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EXCERPTS FROM TEXT OF NUMAYRI SPEECH ON FEDAYEEN ACTION IN THE SUDAN,
6 March 1973

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Brother compatriots. In all our meetings together, we have accustomed ourselves to having heart-to-heart talks and to using frank, open and truthful language. We have nothing to conceal from the people. The people are the masters of truth; they have the say in things; and they have the authority.

Brothers, we have lived together through the ordeal that was imposed on us. The ordeal was preceded, coupled and followed by events which I owe it to the people to place before them without any distortion. Our people have paid a high price of their feelings and nobility. The people should know why.

The talk about what has happened, brothers, must begin with an important reminder about Sudan and the Palestine question, in whose name your land's sanctity was violated, your government was placed in an embarrassing situation and your laws were violated.

Our honest cooperation with the Palestinian resistance, above all the Fatah organization, has been within the framework of this view and understanding of the revolution. [words indistinct] We have provided it with unlimited means of lodgings. We have insured for it the right of movement inside and outside Sudan without restrictions. We have given it the right of transmission through the radio and publication media without censorship and even in a manner that I do not think any state in the world can accept. We have done all this and for this reason we have received no little blame from certain Arab countries for the disparagement that they have incurred. My reply has always been that for the sake of revolutionary fedayeen action we would even accept the criticism that is leveled at my government. Our aim from all this has been to economize efforts and mobilize resources for the sake of the Palestine cause, for the sake of the refugees in the camps, for the sake of those who have been dislodged from their land, for the sake of the orphans and widows and for the cause these have; besides their legitimate right to return to their land and determine their future by themselves.

Brothers, the massacre at the Saudi Embassy has ended. In my opinion, as I have already said, it is a clear, evident crime committed in the land of Sudan to which the laws of Sudan apply and which can be tried by Sudanese courts in accordance with republic decrees. I will ask justice in our country to take its course [words indistinct]. The court's verdict shall be honest and its sentence shall be fair and its punishment shall be in accordance with a sound standard.

But, brothers, the facts I have gathered--I will not reveal all these facts to you for the sake of the investigations--these facts, which are numerous and (?startling), make the Black September operation a matter of secondary importance compared to other basic questions, such as the work of the Palestinian organizations in Sudan, the Arab states' relations with each other and the hard efforts by some citizens as agents for those who seek to distort the victories of the revolution, if not to undermine these victories.

The preliminary facts which I want to share with you brothers are that the head of the Fatah office in Khartoum has been the brains behind this operation, as proved by the documents he wrote with his own hand and which he left behind in his office before fleeing aboard a Libyan plane to Tripoli on the day of the incident. A cable which was found instructed him to be in Tripoli by 1 March.

The man who implemented the operation was the second man in the Fatah office. He is the same man whose voice you heard every evening over Radio Omdurman addressing you over the air without control or scrutiny.

The car used for transporting the eight participants in the operation was a car belonging to the organizations.

This is not all I want to say. This is not what worries me. What worries me is what was revealed by the numerous documents that have been found. All these documents are now in the hands of the investigators. These documents have revealed that the Fatah office had initiated a watch on some embassies and even on some state officials and had been following their steps and movements.

They had recruited commercial agents to write daily reports about the activities of the trade unions, students and the farmers in Sudan and not in Israel.

These documents have also shown their periodic contacts with elements hostile to the regime in Sudan and some of them outside Sudan. These dissenters are headed by a man who fled from a position of responsibility for fear of being brought to task for the (crimes) he committed, which are all punishable by the public law, which was the receiving of commissions abroad and the smuggling of money and the divulging of the highest economic secrets of the state and state documents to quarters outside the country.

Evidence has also been seized proving the radio transmitter was used to serve the outlaws in Eritrea. The messages discovered by the investigators--I still have not recovered from the shock at their contents of contempt for my people and insult to what I am most proud of, namely, the Sudanese (soldier)--include a message in which the sender says to certain Eritreans gathering on the eastern borders of Sudan that a military patrol consisting of a number of officers had been sent by the command to that area on an ordinary reconnaissance trip on the Red Sea coast. The message says: A group of high-ranking enemy officers is going in your direction. Kill them secretly so that you will not be in an embarrassing situation.

This is strange. The Sudanese Army has become the enemy. The Army of Sudan, whose sons have had faith, have gone out and struggled for God with their funds and their souls, is the enemy. They [the Palestinians] are not to blame because the steadfast Palestinian people would never say this, and the genuine Arab ethics would never condone this.

The diary of events in which the absconding director of the Fatah office recorded his daily activities has proved that all his efforts were concentrated on the regime in Sudan, on sabotage in Ethiopia, on meetings with the opposition and on casting doubt on (your leadership).

Brothers, in view of all the above, I have conveyed the matter and its secrets in your name today to the Arab League secretary general. I did not ask them to express a view on or to condemn what has happened in Sudan and precisely in the Embassy of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. Many of them have remained silent about this. We have only asked them to return to their consciences in regard to what is more dangerous. It is our duty to consult over joint Arab action and the nature of relations among the Arab states, and over the limits of fedayeen action and its programs inside Arab states.

Brothers, I have always been eager to give the fedayeen action, which is connected with the cause, the complete freedom of action even when it exceeded its limits in a manner embarrassing to my government and my country. But the matter today is different. It is different because the aid we are giving is being used [words indistinct] Arab countries which are not part of the Palestine battle. It is different because the Sudanese people's aid for the liberation of Palestine was being directed to other battles against us. It is different because the battle effort was being used for cooperation with subversive elements within our country for sabotaging our country itself.

In the face of all this, it is our right today to ask these organizations about their method of action and their ideas. This is the least demanded by comradeship of struggle, let alone by the sovereignty of the state which gives unlimited support, or the right of the people who give without asking for gratitude.

Those who pursue a policy of open coercion must know that the result of any such relation shall be the placing of the whole people of Sudan in a fight against any regime or Arab organization committing such a folly.

Let Israel be happy, thanks to the acts of some people, who by historical accident came to positions of leaderships--people who are ignorant of the facts of life and who think that historical changes can be achieved over the radio or through the [word indistinct] handful of agents and henchmen, whether absconding or not, who trade in the name of the Palestine revolution while they plot to undermine their country and its revolution. To these I address this warning: I am determined not to be lenient or tolerant toward them. The revolution shall doubtly reply to every blow. September will not be the only black month. Indeed, the authority [in Sudan] is capable of turning all the days of the year into pitch black to them for the sake of order, the revolution, Sudan and the people of Sudan.

EXCERPTS FROM ABU DAWUD TESTIMONY BEFORE JORDANIAN MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
Broadcast by Radio Amman, 24 March 1973

[Testimony of Muhammad Dawud Muhammad 'Awdah, alias Abu Dawud before the military prosecutor on 15 February 1973--read by announcer]

[Excerpts] Question: Tell us about your identity in detail.

Answer: My name is Muhammad Dawud Muhammad 'Awdah. I am 36 years old. My nationality is Jordanian. My father's nationality is Jordanian. I currently reside in Damascus.

Question: Do you belong to a political party or organization and what is your position in the organization?

Answer: I do not belong to any political party, but I belong to the Fatah movement which is a political organization. My position in it is that of a member of the Revolutionary Council since November 1970. I joined the movement through 'Ali Hasan Salamah in Kuwait in 1968.

I was sent by the movement to an intelligence course in Cairo on 10 August 1968.

The course lasted 9 weeks. Ten persons were taken during the course.

to Fatah. They included 'Ali Hasan Salamah, Fakhri al-'Umari, Murid ad-Dajani, Muhammad Mahdi Subaytah--Abu 'Ali--Ghassan al-Agha 'Imran of Jenin, a man of the Al-Mubashir family of Gaza living in Cairo, and Yusuf--I do not remember his other name but his father was a Shaykh in Al-Karamah. The Fatah movement accused him of being a Jordanian agent because he was a religious man. Also in the course were Muhammad Dawud 'Aqdash--that is myself--and Muhammad Subayh, a Cairo resident.

The course was held in a house. We used to leave the house once a week for 24 hours. The training course consisted of intelligence matters connected with security intelligence and intelligence recruiting, information evaluation, managing agents, writing reports, observation and investigation, a course in the use of light weapons, and recognizing the weapons of the Israeli enemy such as planes, artillery and other weapons. We used to watch films and see drawings. I was the first in this course. Afterward I returned to Amman where I worked in fedayeen bases as an ordinary element.

Then I took over intelligence duties in the north and trained elements for internal reconnaissance work. I was transferred to Amman to set up central intelligence at the end of 1968. I remained there until May 1969. The center was divided into two parts: Counterintelligence, and recruiting and gathering information on the enemy.

Question: What is the status of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah in relation to the organizational structure, how are appointments made and elections held and what is the composition of the Revolutionary Council?

Answer: In theory the council comes immediately after the Central Committee. The Central Committee is supposed to put before the council for discussion all matters pertaining to the movement. However, from the practical aspect, only what the Central Committee desires is being presented to the Council. Normally, the Council's views are not taken into consideration. Normally the deputy chiefs of the various departments are from the council. The structure of Fatah leadership is as follows:

1. The Central Committee: The committee's responsibilities include all affairs of the movement. The last Central Committee of Fatah was elected in September 1971. Normally, the election of the Central Committee is made by the movement's congress. The congress is composed of members of the former Central Committee and of the former Revolutionary Council and several others chosen by the Central Committee. The members of the present Central Committee are of two categories: The first category are those elected and the second category those appointed. The elevated members are: Abu 'Ammar (Yasir 'Arafat), Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), Abu al-Lutuf (Farug al-Qaddumi), Abu Yusuf (Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar), Abu as-Sa'id (Khalid al-Hasan), Abu Mazin (Mahmud Rida 'Abbas), Kamal 'Adwan, and Abu Salin (Nimir Salih). The appointed members are: Abu Mahir (Muhammad Ratib Ghunayn, and Abu al-Hawl (Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid).

The Central Committee elects from among its members a general command to assume the responsibility of the armed forces of Fatah. The general command is composed of Abu 'Ammar, Abu Jihad, Abu Salih, and Abu Mahir. The Central Committee includes 11 to 15 members. However, the present Central Committee is composed only of 11 members, nine by election and two by appointment.

2. The Revolutionary Council: The Revolutionary Council was elected at the same time and at the same place as the Central Committee in September 1971 in Hammuriyah camp in Damascus. The Revolutionary Council is composed of members elected by the congress and includes the military council appointed by the general command, five members appointed by the Central Committee and delegates assigned to regional areas, who may be summoned to the Revolutionary Council. Normally, these delegates are assigned to neighboring Arab states. The elected members are: Majid Abu Sharar,

engineer Yahya Habash alias Sakhir, Nabil Sha'b, Rafiq an-Nawshah, Najji 'Allush, Aby Akram, Abu Hisham (Sa'id al-Mazyin), Abu Dawud (Muhammad Dawud 'Awdah), Na'im Musa al-'Umlah. The military council members are: Sa'ad Sayil, Abu al-Mu'tasim (Ahmad 'Affanah), Abu al-Zayim ('Atallah 'Atallah), Mahmud Da' 'ash, Al-Haj Isma'il, and Hani al-Hasan. The military council is composed of an unlimited number of members. Membership of the council can be increased or decreased according to the general command's desire. From the theoretical aspect, the military council's duties include the discussion of the affairs of the forces with the general command. However, from the practical aspect, its duties amount to nothing.

Question: What are the operations which the Fatah movement has carried out and who are the persons who were in charge of these operations?

Answer: The special operations organ affiliated with intelligence carries out the operations. The intelligence branch is headed by Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar and his deputy Hamad al-'Ayidi. Ghazi al-Musayni and 'Ali Hasan Salamah are Hamad al-'Ayidi's assistants. Because Hamad al-'Ayidi's personality is weak and Ghazi al-Musayni's personality also is weak and 'Ali Hasan Salamah's personality is stronger, the latter has managed to carry out operations alone and he used to act without reference to Hamad al-'Ayidi. Salamah gathered a group of young men around him. Most of them had a criminal record. The source of 'Ali Hasan Salamah's power comes from the fact that he is supported by Abu 'Ammar personally. When he obtains the resources he needs to mount the operations he does not go back to Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar. But he usually goes back to him when he cannot find the resources so that An-Najjar can provide him with the money and the other needs.

There is no such thing called Black September. Fatah announces its operations under this name so that Fatah would not appear as the direct executor of the operations only the intelligence organ [which is run by] Abu Yusuf and Abu Hasan attributes the operations to the Black September. Abu Iyad does not link the operations to Black September. Abu Iyad carries out special operations whose quality and not number is accentuated. He plans for big operations like the Munich operation and the abortive operation to take over the premier's office. The operations which Abu Yusuf carries out in collaboration with Khalil al-Wazir--Abu Jihad, are usually ad hoc operations. They do not need long-term planning.

Question: Name the operations which have been carried out by Abu Iyad, 'Ali Hasan Salamah, and by Abu Yusuf and Khalil al-Wazir.

Answer: First, Abu Iyad operations. The successful operations are the Munich operation, and the killing of an Israeli intelligence officer in Madrid early January 1972. I do not know who implemented that operation. The unsuccessful operations are: The operation against the Council of Ministers in Amman. Second, 'Ali Hasan Salamah's operations. The successful ones are the Trieste operation--blowing up oil storage tanks in Trieste Italy. These storage tanks supply Europe and Germany with fuel. He sought the help of Ash-Shamali in this operation. Ash-Shamali died of cancer and he was the husband of Antun Sa'adah's daughter. I do not know the persons who carried it out. The second operation was blowing up the gas storage tanks in the Netherlands and Germany. The third operation was killing five Jordanians in Hamburg on the pretext that they collaborated with the Israeli intelligence. The fourth operation was firing shots on the Jordanian Ambassador in London Zayd ar-Rifa'i. The fifth operation was the blowing up of an Israeli vessel in the United States. He also has one unsuccessful operation: The attempted attack in Austria on the Soviet Jews who were emigrating to Israel. Three, Abu Yusuf operations: Killing Wasfi at-Tall. He personally assigned the men through Yahya 'Ashur. He transported them to Cairo and subsequently, he himself transported the weapons to Cairo. He carries an Algerian diplomatic passport; the Sabena plane operation at LOD airport, the LOD operation was a failure; the Bangkok operation which

was a failure also; another operation, which was supposed to take place together with the Bangkok operation, was attacking the Israeli embassy in Romania; that too failed. Another failure was the attempt on the life of 'Abdallah Salah in Tunis. It did not succeed because the Tunisian security measures were good. 'Abdallah Salah went to Tunis to put forward the United Kingdom project. Abu Jihad took part in the Bangkok operation. There were other operations against Mustafa Dudin, 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, 'Abdallah Salah in May 1971. They were planned by Abu Yusuf and Abu Jihad. They failed.

This is my statement which was obtained from me of my own free will, choice and full freedom, and I endorse it with my signature.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 1972

NEW FRONT SET UP FOR PALESTINIANS

CPYRGHT

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Dec. 2—An organization to provide Palestinian guerrillas with protection and support is to be set up by Arab leftists and Communists with the backing of the world Communist movement. Calling itself the Arab Front for Participation in the Palestinian Resistance, it is to have a 12-man secretariat headed by Kamal Jumblat, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and leader of the Progressive Socialist party, who has been elected secretary general. The other 11 members include representatives from the ruling parties in Algeria, Syria, and Iraq, from the Lebanese Communist party and from Al Fatah, the main guerrilla group. Support in Eastern Bloc The new front emerged from the Arab People's Conference for the Support of the Palestini-

an Revolution, which met here for two days earlier this week. The conference was believed to reflect growing support for the Palestinian guerrillas in the Soviet bloc countries and in the Moscow-oriented Arab and international Communist movements. At the opening session, Yasir Arafat, the leader of warmly greeted the Vietcong representative and the representative of the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan urban guerrillas. China and Libya Absent The gathering was attended by leftists from 20 countries, as well as representatives of the Communist parties in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Communist parties from all the Arab countries took part, as did representatives of the rival Baath party factions that rule Syria and Iraq and the ruling National Liberation Front

of Southern Yemen. An Egyptian Marxist, Lutfy el-Kholy, representing the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's sole political party, played a leading role in organizing the conference and in the discussions. Disagreement began the minute the debate opened on a political program for the projected organization. U.N. Resolution Opposed Commando delegations, especially such Marxist groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Democratic Front, insisted that the conference must reject outright the United Nations Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, calling for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab Communists objected to that position and their spokesmen called for moderation. Karim Morowa, a member of the Politburo of the Lebanese Communist party, declared, "I

wish we would learn from experience of the past five years," since the 1967 war. "Let us set aside general revolutionary talk and be guided only by reason," he said. In a compromise, a recommendation was adopted rejecting all "submissive solutions" to the Middle East conflict but not making a direct reference to the Security Council resolution. The conference also called for establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian effort to work for the overthrow of the Government of King Hussein of Jordan. Reaction to Jordanian Move The creation of the front is a delayed reaction to the expulsion of the commandos from Jordan last year. The delay was designed to allow time for Arab Governments to intercede with King Hussein to permit the guerrillas back into his country. These efforts have been unsuccessful.

