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Cover: Chou En-lai, veteran party leader and Premier of the People's Republic of China, pictured at Peking Airport in 1970. Photo by Denes Baracs for Interfoto MTI (Hungary) via EUPRA.

Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives

By S. P. Seth

Except for a brief interlude of Sino-Indian cordiality in the mid-1950's, relations between the two largest and most populous Asian nations over the past twenty-odd years have been marred by mutual distrust, tension, and occasional armed hostilities along disputed segments of their common frontier. In the last two years, however, there have been subtle indications of a change in atmosphere as a combination of factors has seemingly impelled both powers toward a more relaxed and constructive approach to the problems dividing them. The present article will endeavor to trace the beginnings of this change against the background of the earlier record of tension and conflict.

Observers have generally tended to view the border dispute as the basic cause of hostility and impasse in the relations between India and China. In fact, however, the border conflict only triggered tensions that developed from other causes. When one looks back over the checkered course of Sino-Indian relations, it becomes apparent that the primary source of strain between the two countries has lain in faulty assessments on both sides of each other's political and strategic objectives, not only in the context of bilateral relations but also in the broader context of global politics.

In order to see how these misjudgments developed, it is necessary to go back to 1950, when ten-

sion first began building up between India and the newly-established Communist regime in China. The starting point was the Chinese military occupation of Tibet, which removed what had long served as an effective buffer between China and India. Growing acrimony in India over the Tibetan issue was temporarily arrested in April 1954 with the conclusion of a Sino-Indian agreement whereby China, in return for Indian acceptance of Tibet as "part of China," promised to respect Tibetan autonomy and agreed to the continuance of certain Indian trading privileges in Tibet inherited from Britain and the provision of facilities for Indian religious pilgrims.¹ But while this agreement smoothed over the immediate differences between the two governments and ushered in an interval of euphoria in Sino-Indian relations, the atmosphere of cordiality proved short-lived.

Tibet and the Border Conflict

The main reason for the renewal of tensions was the fact that the Chinese occupation of Tibet activated the whole issue of the boundary between China and India, setting in train the long series of claims and counterclaims, and resultant armed border

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¹ A reading of the text of this agreement shows that India conceded more than it gained, but the Indian government skillfully "sold" the agreement to the public by playing up the relatively minor Chinese concessions regarding Indian trade and pilgrim traffic to Tibet and explaining its acceptance of Tibet as "part of China" as signifying recognition merely of China's "suzerainty" rather than "sovereignty." See in this connection P. C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy*, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1952, pp. 25-57. For the agreement text, see Lok Sabha Secretariat, *Foreign Policy of India—Texts of Documents (1947-59)*, 2nd ed., New Delhi, 1959, pp. 103-03.

clashes, that developed during the late 1950's.² The boundary dispute mainly involved two widely separated sectors: the eastern sector, where Tibet adjoined India's Northeast Frontier Agency (now Arunchal Pradesh) and where the line of physical control generally followed the historic McMahon Line; and the western sector, between Tibet and the Ladakh region of Kashmir, where there were conflicting claims on both sides and no clear line of actual control. Chinese interest centered primarily in the western sector, more particularly in the Aksai Chin district of northeastern Ladakh, which lay athwart the only feasible overland route between China's Sinkiang Province and Tibet. When India discovered in 1958 that the Chinese had built a motor road through the Aksai Chin and established a line of advance positions guarding the road, the border dispute suddenly assumed serious proportions. So far as the eastern sector was concerned, the Chinese had indicated in 1956 that they were prepared to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary,³ but after the dispute in the western sector became acute, they sought to use their acceptance of the McMahon Line as a bargaining counter to pressure India into accepting an overall settlement legitimizing their new "line of actual control" in the west.

Even though the border problem was largely a political issue that might have been resolved by compromise in easier circumstances, it became enmeshed in the overall climate of mutual distrust that was again beginning to permeate Sino-Indian relations. This atmosphere of suspicion deepened still further with the 1959 Tibetan revolt against Chinese rule. On the one hand, China's forcible suppression of the revolt evoked a sharp reaction in India, where there were open expressions of sympathy for the Tibetan cause; on the other, the action of the Indian government in granting political asylum to the Dalai

² On the positions of each side in the border dispute, see: For India, Government of India, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China*, White Papers Nos. 1-12 (1954-1966), New Delhi; Government of India, *Reports of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China*, New Delhi, 1961; and Surya P. Sharma, "The India-China Border Dispute—An Indian Perspective," *American Journal of International Law* (Washington, DC), January 1965 (reprinted by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs). For China, *The Sino-Indian Border Question*, two separate studies with the same title, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1952 and 1965.

³ According to then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, he received such assurances personally from Chinese Premier Chou En-lai when they met in 1956. See Government of India, *India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, September 1946-April 1961)*, New Delhi, 1961, p. 360.

Lama in the face of Chinese protests markedly intensified Chinese suspicions of India's intentions with respect to Tibet, particularly in view of New Delhi's equivocal position on the issue of China's "sovereignty" over that sensitive region.⁴

Parallel with these developments, the buildup of distrust between Delhi and Peking was given added momentum by the emergence of a Chinese strategy aimed at exploiting differences between India and Pakistan. Evidence of this new strategy appeared as early as the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states, at which China's representatives were seen befriending the Pakistanis despite the fact that Pakistan, through its membership in SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), belonged to the Western alliance system. According to Pakistani accounts, Chou En-lai, in private talks with Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra during the conference, unquestioningly accepted the latter's assurance that Pakistan's adherence to SEATO was not directed against China,⁵ as well as Bogra's explanation that Pakistan's "virtual defenselessness vis-à-vis India at that time" necessitated "strengthening its relative military position even if this had to be done through American assistance."⁶ Soon after the conference, according to Rushbrook Williams, who had close contacts with the Pakistani official establishment,

... Karachi received . . . a private message from Peking. The Chinese People's Government assured the Government of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their relations; but that this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite conflict of interest could be expected in the near future.⁷

In light of these exchanges, it is clear that Peking's discernment of the potential value of Pakistani friendship in the event of an anticipated conflict with

⁴ See fn. 1.

