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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

SOCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN BULGARIA



CIA/RR PR-104
18 March 1955

DOCUMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: SECRET
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1989
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 11 Oct 79 REVIEWER: 006514

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SOCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN BULGARIA

CIA/RR PR-104

(ORR Project 21.149)

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SOCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN BULGARIA*

Summary

When the Communist Party gained control of the Bulgarian government in 1947, land reform, which is the first step in the usual pattern of socialization of agriculture, had already been accomplished. A series of land reforms before World War II had resulted in a more nearly equal distribution of land than existed in any other Balkan country. About 94 percent of the land was owned by individual peasants. The earlier land reforms may have enabled the Communists to proceed more rapidly with the socialization of agriculture, but the principal factors making for peasant acceptance of socialization were the long-established cooperative movement in Bulgaria and the Communist promise of assistance to landless and poor peasants, who were ready to support the Communist regime for the sake of getting a piece of land or a favored position for credit and aid.

A forced collectivization program, carried out between 1947 and 1953, resulted in the collectivization of over half of Bulgaria's agricultural land and the incorporation of over half of the farm households. State farms accounted for only 3 percent of the agricultural land, a percentage smaller than in any of the other Satellites. Although the collectivization program was successful, it had a depressing effect on agricultural productivity, as it had in the USSR.

The effects of collectivization on agricultural production in Bulgaria are difficult to separate quantitatively from the effects of other variables. Peasants' incentives to increase crop production and animal productivity declined as collectivization was intensified. Only through increases and shifts in crop acreages, not through improvement in yields, was over-all agricultural production maintained throughout the First Five Year Plan at approximately pre-collectivization levels. An increasing population between 1948 and 1953 thus was provided with a diet inferior both in quality and quantity. Per capita production of major foods and per capita food availability declined 14 percent and 9 percent, respectively.

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 October 1954.

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Bulgaria's "new course," which was incorporated in the Second Five Year Plan (1953-57), favors the collective sector of agriculture, as did past policy. Although the government insists that further collectivization is voluntary, the basic philosophy of nationalizing the land still persists. In an attempt to raise the standard of living, the "new course" aims at greater crop and livestock production, increased mechanization of agriculture, expansion of state farms, and increased investments in agriculture.

There is evidence that some of the provisions of the "new course" are being implemented, but it is not likely that agricultural production will increase as a result. It is unlikely that the peasants will be won over by the "new course," and peasant resistance will continue to be a serious obstacle to any short-term increase in agricultural production.

I. Pre-Socialization Period.

A. Land Reform.

When the Communists gained control of the government of Bulgaria in 1947, the first phase of Communist socialization of agriculture -- land reform (redistribution of land) -- had already been accomplished. Under the leadership of Alexander Stamboliiski, the peasant administration had carried out a 3-year (1921-23) land distribution program unequaled anywhere in the Balkan area. 1/* As a result, Bulgaria emerged with a distribution of land more nearly equal than in any other Balkan country. Subsequent land adjustments followed, and by 1934** 94 percent of the cultivated land was in the hands of individual proprietors; 5 percent belonged to the state and communes; and 1 percent belonged to monasteries and schools. 2/ Only 1 percent of the agricultural units contained more than 30 hectares*** of land. 3/

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix F.

** Bulgaria's last prewar census was taken in 1934.

*** One hectare is equal to 2.47 acres.

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This system of owner-operated farms characterized Bulgaria's agriculture until the collectivization drives were begun by the Communists in 1948. The last effort at land reform was conducted by a coalition government in 1946, when the Southern Dobrudja area of Rumania was annexed to Bulgaria. The size of landholdings was limited to 20 hectares in all parts of Bulgaria except in the Dobrudja, where the maximum was set at 30 hectares. 4/

The continuous division of the land through land reform and the division of existing farms under Bulgaria's inheritance law had resulted in a greatly increased number of uneconomic holdings. An attempt by the government in 1933 to consolidate all the small strips and plots owned by one person into one contiguous farm met with little success. 5/ Prior to World War II, only 2.25 percent of the farms, or 0.1 percent of the farm area, were operated by tenants. 6/ These small uneconomic holdings resulted in a subsistence type of agriculture.

