PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE MUNITIONS INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST CHINA



CIA/RR PR-131 30 December 1955

01987

10-16-79

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS



WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE MUNITIONS INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

CIA/RR PR-131
(ORR Project 31.484)

NOTICE

The data and conclusions contained in this report do not necessarily represent the final position of ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and subject to revision. Comments and additional data which may be available to the user are solicited.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

S-E-C-R-E-T

FOREWORD

This report appraises the current status of the arsenals used for the production of munitions in Communist China.* The report uses no information dated before 1949 unless the data indicate that the Chinese Communists either already controlled the arsenals before 1949 or captured the arsenals intact from the Chinese Nationalists and are still using them.

The report divides currently producing arsenals into the categories of major arsenals and minor arsenals. Major arsenals or complexes of arsenals are those in which the production of finished end items constitutes a major contribution to the total munitions requirements of Communist China. Minor arsenals are those units which produce limited quantities of end items or component parts. Only those arsenals which are believed to be in production at the present time are discussed in this report.

The quantitative estimates of capacity (both total capacity and that of individual arsenals) contain the inherent qualitative weaknesses of the many reports of varying reliability from which they have been derived.

Data on the arsenals of Communist China have been compiled by the Department of the Army, G-2; Armed Forces, Far East, G-2; 25X1X7

These listings for the most part are based on the same information which was available to CIA and were not used as confirmation.

25X1X7

- iii -

^{*} Only arsenals used for the production of land munitions have been included in this report.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONTENTS

																	Page
Sum	mary			•			•		•	•	•	•	•			•	1
I.	Develop	ment since	1949	•			•		•	•	•	•	•			•	2
II.	Adminis	trative Co	ntrol	•			•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•	3
III.	Product	ion		•			•		•	•	•	•	• •		•	•	4
	B. Mine	or Arsenals or Arsenals onfirmed In imated Capa	s nstalla		ons		•		•		•					•	4 5 5
	Am E. Est	munition . imated Cape tribution o	acity:	for	the	 Pr	odu	 cti	on	of		eaj	oor	ıs			6 7 9
IV.	Estimat	ed Labor Fo	orce .	•			•	• •	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	11
٧.	Capabil	ities, Vul	ner a bil	Liti	les,	an	d I	nte	nti	lon	ເຮ	•	• •	•	•	٠	12
				Apr	end	ixe	s										
App	endix A.	Types of China .								mm.	un •	isi	t • •		•	•	15
App	endix B.	Arsenals	in Cor	nmur	nist	Ch	ina	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	17
App	endix C.	Methodolo	ery .				•		•	•	•						55
Appe	endix D.	Gaps in I	[ntell:	lger	ice		•				•	•		•	•	•	59
Δηη	endix E.	Source Re	eferenc	es.	_												61

- v -

S-E-C-R-E-T

		Page
	Tables	
1.	Estimated Monthly Capacity for the Production of Ammunition in Communist China, 1952	6
2.	Estimated Monthly Capacity for the Production of Weapons in Communist China, 1952	8
3•	Percentage Distribution of Installations for the Production of Ammunition and Weapons in Communist China, by Geographic Area	10
4.	Distribution of the Estimated Labor Force of the Munitions Industry of Communist China, by Geographic Area	11
5.	Major Arsenals in Communist China	19
6.	Minor Arsenals in Communist China	31
7.	Estimated Monthly Capacity for the Production of Ammunition in the Mukden Arsenal Complex in Communist China, 1948	56
	<u>Map</u>	
Com	munist China: Armament Production Facilities	Inside

- vi -

CIA/RR PR 131 (ORR Project 31.484) S-E-C-R-E-T

THE MUNITIONS INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST CHINA*

Summary

The munitions industry** of Communist China is estimated to include 12 major arsenals and 58 minor arsenals. The 3 most important centers for the production of munitions are Mukden (Shen-yang), with 2 major arsenals and 1 minor arsenal; Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing), with 3 major arsenals and 4 minor arsenals; and T'ai-yuan, with 1 major arsenal and 1 minor arsenal.

Chinese Communist control of the munitions industry has been characterized by a consolidation of arsenals and a possible shift of production emphasis from Manchuria to other areas of China. Reports of new construction and of the expansion of old arsenals during 1951-54 indicate not only that the Chinese Communists are tending to locate arsenals in new locations but also that the Chinese Communist capacity to produce ammunition and light weapons has increased considerably since 1949-50.

Despite the development of new arsenals, Communist China is not self-sufficient in the production of munitions. Although the production of certain types of ammunition is estimated to be more than sufficient for training requirements, the arsenals of China, which have a monthly capacity of about 5,400 short tons*** of ammunition and an estimated annual capacity of between 60,000 and 80,000 tons of ammunition, currently cannot supply all the wartime ammunition requirements of China.

The production of small arms, machine guns, light mortars and light artillery, and special weapons such as rocket launchers and recoilless rifles in Communist China is considered adequate to maintain the necessary levels of equipment even during wartime. The Chinese Communist arsenals, however, cannot provide the heavy weapons

^{*} The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 September 1955.

^{**} The term munitions industry, for the purposes of this report, includes the production of both ammunition and weapons.

*** Tonnages throughout this report are given in short tons.

S-E-C-R-E-T

such as antiaircraft artillery, medium and heavy artillery, or armored fighting vehicles needed to equip the Chinese Communist armies and must import these weapons from other nations in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

The estimated labor force used in the munitions industry of Communist China ranges from 210,000 to 250,000. Over 1,000 Soviet and other foreign engineers and technicians also aid in the production of munitions in China. This technical aid has been instrumental in building up the capacity of the industry. The other members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc have also provided equipment and the raw materials necessary for the expanded production of munitions.

I. Development since 1949.

From the end of World War II until the evacuation of the mainland of Communist China by the Chinese Nationalists in 1949, 20 to 25 government arsenals produced almost all the Chinese Nationalist munitions. Four of these arsenals were removed to Taiwan; the remainder form the basis for the present munitions industry of Communist China. 1/* The three major munitions-producing complexes at Mukden, Chungking, and T'ai-yuan were captured by the Chinese Communists practically intact with only slight destruction by the retreating Chinese Nationalists to several of the Chungking arsenals. 2/

Not only were machinery and arsenal facilities left relatively intact but also about 95 percent of the skilled labor remained on the mainland of Communist China. The skilled labor and technicians have received further training from Soviet and German engineers sent to China by the USSR. $\underline{3}/$

In addition to the arsenals captured from the Chinese Nationalists in 1949, Chinese Communists held 28 arsenals in Manchuria and 15 in northern China** before 1949. The total production of these arsenals was significant in meeting the Chinese Communist needs, but the production of no one arsenal in itself was significant. $\underline{4}/$

^{*} For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E. ** For geographic areas of Communist China as referred to in this report, see the map, inside back cover.

S-E-C-R-E-T

The production of the arsenals was limited by obsolescent machine tools and by the lack of brass-rolling and extrusion equipment as well as by shortages of explosives and copper. In addition, Chinese Communist production was initially limited by transportation and labor problems. 5/

In reorganizing the munitions industry, the Chinese Communists were dependent upon the Soviet Bloc for imports of machine tools, metalworking equipment, and raw materials as well as for technical advice and assistance. Numerous plant reports indicate the introduction of Soviet equipment into various arsenals throughout Communist China. Soviet and/or Satellite advisers and technicians were used in the arsenals, and Soviet experts made an over-all inspection of arsenals to discover and correct discrepancies. The inspection appears to be a part of the Soviet program to aid in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of important arsenals. 6/

Under Chinese Communist administration, the number of small arsenals of workshop size decreased either through the consolidations of small arsenals, the absorption of small arsenals by larger ones, or the conversion of arsenals to nonmilitary production. Under the Chinese Communist regime, the production of munitions has been characterized by specialization in a limited number of weapons and calibers of ammunition.*

II. Administrative Control.

During 1952 the munitions industry of Communist China was placed under the control of the Second Ministry of Machine Industry, one of the economic ministries established as part of the governmental reorganization. 7/ Later reports indicated that in the government reorganization of 21 September 1954 the Second Ministry of Machine Industry was placed administratively in the State Council but under the operational supervision of the National Planning Commission. In this manner, arsenals were placed under the direct control of the central government. Apparently concomitant with this reorganization was a redesignation of the arsenals according to a three-digit system. 8/ Three-digit designations, however, have been identified with only a few specific arsenals.

^{*} For a list of the types of munitions being currently produced, see Appendix A.

S-E-C-R-E-T

III. Production.*

A. Major Arsenals.**

Communist China has an estimated 12 major arsenals with the largest concentrations of arsenals in the Mukden and Chungking areas. The Mukden Arsenal complex in Manchuria, which includes the arsenals in the Ta-tung district and in Wen-kuan-t'un, is still considered the largest arsenal complex in China. It is capable of producing the entire range of weapons and ammunition currently produced in China.***

The Mukden Arsenal complex contains about 50 percent of the artillery and small-arms production capacity and about 15 percent of the total estimated ammunition production capacity of China.

The arsenals in Chungking produce small arms (carbines or sub-machine guns), recoilless rifles, machine guns, and mortars as well as ammunition for these weapons and for artillery pieces.

T'ai-yuan is the only major arsenal complex in northern China. The production of the complex includes artillery ammunition, machine guns, mortars and artillery, and possibly small arms ammunition.

Dairen (Ta-lien), in northeastern China, contains about 10 percent of the total ammunition production capacity of Communist China and probably ranks second to Mukden.