⁵ See Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope and Limits of Convergent Policies," in A. M. Halpern, Ed., *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965; Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China," in *Foreign Policy of Pakistan—A Symposium*, Karachi, The Allies Book Corporation, 1964, p. 79.

⁶ Anwar Syed, "Sino-Pakistan Relations," *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), 2nd quarter, 1969, p. 108.

⁷ Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, London, Faber, 1962, p. 120.

India inspired Chinese readiness to overlook Pakistan's alliance with the West. It also seems probable that the same calculation motivated Peking's consistent refusal—even while India and China still appeared to be on the best of terms—to publicly endorse India's position in the dispute with Pakistan over ownership of Kashmir.

Peking's Misperceptions

In the latter half of the 1950's, the strains in Sino-Indian relations were augmented by still another factor—namely, Chinese misperceptions of India's role in the context of global politics. These misperceptions stemmed primarily from Indian moves toward closer relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union, against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, offered India extensive economic assistance, later supplementing it with sales of military equipment, and there also were indications of a trend toward more cooperative relations between Washington and New Delhi. These developments were viewed in Peking as signifying a shift in India's international political "alignments" to the strategic disadvantage of China.⁸

Against this background of developing Indo-Soviet and Indo-US ties, the Chinese construed India's continuing sympathy for the Tibetan cause, so dramatically symbolized by the Dalai Lama's 1959 flight to political haven on Indian soil, as evidence that India was becoming a willing tool in an aggressive international conspiracy directed against China. This suspicion found expression in Chinese accusations that India was being used as a base of American operations to support rebellion in Tibet by training and arming Tibetan "counterrevolutionary" forces.⁹

Toward the end of the 1950-62 period, initial Soviet-American moves toward détente—though briefly interrupted by the U-2 incident and later by the Cuban missile crisis—tended to reinforce a Chinese "siege mentality" that pictured India as a "front man" for China's more powerful adversaries. This integration of the supposed threat from India into Peking's broader perception of a global anti-Chinese conspiracy created an extremely complex situation that defied solution through bilateral Sino-Indian negotiations.

The Chinese, indeed, were right in estimating that India counted upon developing closer links with the United States and the Soviet Union as a principal means of containing a possible Chinese threat to

⁸ According to Edgar Snow, Peking felt that India was "maneuvering to get both American and Russian aid in order to oppose the unification of the People's Republic." See his *The Other Side of the River—Red China Today*, London, Gollancz, 1963, p. 591.

⁹ See Indian Government White Paper No. 1, referred to in fn. 2 above, pp. 60-69.

Indian security. However, their perception of the developing international situation, and more particularly of India's "involvement" in an aggressive conspiracy against China, was clearly overdrawn.

This becomes clearer if we look at the measures that India was actually taking to bolster its security vis-à-vis China. These measures combined diplomacy with discreet precautionary steps more directly related to military security. On the diplomatic side, India continued its vociferous professions of friendship for China and sought to promote China's involvement and acceptance in international forums in the hope that this would subject Peking to a measure of international discipline. At the same time, New Delhi took steps to cultivate closer political ties with the superpowers in order to achieve "security through policy,"¹⁰ and it had also sought earlier to strengthen India's security perimeter by entering into treaty relationships with the Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

On the military side, India undertook the construction of strategic roads linking the interior with the hitherto inaccessible, mountainous border regions and the establishment of an administrative network in those areas. Indian units also carried out occasional patrols in the border districts "to show the flag," and eventually a more active security posture was adopted with the establishment of so-called forward posts in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied positions in the disputed areas. These limited military measures, however, represented more a conscious demonstration of India's will to stand up to Chinese threats than a full-fledged security effort.

In sum, neither India's diplomatic initiatives nor its military precautions appeared to justify Peking's perception of India as part of an aggressive international conspiracy against China.

Indian Misperceptions

If the Chinese exaggerated, and overreacted to, the perceived Indian threat, India at this stage also misjudged the situation—but in an opposite sense. Despite the apparent strains in Sino-Indian relations, the Indian government persisted in its belief that a direct, large-scale military confrontation with China was politically unthinkable. Consequently, when the conflicts over Tibet and the border issue became too conspicuous and threatening to be glossed over any longer, the government tended to take refuge in expressions of righteous indignation at what it saw as a Chinese betrayal of India's good faith.

¹⁰ R. K. Nehru, "Relations with China and Pakistan," *The Times of India* (New Delhi), Independence Day Supplement, Aug. 15, 1972.

It was, indeed, genuinely felt that India had made vital concessions to China by accepting the latter's position on Tibet and by crusading on China's behalf in various international forums; and as an implicit *quid pro quo*, New Delhi expected Peking to respect India's general position in the boundary dispute between the two countries, which China did not officially challenge until 1959. It was also felt that the Chinese had not been forthright in putting forward their formal territorial claims only after establishing a forward "line of actual control" in the Aksai Chin (western sector), for which they then demanded Indian legitimation.¹¹ As Prime Minister Nehru subsequently remarked, Indian acceptance of this demand would have been tantamount to condoning aggression after it had been committed.¹² Finally, the inclusion in China's September 1959 territorial demands of claims in the eastern sector—notwithstanding Chou En-lai's 1956 assurances to Nehru that China would accept the McMahon Line in that area—added to the Indian sense of betrayal. The Indian general public, having been subjected to much trumpeting of the slogan *Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers), fully shared this sentiment, creating an internal political climate that made it all but impossible for the government to negotiate a political settlement of the border issue on any terms that would be acceptable to Peking.

