nguyễn phúc Hậu,
Nguyễn bá Hữu, Nguyễn Cát, Đỗ Thân, Nguyễn xuân Trường, Phan Chí,
Trần Chí, Trường Phan Hằng Kế, Nguyễn Cát, Nguyễn Mai, Đỗ Công
Trường, Nguyễn Ý, Nguyễn Chung.

Những tên này chủ ý lắng nghe đây: Bức tờ đứng vào vòng móng ngựa cuối đầu xuống, chịu tội trước nhân dân, lắng nghe nhân dân ~~trên~~ ^{hỏi} tội của chúng ý trong mấy năm về trước đây và hiện nay.

Những tên này, có biết hành động, tội trạng đã gây biết bao nhiêu đau thương tang tóc cho nhân dân nhất là từ năm 1966 khi mà (không rạn) bọn Mỹ ra quân ở ác đánh phá phong trào CM. tên này không???

Chính chúng ý đã cố gắng cản gã nhà riết với vì đây mà ^{đây} là đây: Giới cứu thế lên âm mưu của đế quốc Mỹ và bị lừa say sai Chiêu, Kỳ, Khiêm dùng bằng đầu kê máy chém. Ra sức đánh đập, tra tấn tù đây biết bao nhiêu người dân vô tội, bắt thủ tiêu biết bao nhiêu người dân yêu nước, yêu hòa bình, nhằm ngăn chặn phong trào CM của nhân dân đang vùng bước tiến lên. ^{giải phóng} Giới cứu thế lên âm mưu "phi mỹ hoá", "ngụy hoá" chiến tranh, thủ lên âm mưu "bình định cấp tốc", "bình định đặc biệt" nhằm kéo dài cuộc chiến tranh xâm lược miền nam nước Ta, bắt nhân dân ta suốt đời cày cấy làm thân nô lệ cho bọn đế quốc Mỹ.

Chúng muốn xa thấy rằng, Khai nài nài đây xích năm đây giết biết bao nhiêu trẻ. Lo đó mà bản tay của chúng ý đã nhuộm đây máu đỏ với nhân dân Mỹ sát. Chúng may không còn một chút lương tri của con người.

Đây là một hành động điên cuồng, hồ rạng đi ngược lại nguyên vọng thiết tha hòa bình thật sự của nhân dân ta trên toàn cầu, kể nhân dân trên bờ Mỹ nói chung và nhân dân Chủ Mỹ, Mỹ sát nói riêng.

Đây là tội ác chết của chúng ý mà nhân dân toàn xã Mỹ sát đã kết án tử hình.

Đây là giai đoạn cuối cùng của cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước nhân dân ta nhất định vùng bước tiến lên giành thắng lợi hoàn toàn. Chúng ý có biết không??? phải nhanh chóng thủ hình, kịp thời ăn năng hỏi cái, thôi việc, bỏ việc, quay chính, cái ta trình diện với nhân dân và CM. để toàn thân, sum họp với gia đình, và em thì được hưởng lương khoản công nhân tạo của CM. Nếu không... thì tự sát đến bản thân.

Mỹ bọn nhân dân giải phóng xã Mỹ sát đã định cho toàn thể đồng bào trong xã. Nam, nữ, già, trẻ, có súng dùng súng không súng thì dùng gươm, dùng dao bất cứ nơi nào và loại vũ khí gì gặp đâu là trí đó.

Khi đến.

Ngày 1/10/1970
UBND&P xã Mỹ sát

APPENDIX II

**CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM
AND SABOTAGE**

(from 1959 till August 31, 1972)

Year	Killed	Wounded	Kidnapped	TOTAL
1959	102			102
1960	1.159			1.159
1961	2.289			2.289
1962	1.719	6.458	9.688	17.865
1963	2.073	8.375	7.262	17.710
1964	1.611	2.824	6.710	10.645
1965	2.032	2.125	6.929	11.086
1966	2.613	5.690	3.700	12.003
1967	1.183	2.998	.92	4.273
1968	11.192	28.936	1.274	41.402
1969	5.441	18.008	1.879	25.328
1970	4.468	13.347	1.929	19.744
1971	3.736	9.619	2.372	15.727
1972 (August) ..	3.270	8.824	5.778	17.872

APPENDIX III

**ACTS OF TERRORISM ATROCITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF
THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT COMMITTED
BY THE COMMUNISTS**

AS REPORTED IN OFFICIAL NOTES OF PROTEST BY THE
VIETNAMESE MISSION IN CHARGE OF RELATIONS WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION COMMISSION (I.C.S.C.)