The two major arsenals of eastern China are the Ch'in-ling Arsenal in Nanking and the Tsinan (Chi-nan) Arsenal complex. The Ch'in-ling Arsenal produces mortar and small arms ammunition, hand grenades, machine guns, and mortars. The Tsinan Arsenal complex is reported to produce mortar fuses, mines, grenades, small arms, and mortars, although the rate of production of these items is not reported.

The Shih-ching Arsenal in Canton and the Wu-han Arsenal complex of arsenals in central and southern China produce small arms, light machine guns, mortars, light artillery pieces, grenades, fuses, and ammunition for mortars and small arms.

- 4 -

^{*} See the map, inside back cover, and Table 5, p. 19, below.

^{**} Major arsenals or complexes are those in which the production of finished end items constitutes a major contribution to total national munitions requirements.

^{***} For a list of weapons and ammunition, see Appendix A.

S-E-C-R-E-T

The arsenal in K'un-ming in southwestern China is considered to be a major arsenal because it is the major producer of optical fire-control equipment and also produces light machine guns.

B. Minor Arsenals.*

An estimated 58 minor arsenals currently are producing weapons and ammunition in Communist China. The minor arsenals are of considerable significance in the production of ammunition. The minor arsenals of northeastern China have the capacity to produce about 75 percent of the mortar ammunition, about 80 percent of the small arms rounds, and about 80 percent of the hand grenades produced in the area. The minor arsenals of eastern China and central and southern China have the capacity to produce more artillery ammunition and hand grenades as well as bombs, fuses, mines, torpedoes, and depth charges than do the major arsenals in these areas. In the production of weapons, however, the minor arsenals are of less over-all importance than the major arsenals.

C. Unconfirmed Installations.

The multitude of intelligence reports which suggest a great number of small arsenals or plants which produce or at some time have produced military end items tend to present a distorted picture of the munitions industry of Communist China. Installations are often erroneously reported. Some installations may have existed under the Chinese Nationalists or may still be producing simple military end items for the security forces. The installations which possibly exist provide a potential source of additional supply in times of heavy need.

The following four criteria were used to determine which of the many minor arsenals probably no longer contribute to the total production of arms and ammunition.

1. The absence of sufficient information to present a case; the presence of only one report of doubtful reliability not verified by other sources. In this category fall the majority of arsenals which have been dropped from the lists of accepted major and minor munitions-producing arsenals.

^{*} See the map, inside back cover, and Table 6, p. 31, below.

S-E-C-R-E-T

- 2. The absence of recent information -- that is, information after 1949 or the time that the Chinese Communists captured particular arsenals.
- 3. The presence of some positive indication that the production of weapons and/or ammunition has been discontinued in specific arsenals.
- 4. The presence of definite information that certain installations, which are called arsenals, do not produce arms or ammunition but only repair or store munitions. Also in this category are chemical- and explosives-producing plants which are not definitely identified as ammunition-producing plants.

D. Estimated Capacity for the Production of Ammunition.*

The monthly capacity of the major and minor arsenals in Communist China to produce ammunition is given in Table 1. The estimate of capacity is based on the summary of available production figures as given in Appendix B.

Table 1

Estimated Monthly Capacity for the Production of Ammunition in Communist China 1952

	Short Tons
Type of Ammunition	Monthly Capacity
Artillery Mortar Small arms Grenades	1,100 1,000 1,700 1,600
Total	5,400

^{*} For methodology, see Appendix C.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Estimates of production for individual arsenals on which this estimated minimum capacity is based vary in date from 1948 to 1953. An examination of prevailing conditions in the munitions industry of Communist China during 1948-53 indicates that the estimate might best be applied to production capacity during 1952. Because 1949 was a year of war during which the Chinese Communists drove the Chinese Nationalists from the mainland, conditions were unsettled, and production was interrupted. Much of the construction activity in the munitions industry, which was reported during 1950 and 1951, consisted of rehabilitating installations, training personnel, centralizing control under the Communist regime, and preparing for production to meet military requirements in North Korea. With the many problems encountered in rehabilitation, it is doubtful if the estimated production capacity was attained by the Chinese Communists until 1952.

Estimates of the annual production capacity of the munitions industry of Communist China, based on monthly capacity figures (see Table 1*), range from a minimum of 60,000 tons to a maximum of about 80,000 tons. This upper limit would include the unreported capacity of new arsenals and the capacity to produce mines and bombs for which no estimates of production are made.

E. Estimated Capacity for the Production of Weapons.

The estimated monthly capacity of the major and minor arsenals in Communist China to produce weapons is given in Table 2.** The estimate of capacity is based on the summary of reported production rates as given in Appendix B. The dates of information on which these reports were based range from 1948 to 1952. The estimated monthly capacity in Table 2 most closely represents the production capacity of the Chinese Communists during 1952.

A number of major and minor arsenals are reported to be producing one or more of the types of weapons for which quantitative estimates of production rates are not available, thus making an estimate of the capacity of these arsenals difficult. Certain tentative conclusions can be drawn, however, concerning the magnitude of this additional capacity on the basis of analogical comparisons of certain of the important arsenals in the group.*** The capacity to produce

^{*} P. 6, above.

^{**} Table 2 follows on p. 8.

^{***} For methodology, see Appendix C.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 2

Estimated Monthly Capacity for the Production of Weapons in Communist China 1952

	Units
Type of Weapon	Monthly Capacity
Artillery Mortars Machine guns Small arms Special weapons	60 2,300 1,700 24,000
Rocket launchers Recoilless rifles	1,800 220

weapons, as given in Table 2, could possibly be increased by the following amounts: artillery, 100 percent; mortars, about 30 percent; machine guns, about 40 percent; and small arms, about 70 percent.

The Chinese Communist capacity to produce artillery and mortars is centered in the major arsenals -- 10 of the 16 reported producers are major arsenals. Facilities at one or another of the major arsenals are adequate for the production of all calibers of artillery pieces although no reliable reports have indicated that artillery larger than 76.2 millimeters (mm) is being produced by the Chinese Communists. Mortars ranging in size up to 120 mm are believed to be in production.

Machine guns are reported to be in production at 6 major and 8 minor arsenals.* No machine guns made in Communist China have yet been recovered among the enemy weapons captured in Korea. Light and heavy machine guns, however, were produced by the Chinese Nationalist arsenals. The capacity to produce machine guns still exists, and it is believed that the Chinese Communists now are producing machine guns copied after Soviet models.

^{*} See Appendix B.

S-E-C-R-E-T

-25X1B4d

In the field of small arms, production has been concentrated on submachine guns, Type 50, which are modeled after the Soviet PPSh 1941 submachine gun. has indicated a production of approximately 150,000 of these weapons in 1952 at Arsenal 626 in Mukden alone. 9/ Since then, production has been reported at the former 21st Arsenal in Chungking. 10/ Other small arms for which Chinese Communist production in 1951 has been verified

25X1B4d

25X1B4d

include the 7.62-mm pistol, Type 51, and the 26.7-mm flare pistol, Type 51, both copies of Soviet weapons. 11/

Five major and 18 minor arsenals in Communist China can produce small arms. The minor arsenals have about 50 percent of the total Chinese Communist capacity to produce small arms. The reported construction of 4 new arsenals and the expansion of 1 existing arsenal for the production of small arms alone* indicate that the Chinese Communists are increasing their capacity to produce small arms.

25X1B4d

Capacity for the production of 57-mm recoilless rifles at a rate of about 220 pieces** per month at Chungking and capacity for the production of 90-mm rocket launchers at a rate of about 1,800 pieces*** at 2 arsenals in northeastern China have been estimated on No expansion of production of these weapons has been indicated. Requirements for the 57-mm recoilless rifle and the 90-mm rocket launcher are so low as to lead to the conclusion that these items are now out of production, with the 75-mm recoilless rifle and the 132-mm rocket launcher taking their place. 13/

F. Distribution of Installations.

The percentage distribution of installations for the production of ammunition and weapons in Communist China by geographic areas is given in Table 3.**** For the most part, this distribution of installations is representative of the distribution of production. The capacity, however,

- 9 -

^{*} A description of the new construction is given in Table 6, p. 31, below. See the discussion of the former 25th Military Factory in Harbin and of the facilities in Ch'ang-chih, Wu-ch'ang-hsien, Fenghsiang, and Fu-shih.

^{**} The production for the month of January 1952. 1951 production reached a high of 469 pieces in September and totaled about 2,000 pieces for the year.

^{***} The highest rate of production for 1 out of 4 months in 1951.
**** Table 3 follows on p. 10.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 3

Percentage Distribution of Installations for the Production of Ammunition and Weapons in Communist China by Geographic Area $\underline{a}/$

		Po	ercent
	Ins	stallations	
Geographic Area	Ammunition	Weapons	New
Northeastern China Inner Mongolia Northern China Eastern China Central and southern China Southwestern China Northwestern China	35 Negligible 8 16 22 14 5	26 Negligible 11 8 26 16	7 0 13 20 30 0 30

a. The data in this table are a summary of the data in Appendix B.

of the 5 arsenals in southwestern China, an area which includes Chungking and K'un-ming, is considerably more significant than that of the 5 minor arsenals in northwestern China. In addition, the capacity of the two major arsenals at Mukden makes northeastern China a more significant area of production than central and southern China, with its less important major arsenals at Wu-han and Canton (Kuang-chou).

