


FEATURES



"The KGB in Asia: Society of Subversion," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 January 1975.

"Reflection on the Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence Services," by Lothar Metz1, Orbis, Fall, 1974.

The attached survey from FEER finds the presence of the Soviet secret service in Asia to be "widespread and rapidly expanding," with the KGB paying particular attention to Chinese diplomats and to those who sympathize with Peking. According to FEER, long experience with Moscow intrigue has made governments in Europe and North America wary of the Russians. The Soviets, however, are a relatively new phenomenon in much of Asia, where they capitalize on popular sentiments against colonialism.

The long section "Society of Subversion" consists of a brief history followed by a breezy account of selected KGB operatives and activities throughout Asia; this section deserves

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Metz1's observations are being added to the FEER survey primarily to keep attention focused on John Barron's KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. This 1974 book, while written for the general reader, nevertheless contains a wealth of factual material. And as Metz1 puts it, "the KGB phenomenon is significant enough to qualify as an input in the process of making Western and especially US detente policy."

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This Week

After weeks of intensive investigation by the REVIEW's correspondents throughout Asia, the presence of the Russian secret service (KGB) in the region is revealed as widespread — and somewhat clumsy compared with the cloak-and-dagger activities of other foreign powers. The role of this sinister organisation is rapidly expanding in Asia and vast sums are being spent by the Kremlin on gathering information of all kinds, with special reference to China, as the bitter squabble with Peking continues. There is also a concerted drive, masterminded by the KGB, to discredit the Chinese, whether by siding with India in its frontier dispute with China, or by casting doubts on the integrity of the Peking leadership. However, the greatest spy thriller writer of them all, John le Carré, in an exclusive, specially-commissioned introduction to this feature, takes issue with some of these findings. Discussing the relative merits of two recent books, one on the KGB and the other a nest-fouling exposé of the CIA, le Carré points out that the Russians play the secrecy game with greater discretion, and suggests that they do not publish what they know about the US secret service because one day they might be fraternal services in liaison against the Chinese target, *page 20*.



Cover by Morgan Chua; photo by Arthur Kan.



In the twilight world of politics today, things are not what they seem, and even the faces of young radical idealists can be disguises for sinister forces and purposes. Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, speaking on the recent student unrest in the city-state, sees foreign manipulators behind the young men who ostensibly seem to want to mould the world closer to their heart's desire, *page 10*.

After spending two years in a Calcutta jail, two young Americans, Anthony Fletcher and Richard Harcos, were due to appear before a court last week in what would be India's first-ever spy trial involving Westerners. The strange circumstances surrounding the arrest of the two and the case's top-level political implications have already aroused worldwide curiosity, *page 18*.

Seoul's preoccupation with industrial growth has taken its toll of South Korea's farm sector. The bill for imported rice and grain is soaring, and achieving the target of food self-sufficiency by 1976 will be difficult, *page 37*.

The textile recession is posing a major threat to Malaysia, which has encouraged an invasion of textile companies from overseas. With export markets declining, the competition to stay in business is likely to be intense, *page 35*.

European nations are on the defensive about imports from Japan. But their short-sighted attitude, at a time when European consumer goods are flooding into Tokyo, can only harm them, *page 39*.

National unity remains one of the main priorities of leaders in China, and to ensure that the Communist Party maintains its authority, a new slogan has emerged: "The Party must control the Party," *page 13*.

America's friends in Asia will get less foreign aid this fiscal year. Congress has effectively halved the allocations of military and economic funds sought by the Ford Administration — and it could be worse next year, *page 30*.

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Society of subversion

CPYRGHT

OLEG SOLOVIEV has the unnerving habit of glowering across the rim of his whisky glass and growling: "I suppose you think I'm an agent of the KGB?" Acquaintances can only mumble "heaven forbid" and change the subject. Soloviev is described on his visiting cards as the Southeast Asian correspondent of Soviet Radio and Television. He rents an expensive flat in Singapore (22P Tomlinson Road), drives an air-conditioned Toyota, speaks fluent English and Chinese and travels the region without the film crews which encumber his Western colleagues. He confides to expatriates his hatred of the Chinese — "a crafty, untrustworthy race" — and tells stories of alleged atrocities during the Sino-Soviet clash at Chenpao Island in 1969.

"When we went back to recover the bodies of our soldiers, the Chinese had gouged out their eyes."

But KGB? If any cynical mind should harbour such a thought, the Russians have only themselves to blame. Over the past eleven years, 40 countries have expelled Soviet citizens accused of working for the KOMITET GOSUDARSTVENNOY BEZOPASNOSTI, the Committee for Internal Security, whose tentacles spread out across the world. Russian diplomats, journalists and business representatives have all been caught, at one time or another, trying to pry secrets from foreign sources, sometimes subtly, even brilliantly, but mostly crudely and inefficiently.

Not all KGB officers are spies. Some function as "agents of influence," pushing the Soviet point of view, while keeping an eye open for foreign recruits for the espionage network. At the height of the Cold War, these specialists maligned the United States and "Western imperialism", now their target is China, particularly in Asia. The cloak-and-dagger men follow suit, keeping a sharp watch on American activity, but switching their main attention to the Chinese. Their efforts are concentrated on monitoring the contacts and operations of Chinese diplomats and those who sympathise with Peking. In a few sensitive areas, like Indonesia, the Russians are said to inform on "Maoists" among the Overseas Chinese community to Government officials willing and eager to hear stories of Peking-inspired subversion.

The Western world has grown inured to the tides of Moscow-mounted intrigue. A succession of spy-scandals and expulsions has long prompted govern-

ments all over Europe and the Americas to lock up their secrets and regard the Russians with suspicion. Not so in Asia, where the Russians are a relatively new phenomena. The Soviet suppressions in Budapest and Prague may have tarnished the image, but it is still nowhere as immediate or as bruising as recent memories of colonialism. Nor has the KGB been anywhere near as successful or all-pervading as the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), rigging by-elections in India and king-making in Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia and South Korea. Russian espionage activity is small beer compared with the massive operations mounted by the United States, but it is expanding steadily as the Ugly American pulls back, winded, from the Asian periphery.

The KGB is a growing factor in Asian politics, especially in areas of potential change like the Indian subcontinent and Indochina. Even countries with strong autocratic regimes such as Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea have an in-built instability with profitable promise for future turmoil. It is time to look closely at this organisation and its agents who stand, vulture-like in the wings, awaiting the moment of chaos...

THE KGB grew out of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (CHEKA). It was founded on December 20, 1917, by order of the Council of People's Commissars. The first director, FELIX DZERZHINSKY, was a Polish-born Russian who died

peacefully in his bed in 1926. He was lucky. Four of his nine successors were liquidated as foreign spies. A statue to Dzerzhinsky, erected in 1961 by Khrushchev, stands in the square named after him, appropriately opposite the KGB headquarters which back conveniently onto the Lubyanka Prison. The headquarters building was originally the head office of the former All-Russian Insurance Company; it was extended after World War II by a seven-storey annex built by political prisoners and German prisoners of war. In the summer of 1972, a vast new building was opened on the Moscow ring-road, about seven miles from the centre, to house the foreign operations of the KGB. Other smaller offices are scattered throughout the Soviet capital.

The KGB is organised into seven directorates. Its operational staff is believed

to total 90,000, plus some 400,000 clerks and administrators. The two largest and most powerful directorates control the suppression of domestic dissent; their area of responsibility covers everything from expelling Solzhenitzyn to following-up the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The chairman is a former telegraph operator called YURI VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV, a tall, scholarly man with a good knowledge of English who was awarded the Order of Lenin on June 24, 1974, for his service to the State.

President Podgorny, speaking for the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, declared: "I should like on behalf of all the comrades here present cordially to congratulate you and fraternally embrace you, to wish you health and happiness and great success in your difficult but useful work." Comrade Andropov was Soviet Ambassador in Budapest at the time of the Hungarian uprising; he is believed to have been awarded his present post on the strength of his decisive action in seizing the dissident leadership led by Imry Nagy, and sending its members to their deaths.