WASHINGTON POST
8 March 1973

Terrorism: Immune To Diplomacy

CPYRGHT

A "highly noticeable" increase in the "traffic" of suspected Palestinian guerrillas in and out of the Libyan capital of Tripoli occurred for several weeks before the murder of three diplomats—including two high-ranking Americans—in Khartoum last week. That clandestine movement had led top officials here to this tentative conclusion: Without the help of the Libyan revolutionary government, the Black September Organization (BSO) might not be able to carry out its

the desperate blackmail-massacre March 2 in Khartoum, capital of neighboring Sudan. Moreover, a very important part of the resources essential to the BSO is known to come from oil-rich Libya, which is led by the most extreme Arab Nationalist—Col. Muammar Qaddafi—now in power. This aid either comes indirectly through the major Palestinian Nationalist organization, Al Fatah, or directly to the killers.

monarchies with vast oil reserves, also have been financing Al Fatah since the 1967 war, when Israel seized the Palestinian west bank of Jordan and the Sinai Peninsula. One reason for this Saudi and Kuwaiti help has been self-protection. With the payment of blood money, both conservative pro-Western Arab states have been ignored by the Palestinian assassins. Yet, even in the case of Libya, the Nixon administration is extremely reluctant to take diplomatic counter-

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strokes. A careful study of U.S. counteraction all the way up to breaking diplomatic relations with Libya has resulted in a tentative decision to do nothing, and that explains how difficult it is to control world terrorism with diplomacy.

Libya is a principal supplier of oil for Western Europe. Helping in oil production are some 3,000 American citizens, all more or less dependent on the U.S. embassy. If President Nixon broke diplomatic relations with Libya in retaliation for the bloody charade in Khartoum, these Americans would either have to accept evacuation—or run the risk of a possibly violent anti-American Libyan reaction.

Worse yet, it would play into the hands of super-Nationalists in the Libyan government, to the left even of Col. Qaddafi, who want all American influence expelled from the Mideast. Finally, such a diplomatic counteraction might not impede future escapades by the BSO.

Thus, ruling out strong diplomatic counteraction at least for the present,

the Nixon administration is taking a different course: trying to persuade Arab leaders that they themselves must deal toughly with Palestinian terrorism—or risk self-destruction. As one high official told us: "If the Libyans don't handle this, sooner or later it will destroy them."

This is clearly understood by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who was responsible for restraining Qaddafi after the outrageous Israeli shooting down of a Libyan airliner with 106 fatalities two weeks ago.

Sadat even threatened to end the special Egyptian-Libyan political link during his successful effort to prevent Qaddafi from exploding in retaliation against Israel. Sadat's motive was obvious: to block an Arab retaliation so excessive that world opinion, solidly anti-Israeli after the Feb. 21 tragedy, would swing the other way.

Then came Khartoum. Since then, Sadat—along with other Arab moderates—has continued his quiet pressure on Qaddafi. Their message: Let the Sudanese government deal with the eight

assassins without outside interference or threats. Their private hope: the eight will be sentenced to die, with that penalty—the first of its kind—beginning the end of the Palestinian terrorist movement.

But Sadat has scarcely more leverage against Qaddafi than does President Nixon, and even the threat of breaking up the Egyptian-Libyan political union might not stop Qaddafi from attacking the Sudanese government as tools of American "imperialism" if the killers are actually executed.

In sum, there are no international weapons capable of dealing with such global terrorism beyond maximum punishment of those responsible.

That means the death penalty in Khartoum and a decision by all Arab states to stop aiding and abetting international criminal activity. Anything less not only threatens other lives in other countries but also guarantees that even the legitimate Arab cause in the bitter struggle with Israel will be more and more damned, everywhere in the world.

LONDON OBSERVER

4 March 1973

CPYRGHT

DID THE HOSTAGES HAVE TO DIE?

FROM the moment at 7 p.m. on Thursday when the seven Black September guerrillas burst into the diplomatic reception at the Saudi Arabian Embassy here, there was always only one hope that the lives of the five diplomats held hostage could be saved.

The hope was that Jordan's King Hussein would prove a softer target than the Israelis. In this, Black September clearly seem to have miscalculated their new strategy.

The attack on the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum was carefully planned several weeks ago by the Black September group in al Fatah, whose central committee was recently strengthened by the militant Left obtaining stronger positions within it.

Their new task was to achieve two major objectives. The first was to rebuild Black September's morale after the disaster of the Munich massacre and the humiliating bungling of the operation in Bangkok against the Israeli Embassy last December.

The second was to force King Hussein to free Abu Daud—code-name for the top commando leader of al Fatah arrested last month while on a mission

in Jordan—and Colonel Rafe Hindawi, a Jordanian officer who masterminded an unsuccessful coup against King Hussein last November.

Although the freeing of these two top leaders was the main objective of the operation, it was hoped at the same time to secure the release of about 60 other al Fatah guerrillas in Jordan.

Tacked on to the principal demands were a whole string of more propagandistic objectives—the freeing of Sirhan Sirhan, the assassin of Senator Robert Kennedy, and of the Baader Meinhof urban guerrillas in German prisons regarded as comrades of al Fatah; and the freeing of guerrillas in Israel and of all women guerrillas in Jordan.

The operation was timed to coincide with King Hussein's visit to Washington. The aim was to try to force the Americans to use his presence there as a bargaining counter for the release of the American diplomats held hostage. But the timing was wrong—Hussein was in Morocco on a State visit to King Hassan when the guerrillas struck in Khartoum.

The choice of Khartoum was carefully made. The Sudan President, General Gaafar Numeiry, remains personally friendly to the guerrillas, despite his

recent troubles with the Egyptians and the Libyans and his decision to start a rapprochement with the United States and other Western countries following the abortive Communist coup against him last year. He could therefore be counted on as a friend.

Moreover, al Fatah has an office in Khartoum that is given official recognition in the diplomatic list. Its representatives were in a good position to establish the precise whereabouts of the capital's diplomats. They had advance knowledge of the planned reception by the Saudi Ambassador for the departure of Mr Curtis Moore, the US Chargé d'Affaires, and to welcome the new US Ambassador, Mr Cleo Noel, the entire Diplomatic Corps was invited.

Anniversary

It has been established that the Land-Rover used by the guerrillas to attack the Saudi Embassy belonged to the local Palestine Liberation Organisation office. Their local representative has been detained for questioning.

The al Fatah men overlooked only one fact: the reception was being held on the eve of the first anniversary of the agreement ending the 17-year-long

civil war with the southern Sudanese.

Numeiry had decided to turn the anniversary into a major national and international occasion in order to consolidate his regime's role as a Government of national unification and to project a favourable image to the world community. He had invited a number of leading personalities to Khartoum—including Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who had played a helpful role in bringing about the settlement—to visit the southern capital, Juba, with him.

Black September struck on the evening of Numeiry's ceremonial dinner for the Emperor, and the day before his distinguished party of visitors was due to fly south to participate in the Juba celebrations.

The guerrillas' action angered and alienated Numeiry, who had invested a great deal in making an outstanding success of the anniversary.

The choice of Khartoum also marked a new stage in the strategy of the Palestinian leadership: it was the first time they had chosen what they regard as an Arab country (though not a view of the Sudan shared by most Sudanese).

In the past, the Palestinian leadership had always justified their hijacking

and hostage-taking activities in the Western world on the argument that since the West by and large supported Israel, Western capitals were simply an extension of the 'Palestinian battle-front.'

In a communiqué justifying their choice of Khartoum, Black September said that the Sudan was part of the Arab fatherland, entitling them to use its territory for the liberation of the Arabs in Palestine—a view which finds little favour in Khartoum.

Nevertheless, the guerrillas were right in their calculations in one important respect. They could count on Numeiry playing the role of mediator. From the beginning, his Government took the line that they would be guided by the single desire to avoid the killing of the hostages and of the guerrillas. This gave the guerrillas considerable room for manoeuvre.

What was equally clear from the beginning, too, was that this time the guerrillas, not daring to risk another demoralising failure, could be relied upon to carry out their threat to kill their hostages unless their demands were met.

The attack on the four-storey mansion which serves as Saudi Embassy and residence in the salubrious suburb abutting on the Khartoum international airport was almost faultlessly executed. Only two guests were lightly and accidentally wounded—Ambassador Noel and the Belgian *Charge d'Affaires*, Guy Eid—by ricocheting bullets when the guerrillas burst into the reception as it was ending.

Only one of their intended hostages was missing—the West German Ambassador, Michael Jovy, who was showing a distinguished German delegation the sights of Khartoum before himself going to attend the President's dinner for the Emperor. In the past, Black September had always found Bonn a soft target. They hoped this time to strike a blow for their German comrades in the Baader-Meinhof group who have been such loyal allies in Europe.

We were all gathered for the Presidential dinner for the Emperor on the lawns of the glittering, illuminated presidential palace—the old residence of colonial governors where General Gordon was killed—when the news of the attack on the Saudi Embassy came through.

President Numeiry at once called his closest advisors to deal with the situation. He entrusted the negotiations to his

Vice-President and Minister of Interior, Major-General Mohammed El Bakhir Ahmed, and his Minister of Health, Gassim Mohammed Ibrahim, a young and revolutionary-minded officer. It was the latter who was entrusted with the task of going into the Saudi Embassy to talk to the seven guerrillas and who quickly established an easy and joking relationship with their 27-year-old but as yet unidentified leader.

Cables were sent to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, The United States and Belgium informing the governments of the guerrilla's demands after a three-hour session between Health Minister Ibrahim and the guerrillas. Numeiry made no attempt to influence them as to their answers. He called in the Egyptian Ambassador to use his good offices in the Arab world.

From the start, close liaison was established with the skeleton American staff, who throughout have continued to speak in terms of highest praise for the skill and correctness of the Sudanese handling of the affair. They were happy to leave all the negotiations to them.

The first deadline was set for 7 a.m. on Friday. The first reactions that reached Khartoum were toughly uncompromising. While there was no word from King Hussein in Rabat—the crucial figure in the negotiations if any concessions were to be made—the replies from his Crown Prince and Foreign Minister were reminiscent of Israeli attitudes: 'The Jordania Government will not give in to pressure, no matter what the circumstances; nor it is ready to bargain over any demands made by the guerrillas.'

Negotiators

The Saudi King's reply was no less uncompromising, referring to the Black September action as 'harmful to the Arab cause.'

Only the Americans were non-committal at first. They were willing to act in any way the Sudanese thought helpful in saving human lives.

With these unpromising replies, the Sudanese negotiators telephoned the guerrilla leader to ask for an extension of the deadline, explaining that Hussein was in Rabat and more time was needed.

Now the guerrillas withdrew their demands about the guerrillas in Israel, since the Sudan had no contact with the 'Zionist enemy' and about the Baader-Meinhof group, since they had failed to take the German Ambassador hostage. They were silent on Sirhan Sirhan, but

focused their demands on the leaders held in Jordan. All the pressure, therefore, was on Hussein.

During the course of Friday morning the guerrillas offered a compromise. They would be willing to fly with their hostages to the United States, provided they were accompanied by the Sudan Foreign Minister and Minister of National Guidance to guarantee their safety.

They did not explain their choice of the United States, but the Sudanese assume it was because they hoped to get the release of Sirhan and to scoop a major international propaganda coup.

Nevertheless, their major demand for the release of their top leaders in Jordan held fast. The Americans were non-committal in their reply, saying they would do anything to save lives. But the Sudanese firmly rejected any idea of their Ministers accompanying the guerrillas to America; they would go only to an Arab country.

Meanwhile, the Americans took two steps: they offered to arrange for a plane to be available at short notice to fly out the guerrillas and hostages, and they sent a senior State official, William Macomber, who had recently negotiated the release of the US Ambassador in Haiti, to Cairo en route to Khartoum.

The US Air Force sent a C141 aircraft to Khartoum Airport on Friday afternoon, but the Sudanese authorities asked that it should not put down as its landing would be visible to guerrillas on the roof of the Saudi Embassy. The authorities were afraid it would be misinterpreted as a sign of the arrival of American forces. They asked for it to land after night-fall, so the plane returned to the American signals base in Asmara, Ethiopia.

When the second deadline expired at 1 p.m. on Friday, the Sudanese had nothing promising to report to the guerrillas in arguing for another time extension. They were now playing for time.

All they could get from the guerrillas was an extension until 8 p.m. on Friday night—and they were told that was the end of the road. If there were no satisfactory replies by then they would begin to execute their hostages. Nobody was any longer in doubt that they meant what they said.

Meanwhile, President Nixon—who had been playing host in Washington to Israel's Prime Minister, Mrs Golda Meir—had made up his mind. His message reached the American Embassy

officials in Khartoum early on Friday morning. A little later, he was announcing at his Press conference that the position of diplomats had become a dangerous calling, but that the only way to remove future insecurity in their foreign posts was not to give in to pressures.

The colleagues of Noel and Moore knew that their death warrant had probably been sealed. They did not pass Nixon's message on to Mrs Noel and Mrs Moore, who were keeping vigil together in the American Embassy residence only a stone's throw from where their husbands were held captive.

Macomber, who had reached Cairo, could not possibly get to Khartoum before the last deadline ran out at 8 p.m. 'It is now simply a question of playing for time,' a taut Embassy spokesman told me an hour before the expiry of the ultimatum. 'Even if Bill Macomber arrives here, there is nothing he has to offer to make any real difference.'

The Sudanese negotiators made one last attempt just before 8 p.m. They had heard that Hussein had left Rabat en route for Amman. They pleaded for an extension until 2 a.m. on Saturday morning to enable Hussein to reach his capital and make a personal decision.

The streets around the Saudi Embassy were blocked off by police and troops to leave only a quick exit route to the airport if that became necessary.

General Numeiry was not yet back from Juba. Despite all the pressures, he had insisted on accompanying the Ethiopian Emperor there to carry out his planned schedule. In his speech he spoke of the enemies of the Sudan who acted in a way to suggest that they begrudged her achievements. Beyond that allusion, he made no reference to the drama in his capital.

At 8.15 the guerrillas telephoned the Vice-President, General Bakhir Ahmed, to say that they were determined to execute their hostages since they had received no reasonable assurances.

The general pleaded with them not to carry out their executions. An hour later, five shots rang out from the Embassy. Five minutes later the hostage Saudi Ambassador telephoned Radio Om Durman to say the two Americans and the Belgian had been executed.

General Bakhir Ahmed at once telephoned back to speak to the guerrilla leader. He confirmed the action and said that unless positive assurances were forthcoming the two Arab Diplomats would be shot next.

LONDON OBSERVER
11 March 1973

Secret Fatah spy ring uncovered after murders

from COLIN LEGUM: Khartoum, 10 March

SUDANESE investigations into the Black September killing of a Belgian and two American diplomats last week have produced surprising evidence of a clandestine revolutionary Islamic movement which extends from Tripoli in Libya to the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

The extensive ramification of this network of spying and subversion has produced a major crisis for Arab leaders. They are either too embarrassed or too disturbed by the revelations to make public pronouncements in reply to the open challenge and secret diplomatic Notes addressed to them by the Sudan's young military leader, President Gaafar Numeiry.

Extensive documentary evidence shows that the secret movement has its headquarters in Tripoli, but whether or not it is actively directed by Libya's President Muamar Quadhali is unclear. He has so far refused to be drawn either privately or publicly by President Numeiry's public request to him to extradite Fawaz Yassin, the head of the office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Fatah) in Khartoum. Yassin fled to Tripoli a few hours before the storming of the Saudi Arabian Embassy which led to the killing of the three diplomats.

For some inexplicable reason Yassin left behind in Khartoum his diary and handwritten instructions for the attack and a draft sketch of the Saudi Embassy. These showed not only that he had personally directed the Black September operation, but that he was also at the centre of a subversive organisation that had among its aims:—

1. The overthrow of Numeiry's Government in favour of an Islamic Socialist regime that would unite the Sudan with Libya and Egypt in the embryonic Federation of Arab Republics. (An immediate consequence would be to destroy the fragile one-

year-old agreement that brought peace between the Muslim north and the non-Muslim south of the Sudan after 17 years of civil war.)

2. Active support from Libya through the Sudan for the Eritrean liberation movement (ELF), which is partly Muslim-led, to challenge and overthrow the Emperor of Ethiopia and his Christian-dominated Government. (ELF operates on the Sudan frontier with the Eritrean province of Ethiopia, but has suffered recently through internal divisions and the difficulty of getting substantial arms supplies to its rebel forces.)