Thus, the 1950-62 period saw the gradual development of a hostile relationship between India and China which first gathered momentum in the context of bilateral relations and then acquired global connotations as Peking came to view India as part of a hostile international environment. It was not surprising, therefore, that confrontation rather than conciliation became the keynote of policy on both sides, finally producing the border war of 1962.

Hostile Coexistence

Following the 1962 hostilities, which ended inconclusively without any agreement settling the border issue, armed conflict gave way to a state of hos-

¹¹ Prime Minister Nehru expressed his disillusionment when he remarked that in the past, whenever India had called the Chinese Government's attention to errors in Chinese maps showing Indian territory as part of China, the Chinese had evaded the issue by saying that "these were old maps, and their revision would be taken up later when they had the leisure to do so." See *India's Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 350.

¹² Government of India, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 4 (September 1957-April 1963), New Delhi, 1964, p. 217.

tile coexistence between India and China. The Chinese remained nervous and suspicious with respect to Indian policy on Tibet, especially in view of persisting political instability there and the presence of the Dalai Lama and his entourage in India, where Peking feared that he might be encouraged to set up a Tibetan government-in-exile backed by India and outside powers. At the same time, in the global context, Peking became even more fixed in its perception of India as a client state and cat's paw of China's major enemies—the United States and the USSR—with whom Chinese relations were steadily worsening. Peking's suspicions deepened as India proceeded to strengthen its defenses with American and especially Soviet military assistance.¹³

A key element in China's response was the translation of Peking's discreet approaches to Pakistan of the mid-1950's into an active policy of forging close ties with that country as a regional counterweight to India. The prospects for such a policy must have appeared particularly bright to Peking in light of evidences of Pakistan's growing disillusionment with its Western allies for having failed to take advantage of India's dependence on their support during the Sino-Indian border conflict to pressure Delhi into settling the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan on terms favorable to Karachi.¹⁴ Accordingly, China in 1963 concluded a provisional agreement with Pakistan defining the boundary between China's Sinkiang Province and that part of Kashmir claimed by Pakistan,¹⁵ and the next two years witnessed visits to Karachi by top Chinese government leaders, who publicly stressed China's solidarity with Pakistan.¹⁶ Since the border agreement in effect ignored India's claim to sovereignty over all of Kashmir, it evoked a sharp pro-

¹³ On US military aid between late 1962 and September 1965, when it was discontinued following the outbreak of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, see K. Subrahmanyam, *The Asian Balance of Power in the Seventies—An Indian View*, New Delhi, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 1968, p. 21. On Soviet military credits to India prior to 1965, see Selig Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1965, p. 326; after 1965, see an estimate of US Undersecretary of State Kenneth Rush, reported in *The Times of India*, April 21, 1973.

¹⁴ Pakistan's President Ayub Khan made his disillusionment plain when he warned his Western allies in October 1963 that they should "not rule out the possibility of Pakistan firmly allying with China in order to safeguard her independence against Indian aggression." See B. L. Sharma, *Pakistan-China Axis*, Bombay, Allied Publishing House, 1968, p. 96.

¹⁵ Text in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Sino-Pak "Agreement"*—Some Facts, New Delhi, 1963, p. 24.

¹⁶ During a highly successful visit to Pakistan in 1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai voiced general support of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and criticized India, by implication, for adopting "a big-nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on others" (see

test from New Delhi and further aroused Indian suspicions of an emerging Peking-Rawalpindi "axis." There have also been strong indications that China, prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani clash, entered into an understanding with Karachi committing China to aid in the defense of East Pakistan if India should attack that region in a war with Pakistan.¹⁷

In the event, East Pakistan did not become involved in the 1965 hostilities, so that this understanding, if it existed, would not have applied. Even so, China's failure to give more direct and positive support to Pakistan during the 1965 conflict with India caused at least a temporary setback to Peking's strategy of playing off Pakistan against India. Instead of abandoning the policy, however, China redoubled its efforts in order to recover lost ground.¹⁸

While trying to groom Pakistan as an external force contributing to the political fragmentation, and hence the weakening, of India, China also sought to promote the same objective by encouraging and supporting subversive forces within the Indian polity. Peking, in fact, had good reason to be optimistic that India might soon fall asunder under the pressure of its internal political contradictions. Maoist-inspired "Naxalite" elements in India's West Bengal state and rebellious tribal groups in remote areas of north-eastern India seemed to provide potential nuclei for a general Maoist revolutionary upsurge, and in 1966-67 internal political unrest gained momentum as India faced near-famine conditions because of widespread drought. The 1967 general elections, moreover, tended to fragment the Indian polity by bringing into power in a number of provinces a conglomeration of coalition governments composed of

Pakistan Times [Lahore], March 24, 1964). Visiting Pakistan the following year, then Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi called "the solidarity of the 750 million people of China and Pakistan . . . an important force for the defense of world peace" (*Dawn* [Karachi], March 28, 1965).

¹⁷ Speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on July 17, 1963, then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto strongly hinted at the existence of a defense understanding with China when he declared that "an attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. This new factor . . . is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, wish to elucidate it any further" (*Foreign Policy of Pakistan* [A Compendium of Mr. Bhutto's Speeches as Foreign Minister in the Pakistan National Assembly], Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1965, p. 75). See also *Patriot* (New Delhi), June 27, 1969, quoting an East Pakistani author, Kamaluddin Ahmed, in a book entitled *Our Freedom Struggle* (then banned in Pakistan), to the effect that there was a detailed understanding between China and Pakistan regarding the defense of East Pakistan in the event of Indian attack.

¹⁸ See the author's "China as a Factor in Indo-Pakistani Politics," *World Today* (London), January 1969.

disparate elements which had nothing in common except their antipathy to the ruling Congress party. Although the Congress was returned to power at the center, its parliamentary majority was significantly reduced and dangerously faction-ridden.