Reports of new construction and the expansion of existing installations during 1951-54 indicate a possible change in their distribution (see Table 3). The location of new arsenals indicates a de-emphasis of the major production areas of Manchuria and Chungking and a possible attempt to provide all significant areas with a base for the supply of munitions -- at least of small arms and ammunition.

S-E-C-R-E-T

IV. Estimated Labor Force.

Analysis of estimates of the labor force of all major arsenals and of about 66 percent of the minor arsenals indicates that the minimum labor force employed in the arsenals of Communist China totals about 212,000. This estimate is considered a minimum figure because no reported labor figures are available for 21 minor arsenals. The total labor force for these 21 minor arsenals is estimated at about 40,000 on the basis of a rough average derived from the reported figures for 37 of the minor arsenals.

A distribution of the estimated labor force of the munitions industry of Communist China by geographic area is given in Table 4.

Table 4

Distribution of the Estimated Labor Force of the Munitions Industry of Communist China by Geographic Area a/

Geographic Area	Reported Labor Force	Distribution of Total (Percent)
Northeastern China Inner Mongolia Northern China Eastern China Central and southern China Southwestern China Northwestern China	98,000 Negligible 16,000 25,000 29,000 40,000 3,500	46 Negligible 8 12 13 19
Total	211,500	100

a. Based on reports given in Appendix B.

About 1,000 Soviet and European technicians are reported to be working in the major and minor arsenals of Communist China.* The

- 11 -

^{*} Reported information of foreign technicians working in Chinese Communist arsenals is given in Appendix B.

S-E-C-R-E-T

presence of Soviet and European technicians in the geographic areas of China loosely parallels the pattern of arsenal construction and expansion and might be related to this pattern.

During the Korean War, and to a lesser degree during the war in Indochina, many arsenals were operating on a three-shift basis. The existence of this practice at present is unknown. Correlations between the estimated labor force or the number of shifts in operation and possible increases in capacity therefore have not been drawn.

V. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.

The munitions industry of Communist China produces a supply of munitions which is more than adequate for training purposes. The Chinese Communists also are considered capable of maintaining wartime levels of infantry-type weapons such as small arms, machine guns, light mortars and light artillery, rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles.

The Chinese Communists must import ammunition for the following weapons:

152-mm howitzer and self-propelled gun

122-mm howitzer

85-mm antiaircraft and tank gun

76-mm self-propelled gun

12.7-mm antiaircraft machine gun

7.62-mm aircraft machine gun

23-mm aircraft cannon

These items of ammunition are needed for weapons which are now included in the Chinese Communist tables of equipment. Peacetime as well as wartime requirements must be imported from the USSR. $\underline{14}/$

The extent to which the munitions industry of Communist China is unable to supply the wartime requirements of the Chinese Communist military forces is indicated by a comparison of the estimated capacity of the industry in 1952 with the wartime ammunition requirements of that year. The Chinese Communist forces in China and North Korea not only required the capacity production of 60,000 tons of ammunition in 1952 but also had to import 110,000 tons of ammunition from the USSR. 15/The supply of ammunition from the badly damaged North Korean plants was negligible. 16/

- 12 **-**

S-E-C-R-E-T

The ammunition industry of Communist China would have to increase its 1952 production by about 110,000 tons to attain self-sufficiency, or an increase over estimated 1952 capacity of about 180 percent. Such increased production would have to include all imported items for which the Chinese Communists were completely dependent upon the USSR. During 1952-55, out of a total of 58 arsenals producing ammunition, 9 were new arsenals and an additional 6 arsenals reportedly were expanded. Although specific quantity increases cannot be estimated, the annual increase in the production capacity of military end items during 1952-55 has been estimated at 15 percent. 17/ At such a rate of increase China will remain dependent upon Soviet imports for wartime requirements of ammunition for some time to come.

Arsenals producing weapons in Communist China are capable of producing any of the required types of small arms, light artillery, mortars, and machine guns as well as such simple weapons as the recoilless rifle and the rocket launcher. The arsenals have the capacity, at present, to provide both the peacetime and the wartime requirements of light infantry weapons to the Chinese Communist military forces.

Large quantities of rifles, machine guns, mortars (except the 60-mm mortars), antiaircraft artillery, artillery, and armored fighting vehicles were imported from the Soviet Bloc during the Korean War by the Chinese Communists. The construction of new arsenals and the expansion of old arsenals since 1951 indicate that there has been a buildup of facilities for the production of basic infantry weapons. There is no reliable indication of the production of medium or heavy artillery or antiaircraft guns. Chinese installations are not considered capable of producing armored fighting vehicles. Armored cars and armored trucks have been reported as produced in small numbers, but the level of production is not considered an indication of a significant capacity to produced armored fighting vehicles. For the present, Communist China remains dependent upon the Soviet Bloc for all heavy weapons.

The munitions industry of Communist China also depends upon the Soviet Bloc for machine tools, technical assistance, and imports of raw materials such as copper, alloy steels, and explosives. The hope for a quick and easy industrialization has been shattered by the realization that Soviet economic aid would be largely limited by the extent to which Communist China could pay for such aid. 18/

It is anticipated that the munitions industry of Communist China eventually will be self-sufficient in terms of military end items as the installations necessary for the production of more complicated armaments become available.

- 13 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX A

TYPES OF MUNITIONS PRODUCED IN COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Ammunition.

Grenades (hand and rifle).

Antitank hand grenades.

Bombs.

Land mines.

7.62-mm submachine gun rounds.

7.62/79-mm rifle, light machine gun and heavy machine gun rounds.

57-mm recoilless rifle shells.

90-mm rockets.

60-mm mortar shells.

81- and 82-mm mortar shells.

120-mm mortar shells.

37-mm antitank gun shells.

57-mm antitank gun shells.

70-mm infantry howitzer shells.

75-mm gun shells.

76.2-mm howitzer shells.

105-mm howitzer shells.

2. Weapons.

7.62-mm pistol, Type 51.*

7.62-mm submachine gun, Type 50.*

26.7-mm flare pistol, Type 51.

60-mm mortar.*

82-mm mortar.

120-mm mortar.

Machine gun (light).

Machine gun (heavy).

57-mm recoilless rifle, Type 36.*

90-mm rocket launcher, Type 51.*

70-mm howitzer, Type 92.*

76.2-mm howitzer.

25X1B4d

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX B

ARSENALS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

S-E-C-R-E-T

Major Arsenals in Communist China

Estimated Monthly Capacity

Date of Information

Mikden (Shen-yang)
(1,1048) N - 123027' E)
Ta-tung District of Mikden
and Wen-kuan-t'un
Liaoning Northeastern China * Footnotes for Table 5 follow on p. 29. Mukden (Shen-yang) (41°48' N - 123°27' E) Ta-tung District of Mukden Ta-tung 90th Arsenal (main) 51st and 54th Arsenals 626th Arsenal Midden Arsenal complex (see Ta-tung and Wen-knan-t'un branches, below, for all entries except consolidated production estimate). 15,000 workers on three 8-hour shifts (1951) c/ Estimated Labor Force Ammanition:
Smell arms rounds
Mortar shells
Mortar shells
Artillery shells
Ind grenades
Dand grenades
Swells
Smell arms
Meagons:
Smell arms
Mortars
Mortars
Light artillery
Miscellaneous:
Conversion of trucks to
armored vehicles
Repair of weapons Ammunition:
All types
Wespons:
7.62-mm submachine gun,
Type 50 Item 15,000 pieces b/ 700 short tons a/* Quantity The main arsenal is located in the Ta-tung district of Makken. It is not as large in area and has fewer unlidings than the Men-Mann-thun branch. All explosive filling is done in a branch to the east of the city in the Tung-ling Hills. Piece work on small parts, such as those used in hand greendes, is done in sall workshops in the vicinity of the main arsenal. all of the weapons listed under produced all of the weapons listed under production for the The tung and Men-Aman-t'un assembles. Reports indicating the production of antidatroraft artillizery and artillary shower for mrequire verification, and until such verification is obtained, it is assumed that such reports have confused repair work with actual production. Production figures for weapons other than submachine gans camore the determined with any degree of accuracy. Following Merch 1925 the production of submachine gans averaged roughly 15,000 per month.