I. — INDISCRIMINATE SHELLINGS

1) — *Note No. 849/PDVN/CT/2 of April 7, 1971.*

During the first quarter of 1971, the communists made 128 rocket and mortar attacks, resulting in 216 civilians killed, 663 injured and 2100 houses burnt down or badly damaged.

2) — *Note No. 1516/PDVN/CT/2 of July 9, 1971.*

During the second quarter of 1971, the NVA gunners launched 105 shelling attacks with Chicom 107 mm rocket launchers, Soviet 122 mm rocket launchers and mortars of different calibers, resulting in 147 civilians killed, 615 wounded, 492 dwellings burnt down or totally demolished.

3) — *Note No. 2379/PDVN/CT/2 of October 20, 1971.*

During the third quarter of 1971, the communists made 65 rocket and mortar attacks, killing 59 civilians and injuring 249 others.

4) — *Note No. 0052/PDVN/CT/2 of January 6, 1972.*

During the last quarter of 1971, the Communists perpetrated 72 shelling attacks, resulting in 76 civilians killed, 277 injured and 21 houses damaged.

It was recalled that during 1971, 498 civilians were killed, 1804 wounded and 2693 houses damaged in 370 shelling attacks launched by the Communists.

5) — *Note No. 751/PDVN/CT/2 of April 21, 1972.*

During the first quarter of 1972, the N.V.A. gunners launched 71 rocket and mortar attacks, resulting in 65 civilians killed, 278 injured and 155 houses burnt down or badly damaged.

6) — *Note No. 1529/PDVN/CT/2 of July 26, 1972.*

During the second quarter of 1972, the Communists perpetrated 221 rocket and mortar attacks, resulting in 297 civilians killed, 1266 injured and 198 houses burnt down or badly damaged.

7) — *Note No. 2151/PDVN/CT/2 of October 16, 1972.*

During the third quarter of 1972, the Communists made 192 indiscriminate shelling attacks resulting in 241 civilians killed, 873 injured and 247 houses burnt down or badly damaged.

It was recalled that during the first nine months of 1972, 603 civilians were killed, 2417 injured and 600 houses burnt down or badly damaged in 484 shelling attacks launched by the Communists (without taking into account civilian victims in Quang-Tri province, following the open invasion of the Republic of Vietnam by Regular North Vietnamese troops in late March).

II. -- ACTS OF TERRORISM AND ATROCITIES COMMITTED
BY THE COMMUNISTS.

-- Note No. 0132/PDVN/CT/2 of January 24, 1972.

Without taking into account of their indiscriminate shellings of different populated areas, during the whole year of 1971 the Communists deliberately perpetrated 2891 acts of terror (565 assassinations, 483 abductions, 1741 blasts of hand-grenades, mines, TNT charges, 102 cases of mining passenger buses or stopping passenger buses for tax collection and looting).

As a result, 3238 civilians were killed, 7815 injured and 2372 abducted.

-- Note No. 2044/PDVN/CT/2 of September 29, 1972.

Without taking into account their indiscriminate shellings, during the period from January to August 1972, the Communists deliberately committed 2778 acts of terror (423 assassinations, 671 abductions, 1538 blasts of hand-grenades, mines, TNT charges, 25 cases of mining passenger buses and 121 cases of stopping passenger buses for tax collection and looting).

III. — ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE SHIP (November 21, 1970)

On November 21, 1970, a North Vietnamese ship was sunk by the RVN Navy Patrol ships near the Coast of Kiên-Hoa Province.

The wrecked ship camouflaged as a fishing boat bearing the disguised number TOW.03, belonged to the 125th Transport Fleet of the North Vietnamese Navy Forces. Upon approaching the unloading site about 400 m from the mouth of Hàm-Luong River in Kiên-Hoa province, the North Vietnamese infiltrated ship was intercepted and sunk by the RVN navy patrol ships.

Two members of the crew of the ship named Nguyen-Van-Quốc and Nguyễn-Duy-Hoa, plunged into the water when the ship was sinking and swam towards the coast. They were arrested by fishermen who handed them over to RVN Regional Forces in Ba-Tri district, Kiên-Hoa province.

Hard salvage operations by RVN frogmen started the following day and ended only on January 5 since the ship was more than 6 meters under water.