The First Directorate of the KGB concentrates on foreign operations. It is divided into ten departments dealing with specific regions of the world. Number Six covers China, North Vietnam and North Korea. Number Seven handles the rest of Asia from Pakistan to Japan. Sub-sections control Soviet agents sent to live abroad under false identities, specialists who ferret out technical secrets and a "Disinformation Department" designed to spread confusing propaganda through the enemy ranks. British defector Kim Philby put out his "revelations" about his old MI 6 colleagues through this department.

The KGB gets active assistance in the field from officers of the GLAVNOYE RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVLENIYE (GRU), the Soviet military intelligence service. All Russian military attachés are assumed to belong to the GRU, supported by other agents attached to embassies under less obvious cover. The GRU was founded in 1920 to keep the Red Army better informed about its opponents following the disastrous Bolshevik invasion of Poland. An extraordinarily potent organisation was built up during the next decade, only to be decimated by the Stalin purges of 1936-38 and discredited in the 1960s by the discovery that two senior GRU officers, colonels Popov and Penkovsky,

were secretly Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8
 intelligence. KGB officers took over the organisation in 1958 and some observers believe this virtually ended its career as an autonomous unit. It is noted, however, that some of the most spectacular Soviet espionage coups in recent years have been the work of the GRU.

A SPY must be able to work undetected. Once he becomes known, or "blown," to use the language of espionage, his value in the field is sharply reduced. The ubiquitous KGB infiltrates every Russian organisation. The journalist offers a convenient camouflage; after all, it is his job to ask searching questions. Philby works for a KGB subsidiary of the Novosti Press Agency (the Tenth Division), which provides cover for many a Soviet spy. But an agent can be just as easily lodged in the office of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, a Russian trading corporation, SOVEXPORT-FILM or, inevitably, the embassy.

Defectors say the KGB men are the terror of other diplomats. Occasionally they are themselves ambassadors like PAUL STEPANOVITCH KUZNETZOV, who was appointed to Jakarta in 1972. Expelled for spying from Britain in 1952, he went on to Yugoslavia and was connected with the spy-ring which bugged President Tito's private office. Others prefer to be disguised as drivers or junior secretaries, although they often wield as much power as the ambassador himself.

ALEXANDR KAZNACHEEV, a KGB agent in Rangoon, gave a detailed picture of Soviet intelligence operations after he defected to the United States in the late 1950s. The espionage headquarters in all Russian embassies is the closely-guarded Residence (Referentura), which combines the functions of coding room with conference room and filing section for highly-classified documents. The head of KGB operations is known as "the Resident." Only a trusted handful have access to his domain, which is invariably protected by a heavy steel door. Most ambassadors are not admitted. It is here that Russian agents meet, free of their routine cover, to make coded reports and discuss operations.

A CIA man once told a correspondent: "The Russians are intelligence animals. Every bit of information seems to be of use to them. You smoke a pipe, that goes into the file. And if somehow or other they can get their information by covert means, then it's all the more valuable. The KGB seem to despise overt analysis. For instance, weather bulletins don't interest them if broadcast. But if they can steal a bulletin off the meteorologist's desk before anyone can broadcast it, the Rus-

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 The result is that although KGB operations are widespread - so widespread that the British Government was forced to expel or bar 105 Russians from London in 1970 - the payoff is believed to be disappointing. With a few brilliant exceptions, the Russians have pulled off few notable coups in recent years, partly because governments are thoroughly alerted, but also because the bureaucratic structure of the KGB proves expensive and ineffectual. At the same time, Western experts admit that the calibre of the KGB agent is improving as Russia increases contact with the outside world; there is no dearth of money or James Bond-type gadgetry, nor, apparently, of foreign collaborators anxious to be suborned financially, morally or through ideological fervour.

"IT WAS the evening of January 15, 1974, when the streets in the Chinese capital were emptying. The grey, Soviet Volga car sped out of the Soviet Embassy into China. Winding through streets and lanes, it left the city and raced towards the northeastern outskirts. Suddenly it pulled up at a dark place on the Peihuantung Road, about 4.5 kilometres from the city proper. Two people, one taller than the other, stole out of the car and moved towards the Hsipaho bridge 170 metres ahead, the tall person carrying a heavy travelling-bag in his hand. They stopped at the northeastern corner of the 30-metre long and 15-metre wide bridge, looked around, and then disappeared under the bridge one after the other . . ."

This is no extract from a second-rate spy novel. It is an official account by the New China News Agency (NCNA) of events leading up to the biggest recent spy-scandal in Peking. The two men mentioned in the article were U. A. SEMENOV, Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, and A. A. KOLOSOV, an interpreter in the Soviet Military Attaché's office. They were making furtive rendezvous with two Chinese agents; one of them, LI HUNG-SHU, had been trained by the GRU and sent into China in June 1972. After calling out a password, the Russians were preparing to hand over a travelling-bag containing a standard spy-kit: a small, high-speed radio transmitter capable of whipping off a coded message before it could be pinpointed, frequency tables, operating instructions, developer for invisible ink, a forged border-pass and money. Li Hung-shu was to hand

staining intelligence information in secret writing.

"Just as these men were engaged in criminal activities in the dark corner against the Chinese people, a red signal-light zoomed to the sky over the Hsipaho bridge followed by flares," the NCNA account goes on. "Courageous Chinese militiamen and Public Security personnel rushed to the Hsipaho bridge from all around shouting "catch the spies."

The Russians had run into a trap. They immediately claimed diplomatic immunity, as did the driver of the Volga, First Secretary V. I. MARCHENKO, an experienced Chinese-speaking diplomat who was said to be the KGB Resident in China. Also sitting in the car were the wives of Marchenko and Semenov. All five were promptly expelled from the country.

Two months later a Soviet army helicopter ran out of fuel and landed in a remote corner of Sinkiang. The three-man crew was promptly arrested by Chinese border-guards. They are still detained in China. Their story was that they had lost their way on a mercy mission, but the Chinese insist the Russians were spying. The crew did not include a doctor, nor were they carrying any medical supplies. Peking alleged that certain equipment found on board the helicopter proved it was on an espionage mission in a particularly sensitive area, not too far from the nuclear base at Lop Nor.

These are the only two publicised cases of Russian spying in China for several years. But KGB activity goes on continuously. The Embassy in Peking is as large and over-staffed as any other Soviet mission in an area of vital interest to Moscow; and if efforts to contact the Chinese are all too often frustrated, the Russians turn to the foreign community in Peking. A nasty row blew up at an African cocktail party two years ago, when a Russian diplomat asked a Latin American "foreign expert," newly-arrived in China, to help him get information. When the man indignantly refused the Russian shouted "We will kill you." He had to be restrained by embarrassed colleagues. During October 1973, two Russians drove an embassy car into one of the foreigners' compounds in eastern Peking and jumped out wielding a hammer and chisel. They cut the mail box off its pole and drove away with it.

In November 1972, the Reuter correspondent, James Pringle, tried to get a cut-price ticket to Europe from Aeroflot. The Peking manager, ALEXANDR NICOLAEVICH VASILENKO, who works out of the Soviet Embassy, agreed that this could be arranged. Time passed and it appeared that there were "problems." Pringle had applied for an exit permit in mid-December, but as the date approached and no ticket materialised he grew worried. He held several

sessions with the Aeroflot manager trying to straighten things out. On December 13, Vasilenko called Pringle for yet another discussion at the Embassy. The British correspondent was shown into a room he had never seen before and which he now believes was bugged. The Russian then ran through all the minor details previously discussed and said: "We can let you have the ticket, but we would like you to help us with some information." Pringle got up and walked out.