Amidst these conditions of rampant political confusion, the Peking-backed Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)—or CPI(M-L)—resorted to tactics of mass terror, particularly in West Bengal, and China also undertook to equip and train selected cadres for an insurgent Naga régime that had set itself up in the remote hill-country of northeast India. At one time, it even appeared that the rebellious tribesmen (Nagas and Mizos) and the Maoist revolutionaries in West Bengal, with the prompting and encouragement of Peking, might engage in concerted action to disrupt India's polity.

Given these seemingly bright revolutionary prospects in India, it was not surprising that China was initially unresponsive when the New Delhi government, prompted by a feeling of increased self-confidence resulting from India's relative success in the 1965 clash with Pakistan, initiated a series of signals in late 1967 indicating its desire to reopen a dialogue with Peking looking toward a normalization of interstate relations.¹⁹ An additional reason for the lack of response from Peking at this time may well have been the virtual paralysis of Chinese diplomacy as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, which reached its high point of intensity in mid-1967. In any event, Sino-Indian relations remained in stalemated until after the Ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party declared an end to the Cultural Revolution in the spring of 1969.

Interval of Relaxation

The interval between the latter part of 1969 and the events leading up to the Bangladesh crisis of late 1971 brought a brief whiff of fresh air into Sino-Indian relations as Peking's tactics toward India showed some hopeful signs of change. The probable reasons for this shift in style (though not in substance) were several.

First, the change appeared to be in line with China's new diplomatic approach that began to unfold in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. So far as

¹⁹ See statement by the then Indian Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, reported in *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Aug. 30, 1967. The series of signals culminated in a statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi seeking a dialogue with Peking, reported in *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Jan. 2, 1969.

India was concerned, the new Chinese tack manifested itself in a resumption of diplomatic courtesies and even of some formal contacts between Chinese and Indian envoys stationed in third countries. The most significant indication, however, came in Mao Tse-tung's reported remarks to the Indian Chargé d'Affaires at a May Day 1970 reception in Peking, urging that China and India become friends once again.²⁰

Second, it was no doubt evident to Peking that the prospects for an anticipated Maoist revolutionary upsurge in India were already on the wane, with the Indian left-Communist forces and the Naga rebels both hopelessly divided within their respective ranks.²¹ Peking's disillusionment with the tactics and strategy of the CPI (M-L) was, in fact, explicitly conveyed to the Indian party in a secret letter from the Chinese Communist Party,²² which had the contrary effect of further aggravating the fragmentation within the already divided left-Communist ranks.

Third, contrasting political changes in India and in Pakistan probably induced a Chinese reappraisal of the subcontinental balance. On the one hand, the general political situation in India, though still not entirely stable following the split in the ruling Congress, did indicate a pro-Indira Gandhi upsurge which was confirmed in subsequent national elections. In Pakistan, on the other hand, severe political disturbances led in March 1969 to the resignation of President Ayub Khan and the establishment of a new military regime under General Yahya Khan, which reimposed martial law and suspended the constitution. These events exposed sharp divisions in the body politic and were bound to create apprehensions in Peking regarding Pakistan's political stability and its effectiveness as a counterweight to India.

Finally, China's softened attitude toward India no doubt resulted, in part, from a growing acrimony in Indo-Soviet relations caused mainly by a shift in Moscow's policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. This shift, evidenced by a Soviet decision in 1968 to supply sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan and by a

series of subsequent visits to that country by high-level Soviet military dignitaries, was interpreted in India as signifying a Soviet move to follow the Western policy of creating a parity of power between India and Pakistan. There also were misunderstandings over a host of other matters, including the fact that Soviet official maps continued to reflect endorsement of Chinese claims in the boundary dispute with India.²³ At a time when Sino-Soviet hostility was about to erupt in the armed clashes of March 1969 on the Ussuri River boundary and later along the Central Asian border, China could hardly have failed to discern the potential advantage that might be derived from exploiting the simmering differences between Moscow and New Delhi. In this context, a Radio Peking commentary at about the same time as the outbreak of the Ussuri River clashes significantly omitted India from a list of Asian countries accused of ganging up with the Soviet Union and the United States in an anti-Chinese "Holy Alliance."²⁴

The Bangladesh Crisis

The easier atmosphere that appeared to be emerging in Sino-Indian relations in 1969-70, however, evaporated almost as quickly as it had surfaced, as a combination of regional and global developments during 1971—the burgeoning separatist movement in East Pakistan, the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of August 1971, and the December war between India and Pakistan that clinched the independence of Bangladesh—again intensified tensions between New Delhi and Peking.

The independence movement in East Pakistan, which threatened to bring about Pakistan's dismemberment, and India's moral commitment to support it created an extremely difficult dilemma for Peking. On the one hand, China's vital interest in preserving a balance of forces on the subcontinent dictated that it act in support of its Pakistani ally. On the other hand, it wished to avoid provoking India into active involvement in Pakistan's dismemberment and also to keep alive New Delhi's interest in normalizing relations with Peking. Therefore, the Chinese response was muted and twofold.

First, Peking stepped up its verbal professions of "undying friendship" for Pakistan and of support against possible external "aggression" (obviously from India). Such pronouncements, it was hoped, would not only help to deter Indian involvement but also would offset Soviet criticisms of the repressive

²⁰ *The Statesman*, June 8, 1970.

²¹ Chinese hopes of stirring up unrest in India's vulnerable northeastern border regions were dealt a heavy blow by the Indian authorities' arrest of Naga rebel "Commander-in-Chief" Mowu Angami when he and a number of followers attempted to get back into Nagaland after receiving weapons and training in China. See *ibid.*, March 17, 1969.

²² For text of the letter, see *Mainstream* (Delhi), Oct. 21, 1972, p. 33. The letter had been originally sent in November 1970.

²³ For a detailed discussion of these misunderstandings, see the author's "Russia's Role in Indo-Pak Politics," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), August 1969.