3. To undermine Arab Governments, including Egypt, which are ready to co-operate with the United States to achieve a negotiated settlement in the Middle East crisis.

The discovery that Al Fatah, the chief Palestinian guerrilla organisation—which enjoyed diplomatic status in the Sudan—was not only engaged in the Palestinian struggle against Israel, but also in subversion in Arab and African countries regarded as 'reactionary,' has precipitated a major crisis both within the organisation and in its relations with the Arab Governments that support it.

President Numeiry, who has always been an ardent supporter of Fatah and the Palestinian cause, had hoped to get a clear dissociation by the Fatah leader, Yasser Arafat, from the operations of his Khartoum office. Instead of this, Arafat has chosen to insult him by sending a message to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt asking for his support against the 'feverish and surprising campaign by the Sudanese President' for what he describes as 'a new and serious American plot to liquidate the Palestine revolution.'

The Egyptians are clearly embarrassed by this open conflict between Fatah and Libya on one side and Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the other. Sadat has so far declined to solicit his support for his

action in closing down the local Fatah office and punishing the guilty. But the Cairo newspaper *Gomhouria* has published an editorial criticising the Black September operation in Khartoum.

Meanwhile the Sudan Government is determinedly pushing ahead with its plans to stage two trials in a fortnight's time. The first involves nine Palestinians—the eight guerrillas who rescued the Saudi Embassy and killed three of their five hostages, and the ninth man, who drove the men to the Embassy. This man was the No. 3 at the Khartoum Fatah office. The guerrillas' leader, Riziq Abbou Kass, was the No. 2 at the Fatah office and a well-known broadcaster who enjoyed the privilege of using Sudan radio for a regular programme devoted to the Palestinian struggle.

At one time, Riziq was the neighbour of the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, Guy Eid, who, with his fiancée, was on regular visiting terms. Of the three murdered diplomats, Eid was singled out for humiliating treatment before he was killed. Because he was born in Cairo and spoke good Arabic, he was suspected of being an Egyptian Jew and, as such, a Zionist agent. His fiancée flew to Khartoum with his birth certificate showing he was of Lebanese Christian descent. But when confronted with this evidence by the Sudanese intermediaries, the Black September leader said that Eid would pay for the part played by a Sabena pilot in the shooting last year of two Black September guerrillas who had hijacked his aircraft to Lod.

The Sudan prosecutor is expected to demand the death sentence for all nine Palestinians. But even if the court should pass a death sentence, it is doubtful if Numeiry would allow it to be carried out.

While the Palestinians will be tried by an ordinary court, the six Sudanese who have been arrested will be tried by court-martial. Two of them were em-

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versity lecturer and one of the Sudan's best-known physicians. They belong to a pro-Libyan Arab socialist group that is both anti-Communist and anti-Muslim Brotherhood.

One of this group has been under police surveillance since it was learned a year ago that he had approached one of Numeiry's leading opponents, exiled in Saudi Arabia, with proposals to form a united front to overthrow the Sudanese regime. These overtures were rejected because the exiled leader refused to accept the help of Libya in bringing about a change of Government in Sudan.

Another Numeiry opponent, the former Prime Minister and Mahdi (leader), Sayyed Saddiq, also reported to the police that he had been approached to join with the pro-Libyan group to overthrow Numeiry. He, too, refused to accept foreign involvement.

There are other links between

the accused and Tripoli, where the leader of the anti-Numeiry forces, former Finance Minister and well-known Arab socialist Muhammad Abdel Halim, is in the paid employment of the Libyan Government.

The documents left behind in the Fatah office by Fawaz Yassin show that the organisation was the link between a Sudanese cell and the Eritrean Liberation leaders to spy on Sudanese troop movements along the Ethiopian frontier and to provide help for the Eritreans.

The decision to execute the three hostages was not taken by the guerrillas in the embassy, but in Beirut. A Black September contact approached the Sudanese Ambassador to the Lebanon late on the Friday evening and asked him to pass on a code message to the guerrillas in Khartoum. It consisted of two words in Arabic—Cold River. That was the name of the Fatah camp in North Lebanon that had been attacked

by the Israelis the previous week.

The message reached the guerrillas around 8 p.m. on Friday. It was—though the Sudanese were not to know it—the order for the execution to be carried out.

Having offered the diplomats cigarettes and given them 25 minutes to write their last letters to their families the guerrillas tried to get them to sign a last will, dictated by them, in which the diplomats were to have denounced their Governments. All refused. They were then bound and one guerrilla approached them with a long knife. Ambassador Cleo Noel said that if they were going to be stabbed, he would prefer to be lying down. The guerrillas then told the diplomats they were to be shot and asked the Saudi and Jordanian Ambassadors whether they would like to come into the cellar to watch the execution. Both refused. The Saudi Ambassador's wife

—who had shown great fortitude throughout—pleaded with the guerrillas. "Young men," she said, "consider carefully what you are doing. Don't do it, I implore you." They gently pushed her aside and she fled in tears to her bedroom.

The three doomed men were led to a cellar, where they were roped to a pillar. All eight guerrillas participated in the shooting, three using automatic weapons and five using revolvers. When the guerrillas came back into the reception room, they seemed, according to the Saudi Ambassador, to have changed. "They did not look like men who had killed before," he said.

At two o'clock on Sunday morning the guerrillas agreed to surrender themselves, their hostages and the bodies at day-break. The only promise given to them was that they would be treated with dignity and that they would not be shot at when they emerged.

DAILY NATION, Nairobi

16 March 1973

ARAB GUERRILLAS ACCUSED OF USING AFRICA AS THEIR NEW HUNTING GROUNDS

CPYRGHT

THE Government and people of Kenya must be made to realise that the Black September organisation and the Al Fatah regard Africa "as the best hunting ground" and they therefore pose a danger to every African country by their acts of terrorism.

This was stated in Nairobi yesterday by an Assistant Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, Mr. J. M. Kariuki, who was commenting on the recent massacre of American and Belgian diplomats in Khartoum by Black September guerrillas.

Mr. Kariuki hoped that President Numeiry "will give those Palestinian guerrillas held in Khartoum in connection with the Black September murders what they deserve—justice.

"He should not hesitate to dish out capital punishment to those who so richly deserve it," Mr. Kariuki said, adding: "He should show them what to expect in case they are contemplating a further act

against another State."

The Assistant Minister pointed out that Palestinian offices exist in Kampala and Mogadishu.

He stressed: "Surely the governments of Uganda and Somalia must draw the same conclusions from the Khartoum slaying and deal with those people as Numeiry is dealing with them."

He observed that "if these atrocities and acts of brutality are not going to be stopped once and for all, action must be taken quickly before these assassins strike again. Kenya could be next," he asserted.

Condemning the Khartoum massacre, Mr. Kariuki stated that the atrocities only served to alienate world opinion against the Arab liberation movement, which after the inexcusable shooting down by the Israelis of a Libyan airliner, had taken a turn for the better.

"It is no time now to argue on who is right or wrong in the Middle East crisis. What is important now is to consider how best governments the world over can safeguard their territorial and national integ-

ritv from such misguided and desperate elements." Mr. Kariuki said.

He charged that African governments "have been unduly quiet" about Black September's acts of indiscriminate slaughter.

Several airlines, mostly Israeli and American, confirmed in Nairobi yesterday they had intensified security measures to guard against possible hijacking and sabotage attempts by terrorists.

The extra alert by the airlines follows a warning by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to guard against possible hijacking and sabotage attempts by Palestinian guerrillas disguised as women or priests.

The area director of Trans World Airlines for East and Southern Africa, Mr. A. B. Krueger, said yesterday they were alerted by the FAA last week.

"We have been super-conscious about security for quite some time. All our passengers go through the normal checks," he said, adding that electronic searching devices were used.

The FAA is understood to have told the airlines the action reportedly had been planned in revenge for the downing of a Libyan airliner by Israel last month in which 108 people lost their lives.

One airline that has been taking special precautions is El Al, the Israeli airline which runs about four flights per week through Nairobi.

Airline pilots from 41 countries yesterday discussed the problem of international air safety in a conference in Tokyo clouded by two recent air disasters.

Recommendations for better air navigation facilities in African nations and new approaches to the hijacking problem will be considered during the 28th conference of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations, conference sources said.

The sources said a key item for discussion would be the shooting down of the Libyan jet by Israeli fighter planes.

The sources said the shooting down would be taken up in the context of the larger question of deficient air navigation aids in African nations.

WASHINGTON POST
15 March 1973

Black September Profile

A 'Community of Terror'

CPYRGHT

BEIRUT, March 13—In the wake of the Palestinian guerrilla raid on Khartoum, a shadowy profile of Black September is beginning to emerge from information that has surfaced either in their "successful" operations or from their operatives captured in their failures.

Except at the top planning level, "Black September is more a state of mind than an organization," one Western analyst of Arab affairs says.

"There is a growing community of terror," spread across the organizational structures of the Palestinians," adds another expert.

The tightly knit leadership cell is seen as drawing on the established guerrilla groups for quotas of young gunmen picked from the ranks of Palestinians traumatized by the bloody fighting in Jordan in September 1970, when King Hussein's army wiped out 3,000 to 5,000 Palestinian commandos and civilians.

The recruited groups are trained, often in Syria or Iraq, for specific missions. Only in the moments before they embark on the operation is it finally confirmed to them that they have become members of Black September. On the scene of the operation, they receive logistical support from established groups like Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The team leaders who have been captured seem to be youthful, well-educated Palestinians. The second-in-command of the Munich killings spoke English, French and German. One of the four Black September

operatives who hijacked a Belgian airliner to Lod airport in Israel last May flew the plane himself. The leader of the Khartoum raid was a communications expert.

Evidence about the top Black September leadership is still fragmentary and uncorroborated by solid information from inside the Palestinian organizations. But the Khartoum operation and the capture of a Fatah leader, now said to be definitely linked to Black September, by Jordanian authorities last month have provided important new clues.

Western sources normally reluctant to discuss Black September because of the scarcity of information have said this week that the man who ran the Khartoum operation from Beirut is Salah Khalef, an extremist Fatah theoretician aged about 40 and better known under his guerrilla code name of Abu Ayad.

Most Palestinian guerrillas adopt a code name that includes Abu, which means "father of" in Arabic.

Khalef denied in an interview in the Beirut newspaper L'Orient le Jour last month that he belongs to Black September. But his name has been repeatedly linked to the organization.

Abu Daoud

Jordanian intelligence accused him of being behind the November plot by a high-ranking Jordanian army officer to assassinate King Hussein. And last month, his name was mentioned in a public confession obtained from Jordanian authorities from another important Fatah leader, Mohamed Daoud Audch, also known as Abu Daoud.

Abu Daoud, said to be in his mid-30s and from Jerusalem, and 16 of his men were captured by Jordanian authorities on Feb. 8, two days before they had planned to seize the Jordanian prime minister and the Cabinet in their offices in Amman. They also apparently intended to seize the American embassy.

Black September has said that the Khartoum raid was intended as an emergency mission to save Abu Daoud and his men from execution by obtaining their release in exchange for the diplomats.

[King Hussein announced Wednesday in Amman that he was commuting the death sentences passed on Abu Daoud and 15 of his colleagues for alleged subversive activities, UPI reported. In a royal message, the king said that his decision was prompted by "sincere and honest appeals" to spare the lives of the guerrillas and "human considerations that haunted us day and night."

[The king did not make it clear whether this meant the guerrillas would be released or still have to serve prison terms.]

Fatah Cover

The guerrillas involved in the Khartoum raid were willing to give up their Fatah cover in Khartoum, alienate the Sudanese government, which had not taken a position against them, and cause Fatah to lose its main office for Africa.

All of this would indicate the importance Black September attaches to Abu Daoud. Fatah spokesmen have identified him as one of Fatah's two or three top military leaders, since he headed the powerful Palestinian militia in Jordan in 1970.

But his Black September links may be even more important. There are strong indications here from sources who cannot be identified but who have been reliable in the past that Abu Daoud was in Munich two to three weeks before the Munich operation, and may have helped to plan and run it.

The Palestine Liberation organization and Fatah have disputed Abu Daoud's televised confession, made before Hussein put him on trial and first confirmed the death sentence. But reliable sources here say that information extracted from the men with Abu Daoud have confirmed the major points of his confession, which fits the developing pattern of Black September operations.

Jordan Mission

About 20 Palestinians recruited for the Jordanian mission—which was, according to Abu Daoud, designed to show Hussein and the world that the guerrilla movement still existed—were trained in Iraq for two months.

Abu Daoud had special cars made up with secret, welded compartments to carry weapons into Jordan. But according to reliable sources, an informant tipped off the Jordanians, who caught most of the group traveling on Omani passports.

Other evidence of the link between the Black September organization and Fatah came today in an interview Yasser Arafat, the head of Fatah and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, allegedly gave to the Beirut weekly As Sayyad.

"I see nothing strange in Fatah elements joining Black September," Arafat was quoted as saying.

Interview Denied

Later tonight, the Palestinian news agency Wafa denounced the interview as "a fake and an invention that has no basis in truth," and a guerrilla spokesman said that Fatah and the PLO had no connections.

Arafat claimed in the alleged interview that Japanese, Turks, Iranians and other strugglers from foreign countries "have taken part in Black September operations.

"Is it strange, therefore, that Palestinians, even commandos from the various re-

sistance groups, should join this organization?" asked Arafat.

If accurate, Arafat's reference to foreigners serving in Black September is especially significant since there had been no previous indication of this. The Japanese gunmen who killed 26 persons at Lod airport last May were working for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

While disclaiming his own responsibility in the Khartoum murders—two American diplomats and a Belgian envoy—Arafat significantly did not challenge Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeri's assertion of last week that Fatah's top two representatives in Khartoum had been part of the plot.

Replying to Nimeri's charge, Arafat said: "It does not concern me nor is it within my ability to stop the men of Black September from undertaking their operations."

Philosophy Unclear

Still lacking is a clear indication that Black September has a political philosophy behind the revenge it seeks on Hussein and Israel.

Unlike the other guerrilla organizations, Black September has never mounted a single military operation inside Israel. It has dealt in international terrorism that is less visibly connected to its proclaimed goals than were the terrorist attacks by Israeli groups like the Stern Gang nearly three decades

ago, or than are current guerrilla operations by groups like the Tupemaros in Uruguay or Turkish terror groups.

Predicting that he would probably be assassinated, Salah Khalef, speaking with another Fatah leader, told L'Orient le Jour: "We are planting the seed. Others will harvest it . . . It is enough for us now to learn, for example, in reading the Jerusalem Post that Mrs. Meir had to make her will before visiting Paris, or that Mr. Abba Eban had to travel with a false passport" to avoid Palestinian attacks.

"For some Arabs, this will seem only folklore. We count on them to do better" in the future.

WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1971

Libyan Volunteers Join Palestinians

By David Hirst
Manchester Guardian

CAIRO—Libyans are now fighting alongside Palestinian guerrillas as part of Col. Muammar Qaddafi's strategy for what is known as the "pan-Arabization of the battle" against Israel.

According to a Fatah publication, the first batch of Libyan volunteers have arrived in Damascus aboard a special plane, accompanied by Capt. Abdul Rahman el-Eid, head of Qaddafi's military bureau. Fatah did not say how many there were, but it could not have been very many.

Earlier this year, Qaddafi called for Libyan volunteers to join the guerrillas. However, he soon expressed disappointment at the poor response — only 35, from Libya's second largest town of Benghazi, according to one report.

So the Libyan contingent is not likely to transform the guerrillas' low fortunes. But in Qaddafi's eyes, it is the force of example that counts.

The impetuous young leader is growing impatient with almost everyone—

guerrillas themselves. He has sharply criticized their internal divisions, blaming left-wing Popular Front members, who he says are "deviationists and secessionists."

Fatah His Favorite

Fatah is his favorite organization, though apparently he thinks it should accept more Arabs, rather than just Palestinians, in its ranks, an dbe said earlier that Libyan guerrillas would fall under Fatah's command.

But with gestures like this, it is mainly the other Arab regimes he is attacking. Qaddafi can barely conceal his disgust at many Arab states' evasions, selfishness and hypocrisy, and he has publicly put his faith in Jordanian "free officers" to do away with King Hussein.

The Libyan delegation to last week's Joint Arab Defense Council meeting in Cairo could not be induced to lend its name to the collective expression of condolence at the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tell.

According to Qaddafi, one

guerrillas from Jordan was because "hundreds, even thousands, of Libyan volunteers" were preparing to join them there. But Hussein, though considered the worst, is not the only Arab leader criticized by him.