The cargoes carried by the sunken ship were recovered and composed of the following arms and munitions made in Soviet Union and Red China :

A. — WEAPONS :

<i>Type</i>	<i>Origin</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
75 mm recoilless rifle	Chicom	5
50 mm heavy machine-gun	»	1
K.54 pistol	»	1
B.40 rocket launcher	»	50
B.41 rocket launcher	Soviet	50
82 mm mortar	Chicom	1
AK.47 machine-gun	»	193

B. — MUNITIONS :

<i>Type</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
AK.47 cartridge	777 cases (1.400 cartridges per case)

B.41 rocket	528 rounds
B.40 rocket	420 rounds
82 mm mortar	56 »
107 mm rocket	95 rockets
75 mm cannon shell	337 shells
Cartridge of CKC rifle	
Model 53 (7,62 mm)	968 cartridges
Big case of TNT	30 cases (46 kgs per case)
TNT small case	168 cases (28.8 kgs per case)
Fuze of water mine	20 fuzes
Case of light fuze	5 cases
Chicom C.4 explosive	1 box
Chicom C.3 explosive	26 boxes
C.3 fuze	30 fuzes
Chicom hand-grenade	3 hand-grenades
Fuze-timing	1 box
Fuze No. 8	5.000 fuzes
Chicom flare	2 flares

IV. — **SOME TYPICAL CASES OF COMMUNIST ACTS OF
TERRORISM.**

1) *Blasting of Tu-Do night-club in Saigon.*

On September 15, 1971, the communist terrorists set off an explosive charge of 5 kg of TNT in the Tu-Do night-club located at the corner of Thai-Lap-Thanh and Tu-Do streets, Saigon. The explosion resulted in 15 civilians killed and 57 others heavily wounded. The blast also badly damaged the night-club.

The fact of killing innocent civilians who came just for listening music committed by the North Vietnamese terrorists is really a barbarous act.

(Ref. : Note No. 2400/PDVN/CT/2 of October 25, 1971)

2) *Resolution by the Câm-Tâm hamlet inhabitants dated
March 6, 1971 (condemning Communist act of terrorism
which resulted in 78 plantation workers killed and injured)*

On April 1, 1971, the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC forwarded to the ICSC Secretariat General

in Saigon a resolution signed by the Câm-Tâm hamlet inhabitants unanimously condemning the North Vietnamese communists for mining and massacring a large number of innocent workers, inflicting misery and mourning on the victims' families.

According to the resolution dated March 6, 1971, a bus operated by Ong Quê rubber plantation was blown up by a mine laid by communist terrorists on the road No. 57 of Câm-Tâm hamlet, Xuân-Lộc district, Long-Khanh province. The blasts resulted in 78 plantation workers killed and injured.

(Ref. : Note No. 892/PDVN/CT/2 of April 21, 1971)

3) *Truce violations committed by NVA infiltrated troops on the occasion of Buddha's Birthday (May 1971)*

During the 24-hour cease-fire proclaimed by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the NVA unilaterally violated it 34 times by killing innocent civilians and attacking ARVN installations. In 12 significant incidents cited, 47 civilians were reported killed and 15 wounded by the communist violators. The listed truce violations included the sinking of a sampan jammed

with civilians after it hit a communist floating mine in the Cua Viêt river near the demilitarized zone. Of 44 persons aboard, 30 were killed, 4 wounded and 10 missing.

In a note sent to the ICSC Secretariat General in Saigon on May 10, 1971, the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC pointed out :

« The North Vietnamese infiltrated troops violated all of the truces they had so far declared. Being treacherous and bellicose creatures, during the short cease-fire in observance of sacred Buddha's birthday, the NVA troops deliberately sowed death among the innocent civilians and unilaterally made attacks upon a number of ARVN troops who rigorously observed the truce. The South Vietnamese people still remember, with horror, the Lunar New Year truce violations in 1968 during which the communist troops massacred 14,000 civilians and buried alive thousands of others, the majority being old persons, women and children, in many mass graves in the vicinity of Hue City ».