B. Cooperative Movement.

Before World War II, Bulgaria had become the leader of the cooperative movement in the Balkans. This movement was carried on under the guidance of the peasant (Agrarian) party, which had been the leading advocate for land reforms during the 1920's. Patterned after Western cooperatives and superimposed on the culture of the Bulgarian village, the movement filled the greatest needs of the peasants. It provided the necessary credit for farming operations each year and guaranteed assistance through financial crises. Before World War II, there was hardly a Bulgarian village without a cooperative credit association. Many of these associations had production and consumption affiliates. These cooperatives were free and voluntary associations. The more than 3,000 credit associations provided a basis for the joint effort of numerous small landholders to pool their machines, tools, fertilizers, and other inputs in an effort to overcome cooperatively the disadvantages of inadequate landholdings and to provide the means to secure proper equipment for individual households.* 8/

* Approximately 1,677 peasants with small holdings had formed 28 free agriculture producer cooperatives on the basis of retaining the private ownership of the land, inventories, and livestock contributed to the cooperative effort, which in case of withdrawal of the peasant from the cooperative were to be restored to him. 7/

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In villages in which there was no formally organized production cooperative, it was the custom for the peasants to band together and cooperate in such activities as cultivating and harvesting crops and husking corn.

In the Bulgarian villages, there was developed a type of village rotation of crops wherein all the wheat was planted in a single area of the village lands, all the corn in another area, and so on with other crops. An extension service modeled on that of the US was developed to assist peasants. An American College of Agriculture had been established in Bulgaria to offer instruction in the science and art of agriculture.

C. From Cooperative to Collective Farms.

The growing Communist influence during and after the war spurred the Agrarian Party of the new Fatherland Front Coalition into increased agitation for further land reform. During the reform of 1946 the party played into the hands of the Communists, who won the support of the peasants to their so-called cooperative plan. By the time the Party came into full power in the fall of 1947, a few LCAF's, patterned closely after the collective farms of the USSR, had been organized.* It was not until after the harvest in 1948, however, that the first campaign to socialize agriculture by means of the collective farm system was initiated under Communist supervision.

II. Administrative Structure.

The socialization of agriculture in Bulgaria is under the direction and control of the Ministry of Agriculture, presently headed by Stanko Todorov. g/ Decrees and directives emanate from the central government and filter down through the regional and local levels. The structure and operation of the related agencies (collective farms, state farms, and machine tractor stations -- MTS's) do not add directly to this report but are nevertheless an important and essential part of socialization. Their structural

* The terms collective and cooperative are used interchangeably in Bulgaria. Collective is the proper word, but the Communists also use cooperative because it is more acceptable to the peasant. The English equivalent of the official Bulgarian collective is "Labor Cooperative Agricultural Farm" (LCAF).

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organization and a description of their relationship to the central government as well as of their functions are shown in Appendix A.

III. Development of Socialization of Agriculture under the Communists.

A. Steps in Socialization.

Steps taken by the Communists in the socialization of agriculture in Bulgaria are as follows:

1. Land Reform.

The remaining large estates, plus church lands and the excess amount of land (over the allowable legal amount -- 30 hectares), were confiscated and turned over to the landless peasants as well as to peasants with small landholdings. A considerable area of confiscated land was reserved for state farms.

2. Establishment of State Farms.

Most of the state farms were established before the collectivization drive was launched. State farms are owned by the government and operated by paid labor, and they serve as model farms and service units to collective farms. In the initial stages of collectivization the state depends largely upon state farms as a means of penetrating the countryside politically and as a means of sustaining production. The state farms also perform the function of providing the collective farms with selected superior seed and high-grade breeding stock, introducing improved agrotechniques, and giving general guidance in the use and development of new crops and techniques.

3. Establishment of MTS's.

The MTS's were established for the purpose of controlling and regulating the use of the agricultural machinery of the country, a principal requisite of socialized agriculture. Few collectives were organized until after the MTS's were fairly well organized. The MTS personnel, in addition to operating the machines, act as a vanguard in publicity and in recruitment of members for the collectives.

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4. Establishment of Collective Farms.

Collective farms were established ostensibly on the basis of free and voluntary membership but, as in the other Satellites, peasants were coerced into joining by the government. After the 1950-51 collectivization drive, the government strengthened its position economically and politically by setting up the operation of collective farms according to the provisions of the 1951 model statute for LCAF's.*

The collective farms are operated under state supervision, although there is an important difference in the legal basis of collectives between Bulgaria and the USSR. It is that in Bulgaria, members of a collective farm retain title to the land they have contributed, whereas in the USSR the government has the title to the land, which it leases in perpetuity to the collective farm.

