


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CHAPTER XII

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JOINT ARMY-NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY

OF

KOREA

(INCLUDING TSUSHIMA AND QUELPART)

DEFENSES

APRIL 1945

List of Effective Pages, Chapter XII

SUBJECT MATTER	CHANGE IN EFFECT	PAGE NUMBERS
Cover Page	Original	unnumbered
List of Effective Pages and Table of Contents, Chapter XII (inside front cover)	Original	unnumbered
Text	Original	pp. XII-1 to XII-10
Figures (insert, reverse sides blank)	Original	Figures XII-1 to XII-8
Imprint (inside back cover, reverse blank)	Original	unnumbered

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Chapter XII

DEFENSES

120. Introduction

Korea and the islands of Tsushima and Quelpart occupy a strategic position in the inner defense of the Japanese Empire. This area is an important military supply base for the Japanese and serves as the basic route over which military supplies pass between Japan and the interior of Asia. The Najin (Rashin) area is of strategic importance because of its proximity to Southeastern Siberia and particularly to the port of Vladivostok. (A-2)

The fortifications are located so as to protect shipping between the Japanese Islands and the Asiatic mainland and to guard the important ports, airfields, and industries of Korea. (A-2)

While all available information on fortifications of Korea, Tsushima, and Quelpart is given in this chapter, it is based on fragmentary and often old reports. This is especially true concerning Tsushima. Pusan (Fusan) is partly covered by recent aerial photography which reveals a number of gun emplacements. Fragmentary aerial photography is available for Chinnamp'o (Chinnampo), P'yongyang (Heijō), Inch'on (Jinsen), Kyongsong (Keijō), Hungnam (Konan), Sinuiju (Shingishū), and Quelpart (Saishū); however, it reveals little information about fortifications in these areas.

An evaluation is given in parentheses after items or paragraphs of the text.* However, no attempt is made to evaluate the estimates of strength given in Topic 121 or the estimates of capacities given in Topic 122 as these estimates are generalizations made on the basis of many items of information, and no single evaluation can be appropriately applied to them.

121. Organization of Army Defense Forces

A. Administrative and tactical functions.
(FIGURE XII - 1)

Japanese Army forces in Korea are under the command of the Korea Army with headquarters at Kyongsong (Keijō). There are three divisional districts in Korea: Ranan, Heijō, and Keijō. It is believed that Quelpart Island (Saishū-tō) is under the Korea Army and that Tsushima is a part of the Kurume Divisional District under the jurisdiction of the Western District Army with headquarters at Fukuoka, Japan. Japanese ground strength in Korea is estimated to be 127,000, of

* The following system of evaluation provided for in Adjutant General letter (AG 250.05) of 25 November 1942. Subject: Intelligence Reports—Reliability Rating Designated by Symbol is used:

Evaluation on information source	Evaluation of information as to truth, credibility, or probability
A. Completely reliable	1. Report confirmed by other sources
B. Usually reliable	2. Probably true report
C. Fairly reliable	3. Possibly true report
D. Not usually reliable	4. Doubtfully true report
E. Unreliable	5. Improbable report
F. Unknown	0. Truth cannot be judged

which 120,000 are army ground and 7,000 army air ground troops.

B. Disposition of forces.
(FIGURE XII - 1)

The present disposition of identified major units in Korea is shown in FIGURE XII - 1. No units have been identified on Quelpart. Estimated strength of identified units is shown below.

(1) Location of identified units in Korea.

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH
Korea Army Hq.	Kyongsong (Keijō) (Seoul)	500
Ranan Division	Nanam (Ranan)	20,000
Keijō Division	Kyongsong (Keijō) (Seoul)	20,000
Heijō Division	P'yongyang (Heijō)	20,000
Mixed Regiment?	Unlocated	4,000
(not independent)		
Rashin Fortress	Najin (Rashin)	2,000
Eikō Bay Fortress	Wonsan (Genzan)	2,000
Pusan Fortress	Pusan (Fusan)	3,100
Reisui Fortress	Yosu (Reisui)	2,400
Other minor units		12,300

Total strength of identified units in Korea: 86,300

(2) Location of identified units on Tsushima.

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH
Tsushima Fortress	Tsushima	2,400

Total strength of identified units on Tsushima: 2,400

122. Supply and Maintenance

A. General.

The peninsula of Korea provides Japan with a strategic military supply base and is an important source of raw materials for Japanese war production. The well developed transportation facilities serve as a convenient bridge for military supply movements between Japan and her occupied areas in Asia.

Large quantities of all classes of military supplies are reported stored throughout Korea. These supplies probably support the troops stationed there and may serve as reserves for troops in Manchuria and Northern China. (B-2) Stores and facilities of Quelpart and Tsushima are probably sufficient only to maintain the troops and equipment located there. (F-3)

B. Availability of supplies.
(FIGURE XII - 2)


Provisions and forage are believed adequate. Numerous rice-cleaning factories and rice stores in warehouses indicate a probable sufficiency in rice reserves, while coastal waters afford a supply of fish. The limited supply of meat and poultry available in Korea is believed to be further curtailed by the reported shipment of these items to Japan.