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January-February 1973

NOTEWORTHY EVENTS

February 10-14	USSR	Trial and sentencing in 1966 of Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavski who were arrested and held without trial for five months after which they were respectively sentenced to five and seven years at hard labor. Sensational trial united dissidents, stimulated unofficial literary publishing, provoked mass arrests and riveted people's attention on politics. After serving their terms both men were barred from writing for publication or having Western contacts. Sinyavski has recently asked permission to leave the USSR for an extended stay in France.
February 16	USSR	Lithuania declared independence from Russia in 1918; independence and sovereignty recognized by treaty July 12, 1920. Soviet Union invaded and occupied Lithuania on June 15, 1940 as Stalin reaped advantages of Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact. Lithuania experienced worst anti-Soviet riots last year since country annexed. Hundreds were arrested and those who have been tried have received stiff sentences.
February 14-25	USSR	20th Party Congress, 1956. Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev denigrated Joseph Stalin and condemned his cruelties. Pyotr Yakir, son of famous general executed by Stalin, who was imprisoned at age 14 was granted full amnesty and promised immunity from further imprisonment. However, Yakir was arrested by

		KGB last June and is expected to be put on public trial.
February 25	Czechoslovakia	25th Anniversary of the communist coup in 1948 in which President Benes yielded to an ultimatum to install a pro-Soviet cabinet. On March 10 Communists claimed that Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk -- who was found dead below office window and possibly murdered -- had committed suicide. On May 9 the National Assembly adopted constitution modeled after USSR's. President Benes refused to sign and resigned in June. He was succeeded by Klement Gottwald. Stalinist purges of 1950's decimated party and Czechoslovakia became docile satellite under Antonin Novotny until his ouster in January 1968. Alexander Dubcek became popular leader whose April reform program included far-reaching economic and political changes.
February 21-28	U.S.-China	Mutual interest in normalization of relations between United States and China culminated in President Nixon's visit to China February 21-28 1972 on invitation from Premier Chou En-lai. They agreed to continue progress toward normalization of relations-- which thus far has consisted of lifting of trade restrictions and travel ban, and limited cultural and scientific exchanges.
March 5	USSR	20th Anniversary of Stalin's death.

Elections

March 4	Chile	Parliamentary elections for 150-member House of Deputies and 25 of 50 Senators. This will be Chilean electorate's first opportunity since the April 1971 municipal elections to express its judgment on the performance of President Allende's government.
March 7	Bangladesh	First general elections since Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan December 1971. Prime Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahman and his party are expected to win.
March 11	France	French parliamentary elections. French Socialist and Communist parties have united in a joint action program. At issue is whether, in the event this left-of-center coalition were to come into power, communists could be trusted to adhere to democratic principles.
March 11	Argentina	General Lanusse has made good his 1972 promise that general elections would be held in 1973. Juan Peron had expected to play a significant role in the elections but he was barred from running for President. His temporary return to Argentina did not save the Peronist movement from its political squabbles.

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January-February 1973

SHORT SUBJECTS

CUBANS WARNED AGAINST ANTI-SOVIETISM

The Castro regime has made clear that it will not tolerate anti-Soviet sentiments or opposition in Cuba, especially in light of the new Cuban-Soviet economic agreements, which Cuba may be said to have paid for in increased dependence, both economic and political, on the USSR. In a speech made at ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR, which was broadcast by Havana radio in late December, first Vice Minister and Second Party Secretary Raul Castro emphasized the evils and perils of anti-Sovietism. After praising Soviet achievements and expressing gratitude for Soviet support, Raul assailed the "whole throng of revisionists and false Marxists" who "distort the character" of Cuban-Soviet relations.

Although the target of his speech was generally vague, it was apparently aimed at those Cubans who have reservations about close Cuban-Soviet relations, especially in the economic area. When he quoted a 1970 speech of Fidel's against self-appointed "super-revolutionaries," it was obvious his targets were the two Frenchmen, journalist K.S. Karol and agronomist Rene Dumont, former friends of Fidel, who published books critical of growing Soviet influence in Cuba and Fidel's personal style of rule. The books, published in 1970, were Karol's Guerrillas in Power, and Dumont's Cuba, Is It Socialist?

Noting that Cuba had stood fast in the face of "imperialist" threats, he commented: "This determined attitude of revolutionary intransigence has made us deserving of support of the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist nations." After warning against "anti-Soviet tendencies that are sugar coated with super-revolutionary phraseology," he expressed concern about "imperialist" attempts to divide the international communist movement by "sowing distrust among people who are struggling for economic and political liberation regarding Soviet aid and experience." Raul Castro may also have been reflecting concern over an earlier Havana TV report of the sentencing of an unspecified number of "counterrevolutionaries" in Pinar Del Rio province on grounds of "destroying or damaging machinery and other tools obtained from socialist countries." Their sentences were stiff, ranging from eight to thirty years' loss of freedom. In conclusion, he warned, "those who cast gloom over or weaken the ties uniting" Havana and Moscow "will find themselves in the trash can of history or crushed by their unavoidable fate."