²⁴ *The Statesman*, March 8, 1969.

policies being pursued by the Yahya Khan regime toward the separatists in East Pakistan.²⁵

Second, Peking balanced its vociferous expressions of support for Pakistan with a carefully restrained and low-key reaction to popular Indian fervor for the Bangladesh movement in the hope that such a response would be less likely to prod India into the very course of action that Peking wished to prevent. At the same time, China was reported to be discreetly advising the Pakistani government "to act with restraint and seek a political settlement of the East Bengal [i.e., East Pakistan] problem."²⁶ Moreover, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (later to become President, and currently Prime Minister, of Pakistan) visited Peking in early November, 1971 at the head of a high-level delegation including army, navy and air force chiefs, Pakistani hopes of obtaining direct Chinese military help in the event of a conflict with India over East Pakistan apparently received no encouragement.²⁷

Thus, China appeared to be trying to walk a political tightrope in coping with the threatening situation on the subcontinent—balancing between loud verbal support of Pakistan (coupled with quiet diplomatic pressure for a peaceful resolution of Pakistan's internal political contradictions) and careful restraint toward India so as not to destroy New Delhi's hopes for a normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

The same note of restraint was evident in the initial absence of hostile official reaction from Peking to the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, in spite of the fact that it obviously strengthened India's hand vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan. This restraint, of course, was cast aside with the outbreak of the December Indo-Pakistan war, China thereafter assailing the treaty as an "aggressive alliance" and claiming that India would never have taken up arms in support of Bangladesh had it not been for the deterrent effect of the treaty (i.e., on China).²⁸

In fact, while the Indo-Soviet treaty did provide India with a valuable political and security prop such as the country had not enjoyed at the time of the 1962 border war with China because of Nehru's reluctance to seek such a link with any superpower,

²⁵ On the Soviet and Chinese roles in the Bangladesh crisis, see Zubeida Mustafa, "The 1971 Crisis in Pakistan-India, the Soviet Union, and China," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), April 1972.

²⁶ BBC radio report quoting the Rawalpindi correspondent of *The Times* (London), also in *The Hindustan Times*, Nov. 13, 1971.

²⁷ A dispatch published in *The Observer* (London), Nov. 13, 1971, reported that Mr. Bhutto, in an interview following his return from China, indicated that Pakistan could "probably hope for little real help there."

²⁸ See, e.g., statement by the Chinese delegate to the UN Security Council during the debate on the admission of Bangladesh, reported in *The Times of India*, Aug. 27, 1972; also in *Peking Review*, Dec. 8, 1972.

China's options in the Bangladesh crisis would have been extremely limited even without it. Consequently, when the crisis actually erupted into war between India and Pakistan, the role that Peking chose to play was precisely the limited one that many informed Indians anticipated: China restricted its response to efforts to mobilize international diplomatic pressure as a means of thwarting the realization of India's objectives.

There were a variety of considerations that contributed to China's decision to eschew military intervention—some military, others political. The military considerations were essentially three: (1) The logistical and combat limitations that would be imposed on Chinese forces operating from the difficult Tibetan terrain amidst a hostile native population²⁹ ruled out anything beyond minor diversionary actions that would probably be ineffectual. (2) As the Chinese had learned from an armed border clash at Nathu La in 1967, when the Chinese had reportedly suffered high casualties and failed to dislodge the Indians from their positions, the Indian border forces were much better prepared than at the time of the 1962 war. (3) Once hostilities began between India and Pakistan in December, the speed with which the Indian forces attained their objectives in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) deprived the Chinese of the opportunity to gain a possible strategic advantage by a quick thrust from the Chumbi Valley through the northwestern part of Sikkim, which could have cut off India's northeastern provinces from the rest of the country.

The political deterrents were equally cogent: (1) The Indo-Soviet treaty heightened the probable risk involved in Chinese military intervention against India. (2) The activities and subsequent death of Lin Biao (allegedly in a plane crash in the Mongolian People's Republic in September 1971) had produced unsettled political conditions inside China that militated against any military adventurism abroad. (3) Peking probably recognized that the independence movement in Bangladesh was a genuinely popular, indigenous phenomenon that Pakistan would not be able to crush, especially in view of the more than 1,000-mile distance between West and East Pakistan. (4) China probably also realized that military intervention would permanently alienate the population of Bangladesh from China without creating favorable objective conditions for the reunification of Pakistan.

All these considerations evidently convinced Peking of the wisdom of heeding Mao's teaching never to engage in an unwinnable war. Consequently, the only

²⁹ Michael Peissel, in his book *Cavaliers of Kham—The Secret War in Tibet*, London, Heinemann, 1972, claimed that China for the past 15 years had had "a Vietnam" on its hands in Tibet.

option left open for China was to resort to diplomatic efforts to thwart India's intervention in support of independence for Bangladesh and to prolong the conflict there in the hope that eventual disenchantment with India on the part of the local population would promote leftist political tendencies and thus create favorable conditions for Chinese manipulation in furtherance of Peking's objectives.

India's speedy victory in the war defeated this Chinese strategy, however, and the immediate effect of the conflict was to return Sino-Indian relations—at least on the Chinese side—to the state of hostile vituperation that had characterized them throughout most of the 1960's. In the wake of the hostilities, Peking unleashed an unprecedentedly harsh propaganda assault against India in which it questioned the very basis of Indian nationhood, denigrating the state as a British creation,³⁰ and went so far as to voice implied threats that others might do to India what that country had done to Pakistan.³¹ The attacks also castigated India as a "sub-superpower" that posed an increasing threat to its smaller Asian neighbors, and Chinese leaders conjured up a vision of India as part of a Soviet-dominated encirclement ring designed to strangle China.³²

These emotional outbursts were understandable in light of Peking's discomfiture at having been unable to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan, and New Delhi chose to play down the Chinese attacks and keep open its earlier option for a dialogue between the two governments. This course proved wise, for the Chinese, having let off steam, subsequently returned to a correct, if not very friendly, posture toward India.