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TABLE XII - 1

THE CHAIN OF SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE JAPANESE ARMY SUPPLY DEPOTS IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR (KOREA).

10 February 1945



[dashed box] = designate Branch depots in area other than Japan or Korea affecting the supply administration of Korea.

The clothing supply for Japan's armed forces on the peninsula appears to present little difficulty. The large clothing depots at Pusan (Fusan) and Najin (Rashin) probably maintain clothing reserves for supplying the troops in training, in staging areas, and those already on operational duty in Korea. (B-2)

Korea is an important center for the manufacture and distribution of small arms and, in general, is a transit area for the storage and distribution of other ordnance materiel. Reserves of ammunition are held in many warehouses and reverted storage areas, as well as at arsenals and explosives plants.

Some gasoline and oil are produced synthetically in Korea and are supplemented by imports. Numerous warehouses and open storage areas have been reported to contain gasoline and oil in drums. Tank storage and distribution are facilitated by ship-shore oil pipe lines believed to be in operation at Pusan (Fusan) and Mump'yong (Bunhei-ri). (A-2)

C. Administration.

The over-all administration of military supply is centered in the War Ministry at Tōkyō. This responsibility passes through lower administrative echelons in Japan proper to administrative headquarters in Korea. (A-2)

The functions of the War Ministry are not too clear with respect to control in the production of supplies; the procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies; and their transportation. It is believed, however, that in Korea the Army exercises a more direct control over these activities than the War Ministry does in Japan.

TABLE XII - 1 indicates the various types of duties performed by the respective depots or agencies, as well as the chain of administrative command from the major depot in Japan to its corresponding branch depot or agency in Korea or Manchuria.

A supply depot or a branch supply depot probably functions in the actual receipt, storage, and distribution of supplies, while an agency appears to be concerned more with the "desk work" for the processing of supplies in a local area. (A-3)

D. Location of supply depots.

(FIGURE XII - 2)

Concentrations of specific types of supply installations throughout Korea emphasize the strategic disposition of some types of supplies with respect to Manchuria and the Southeast Siberian frontier. Remount depots are located in the north-eastern part of the peninsula. The central and northwestern areas contain important groupings of arsenals and munitions plants with nearby stores of ammunition and ordnance materials. Along the southern coast many warehouses and storage areas serve as transit points for Japanese military supplies to the interior of the Asiatic continent. It is probable that numerous warehouse areas for military supplies are conveniently located along the railroads in the interior of Korea. (A-2)

The supply installations and supply points of Korea are located by coordinates in the following list. Known details of these locations are included in FIGURE XII - 2.

Aoji-dong (Agochi-do)	42° 32' N 130° 25' E
Ch'aho (Shako)	40° 12' N 128° 39' E
Chinhae (Chinkai)	35° 09' N 128° 39' E
Chinju (Shinshū)	35° 13' N 128° 05' E
Chinnamp'o (Chinnampo)	38° 43' N 125° 23' E
Ch'onan (Ten an)	36° 49' N 127° 08' E
Ch'ongjin (Seishin)	41° 46' N 129° 48' E
Hamhung (Kankō)	39° 55' N 127° 31' E
Haeju (Kaishū)	38° 04' N 125° 42' E
Hoeryong (Kainei)	42° 26' N 129° 45' E
Hoshui (place name cannot be confirmed)	42° 08' N 130° 04' E
Hungnam (Kōnan)	39° 52' N 127° 33' E
Inch'on (Jinsen)	37° 28' N 126° 37' E
Kapsan (Kōzan)	41° 05' N 128° 18' E
Kumsan (Kinsan)	36° 06' N 127° 30' E
Kunsan (Gunsan)	36° 00' N 126° 43' E
Kyomip'o (Kenjiho)	38° 45' N 125° 37' E
Kyonghung (Keikō)	42° 37' N 130° 30' E
Kyongsong (Keijō) (Seoul)	37° 32' N 126° 57' E
Kyongwon (Keigen)	42° 49' N 130° 09' E
Masan (Masan)	35° 11' N 128° 34' E
Mokp'o (Moppo)	34° 46' N 126° 23' E
Mump'yong (Bunhei-ri)	39° 15' N 127° 23' E
Najin (Rashin)	42° 09' N 130° 16' E
Nanam (Ranan)	41° 44' N 129° 42' E
P'ung hae (Hokai)	42° 10' N 129° 43' E
Pup'y ong (Fuhei)	36° 45' N 126° 28' E
Pusan (Fusan)	35° 06' N 129° 02' E
Samch'ok (Sanchoku)	37° 25' N 129° 10' E
Sariwon (Shariin)	38° 32' N 125° 45' E
Sinuiju (Shingishū)	40° 05' N 124° 20' E
Sohojin (Seikoshin)	39° 49' N 127° 36' E
Songjin (Jōshin)	40° 41' N 129° 10' E
Taetsa-do (Daitasa-tō)	39° 54' N 124° 22' E
Taegu (Taikyū)	35° 53' N 128° 36' E
Ulsan (Urusan)	35° 32' N 129° 20' E
Unggi (Yūki)	42° 19' N 130° 24' E
Wonsan (Genzan)	39° 10' N 127° 26' E
Yongamp'o (Ryūgampo)	39° 56' N 124° 22' E
Yongan (Eian)	41° 16' N 129° 30' E
Yongwol (Neietsu)	37° 10' N 128° 29' E
Yosu (Reisui)	34° 44' N 127° 45' E
Yunai (place name cannot be confirmed)	42° 50' N 130° 09' E
Quelpart (Saishū-tō) Island	
Tsushima Island	