B. Policies, Plans, and Progress of Socialization, 1947-48.

1. Policies and Plans.

The Two Year Plan (1947-48) for the socialization of agriculture in Bulgaria was set up essentially to provide the necessary facilities for the first collectivization drive and to introduce the economic measures by which the established collective farms could advance and develop.

Objectives of the plan included 10/:

- a. Expanding state farms.
- b. Increasing number of MTS's to 30 in 1947 and to 50 in 1948.
- c. Increasing number of tractors to 740 in 1947 and to 2,057 in 1948.
- d. Importing 20 combines in 1947 and 30 in 1948.

* This organization is called in Bulgarian TKZS -- Trudovo Kooperativno Zemedelsko Stopanstvo.

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e. Meeting the following targets for collectivization:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Collective Farms</u>	<u>Number of Hectares</u>	<u>Number of Households*</u>
1947	560	250,000	N.A.
1948	800	400,000**	60,000

f. Placing livestock breeding enterprises on 30 state farms, 120 collective farms, and 150 municipal*** farms.

g. Extending various forms of economic aid to the socialized sector, such as loans for the setting up of cooperative facilities at greatly reduced rates (5.5 percent for independent farmers and 3.5 percent for cooperatives); use of agricultural machinery at reduced fees; exemption from taxes; free veterinary services; provision for the use of superior seeds, vines, fruit, and trees; and animal breeding stock.

During the progress of the Two Year Plan a legal structure was set up which gave the government power to execute the plans. In February 1948 a law was passed legalizing the compulsory purchase of agricultural machinery by the government. This law provided that all machinery -- including such equipment as tractors, threshers, seeders, hay binders, and the like -- was subject to compulsory sale. This equipment was transferred to the MTS's or diverted to state farm use. As a result of the implementation of this act the government was able to strengthen the MTS's and at the same time weaken the large landholder through

* A household is often referred to as a landowner, homestead, estate, farm, or family.

** As explained below, this acreage apparently was reduced although there appears to have been no formal announcement of the reduction.

*** The main difference between a state farm and a municipal farm is jurisdictional. The municipal farm is under the control of the city or municipal governing body and not the state. The functions of the two farms are primarily the same. A municipal farm supplies only the city with which it is associated, whereas state farm produce can be sent anywhere at the discretion of the government.

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destruction of his basic means of production. 11/ Half the indicated (minimum) price was paid for the confiscated machinery immediately in cash, and the remainder was deferred.

On 21 May 1948 the Council of Ministers issued the decree for the compulsory sale of wheat, rye, barley, oats, and spelt. Compulsory deliveries were set higher for independent peasants than for those in collectives. 12/

Another law was passed for the establishment of a progressive system of taxation based on income and on property held by individual peasants. The well-to-do farmers -- the independent farmers, in this case -- were forced to bear the largest burden. Small landholders (under 3 hectares) or farmers not returning a prescribed amount of income were exempt from payment of taxes. In 1948 this law excused 50 percent of the small peasant farms from paying taxes. Hence the weight of taxation was on the middle and wealthy classes of peasants. 13/

In December 1948 the government abolished tenant farming. In this manner, production capabilities of the farmers with larger holdings were reduced further. 14/

In 1948 the "law of state goods" was enacted, authorizing the government to dispossess peasants so that the needs of collective farms and state farms could be met. Land outside the collectivized area was given the dispossessed peasant. This law served as a vehicle for getting rid of recalcitrant and anti-Communist peasants. 15/

The 1945 decree on cooperatives was further altered by governmental action which permitted the Communists to establish collective farms similar to the Soviet collective farms (kolkhozes). 16/ Although this action modified the existing law, it failed to change the provision granting private ownership of land and the "free and voluntary association" of peasants. Because of these provisions in the law, the Communists could not legally use force to establish collective farms, and since the denial of the use of force was counter to their plans, the law was conveniently overlooked. By deed as well as by legislative action, the Communists had established by the end of 1948 a legal basis upon which to carry out an intensive collectivization program.