Pan-Arabize Battle

The pan-Arabization of the battle means, according to the Libyan Leader, that every regime, whether in the front line or not, should contribute according to its means to war effort. Said Qaddafi recently: "The regime which thwarts the harnessing of Arab resources must be swept away, and I declare that the regimes which are doing this include republics as well as monarchies."

Qaddafi has yet to clarify which republics he has in mind.

He has never hidden his opposition to the U.N. Security Council resolution on the Middle East, and though he has not specifically criticized Egypt for continuing to subscribe to it, one read an implied criticism of that country into almost everything he says on the subject.

lared that the present "no war, no peace" situation was becoming intolerable, and that something must be done within two months.

Frustrated Pan-Arabism

Qaddafi's growing determination to make Islam—his own fundamentalist version of it—the ideological basis of his rule may stem at least in part from his frustrated Pan-Arabism.

There was an implied rebuke to Egypt and Syria, his allies within the three-nation Arab Federation, in his recent decision to restore the supremacy of the Moslem holy law he claims which "provides the easiest solutions to mankind's problems till the day of judgment." For he did it shortly after President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Hafez Asad of Syria had reportedly spurned his proposal that they, too, respect Islam by instituting compulsory alms-giving and banning alcohol.

As Qaddafi grows more and more frustrated with Arab paralysis towards Israel, he may take these chiefs of state publicly to

EAST AFRICAN STANDARD
9 March 1973

CPYRGHT

Cairo hits at Fatah operation

The State-supervised Cairo Press yesterday called the Palestinian operation in Khartoum last week a "mistake".

In the first critical comment in Egypt since Palestinian raiders killed three diplomats in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum on Friday, *Al Ahram*, wrote that "the Palestinian resistance is not infallible" and *Al Gumhuriya* called the raid "the latest in a series of mistakes".

The Palestinian revolution will continue "despite deviations on the part of certain Arabs "the

semi-official *Al Ahram* said in an editorial which went on to deplore the decision by Sudanese President Nimeiry to suspend Palestinian activities in the country.

Al Gumhuriya went further, citing an "urgent need for unification of the resistance and for total observance of decisions made by the Palestinian command."

If the operation was designed to avenge innocent victims of Israel it should have been staged inside occupied territory, *Al*

Gumhuriya said. And if the aim was propaganda for the Palestinian cause, the planners should have sought favourable instead of negative propaganda results, especially after the downing of the Libyan jetliner by Israel on February 21 had won fresh sympathy for the Palestinians.

"We cannot afford to endorse the mistakes of certain members of the resistance", the paper added.

Meanwhile, Fawaz Yassin, former director of the Fatah guerilla organisation's Khartoum office,

is to be tried in his absence in connection with the murder of the three Western diplomats according to sources in the Sudan capital.

Alleged to have master-minded the attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy by eight members of the Black September group, he fled to Libya on the day of the attack.

The Khartoum newspaper *Al Ayam* said yesterday the Fatah organisation must prove to the world that it was not involved in the killing of the diplomats.

LE SOIR, Brussels
10 March 1973

Un journal égyptien condamne l'action de « Septembre noir »

Le chef du bureau du Fatah à Khartoum sera jugé par contumace

CPYRGHT

Le Caire, 8 mars (A.F.P.).

Le caractère sacré des buts de la résistance palestinienne ne permet cependant pas de faire abstraction des erreurs commises de temps à autre par certains de ses membres, et la dernière erreur en date est l'opération de Khartoum », écrit dans un éditorial le quotidien égyptien « *Al Goumhouria* ».

C'est la première fois que la presse égyptienne adopte ce ton en évoquant le drame de Khartoum et le condamne ouvertement.

A Khartoum, on indique que M. Fawaz Yassine, chef du bureau du « Fatah » dans la capitale soudanaise et impliqué dans l'affaire de l'ambassade d'Arabie séoudite, sera jugé par contumace.

Le général Nimeiry avait affirmé mardi dernier que Fawaz Yassine était le cerveau de l'opération et qu'il s'était enfui en Libye peu avant l'attaque des fedayine contre l'ambassade. D'autre part, selon une source responsable du ministère de l'Intérieur, l'enquête a montré que les cinq Soudanais arrêtés à la suite de l'attaque de l'ambassade

n'ont aucun rapport avec cette affaire. L'enquête se poursuit à leur sujet, mais pour des activités subversives.

Manifestation au bureau bruxellois de la « Middle East »

Une vingtaine d'étudiants libanais de Bruxelles sont allés protester jeudi au siège des « Middle East Airlines », rue Ravenstein, contre la participation de cette compagnie aérienne libanaise à des voyages touristiques organisés par une agence belge, qui ont comme destination les territoires occupés par Israël ». Il s'agit de voyages en avion de Bruxelles à Beyrouth, d'où les touristes sont transportés en autocar à travers la Syrie et la Jordanie vers les territoires occupés.

Une note de M. Georges Eid

M. Georges Eid, frère de M. Guy Eid, a fait parvenir aux journaux la note suivante :

« La famille Eid est d'origine orientale, exactement syro-libanaise. Nous avons été naturalisés belges sous Léopold II.

« Depuis cette date, nous n'avons cessé d'être au service de la Belgique et plusieurs membres de notre famille sont morts de manière tragique pour elle en 1945...

« Nos parents étaient eux-mêmes volontaires de guerre en 1914-1918 dans les rangs de l'armée belge...

« Mon frère et moi-même avons toujours essayé d'expliquer à tous nos compatriotes le point de vue palestinien.

« Nous regrettons beaucoup de voir que tous nos efforts se soient révélés aussi vains, mais je crois qu'il serait bon de rétablir chaque fait dans son contexte et de ne pas nous imputer d'autre nationalité que la nôtre, c'est-à-dire citoyen belge ».

D'autre part, M. Georges Eid tient à réfuter des allégations parues dans certains journaux: selon lesquelles son frère était marié. On sait qu'il était fiancé et qu'il allait se marier prochainement.

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1973

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ARAB LEADERS FEAR THEY MAY BE TARGET OF PALESTINIANS

By Jim Hoagland

Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIRUT, March 13

"This operation will teach the world to take our words seriously. We will not be doublecrossed again or allow our demands to be the subject of bargaining."

This explanation of Black September's murder of two American diplomats and a Belgian colleague in Khartoum March 2 was attributed shortly after the killings to an unnamed spokesman for Black September by Al Moharrer, a Beirut newspaper with close ties to the Palestinians.

Those who claim to speak for Black September are portraying the raid on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum as an emergency mission aimed primarily at freeing Abu Daoud, a key Palestinian leader now under death sentence in Jordan.

But Arab leaders appear to be studying the Khartoum murders apprehensively for much broader political significance. Almost uniformly, they have retreated into a protective silence over the murders and Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeri's angry denunciation of the guerrillas.

"Whether intended as warning to other Arab leaders or not, it is being taken that way," said a Western diplomat. "Silence in this case should probably not be interpreted as approval or disapproval, but as fear for their own skins."

The operation is seen in such stark terms in the Sudan. "It was a punitive expedition," said one high-ranking official in Khartoum last week. "They wanted to humiliate us, to put a strain on Sudan's relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia."

"The big question now in the Middle East is whether [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat will be intimidated.

His new dialogue with the United States was surely one target of this mission."

More Than Attention

Whatever Black September intended, the Khartoum murders already have had sharp impact at the Sudanese, Arab and international levels. In contrast, the murder of Israeli athletes in Munich and the massacre of tourists at Israel's Lod airport last year were primarily macabre exploits in attracting world opinion to the Palestinian cause.

In Khartoum, particular diplomats were apparently singled out for capture because of their roles in carrying out national policies. Black September has clearly indicated that it numbers among its enemies not only Israel but also the United States and Arab governments that are friendly to American policy.

In addition to raising a sudden new sense of vulnerability among Arab leaders, the impact of the Khartoum murders includes these points:

- The attack has pulled the Sudan back into the angry maelstrom of Arab politics despite that ethnically mixed country's efforts to turn inward and deal with its own problems. The insult delivered to Nimeri has turned him from a supporter of the guerrillas into an avowed foe, and brought him into verbal war with Libya's leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

- If Nimeri's strong suggestions that Libya was involved in the plot stand unrefuted and if Egypt is serious about its current diplomatic campaign as a peace exploration, a new wedge will have been driven between the two Arab countries, which are due to merge into a single state in September.

- The attack calls into question the relations between conservative and

moderate Arab governments and the Palestinians. Splitting the main body of the

guerrilla movement off from the conservative Arabs and forcing it underground as an international terror organization appears to have been one of Black September's main goals from the start.

- A direct challenge has been laid down to the United States in the Middle East, where every American diplomat now faces major security risks. Black September attempted to justify murdering one of the American diplomats by claiming that he was a CIA agent, a charge frequently made against active diplomats in this region.

Responsible Lebanese newspaper editors are already predicting a counterwar by American agents now that "the commandos appear to have crossed the thin line which had thus far separated them from extending their campaign of violence against Israel to the U.S. presence in the Arab world," in the words of one editor.

Arafat's Promise

The background to the Khartoum tragedy embraces the Sudan's growing links to the West and its African neighbors, new American activism in the Middle East, and increased friction between guerrillas and Arab governments.

Efforts by the Nixon administration to promote peace explorations and trips to Washington last month by Jordan's King Hussein, Sadat's top security adviser Hafez Ismail and Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir have triggered vitriolic new attacks from the Palestinians on the American role here.

"Welcome to the American efforts and the American conspiracies," Palestinian guerrilla leader Yasser

Arafat told a public rally in Baghdad three weeks before the Khartoum operation.

"We are going to turn this region, like Vietnam, into a center of revolutionary radiation for the entire world."

And four days after the Khartoum raid, Hani al Hassan, one of Arafat's top lieutenants in the Fatah organization, was quoted in the Beirut press as warning that any Arab leader who signs a peace agreement "at the expense of the Palestinian people" would be assassinated in a matter of hours.

On the same day, in the magazine Palestine Revolution, top Palestinian movement spokesman Kamal Nasser wrote that it would appear that Black September leaders "have made up their minds definitely about American imperialism," which Nasser said had backed Hussein's bloody crushing of the Palestinian movement in Jordan in 1970.

But they "have not yet made up their minds about other forces in the Arab world," Nasser wrote. "They are still hopeful that some of these forces may see the light, and place their national interests before their economic interests . . ."

Arafat and Nasser have specifically denied that they know anything about Black September or that it is connected to Fatah or the overall coordinating group, the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

But they have turned away from Nimeri's challenge to denounce the attack on an Arab embassy in an Arab capital, and to turn over the Fatah Khartoum representative whom Nimeri accuses of masterminding the plot before fleeing to Libya.

Their comments tend to confirm the widespread estimation among Arab and Western observers that the Palestinian movement is in-

creasingly radicalized and defiant of the Arab governments. The Khartoum murders will exacerbate the already apparent conflict between the 1.5 million Palestinian refugees and the Arab governments that have been their hosts since the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967.

A Mood of Betrayal

For many of the governments, the Palestinians have come to resemble guests who came to dinner and have stayed on for 25 years. They are viewed with a mixture of suspicion, pity and hostility by the Arab governments, which at various times have supported them, manipulated them and, in what appears to be the dominant analysis of the current guerrilla leadership, betrayed them.

This spreading feeling of betrayal is likely to have been an important factor in Black September's decision to strike at the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that they are Arab countries that have given more than nominal support to the guerrillas in the past.

The January meeting of the Arab League Defense Council in Cairo now appears to have been an important turning point in Palestinian-Arab relations. Hussein, the guerrillas' arch-enemy, was partly rehabilitated by an offer to be included in the symbolic over-all Arab defense planning body. A move to put the guerrillas formally under the command of Arab host armies also disturbed Arafat's representatives at the meeting.

Saudi Arabia and the Sudan played roles in the mediation between Jordan and the other Arab countries, according to Cairo sources. In his speech in Baghdad, Arafat

said that only Libya, Kuwait, Iraq and Tunisia had supported the Palestinian position. "We will break from Arab ranks if they accept a defeatist solution," he warned.

In their first statement from inside the Saudi Embassy after they captured it, the eight Black September terrorists claimed "the right" to carry out operations on Arab soil.

The operation was also intended to "confirm that the question of financial aid to the Palestinian movement—sums exaggerated indeed—do not and cannot constitute an obstacle in the way of the revolution's strategy," according to As Sayyad, a Beirut weekly newspaper that published "unannounced and real aims" of the Khartoum operation "as summed up by Palestinian officials."

Saudi Arabia has channeled its donations to the Palestinians through Fatah, which according to reliable Palestinian sources received at least \$100,000 a month nominally for family support of guerrillas killed in action against Israel. Other gifts were made directly by King Faisal and other Saudi officials to guerrilla leaders they trusted.

But Arab and Western sources report that the Saudis had cut down on their payments to Fatah after Fatah members identified with Black September hinted in Cairo in December that Arab governments would not be exempted from "revolutionary action" and after Khalid al Hassan, a leading moderate, was removed from the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee.

Approximately 20,000 to 30,000 Palestinians live in Saudi Arabia. The bulk of

the 200,000 Palestinians living in the oil-producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf are in Kuwait, which is a much more important financial supporter for the guerrillas, and which has been lobbying furiously with Hussein to get Abu Daoud released.

Two other Arab countries with large concentrations of Palestinian residents—Lebanon and Syria—have not given any clear indication of how they will respond to the new crisis in inter-Arab relations.

In Egypt, the authoritative newspaper Al Ahrar has also been ambiguous, noting shortly after the killings that the guerrillas "are not infallible" but then shifting last Sunday to calling on Nimeri to treat the eight Black September killers as Egypt treated the murderers of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal—presumably by letting them out on bail and then allowing them to quietly leave the country.

NIMERI is clearly in no mood to do that. He personally toughened the language of the speech he delivered March 6 after aides had written a milder one for him in an effort to keep the Sudan from becoming too entangled in Arab politics.

The Sudan's main objectives this year, as explained by one aide who helped shape them, had been to concentrate on internal economic development, to improve relations with the African countries on its borders, to seek stronger ties to the conservative Arabian Gulf states that could help with economic development, and to ignore as much as possible the growing strains the country faced with Libya and Egypt.

"This kills all of that," sadly noted one important Sudanese analyst who said Nimeri was accurately reflecting the burning anger and sense of injured dignity that has marked popular Sudanese reaction to the killings.

Despite all these resounding repercussions, however, Palestinians in Beirut in touch with the guerrilla leadership continue to insist that the goals of the Khartoum operation were limited.

They point to the two main thrusts of the Black September statements: The need to establish that they would carry out their threats, and their insistence on freeing Abu Daoud.

The "we will not be double crossed again" quote in Al Moharrer apparently referred to the Munich massacre last September. There, an ambush was set up for the guerrillas after they had allowed negotiating deadlines to pass.

Khartoum also carried echoes of Bangkok. In December, Black September terrorists seized the Israeli embassy in Bangkok but released their six Israeli hostages and were talked into leaving the country after their demands had been rejected.

"Bangkok was a blow to the organization's prestige," a Palestinian source said. "Khartoum was partly to recover from that."

If accurate, the Al Moharrer quote casts an especially sinister shadow for any future hostages of Black September. The sense of the refusal to "allow our demands to be the subject of bargaining" would appear to be that future threats to murder hostages in cold blood will be carried out immediately, not after three deadlines had been allowed to pass as in Khartoum.

THE SPECTATOR
9 September 1972

Terrorism

Behind Black September

CPYRGHT Ibrahim Saleh Hagar.

The massacre at Munich raises in an acute form the question of what can be done to combat international terrorism. But first it is necessary to know in detail the constitution of the terrorist threat. We print below an article analysing the background to recent outbursts of violence by the Black September and allied Arab irredentist and revolutionary groups by an exceptionally well-informed author, Ibrahim Saleh Hagar, who is based in Rome, and is in close and constant touch with Intelligence sources.

All the indications are that Palestinian terrorist organisations, which have conducted a desperate but on the whole futile struggle against the State of Israel for the last twenty years, stand at a crossroads in their history. They may try to continue the armed struggle in the Middle East itself, or they may turn their attention increasingly to the outside world, in particular Europe, and, possibly later on, other continents. In the latter event, all pretence of concentrating on "military" targets will go, and the whole western world will find itself involved in a deadly dangerous confrontation with Palestinian Arab terrorism.

Of crucial importance in the phase of 'diffused' terrorism which seems to be beginning is an organisation calling itself 'Jihaz al Rasd' — RASD for short, or "Operation Network." This organisation, which has been built up in its present form over the past three years, has been described as the "unseen other half" of the "Fatah" movement led by Yassir Arafat and constituting by far the largest of the dozen or so Palestinian Arab terrorist groups. The RASD controls the "Black September" activist group, which has carried out numerous acts of banditry, sabotage and murder. Black September has, in turn, links with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other groups affiliated with Fatah. All of these groups, again, are linked with the ostensibly "respectable" Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). A West German secret service report has shown that Fatah, PFLP and other activist delegates have seats on the thirteen-man Executive Committee of the PLO.