Meanwhile, the drastically altered situation on the subcontinent resulting from the defeat and breakup of Pakistan confronted both China and India with a whole new set of problems and concerns that continue to have an important bearing on their policies toward each other. These problems and concerns revolve around two major elements: first, the position of Pakistan on the subcontinent; and second, India's relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Status of Pakistan

In regard to the first, the greatly increased pre-

³⁰ Chou En-lai interview with Neville Maxwell, reported in *The Sunday Times* (London), Dec. 5 and 19, 1971.

³¹ New China News Agency (NCNA) report, Dec. 17, 1971.

³² In a book published after a trip to China in 1971, former French Premier Pierre Mendes-France recounted an interview with Chou En-lai in December 1971, in which Chou took this line. See *The Times of India*, Aug. 26, 1972.

dominance of India and the weakened condition of Pakistan sharply reduced the effectiveness of the latter, from China's standpoint, as a regional counterweight to India. At the same time, China could not ignore the fact that Pakistan still faced potential internal troubles arising from minority autonomy movements in its Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, which presented the danger of a further threat to the country's integrity if it were to be encouraged on a collision course with India. Both these considerations tended to incline Peking toward a new concern for stability, rather than confrontation, on the subcontinent.

There were, in fact, numerous evidences during 1972-73 of such a concern on China's part. When Professor John K. Galbraith, formerly US ambassador to India, visited Peking in September 1972, he was assured by Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua that China desired peaceful relations with and between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Chiao, according to Galbraith's published account, also used the occasion to seek the American's good offices in counseling his Indian friends to show greater flexibility and moderation toward Pakistan's postwar Bhutto government.³³ Other signs of Peking's new attitude were provided by its favorable reception of both the Simla agreement of July 1972 and the Delhi agreement of August 1973,³⁴ which marked important steps toward the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations and the amicable settlement of various issues left by the war.

China's interest in promoting stability on the subcontinent, as well as in avoiding any further erosion of Peking's credibility with Pakistan, likewise dictated a policy of continued political support for the Bhutto government in order to shore up its position in Pakistan's fragmented polity and provide it with at least some bargaining power in its negotiations with India. But if Peking was to avoid what Delhi might see as an outright anti-Indian posture, its support of Pakistan could not be open-ended. Thus, when the question of the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations came before the UN Security Council in August 1972, China acceded, apparently not without some reluctance,³⁵ to an

³³ J. K. Galbraith, *A China Passage*, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1973; from extracts published in *The Hindustan Times*, April 1, 1973.

³⁴ See Chiao Kuan-hua's comment on the Simla agreement, made in Islamabad during an official visit to Pakistan, reported in *The Times of India*, Aug. 30, 1972. On Chinese reception of the Delhi agreement, see *The Hindustan Times*, Oct. 4, 1973.

³⁵ Prime Minister Bhutto revealed in press interviews that it had required considerable effort on his part to persuade the Chinese to exercise their veto in the UN. See report by P. N. Lakshaman in *The Times of India*, Jan. 18, 1973; also Bhutto's interview with Lewis Simons of *The Washington Post*, quoted in *ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1972.

appeal from the Bhutto government to exercise its veto power, but the Chinese delegate to the Council was careful to make it clear—to both India and Bangladesh—that China was “not fundamentally opposed” to the new state and was interested only in “a reasonable settlement of the issues” between Pakistan and Bangladesh.³⁶

There were subsequent indications as well that China sought to encourage Pakistan's early recognition of Bangladesh. Thus, in July 1973, Chinese official comment warmly welcomed a resolution of the Pakistan National Assembly authorizing Prime Minister Bhutto to recognize Bangladesh “at an appropriate time,”³⁷ and several months later the Pakistani government-owned *Morning News* (Karachi) warned domestic opponents of recognition that Pakistan's friends, including China, could not wait indefinitely to recognize the “near-reality” (of the new state).³⁸

On the Indian side, too, the new situation on the subcontinent in the wake of the December 1971 war was one in which India clearly had nothing to gain from any further dismemberment of Pakistan, entailing as it would the risk of converting that country into an area of global confrontation and thereby undermining India's own security. Furthermore, rising Soviet influence in Afghanistan, in conjunction with the existence of minority separatist movements in Pakistan's adjoining Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, was a development which, notwithstanding the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, would clearly be prejudicial to India's long-range national interest and would likewise tend to constrict Delhi's options in international politics.

These concerns, as well as India's genuine desire to place the new political structure of the subcontinent on a more stable footing, undoubtedly lay behind the more flexible and conciliatory posture adopted by the Indira Gandhi government toward Pakistan after the 1971 conflict. The posture itself was manifest in the series of bilateral negotiations concerning reciprocal withdrawals of forces from territories occupied during the hostilities, the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners-of-war, and other matters involved in the process of normalizing relations.

Peking and Indo-Soviet Ties

To turn to the second pivotal element affecting

³⁶ For Huang Hua's statement in the UN Security Council, see *Peking Review*, Dec. 8, 1972, p. 11.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, July 20, 1973, p. 19.

³⁸ Quoted in *The Times of India*, Nov. 12, 1972.