E. Supply routes.

(FIGURE XII - 3)

(1) General.

Korea's rail and road network is most highly developed along the west coast, in the south, and in the extreme north-east. In general, main lines of communication run north and south with comparatively few through connections between the east and west coasts, outside the southern area. Rivers are generally shallow and are not believed to be used to any significant extent for military traffic beyond those ports open to ocean-going vessels. Good seaports are numerous along the south and west coasts, but on the east coast there has been very little development south of Wonsan (Genzan). (B-2)

(2) Roads.

Main highways largely parallel the rail lines and provide additional, secondary, means of transportation. However, in certain areas in which the railroads have not been extensively developed, highways perform a relatively more important service. This is particularly true in the north.

The main trunk highways form a large "X" with Kyongsong (Keijō) at the hub, Pusan (Fusan) and Mokp'o (Moppo) at the southern terminals, and Sinuiju (Shingishū) and Najin (Rashin) at the northern terminals. Another important highway connects P'yongyang (Heijō) and Wonsan (Genzan). (B-2)

While Korea has an extensive network of roads, only those deemed suitable for military traffic are shown in FIGURE XII - 3. They have been classified as primary and secondary highways.

The primary highways (daily capacity in each direction, estimated to be 1,000 to 1,500 short tons), usually have a hard or gravel surface and are generally capable of two-way, all-weather service. In and adjacent to major cities, they are frequently paved with asphalt.

The secondary highways (daily capacity in each direction, 500 to 1,000 short tons), include roads generally with gravel surface, capable of two-way travel, although averaging somewhat less in width than the above group, and at times impassable during wet weather. (B-2)

The daily capacity figures given above are based on the use of the standard 1½-ton Japanese military truck loaded with military supplies. Actual loads carried will vary according to local conditions of terrain. The upper range of the estimated capacity figures are generally applicable to the coastal regions and those in the lower range to mountainous regions. However, in the strategic Hamgyong-pukto (Kankyō-hokudo) Province it may be expected that mountain roads will be better than average. Rain (especially in July and August) and spring thaws hinder travel on secondary highways, while snow is sometimes a problem in the northern area. Gravel for maintenance is readily obtainable in most areas. (B-2)

(3) Rail.

The main rail route in Korea extends from the port of Pusan (Fusan) northward through Kyongsong (Keijō) and P'yongyang (Heijō) to An-tung in Manchuria. It is believed to be completely double-tracked as far north as the vicinity of P'yongyang (Heijō), but between that city and the Manchurian border some points are known to be single-tracked. Between Kyongsong (Keijō) and Pusan (Fusan) an alternate route is available via Kyongju (Keishū) and Andong (Antō), but this is much inferior to the main line in carrying capacity. Outside the extreme southern part of the peninsula there are but two lines which provide through rail transportation between the east and west coasts. These connect Wonsan (Genzan) with Kyongsong (Keijō) and P'yongyang (Heijō), respectively. North from Wonsan (Genzan) an important single-track line runs to the port of Ch'ongjin (Seishin) which in turn is connected by a large loop with the Manchurian railways and the port of Najin (Rashin). This loop is reported to have double-track in some sections, one such stretch being located between Hoeryong (Kainei) and Sangsambong (Kamisambō). All important ports are joined with the rail network. (B-2)

The principal lines are standard gauge (4' 8½") but there are numerous spur lines, most of them serving mines, which are narrow gauge (2' 6"). (B-2)

In South Korea a proposed extension between Chinju (Shinshū) and Sunch'on (Junten), with a connection to the port of Samch'onp'o (Sanzenho), may be completed, but reliable confirmation is lacking. (B-2)

TABLE XII - 2
RAIL CAPACITIES FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES

LINES	ESTIMATED	PRESENT	ESTIMATED	MAXIMUM
	CAPACITY NO. TRAINS	PER DAY SHORT TONS	CAPACITY NO. TRAINS	PER DAY SHORT TONS
<i>NORTH KOREA</i>				
Wonsan - Ch'ongjin (Genzan - Seishin)	10	4,000	15	6,000
Paegam - Yonsa (Hakugan - Ensha)	5	1,700	7	2,380
P'yongyang - Wonsan (Heijō - Genzan)	10	3,500	15	5,250
P'yongyang - Manp'ojin (Heijō - Mampochin)	5	1,700	7	2,380
P'yongyang - Sungho-ri (Heijō - Shōkōri)	6	1,500	10	2,500
Kyongsong - An-tung (Keijō - An-tung)				
Kyongsong - P'yongyang (Keijō - Heijō)	30	19,800	45	29,700
P'yongyang - An-tung (Heijō - An-tung)	25	16,500	30	19,800
Kilchu - Hyesanjin (Kisshū - Keizanchin)	5	1,700	7	2,380
Ch'ongjin - Najin (Seishin - Rashin)	10	5,500	15	8,250
Sinanju - Kaech'on (Shinanshū - Kaisen)	8	3,900	12	6,000
Sinuiju - Taedasa-do (Shingishū - Daitasa-tō)	8	5,200	10	6,500
Sungho-ni - Tokch'on (Shōkori - Tokusen)	6	1,500	10	2,500
Chongju - Sup'ung-dong (Teishū - Suihō-do)	5	1,700	7	2,380
<i>CENTRAL KOREA</i>				
T'osong-ni - Ongjin (Dojō-ri - Oshin)	8	1,600	12	2,400
Wonsan - Kangnung (Genzan - Kōryō)	6	2,900	10	5,000
P'yongyang - Chinnamp'o (Heijō - Chinnampo)	10	8,200	15	12,300
Kyongsong - Wonsan (Keijō - Genzan)	10	6,600	15	9,900
Kwangju - Kyomip'o (Kōshū - Kenjiho)	10	8,200	15	12,300
Sariwon - Changyon (Shariin - Chōen)	8	1,600	12	2,400
Sariwon - Haeju (Shariin - Kaishū)	8	1,600	12	2,400
Kyongsong - Inch'on (Keijō - Jinsen)	15	12,300	20	16,400
<i>SOUTH KOREA</i>				
Pusan - Kyongju - Taegu (Fusan - Keishū - Taikyū)	8	3,900	15	7,500
Sunch'on - Songjong-ni (Junten - Shōtei-ri)	8	3,900	12	6,000
Kyongsong - Pusan (Keijō - Fusan)	30	19,800	45	29,700
Kyongsong - Kyongju (Keijō - Keishū)	5	1,700	7	2,380
Kumch'on - Andong (Kinsen - Antō)	6	2,900	10	5,000
I-ri - Kunsan (Ri-ri - Gunzan)	10	6,500	15	9,750
I-ri - Yosū (Ri-ri - Reisui)	10	4,900	15	7,350
Samnangjin - Chinju (Sanrōshin - Shinshū)	10	6,500	15	9,750
Taejon - Mokp'o (Taiden - Moppo)	10	6,500	15	9,750
Ch'onan - Changhung-ni (Ten an - Shōkō-ri)	8	3,900	12	6,000

The estimated daily capacities of the main railway lines are shown in TABLE XII - 2. Computation has been based on the grade, track conditions, sizes and types of locomotives in use, and the quantity of rolling stock available.

(4) *Sea.*

FIGURE XII - 2

Port capacities indicated in FIGURE XII - 2 have been estimated on the basis of known port facilities. Consideration has been given to the loading and unloading of vessels at anchor by lighters and coasters, as well as to their servicing alongside wharves and quays. Although data on the observed shipping in this area is incomplete, it is believed that the figures given for port capacities constitute a reasonable estimate.

Adequate road, rail, and storage facilities are believed available to handle the incoming shipments of military supplies.

The significance of the proximity of Pusan (Fusan) to Japan, with respect to her problem of supply movements to the continent of Asia, has warranted the expansion of the facilities at its port. The port's present capacity has been estimated at 20,000 long tons per 10-hour day. A ferry service is operating between Pusan (Fusan) and the Japanese port of Shimonoseki. Najin (Rashin) on the northeastern coast of Korea has an estimated port capacity of 13,700 long tons per 10-hour day and is believed to handle shipments from the ports of northern Honshū and Hokkaidō. (A-2)

Along the western coast two major supply depots, Kyongsong (Keijō) and P'yongyang (Heijō), are reported being served regularly through the ports of Inch'on (Jinsen) and Chinnamp'o (Chinnampo) respectively. (F-2)

Information is lacking as to ports on the islands of Quelpart and Tsushima. A packet steamer of very low tonnage has carried passengers from the mainland of Korea to a small pier at the town of Cheju (Saishū) on the northern coast of Quelpart. (F-2) On the eastern coast a submarine base has been reported in operation. Tsushima Island is reported having many anchorages, Takeshiki, Izuhara, and Kin being three of the largest. (F-3) A torpedo boat base is indicated at Kusubo, a town on one of the smaller islands.