RASD and Black September, between them, organised the hijacking of the Sabena airliner on May 8, 1972, the murder of the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi

the blowing up of the Rotterdam oil refinery on March 15, 1971. They were almost certainly responsible for the attempted murder of the Jordanian Ambassador in London, Mr Zaid al Rifai, on December 15, 1971, for the attempted destruction of an El Al airliner on the Rome-Tel Aviv run on August 16, 1972, and for the blowing up of part of the Trieste oil refinery later in the same month. It seems probable that RASD and Black September collaborated with the PFLP in the hiring of the trained Japanese murderers who killed twenty-seven civilians and wounded seventy-eight more in the Lod Airport massacre of May 30, 1972.

RASD itself began operations in the early 1960's primarily as an intelligence organisation, to gain information about Israel and screen recruits for the Fatah. Early RASD members were trained by the Egyptian Intelligence Service, which has drawn heavily in the past on ex-members of the Nazi SS for its expertise. In the last three years RASD has changed its character into something approaching an Arab Mafia. It has carried out killings and kidnappings for money, and has built up financial reserves in Italy, West Germany and Switzerland totalling an estimated \$100 million. It has financed large-scale smuggling operations, the most intriguing being that of hashish — grown in the Lebanon and dispatched in half-kilo packages, gaily decorated with the picture of an Arab commando holding his machine-gun at the ready. It has recruited agents in Europe and supplied them with forged papers, and it has established close working relations with "indigenous" terrorist gangs in European countries, particularly West Germany and Italy.

RASD has its own "action cells" in half a dozen European countries and may already be seeking to establish them in the

cells have been trained very often in Syria; their special value to RASD is their local knowledge and the fact that they are not so easily identifiable as Arabs. The action cells have been responsible for the extensive stockpiling of weapons, but their purchase has been carried out by much more "respectable" elements of society. Thus in Rome, which is becoming RASD's main centre in Europe, contact is fostered through the Diplomats Club, owned by RASD. Only at the end of August did the Italian police learn of the liaison between Arab diplomats and Palestinian terrorists in Rome.

There is one interesting difference between RASD cooperation with indigenous terrorist groups in West Germany and Italy. In West Germany, contact has been maintained exclusively with leftist groups of a radical kind, chief among them the so-called "Baader-Meinhoff gang." In Italy, RASD and other Palestinian organisations have links with the neo-fascist Right as well as the Left. The Irish Republic is another interesting case; there is close liaison in the field of propaganda between the Palestinians, the IRA and the embryonic Irish Communist Party, but entirely separate contact exists between Arab offices and Anglo-Irish conservatives — apparently of a relatively harmless nature so far.

The titular head of RASD is Abu Hasan, the son of a Palestinian sheikh killed by the Israelis in 1948. But the real leaders of the organisation are members of the Hussein family, who produced Haj Amin, the last Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and a supporter of the Germans during the war who advised the Nazis not to spare Jewish children in their plan to exterminate European Jewry. Three members of the Hussein family have high posts in RASD; in addition, several members of the Fatah leadership, including Arafat himself, are Husseinis and all nine members of Fatah's political bureau are related by family or by marriage.

There is a further feudal connection between Fatah and the Hussein clan; many of the Palestinian terrorist commandos have been recruited as a result of having been labourers, and sons of labourers, on Hussein land. RASD, even more than Fatah, has been built up on the basis of a "family elite," which is in no way unusual in the Arab world but is common to other international organisations like the Mafia and Cosa Nostra. One member of the Hussein family is RASD's technical adviser, responsible for murder and sabotage operations; another is chief executive officer, organising the planning branch which carried out Wasfi Tal's assassination.

The emergence of RASD as a real force in Palestinian terrorism is doubly significant in that it has come at a time when the protagonists of more orthodox armed conflict against Israel are in a state of despair. The bloody and ruthless battles fought against the terrorists by King Hussein's Jordanian army at the end of 1970 and in the spring of 1971 forced them to withdraw into the Lebanon and Syria. Neither of these countries is prepared to allow terrorists to operate without restriction across their frontiers with Israel, but there are obvious differences in the terrorist positions in the two countries.

In the Lebanon there are about 2,000 terrorists in the Arkoub area, known as "Fatahland" and close to Israel's north-eastern border. There are another 3,000 on the Lebanese-Syrian frontier close to Mount Hermon. Under the December 1969 Cairo agreement they were allowed to raid into Israel from secure bases in the Lebanon, as long as they did not fire across the frontier and provoke Israeli counter-action. The terrorists did not keep to the terms of this agreement, and heavy Israeli reprisal raids have now led to the Lebanese government obtaining a promise of no further military action, at least until after the summer ends. In return, the terrorists are allowed to maintain close contact in Beirut with Arab offices, planning staffs and propaganda organs.

Syria has attached the Palestinian activists to its own armed forces and has grouped them in the para-military "Saiqa" organisation. Armed and controlled from Damascus, Saiqa has an estimated strength of 15,000 to 20,000 men. Saiqa is linked with other groups through the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), in which Arafat plays a leading role and which has in the past tried unavailingly to coordinate overall terrorist activity.

Paradoxically, the efforts of the terrorists to re-group in the Lebanon and Syria would, if successful, have the effect of diminishing the threat posed to the western world by RASD, Black September and other murder gangs. Successful re-grouping would mean that the struggle against Israel would be carried on in the Middle East itself. Yet the odds must be against a "terrorist renaissance" on Israel's northern and north-eastern borders. Israel's frontier with the Lebanon is comparatively short and easy to defend, and the Lebanese authorities will continue to discourage persistent shelling across the frontier which brings swift and heavy retribution. And no Syrian government is likely to be foolish enough to encourage large-scale terrorist activity against an Israeli enemy which is only two hours'

It has been estimated that 30,000 to 50,000 Palestinians in all have been given military training, and elite squads have received additional training for sabotage and murder operations. While King Hussein of Jordan appears to be thinking more in terms of a negotiated peace with Israel, and President Sadat of Egypt has ejected his Soviet advisers, technicians and airmen and thus diminished his effective military striking power, the Palestinian

Arabs are increasingly isolated and unhappy with the "no-war-no-peace" situation. The civilized world, at the same time, is becoming more and more angered by sabotage and hijacking operations, and by brutal and murderous attacks on harmless civilians. Yet Rome and Bonn are already threatened by mounting terrorist activity; tomorrow it may be the turn of London and other western capitals.

HUMAN EVENTS

7 October 1972

Yasir Arafat's Revenge**Behind Arab Terrorism**

CPYRGHT

By HENRY J. TAYLOR

Arab terrorism, again headlined, begins with Palestinian guerrilla leader Yasir Arafat, alias Abu Ammar, whom I once went to see at his hideout in Amman, Jordan, and have written about. In all the Arab world no man's hands are more bloody than his.

Arafat is a broad-shouldered, rock-like man with a grip that is a crusher—a mercilessly cruel, evil character, zero Fahrenheit temperature. His tanned face is leathery, his mustache fierce and immense, his ancestral nose hooked, like a scimitar, and his daring brown eyes exchange glances as sharp as swords in the air.

He was holed up in a shabby room in an old house built in the cliffside. He had an automatic rifle on the table and was heavily guarded by camouflage-uniformed "militia." It was the moment of the Moslem prayer before sundown: *Salat li'asr*.

Arab etiquette demands that a host bid his guest "*mit ahlan wa sah'lan*"—a hundred times welcome. Substituting *alf*—a thousand—for *mit*, a hundred—builds extravagance into the courtesy and makes it ironic, as all Mideast hands well know. He hit me with *alf* at once.

Arafat leads both Al Fatah, the largest Arab guerrilla commando group and the all-encompassing United Commando Command and operates the powerful, insidious Voice of Assifa radio, the "Voice of Storm," and the Cairo-based Voice of the

Palestine Revolution radio, which blanket the Arab world.

His followers are drawn from the Palestine evictees, who now total about 2.5 million. They have had no political life. They are the moths; Arafat is the candle. They are the victims of two wars and the cause of another. For yesterday's Arab refugees are today's guerrillas who, in a great oversimplification, feel that Israel deprives them of their birth-right.

Inshallah (God willing) is the key word and philosophy in the Arab world. And all Arabs are willing to pay high for what they call their *akhad taro*—their revenge.

Arafat and his followers call their Israel assaults the *Sira'a* ("The Historic Struggle") and preach the war in terms of decades. He admitted to me that his followers "can be mobilized only around the issue of fighting." But the movement is deeply at odds within itself. And this accounts for the Black September group in his Al Fatah which claims responsibility for the Munich Olympic Games horror.

It is led by Munzeer Salman Khalifah, 29, a Palestinian Arab formerly of Beirut. Khalifah himself calls Al Fatah "the mother organization." In September 1970 brave King Hussein ordered his army to battle the guerrillas in Jordan. He won the civil war militarily, but not politically. And Khalifah named his Black September group in protest against King Hussein's action.

CPYRGHT

In February it began striking European targets and our Central Intelligence Agency estimates that it has expanded from 150 to about 300 members, including members in Western Europe and Yugoslavia, with some 51 cells throughout West Germany alone.

The CIA has discovered members arriving at East Berlin's Schonfeld Airport and being smuggled into West Berlin. They use false passports and each cell is a self-contained secret: cell members do not know the members of the other cells. And the CIA is convinced that it was this group that received a

\$5-million ransom from the West German government last winter for a high-jacked Lufthansa jet, although Bonn has never stated to whom it was paid.

Arafat told me that he and his followers must move the destiny of Arab world negotiations out of the hands of the Arab governments and,

by veto, into their own. The Arab world is unorganized, and probably unorganizable, and this militant veto power represents a force which even the best-organized Arab governments cannot ignore or suppress.

The Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, recognizing the importance of this veto force, invited Arafat to Moscow. With me, Arafat was evasive about the results, saying only that "the hearts in Moscow are warm and the snow is cold." He clearly got recognition, however, as a power independent of the Arab governments.

It is a superb blend of terror and blackmail—unspeakably brutish and unspeakably violent—but the prospect is not visionary. The Arab governments are shot through with individuals whose real loyalties are to dissident factions. Arafat swoops down on the opportunity like a hawk.

CPYRGHT

LE SOIR, Brussels
8 March 1973

ACCUSANT INDIRECTEMENT LA LIBYE

Le Soudan porte l'affaire de Khartoum
sur le plan interarabe

CPYRGHT

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Le Caire, 7 mars (A.F.P.).

Le général Nemeiry, chef de l'Etat soudanais, a accusé la Libye d'être à l'origine de l'attaque de l'ambassade d'Arabie Séoudite à Khartoum, jeudi dernier, portant ainsi cet incident sanglant sur le plan interarabe.

Le chef de l'Etat n'a pas cité la Libye nommément, mais il a insisté sur le fait que le commando palestinien était venu à bord d'un avion de ligne libyen et, par ailleurs, la presse soudanaise a révélé, il y a trois jours, que le cerveau de l'opération, Favaz Yassine, chef du bureau du Fatah à Khartoum, s'était réfugié à Tripoli. Pour être sûr d'être bien compris, le général Nemeiry a demandé l'extradition de Favaz Yassine.

Si le président dépasse le cadre du contentieux soudano-palestinien pour en faire une affaire interarabe, c'est que le problème du jugement des commandos n'est pas facile à régler. D'un côté, il doit châtier les commandos pour des

pour des raisons diplomatiques, le général Nemeiry ne peut tolérer que des factions arabes viennent tramer des intrigues sur son territoire avec tous les risques de subversion que cela comporte.

Une aide économique

dont on ne peut se passer

Par ailleurs, le Soudan, dont la situation économique est difficile, compte sur l'Occident et sur les pays arabes riches, comme l'Arabie, pour l'aider à sortir du sous-développement. S'il ne condamne pas les auteurs de la tuerie de l'ambassade d'Arabie Séoudite où deux diplomates américains et un diplomate belge ont trouvé la mort, il est certain que cette aide disparaîtra.

D'un autre côté, le Président soudanais sait que s'il condamne les commandos, il provoquera un véritable tollé, plus ou moins sincère d'ailleurs, dans tout le monde arabe qui défendra alors particulièrement cette faction pro-palestinienne risque aussi d'avoir des

échos au Soudan même où tout le monde ne voit pas d'un oeil favorable les distensions que provoque le général Nemeiry à l'égard du monde arabe.

La meilleure solution est donc d'accuser un autre Etat d'ingérence dans ses affaires intérieures, ce qui refait l'union sacrée au Soudan et empêche les autres Etats arabes de se mêler trop nettement des affaires soudanaises. L'inconvénient de l'opération, c'est qu'en s'en prenant à la Libye, le général Nemeiry s'en prend du même coup à l'Egypte. Les relations avec Le Caire n'étaient pas très bonnes depuis quelque temps, mais elles risquent de se détériorer davantage encore dans les jours qui viennent.

Le général Nemeiry a sûrement calculé ce risque. S'il le prend, c'est qu'il préfère maintenir l'ordre public chez lui et garder l'amitié de ceux qui peuvent l'aider à développer son pays, quitte à couper les ponts avec des Etats ou des organisations arabes qui de toute façon,

DAILY NATION
5 March 1973

CPYRGHT

Terror in Khartoum

BLACK SEPTEMBER is the pseudonym of that spineless gang of international thugs and murderers who, last September, stole their way into the Israeli village at the Munich Olympic Games and murdered eleven Israeli athletes.

The gang — a highly indisciplined wing of the Palestinian El Fatah movement — committed another crime on African soil at the weekend when, on Thursday evening, its dare-devils burst into a reception at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, occupied it and, at gun point, took into hostage five foreign diplomats.

The gang of seven Palestinians surrendered to the Sudanese army early yesterday morning — but only after murdering three of its hostages, two Americans and a Belgian. It had also threatened to murder the other two hostages but they were spared when the band surrendered.

One bitter lesson we all must have learned is that our countries must refuse entry to any Palestinian so-called "freedom fighters", whatever masks they may be wearing. It now remains to be seen what the Sudanese Government will do with the murderers who surrendered. If they are let off scot-free, a shocked world will condemn the Sudan.

It can no longer be doubted, even by those member-States of the Organisation of African Unity who have been aiding and harbouring such terrorists, apparently believing in the "righteousness" of their cause against the State of Israel, that they are, in reality, a murderous nuisance and can constitute a great danger to any country's sovereignty.

Although the Sudanese authorities have already condemned the crimes committed in Khartoum at the weekend by the Black September gang, it was baffling to note that between the time the main crime of trespassing into the Saudi Embassy grounds and the moment the terrorists boasted of having executed their first victims, the place had not been bombarded by the Sudanese troops and police who ringed it.

Did the authorities there expect the terrorists to obey verbal orders?

Indeed, had instant police action been mounted on Friday night, some of the hostages may have been retrieved

alive from their predicament. The Black September gang is El Fatah's suicide squad and its members are always ready for their avowed destiny anyway.

Judging by the demands made by the band of murderers after their intrusion on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, it was clear that they were not acting the way they did because of their opposition to Israel. Murder, arson and piracy form the basis of their manifesto. They craftily prostitute their hatred of Israel, while committing such heinous crimes, in order to mislead world opinion which is basically alienable.

The Sudanese authorities must by now have discovered, to their own dismay, the dangers inherent in allowing into the country any number of Palestinian refugees. Unlike African freedom fighters struggling for Uhuru single-mindedly, the Black September Palestinian terrorists have become seasoned international criminals of the worst order.

Regrettably, they are apt to be used as cheap political decoys and suicidal hirelings by any rebels in exile abroad who may wish to disturb their own country's peace and stability. This warning should be written on the wall by all OAU-member States — 90 per cent of whose leaders are constantly bewitched by coup phobia.

Kenya, in league with several other African and world countries, has already slated Israel for her recent destruction in mid-air of a Libyan civilian aircraft, resulting in many innocent deaths. Admitting that it was an error, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, said on Sunday that the Khartoum incident involving the Black September gang has had a greater impact.

It would be highly impolitic and perilous if any government in the world, including the Sudanese government, acceded to the type of demands for ransom and safe conduct made by the Palestinian international crooks.

Those of them who belong to the murderous Black September movement have forfeited the freedom fighters' credibility and, wherever they may go, must be hunted down and eliminated.

El Fatah's respectable leadership must now disown these gangsters.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1973

Are There Links Connecting Terrorists Around the World?