A KGB agent is an expensive investment. He (or occasionally, she) must become fluent in at least one language. If destined to live abroad, posing as the citizen of his adopted country, he must do more than learn to blend into his background by learning the customs and history of the people he imitates; he must create an entirely new identity and live with it at all times. Even the agent operating from the safe-keeping of his embassy has been through years of training. Invariably he or she is of above-average IQ, put through an exacting course at one of the several KGB training schools in the Soviet Union, tested for reliability, courage and, above all, political dedication to the Moscow cause. The agent posing as a journalist or working from within a trading organisation, must learn enough about his supposed trade (and of the kind of inquisitive questions he is liable to face from foreign colleagues) to dispel suspicion.

So it is a serious setback to the KGB when one of these agents is detected and expelled. In the immediate post-war period KGB operations, directed mainly towards West Europe and the Americas, were comparatively unsophisticated. But so were the Western security services. Sensational leaks like the loss of nuclear secrets are part of history. Tightened security throughout the world led to the unmasking of increasing numbers of KGB agents and the people they recruited. The culmination was the unprecedented expulsion of the Russians from London.

Some of these spies have since surfaced elsewhere. It would be surprising if they had not in view of the investment involved. KGB men expelled from Britain have reappeared in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Thailand. Their value has obviously depreciated, since the countries concerned are already forewarned. These countries, however, have hesitated to expel the suspects.

The Thais made half-hearted efforts to have VIKTOR VEKLENKO declared *persona non grata* soon after he arrived in Bangkok on May 29, 1972. He took up the post of Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy eight months after his expulsion from Britain. Lately, there has been some sophisticated speculation that Veklenko is employed as a "red herring" to distract the attention of the

Thai Special Branch from less obtrusive Bangkok became a major centre of Soviet espionage immediately after diplomatic relations were established in the early 1950s. The Embassy was an obvious window on Vietnam and the still-forbidden areas of Southeast Asia. Listed staff today number 25, but that is deliberately misleading. Soviet embassies employ no local people apart from translators; cooks, maids and drivers are all brought from Russia. The total is, therefore, more like 250, compared with five Thais in their mission in Moscow. Since it is estimated that a sizable proportion of the denizens of any Soviet embassy work for the KGB or GRU (assisted from outside by journalists and trade executives), this provides a potential second only to the CIA.

None of this has gone unnoticed in Peking, which periodically complains of Soviet spying activity in southern and eastern Asia. The *People's Daily* recently alleged that Soviet diplomats had been gathering intelligence along the Thai coast. The charges proved, on examination, to be a rehash of frequent allegations in the Thai press, notably the *Bangkok Post* and *The Nation*, which have consistently condemned spying (not only by the Russians) in Thailand.

The Nation named KAIR ILIASHEV, Deputy Trade Director in Bangkok as the KGB Resident in Thailand. A diplomat, Second Secretary ANATOLI SMIRNOV, now in his second tour of the country, has also been mentioned as a senior KGB officer. Similar accusations have also been made against the present Tass news agency representative, ALEXANDER KAKAULIN, and officials of the Thai-Soviet THASOS shipping organisation and Aeroflot.

Soviet trading officials are naturally suspect, since total trade was only US\$6 million in 1973. The Soviet trade compound in Bangkok costs \$50,000 a year and provides comfortable shelter for fifteen families. The outlay would seem disproportionate to the volume of business.

The Thai authorities are alert to the dangers. In earlier days they were under pressure from the Americans to crack down on the Russians. But détente and the change to civilian Government have made the Special Branch a trifle more permissive. The last Soviet citizen was expelled from Thailand in September 1965. He was LEONID MAMURIN, a senior trade official. In 1960, the Tass correspondent, I. GARUCHIN, and the assistant press attaché, K. SAHAGAROV, were kicked out for spying. None of these men has apparently reappeared abroad, but changes of name (and sometimes, it is said, of appearance) makes it difficult to trace them.

SPECIAL Branch officers burst into a

and arrested three men. One was a local HUNG-YAN, the others were Russians, an interpreter of Chinese origin called STEPAN TSUNAEV and ANDREI IVANOVICH POLIKAROV, both registered as seamen aboard the visiting Russian cruise-ship Khabarovsk. In fact, they were KGB agents establishing routine contact with a blossoming spy-ring aimed at China. Another Chinese, arrested later but never named, admitted that their eventual aim was to spread an espionage network throughout Southeast Asia. Police claimed they found documents on Polikarov which supported this story; far from being an ordinary seaman, he was a senior KGB operative, once active in Japan, who taught and directed espionage against China under cover of a professorship at the Far Eastern University in Vladivostok.

Another KGB agent, ALEXANDER TRUSOV, recruited Ho Hung-yan in 1969 while posing as marine superintendent supervising repairs to Russian ships in the Whampoa Dockyard in Kowloon. The Chinese businessman was later contacted by other agents who reached Hongkong aboard visiting Soviet vessels. This is the only means of infiltration left open to the Russians. Efforts to open a consulate in Hongkong have been continuously blocked by the British Government. But ship repairs are important to Hongkong's business and have never been restricted, although the number of visits by Soviet ships has been somewhat curtailed in recent years.

Every vessel is known to carry a quota of Chinese-speaking spies entrusted with the task of collecting information about China and recruiting people locally to carry on the work. There was a time when Russian ships' stewards, speaking perfect English, called regularly (and vainly) at the REVIEW to discuss "the current political situation." A merchant liner, the Sovetsky Sojus, called at Hongkong in 1971 with eight crew members who turned out to be Soviet China-watchers from the Department of Oriental Studies at the Far Eastern University in Vladivostok; and other ships arriving for repair were seen to carry more than the necessary skeleton crew. Efficient surveillance, however, hampered their extra-curricular activities ashore.

The Hongkong police held Ho Hung-yan for nearly four months, then put him aboard the Soviet container ship Kavalerovo, en route to Vladivostok through Hongkong. The skipper protested and refused to sail. For 10 days the ship swung at anchor, presumably awaiting instructions from Moscow, until finally it sailed on November 24, 1972, escorted by police launches, with the Chinese spy still on board. Since then the Russians have been more cautious.

Two new Russian marine superintendents arrived in Hongkong at the begin-

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 ordinate repair work in the Hongkong United Dockyards Ltd. They are VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH IVANOV and VYACHISLAV DMITRIEVICH PIKIN, both officials of the State trading organisation, SUDOIMPORT. They lead a quiet and segregated life in flats reserved for foreigners within the dockyard compound.

FEARS of defection haunt the KGB, if only because their activities so permeate the Russian presence abroad that any Russian seeking asylum (usually in the United States) is liable to betray an entire nest of agents and their foreign contacts. When EVGENI SOROKIN, a young clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane, crashed his car in September 1972, and then sought asylum in the West, the Russians quietly withdrew 25% of their diplomatic staff from Laos. Since then the Russians have been build-

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 provoke questions about the size of their embassy. Staff now number more than 100, although the Soviet Union provides virtually no aid to Laos and conducts no trade at all.

Observers believe the Russians have one main mission: Apart from the obvious aim of keeping an eye on the dwindling US commitment and the domestic political scene, the Russians have chosen Laos as an important tilting ground in their struggle with China. "There is a ding-dong battle going on in the streets of Vientiane between the Russians and the Chinese," a diplomat told the REVIEW. "There is an open hostility you don't find between Russian and Chinese diplomats in Europe."

When the Russians laid on two big Antonov-12 transports to fly Pathet Lao troops and police into Vientiane last year, the Chinese promptly flew a Pathet Lao contingent to Luang Prabang aboard their own Ilyushins. The resident Tass correspondent works part-time at the Ministry of Information and the official Agence Lao Presse carries an increasing number of Tass despatches. The Chinese, not to be outdone, have installed a representative of the New China News Agency with his own teleprinter: News of the recent air accord between China and Laos was carried by Agence Lao quoting NCNA.