* * * * *

NEW RECTOR PLANS TO CHANGE LEFTIST CHILEAN UNIVERSITY

On 4 January Professor Carlos von Plessing was officially inaugurated as Rector of the University of Concepcion. In the university elections held in late November, he won over two leftist candidates representing the Popular Unity and extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) elements within the university. His victory, as well as that of his vice rector -- both were more significant than the actual numerical result would indicate -- was considered important as a reflection of the growing dissatisfaction with the Allende government, especially in view of the fact the university is considered the most leftist in Chile. The student arm of the MIR was founded there, and it is one of the intellectual strongholds of the Miristas and Communists.

In an interview following his election, published in the Santiago paper, La Prensa, von Plessing indicated changes that would be made in the university: "We shall modify the structure of the Superior University Council. We shall see to it that its members really represent the whole community, and that they are responsive to the real University, instead of projecting a distorted image, as they do at present. They say the University of Concepcion is a Red University. That is untrue... the proof lies in this election... if the majority does not want a Red University, there will not be one. When queried as to what caused the image of a "Red University," von Plessing replied, "the fact that university reform had left control of the university in the hands of Marxists and 'ultras,' even though that did not correspond to the real situation."

Noting that the new rector had emerged with the support of several democratic opposition parties, the reporter asked what commitments the rector made to them. von Plessing replied, "I talked to all of them. I was very frank and told them that I could not submit to the dictates of any political party. We disagree, but we respect the laws that govern us, and we are not averse to change. That is our commitment." The reporter remarked that the budget for the University of Chile had been cut because the rector did not support the government, and then asked von Plessing if he were prepared for such an eventuality. The rector replied, "this government is trying to create a New Man. If it really wants to do that, it cannot suffocate institutions of higher learning-- that would be inconsistent. In any event, if we must, we shall knock on doors." He concluded his conversation by emphasizing that the democratic opposition in Chile "must unite everywhere. We must forget what divides us, and unite. It has been a hard lesson but we are learning." (A fuller discussion and background on university reform in Latin America is in the December 1972 issue of CA Perspectives.)

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ITALIAN COMMUNISTS REJECT SOVIET CRITICISM

The editor of the Italian communist pictorial weekly Giorni-Vie Nuove, PCI central committee member David Lajolo, expressed the view during a 21 November 1972 Italian television program that the Soviet 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was the result of Stalinist errors which have survived in the Soviet system. In early December, Moscow's Literaturnaya Gazeta accused Lajolo of having "confused ideas" about the Czechoslovak situation. On 14 December, the Italian Communist Party daily Unita replied: "We would never think of denying the Literaturnaya Gazeta the right to express its opinion or to protest against any broadcast of the Italian State Radio-Television. We voice our own opinions about it regularly in these columns. However, we must emphasize that comrade Lajolo was also expressing the views of our party with regard to events in Czechoslovakia. . . We must also emphasize that while we have absolutely no objection to polemics, it is one thing to debate and quite another to engage in uncivil and gratuitous comment. They say of Lajolo that he was known in the past for his rather confused ideas on Czechoslovak events. Known to whom? To the Literaturnaya Gazeta? Not, certainly, to the central committee of the Italian Communist Party of which Lajolo is a member."1)

Another Italian communist journalist, Alberto Jacoviello, attacked by Literaturnaya Gazeta for a series of laudatory articles about China he wrote for Unita, replied to Soviet criticism in an interview for the 17 December issue of Espresso, independent Italian pictorial weekly:

"Literaturnaya is a publication distinguished not for its accuracy but for its monotony. . . According to that publication, I am supposed to be more Maoist than Mao. It would be easy to reply that not a few of those working for Literaturnaya (and not only for that magazine) are more Stalinist than Stalin, - and in the worst, not the best ways. . . . The truth is that at Literaturnaya and elsewhere, communist militants who take an interest in China are not very popular. With its original theories about the construction of socialism, China disturbs their sleep, disturbs their slothfulness in their Tolstoyan dachas in the forests outside of Moscow."