CPYRGHT

Twenty-six tourists, including 16 Americans, are slaughtered at Tel Aviv's Lod Airport. A British soldier, guarding a day-care nursery in Belfast, is cut down by a sniper's silent bullet. Two American diplomats and a Belgian are murdered in Khartoum. The British governor of Bermuda and his aide are assassinated in the garden of Government House as they take the governor's dog for a pre-midnight walk.

A rocket smashes into an isolated Rhodesian farmstead, killing a woman and badly wounding her husband. In Uruguay, Tupamaro urban guerrillas kidnap the British ambassador and hold him hostage.

underground "people's prison." In Canada, Quebec separatists murder a provincial cabinet minister.

Isolated events, separated by both time and distance from each other. Is there a linkage among them? Is there, in short, an international conspiracy of damned and dispossessed men, a legion of fanatical killers dedicated to the overthrow of lawfully constituted governments wherever they may be?

To say so would be over-dramatizing: There simply is not enough hard evidence to prove that there is an international conspiracy of violence. But there are, Western sources indicate, enough

links connecting various terrorist groups.

Take last year's slaughter at Lod Airport in Israel. It was carried out by three Japanese fanatics on behalf of a Palestinian Arab terrorist group. The Japanese had been trained at a camp in Lebanon. They had picked up their false passports in West Germany. They had received their Czech weapons from an Italian source.

It is known that members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine visited Tokyo secretly in November of 1971. There they established contact with the Renzo Sekigun (United

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fanatics who have been involved in shootouts with the Japanese police. The three Lod terrorists later flew to Lebranon and were trained near Baalbeck.

Nor are the Japanese the only foreign group with which the Palestinian terrorists have links. One of the little-noticed demands of the eight who butchered the two Americans and the Belgian in Khartoum was for the release of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, leaders of the so-called Baader-Meinhof group of anarchists which troubled West Germany for two years before its leaders were arrested.

It is also known that the Arab terrorists have at least loose links with the Turkish People's Liberation Army (which has murdered one Israeli diplomat and kidnaped a number of American servicemen), the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army, Uruguayan Tupamaros and Italy's so-called "Red Brigade," whose activities are centered on Milan. Representatives of several of these groups conferred se-

cretely with the IRA leaders in Dublin last May.

Insofar as there is a central headquarters or contact point for the various terrorist groups, it appears to be—or to have been until very recently—Zurich.

Last July, Hans Walder, the Swiss attorney general, reported that the Swiss police had uncovered a group headquartered on the Baendlistrasse which had associations with both the West German Baader-Meinhof gang and Milan's "Red Brigade." Some 41 people had been involved, about a quarter of whom were arrested.

All of the leaders and most of the guerrillas of the three African groups operating against Rhodesia from Zambia have been trained in the Soviet Union, China or by Chinese officers in Tanzania. Their weapons and funds also are provided by either Russia or China, Rhodesian sources say.

It is not yet known if the murderers of Sir Richard Sharples and his aide in Bermuda were linked to any of these organizations. There are a number of

militant black organizations on the vacation island.

What is clear is that international acts of terrorism are on the increase. As of November 1, 1972, 30 airliners from 14 countries had been hijacked and 29 other hijackings had been frustrated, with the loss of 140 lives and 99 wounded (these figures do not include the 108 dead from the Libyan airliner shot down by the Israelis). In the past five years, 32 diplomats from 13 countries have been kidnaped and 6 have been killed. Deadly letter-bombs have been mailed to addresses in more than a dozen countries.

Although the terrorists have a network of "safe-houses" all over Europe and the Middle East, things do not always go their way. In Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, an Arab underground leader's telephone rang the other day; when he answered it, the instrument exploded, killing him. And from time to time, a Palestinian's body is found in an alley in Rome or in a Frankfurt cul-de-sac.

And guess who's responsible for that?

NATION

19 March 1973

"Take Us Seriously"

CPYRIGHT

So said the Black September terrorists who murdered two American diplomats and a Belgian, also a diplomat, in Khartoum, capital of the Sudan. The world has done exactly what the murderers demanded, but with horror and execration, not condonation. Among sober-minded Arabs the reaction was one of dismay.

Every underground movement has its lunatic fringe but in earlier times the sane majority could usually keep its quota of madmen under restraint. Technology has liberated them: it is part of the price we pay for worldwide instant communications. Injured or resentful groups can command world attention with the speed of lightning—one of the more dubious blessings of electronics. It is not hard to do; the only requirement is a small band of determined men armed with automatic weapons.

It can be done wisely, but the tendency is toward fanaticism and recklessness. For any hope of success, the activists must have a good case, keep violence to a minimum, and by what they do and say appeal to the sense of justice which, if not universal, is latent in a great many people.

The Black September terrorists are not likely to learn from this disaster, which may well have wrecked their movement, but the lessons are worth noting:

¶The terrorists horrified the world because it was clear that they intended to kill the two Americans and the Belgian (apparently they mistook him for a Jew) with-

out giving the governments involved a chance to negotiate or even remonstrate. Their demands, such as the release of Sirhan Sirhan, were obviously megalomaniac. Significantly, they beat up their captives before killing them; their predecessors at Munich at least refrained from that barbarity. They then called in a doctor to treat the captives before shooting them.

¶They have embarrassed Arab nations which were sympathetic to their cause, even if not actually financing and supporting it. They alienated the moderates throughout the Arab world.

¶The government of Israel had incurred widespread condemnation for the shooting down of the Libyan airliner, with the loss of 106 lives. [See Jon Kimche: "Dayan, Meir and the Libyan Plane," *The Nation*, March 12.] There were mitigating circumstances in that incident, based in part on the earlier atrocities by Black September bands, and the failure of the Israeli military authorities to communicate on the radio frequencies used by the Cairo control tower and the lost airliner, but the onus remained on the Israelis. The terrorists got the Israelis off the hook for the time being.

¶By staging their action in Khartoum, the assassins drove a wedge between the government of the Sudan and the Arab world. They timed the blow for "Unity Day," as though to punish the Sudanese Government for appearing to turn its back on the Arab world. The Middle East.

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¶The terrorists specifically mortified Saudi Arabia, in whose embassy the executions occurred.

¶Heroic speech must culminate in heroic action, or it becomes ludicrous. The Khartoum blow-hards scaled down their demands, finally dropped them after killing the three diplomats, and surrendered ignominiously. It was as if Samson had refrained from pulling down the Philistine temple because he did not want to get hit on the head.

¶The killings damaged prospects for possible peace talks in the Middle East. That may have been the prime reason for the action, or the terrorists may have been the tools of a Libyan plot. At the outset they demanded the freedom of hundreds of Arab captives; the end result may be that King Hussein will execute the sixteen guerrillas he has in captivity.

The most deplorable aspect of the whole affair is that the Palestinians have a genuine grievance and reasonable claim for redress. The Arabs have exploited their cause in the most shameless way, without giving them help or hope, but the Khartoum type of action by those claiming to represent the Palestinian cause is divisive even among Palestinians.

No one is entirely guiltless in this tragedy. Nor will it avail any of the participants to pass resolutions, or convert their embassies into fortresses. Even if the diplomats remain unscathed, there will always be the businessmen and tourists, soldiers and sailors: the possibilities are endless. Isn't it time to deal seriously with the Palestinian question, instead of leaving it to the most irresponsible elements and the tactics of the madhouse?

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 December 1972

Latin Guerrillas Fail to Organize Uprising

Survey of Terrorist Movements Reveals
Their Status as Fragmented Kaleidoscope

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

BUENOS AIRES (AP)—

How close and bright would the future appear if two, three, many Vietnams flowered on the face of the globe . . ."

That was the musing of Ernesto (Che) Guevara, the Cuban-Argentine guerrilla leader, months before he died at the hands of the Bolivian army in 1967.

Five years after his abortive attempt to export the Cuban revolution to the jungles of Bolivia, the future appears to have passed him by.

Guevara's yearning for a series of bloody struggles in Latin America "with their quota of death and immense tragedies" that would destroy North American "imperialism" forever is as far away from success today as it was when he was shot to death.

In the complicated arena of world diplomacy where yesterday's enemies can become today's friends, better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and China are not heartening signs to Latin revolutionaries. In addition, the low-key but potentially important negotiations under way between Washington and Havana over airliner hijackings would be a critical blow to the guerrilla movements in the Ameri-

das should the talks develop into a wider forum for better relations.

Source of Support

Cuba has been a traditional source of moral and material support for Latin-American guerrilla movements.

An Associated Press survey of the status of guerrilla movements in Latin America reveals a fragmented kaleidoscope of revolutionary groups.

Some old organizations, such as the vaunted Tupamaros of Uruguay, have succumbed to attrition in virtual open warfare with better-equipped army and police forces.

Other organizations have shown that a few determined men and women can carry off spectacular demonstrations of violence and terror. But they have failed to achieve Guevara's most cherished desire: to win the confidence and support of Latin-American workers and peasants in an organized uprising against the so-called "oligarchy."

Argentina — Terrorist bombings have become an almost daily occurrence here but the recent return of former dictator Juan D. Peron as the country prepares for free elections next year appears to have helped ease tensions between the military government and its opponents.

The most active groups are the People's Revolutionary Army, or ERP, the Montoneros and the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The former is Trotskyite, the latter two groups support Peron's return to power.

Last April, ERP terrorists kidnaped and killed Oberdan Sallustro, the Ita-

lian general manager of Fiat-Concord.

Lately, Argentine revolutionary organizations have switched attention to bombing attacks against exclusive social and sports clubs where the "oligarchy" relax and play.

Argentine police do not supply statistics, but it is known that several hundred persons have been jailed as security forces hunt down guerrillas.

Bolivia — The military government of President Hugo Bazer, an army colonel, has almost wiped out the guerrilla movement in Bolivia. The National Liberation Army founded by Guevara has ceased to be an effective force. Tough army rangers destroyed a 70-man guerrilla column in 1970. The eight survivors were allowed to seek political asylum in neighboring Chile.

Brazil — Having effectively curbed most urban terrorism in Brazil since

taking power in 1964, the military government is reportedly hunting down a new guerrilla movement that claims to be gathering its forces "in a far corner of the Amazon jungle."

The organization, in a pamphlet delivered anonymously in October to a foreign newsman, calls itself the "Araguaia Guerrilla Forces Command," after an Amazon River tributary.

Last September, the army announced that anti-government terrorists killed a sergeant on an antiguerrilla mission near where the Transamazon Highway is under construction, the first time in two years the government acknowledged the presence of rural guerrillas in Brazil.

A Brazilian newspaper recently reported that 5,000 troops were hunting for guerrillas near the Araguaia River. The armed forces never confirmed this but the fact the story was allowed to run in a paper constantly under the eyes of government censors indicated it was probably true.

The armed forces and police have killed or captured most known Brazilian guerrilla leaders. Thousands of real and suspected subversives are in jail on

charges of "endangering national security."

Chile—The 1970 victory of Marxist Salvador Allende and his leftist Popular-Unity coalition in a free presidential election short-circuited the programs of Chile's Revolutionary

Left Movement, known by its Spanish initials as the MIR.

This group has had to curtail its armed "expropriations" of banks and supermarkets. The MIR sees Allende's government as a "positive step," but says only violence will win "all power for the working class."

Colombia—Three guerrilla groups have operated in Colombia for 10 years, mainly in rural areas.

Aside from scattered ambushes of army patrols or kidnappings of rich ranchers, they have posed no threat to the nation's civilian government.

Ecuador—There is no history of guerrilla move-

ments in Ecuador in recent years. Even university and secondary school students, traditional government opponents, have been quiet since a military government seized power last February.

Mexico—Guerrilla activity appears to be mainly confined to sporadic actions in rural areas. Guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas, accused of leading an ambush last August in which 18 soldiers were killed and 16 others wounded, has been promised amnesty by the government in exchange for the opportunity to talk with him. Another important guerrilla leader, Genaro Vazquez, died this year in an auto accident.

Bombings of public buildings and North American properties increased in Mexico this year.

Peru — The country's military government, which took over in 1968, is proud of the infrequent

outbreaks of violence since then. There is no organized guerrilla movement in Peru, although military leaders frequently accuse "the extreme right and the extreme left" of counterrevolutionary agitation in connection with labor unrest.

Uruguay — A state of "internal war" by combined action of the Uruguayan army and police has virtually destroyed the action arm of the Tupamaros, probably the best known of Latin America's guerrilla movements. Its leader, Raul Sendic, is under guard in a hospital with part of his jaw shot off. He was captured during a shootout last September.

The Tupamaros gained notoriety in 1970 when they kidnaped and killed U.S. police adviser Dan Mitrione. They also kept British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson and U.S. agronomist Claude Fly imprisoned for months in a

"people's jail." More than 30 Tupamaros have been killed and 2,000 jailed and a number of constitutional guarantees have been suspended to aid the hunt for other guerrillas.

Venezuela — Although they present no serious threat to the civilian government, urban guerrillas have intensified their activities in recent weeks, presumably in preparation for disruption of next year's presidential elections.

"We have removed their eradication," said President Rafael Caldera, recently of the guerrillas, "but there still remain small groups which once in a while carry out acts to make their presence known."

Last week gunmen from the Armed Forces of National Liberation, the main guerrilla organization in Venezuela, killed a former police chief who had fought terrorists.

AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT, Beirut
12 March 1973

CUBA-SOUTH YEMEN :

A SPECIAL POSITION

CPYRGHT

Cuba is taking a growing military and economic interest in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. According to Aden News Agency reports, Jacinto Vazquez de la Barza, Cuban ambassador to the PDRY, who is resident in Cairo, visited the republic from 17 to 21 January, when he had separate meetings with the three members of the Presidential Council, and the secretary general of the ruling Marxist National Liberation Front, Abdul Fattah Ismail.

During his visit, the ambassador was made to feel a guest of top-level importance. He returned this hospitality by organizing a party given on board a Cuban freighter which had arrived in Aden on 9 January. The PDRY prime minister (who is also minister of defense), and the Minister of the Interior, Mohammad Salch Muti, were among the guests.

The freighter unloaded a cargo of sugar and later, at night and in complete secrecy, large quantities of stores were removed from the ship under the

protection of PDRY forces. It is also known that substantial numbers of Cubans, many of them military personnel, have begun to arrive in Aden.

Deliveries of military stores to Aden, and the sudden arrival there of Cuban military personnel from Havana, are believed to be the outcome of Cuban-PDRY agreements concluded during Abdul Fattah Ismail's visit to Cuba in October/November 1972. He was accompanied by a number of military officials, and in the middle of December a Cuban delegation, headed by a senior Cuban defense official, arrived in Aden. Since then up to 150 Cuban military "specialists" have arrived in the PDRY, where they dispersed to special camps upcountry.

Observers are wondering what lies behind this new Cuban military involvement in the PDRY. As allies of the Soviet Union, the Cubans are presumably diverting Soviet-made military stores to Aden with the full knowledge of the Russians. A possible explanation is that Moscow, aware of growing disillusionment in the Arab world, is seeking to

Soviet military aid, is using the Cubans as a cover for its strategic interest in this geographically important area. China, too, is strategically interested in South Yemen, and Cuban military aid could intensify Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in this remote part of the Arabian peninsula. The Cubans now in the PDRY are expected to specialize in training the latter's forces in guerrilla warfare and subversion directed against the YAR, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

In recent months South Yemeni leaders have been critical of the amount of Soviet and East European aid directed to their country, which they say is infinitesimal compared with that given to Cuba. Abdul Fattah Ismail is on record as saying that the PDRY is "the new Cuba in the Arabian Peninsula" and is more deserving of Soviet aid, since Cuba is "much more developed" and "the difficulties faced by the revolution in Yemen are greater than those which Cuba has had to deal". In a newspaper interview last November he said that while the PDRY did not "negate the importance of the current level of the aid and the great sympathy our revolution in getting from all socialist countries," this was "not yet sufficient to meet the requirements of the revolution". He included in the term "revolution" the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) and the Palestine resistance movement. Both the Soviet Union and China support the PFLOAG, but Chinese aid and influence are greater. PFLOAG (formerly the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf) seeks to destroy the "imperialist presence in all its forms" and in particular the regime in the sultanate of

Muscat. It operates in the Dhofar province of Muscat, adjoining South Yemen.

At a nonmilitary level, there are other indications of mounting Cuban interest in South Yemen. On 27 January an agreement was signed between the PDRY's "Public Corporation for Fish Wealth" and the Cuban Fishing Company for cooperation in the field of fisheries. A representative of the Cuban company, Jolio Marx, signed the agreement as head of a Cuban team which had arrived earlier in the PDRY to "assist" in the development of local fisheries.

Aden News Agency also reported on 3 February that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Saleh Aulaji, would be visiting Cuba in February at the invitation of the Cuban foreign minister. This visit was announced as coinciding with that of a delegation from the General Confederation of Democratic Yemeni Workers, led by the Vice President, Mohammad Suda'i Ali, which was traveling at the invitation of the Federation of Cuban Trades Unions. All the nonmilitary events were publicized in speeches and press statements emphasizing the spirit of friendship and cooperation between Aden and Havana.