123. Fortifications

A. Fortified areas.

(FIGURES XII - 5, XII - 6, XII - 7, and XII - 8)

The principal fortified areas in Korea and the islands of Tsushima and Quelpart are centered around Pusan (Fusan), Najin (Rashin), Wonsan (Genzan), and Aso-wan (Tsushima Sound). Coast defenses are also at Chinnamp'o (Chinnampo), Inch'on (Jinsen), and Yosū (Reisui). The principal industrial regions are defended by light concentrations of anti-

aircraft defenses. (A-2) Recent reports indicate that extensive marine minefields are in the Korea and Tsushima-kaikyō (straits) and in the Najin (Rashin) area. (B-2)

The defenses concentrated around Pusan and Tsushima are intended to protect the highly strategic supply route between Japan proper and the Korean Peninsula and to prevent passage from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan either through the Korea Strait or the Tsushima Strait. The fortifications located in the Najin (Rashin) area protect the strategic Korea-Soviet border and the important ports of Najin (Rashin) and Unggi (Yūki). The defenses in the fortified area of Wonsan (Genzan) defend a potentially important naval station and harbor. (A-2)

A comprehensive outline of known fortifications as of 10 February 1945 is presented in the following figures.

FIGURE XII - 5—Korea: including Tsushima and Quelpart, Fortifications.

FIGURE XII - 6—Tsushima, Fortifications.

FIGURE XII - 7—Pusan Ho (Fusan-kō), Fortifications.

FIGURE XII - 8—Wonsan (Genzan) and Yonghung-man (Eikōwan), Fortifications.

All known information on armament of the various fortifications is given. However, in some instances, the specific models of weapons are not known. TABLES XII - 3 and XII - 4 contain specifications concerning weapons that may be found in Korea and the islands of Tsushima and Quelpart.

TABLE XII - 3—Japanese Fixed Coastal Guns.

TABLE XII - 4—Japanese Mobile Artillery.

B. Mobile artillery.

Mobile artillery units have been located in the general areas listed below. The normal armament of each unit is indicated in parentheses. Characteristics of individual weapons are given in TABLE XII - 4.

(1) *Kyongsong, (Keijō), Seoul.*

One field artillery regiment replacement unit (component of depot division) with 6 Model 95 (1935) or Improved Model 38 (1905) 75-mm. field guns and 6 Model 91 (1931) 105-mm. howitzers is located here.

(2) *P'yongyang (Heijō).*

One field artillery regiment replacement unit (component of depot division), with 3 Model 95 (1935) or Improved Model 38 (1905) 75-mm. field guns, 6 Model 91 (1931) 105-mm. howitzers, and 3 Model 4 (1915) 150-mm. howitzers is located here.

(3) *Nanam (Ranan).*

One mountain artillery regiment replacement unit (component of depot division) with 9 Model 94 (1934) 75-mm. mountain guns is located at Nanam.