The Thai press tends to see spies under every bed, but a report in the *Bangkok Post* naming VIATCHESLAV F. CHIRIAEV as "a very high Russian intelligence officer" in Vientiane is not disputed by foreign observers. An American book on the KGB by John Barron lists the present Russian Ambassador to Laos, VALENTIN P. VDOVIN, as a KGB officer and alleges that he has previously had espionage experience in France and French Africa.

TROUBLE attracts spies like flies to a jam-pot and there is trouble aplenty these days in Bangladesh. Hence the appointment of ANDRE FOMIN as Soviet Ambassador and the presence of such experienced KGB officers as GEORGI ALEXANDROVICH KUZNETSOV, who went to Britain in 1965 after three years in New York, only to be expelled in the great spy purge of 1971. Kuznetsov turned up as commercial attaché in Dacca in early 1972. He now spoke fluent Bengali as well as English and seemed more interested in contacting the student community than in expanding trade.

The Singapore *Nanyang Siang Pau* of June 27, 1973, had this to say: "In order to win over the Bangladesh Youth and Trade Union organisations, Russia despatched Kuznetsov to Bangladesh as a member of the Soviet Embassy to take charge of these special duties. These duties included his being actively engaged in liaison work with the Bangladesh Youth and Trade Union organisations. His real task was to keep an eye on these organisations in order to prevent penetration from Maoist elements and other revolutionary organisations."

Kuznetsov's ambassador is a former deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, a member of the Supreme Soviet and said to be in charge of policy-planning in South and Southeast Asia. Surely Dacca did not deserve a diplomat who outranks his colleagues in New Delhi and Jakarta? The answer is that the Soviet Union rightly regards Bangladesh as a key spot in a troubled continent. It is even something of a vacuum where the Russians have a head start, for once, over the Americans, but where China is beginning to win influence.

The Soviet Union has been making the most of its early offers of aid (at one time there were two or three thousand Russians doing salvage work in Chittagong), while lending a clandestine hand to help stamp out insurgency led by underground groups often drawing their political inspiration from Peking. Soviet helicopters in Bangladesh are reported to have flown support missions during May-June of 1972 for military forces chasing the "Maoists" in the swampy Sunderbans and in the Chittagong Hill tracts, where the actual fighting was quietly conducted by the Indian Army. The rebels in this latter area were Mizos, condemned by Tass as "Chinese-trained."

The *Nanyang Siang Pau* concluded: "If the Soviet Union wishes to retain its full influence in Bangladesh, it must continue to support all elements, with the assistance of such people as Kuznetsov. In this way it can effectively prevent the Bangladesh people from relying too heavily on the West and the Chinese People's Republic for future assistance."

"USING Singapore as a base, Soviet social-imperialism is accelerating its infiltration of our country and others. Through its embassies, branches of the Moscow People's Bank and other channels, Soviet revisionism is vigorously carrying out infiltration, expansion and espionage activities. In carrying out these secret activities, Soviet agents and ships, using all kinds of identification and names as covers, are coming and going continuously in increasing numbers."

That is what "The Voice of Malayan Revolution" broadcast in Chinese on April 6, 1974. The same sort of accusations are made constantly by Peking, but are they really true? Our correspondents report that the Singapore Russians all keep a low profile. Some have actually joined the Cricket Club. Since most of the Republic's citizens are Chinese, political sympathies lie closer to Peking than Moscow. The Russians tend to play down their line, at least in conversation with Singaporeans.

Diplomatic relations between Singapore and the Soviet Union were not established until June 1968, nearly three years after the Republic opted out of Malaysia. That same year a joint shipping company was formed to facilitate direct trade and in 1969, Aeroflot began a thrice-weekly service between Moscow and Singapore. The Moscow Narodni Bank established a branch in 1971, and the following year Russian ships began using the repair facilities at Keppel Harbour and other yards. Some 500 Russian ships now call at Singapore every year with so many sailors hungry for cameras and transistor radios that an enterprising shopkeeper in High Street has put up a cyrillic signboard and employed a Russian-speaking assistant.

The new embassy site in select Cluny Road was purchased from the Chartered Bank for S\$1.5 million (US\$641,025). It covers an area of 268,000 sq. ft, with de luxe facilities like a swimming pool, sauna and tennis, volley and gorodki courts. The entire complex is believed to have cost \$2.5 million. The most important inmate is a Ukrainian, VALENTIN PASENCHUK, who holds the post of deputy head of mission. He spent five or six years in China and is an acknowledged expert on Chinese affairs.

An active but unobtrusive press corps includes representatives of Tass, Novosti and of course, Soviet Radio and TV. Most of these men are professional China-watchers led by YURI B. SAVENKOV of Novosti, a gregarious, squash-player who speaks good Mandarin. His duties include keeping a check on the Chinese newspapers, most of them openly pro-Peking.

The Singapore-Soviet Shipping Company (SOCIAC), incorporated early in 1968, originally had two Russians on the board. They were YURI KUB-

YUSHKIN (chairman) and a director, IGOR KASHNIKOV, a former Singapore journalist, LIM BENG TEE, set up the Tri-Union Company (Pte) Ltd with himself as managing director. A contract was signed with SOCIAC to handle their stevedoring in Singapore. The business appeared to prosper, with Lim soon able to buy a \$50,000 apartment and ride around in a chauffeur-driven Mercedes.

On August 7, 1973, Lim was arrested and is still being detained, without trial under the Internal Security Act. A police statement alleged he "was acting in the interests of foreign intelligence organisations through their business enterprise here." The Russian connection was never mentioned. The Internal Security Department made it quite clear, however, that Lim was a Soviet spy. He was apparently recruited to pass on news about China, using contacts all over the region and may also have been in a position to provide the Russians with the kind of inside information on Singapore politicians and personalities which go into those insatiable KGB files "for later action."

A month after Lim's arrest, a Russian shipping expert arrived in Kuala Lumpur. He was ANATOLI LYKHO, described as a representative of the Soviet shipping line, SOVINFLLOT. His assignment was adviser to the Malaysian line, SYARIKAT ANGKATA LAUT, which acts as agent for Soviet ships calling in Malaysian ports. He also had strong links with SOCIAC in Singapore. Lykho has since remained something of a mystery. His only public statement, in Malacca, in September 1973, was that he intended studying port facilities in Malaysia to help ship rubber direct to Russia. But his contacts with Malaysian shipping men is minimal and potential business contacts have difficulty even finding out where he lives. All that is known is that he operates out of the Soviet Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

THE DEZINFORMATSIYA, or Disinformation Department of the KGB, Department "A" of the First Directorate, can organise anything from a demonstration outside the US Embassy in New Delhi, to leaking information, some of it accurate but usually highly suspect. The Indian "rent-a-mob" business was extensively used both by the Russians and the Americans during the early 1960s. It was directly controlled on the Russian side by a KGB specialist within the Soviet Embassy. Leaks require rather more subtlety and here again journalists are invaluable. One of the best-known channels for this delicate form of psychological warfare is VITALI YEVGENNEVICH LUI.

The man known to the Western press as Victor Louis is a plausible, 46-year-old soft-spoken Russian, who was imprisoned during the 1950s for blackmarket

activities. He still deals occasionally in gold and foreign currency, a serious offence under Soviet law, but is so dramatically rehabilitated that he boasts a comfortable Moscow apartment and a splendid suburban dacha where foreigners are entertained with Scotch whisky and caviar. Louis has obviously won the stamp of approval from someone in the Soviet Government. These days he is accorded the rare privilege of travelling abroad and writing for foreign newspapers. As correspondent of the London *Evening News*, he had a world scoop with first word of Khrushchev's downfall.

His activities and life-style arouse understandable suspicion abroad. The kindest critics accuse him of pushing Soviet propaganda into the international press. The harshest say outright that Victor Louis is an agent of Department "A," whose many covert tasks have included blackening the reputations of the dissident Russian writer, Alexander Solzhenitzyn, and Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, who sought refuge in the United States in 1967. The author, John Barron says: "His job demonstrably is to sow confusion, plant lies, peddle fraudulent or stolen manuscripts and smear the reputations of dissenting Soviet intellectuals . . ."