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The Two Year Plan in addition called for the recovery by the end of 1948 of all segments of the economy to at least the prewar level.

2. Progress.

During the Two Year Plan the main emphasis of the socialization program was on setting up a base upon which collectivization was to be established. This included the organization of state farms, MTS's, and the expansion of mechanized agriculture. In 1947, state farms had not increased in area or number since their establishment in 1945. The majority of state farms were located in Southern Dobrudja,* the area with the largest estates, and some were created from confiscated church lands. Fifty-six state farms were established in 1947. These were increased to 86 in 1948, accounting for 77,500 hectares, an average of 901 hectares of land per farm (see Table 1**). 17/ Most of the state farms organized in 1948 were on land which apparently had lain idle in the Dobrudja since before the war. The small size of peasant holdings other than those in the Dobrudja probably discouraged any large-scale campaign to increase the number of state farms elsewhere. Instead, more attention was devoted to increasing the size of the individual state farms.***

Organization of MTS's was not accelerated until 1948, following the gaining of control of the government by the Communists. The effect of the compulsory sale of machinery is shown by the rapid increase in government-owned tractors during 1948.****

* Southern Dobrudja was acquired from Rumania in 1946.

** Table 1 follows on p. 10.

*** The existence of state farms planned by the Communist Party of Bulgaria did not become of major significance until the Land Reform Law of 9 April 1946. 18/ At that time, 74,370 hectares 19/ of the 243,000 hectares 20/ in the state land fund were allocated by the state for the development of state farms. There was no legal basis for establishing state farms until the adoption of the new constitution on 4 December 1947. 21/ There were a number of farms organized before this date, but most of the farms were organized in 1948.

**** One source places the number of tractors appropriated at 3,600 by the end of 1949. This action accomplished two purposes. First, it gave the Communists the tractors they needed at their own price, and second, it made the private peasants dependent on the government for tractor power. 22/

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Table 1
Progress of Formation of State Farms in Bulgaria
1947-53

<u>Year a/</u>	<u>Number of State Farms</u>	<u>Area in State Farms (Hectares)</u>	<u>Area per State Farm (Hectares)</u>	<u>Area in State Farms as Percent of Total Agricultural Land b/</u>
1947	56 <u>24/</u>	20,700 <u>25/</u>	370	0.4
1948	86 <u>26/</u>	77,500 <u>27/</u>	901	1.6
1949	91 <u>28/</u>	85,000 <u>29/</u>	934	1.7
1950	91 <u>30/</u>	85,000 <u>31/</u>	934	1.7
1951	103 <u>32/</u>	154,500	1,500 <u>33/</u>	3.1
1952	108 <u>34/</u>	160,000 <u>35/</u>	1,481	3.3
1953	108 <u>36/</u>	160,000 <u>37/</u>	1,481	3.3
(Plan)		120,000		2.4

a. End-of-year figures.

b. Agricultural land includes arable land, meadows, vineyards, orchards, and gardens. The estimated agricultural land in Bulgaria is 4.9 million hectares. 23/

The number of MTS's increased from 30 in 1947, 38/ with 140 tractors, 39/ to 71 in 1948, 40/ with 3,526 tractors. 41/ The plan for MTS's in 1948 was exceeded by 42 percent, and the plan for tractors by 71 percent (see Table 2*). During the year, sizable imports of tractors came from the USSR.

Collectivization got off to a slow start in 1947, but by the end of 1948, 1,100 collective farms comprising 78,900 households and controlling 292,380 hectares of agricultural land had been

* Table 2 follows on p. 11.