. 19 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

March 1948 to January 1954

Major Arsenals in Communist China (Continued)

Dairen (78-11en) (38'55' N - 121'35' E) Fort Arthur Maval Base area	Minken (Sher-Yang) (A) Wo W - 129°27' E) One kilometer east of the railroad station in Wen- kuan-t'un	Location Northeastern China
Chien-hein combine Yu-hua Arsenal Pairen Rall-road Works (82-mm morter casings) Pairen Calcium Carbonake Manufacturing Company (75-mm shell casings) Dairen Chemical Arsenal Kosho Arsenal (fuses) Chien-hain Steel Works (shell heads and brass plate, steel rods) Pairen Machine Manufacturing Plant (artillery and mortar shells)	Wen-kuan-t'un 90th Branch 52d Arsenal	Identification
5,000 e/ 500 e/ 1,000 e/	30,000 to 40,000 workers on three 8-hour shifts 7 days a week Includes Soviet technicities Soviet decima and 80viet drafting engineers d	Estimated Labor Force
Ammunition: 75-mm artillery shells 86-mm artillery shells Hand grenades Hifle shells Artillery fuses Shell heads Miscellaneous: 82-mm mortar casings Gan cotton TMT Piorio acid Dynamite Cordite Mercury fulminate Beruss plates and disks for use In shells In shells High-speed steel rods	Ammunition: Smell arms rounds Mortar shells Artillery shells Hand grenades Weapons: Smell arms Machine guns (heavy) Mortars Rocket launchers Light artillery Miscellameous: Repair of weapons	Estimated Monthly Capacity Ttem Q
100 tons e/ 20,000 units e/ 400 tons e/ 105 tons e/ 115 tons e/ 30 tons e/ 3 tons e/		ly Capacity Quantity
The Chien-hain combine was formed to administer a number of industrial enterprises turned over to the Chieses Communists by the Russians in June 1947. A munitions trust holding company consists of at least seven plants. The 17-mm shell casings are sent to Vi-hua Arsend for filling from the Dairen Calcium Carbonate Manufacturing Company. The Dairen Chemical Arsenal for filling from the Dairen Calcium Carbonate Manufacturing Company. The Bairen Chemical Arsenal for eithing from the equipment from Liao-yang; it is the chief source of supply of explosives for the Vi-hua Arsenal. The Chien-hain Steel Works supplied all steel rods and bruss plates to the Wi-hua Arsenal. The Dairen Machine Manufacturing Flant was prepared for conversion project was acheduled for completion in December 1952.	The area is about 8 square miles. Several hundred workers' quarters, mostly one-story red brick buildings are located to the vestern part of the aresnal area. Plant No. 2 is located to the east of theid gams. Plant No. 4; located to the east of fleat gams. Plant No. 4; located to the east of Plant No. 2, produced Soviet-type small arms, mechine gams, and mortars. Plant No. 3 and mechine gams, and mortars. Plant No. 3 on stern east of Plant No. 4; in the eastern extremity of the arsenal area, produced arthirty pieces and ammnition. During buly 1991 there was additional construction of buildings, and damage done by the Chinese Mationalists was largely repaired.	Remarks
1948 to 1949	November 1948 to March 1952	Dete of Information

Table 5
Major Arsenals in Communist China
(Continued)

			Estimated Monthly	Capacity		
Location	Identification	Estimated Labor Force	Item-	Quantity	Remarks	Date of Information
Worthern China						
T'ai-yuan (37 ⁰ 52' N - 112 ⁰ 33' E) Shansi	Tisi-yuan Arsenal Joth Arsenal or Bactory Wolk Tisi-yuan Mamufacturing Plant Northwest Mamufacturing Plant	10,000 (1953) <u>f</u> / 2 shifts	Ammunition: Artillery shells Small arms rounds Weapons: Field guns Machine guns (light and heavy)	90,000 rounds g/ 50 pieces g/ 260 pieces g/	The Tial-yuan Arsenal complex includes installa- tions located within the city wall as well as the main arsenal to the north of the city. The Northwest Chemical Norwis, listed separately, is probably connected in some way with the Tail-yuan Arsenal. The arrenal reportedly located at Risi-ming-ts un probably is the main armenal north of the city.	April 1949 to August 1953
Eastern China						
Nanching (Nan-ching) (32°03' N - 118°47' E) Kiangeu	Former 60th Arsenal Ch'in-ling Arsenal	2,000 <u>h</u> /	Assumition: Band gremades Small arms rounds Mortar shells Weapons: Machine guns (heavy) Miffles (probably repair and robullding) Mortars	100,000 units 1/ 12,000,000 rounds 1/ 100,000 rounds 1/ 200 pieces 1/ 1,000 pieces 1/ 1,200 pieces 1/ 1,000 pieces 1/	The arsenal area is about 1,950 x 1,350 feet. The Chinese Nationalists removed the 60th Arsenal to Formson, but information in May 1956 stated that the arsenal had been completely to the control of the	1949 to May 1952
Teinan (Chi-nan) (36°40' N - 117°00' E) Sbantung	Tsinan Arsenal complex includes: former MM With Arsenal and lat Arsenal. Estion and Arsenal, southwest section section as a continuous and a continuous action as a continuous action as a continuous action of the city of the city and a complex in the ci	2,800 g/ (This is be- lieved to include at least three plants)	Ammunition: Bond greender Land mines Small arms rounds Wotor fuses Wespons: Small arms 60-sm mortars Miscellawds Sepain of weapons	30,000 units j/ 1,500 to 2,500 units j/	There are at least three small avenuals in the Vainan Aresenal complex. A fourth avenual, prob- ably the Bus-feng Aresual in the southeast sec- tion of the city, has been reported as converted to the production of lathes. The NFF With Ares- nal was partly evacuated to Entwan. Mechinery was soved into Teinan by the Communists in 1175% 19 is considered to be a part of the complex. This aresnal was a major aresnal under the Chinese Bationalities.	August 1948 to March 195

		(continued)

W1-ch'ang (30°32' N - 114°18' E) Hupeh	(30°34' N - 114°13' E) Including: Imag-yang (Ban-yang) (30°33' N - 114°16' E) IBankow (Ban-k'ou) (30°35' N - 114°16' E)	Wu-han Arsenal complex	(2) L) N = 11) CC L)	Canton (Kuang-chou) (23°07' N - 113°51' E) Shih-ching	Central and Southern China	Location	
31st Arsenal 32d Arsenal 30th Arsenal	Hang-yang Arsenal (former 26th Arsenal) Plant No. 43 Central and South China Military District Ordannee Reactory			Hsin-nan Arsenal or Hsin-nan Machinery Factory or 32d Ordnance Factory and/or Shih-ching Arsenal		Identification	
	15,000 (November 1952) m/ Sowiet and German ord- nance experts		plant in 1954	1,200 (1952) at Hsin-nan Arsenal k/ Soviet and Czechoslovak technical advisers to the		Estimated Labor Force	
Rifles (automatic) Mechine gmms (light) Sl-mm morters (planned) Artillery (planned)	Mortar shells (June-August 1952) Small arms rounds Hand grenades Fuses Fuses Fuses	Aumunition:	Weapons (1951): Mortars Light artillery Rifles	Ammunition: Small arms rounds Mortar shells Hand grenndes		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
2,000 pieces <u>o/</u>	33,000 rounds <u>n</u> /	17 STEELS (1964)	220 pieces 1/ 15 pieces 1/ 800 pieces 1/			Quantity	ly Capacity
43 in Bang-yang. Sordet and German ordnance experts worked in Bankow in August 1951 on a new type of regid- firing rifle. Bankow kreenal also is reported to have done experimental work on tuses in 1951. New arsenal workshops were reported in Wu-ch'ang in 1952.	center for the Central and South China Military District. The Hang-yang Arsenal was reported to have re- ceived Sortet machines before November 1952 and machinery from other arsenals in Communist China. Wooden ammunition boxes were made at Flant No.	under the supervision of Czechoslovak and Soviet technical advisers. The Wu-han Arsenal complex is the ordnance	Arsenal, are referred to interchangeably and possibly are separate plants of a single complex. The Shin-ching Arsenal appears to specialize in the production of ammunition and was reported to revolve freshool rock and Soviet-ivne summittion	Soviet machinery was received in Lawe 1951 and possibly also in 1952. Further expansion was reported by 1954 at Shih-ching. The two arsenats, the Hsin-pan Arsenal and the Shih-ching		Remarks	•
		February 1951 to April 1953		October 1930 to outs 1934	0.15.1 1050 +0 15.1 105.	Date of Information	

Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing) (29°34' N - 106°35' E) Szechwan

Former 10th Arsenal Possibly a branch of the former 50th Arsenal

2,000 (February 1951) s/

Ammunition:
60-mm flares
60-mm morter shells
82-mm morter shells
87-mm high-explosive (HE)
shells

500 units g/ 35,000 rounds g/

The area is 2.5 x 2 kilometers. There are 120 buildings of various sizes, mostly 1-story grey brick about 60 x 15 meters. The to 15 percent of the areenal was destroyed by the Chinese Mattonalists. During 1950 the arsenal was repaired and/or oxpanded. In May 1950 the arsenal was repaired and/or oxpanded. In May 1950 the arsenal was reported to be in full operation.

220 pieces r/ 350 pieces g/

Weapons:
Rifles
Machine guns (light)
Mortars

100 pieces g/

Ammanition:
Hand greades
Aerial bombs
Aerial bombs
50-mm mortar shells
57-mm recoilless rifle shells
Weapons:
60-mm mortars
60-mm mortars
82-mm mortars
77-mm recoilless rifles
(January 1952)

35,000 rounds 5,000 rounds <u>g/</u>

The area is 1.5 x 1.5 kilometers. The testing area is 1.5 kilometers north of the arcsenal. Buildings are dispersed. Some shops are hidden in caves. The machinery under the Chinese Mationalists was primerily German and Austrian, some US. The arcsenal had its own power plant, which was destroyed by the Chinese Mationalists. The power station was reported as repaired by November 1950.