The ideological dispute with Peking has faced Louis, and other specialists, with a bigger challenge. They must now do their utmost to discredit the Chinese leadership by pushing the Soviet points of view, hinting at divisions within China and touching on sensitive issues which cause alarm in Peking. That was the purpose behind Victor Louis' much-publicised "secret" visit to Taiwan in October 1968. The results were gratifying. Did this mean that the Soviet Government was establishing tentative links with the exiled Nationalists? Louis did not say. He was content to leave eddies of speculation in his wake before returning to the good life in Moscow.

Two years ago, Pravda assigned its chief foreign correspondent, VLADIMIR GREGOROVICH, to the Philippines. It was an oddly obscure assignment for such an experienced journalist. Small, bespectacled Gregorovich has worked in Canada and the United States. He speaks excellent English and wields an expense account that allows for ample entertaining around Manila. The Philippines do not yet enjoy diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but Gregorovich has acted as go-between in the tortuous negotiations, dining occasionally with President Marcos at Malacañang, an honour accorded few other resident correspondents. He rents a villa in the plush Makati suburb of Dasmariñas village on the outskirts of Manila and commutes regularly between there and Moscow. Whether he actually writes much is a subject of keen speculation among local Gregorovich-watchers, although lately he has been reinforced

by Tass, with a similarly fluent command of English.

Tass correspondents often work in fields outside the scope of the ordinary correspondent. SERGEI SVRIN came out to Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s, the first Soviet journalist accredited to Malaysia and Singapore. Tall, fair and sophisticated, with near-perfect English, he looked more American than Russian in his well-cut Ivy League suitings. He paid several visits to the Philippines at a time when Russians were less welcome there than they are today and probably prepared the ground for Gregorovich. What is not generally known is that he was also a Soviet-China expert, a forerunner of the Soloviev-style characters of Singapore. He worked in China during the early fifties as interpreter for the Soviet technical missions. A few weeks ago he called again in Singapore, telling foreign colleagues that he was collecting material for a book on the impact of the Cultural Revolution outside China.

Tass offices are notoriously over-staffed. The British news agency, Reuters, keeps two correspondents in New Delhi for the whole of India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. There are seven Tass correspondents in India alone, along with representatives of Novosti, Pravda, Izvestia, Trud, New Times and Soviet Radio and TV. Separate Tass offices have been established in Dacca and Colombo. The agency's news service remains far less comprehensive than Reuters or anything put out by the rival American wire services.

India has always had top priority with the KGB. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 opened the flood-gates to Russian infiltration. It has often been said that "there are no secrets in India," considering the nature of the Indian Government and its ideological bias, but it has only lately become apparent that the treaty threatened internal security.

ernment and the trade union movement were making it easy for the Russians to infiltrate their agents.

It is common knowledge that certain Soviet journalists form an essential part of the KGB operations in India. Until recently they enjoyed complete freedom from police surveillance by driving around in cars with diplomatic number plates. Their claim for diplomatic immunity was only withdrawn after a heated debate in the Lok Sabha. Soviet journalists are the most important "case officers" for a vast army of agents and informers. Agents in the trade union movement can paralyse the economy at will; others form a powerful lobby within the Congress party to keep a wavering leadership pressing towards its declared goal of socialism.

Covert activities are cleverly financed without transferring suspiciously large

sums to the Soviet Embassy. Soviet trading organisations channel their exports through private firms instead of the State Trading Corporation. The firms pay a percentage commission direct to the Russians in India, a total estimated at running into millions of rupees a year. But as long as the Indian Government remains dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid, the authorities prefer to ignore such lapses. In the opinion of many prominent Indians, the country has become enmeshed so closely with Russia that there is little hope of reversing the trend.

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A Journal of World Affairs

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REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

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by Lothar Metzl

WE are familiar with the theme that real détente with the Soviet Union cannot be achieved unless the Soviet system changes radically. One school holds that the Moscow regime's continuing commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its global aspirations places severe restrictions on Soviet détente policies. In essence, this is also the argument of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the exiled Soviet writer, who has pleaded with Soviet leaders to relinquish their obsolete and counterproductive state ideology. Another school maintains that the USSR is an expansionist power with goals similar to those of Czarist imperialism. Adopting this argument, the Chinese communists characterize Soviet leaders as social-imperialists and accuse them of having betrayed the revolution.

A new and more narrowly gauged argument proceeds from an assessment of a Soviet core institution, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti (Committee for State Security), or KGB. Administratively assigned to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the KGB is controlled by the leaders of the Communist Party. Its fundamental missions are to maintain a flexible but nevertheless iron infrastructure of repressive social and political police controls at home, and to undermine the socio-political and structural integrity and stability of noncommunist governments abroad. That the withering away of the KGB is a prerequisite for a reliable relaxation of international tensions is one of the conclusions reached in John Barron's detailed, multisourced investigative report, *KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Agents*.*

In part, this report presents evidence to establish the KGB's paramountcy within the Soviet institutional system as the rulers' "principal instrument of power." (p. 332.) The huge dimensions of the domestic KGB apparatus are described along with its elite status and brutal methods of repression. Nevertheless, the argument does not derive specifically from an evaluation of the role of the KGB in internal Soviet affairs. The major portion of the

**KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Agents*. By John Barron. Pleasantville, N.Y.: Reader's Digest Press (E. P. Dutton, distributors), 1974. 462 pp. \$10.95.

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assembled facts, case histories and statistical data assesses the range, methodology and effectiveness of external KGB espionage and covert political action operations through which Soviet leaders endeavor "to shatter the status quo in foreign lands." (p. 91.) The report takes the high—and rising—incidence of clandestine Soviet operators abroad as an important indicator of continuing intent, and finds that "there can be no real détente until this massive KGB aggression stops." (p. 334.) Barron submits that massive governmental and public opinion pressure in the West may persuade Soviet leaders to desist, in their own interest, from undermining détente through covert KGB operations abroad. Such pressures, he suggests, may also lead to a softening of repression (pp. 332-337). It is doubtful, however, that such pressures, if practical at all, will produce more than tactical concessions to Western opinion.

Soviet doctrine continues to perceive the KGB as an essential element of the Soviet state, second in significance only to the armed forces. In the postwar period, the highest leaders have consistently expressed this policy view at every party congress, no matter how divided they were on other issues. On March 30, 1971, at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Brezhnev followed the example set by Malenkov and Khrushchev in re-emphasizing "the important role played by the organs of state security . . . in the struggle to safeguard Soviet society against hostile elements and against the intrigues of imperialist intelligence services."¹ For obvious reasons, Brezhnev did not refer to the considerable clandestine role played by the KGB on the international scene, but this role—and, to a certain extent, Barron's findings—has been confirmed in unofficial Soviet sources. Since 1964, there has developed an extensive and probably KGB inspired, special Soviet literature that glamorizes the history of the institution as well as selected espionage feats of Soviet agents during World War II and in the postwar period.² This literature has been supplemented by occasional film versions. By way of policy, doctrine and propaganda, the KGB appears firmly entrenched.

Barron's investigative report is meant for the general reader but its factual content should be of more than passing interest to policymakers engaged in structuring détente with Moscow: it indi-

¹"24th Congress of the CPSU," *Information Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 7-8 (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1971), p. 98.

²*Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1964-70: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, with Some Additional Titles from Other Sources*, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington: GPO, 1972).

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cates explicitly that the Soviet regime retains a considerable covert capability abroad for circumventing détente via the KGB.