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Table 2

Machine Tractor Stations and Equipment in Bulgaria
1945-53

Year <u>a/</u>	Tractors			Combines			
	Numbers of MTS's	Total <u>b/</u>	Average Number per MTS	Average Socialized Area per Tractor <u>c/</u> (Hectares)	Number	Average Number per MTS	Average Breadgrain Area per Combine <u>d/</u> (Hectares)
1945	5	165 <u>42/</u>	33	888	0	0	0
1946	21 <u>43/</u>	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	0	0	0
1947	30 <u>44/</u>	140 <u>45/</u>	5	1,289	0	0	0
1948	71 <u>46/</u>	3,526 <u>47/</u>	50	83	0	0	0
Planned by end 1948	50 <u>48/</u>	2,057 <u>49/</u>	41	97	50 <u>50/</u>	1.2	N.A.
1949	86 <u>51/</u>	4,736 <u>e/</u>	55	116	10 <u>51/</u>	0.2	178,000
1950	95 <u>58/</u>	5,936	62	349	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1951	115 <u>59/</u>	7,270	63	308	550 <u>60/</u>	5	3,164
1952	140 <u>61/</u>	8,057	57	312	1,363 <u>62/</u>	10	1,276
1953	149 <u>63/</u>	8,769	59	287	1,563 <u>64/</u>	10	1,113
Planned by end 1953	150 <u>65/</u>	10,000 <u>66/</u>	67	300	100 <u>67/</u>	1.5	N.A.

a. As of the end of the year.

b. Does not allow for depreciation. Represents total tractors, not based on equivalent horsepower units.

c. For total socialized area, see Appendix C, Table 6, p. 47, below.

d. For total breadgrain area, see Appendix C, Table 7, p. 48, below.

e. Total tractors per year for 1949 to 1953 are obtained by adding yearly tractor imports to the previous year's total: Imports are 1949, 1,210 52/; 1950, 1,200 53/; 1951, 1,334 54/; 1952, 787 55/; and 1953, 712. 56/

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organized. 68/ The 1948 plan was overfulfilled by 38 percent in collectives and 32 percent in the number of households. The original plan for area collectivized proved to be too ambitious and it was only by reducing it one-half -- to 200,000 hectares -- that this goal also was overfulfilled, by 46 percent. This change, taken together with the claims for numbers of collectives and households, indicates that the pressure of collectivization probably was aimed at the area of small peasant holdings.

From the point of view of numbers, the Communist government's Two Year Plan was a definite success. Unusually dry weather continuing from 1945 through 1947 probably contributed considerably to the slow start of collectivization in 1947, but the good harvest in 1948 probably encouraged swift action. Campaigns for organizing collectives generally begin after the harvest and continue to early spring.

C. Policies, Plans, and Progress of Socialization, 1949-53.

1. Policies and Plans.

The government launched its Five Year Plan on schedule. Although stressing development of individual farms, it provided for the collectivization of agriculture as well, with plans for improvements by which the main objective, collectivization, could be reached with an accompanying increase in the standard of living.

In the development of socialization of agriculture, the definite targets included the following:

a. By the end of the Five Year Plan (December 1953) collective farms in Bulgaria were to number 4,000, covering 3 million hectares, about 60 percent of the agricultural land. 69/

b. State farms were to become model socialist enterprises. 70/

c. The number of MTS's was to reach 150 with a total of 10,000 tractors. 71/

d. Special emphasis was to be placed on the manufacture of agricultural machinery other than tractors, which were to be imported. 72/

* See Appendix C, Table 6, p. 47, below.

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e. Socialist production was to represent 60 percent of the total production and 72 percent of the marketable production of agricultural commodities. 73/

f. Income of peasant population was to increase by 30 percent. 74/

g. To make possible the higher standard of living proposed during the collectivization campaign, the cultivated area and yields of crops were to be increased. Grain production was to increase by 1 million tons, or 30 percent, 75/ and livestock of all kinds was to be increased considerably. 76/

Bulgaria's First Five Year Plan was not interrupted by the "new course" as were the plans in other Satellites, perhaps because, for one thing, it was supposedly fulfilled 1 year ahead of schedule (1952), before the "new course" began. No new plans for the continued collectivization of agriculture were announced, however, in 1953, and the new Five Year Plan (1953-57) specifies that gains previously made in collectivization must be consolidated and imbalances in the economy corrected. Bulgaria's "new course" announcement, on 8 September 1953, spoke not of collectivization but of other weaknesses in the agricultural sector. Programs were listed which were intended to increase efficiency and production while providing immediate economic relief to the peasants.

2. Progress.

a. Collectivization.

The formation of collective farms was given higher priority than either MTS's or state farms during the First Five Year Plan.* Following the success of the 1948 campaign for collective farms, there came during the next 2 years an equally vigorous and successful campaign culminating in an exceptionally fruitful drive for the Communists but a most devastating one for the peasants.