1) Note: Approximately 16 months ago the Czechoslovak Party daily Rude Pravo denounced Lajolo for printing an interview with Josef Smrkovsky, one of the leaders of the Prague Spring, in which Smrkovsky criticized the present situation in Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia.

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THE CRITICAL SWEDES

The Swedish Prime Minister's latest and most extravagant condemnation of America's role in Vietnam has raised the question as to why this neutral country and erstwhile friend of the United States currently expresses more hostility toward Washington and less understanding of its position than any other Western country, although many of the latter are more directly affected by U.S. actions than Sweden. Prime Minister Palme is fond of citing the "humanitarian" basis for his concern with U.S. foreign and domestic problems. And some prominent Swedes apparently believe that their economic and social achievements require them to commiserate with those who inhabit less fortunate countries. The moral rectitude of Sweden's socialist leaders is often viewed with scepticism by Sweden's Scandinavian neighbors who perceive a certain selectivity in Stockholm's indignation. To the Danes and Norwegians, Mr. Palme's foreign policy is considerably more pragmatic than it appears. They point out that while the Swedish Prime Minister has freely levelled the harshest criticism against the U.S. (where the consequences are limited to an occasional diplomatic rebuff), his conscience has remained strangely untroubled by the plight of Soviet Jews or the repressions in Lithuania, about which he has been completely silent. Nor did Stockholm find it necessary to sympathize with the leaders of the 1968 reforms in Czechoslovakia who were sentenced last summer to long prison terms for their efforts to win for the Czechoslovak people a modicum of the independent, national and humanitarian socialism that Swedes claim to enjoy. Sweden is obviously rather more attuned to the sensitivities of her large Russian neighbor. These Scandinavian countries have also noted that the Swedish government tends to protest the loudest about injustices suffered in other countries at times when Sweden's own domestic problems are particularly troublesome. (Sweden has been suffering from an unusually high level of unemployment and its economic growth rate has dropped to among the lowest in Europe, while in the last five years inflation has driven prices up more than 30 percent.) Finally, Sweden's nordic neighbors point out that Palme's Social Democratic Party faces a serious challenge in this September's elections. Public opinion polls indicate that the socialists currently trail their moderate opposition. In order to be re-elected, the government must not only divert popular attention from these domestic issues, but also solicit the assistance of the Swedish communists for whom the Prime Minister's selective compassion makes considerably better sense.

Taking care to differentiate their position from that of the Swedes, the German socialists have made it clear that neither the Federal Republic nor West Europe as a whole can afford, like neutral Sweden, to burden the Western alliance for the sake of temporary political advantage.

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A BOOST FOR THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTICS

Narcotics authorities waging an uphill battle against the thriving world traffic in drugs were recently encouraged when Burma, reluctant for many years to accept outside help in curbing the opium traffic in her backyard, finally agreed to accept assistance from a United Nations team of narcotics experts. The team, headed by Dr. Sten Martens (Swedish physician and leading authority on drug control) has already arrived in Burma where the focus of its efforts will be Southeast Asia's famed "Golden Triangle." Over the past decade this hard-of-access, hilly region where the borders of Burma merge with those of Thailand and Laos, has become the largest single source of illicit opium in the world. It is estimated that even with some past Burmese government effort to curb the drug trade, an estimated 700 tons of illegal opium finds its way into the world market every year from the Golden Triangle.

The Burmese have been touchy about the narcotics issue, have only grudgingly admitted the dimensions of the problem and have hitherto been unwilling to admit their failure in curbing either the illicit cultivation or the trading of opium in the area. In light of the United Nations Division on Narcotics' quick and positive response to Burma's request for help, narcotics authorities are hoping that other nations, similarly beset, will seek responsible outside assistance in coping with their particular segment of the overall problem. Burma's neighbor, Thailand, has already accepted outside help and now both the United Nations and the United States are accelerating their assistance to the Thai government on drug control. Optimistically, substantial international help for both Burma and Thailand will combine to establish a significant measure of control over the opium growers and traders who have operated so high-handedly in the Golden Triangle.

Afghanistan, another nation initially skittish about accepting help in narcotics control, has just agreed to large scale help from the United States. Lebanon is also receiving international help with her drug problem.