March 1947 to January 1954

Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing) (29°3+" N - 106°35" E) Located about 30 miles from Ch'ung-ch'ing st T'ang-chia-t'o (29°35" N - 106°39" E) Szechwan

Former 50th Arsenal 497th Arsenal

Southwestern China

Location

Estimated Labor Force

Item

Quantity

Estimated Monthly Capacity

Major Arsenals in Communist China (Continued)

27 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

1949 to February 1951

4 e e e e e

	- 102 ⁰ 4,1' E) Former 53d Arsenal 2,000 plus (1950) y /	(Ch'ung-ch'ing) Former Elst Arsenal 20,000 t/ - 106052; E) Rof the Chia-ling Chiang-pei across gking.	Location	
보 얼얼얼얼얼	Weapons: 7.92-mm machine guns (light) Miscellaneous: Bincoulars Mortar sights Compasses Rauge finders Sights for recollless rifles Repair of small arms and opti- cal instruments	Ammunition (1949): 82-um morter shells (smoke) 82-um morter shells (smoke) 120-um steel shells 27-um rife gerendes [Mud.grenades (HE)] (Nifle grenades (HE)) (Nifle grenades (HE)) (Mifle grenades produced by the 31st Breunch Arsenal) (Meapons: Rifles (1952) (Machine guns (1952) information reports this as a new 1tem of production for the 21st Arsenal. y/ Nossbly the Miscellaneous: Leather rifle slings Beyonets Beyonets Garrying strays for machine guns (11ght)	Estimated Monthly Capacity Force Item	
s. 35/ v. 35/	500 pieces x/ 300 units x/ 600 units x/ 2,000 units x/ 70 units x/	5,000 rounds u/ 5,000 rounds u/ 2,000 notes u/ 20,000 mits u/ 100,000 mits u/ 5,000 mits u/ 1,000 mits u/	Capacity Quantity	
	The arsenal was enlarged before and during World War II. After V-J Bay, machines from the following arsenals were sent to the 53d Arsenal: the Calst Branch Arsenal at An'ning, the 58d 1-14ang Arsenal, the 53d Branch Arsenal at Knei-yang, and the 44th Arsenal at Knei-yang, me arsenal escaped destruction by the Chinese Mationalists. It has a dual mission the manufacture of Czechoslowak-type 11ght machine guns and of optical instruments.	The area is about 3 kilometers east and west by 1.5 kilometers north and south. There are about 200 buildings. Some damage was done by the Chinese Nationalists and was partly repaired by 1590. By october 1950 the areaal was operating at 50-percent capacity. In early December 1950, Soviet equipment for the manufacture of wespons was received. The arsenal has its own power plant. Production figures are Oflinese Nationalist.	Remarks	
A PARTY PROPERTY AND A PARTY PROPERTY PROPERTY AND A PARTY PROPERTY P	1948 to 1951	1944 to June 1952	Date of Information	

Minor Arsenals i	ŀ
π	
Communist	-
China	

Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh (42°06' N - 123°57' E) Heilungkiang	Chi-an (Ghi-an heien) (42°06' N - 126°10' E) Kirin	Chia-mu-ssu (140°50' N - 130°21' E) Heilungkiang	An-tung (40°06' N - 124°24' E) Lisoning	Northeastern China	Location	
Gh'i-ch'i-ha-erh Arsenal complex 31st, 32d, and 33d Arsenals (Borth Manchurian Arsenal) (Beilungkiang Arsenal)	No. 1 and No. 2 Arsenals. Probably local designations of two plants within the same arsenal		Chien-tung combine (6 arsenals)		Identification	
3,000 (Pall of 1952) <u>d</u> /	2,000 (before November 1948) <u>c</u> /	e,700 b/	1,100 (1949) <u>9</u> /*		Estimated Labor Force	
Ammanition: BEAG grenades 75-um howituer fuses Mortar shells Artillery shells Bombe Wespons: Knee mortars Miscellanoous: Repair of tanks	Ammunition: Bland grenades Small arms rounds Land mines Artillery shells Miscellaneous: Repair of rifles	Ammunition: Hand grenades Small arms rounds Small surs rounds Other types Wespons: Rifles	Ammunition: End greates Mortar shells Miscellaneous: Explosives for grenade and mortar shells Repair of small arms and mortars		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
96,000 units e/	4,500 units c/ 60,000 rounds c/ 1,500 units c/		18,000 units <u>a/</u> 9,000 rounds <u>a/</u>		Quantity	hly Capacity
There is a large installation occupying several square kiloseturs. The area was formerly the site of depanese workshops. In 1951, meahinery and personnel were reportedly brought here from the Makien Areanal complex in order to escape possible UM air radas. In 1953, information indicated a planned expansion of building floorepace by 100,000 square feet. A timber-drying plant with a capacity of 1,000 outsi feet per day was installed, Machinery was being supplied by the USER. Before 1949, greade parts and explosives were imported from the USER. The arsenal complex is capable of manufacturing rifles and machiner guns jout actual production has not been verified.	The arsenal consisted of two 1-story buildings 330 x 90 feet. Part of the machinery was reported as being installed underground.	The arsenal has been operating since mid-1946, As of mid-1951 the arsenal was producing a large variety of cumunition and hand gerandes for shipment to Chinese Communist forces in North Korea.	The Chien-tung combine consists of 15 large brick bulldings. The original arsemal was dismartied by the Russians, and the productive capacity was destroyed by the Chinese lectomalists. The Chinese Communists rethreshed the arsemal with equipment confiscated from privately owned factories. The production figures given are for 1948.		Remarks	
1946 to 1953	1948 to 1948	1946 to 1951	1947 to 1949		Date of Information	

	Minor	
(0,	Arsenals	
nt	'n	
Continued)	Communist	
	China	

Harbin (Ha-erh-pin) (45°45' N - 126°35' E) Heilungkiang	Fu-Shun (41952 N - 123953' E) Liaoning	Fu-hsien (Wa-faug-tien) (39938 N - 122000' E) Ideoning	Fon-hein (42°06'N - 121°42'E) Jehol	Northeastern China (Continued)	Location	
Technological Institute and Wegdeca Works		Ryonan Arsenal Former Nichiman Arsenal			Identification	
	2,000 (1947) 9/	5,000 (1948) <u>e</u> /	600 (1945) <u>f</u> /		Estimated Labor Force	
Ammunition: Small arms rounds Weapons: Machine gums Flame throwers	Ammunition: Band grenades Explosives for the Mukden Explosives for the siden Arsenal complex Possible shell filling Miscellaneous: Evimer coord Enchary pencils	Ammunition: 80-mm mortar shells 80-mm mortar shells Band grenades Miscellaneous: Repair of rifles and machine gums Assembly of tanks g/ Ball bearings	Ammunition: Hend-grenade shells 60- and 60-mm mortar shells 90-mm mortar shells Miscellaneous: Regair of weapons Parts for weapons		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
750,000 rounds <u>h</u> /		30,000 mits a/30,000 mits a/15,000 mits a/15	60,000 to 90,000 mits £/ 4,500 to 14,600 rounds £/ 2,100 to 2,400 rounds £/		Quantity	Ly Capacity
In November 1950, part of the Makden Arsenal complex was reported to have moved to Harbin. Machinery was housed in eshool buildings. Workers from Makden were used. Production was the same as before evacuation. It is probably a temporary installation.	Under the Chinese Nationalists, this arsemal was a branch of the Muxden Arsemal complex.	In 1948 this arsenal was under the control of the Chinese Communists. It is reported to have been converted into a tank-assembly plant in August 1950. Tanks were assembled from parts received from the USSR.	This is a former machine tool plant. It was converted to the production of ammunition by the Chinese Communists in Hovember 1945. There are 6 brick buildings 100 x 90 feet. Shells produced in 1948 were shipped to an unknown installation, probably a branch of this arsenal, for finishing.		Remarks	
1950	1947 to 1952	1948 to April 1951	1945 to 1948		Date of Information	

	(Continued)	Minor Arsenals in Communist China	F 500 F 600
--	-------------	-----------------------------------	---

			Estimated Monthly Capacity	ucity		
Location	Identification	Estimated Labor Force	Item	Quantity	Remarks	Date of Information
n China (Continued)						
a-erh-pin) 126°39' E) ang	Tung-kee Workshop	600 1/	Aumunition: Hand grenades Small-arms rounds Mortar shells		The Tung-kee Workshop is located in an area about 200 x 100 meters. It contains 3 main buildings of brick construction, each 50 x 10 meters.	1948 to 1949
a-erh-pin) - 126 ³ 39'E) ang	Former 25th Military Factory	3,100 Chinese <u>1</u> / 950 Russians <u>4</u> / <u>e</u> / <u>1</u> /	Ammunition: Small-erms rounds Small-erms Shell cases Shell cases Shell ames Mascallameous: Small arms Hiscellameous; Assembly of new weapons and tanks. Assembly of new weapons and tanks received from the USSR. 1		The USSR supplies the plant and equipment for this new arsenal. Expansion of the arrenal and labor force is expected. Possibly there are 2 installations of about equal size, I specializing in repair and assembly and the other in the production of small arms and ammunition. (Potentially, this is a major arsenal for production.)	1951 to 1953
1 - 130°21' B)	Hun-ch'un Arsenal (There are about eight arsenals dispersed through- out the Hun-ch'un area. They appear to be components of a complex.)	7. (34-146) F	Ammunition: Band gremades Band gremades Gremade handles Mortar fuses Mortar shells Artillery shells Small-arms rounds Weapons: Mortars Mortars Faris for riles Faris for riles Faris for veapons	60,000 units 1/300,000 units m/36,000 units m/5,000 rounds 1/77,000 rounds 9/17,000 rounds 9/170 pieces 9/	There are eight scattered arsenals. Some equipment for the production of morter shells reportedly was moved here from Lairen in 1947.	1946 to 1951
11-lin) N - 126°33' E)	Former 41st Arsenal		Ammunition: Small-arms rounds after 1950			December 1950