Implicitly, Barron's data on KGB repression within the USSR also agree with comments by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, who noted the "negative impact of the domestic policies of the Soviet Union upon détente," and stated, "As long as the excesses of domestic brutality in the Soviet Union indicate the absence of . . . a common [to East and West] moral framework, détente can only be limited and precarious."³

The argument that Soviet ideology is a deterrent to real détente has been frequently countered by denying that the ideology is policy-related and by evaluating it as mere rhetoric and propaganda. The argument that real détente with Soviet imperialism is impossible is countered by the assumption that the regime's détente posture represents a genuine mellowing and not merely a change in tactics.⁴ Barron's institutional argument is also not immune to criticism. One could point out that he has taken the KGB out of its institutional context and neglects the repressive character of other Soviet institutions, e.g., the Communist Party, the mass organizations, the ideological and communications apparatus, and so forth. Likewise questionable is the implication that the KGB alone—rather than in conjunction with other factors, such as Soviet military and political policies—is capable of undermining détente.

Nevertheless, the essential thrust of Barron's institutional argument remains valid. Whether or not the KGB is viewed within the total institutional context, whether it is a single anti-détente factor or only one of a series, the KGB phenomenon is significant enough to qualify as an input in the process of making Western and especially U.S. détente policy. It appears that this factor has not been adequately measured as yet. The academic community, for instance, has consistently shied away from the study of the internal and external role of the KGB.⁵ There is no certainty

³Hans J. Morgenthau, "Détente: The Balance Sheet," *New York Times*, March 28, 1974, p. 39.

⁴For a critique of this assumption, see Bertram D. Wolfe, "Some Problems of the Russo-American Détente," Address delivered at the 12th Slavic Conference, Department of History, Oklahoma State University, November 2, 1973. Unpublished manuscript.

⁵See Robert M. Slusser's review in *Slavic Review*, December 1973, pp. 825-828. Professor Slusser writes, "Despite its fundamental and universally recognized importance, the [Soviet] secret police continues to be the neglected stepchild of Soviet studies. . . . As far as the scholarly community of this country is concerned, the study of the secret police still seems to be regarded as somehow discreditable, marginal, or unfeasible."

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that the intelligence community has been less reluctant. Barron's investigative report, therefore, is a first step in the right direction. One of its virtues is that it draws attention to the academic and policy research tasks still ahead. The dimensions of the problem are large enough to justify a cooperative effort of scholars, government estimators and investigative reporters of Barron's senior status.

II

On a small scale, Barron's report sets a precedent for the more broadly based cooperative effort required to produce a thorough estimate of the KGB. The bulk of the data comes from knowledgeable Soviet defectors and from corroborative open-source research. In addition, the report credits otherwise unidentified Western security services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser extent the Central Intelligence Agency, with providing information and advice (p. xii). These contributions extend our knowledge, particularly of some of the KGB's largely unknown structural and organizational aspects. The accounts of former KGB officers and agents are at least equally revealing. Through them the report views the KGB from within and exposes, *inter alia*, its priority targets and operational methods, the pressures and tensions under which its personnel operate, and its close connections with top leaders of the party.

Limited as the governmental contributions are, they will give rise to accusations that Barron is spreading Cold War propaganda. Soviet and other communist media are bound to turn his institutional argument around and claim that his report represents but another of the many attempts by Western intelligence agencies to scuttle détente. As early as October 1973, an authoritative editorial in *Kommunist* warned that the supporters of the Cold War had "regrouped their forces to hold up, distort and undermine the positive process which has begun in the international relaxation of tensions."⁶ On March 15, 1974, Brezhnev stated at Alma-Ata that the Soviet leadership had expected all along that détente efforts would meet "stubborn resistance from the most reactionary and aggressive circles of imperialism and of all political movements . . . interested in maintaining international tensions." Bourgeois media in particular were being "actively

⁶*Kommunist*, October 1973, translated in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 60631, November 26, 1973, p. 13.

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used to implement this counter offensive.”⁷ The first deputy chief of the KGB, Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigun, accused Western intelligence services of increasingly sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda.⁸ Although these statements may simply serve the regime to justify continuing repression and obstructionism in détente matters, they will certainly prompt Soviet media to brand Barron's report as propaganda. But is it?

A few illustrations will show that his study on KGB operations in the Soviet Union is under-researched and understated rather than distorted and exaggerated. Chapter IV (pp. 70-90) delineates the complex organization and highlights the key operational elements of KGB headquarters in Moscow. These include “domestic security” and “foreign intelligence” functions on the largest conceivable scale. In the West these functions are generally assigned to a variety of agencies in order to prevent the accumulation of too much power in a single institution—albeit not always successfully. To sharpen our perception of KGB super-centralization, Barron could have pointed to parallels between the KGB and its counterpart in Nazi Germany, the Main Office of State Security (Reichssicherheit Hauptamt, RSHA).

The RSHA, headed by Himmler and staffed in the main by the SS, included both the Gestapo, the secret state police, and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD), the foreign espionage and subversion service.⁹ In the KGB the First Chief Directorate is responsible for espionage and subversion abroad. The Gestapo function is carried out by the Second and partly also by a new Fifth Chief Directorate. Through them, the KGB maintains its ubiquitous surveillance and control of the Soviet population as well as of all foreigners (diplomats, students, tourists). The border police of the RSHA has its replica in the KGB's uniformed elite force of border guards. In some respects, the KGB is more centralized than was its German counterpart. The extensive surveillance of the Soviet armed forces is lodged in the powerful Armed Forces Directorate. A high-level Disinformation Directorate promotes and supervises KGB operations aiming at pollution of the opinion-making process in the West. Among its specialties are the distribution of forged documents and fabricated intelligence as well as the organization of riots and demonstrations to manipulate public opinion (pp. 165, 166). Similarly,

⁷Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, March 18, 1974, p. R 15.

⁸*Ibid.*, March 6, 1974, p. A 3.

⁹Jacques Delarue, *Histoire de la Gestapo* (Paris, 1962), pp. 609-613.

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the KGB has institutionalized the function of preparing acts of sabotage in peacetime and maintains a special unit for political murder (Chapters VIII, XIII).

The KGB also shares with the RSHA some of its deficiencies, such as excessive bureaucratization, obsession with secrecy, and rigid compartmentalization.¹⁰ Comparative analysis indicates that the KGB represents not, as Barron puts it, "a unique phenomenon of this century" (p. 1) but rather a behavior pattern that "totalitarian" regimes have in common, regardless of their ideological, political and other differences. This conclusion was forcefully expressed by Solzhenitsyn in his reply to Soviet criticism of his *Gulag Archipelago*. When *Literaturnaya Gazeta* accused him of having equated the entire Soviet people with fascist murderers, Solzhenitsyn replied, "Just a little jiggling of the facts. Yes, I equate the Cheka-G.P.U.-N.K.V.D. murders with the Fascist murderers. But *Literaturnaya Gazeta* hauls in 'all Soviet people' here in order to more conveniently hide our hangmen among them."¹¹

The dimensions of the KGB empire are not worked out with precision because Barron's report focuses almost exclusively on the Moscow KGB center. The Moscow center, however, while it is itself in charge of the largest Soviet republic, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), is an all-Union institution and commands its counterpart KGB centers in the other republics of the USSR. Thus, there are fifteen powerful KGB centers among which the Moscow center is *primus inter pares*. Below the other fourteen centers the KGB structure parallels that of the Communist Party's lesser organizations. It devolves from the fourteen republic central committees to their respective, large territorial (*oblast*, *krai* and *okrug*) committees, down to rural district party committees (*raikoms*), and in urban areas to town or city committees (*gorkoms*).¹² A recent Soviet source lists 6 *krai*, 144 *oblast* and 10 *okrug* (territorial) party committees, 780 major city party committees (*gorkoms*), and 511 city district and 2,842 village (rural) party committees (*raikoms*).¹³ It can be

¹⁰Compare Barron, pp. 73-74, with Delarue, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-315.

¹¹See text of Solzhenitsyn's statement, *New York Times*, January 19, 1974. The Cheka, GPU and NKVD are the predecessors of the KGB.

¹²Peter Frank, "The CPSU Obkom First Secretary: A Profile," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 173. The all-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union also acts as the party in the RSFSR.