TABLE XII - 3
 JAPANESE FIXED COASTAL GUNS
 February 1945

CALIBER	IDENTIFICATION	LENGTH IN CALIBERS	SHELLS	WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE (POUNDS)	PENETRATION EFFECT (INCHES AT 90°)	MUZZLE VELOCITY (FEET PER SECOND)	MAXIMUM RANGE* (YARDS)	ELEVATION* (DEGREES)	TRA- VERSE** (DEGREES)
3 inches	Model 10 (1921) dual purpose gun	40	Armor-piercing high explosive	12.5	1.1 at 5,000 yards	2,200	11,600 (vertical range 20,000 ft.)	85	360
3 inches	Model 3 (1914) naval gun	45	High explosive	12.5		2,200		-5 to +20	
4 inches	Unknown								
120-mm. (4.7 inches)	Destroyer MINEKAZE class Model 3 (1914) naval gun	45		45	1.7 at 10,000 yards	2,800	17,600	45	360
120-mm. (4.7 inches)	Model 38 (1905) 120-mm. Howitzer		Armor-piercing high explosive					-5 to +43	3
5 inches	Standard naval dual purpose gun	50		63	1.5 at 20,000 yards	2,900	21,000	85	360
150-mm. (5.9 inches)	Model 45 (1912) 150-mm. gun		Armor-piercing high explosive	101 89					
150-mm. (5.9 inches)	Unknown		Armor-piercing						
6 inches	Cruiser IWATE class naval gun	40	Armor-piercing	100	2.6 at 15,000 yards	2,800	14,000	20	360
6 inches	Battleship KONGO class naval gun	50	Armor-piercing	100	2.2 at 15,000 yards	2,300	18,000	20	360
6 inches	Mark VII British coast de- fense gun on Mark II mount			100		2,525	14,100		360
6 inches	Mark VII British coast de- fense gun on Mark III mount			100		2,500	15,000		360
6 inches	Mark VII British coast de- fense gun on Mark V mount			100		2,525	21,700		360
155-mm. (6.1 inches)	Schneider naval gun	50	Armor-piercing	123.5		2,854			
194-mm. (7.6 inches)	Unknown								
8 inches	Armstrong-Whitworth naval gun (1905)	45	Armor-piercing	254 (estimated)	7 at 5,000 yards		25,000 (estimated)	30	360
8 inches	Russian naval gun	45							
8 inches	Armstrong-Whitworth naval gun	40	Armor-piercing	254	2.5 at 20,000 yards	2,600	21,000	35	360
9.2 inches	British coast defense gun on Mark VII mount	45	Armor-piercing	380		2,825 (with super charge)	31,300 (with super charge)	35	360
9.2 inches	British coast defense gun on Mark V mount	45	Armor-piercing	380		2,700	19,300		265
240-mm. (9.4 inches)	Model 45 (1912 howitzer)	16.2	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive	440		1,300	11,300	+45 to +65	360
240-mm. (9.4 inches)	French gun, model of 1884 (believed to be a Canet gun), or Japanese copy	26	Armor-piercing				19,000	-5 to +38	20
10 inches	Russian naval gun	45	Armor-piercing		9.75 at 5,000 yards				
10 inches	Armstrong-Whitworth naval gun	45			10.5 at 5,000 yards				
270-mm. (10.6 inches)	Schneider 1893-96 gun	40	Armor-piercing	580		2,700	Over 20,000	25	
270-mm. (10.6 inches)	Schneider 1893 gun	45	Armor-piercing	579.1		2,600	26,000		
10.8 inches	Gun, unknown	40	Armor-piercing				24,000		
280-mm. (11 inches)	Japanese modification of Italian type howitzer						7,300	+45 to +65	360
305-mm. (12 inches)	30-cm. howitzer (short)	16.4	Armor-piercing	880		1,310	13,080		360
305-mm. (12 inches)	30-cm. howitzer (long)	24	Armor-piercing	880			16,570		360
12 inches	Japanese gun	45	Armor-piercing		16 at 5,000 yards				

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DEFENSES

Page XII - 7

TABLE XII - 3 Continued

CALIBER	IDENTIFICATION	LENGTH IN CALIBERS	SHELLS	WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE (POUNDS)	PENETRATION EFFECT (INCHES AT 90°)	MUZZLE VELOCITY (FEET PER SECOND)	MAXIMUM RANGE* (YARDS)	ELEVATION* (DEGREES)	TRA- VERSE** (DEGREES)
12 inches	English	40	Armor-piercing		12 at 5,000 yards				
14 inches	Battleship KONGO class naval gun	40	Armor-piercing	1,400	6.5 at 30,000 yards	2,600	32,000	35	360
16 inches	Battleship NAGATO class naval gun	45	Armor-piercing	2,200	10 at 30,000 yards	2,592	36,000	35	360

*Maximum elevations indicated for naval guns apply to ship mounts. The character of the land mounting would affect the maximum elevation and, consequently, the maximum range.

**The traverses of naval guns are limited by ship structure when mounted on ships, and by terrain only when mounted on land.