	Minor	
(£)	Minor Arsenals	
Ĕ.	in (
Continued)	Communist	
	China	

T'ish-ling (12018'N - 123049'E) Liaoning	Makdon (Shen-yang) (41 ⁰ N6' N - 123 ⁰ 27' E) Idaoning	Pei-an (48°16' N - 126°36' E) Heilungkiang	Mn-tan-chiang (44°35' N - 129°36' E) Heilungkiang	Iin-chiang (41 ⁰ 44 N - 126 ⁰ 55'E) Kirin	Northeastern China (Continued)	Location	
3d Arsenal	Pormer 53d Arsenal (formerly the Manchurian Automobile Manufacturing Company)	Former 62d Arsenal	Plant No. 22			Identification	
20 Chinese Communist officers t/ 1,275 Chinese laborers t/ 2 Soviet officers t/ 20 Soviet Lathe operators t/	1,500 to 2,000 (December 1990) g/	7,000 (1953) <u>r</u> /	3,000 (1953) <u>p</u> /	200 Japanese (repair) (1948) <u>m</u> / 500 Chinese <u>m</u> /		Estimated Labor Force	
Ammunition: Band grenades Band grenades Small-arms rounds Weapons: Machine guns Mortars	Ammunition: Smell-arms rounds Weapons: Smell arms Mortars Mortars Miscellameous: Repair of trucks and vehicles Pistons for locomotives Pots and pans	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds 81-mm mortar shells	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds (September 1952) g/	Ammunition: Band grenades 60-mm mortar shells 82-mm mortar shells Miscellaneous: Repair of small arms		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
380,000 units u/			15 million to 18 million rounds	45,000 units $\underline{m}/$ 1,200 rounds $\underline{m}/$		Quantity	hly Capacity
The arsenal contains eight 1-story buildings 400 x 30 meters used in the production of arms and ammunication, a 1-story building 200 x 25 meters, a 1-story building 130 x 30 meters used in the manufacture of vergous, a foundry, warehouses, and a power station.	The USSR removed the total capacity of the arenal to produce whicles. From 1946 to 1948 the Chinese Mationalists developed the around to produce submachine guns and morters with US machinery and equipment. The Chinese Communists reportedly continued production. Local newspapers have called this a model plant with the highest efficiency record of any army installation in the northess term military command.	The arsenal was expanded following the outbreak of the Korsen War. The reported manufacture of tanks and small cannons is doubtful. It is probably repair and/or assembly.	The arsenal moved here from Hsing-shan in June 1950. November to December 1951 and April to May 1952, Soviet machinery was imported. During 1952, plans were completed for an increase in production to 30 million rounds per month. g/	The arsenal consists of machine shops, a trench mortar-shell assembly shop, a foundry, and three grenade plants. The arsenal reportedly moved here from Thunhus (McM. N. 125°95' B) in early 1947. It received equipment from the USSR and from An-shan. Small shops throughout the city produced ammunition and grenades.		Remarks	
1949 to August 1950	1946 to 1953	1949 to 1953	1946 to March 1953	, 1945 to 1948		Date of Information	

Thentsin (T'ien-ching) (3908' N - 117012' E) Hopeh	T'ai-yuan (37º52' N - 112º33' E) Sbansi	Peking (Fei-ching) (39°56' N - 116°24' E) Hopeh	Northern China Ch'ang-chih (36°11' N - 113°06' E) Shansi	Yen-chi (42 ⁶ 53' N - 129 ⁰ 31' E) Kirin	Tun-hua (43°21' N - 128°13' E) Kirin	Northeastern China (Continued)	Location	
60th Plant	Northwest Chemical Works	70th Arsenal	Arsenal		Former 42d Plant (formerly the Manchurian Pulp Plant)		Identification	
	3,000 aa/	3,000 (1951) $y/$ Also Soviet technicians	·	2,000 (1948) <u>w</u> /	2,000 (1950) 1/		Estimated Labor Force	
Weapons: Small arms Miscellaneous: Repair of armored vehicles	Ammunition: Gan powder Artillery shells Artillery shells Bombs and mines Miscellaneous: Explosives	Ammunition: Band gremades Rifle gremades Rifle gremades Weapous: Weapous: Miscellameous (light) Miscellameous (arms	Weapons: Rifles	Ammunition: Hand grenades Mortar shells Howitzer shells	Weapons: Rifles Machine guns (light)		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
		130,000 units $z/$ 30,000 units (1952) $z/$					Quantity	hly Capacity
A possible ammunition factory was reported to be constructed near the former international Race course (1953).bb/ Arcenta facilities here may be used for the repair of small arms and aircraft cannon.	Expansion was reported in 1949. This installation probably operates in connection with the Tai-yau Arsenal in the production of shells and may be a branch of the Tai-yaun, or Northwest, Manufacturing Plant.	Eighteen Ozechoslovak-made lathes were received in 1952. Several small installations within Peking probably come under this arsenal.	The First Engineering Bureau of the Second Ministry of Machine Industry was to establish a medium-size arsenal. Construction was to begin shortly after May 1953. χ	In 1948 this arsenal was reported as one of the two largest arsenals in eastern Manchuria. It appears to produce primarily amminition.	The Chinese Communists converted a former woodpulp plant to the production of munitions during $1947-48$.	,	Remarks	
1949 to 1953	January 1949 to October 1949	June 1949 to April 1952	July 1952 to May 1953	1947 to 1948	1947 to 1950		Date of Information	

Minor	
Minor Arsenals in (Contin	
ls in Com Continued	LOCKED C
Communist wed)	
China	

Suchow (Hsu-chou) (T'ung-shan) (3t ⁰ 16' N - 117 ⁰ 11' E) Klangsu	Bo-fei (31°51 N - 117°17' Ε) Anhwei	Hangchow (Hang-chou) (30°15' N - 120°10' E) Chektlang	Tsingtao (Ch'ing-tao) (36'Ou' N - 120'19' E) Shantung	Chargetien (36°48' N - 118°03' E) Shantung	Eastern China	Location	
			Branch of former With Arsenal	Former Wippon Light Metal Manufacturing Plant		Identification	
4,000 to 7,000 <u>@</u> / 3 shifts	1,500 <u>ff/</u> 150 Russians <u>ff/</u> 30 Apanese <u>ff/</u> (1950)			3,200 <u>05</u> /		Estimated Labor Force	
Amminition: Artillery shells	Ammanition: Hand grenades Bursting charges Miscellaneous; Farts for mechine guns (light) Repair of small arms and automatic weapons	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds Water mines	Ammunition: Hand grenades Weapons: Small arms Miscellaneous: Repair of weapons	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds Small-arms rounds 25,000 rounds cc/ Morriar shells 25,000 rounds cc/ Morriar shells 25 to 5 tons cc/ (Capacity Listed is that of equipment received from the Ko-kim-bu arsenals in 1949)		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
			60,000 units <u>dd/</u>	300,000 rounds cc/ 25,000 rounds cc/ 2 to 5 tons cc/ ent received from the		Quantity	Capacity
In 1951 a large areand reportedly was being built here: hip Part of the large labor force may have been employed in construction.	There are possibly 2 arsenals with a total area of about 75,000 square meters.	In 1950, information indicated that this was a small arsenal. In June 1953, information indicated that a water-mine plant was established with Sowiet aid. cc/	This arsenal is chiefly a repair plant. It also produced all parts for hand grenades except the explosive filler up to 1940. In 1951, information indicated continued production of hand grenades and production of small arms. The latter production is not verified and may be repair rather than manufacture.	The plant was converted to the production of munitions. It received equipment for the production of munitions from the seven small Ko-kim-bu arsends in Pio-hai-so (40°24' N - 116°29' N) 10 1949. Buildowes from these arsenals were to transfer to Chang-tien in June 1949. Some equipment was received from the Tsinan Arsenal complex.		Remarks	
1951	1950 .	January 1950 to March 195	May 1948 to 1951	. 1949		Date of Information	

	inor	
(Cor	Arsenals	
ti	Ħ	
med)	Communist	
	China	

			Estimated Monthly Capacity	nly Capacity		
Location	Identification	Estimated Labor Force	Item	Quantity	Remarks	Date of Information
Eastern China (Continued)					•	1050
Po-shan (36°29' N - 117°50' E)	lst and 2d Arsenals of the Eastern China Military Zone	7,000 11/	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds	2.5 to 4.5 million	Construction was reported in this area in 1951-hh/	November 1950 to November 1952
2 arsemals located about 12 kilometers southeast of Po-shan. Shantung			Hand grenades	600,000 to 700,000 units		
Shanghai (Shang-hai) (31°14' N - 121°28' E) Kiangsu	Naval Arsenal (formerly the East China 26th Arsenal)		Ammunition: Mines Torpedoes Deep-water bombs		In 1954, information indicated that there were branch workshops in Wu-sung, Pu-tung, and Ching-su.	September 1954
Shangbai (Shang-hai) (31°14' N - 121°28' E) Kiangsu	Shanghal Arsenal (former filst Arsenal)	2,200 (1950) <u>ff/</u> 200 Soviet fechnicians <u>ff/</u> (1950)	Ammunition: Hand grenades Small-erms rounds Artillery shells Miscellaneous: Repair of small arms and infratry heavy versons		Possibly there are several subarsensus in addition to the level Arsenal with which these plants may be associated. Elamis were reported at Imag-hua (3000 M - 121 27 B), Wu-sung (3029 M - 121 295 B), and in the area 700 meters northwest of the Chou-P'u realroad station. Possibly it includes parts of the	May 1949 to January 1951
Central and Southern China						October 1060
Ch'ang-sha (28 ⁸ 12' N - 112 ⁰ 58' E) Hunan	2d Ammunition Factory of the South China Military District		Ammunition: Small-arms rounds Mortar shells		The arsenal moved here from Canton.	October to November 1972
Oh'en-ch'i (28°00' N - 110°11' E) Human	Arsenal Former 11th Arsenal under the Chinese Nationalists	1,300 in artillery-shell manufacturing section kk/ (1950)	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds Artillery shells Bombs Miscellaneous: Repair of rifles and machine gums		The Chinese Nationalists made rifles and amminition here. The area is reported as 200 x 200 meters with 2 sections in the plantartillery-shell manufacturing and bomb manufacturing.	May 1950 to May 1953
			Built norte for rifles			