* The targets set for the Five Year Plan were allegedly attained in 1952, a year ahead of schedule, and the Second Five Year Plan began in 1953. This report, however, deals mainly with the 5 years, 1949-53, in order to maintain consistency in comparing fulfillment of plans with targets originally worked out for 1953.

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Titko Chernokolov, who served as Minister of Agriculture from January 1950 to June 1951, was one of the most ardent leaders of the collectivization drives. During his term of office he spread a wave of terror over the Bulgarian countryside, in what was called a "massivization" campaign.*

Chernokolov was dismissed from the Communist Party in June 1951, the "massivization" program subsided, and by the end of 1953 collectivization was at a standstill.** The goal of 4,000 collective farms by the end of 1953 was almost 30 percent short of fulfillment; instead of 60 percent of the country's households being on collective farms as planned, 568,989, less than 52 percent, could be counted by the end of 1953. Also the plan for the amount of agricultural land which was to have been collectivized failed by 16 percent (see Figure 1***). 78/

Because of the approximately equal size of farms throughout the area collectivized, there is a close correlation between the number of households in the collective system and the

* "This massivization campaign provoked very serious incidents and disturbances. The directors of the operation, whose brutality surpassed any in the other Eastern European countries, had to be sacrificed to public resentment. The Director of Cooperative Farms, Minkov, was relieved of his duties and Chernokolov was given a strong warning, as was his assistant, Vulkov. At the same time the directives of the Ministry of Agriculture were annulled, and the districts and regions were directed to create a fixed number of new cooperative farms within a specified period. The slight lull in collectivization was soon gone, however. Chernokolov's deep desire for continued massivization, this time in the Dobrucaja, with the 'personal aid of Stalin,' proved too much even for his Communist overlords, and he was expelled from the Cabinet as an enemy of collectivization on 23 June 1951. The increasing frequency of acts of sabotage throughout the collectivized area required severe measures against peasants who were leaving the cooperatives. The collectivization of agriculture has been carried out in a less brutal but also less rapid manner in the other people's democracies." 77/


** In fact, there were no collective farms added during 1953. Various sources, however, recorded increases in the number of households on collective farms during 1953.

*** Following p. 14.

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Figure 1

BULGARIA
GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE AND STATE FARMS
1944-53



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size of the collectivized area. Figure 2* presents a graphic disposition of households in Bulgaria since 1945. Land ownership is shown in Figure 3.*

The collectivization campaign of 1950 and early 1951 encountered scattered open resistance among the peasants. One report stated that for the first time in a Cominform country, Bulgaria had experienced a public rebellion against collectivization of agriculture, and the rebellion had been successful. Many peasants had suddenly withdrawn from the collectives in order to start their own farming anew. The government had been forced to yield to the pressure of the peasants. Local authorities had been ordered to drop all reprisals against peasants withdrawing from collectives. The government planned to consolidate the remaining collectives and to further them through increased state assistance. 79/

b. State Farms.

During the course of the Five Year Plan (1949-53), only 22 state farms were created, but the average size of farms increased almost 65 percent. State farms occupy approximately 3 percent of the agricultural land, compared with 6 percent in Rumania, 11 percent in Poland, 14 percent in Czechoslovakia, and 12.5 percent in Hungary. 80/ The progress of the formation of state farms, 1947-53, is shown in Table 1.** Except in the Dobrudja few areas remained in the country where large estates could be appropriated for state farms. Thus while the government has followed a policy of establishing at least one collective farm in each community 81/ it has organized state farms in those areas which provided the most accessible land. Because of the incompetency of state farm leadership, inadequate technical knowledge of the directors, and the general indifference of the workers, state farms have not proved to be the model farms they were intended to be.

Three types of state farms predominate at present: (1) 15 percent are livestock; (2) 80 percent are mixed livestock and general farming; and (3) 5 percent are in vineyards. 82/ The

* Following p. 16.

** P. 10, above.

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efficiency of these farms is described as very low. This evidence justifies the announcement in the new Five Year Plan that more emphasis will be placed on further development and strengthening of state farms during the next 4 years. 83/

c. MTS's.

The development of MTS's has progressed at about the same pace as has that of collective farms. Since 1948, when the machine confiscation campaign was at its height, the establishment of MTS's 84/ has been in the same areas where collective farms have been concentrated.