Sino-Indian relations—i.e., India's tie with the Soviet Union symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty—there is ample evidence that this relationship sharply intensified Chinese suspicions of a joint conspiracy on the part of Moscow and New Delhi against the PRC. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai personally voiced such suspicions in talks with the visiting French ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France, in Peking in December 1971. Chou denounced Soviet policy in the Indo-Pakistan war, then going on, as aimed at catching China between two military jaws—Siberia and Mongolia in the north and “a Soviet-dominated India and Bangladesh in the south.”³⁹ Even stronger language was used in a Chinese propaganda broadcast, which assailed India's “invasion” of Pakistan as “out-and-out aggressive war” directed by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism “to further its aims of “setting Asians against Asians” and gaining “control of the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.”⁴⁰

China, like India, also feared a possible move by the Soviet Union to use Afghanistan as a base for supporting the separatist movements in Pakistan's vulnerable border provinces. But in this the Chinese tended to see India as a co-conspirator with the USSR and Afghanistan in a joint plot to effect a further dismemberment of Pakistan within the next few years. These Chinese suspicions were openly expressed in connection with the July 1973 coup in Afghanistan, which resulted in the establishment of a new government under Prince Mohammad Daud, reputedly a close friend of the Russians and a hard-line advocate of the unification of ethnic groups divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan's Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces.⁴¹ Peking's apprehensions regarding Soviet expansionism in South Asia and possible Indian “involvement” in it may likewise have inspired a Chinese diplomatic move in June 1973 to encourage Iran to bolster its military strength by seeking foreign arms and to enter into closer political and military cooperation with Pakistan.⁴²

On the other hand, at a time when the Chinese were drastically restructuring their foreign diplomacy in order to counter the growing Soviet threat from the north, they could not ignore the danger that a policy of intransigent hostility toward India and continued refusal to respond to Delhi's overtures for a dialogue might only push India further into

³⁹ See fn. 32.

⁴⁰ NCNA English-language broadcast from Peking, Dec. 23, 1971.

⁴¹ See *The Australian* (Sydney), Aug. 4, 1973, quoting a Clare Hollingsworth dispatch from Peking to the London *Daily Telegraph*.

⁴² See reports on visit to Teheran by Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, *The Times of India*, Dec. 27, 1973.

the embrace of Moscow. One indication of Chinese awareness of this danger was a considerable toning down of anti-Indian propaganda emanating from Peking. Thus, the Indian subcontinent was conspicuously omitted from the customary analysis of the international situation contained in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) New Year's (1973) editorial,⁴³ thereby sparing India from the kind of violent anti-Indian invective that had highlighted Chinese propaganda immediately after the 1971 conflict. Even more significant was the fact that Chou En-lai's report to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August 1973 similarly avoided any direct criticism of India, although it did make passing reference to the dismemberment of Pakistan, which Chou blamed exclusively on the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

There was further evidence that explicitly linked this apparent softening of the Chinese attitude toward India with Peking's desire to avoid strengthening—and, if possible, to weaken—India's ties with the Soviet Union. Following a visit to China in early 1973, Sultan Ahmed, editor of the authoritative Pakistani newspaper *Morning News*, reported that there was a feeling in Peking official circles that if Sino-Indian relations were to improve, India's "dependence on the Soviet Union" would be reduced.⁴⁵

As for India, the international situation in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war tended to bring to the fore a different but converging set of concerns. The Indo-Soviet treaty had not only had a harmful impact on Sino-Indian relations but had also created the impression in some foreign countries that India was abandoning its long-standing policy of nonalignment in favor of "alliance" with the USSR. Inasmuch as India did not conceive of the friendship treaty as anything like a formal alliance, this situation tended to persuade New Delhi of the need to correct such misinterpretations and to broaden its international options by cultivating balancing relationships with China and the United States.

India and the Soviet Connection

India's concern in this regard was evidenced by a number of official statements explicitly aimed at reassuring the Chinese and others regarding the nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, addressing the Indian Parliament in late 1972, characterized the view that this relationship was an obstacle to the normalization of

⁴³ Reprinted in *Peking Review*, Jan. 5, 1973, pp. 9-11.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 35-36.

⁴⁵ Quoted in *The Times of India*, March 7, 1973.

Sino-Indian relations as "completely mistaken," adding:

*The Indo-Soviet treaty is not aimed against any third country. We are prepared to consider similar arrangements with any other country that is willing to do so.*⁴⁶

Foreign Minister Singh coupled these reassurances with a new bid for direct talks with China on the issues "which have bedevilled our relations in the past."⁴⁷

Shortly thereafter, the Indian Foreign Minister used the occasion of a press conference in Tokyo to clarify India's position on a much broader range of issues to which the Chinese were sensitive, including the Indo-Soviet relationship. Attempting to dissociate that relationship from Sino-Soviet hostility, Mr. Singh emphasized that the two were unrelated, and that, in fact, the strains in Sino-Indian relations antedated those between China and the Soviet Union. On another related and highly sensitive issue, the Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security scheme, he avoided any explicit reference to the Soviet proposal but expressed the view that Asian security could be achieved only by strengthening the individual Asian nations, and that this in turn could be accomplished only through economic development. Mr. Singh also reiterated New Delhi's position that Taiwan had always been part of China, adding that India would never support self-determination for the island. (This was possibly meant to reassure the Chinese that India would not be a party to any Soviet machinations for an independent Taiwan.) Finally, the Indian Foreign Minister cited the absence of tensions on the Sino-Indian border as a hopeful sign pointing toward improved relations between China and India.⁴⁸

There also were more general statements by Indian government leaders designed to correct misunderstandings abroad of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, categorically denied in December 1972 that India was anybody's satellite,⁴⁹ and in June 1973, in connection with reports that the Soviet Union was seeking naval facilities on the Indian coast, she declared that India had not given and did not intend to give bases to any foreign power.⁵⁰ A *New York*

⁴⁶ *Indian and Foreign Review* (New Delhi), Dec. 15, 1972, p. 7.

⁴⁷ *The Times of India*, Dec. 1, 1972.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1973.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1972.

⁵⁰ Interview with Australian Broadcasting Commission, reported in *ibid.*, June 3, 1973. For a detailed discussion of India's relations with the major powers in the aftermath of Bangladesh, see the author's "India's New Role in the South Asian Context," *Pacific Community*, April 1973.