Although Cuba appears to have a position of influence in the PDRY and commands respect among Palestine resistance leaders, Fidel Castro's prestige has fallen in Arab countries because of his inability to take an independent position. He has been accused of being "inconsistent" in maintaining diplomatic relations both with Arab states and Israel; an Arab diplomat recently described this inconsistency as "a glaring blot" on the revolutionary claims of Cuban leaders.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
19 February 1973

Cuban guerrillas killed in Guinea river clash

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By BRUCE LOUDON
in Lisbon

EIGHT Cubans serving with African guerrillas have died in a clash with Portuguese troops in Guinea-Bissau, according to military sources in Bissau.

The Cubans, heavily-armed and in the battle dress of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) were crossing the Cashen River in a rubber boat when they were attacked by a patrol of Portuguese marines.

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sank in midstream. The bodies of the Cubans, it was claimed, have been recovered.

It is believed that the insurgent force, led by the Cubans, was preparing to launch a morale-boosting attack in the heartland of Guinea-Bissau.

Communist plot

The PAIGC is in urgent need of moral uplift since the organisation has been riven by internal dissent since the assassination last month of Amilcar Cabral, its leader. This probably accounts for the fact that the Cubans threw caution to the wind and entered Portuguese territory.

They are not the first Cubans to appear with the PAIGC.

Pedro Rodriguez Peralta, who holds the rank of colonel in the Cuban Army, is in jail in Lisbon after being captured with rebel forces in Guinea-Bissau.

Gen. Antonio "de Spinola, Portuguese Commander-in-Chief, has told me there are "hundreds" of Cubans acting as training officers at PAIGC camps in Senegal and Guinea-Conakry.

There are reports that other foreign "advisers" are serving with the PAIGC and Lisbon will now seek to show that the Portuguese are fighting an international Communist conspiracy.

In Mozambique, it was reported yesterday that Portuguese soldiers had killed, wounded or captured 143 Frelimo insurgents during the past month.

THE MIAMI HERALD
25 February 1973

CPYRGHT

CUBA STILL MEDDLING, AFRICA DEATHS SHOW

CPYRGHT

BY FRANK SOLER
Herald Latin America Staff

Cuba's continuing subversive activity in Africa has surfaced again with the deaths of eight Cuban-born guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea.

The eight guerrillas reportedly drowned when their boat was intercepted and sunk by a Portuguese naval patrol vessel on a river in the northern part of that Portuguese West African colony.

Portuguese intelligence sources said the dead Cubans had been part of an insurgent force surprised on the Cacheau River as the group attempted to infiltrate into Portuguese Guinea from neighboring Senegal.

ACCORDING to the same sources, the Cubans had recently arrived from Havana to replace other Castroite guerrillas returning to Cuba after a tour of duty in Africa.

The Cubans were serving with the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) a rebel army of 10,000 Soviet-trained and equipped irregulars based in Guinea and Senegal.

Operating from these neighboring havens — and from Portuguese Guinea territory it controls — the PAIGC has been waging a hit-and-run jungle miniwar with Portugal for control of the colony for 10 years.

Until last month, when its 46-year-old London-trained agronomist-leader Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry Guinea, the PAIGC was considered one of the most successful, anti-white colonialism ss guerrilla movements in Africa.

IT REMAINS uncertain what long-range effect

Cabral's death may have on the movement. But judging by the Cacheau River action, the PAIGC's strike capability appears undiminished.

The death of the PAIGC-affiliated Castroites once again focuses attention on Cuba's role in that "forgotten war," as newsmen have dubbed the bloody, Vietnam-like conflict between the rebels and Portugal.

Currently, an unspecified but sizable number of Cubans are said to be serving as "advisers" with the guerrillas.

And a large number of PAIGC guerrillas reportedly continue to undergo insurgency training in special schools in Cuba.

CUBAN delegates were present when PAIGC supporters met in Conakry following Cabral's death to discuss ways of keeping the movement afloat.

And most, if not all, members of Guinea President Sekou Toure's personal bodyguard reportedly are specially-trained Cubans.

The Cubans' role in Portuguese Guinea has been compared to, albeit on a smaller scale, the "adviser" role of the first U.S. forces sent to Indochina.

THE DROWNING of the eight Cuban guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea comes at a time when Cuban subversion in the Western Hemisphere is said to be on the wane.

The apparent decrease in the level of Cuba's hemispheric intervention is cited by some as a key reason for lifting sanctions imposed against Cuba by the

Organization of American States in 1964.

Cuba's meddling in African affairs is by no means recent. Neither has it been confined to Portuguese Guinea.

The African interventions dates back to at least 1962 and includes, such other targets as The Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana and Zanzibar.

IN MID-1962, a contingent of Cuban blacks was discovered fighting beside Communist guerrillas in the eastern Congo.

In November 1963, Morocco severed ties with the Castro regime after charging that several Cuban freighters loaded with Soviet weapons had been sent to aid hostile neighbor Algeria in a Sahara Desert war.

In January 1964, a ship flying the Algerian flag docked at Tanganyika, on the African mainland about 25 miles from the East African island of Zanzibar, and unloaded the Soviet weapons.

Ten days later, John Okello, a former Mau Mau terrorist who in 1961 headed the Cuba-Zanzibar political office in Havana, topped the Zanzibar government.

REFUGEES evacuated from the island told of seeing many Spanish-speaking persons in Castro-style fatigues among the rebels.

Tanganyika and Zanzibar recently independent from Great Britain — then joined to create Tanzania, which soon became a "back door" for Cuban infiltration into Africa.

More than 100 Cuban "advisers" arrived in Tanzania during 1965 to train rebels from other African countries, notably The Congo.

That year, Congo Premier

Moise Tshombe accused Cuba of sending agents to aid Congolese rebels and displayed the bodies of several of the Cubans.

A NUMBER of Cuban exiles, many of them veterans of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, were among fighter-bomber pilots flying for Tshombe's air force at the time.

It was in 1965 also that Ernesto (Che) Guevara dropped from sight in Cuba and traveled to Africa to lead guerrilla groups there. His effort, however, was unsuccessful and he moved on to Bolivia, where he was killed in 1967.

Cuba's African subversion intensified following the 1966 Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Peoples, which was held in Havana.

REPORTS of Cuban involvement in various African hotspots proliferated and the number of Cuban officers involved increased.

In 1969, one of the highest-ranking Cubans then serving with the PAIGC guerrillas was wounded and captured by the Portuguese as he led a guerrilla group from Guinea into Portuguese Guinea.

The officer was identified as Cuban army Capt. Pedro Rodriguez Peralta, a long-time associate of Fidel Castro who fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra mountains against Fulgencio Batista.

Peralta confessed that he and "several other" officers had been assigned by the Castro regime as "aides" to the PAIGC insurgents.

He is currently serving a 10-year prison sentence.

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April 1973

NOTEWORTHY EVENTS

April	Libya	A Union of European and Arab Youth meeting is being personally sponsored by Libyan President Qadhafi. The object of the meeting is to promote militant positions on the Mideast problem, particularly in support of Palestinian Liberation efforts.
April 10	Czechoslovakia	Fifth Anniversary of the publication of the "action program." Known as the "April Theses," the theoretical basis for the liberalizing reforms that Alexander Dubcek inaugurated in 1968, which led to the Soviet invasion in August of that year.
April 10-15	Chile	An International Conference Against Multi-National Companies is to be sponsored by Chilean General Confederation of Workers (CUT) and supported by Communist World Federation of Trade Unions. CUT claims it has support of all the trade unions but the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) declined to support the meeting.

April 6	Ethiopia	Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a pan-African Trade Union Congress will take place in Addis Ababa to discuss the establishment of a single trade union organization. This new organization would replace the non-Communist African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) and the Communist dominated all-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF).
April 22	USSR	Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born, 1870. In the exchange of CPSU party cards which began on 1 March, party document number one was accorded Lenin as a traditional gesture in honor of his role as founder of the Soviet communist party. CP Chief Leonid Brezhnev was given card number two.
May	Germany-USSR	Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev will make an official visit to Bonn.
May 15	US-Japan	In 1972 the United States returned the last of its World War II captured islands, Okinawa and the remaining Ryukyus to Japanese sovereignty. By contrast the USSR still asserts its authority over the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, which it seized in the last week of World War II.

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CPYRGHT

"He exterminated millions of men; millions died with his name on their lips. He accepted both as a necessity, but of the one and the other, it was never possible to discover in him any sign, any trace on his visage or in his words, even though he must have had a boundless hatred for the one and was not concerned to know about the other. The party bureaucracy recognized in him its leader and its guiding spirit, even when he oppressed and decimated it. At no moment that I was with him did I ever feel that he was able to experience a second of untainted joy or an instant of disinterested and non-egoistic happiness. Such sentiments were outside his world."

Corriere della Sera, Milan, 4 March 1973

Come Gilas ricorda il georgiano

In un incontro diretto aleggiava subito nell'aria tutto ciò che tradiva il temperamento di calcolatore di cui era impastata la sua personalità - Ma era anche un uomo dalle emozioni forti e vigorose

CPYRGHT

Milovan Gilas ha 62 anni. Ex-comandante partigiano, aiutante di Tito e suo presunto delirio, egli si distaccò sempre più dalla linea ufficiale del partito comunista jugoslavo, auspicando riforme in senso democratico. Nel suo celebre libro «La nuova classe», che gli procurò una dura condanna, criticò aspramente l'involutione burocratica del comunismo sovietico. Gilas s'incontrò più di una volta con Stalin e dalle sue esperienze trasse un altro libro, intitolato appunto «Conversazioni con Stalin». La rievocazione che pubblichiamo è inedita.

Inutilmente cerco di capire e ricordare quale altro personaggio storico contemporaneo, al di fuori di Stalin, stimolasse e ricercasse nei rapporti personali diretti le stesse impressioni dell'immagine che di lui era stata artificialmente costruita ad uso di propaganda pubblica. Già dalle prime parole, che egli profferiva, defluivano da lui le sensazioni

che scaturivano da un suo contegno marziale e pensoso e da una grottesca maschera di bonarietà, quella stessa costruita dalle sue fotografie ufficiali, dai ritratti artistici, e in buona parte dai film documentari.

In realtà in luogo di questo Stalin pubblico, inventato dalla sua personale propaganda, entrava in scena davanti all'interlocutore stupefatto uno Stalin privato, per così dire operativo, di lavoro, nervoso e intelligente, e dall'altro lato vanitoso, e tuttavia amante di un modo di vita modesto.

Sono stato ricevuto per la prima volta da Stalin durante la guerra, nella primavera del 1944. Aveva vestito allora l'uniforme di maresciallo che non doveva più smettere. Quella dura uniforme militare subiva però istantaneamente sul suo corpo una strana trasformazione, quasi una metamorfosi, determinata dal suo atteggiamento assolutamente non militare, vivace e non convenzionale, che facevano di un'uniforme un semplice quotidiano, mutavano la divisa in un abito qualsiasi.

In un incontro diretto cominciava anche ad aleggiare però subito nell'aria tutto ciò che tradiva e denunciava la mentalità e il temperamento di calcolatore di cui era impastata la sua personalità, per quanto sia necessario dire che egli non cercasse affatto di nascondere queste sue qualità, ritenendole anzi inseparabili da quelle di un vero politico. Qualche volta in modo grottesco egli cercava addirittura di sfoggiarle e di metterle in rilievo. Così verso la fine della guerra aveva consigliato ai comunisti jugoslavi di accordarsi pure col re Pietro II, aggiungendo: «E poi, quando vi sarete rafforzati — il pugnale nella schiena...».

Memoria ferrea

I leader comunisti, anche quelli dei partiti stranieri, erano a conoscenza di queste particolarità di Stalin, ed erano spinti per questo motivo a prestare attenzione al modo in cui parlava, a ogni affermazione o un appunto, nonché a provarne un certo cominciamento ritenendo che

questi erano in definitiva i mezzi coi quali poteva essere rinforzato lo Stato sovietico, quale centro di propulsione del movimento comunista mondiale.

I sistemi e il carattere di calcolatore, insieme all'astuzia che si riscontravano in Stalin, davano l'impressione di un uomo freddo, senza pietà, incapace di slanci sentimentali. In effetti egli era anche un uomo dalle emozioni forti e vigorose, propenso ad improvvise esplosioni.

Naturalmente tale emotività era da lui subordinata alla situazione e agli obiettivi da raggiungere: Stalin si agitava in tutto il suo essere, ma probabilmente riusciva benissimo a dominarsi quando così era necessario.

Possedeva una memoria eccezionale: ricordava senza errori tutti i particolari riguardanti i personaggi di un libro o romanzo, o di persone reali, anche se di esse non rammentava più i nomi, e così pure teneva ben fisse nella memoria le qualità e le debolezze degli uomini politici stranieri. Spesso se la prendeva per delle piccolezze e sottigliezze di

nessun conto, che successivamente si dimostravano all'improvviso di grande importanza: nel mondo di Stalin e nella sua mente non esisteva nulla di tanto trascurabile che non potesse un giorno diventare importante. Direi che avesse più memoria per il male che per il bene, forse anche perché intuiva che l'ordine che egli costruiva non avrebbe potuto esistere in nessun altro mondo se non nemico...

In sostanza era un autodidatta, ma non soltanto nel senso in cui lo è ogni uomo dotato, ma anche nelle sue effettive conoscenze. Si muoveva tuttavia con abbastanza disinvoltura nel campo della storia e della letteratura classica, come pure in quello degli avvenimenti e fatti di ogni giorno. Non si aveva la sensazione che egli si vergognasse o provasse un senso di inferiorità o nascondesse la propria ignoranza. Se accadeva che non fosse informato sull'argomento della conversazione, ascoltava con intensa attenzione, aspettando con impazienza che si passasse a un altro tema.

Il rigido, unilaterale dogmatismo era un altro importante e appariscente aspetto di Stalin. L'ideologia, rispettivamente il marxismo come un pre-determinato e chiuso sistema di visioni, era per lui la base spirituale del potere totalitario, rispettivamente costituiva il fondamento per la trasformazione di questo potere in un'arma della società aclassista. Pur attenendosi inflessibilmente e senza remissioni a questo principio, Stalin non se ne sentì tuttavia mai schiavo: era il principio che doveva servire lo Stato e la burocrazia di partito, e non questi ultimi il principio.

Senso critico

Non si lasciava sfuggire la occasione per approfittare di confutare pubblicamente le tesi di Clausewitz, il grande teorico dell'arte della guerra tedesco, benché questi fosse stato il modello militare di Lenin, e persino, quando si trovava in mezzo a una cerchia chiusa di ascoltatori, naturalmente dopo la vittoria sulla Germania hitleriana, per attaccare e tentare di ridimensionare addirittura Marx ed Engels e rimproverare ad essi la loro dipendenza dall'idealismo classico della filosofia tedesca.

Certamente si rendeva conto di molti dei propri sbagli e insuccessi, anche se pubblicamente non li mettesse poi in evidenza. Così si poteva sentir dire da lui frasi come: « Siamo stati portati da questi mari » da questo o da quegli altri. Cosa che lo portò nel

giorno delle celebrazioni della vittoria a ricordarsi e a discorrere degli sbagli commessi in guerra. Ai primi del 1948 disse anzi che furono i cinesi a suo tempo ad aver ragione, e non lui, nel valutare le proprie capacità e prospettive per il futuro.

La prima impressione sulla levatura intellettuale e sul carattere forte non si indeboliva nel corso della conversazione ma si approfondiva. Tale impressione veniva poi rafforzata dalla sua ininterrotta, quasi morbosa attenzione e vigilanza sulle persone con cui parlava, che alla fine assumeva un'azione terrorizzante sull'ascoltatore. Ci si accorgeva allora che egli era nient'altro che un avviluppato cumulo, una matassa di nervi, irti e tesi in tutte le direzioni: non era possibile in sua presenza permettersi una lontana allusione, e nemmeno cambiare la espressione degli occhi, senza che egli non se ne accorgesse e non lo notasse.

Oggi in seri circoli scientifici dell'Occidente si vogliono vedere in Stalin caratteri addirittura criminali e maniaci. In base alle esperienze dei miei incontri con Stalin non potrei confermare questi rilievi se non nel senso e in quanto ogni conquistatore è

un distruttore, ed è dall'altra parte un costruttore in quanto creatore di un nuovo impero, e porta pertanto dentro di sé gli impeti di grandi entusiasmi e di ossessionanti ire e disperazioni. Le sfrenate esplosioni d'ira ossessiva e i successivi accessi di buffonesca gioia, che in lui si alternavano, non poterono non lasciare una traccia sul suo animo. Era normale che questo accadesse. Sarebbe stato invece anormale sterminare alcune generazioni di propri seguaci e i propri stessi familiari, come egli fece, e restare dopo tutto ciò normale, non sospettoso e flemmatico.