TABLE XII - 4

JAPANESE MOBILE ARTILLERY
February 1945

WEAPON	SHELLS	WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE (POUNDS)	MUZZLE VELOCITY (FEET PER SECOND)	RANGE (YARDS)	ELEVATION (DEGREES)	TRAVERSE (DEGREES)	DRAFT	WEIGHT IN FIRING POSITION (POUNDS)	WEIGHT IN TRAVELING POSITION (POUNDS)	RATE (ROUNDS PER MINUTE)
Model 98 (1938) 20-mm. AA ma- chine cannon	High explosive with tracer, self-destroying Armor-piercing with tracer	0.30 0.35	2,720	Horizontal 5,450 yards Effective ceiling 4,000 feet	-10 to +85	360	Horse	836 (without wheels)	865	120
Model 1 (1941) 47-mm. gun	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive	3.37 3.08	2,722 (armor-pier- cing high explosive)	3,900	-11 to +19	60	Motor truck	1,660	1,760	12
Model 88 (1928) 75-mm. AA gun	High explosive Shrapnel Illuminating High explosive pointed AA High explosive pointed	14.5	2,360	15,000 yards Effective ceiling 22,500 feet	- 5 to +85	360	Motor truck	5,400	6,000	10 to 15
Model 94 (1934) 75-mm. mountain gun	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive Shrapnel Smoke Incendiary Illuminating	14	1,300	8,800 yards	-10 to +45	40	Pack	1,200	1,100	10
Model 38 (1905) improved 75-mm. gun	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive Shrapnel Smoke	14	1,700	11,700 (with high explosive pointed)	- 8 to +43	7	Horse	2,400	4,200	10
Model 90 (1930) 75-mm. gun	Incendiary Illuminating High explosive pointed	14	2,230	15,000 (with high explosive pointed)	- 8 to +43	50	Tractor	3,500	4,400	10
Model 95 (1935) 75-mm. gun		14	1,700	11,700 (with high explosive pointed)	- 8 to +43	50	Horse	2,450	4,250	10
Model 92 (1932) 105-mm. gun	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive High explosive pointed Incendiary Shrapnel	35	2,500	20,000 (with high explosive pointed)	- 5 to +45	36	Tractor	8,200	9,600	6
Model 91 (1931) 105-mm. how- itzer		35	1,800	12,000	- 5 to +45	40	Horse	3,300	4,300	6
Model 99 (1939) 105-mm. Moun- tain gun	High explosive High explosive pointed	30		6,000 (with high explosive)		18	Horse or Pack	1,650	1,750	2 to 4
Model 96 (1936) 150-mm. howitzer	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive High explosive pointed Shrapnel Smoke Illuminating	70-80	1,800	12,000 (with high explosive pointed)	- 5 to +65	30	Tractor	9,100	11,000	3 to 4
Model 4 (1915) 150-mm. howitzer		70-80	1,300	9,500 (with high explosive)	- 5 to +65	6	Horse	6,100	2 loads heavier 4,850	3 to 4
Model 89 (1929) 150-mm. gun	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive High explosive pointed Shrapnel	80-100	2,500	20,000 (with high explosive)	- 5 to +43	40	Tractor	22,950	2 loads heavier 17,200	1 to 2
Model 45 (1912) 240-mm. howitzer	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive	440		11,300 (with armor-piercing high explosive)	- 2 to +65	360	Tractor	70,000	Heaviest load 14,500	1
Model 90 (1930) 240-mm. Schnei- der railway gun	High explosive Armor-piercing high explosive	440	3,560	55,775	0 to +50	360	Locomotive	292,000		

C. Antiaircraft artillery.

The following antiaircraft units have been located in Korea: 2 antiaircraft defense regiments with 16 or 24 Model 88 (1928) 75-mm. antiaircraft guns each; 1 independent antiaircraft defense battalion with 8 or 12 Model 88 (1928) 75-mm. antiaircraft guns; 1 independent antiaircraft artillery battalion with 8 or 12 Model 88 (1928) 75-mm. antiaircraft guns; and 2 independent antiaircraft artillery companies with 4 or 6 Model 88 (1928) 75-mm. antiaircraft guns each.

D. Railroad artillery.

The first 240-mm. Schneider railway gun was purchased by the Japanese in 1929. It is reported that 30 of these guns are now in the possession of the Japanese. While no Japanese railway guns are known to be in Korea, it is probably possible to operate this or a similar gun on the main railway lines in Korea. Detailed specifications of this gun are given in TABLE XII - 3.

E. Air warning system.

Details pertaining to the air defense system in Korea, Tsushima, and Quelpart are incomplete and fragmentary. Despite this, factual information is available to indicate that an air defense system similar to that in Japan proper has been established and has in operation an adequate warning system to detect approaching aircraft.

The use of airplane searches, radio search receivers, visual observers on land and in boats, and early warning radar, which is capable of detecting aircraft and surface vessels at a distance of 70 miles, enables the Japanese to detect approaching airplanes before they are over Korea or parts of Japan proper. Information pertaining to advance detection of Allied bombers is not available.

It is believed that a systematic airplane search is maintained off the southern and southeastern coasts of Korea presumably for the primary purpose of detecting surface vessels and submarines. These searches, which may extend as far as 100 and 200 miles out to sea, also afford possibilities of reporting aircraft.

Vedette and patrol boats are stationed some distance off the coast. These are, in many cases, equipped with radio to report their observations. Those not so equipped signal visually to nearby larger boats having radio equipment.

It is further believed that visual observation posts, supplemented in some cases by sound facilities, are spotted at various points for the purpose of reporting the presence of airplanes and surface vessels as soon as they are within visual or audible range.

Radar installations are known to be located on the island of Quelpart. The approximate locations of these are shown on FIGURE XII - 5.

Reports received by way of the various air warning facilities are promptly broadcast through the Headquarters of the Chinkai (Chinkai) Guard District to various points within the Japanese Empire, including the War and Navy Ministries in Tokyo. The communications network available to the Japanese armed forces is very good. (A-2)

F. Air raid precautions.**(1) Organization.**

The Air Defense Headquarters, attached to the Home Ministry, is the central body supervising civilian defense activities, establishing policy, and conducting research in air raid precaution problems. It is headed by the Home Minister of Japan and includes representatives of other ministries. Members of the Home Ministry's Police Bureau hold important positions in the Headquarters, and the police in general are charged with the immediate supervision of air raid precaution functions as they are performed by the Neighborhood Associations (Tonari-gumi) and by various volunteer groups.