Times report from New Delhi in March 1973 pictured Mrs. Gandhi as "seeking to blunt the view that India's nonalignment is slipping away" and even pointed to signs of "a delicate turn" in Indo-Soviet relations. In this context, the report also noted the Indian government's firm determination not to dovetail its economic planning with that of the Soviet Union.⁵¹

These indications of a disposition on India's part to move away from overly close ties with the USSR in order to mend relations with China were indirectly reinforced by signs of apprehension in Moscow. An early evidence of Soviet nervousness on this score was an article by G. V. Matveev in the Moscow scholarly journal *Problemy Dalnevo Vostoka* (Problems of the Far East), which for the first time voiced unreserved support of India on the Sino-Indian border issue and accused China of duplicity in taking over the Aksai Chin.⁵² Soviet party chief Brezhnev's spectacular visit to India in November 1973 could also be seen as attributable, in large measure, to the same concern over the future orientation of Sino-Indian relations.

Thus, in two vital areas bearing on Sino-Indian relations—i.e., the strategic position of Pakistan on the subcontinent and India's association with the Soviet Union—the period since the end of the Indo-Pakistan war has seen forces at work that have appeared to be nudging both India and China toward a reorientation of their bilateral relations along lines of conciliation rather than confrontation. It remains to sum up the evidences to date of a disposition on both sides to enter into direct negotiations with a view to composing their past differences.

Trends in Bilateral Relations

On the Indian side, we have already noted Foreign Minister Singh's renewed appeal for direct talks with China in his late 1972 statement in the Indian Parliament, as well as his explicit reassurances to the Chinese on the Indo-Soviet relationship and other sensitive issues in his Tokyo press conference of January 1973. It should also be noted that Chinese accusations of Indian meddling in Tibet, made in the UN administrative and budgetary committee in October 1972,⁵³ drew the reassuring response that

⁵¹ Excerpts reported in *The Times of India*, March 28, 1973.

⁵² G. V. Matveev, "Political Machinations of Peking on the Indian Subcontinent," *Problemy Dalnevo Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 4, 1972, pp. 39-45; gist reported in *The Hindustan Times*, Jan. 7, 1973.

⁵³ See *The Times of India*, Oct. 22, 1972.

India unequivocally accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet, did not harbor any émigré Tibetan government, and was not acting in any way in support of Tibetan rebellion.⁵⁴ Furthermore, while Indian official statements, for obvious reasons, have remained noncommittal on the boundary issue, New Delhi's expressed desire for talks without preconditions would seem to suggest that India is not unwilling to discuss and settle the problem on a compromise basis.

On the Chinese side, too, there have been slight but—in the aggregate—significant indications of a more positive attitude toward India. One was the appointment in March 1973 of a new Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in New Delhi after an 18-month period without diplomatic representation above secretary-level (the new Chargé, Ma Mu-ming, had been First Secretary of Embassy in New Delhi in 1956, during the period of Sino-Indian cordiality).⁵⁵ Another was the republication in China in April of a note which Chou En-lai had addressed to the heads of Asian and African states in 1962 with regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute.⁵⁶ Although the republication was probably meant to serve notice on India that China was not likely to retreat from its old position that the boundary should be fixed on the basis of "actual control," it could also be seen as reflecting an intention on Peking's part to take up New Delhi's offer of direct talks on outstanding issues at an appropriate time. Of possible significance, too, was China's reported abandonment of a cotton-farming project in a strategic area of Nepal close to the Indian border, which had aroused Indian apprehensions. While economic considerations could have influenced the Chinese decision, the move was viewed, in part, as a political gesture toward India.⁵⁷

There have also been roundabout hints in the diplomatic sphere of a Chinese change of heart. Coincidentally with Foreign Minister Singh's conciliatory press interview in Tokyo, the Chinese were reportedly telling a visiting Italian delegation in Peking (headed by Italy's Foreign Minister) that China was not intransigent toward India and that, on the contrary, several attempts had been made on the Chinese side to promote a new phase of improved relations between the two countries.⁵⁸ Still more significant, perhaps, was a report that Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu told visiting Indian

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1972. See also Mrs. Gandhi's interview with Murray Galt, *Time* (New York), Dec. 11, 1972, p. 24.

⁵⁵ *The Times of India*, March 22, 1973.

⁵⁶ Reported in *The Statesman*, April 18, 1973.

⁵⁷ See *The Times of India*, April 6 and 27, 1973.

⁵⁸ See *ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1973.

President V. V. Giri in Bucharest last October that he had the impression of a much more relaxed Chinese attitude toward India, and that he expected this to lead to a normalization of Sino-Indian relations.⁵⁹ In view of Romania's close political contacts with Peking and the part it reportedly played as an early honest broker between China and the United States, Ceausescu's remarks to the Indian President were probably more than a diplomatic nicety.

Meanwhile, the new mood on both sides has been reflected in the attendance of appropriate Chinese diplomatic representatives at official Indian functions both in and outside India and in exchanges of cordial messages between the two governments on important national occasions. (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took note of this in a press interview in Colombo last year, when she remarked, "Earlier they [the Chinese] were not on talking terms with us, but now they are . . . and come for our receptions and the like. This continues to progress."⁶⁰) Other straws in the wind have been the cessation of the "loudspeaker war" between the opposing Chinese and Indian lines of control in the vicinity of Nathu La and the inauguration of Ethiopian Airways flights to China via India, with Chinese through travellers permitted to move about freely in Bombay without Indian visas.⁶¹

All these scattered bits of evidence, when taken together, suggest that while no new explicit and clear-cut policy framework has emerged on either side, at least there has been significant movement toward preparing the climate for a dialogue between New Delhi and Peking. It should be borne in mind in this connection that substantive changes in Chinese foreign policy particularly have tended—as in the case of the Sino-US rapprochement—to follow after a protracted preparatory course evidenced by seemingly insignificant changes in emphasis and subtle nuances. Whether in terms of such minor clues or in terms of the strategic forces now at work in subcontinental and global politics, it seems reasonable to infer that China and India, after two decades of almost continuous tension and hostility, are at last moving toward a normalization of their relations.

⁵⁹ See report in *The Overseas Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Oct. 18, 1973.

⁶⁰ *The Statesman*, April 30, 1973.

⁶¹ *The Times of India*, April 6 and 7, 1973.