Location Central and Southern China (Continued)	Identification	Estimated Labor Force	Estimated Monthly Capacity Item Q	(Capacity Quantity	ty.	Aty Remarks
Chen-nan-kuan (21 ⁰ 59' N - 106 ⁰ 43' E) Kwangsi	8th Branch Factory	7∞ <u>™</u> /	Weapons: Machine guns (light and heavy)		The factory moved from Kweilin in July 1951. The factory is equipped 11/ with 4 machines for manufacturing machine guns and 1 fron-refining funace. The director of the factory is to Ch'1-ching.	January 1950 to November 1951
Ch'in hsien (21°56' N - 108°37' E) Kwangsi	Yamchow Ammunition and Repair Plant		Ammanition: Smæll-arms rounds Artillery shells Miscellameous: Repair of weapons	150,000 rounds <u>mm/</u> 3,000 rounds <u>mm/</u>	The plant was under construction in 1952. \underline{m}	October to November 1952
Ch'in hsien (21°57' N - 108°37' E) Kwengsi		600 <u>mm</u> /	Ammunition: 60-mm mortar shells Small-arms rounds	20,000 rounds mm/ 150,000 rounds mm/	In February 1954, 50 experienced workers were recruited to work in P'ing-hsiang, and Ch'inhsien. Soviet equipment arrived on 15 July 1951.	December 1950 to June 1951
Wu-ch'ang hsien (Chin.R'ou) (3020' N - 114007' E) Hupeh	Arms Repair Shop		Ammunition: Machine-gun rounds Machine-gun rounds Small hand grenades Weapons: Weapons: Miscellaneous: Spare parts for weapons		In 1951 the shop was reported as recently enlarged mp/ It was also reported to be an underground arcsenal being constructed in the mountains to the south of Mu-ch ang-haisen to be completed by the end of 1990. 00/	October 1952 to February 1954
(24°46' N - 113°35' E) Kwanghing	7th Arms Manufactory of the Central Military Council		Weapons: Riffle Machine guns (light) Miscellaneous: Repair of all types of small arms	600 units <u>pp</u> / 60 pieces <u>pp</u> /	Construction started in early 1952. gg/ Mechinery came partly from the USSR and partly from the Bath-man Arsenal. The head of the factory is Yeh Ming, and the Soviet adviser is Mechith. Arms repair shop is located 3 miles from the city and has 200 workers and mechinery	May 1952 to September 1952

Kwangs i	Nan-ning (22°49'N - 108°19'E)	<pre>Lung-ching (Lung-chou) (22020' N - 107001' E) Kwengsi</pre>	Kwangsi	Liu-chou (24°19' N - 109°24' E)	Pang-ch'eng (21 ⁰ 46' N - 108°21' E) Kwangsi	Chu-chou (27 ⁶ 50' N - 113 ⁰ 09' E) Hunan	Central and Southern China (Continued)	Location	
	Nan-ning Machine Factory		(IOTMET COPLIA RESERVAL BY CHIEFARY OF THE FORMER THE CHIMEST THE CHOU Arms Repair Shop)	Liu-chou Machine Plant operated by the Kwangsi government	5th Arsenal of the South China Military District	Arsenal of the Central and South China Ordnance Administration		Identification	
					800 (includes Viet Minh workers) tt/	4,600 <u>rr/</u> 3 shifts (1951)		Estimated Labor Force	
	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds	Armanition: Shells and bombs Wespons: Small arms and automatic wespons	Hand grenades Miscellaneous: Repair of small arms Machine tools and industrial machinery ww/	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds Hand grenades Weapous: Small arms (possibly) Machine guns	Ammunition: Band grenades Small-arms rounds Weapons: Moritars (December 1952) Moritars (Index) Moritars (Theory and light) Fiftes		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
			:	1 million rounds vv/		20,000 units <u>ss/</u> 90 pieces <u>ss/</u> 5,000 pieces <u>ss/</u>		Quantity	y Capacity
wespois from Soviet-supplied parts (1953). At the end of 1951, 90 Soviet technicisms and 10 pieces of Soviet-made machinery arrived. xz/From 15 July to September 1953, daily deliveries of copper impots were reported at 60,000 to	The Nan-ning Weapons Repair Shop was reported as moved to Heng-t'ang (22°23' N - 108°53' E). This show may have here expanded to assemble	This is also a supply center for the distribution of ammunition, Soviet arms, and materials from Bloc countries to the Wiet Minh.	assigned during 1952. In May 1951, 20 lathes, 10 cases of electric drills, and other small machines arrived from Canton. The hand grenade branch planned to move into the arsenal in March 1951.	Armsment repair operations were reported as restored to normal in 1951. The arsenal repaired 5,000 rifles. vv/ Soviet experts were to be	The arsenal was established in late 1950 or early 1951. mu/ It received new Sortet machinery in May 1952, mu/ reportedly to produce machine guns, rifles, pistols, and ammunition. There is production for the Viet Minh. The arsenal also repairs rifles. The director is Chang Ting.	Underground storage for morter shells was being prepared near the arsenal. There was a significant increase in production in March 1991 over January 1991.		Remarks	
	October 1952 to November 1953	October 1950 to March 1952		February 1951 to March 1953	October 1950 to January 1954	MEA TANT ON TRECEMENT TANK	10F1 to Topombou 10F0	Date of Information	

Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing) (29°34' N - 106°35' E) About 20 kilometers west	Ch'eng-tu (3040'N - 104°04'E) (30°40'N - 104°04'E) (5 kilometers southeast of the city) Szechwan	Yen-ch'i (28°10' N - 110°57' E) Human (Bust of ferry larding) Southwestern China	Swatow (Shan-t'ou) (23º22' N - 116º40' E) Kwangtung	P'ing-heiang (22°06' N - 106°04' E) Kwangsi	Central and Southern China (Continued)	Location	
Former 25th Arsenal	31st Arsenal	Arsenal	(P'ao-t'ai)			Identification	
2,000 ggg/ (Chinese Nationalist figure)	· 2,000 eee/	3,500 to 4,000 and Soviet advisers <u>add</u> /		600 (1951) zz/ 79 Soviet end Szechoslovak mechanics and tech- nicians who arrived in September 1951. zz/		Estimated Labor Force	
Amminition: Small-arms rounds	Ammanition: Small-arms rounds Small-arms orders Scamm mortax shells Hand grenades Miscellaneous: Repair of small arms	Weapons: Machine guns (light and heavy) 82-mm mortars	Ammunition: Bombs Antitank shells Sea mines	Light and heavy infantry weapons and ammunition for the Viet Minh. (Fossibly includes light mortars, grenade launchers, rifles, and automatic weapons.)		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
9 million rounds.hhh/ (1944-49)	15,000 rounds fff/				·	Quantity	ly Capacity
The arsenal area is circular in shape and about h kilometers in diameter. There are about sixty 1-story buildings of various shapes and sizes.	In 1952, recent expansion was reported. eee/ The arsenal has 2 workshops 1-story brick buildings with galvanized from roots. Rifle production was reported as well as eight machine gums in 1951.	Labor reported at the arsenal includes 1,000 from Indochina. The director is Wang Let and the Army representative is "Fan Feng. The arsenal was reported to be producing artillery shells and rocket shells of a new type, but this is doubtful.	This arsenal was under construction in August 1951. $\frac{\cos}{\cos}$	Expansion was reported in 1953. assa/ Soviet machines and construction work were reported in 1951. bbb/ The Soviet autuser was Barkov (1951-53; the superintendents are Tseng Sheng (1951) and Othen Obang-bein (1953); and the assistant is Cheng Wei-man (1951).		Remarks	
1944 to 1950	19 50 to 1 9 52	October 1952 to September 1953	August 1951	October 1950 to July 1953		Date of Information	