Burma's move is a double bonus in the international sense. Not only are controls in her backyard vital to the establishment of regional and international control of the opium trade, but the move has permitted the United Nations, after being under fire for years for inept handling of the worldwide drug problem, to move at last into a position to make major inroads on world narcotics traffic. From another vantage point this growing role in combatting world trade in drugs is permitting the United Nations to make a major impact as an operational agency.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 January 1973

Burma Finally Admits U.N. Drug Team

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y. Jan. 14—Burma, reluctant for many years to take outside help in curbing opium trafficking, has accepted a United Nations team of narcotics-control experts. The group, led by Dr. Sten Martens, chief of the United Nations Division on Narcotics, arrived last week. The hilly region called the "golden triangle," where the borders of Burma, Thailand and Laos meet has become the largest single source of illicit opium.

Some Progress Reported

Narcotics authorities remain cautious about the United Nations team's prospects of success, and John E. Ingersoll, the head of the United States Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, says: "I'm holding my breath." The Burmese have been touchy about the narcotics issue, unwilling to acknowledge that illicit cultivation and trading in opium have been going on in remote areas where the Government is unable to maintain its control and where armed guerrillas operate, such as in Shan state. The Government, according

to authorities here who are familiar with the area, has made some progress in recent years in extending its control and in policing the drug traffic. However, even now, it is estimated that 700 tons of illegal opium originating in the region find its way into the world market every year.

In agreeing to admit a United Nations group, the Burmese Government stipulated that it preferred European experts—no Americans. Dr. Martens is a Swedish physician and a leading authority on drug control. The others with him are his deputy, Wacław Micuta, who is a Polish expert; and a specialist from the Food and Agriculture Organization, Henk Teunissen of the Netherlands.

The three are to make a preliminary survey, assessing the possibilities of substituting other crops for opium, for treating the addict population estimated at 100,000, and for improving police and drug-control measures.

Significance for U.N.

Burma's decision is seen here as having particular significance at this time. Thailand was the first Asian country to accept outside aid in control-

ling narcotics, and now both the United Nations and the United States are accelerating assistance. Afghanistan, also after some initial hesitation, has now accepted a large-scale aid program from the United Nations. Lebanon is also getting international help.

Thus the United Nations — after being criticized for years for inept handling of the international drug problem—is at last in a position to make a major impact as an operational agency.

United States authorities, in particular, have been impatient about the delay in getting field programs under way, especially since Washington took the lead two years ago in setting up a new fund for drug-abuse control. The United States has so far contributed \$3-million, while 20 other governments together gave \$1.5-million.

More Money Needed

However, almost all of this money has been committed, and it is estimated that a minimum of \$22-million will be needed to cover already planned anti drug operations in the next few years. Field programs for Afghanistan and Burma alone would each require \$5-million through 1976.

United Nations and American officials expect that the next session of the Commission on Narcotics and Drugs opening Jan. 22 in Geneva will show whether governments are willing to provide adequate financial support for an expanded program.

Mr. Ingersoll, who is expected to be elected the commission's chairman, also pointed to the difficulties in getting experts to conduct the planned projects. Acknowledging that the world organization's prestige had diminished in recent years, he declared: "Here is one area where the United Nations can show its effectiveness. If it does not, chances are that it will come in for greater criticism."

Other expansions of the United Nations effort in the field of drug control are also under consideration—if governments provide the financing. One proposal being studied here would be to entrust the work to a new, autonomous United Nations body, giving it a status and a staff comparable to the recently established United Nations program for the environment.

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Shallow graves have been scooped out of the sand to accommodate the remains of the latest victims of the « Mile of Death » massacres outside Quang-Tri city. Rough board coffins await Christian and Buddhist rites before final burial outside the gutted village of Phong-Dien.

Mr Chau organized a volunteer group of civilians to search for bodies. Finding the bodies was difficult, because numerous sand storms had covered many of them and the rainy season had further complicated the search process. The volunteers also came under communist shellfire from the mountains and hills overlooking Highway no. 1.

2. -- Former NVA Corporal Le-Xuan-Thuy's account provides additional elements :

(a) that the North Vietnamese Commanders of the ambushes were perfectly aware of what they were doing,

(b) that some of the NVA troops participating objected to the killing of civilians,

(c) that the attacks took place over a period of five days — April 29 through May 3 — rather than two-day period originally reported.

Former Corporal Thuy, who rallied to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on July 31, was a member of a signal platoon attached to 4th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 32th North Vietnamese Division. He had been assigned the task of establishing communications between his battalion headquarters and North Vietnamese Forces operating in the area of Can-Dai Bridge, near Highway no. 1, and witness the action occurring in his particular area.