¹³*Kommunist*, September 1973, translated in JPRS 60363, October 25, 1973, p. 29.

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fairly assumed from these figures that 940 major and 3,353 secondary KGB centers are distributed throughout the Soviet Union. To these figures must be added the innumerable special KGB branches operating within the armed forces and civilian institutions.

The number of KGB staff personnel deployed exclusively against the Soviet people certainly exceeds the strength of the Gestapo at its height in 1944, when it ranged between 40,000 and 50,000.¹⁴ Barron's tentative figures—90,000 staff officers and 400,000 clerical workers, building guards, border guards and special troops—are probably on the conservative side, especially if one considers that the border guards alone are thought to number 300,000 (pp. 71, 85).

The total political and functional weight of the KGB within the Soviet system likewise cannot be adequately measured in terms of the Moscow center alone. Barron points out that the all-Union KGB is represented on the Politburo and Central Committee of the CPSU (p. 11) but fails to mention similar patterns in the republics. The chairman of the important KGB of the Ukrainian republic, for instance, is a candidate member of the Politburo of the CP Ukraine. Republic KGB chiefs and deputy chiefs are regularly elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviets of their jurisdiction.

Moreover, Chapter V (pp. 91-113) surveys the center's ability to extend its operational radius by inserting KGB officers into a variety of state mechanisms, ranging from the vast censorship apparatus to the administration of religious affairs, news agencies, the areas of foreign affairs and foreign trade, and so forth. It can also exploit a multitude of rigid and repressive social controls assigned to other agencies, e.g., with regard to the internal passport and work book system, travel controls, the draft, and mental institutions (pp. 96-99). Thus, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs administers the labor camps but the selection of inmates is in the hands of the KGB. Clearly, one would need to apply a regional multiplication factor to arrive at the full extent of the KGB's interagency coordination, including its behind-the-scenes manipulation of the judicial process.

In sum, Barron's investigation of the role played by the KGB in the USSR's internal affairs barely approximates but does not distort Soviet realities. Even in its rudimentary form it is com-

¹⁴Delarue, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

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patible with the official Soviet definition of the KGB's mission—i.e., to “be the terror of all enemies of the Soviet state”—given to the Twenty-first CPSU Congress by Politburo member Aleksandr N. Shelepin, who was then chairman of the KGB and is now head of the multi-million-member federation of Soviet trade unions.¹⁵

Although the terror tactics of the KGB are subject to change, Shelepin's strategic definition still holds. Barron shows how little it takes to be sent to prison, labor camps or mental institutions as an enemy of the Soviet state (pp. 107, 108). However, he does not deal adequately with the more elusive aspects of a huge secret police that can recruit collaborators, spies and informers practically at will. Because the corruptive effect of the KGB on Soviet society in general and on the regime sponsoring this corruption in particular has a bearing on détente, this problem needs to be closely studied.

III

Barron's exposé of covert KGB operations abroad has more than one counterpart in Soviet books and articles exposing Western intelligence services, but there is a significant difference. Barron's view does not represent an official position even though it may have been influenced by Western counterintelligence findings. Soviet reports of this type represent the official Soviet view and are therefore beyond public criticism or challenge. Moreover, it is the KGB itself that frames and disseminates this view, generally over the signature of its chairman, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, or his first deputy, Tsvigun.¹⁶ Their pronouncements have the backing of the CPSU, for Andropov is a member of the Politburo and Tsvigun is a candidate member of the Central Committee. Andropov, moreover, was recently awarded the Order of Lenin.

Barron's report calls for consideration by policymakers. The KGB, on the other hand, is authorized by Soviet policymakers to define the parameters of the subversive threat from abroad. While in the United States the time is past for such self-serving and justificatory procedures, the Brezhnev regime still follows them for

¹⁵*Current Soviet Policies III, The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 178.

¹⁶For example: Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Speech at the 50th Anniversary of Soviet State Security Organs, *Pravda*, December 21, 1967. Semen Kuzmich Tsvigun, “Ideological Diversion—a Tool of Imperialist Reaction,” *Kommunist*, March 1972, pp. 109-118; “Revolutionary Vigilance Is an Integral Part of Soviet Man,” *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Political Self-Education), February 1971, pp. 38-48.

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a variety of reasons. KGB estimates enable the regime to neutralize domestic dissenters as tools of external antagonists. They also enable it to negate Western demands for less restricted exchanges. In the final analysis, though, the estimative authority of the KGB derives from the general outlook of a leadership still committed to rule by secrecy and, therefore, prone to attribute secret conspiracies to its partners in détente as well as to open opponents. The KGB is the institutional embodiment of this view. In the democratic West similar behavior patterns have tended to dissipate. In the USSR they are permanently rooted in the statutory and social obligations of the members of Soviet society. The 1952 statutes of the CPSU obligated a party member "to keep Party and state secrets and display political vigilance, keeping in mind that the vigilance of Communists is necessary on every sector, and in all circumstances."¹⁷ The 1961 amendments to the statutes again made it a duty of every party member "to display vigilance to guard party and state secrets."¹⁸ "Political vigilance" is incumbent not only on party members but on the entire population as "an absolute and most important condition for successful struggle against the subversive activities of the enemies of the Soviet state."¹⁹ These obligations undoubtedly create greater receptivity to KGB allegations about Western conspiracies.

In his Introduction to the Barron volume, Robert Conquest states that the book "implies the need for continual vigilance" against KGB operations in the West. Yet, as the KGB spearheads the perennial large-scale vigilance campaigns of the Soviet regime, it does not imply but *implants* fear and distrust of the West. To this political end generalizations and ideological constructs are often substituted for fact. Nonetheless, the facts assembled in Barron's report strongly suggest that the KGB creates far greater problems for nations in the West—developing as well as developed—than comparable Western intelligence services create for the Soviet Union.

Barron has acceptable figures to show that from the early 1960's on the Soviet regime has used the "normalization" of its relations with noncommunist countries to expand the presence and operations of the KGB as well as the military intelligence agency of the

¹⁷Current Soviet Policies, *The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Party Congress, Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 28.

¹⁸Jan Triska, editor, *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 158, 159. The cited amendment is still in force.

¹⁹*Kommunist*, February 1974, translated in JPRS 61776, April 17, 1974, pp. 162, 163.

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Soviet General Staff. To support his statement that 50 to 80 per cent of Soviet diplomats abroad are undercover intelligence officers (p. 17), Appendix D reliably provides the names and careers of about 1,700 of them (pp. 379-415). In addition, the covert KGB presence abroad is augmented by the personnel of allied intelligence organizations from Eastern Europe, Cuba and North Korea (pp. 141-163), and while Barron has no statistics on their incidence he shows how effectively they can perform. Through the intelligence service of North Korea, for instance, the KGB instigated—albeit unsuccessfully—guerrilla operations in Mexico, a country with which Moscow had “normal” relations (pp. 230-257).

Incomplete as Barron's figures are, they are not likely to be challenged by the KGB. Nor have Soviet sources published similarly precise data to show that the presence of Western intelligence services has increased as dramatically in socialist countries as has that of the KGB and its auxiliaries in noncommunist countries. In fact, KGB statements credit no Western intelligence presence in the Soviet Union whatsoever. Instead, they focus on the West's attempts to infiltrate “agents” from abroad in order to meet extensive intelligence requirements. These agents may come by “miniature helicopter or minisubmarine.” Or, they may “show up through legal channels: with a diplomatic passport, as a tourist, or as a member of a scientific, commercial, or cultural delegation.” In the main, however, their espionage efforts are evaluated as futile because of “the lack of a social base for the activities of imperialist intelligence in the Soviet Union.” According to the KGB, the recruitment of Soviet citizens by Western intelligence happens, but “not frequently.”²⁰

Barron's data on the enormous counterintelligence and surveillance capabilities of the KGB support its self-view. So does Moscow's low rate of expulsions of foreigners accused of espionage—often on trumped-up charges at that. In the West, in contrast, expulsions of Soviet intelligence staff officers run high: 226 Soviet representatives were expelled during 1960-1970; in 1971 and 1972, 191 were expelled from five countries alone (pp. 27, 28). Over the long term these losses average out to roughly 20 to 25 per cent, leaving the KGB to operate at 75 to 80 per cent of capacity. Nonetheless, in quantitative terms, it seems fairly evident

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 160. The quoted statements appear in a review of *Taynyy Front* (The Secret Front), a recent book by KGB Deputy Chief Tsvigun (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973).