- 64 -

	inor	
(Cont.	Arsenals	
ntir	Ħ	
meď)	Communist	
	China	

Feng-hsiang (34°26' N - 107°18' E) Shensi	Lu-hsien (28°53' N - 105°23' E) Szechwan Northwestern China	Changiting (Ch'ung-ch'ins) (29°34' N - 106°35' E) (Tan-tzu-shih) (Across the Yangtze (Th'ang Chiang/ H'er Trom Chiang-pei) Szechwan	Chungting (Ch'ung-ch'ing) (29°94' N - 106°35' E) Sechwan	Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing) (29°34' N - 106°35' E) About 5 kilometers west of the Shan-hu-pa Airfield Szechwan	Southwestern China (Continued)	Location	
Arsenal	Former 23d Chemical Arsenal	Former 30th Arsenal	Former 20th Arsenal	Former let Arsenal		Identification	
		1,000 班班/		1,200 (1947) 111/		Estimated Labor Force	
Weapons: Copy of Soviet rifle	Ammintton: Chemical grenades with grenade launchers	Ammarition: Band grenades	Ammunition: Smell-arms rounds Flare shells Mortar shells	Ammunition: Architery shells Weapons: 7.9-mm rifles Machine gams (light)		Item	Estimated Monthly Capacity
	15,000 units <u>111</u> / (1954)		10 million to 18 million rounds <u>jij</u>	10,000 rounds 600 pieces 200 pieces		Quantity	thly Capacity
This is a new arsenal.	The arsenal was reported as partially removed by the Chinese Nationalists. Under the Chinese Nationalists (1948) it was reported to consist of a gas-mask plant, a nitrocellulose plant, and a sullburic acid plant. The arsenal was not in production in 1950.	This is a small arsenal. Possibly it produces rifle grenades and rifle-grenade launchers. Machines were moved here from Hang-yang during the Sino-Japanese War.	The arsenal area is about 4.5 x 2.5 kilometers, and there are about 200 1-story buildings of various sizes. Under the Chinese Mationalists, powder was imported from the US. It was alightly damaged by the Chinese Mationalists. Only a portion was in operation in May 1950. Many steps in manufacturing were done by hand labor.	The arsenal was reported to be in partial produc- tion in May 1950. It is reported to be an underground arsenal with machine shops in numer- ous caves. Machinery was moved here from Hang-yang during the Sino-Japanese War.		Remarks	
August 1952 to November 1952	October 1948 to June 1954	1944 to 1951	1944 to February 1951	1944 to 1952		Date of Information	

- 53 **-**

NSNSNS	Yung-teng (36°04h' N - 103°24' E) Kansu	Yen-an (Fu-shih) (36°34 N - 109°27' E) Shensi	T'ung-wei (35°18' N - 105°10' E) (Northwest of Tien-shui) Kansu	Tso-shui (33°40' N - 109°09' E) Shensi	Sian (Hsi-an) (34°16' N - 108°54' E) Shensi	Northwestern China (Continued)	Location	
[최 <i>822]조</i> [최222]조 수 :	1st Northwest China Arsenal	V.	Arsenal	Arsenal	Arsenal		Identification	
<u> </u>	1,000 laborers. <u>ppp/</u> 300 Soviet Japanese and European technicians <u>ppp/</u>	2,500 mmm/ Unknown number of Soviet technicians					Estimated Labor Force	
B 1 다 & 유 다 타 & 다 8	Ammunition: Small-arms rounds Weapons: Small arms	Ammunition: Mortar shells Mortar shells Hand Greendes Meapons: Meapons: Rifles Grenade launchers	Ammanition: Rifle shells	Weapons: Copy of Soviet machine gun	Weapons: Mortars (unknown size) Miscellameous: Accessories for rifles and machine guns		Item Qu	Estimated Monthly Capacity
(2) (2) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4	This arsenal received Soviet-made machinery. $\underline{pp}/$ The superintendent is Wang K'o.	It is reported by some to be Communist built. ooo/	This is a new arsenal. mmm/	This is a new arsenal. mmm/	This is an old arsemal. Chinese Communist plans call for expansion and the introduction of Soviet equipment and methods. mmm/		Quantity Remarks	
	made machinery. ppp/							
111. 100 1	November 1951	January 1950 to November 1952	August 1952	August 1952 to November 1952	August 1952 to November 1952		Date of Information	

Table 6
Minor Arsenals in Communist China (Continued)

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX C

METHODOLOGY

1. Ammunition Capacity Estimates.

The estimated monthly capacity for the production of ammunition in Communist China was based on the reported production figures summarized in Appendix B. Many reports mention only the number of rounds per category of ammunition and do not list exact calibers. Adequate information needed to arrive at a weighted average weight for a representative round for each category was lacking. To obtain the minimum capacity, in tons, for artillery and mortar shells and grenades, the lowest weight within the category was used. The 7.62-mm rifle and machine gun round was used to obtain the minimum capacity, in tons, of small arms ammunition.

The following items and weights were used: artillery shells, 70-mm -- 9.9 pounds; mortar shells, 60-mm -- 3.25 pounds; small arms, rounds, 7.62-mm -- 0.055 pounds; and hand grenades -- 1.54 pounds. The minimum capacity for the production of ammunition in Communist China was determined by totaling the reported production from Appendix B, in tons, and in rounds converted to tons. The monthly estimates shown in Table 1* were derived from this total.

Table 7** gives the estimated monthly capacity for the production of ammunition in the Mukden Arsenal complex in 1948. The complex was given more detailed treatment than any of the other arsenals because it is the major munitions-producing complex in Communist China and because more detailed information on production according to calibers was available for this arsenal than was available for the others.

2. Production Capacity for Weapons.

To arrive at the general magnitude of additional capacity of the arsenals for which no monthly rates of production are available, analogous comparisons of the more important arsenals, as listed below,

^{*} P. 6, above.

^{**} Table 7 follows on p. 56.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8 Reported Production <u>3</u>60 화 ্র ন ام 100 150 110 Weight of (Tons) 32 128 176 Reported Production Estimated Monthly Capacity for the Production of Ammunition Weight of 65,000 256,000 352,000 308,000 191,000 220,000 Pounds) in the Mukden Arsenal Complex of Communist China Individual Round S-E-C-R-E-T Weight of (Pounds) 0.055 3.25 8.52 35.2 1.54 Table 7 19.1 1948 - 56 Reported Production a/ 20,000 30,000 10,000 10,000 200,000 4,000,000 Units)

Artillery shells

Hand grenades

75-mm

Total

110/ Rounded.

81- and 82-mm

11-09

120-mm

Type of Ammunition

Small arms rounds

Mortar shells

Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8

S-E-C-R-E-T

were made where applicable. Analogous arsenals were selected on the basis of old Chinese Nationalist production estimates, 111/ the types of end items reported to be produced, and the similarity of geographic areas of production. The arsenals selected were the following:

Mukden Arsenal complex; T'ai-yuan Arsenal complex; Tsinan Arsenal complex; Hsin-nan Arsenal, Canton; Wu-han Arsenal complex; former 10th Arsenal, Chungking; and former 21st Arsenal, Chungking.

a. Artillery.

The capacity of the Mukden Arsenal complex was compared with that reported for the T'ai-yuan Arsenal complex, and the capacity of the Wu-han Arsenal complex was compared with that reported for the Hsin-nan Arsenal in Canton. An estimated additional capacity of 100 percent over the reported production capacity is suggested.

b. Mortars.

Similar comparisons were made to obtain the estimated capacity of the Mukden and Wu-han arsenals to produce mortars. In addition, the capacity of the Chungking former 21st Arsenal was compared with the reported capacity of the Chungking former 10th Arsenal. An estimated additional capacity of 30 percent over the total reported production capacity is suggested.

c. Machine Guns.

Similar comparisons were made to obtain the estimated capacity of the Mukden and Wu-han arsenals to produce machine guns. An estimated additional capacity of 40 percent over the reported production capacity is suggested.

d. Small Arms.

The submachine gun production of the Chungking former 21st Arsenal was compared with that of the Mukden Arsenal complex and the capacity at the Tsinan Arsenal complex with that of the Canton arsenals. An estimated additional capacity of about 70 percent over the reported production capacity is suggested.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX D

GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE

A most serious gap in intelligence exists in the area of production information after 1949. Information on raw materials going into arsenals, on the capital equipment presently used in the arsenals, and on the specific end products of the arsenals is almost nonexistent. The reports of production which do exist consist largely of simple references to types of armaments such as small arms, artillery, guns, grenades, shells or small arms ammunition, or artillery ammunition.

Descriptions of buildings are out of date in most cases, and photointelligence is lacking on even the major production installations such as the arsenals around Chungking and T'ai-yuan. Little information to confirm developments in the munitions industry of Communist China since 1949 is available.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX E

SOURCE REFERENCES

25X1X4

The

25X1X4

The large majority of sources used in this report were

25X1X4

reports were based on interrogations of Japanese prisoners of war and other repatriates who were in Communist China, on articles appearing in the Chinese Communist press, and on information from

25X1X4

The quality of the information available from the interrogation of persons returning from Communist China ranges from reliable to completely false. It is believed that the poorest of the interrogation reports have been recognized and eliminated. The reports which were used were generally confirmed by two or more sources. A large part of the detailed information available on Chinese Communist arsenals comes from these interrogation reports which, unfortunately, are based on observations during 1949, 1950, and possibly 1951, and do not give the current picture.

Articles from the Chinese Communist press were used cautiously. Generally the Communist-controlled press within Communist China gives very little information on the arsenals or on the Second Ministry of the Machine Industry. The information that does reach the Chinese Communist newspapers is, however, more reliable than that received in the more numerous newspaper reports from Hong Kong, T'ai-pei, and Tokyo. The most unreliable were those from the pro-Chinese Nationalist Hong Kong newspapers, although they also are the most prolific in information on Chinese arsenals.

25X1X4

is very valuable and considered reliable depending upon the channels through which the in-

25X1X7

25X1X7

formation was obtained. Information from is used very cautiously. As with the pro-Chinese Nationalist press, the information often happens to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist cause. The estimate of the reliability of

25X1X4

25X1X4

is based on the evaluation of the reporting agency when this information does not conflict with

reliable information already on hand.

- 61 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8

S-E-C-R-E-T

Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:


Source of Information	Information
Doc Documentary A - Completely reliable B - Usually reliable C - Fairly reliable D - Not usually reliable E - Not reliable F - Cannot be judged	 1 - Confirmed by other sources 2 - Probably true 3 - Possibly true 4 - Doubtful 5 - Probably false 6 - Cannot be judged

"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document.



Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt



Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000090001-8 SECRET