(2) Police.

It is probable that a new police unit, the *Keibitai*, similar to that formed in Japan proper in April 1944 has been established for the maintenance of peace and order during emergencies. These police were not to engage in ordinary police administration business but to undergo special training on military lines. It is reported that the National Defense Association maintains a training institute at Kyongsong (Keijō) where such training is being conducted.

(3) Neighborhood associations (Tonari-gumi).

Neighborhood associations, of which everyone is a member, have been established. The members of these act as air raid wardens and are trained in fire fighting and first aid. Their activities have been largely in the hands of women, but it is now believed that men have been urged to take a larger part in neighborhood air raid activities.

(4) Warning.

Sirens are used, but the population has been warned to expect alarms by bells, flags, and signal light as well. There are three sirens signals: alert, air raid, and all clear, the first and last being similar. There is also provision for warning by local wardens, who shout the warning and all clear through megaphones. Gas mains are to be turned off as soon as the alert sounds and the use of telephones by the general public is prohibited for five hours after the all clear.

(5) Blackouts.

Blackouts are known to have been practiced for a number of years. (A-1) No information is available as to the extent of their perfection.

(6) Shelters.

Information as to what provisions have been made for air raid shelters is very meager. There is a small number of modern buildings in the more important towns of Korea capable of affording effective shelters. The only other reported shelter is of the trench type. (A-2)

(7) Fire control.

Fire control has been recognized by the Japanese Government as a major problem in the event of air raids. Information on actual procedure is scattered and incomplete.

To make sufficient water available, a number of underground reservoirs have been built in important centers as preparation for air raids. An important measure aimed at preventing the spread of fire has been the prohibition of the construction

of houses with straw roofs and the erection of any buildings at all in certain areas. (A-1)

The air defense system in Korea, Tsushima, and Quelpart is believed to be far from complete. This is predicated upon the assumption that the Japanese armed forces believe that all large-scale Allied air attacks will be directed against the important and strategic areas in Japan proper for some time to come. It is further believed that the native Koreans are reluctant to give wholehearted cooperation in carrying out their duties.

124. Potential Defense Areas

A. General.

(FIGURE XII - 5)

Several coastal areas not listed in Topic 123 as fortified are believed suitable for operations against strategically important inland areas. For this reason these areas may have coastal defenses or may be provided with them in the future.

In addition to the anti-aircraft defenses shown in Topic 123, similar installations probably exist in other areas which contain important airfields, ports, and industries.

B. Potential fortified areas.

The potential fortified areas are listed below and are shown on FIGURE XII - 5.

(1) Taedasa-do (Daitasa-tō, Tashitō).

This growing industrial area commanding the mouth of the Yalu River, contains an important newly developed port, munitions plants, and an airfield. (A-2)

(2) Haeju (Kaishū).

This area contains a large explosives plant, a cement plant, an airfield, and port facilities. (A-2)

(3) Kunsan (Gunzan).

This area includes a potential landing beach in the vicinity of a strategic railroad junction as well as an airport. (B-2)

(4) Ulsan-man (Urusan-wan).

Landings on the beach in this area would by-pass the heavy fortifications of Pusan (Fusan) and would make possible an enveloping movement toward Pusan and Chinhai (Chinkai). The east coast railroad line is only a few miles from the coast in the area. An airfield is located here. (B-2)

(5) Yongil-man (Geijitsu-wan).

At the head of this bay there is a potential landing beach in close proximity to a rail center on the coastal railroad. (B-2)

(6) Changjon (Chōsen).

This area contains port facilities and a potential landing beach. The coastal railway leading to the important port of Wonsan (Genzan), about 48 miles northwest, runs very near the sea at this point. (A-2)

(7) Hambung-man (Kankō-wan).

Landings along the beach in this area would permit a direct approach to the important industrial district centering in Hungnam (Kōnan). The port of Wonsan is 45 miles to the south. (B-2)

(8) Iwon Anchorage (Rigen Hakuchi).

The area at the head Iwon Anchorage (Roadstead) presents a potential landing beach between the important centers of Hungnam (Kōnan) and Songjin (Jōshin). Both the coastal railway and a first-class road at least 24 feet wide run very near the shore here. (B-2)

(9) Immyong-bae (Rimmei-kai).

A potential landing beach is located at the northern head of this bay. Objectives in a landing here would be the port facilities of Songjin, the coastal railway which runs through the city of Songjin, and the first-class highway running south to Hamhung (Kankō) and Wonsan and north to Nanam (Ranan), Ch'ongjin (Seishin), and Najin (Rashin). (B-2)

(10) Kidong-man (Kido-wan).

This area includes a number of small potential landing beaches which would permit direct approach to the important ports of Ch'ongjin and Najin. (B-2)

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FIGURE XII - 1
Japanese Army Dispositions
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




FIGURE XII - 2
Supply Installations and Ports
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






FIGURE XII-5
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