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that the KGB's potential in the West far outweighs whatever covert capabilities the "imperialists" may have in the Soviet Union.

In qualitative terms, the disparity becomes even more pronounced. Its direct bearing on détente devolves only in part from the proven professionalism of Soviet espionage operations. Barron points out correctly that the KGB continues to give first priority to acquiring documentary evidence of the military and political secrets of allies and adversaries, through classical agent operations. As a case in point, he describes the successful penetration of a highly guarded American communications center in France (pp. 199-239). On the other hand, he indicates that this traditionalist Soviet capability is offset by the technological apparatus for intelligence collection the United States has developed. In his opinion, this apparatus has not been matched by the Soviet Union. Whether or not this is so is difficult to judge on the basis of available information, especially given the intensity of the Soviet effort to catch up with Western military technology.

In the perspective of Western détente politics the most disturbing feature of KGB operations is this: they aim persistently and frequently successfully at the recruitment or infiltration of agents in the center of governments which desire to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. Barron's evidence, though scattered throughout the report, shows that this is a long-term trend. Recent events in West Germany confirm that intelligence services in Eastern Europe replicate the KGB model.

The KGB attacks its targets both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In a carefully staged deception and sex entrapment operation, it attempted to blackmail the French ambassador to the Soviet Union into collaboration, on the—mistaken—assumption that he would become one of General de Gaulle's most intimate advisers (pp. 118-140). President Nasser's chief confidant and intelligence adviser was recruited as a Soviet agent during the heyday of Egyptian-Soviet relations and so served until he was arrested by President Sadat in 1971 (pp. 51-53, 58, 59, 61). President Nkrumah of Ghana was persuaded to let the KGB and allied secret services assume control of his domestic security and external intelligence operations until his overthrow by the military (pp. 252-254). Barron's reliably documented cases could have been augmented by a series of others, such as the account of Soviet agent Harold A. R. ("Kim") Philby, who at one time headed the Soviet desk of Great Britain's external intelligence service. Moreover, the KGB practice of recruiting or manipulating

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high government officials extends not only to Western governments. Barron shows how the technique was applied in Castro's Cuba (pp. 147-152). Again, in September 1974, an apparently Soviet-backed anti-Tito conspiracy was uncovered in Yugoslavia.

The circumstances surrounding the resignation of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt on May 6, 1974 strikingly underline the trend as well as its implications for détente. Brandt, the prime architect of East-West détente, resigned because one of his personal advisers was exposed as an agent of the East German intelligence services. As such, he had served for several years on Brandt's personal staff. In view of the KGB's close relations with its East German counterpart, it must be assumed that the Moscow center received the fruits of this operation. It is highly probable also that the Soviet Politburo was kept informed and accepted the political risks involved in preference to calling the operation off.

On the other side of the ledger, the KGB keeps exposures of its activities abroad concealed from the Soviet public, and has no comparable exposures to offer. In 1956, Khrushchev, in his secret speech to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, branded Politburo member and secret police chief Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria as an "agent of foreign intelligence."²¹ The accusation was not credible but served as an additional justification for Beria's execution. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed in 1962 as a Western spy, did not belong to the innermost circle of the Soviet leadership. Nonetheless, the KGB has been obliged by the Brezhnev regime to keep the threat of foreign intelligence infiltration alive by proclaiming that the current tactics of Western imperialism are primarily designed to use détente as a cover for ever-increasing ideological subversion operations.

This construct permits, for example, the defamation of Soviet physicist and dissenter, Andrei S. Sakharov, as "a tool in the hands of the enemies of socialism and relaxation of international tension, who are manipulating his personality with professional skill."²² It is sufficiently loose and elastic to allow for its arbitrary application to any opponent of the regime:

Today, when the principles of peaceful coexistence are being asserted, the main efforts of imperialist intelligence and other special services are aimed at achieving the so-called "erosion" of socialism. In fact, this means attempts at restoring in the socialist countries the capitalist order with the

²¹*Current Soviet Policies II, The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 184.

²²*Kommunist*, October 1973, translated in JPRS 60631, November 26, 1973, p. 12.

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help of a "silent" counterrevolution. Reliance on the corruption of the Communist or any other revolutionary movement from within is now one of the most important trends in imperialist class strategy.²³

The Chinese communists, meanwhile, credit the Soviet leadership itself—but not Western intelligence services—with the introduction of capitalist principles into the Soviet system. Objective Western observers fail to see any signs of a brewing capitalist counterrevolution. The Soviet regime raises the specter of Western subversion in order to justify its stringent ideological protectionism.

The CPSU's ideological apparatus and the academic community have the task of identifying and exposing Western trends, concepts, publications and authors which are to be considered hostile to Soviet ideology. The KGB has the task of providing evidence of the alleged conspiracy. It must project the ominous image of a well-coordinated, well-financed psychological warfare campaign. It has been doing so by postulating a monolithic superstructure of governmental, private and academic institutions, such as, in the case of the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and various research institutes concerned with Soviet affairs. With respect to the exploitation of religion and nationalism, a recent book exposes the subversive efforts of the Vatican, the Jehovah's Witnesses Society, "reactionary Muslim organizations," and obscure Russian Orthodox churches.²⁴ Among the "ideological contraband" that religious centers abroad are trying to smuggle into the Soviet Union, its authors cite publications of the Bible Society in London as well as copies of the Gospel According to John. The new book by the KGB's First Deputy Chairman, Tsvigun, exposes hitherto unknown nationalist groups in Moldavia and the Ukraine.²⁵

Barron's report neglects this significant function of the KGB. A thorough investigation of the scope and impact of this sort of literature would seem useful. Even if its factual content is found to be minimal, an analysis of KGB propaganda may shed light on the extent to which the Soviet regime can win public support for its restrictive policies vis-à-vis dissenters and the influx of Western ideas. The first edition of Tsvigun's book—200,000 copies—was reportedly sold out in a few days.

²³*Kommunist*, February 1974, pp. 121-125.

²⁴A. V. Belov and A. D. Shilkin, *Diversiya Bez Dinamita* (Sabotage Without Dynamite) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972).

²⁵*Daily Telegraph* (London), April 18, 1974. Also see note 20.

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The disparity between the KGB and Western intelligence services is a reflection of leadership attitudes. In the United States, domestic intelligence programs as well as covert action abroad, such as in Chile, have come under increasingly critical scrutiny, both by the public media and by the government. As regards the Soviet Union, although Barron may go too far in characterizing the KGB as "the primary executor of foreign policy" (p. 17), his report indicates that the Soviet regime has far greater confidence in the KGB's ability to manipulate international relations than it has in its conventional diplomatic establishment. In the United States, similar Cold War attitudes have eroded and are likely to erode further in the wake of the Watergate scandals. In the Soviet Union, where the KGB is beyond criticism, reliance on the KGB apparatus abroad is likely to increase. Détente offers new opportunities for operational expansion and for the acquisition of additional covert reserves. The fact that the CPSU's control of the international communist movement has been weakened should further strengthen the role of the highly centralized international KGB apparatus.

On the whole, Barron's institutional argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. Even if the new threats to international stability—inflation, energy and food shortages—seem to loom larger, the KGB still represents a highly disintegrative force. A thorough and broadly based review could project the risks as well as the countervailing factors more precisely than does Barron's otherwise commendable report. Soviet détente policies and the KGB system are likely to coexist and interact for the foreseeable future.