Ritengo che per trovare una spiegazione degli aspetti maniaci e criminali della personalità di Stalin bisognerebbe indirizzare la ricerca in direzione dell'idea e dell'ordinamento del mondo che egli intendeva edificare. L'idea stessa della edificazione di una qualsiasi società nuova, e tanto più di una società senza conflitti, o per usare un neologismo « non-conflittuale », è in se stessa mitomania, rappresenta l'irrazionale, mentre un ordinamento sociale basato sulla non-legalità non può essere per se stesso che criminale.

Piccolo di statura

Stalin era troppo piccolo di statura, con gli arti sproporzionatamente lunghi rispetto al busto corto, per non soffrire per questa malformazione. Di lui era piacevole solo la testa che si poteva dire anche bella per la vivace intelligenza che da essa traspariva, e per la semplicità popolare e gli occhi giallognoli di mutevole luminosità.

Sterminò milioni di uomini, milioni morirono col suo nome sulle labbra. L'una cosa e l'altra egli accettò come una necessità, ma né dell'una né dell'altra fu possibile mai scoprire un segno su di lui, una traccia sul suo volto, nelle sue parole, anche se egli si sforzò di odiare senza misura i primi, e non si curò di conoscere gli altri...

La burocrazia partitica senti in lui il suo capo e la sua guida, anche quando egli l'opresse e la decimò. In nessun momento, trovandomi con lui, ho potuto avere la sensazione che egli potesse provare un attimo di gioia senza ombra o un istante di disinteressata non egoistica felicità. Erano queste le sensazioni al di fuori del suo mondo, senza le quali egli ha potuto tuttavia vivere proprio perché aveva identificato se stesso con la sua idea del mondo e con l'ordinamento fondato su di essa.

Milovan Gilas

Matta stated that of the 9 Russian road graders sent to Curicó, 3 or 4 were out of service because of mechanical problems, which disrupt the normal activities of the highway department.

He added that, following instructions, two of the old American machines had been sent to Cauñin, and that there are instructions to send others to that region, but that his office will not deliver them because for the time being it is considered necessary to send them to Curicó, especially because of the problems encountered with the Russian road graders.

He stated that Soviet machinery is no good for mountain service, because they are too wide for the roads. An old Austin motor grader which is in perfect condition has, therefore, been sent to that sector. On the other hand, Matta was of the opinion that the bulldozers purchased in the Soviet Union had not yet been a problem to the Highway Department.

EL MERCURIO, Santiago
19 January 1973

No Funcionan Las Maquinarias Rusas

SANTA CRUZ.— A menos de tres meses de haberse traído a la zona las máquinas motoniveladoras rusas para el arreglo de los caminos, más del 70% se encuentran en mal estado y muchas de ellas sin posibilidades de repararlas y por lo tanto se están usando para sacar piezas para arreglar otras. Esta última situación ocurre por ejemplo con la máquina HMH 737 que con menos de 60 horas de trabajo efectivo, ya quedó fuera de servicio porque sus fallas son múltiples y para ella no hay repuestos.

Los operadores y mecánicos de estas motoniveladoras rusas llegadas a la provincia a fines de octubre, tienen opiniones fuertes y lapidarias. Uno de ellos expresó: "que se lleven luego estas máquinas". Otro acotó: "Sería un castigo de Dios trabajar alguna vez con esta máquina". Otro operador señaló: "Que se las lleven luego a la fundición libertad". Otro operador, que ha participado en cursos de adiestramiento, expresó que los propios instructores habían señalado que con estas máquinas "se habían retrocedido 30 años en cuanto a calidad técnica".

CASOS CONCRETOS

La motoniveladora HMH 683, entre horas efectivas de trabajo, la traída desde Valparaíso a Santiago y de allí a Santa Cruz, más las horas de transporte hasta las faenas de Santa Cruz, apenas ha completado 286 horas de trabajo y las fallas han sido múltiples. En la actualidad se encuentra paralizada en los talleres de Santa Cruz.

En Lolol de las dos motoniveladoras, una se encontraba trabajando. La otra está fuera de servicio. Una de ellas falló mientras se encontraba trabajando cerca de Bucalemu, en el terraplén de puente Cabeceiras en la comuna de Paredones y para habilitarla hubo que sacarle una pieza a la que se encontraba en los talleres de Lolol.

En Marchigüe, de las tres motoniveladoras rusas, hay una en servicio. Uno de los funcionarios confidenció que prácticamente con tres máquinas se estaba armando una.

A San Fernando llegaron cuatro motoniveladoras rusas. Una nunca se pudo utilizar, porque en el sólo trayecto de Santiago a San Fernando sufrió una grave falla.

Un mecánico de Bancagua que estuvo de visita en Santa Cruz, señaló que de 8 máquinas rusas que llegaron, una sola estaba en servicio.

La situación así dada a conocer, comprobada por "El Mercurio" y recogiendo antecedentes entre los propios empleados y operadores en rueda, es de extrema gravedad y seguramente ello ira a dar motivo para una amplia investigación, por cuanto todos coinciden en señalar que fue una pésima adquisición y comentan que se trata de modelos con más de 30 años de antigüedad, copiado de viejos modelos americanos pero con modificaciones.

DIGNO DE RIPLEY

El operador de máquinas motoniveladoras de Lolol, Francisco Verdugo, que también se le entregó una motoniveladora rusa nueva y cansado de tanta deficiencia, concurrió a San Fernando a pedir que le devolvieran su antigua máquina Adams que tiene 16 años de uso.

El ruido en el interior de la cabina es ensordecedor. Todos los operadores reclamaron de esta situación. El inspector de máquinas de la provincia, Secundino Gutiérrez Díaz, debió mandar unos filtros para colocarse en los oídos.

LAS FALLAS

Las fallas principales enumeradas por técnicos de vialidad, serían las siguientes:

EL MERCURIO, Santiago
25 December 1972

Denuncia: No Sirven las

CPYRGHT Motoniveladoras Rusas

CURICO.— La mala calidad de las motoniveladoras soviéticas adquiridas por la Dirección de Vialidad para el arreglo de los caminos hizo presente el gobernador de Mataquito.

El jefe departamental Federico Nuñez, dijo que a Mataquito le fueron asignadas dos de estas máquinas de fabricación soviética, las que se encuentran en estos momentos fuera de servicio por desperfectos en su funcionamiento. Agregó que en un mes estas motoniveladoras solo han funcionado dos veces, lo que hace injustificable su inversión.

El gobernador Nuñez dijo que fue informado extraoficialmente que las mencionadas motoniveladoras fabricadas por los rusos estaban destinadas a despejar los caminos de nieve pero en ningún caso para la conservación de las vías.

Más adelante señaló que sugerirá a las autoridades del servicio de Vialidad que no se retiren las máquinas norteamericanas antiguas, que son ideales para la reparación de los caminos, especialmente los de la costa curicana. Estas máquinas están siendo reemplazadas por las motoniveladoras fabricadas en la Unión Soviética.

MAQUINAS RUSAS NO SIRVEN

Consultado el jefe provincial de Vialidad, Mario Matta, sobre

los problemas denunciados por el gobernador de Mataquito en las máquinas motoniveladoras soviéticas, respondió que creía que la topografía de la provincia no hacía aconsejable su uso en los caminos curicanos.

Matta manifestó que de las 9 motoniveladoras rusas enviadas a Curicó 3 ó 4 se encuentran fuera de servicio por problemas mecánicos lo que produce trastornos en las actividades normales de la repartición.

Agregó que dos de las máquinas antiguas norteamericanas fueron enviadas a Cautín por disposición superior y que existían instrucciones para destinar otras a esa región, pero que la oficina no las entregará por estimar que por el momento son necesarias en Curicó, considerándose especialmente los problemas que se han presentado con las motoniveladoras soviéticas.

Expresó que la maquinaria soviética adquirida no sirve para la cordillera, porque son muy anchas para los caminos, circunstancia que ha motivado la destinación a ese sector de una vieja motoniveladora Austin que se mantiene en perfecto estado.

Matta opinó, por otra parte, que los bulldozers adquiridos en la Unión Soviética hasta ahora no han dado problemas al servicio de Vialidad.

DENOUNCEMENT: RUSSIAN ROAD GRADERS ARE NO GOOD

CURICO - The Governor of the Department of Mataquito, Federico Nuñez, stated that Soviet road graders purchased by the Highway Department for road maintenance were of poor quality. He said that Mataquito had received two of these machines of Soviet manufacture, which were presently out of service because of failures. He added that in a month these road graders had functioned only twice, which makes the investment unjustifiable.

Governor Nuñez said that he had been informed unofficially that these Russian-made road graders were intended to clear snow from the roads, but not for road maintenance. He pointed out that he would suggest to the highway authorities not to do away with the old American machines that are ideal for road repairs, especially along the coast in Curicó province. These machines are being replaced by Soviet-made road graders.

Russian Machines Are No Good

The Highway Chief of the province, Mario Matta, was asked about the problems of the Soviet road graders which had been strongly criticized by the Governor of Mataquito. Matta replied that in his opinion the use of these road graders was not advisable on the roads of Curicó because of the topography of the province.

CPYRGHT

—Fallas en la Caja de Cambios. Una máquina rompió piñón. Otra rompió la horquilla que corre los engranajes para hacer cambiar de velocidad; falla en los rodamientos de la transmisión de la caja de cambios. Uno de los engranajes fue sacado con sus estrías totalmente borradas; fallas en el eje de la transmisión final; fallas en los cilindros hidráulicos de accionamiento de los diferentes mandos; fallas en las mangueras de alta presión del sistema hidráulico, habiéndose roto la mayoría y en la actualidad se encuentran parchadas con elásticos; falla en las conexiones de las cañerías del sistema hidráulico; filtraciones de aceite, incluso petróleo; falla en los engranajes de la tornamesa; falla en los repartidores del sistema hidráulico; fallas en el sistema hidráulico de la dirección, constituyendo un grave peligro para los operadores; neumáticos muy duros con 18 telas que no amortiguan.

EFICACIA DE TIEMPO

Consultado el Jefe Mecánico de Santa Cruz, señaló que los operadores de estas máquinas, cuando estaban buenas, debían disponer diariamente de una hora para hacerle revisiones, apretar pernos, parchar mangueras y revisar los sistemas de más cuidado. Agregó que con las anteriores máquinas, apenas se les dedicaba unos 15 minutos y que en resumen se reducía a la revisión del aire de los neumáticos.

Estas máquinas también son muy lentas, demorándose mucho en el trayecto para llegar a las faenas.

Según el inventario, en el departamento hay 16 motoniveladoras, de ellas 8 máquinas rusas, pero en la actualidad solamente hay cinco en servicio, por lo que el mantenimiento de los caminos se ha visto resentido.

RUSSIAN MACHINERY DOES NOT FUNCTION

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

SANTA CRUZ - Less than three months after the arrival in Santa Cruz of the Russian road graders for road repairs, over 70% are in bad condition. Many of them cannot be repaired and their parts are being used to repair others. This is the case of machine No. HMH 737 with less than 60 hours effective work, which cannot be used because of its numerous failures and because there are no spare parts.

The operators and mechanics operating these Russian road graders that arrived in the province at the end of October have strong and incontrovertible opinions. One of them said: "Take away this trash soon". Another said: "It would be God's punishment to work again with this machine". Another operator commented: "Let them be taken soon to Fundición Libertad" (a Santiago smelter of scrap iron). Another operator who had taken training courses, said that the instructors had pointed out that with these machines "they had moved back 30 years with regard to technical quality".

CPYRGHT

Specific Cases

Motor grader MHM 683, counting actual hours of operation, transportation from Valparaiso to Santiago to Santa Cruz, plus the hours of transportation to the site of work in Santa Cruz, has barely completed 286 hours of operation, and failures have been numerous. It is presently out of service in the workshops of Lolol.

In Lolol, of the two road graders one was working and the other was out of service. One of them broke down while working near Bucalemu, on the embankment of the Cabeceras bridge in the municipality of Paredones, and in order to repair it, it was necessary to take a part from the grader in the Lolol workshops.

In Marchigüe, of three Russian road graders, only one is working. One of the officers confided that by using parts from three machines another one was being assembled. San Fernando received four Russian road graders. One of them could never be used because of a serious failure that occurred on the road from Santiago to San Fernando. A mechanic from Rancagua visiting Santa Cruz said that of the 8 machines received, only one was in service.

CPYRGHT

This situation, which has been confirmed by "El Mercurio" and through information received in conversations with employees and the operators themselves, is extremely serious. It will surely give rise to a thorough investigation, since everyone concurs in pointing out that it was a very bad purchase. The models are 30 years old, copied from old American ones with some modifications.

Worthy of Ripley

The road grader operator in Lolol, Francisco Verdugo, who also received a new Russian road grader, was so tired of so much inefficiency, that he went to San Fernando to request that the 16 year old Adams machine he had before be returned to him. The noise inside the cabin is deafening. All operators complained about this. The inspector of the province, Secundino Gutierrez Diaz, had to send ear plugs.

The Breakdowns

The main breakdowns given by technicians are the following:

- Breakdown of the gear box. One machine broke the gear-wheel pinion; another one broke the gearshift; failure of the ballbearings in the transmission of the gear box. One of the gears was removed with the grooves completely worn out.
- Failures in the rear transmission axles
- Failure of hydraulic cylinders of the various gears
- Failure in high pressure tubes of hydraulic system, most of which are torn and have been patched with rubber; faulty connections in hydraulic tubes system
- Oil leaks, including petrol
- Failure in turntable gear
- Failure in hydraulic distributor system
- Failure in hydraulic system of steering, constituting a serious danger to operators
- Very hard 18-fabric tires with no cushioning.

Loss of Time

In reply to a question, the Chief Mechanic in Santa Cruz pointed out that when these machines were in working condition, the operators had to spend one hour a day in checking, tightening screws, patching tubes, and looking over the most important systems. He added that the machines used previously only needed 15 minutes to check, which consisted mainly of checking the air in the tires. These machines are also very slow, taking a long time in arriving at the working site.

According to the inventory, the provincial department has 16 road graders, of which 8 are Russian, but presently there are only five in service, which results in inefficiency in road maintenance.

EL DIARIO DE HOY, 6 Mar 73
San Salvador

LA NOTA DEL DIA

*Maquinaria rusa inútil
antes de tres meses de uso*

Desde Santiago de Chile se nos transcribió un mensaje sobre la triste experiencia tenida con equipos camineros de fabricación rusa. Más del 70% —decía la información— de las máquinas motoniveladoras rusas para el arreglo de caminos, habían sido abandonadas, y la única explicación que se recibía en defensa era que los equipos afectados se habían puesto a labores inadecuadas, ya que una cosa era nivelar suelos y otra apartar la nieve. Sin embargo, los operadores y mecánicos que se quejaban de la mala calidad de los equipos, hacían referencia a las ya antiquísimas máquinas norteamericanas que seguían trabajando con visible excelencia.

Lo que se informa desde Chile sobre la mala calidad de los equipos soviéticos ha pasado antes en Colombia y si mal no recordamos, en el Perú y Venezuela. Estas negociaciones entre países latinoamericanos y Rusia —prácticamente de trueque— han sido verdaderos errores, casi siempre producto del peculado partidista, ya que generalmente los reformadores igualitaristas —que truenan contra el capital— se queman con verdadera sed de dinero en cuanto están arriba. Desde luego, estas experiencias no se han padecido solamente en negocios con la Unión Soviética. Hace como 5 años se hizo público en Bolivia el desastre sufrido con una negociación de maquinaria agrícola adquirida en otros países socialistas de Europa. Y no sería remoto que los equipos que están por llegar o que han llegado a Costa Rica den resultados parecidos: de poca duración y efectivamente caros, ya que a cambio del magnífico café costarricense les llegará chatarra deficientemente manipulada.

Desde luego, hay que darle mayor amplitud a estos juicios, si no generalizándolos hasta el infinito, sí dándoles la justa amplitud, ya que hoy día la mala calidad de muchas cosas importadas en toda la América Latina ha llegado casi al colmo: cañerías arruinadas antes de los tres años, herramientas inútiles a muy corto tiempo, artefactos y motores, para los cuales no se encuentra remedio en caso de desperfectos y porque las calidades son inferiores. Se padece en todo el mundo de un invisible sabotaje: la pugna entre el productor y el consumidor y sobre cada empresa industrial se cierne amenazadora la acción adversa desde arriba y desde abajo. Esto está produciendo un inevitable perjuicio a la economía de todos los países, casi equivalente a una estafa a escala internacional.

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