The plan to have 150 MTS's by the end of 1953 missed being fulfilled by only one. On the basis of an estimated 2,855 collectives and state farms at the end of 1953, there was an average of 1 MTS to each state farm and to each 18 collectives. Since all MTS work is done on a contract basis, some MTS's may cover a larger area in servicing collectives and state farms. These services include plowing, cultivating, sowing, harvesting, and other work which requires the use of machinery. The MTS's now maintain agronomists whose services are free to the collective farms for advice in general agricultural practices. Also, in 1951, a political department was attached to each MTS for propaganda purposes. On 14 October 1953, however, this office was transferred to the regional council, and responsibility of the political department was assigned to the county committees. 85/ Table 2* shows the number of MTS's and their most important machinery, from 1945 to 1953.

Many training courses have been conducted since 1949 to increase the efficiency of the MTS personnel, particularly of tractor drivers and repairmen. A recent ruling provides for the automatic attachment of army tank personnel to MTS's as tractor drivers upon their release from the army. 86/

There were 8,769** tractors in the MTS's by the end of 1953. This number represents about an 88-percent fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. Some of these tractors may not be used in agriculture.

* P. 11, above.

** The Bulgarian government apparently has used two systems of accounting for tractors. The first, instituted at the inception of the Two Year Plan, counted each tractor as a unit. Subsequently,

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Figure 2

BULGARIA
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS UNDER COMMUNIST DOMINATION
1945-53





Figure 3

BULGARIA
DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND UNDER COMMUNIST DOMINATION
1945-53



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Since Bulgaria manufactures no tractors, the number given represents the amount added to the MTS's during the confiscation drive, plus the yearly addition of imports. Nor can it be assumed that all tractors in the MTS's are fully utilized. Tractors are continually breaking

tractors have been inventoried on the basis of horsepower -- 15 horsepower being used as the base unit. Thus a 15-horsepower unit may equal 1 tractor, one-half tractor, and so on. The tractor goal of the First Five Year Plan was 10,000. On its completion (1953) the government claimed to have on hand 13,051 ^{87/} tractors of 15-horsepower units, a figure probably calculated by dividing the aggregate horsepower of all tractors in the country on that date by 15. The two figures (8,769 actual and 13,051 15-horsepower units) cannot be reconciled, since the average horsepower of the 8,769 tractors is unknown. Since this figure does not allow for depreciation, it very probably represents more than 13,051 15-horsepower units. This assumption is based on the suggestion that large tractors are being used on the collective farms which have been established in the grain-growing areas, where heavy equipment can be more efficiently used.

Descriptions of tractors being imported indicate a preponderance of track-type tractors of the popular Soviet KD 34 and DT 54 types whose drawbar horsepower would be approximately 28 and 47 horsepower, respectively. A small sample of tractors taken from defector reports indicates that on one state farm the average horsepower of all tractors was about 26 and the weighted average about 37 horsepower.

There is no indication of the date when the Bulgarian Communist government began inventorying tractors in terms of 15-horsepower units. An official document ^{88/} dated 16 July 1953, in making comparison with 1952 goal fulfillment, refers to the 10,000 tractors in the original Five Year Plan in terms of 15-horsepower units. There can be little doubt that a sizable number of the 8,769 tractors could be charged to depreciation, and the remainder, reduced to 15-horsepower units, would probably add up to the number (13,051) claimed by the government at the end of 1953. To take a hypothetical case: By applying the weighted horsepower figure of 37 to only those tractors imported since 1948 (5,243), which could be considered to be in sufficiently workable condition to be used for agricultural work by the end of 1953, a total of 12,933 tractors of 15 horsepower is obtained. This analysis allows for a complete depreciation by 1953 of the 3,526 tractors (see Table 2) in MTS's at the end of 1948.

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down, and depreciation regularly takes its toll.* At most, the number of tractors probably represents the minimum number required based on an average workload and does not include any reserves.**

3. Mechanization of Agriculture.

Possibly not more than 75 percent of the number of tractors given is available for continuous use, because of breakdowns and other stoppages. A specific example from another Communist country ^{89/} which might be comparable shows the monthly report of two tractor brigades assigned to an operation (possibly plowing) involving a plan of 1,600 hectares, with 3,000 hours assigned. In the time allotted, work had been completed on 1,550 hectares, with 2,400 hours utilized on the job. The remaining 600 hours were charged to stoppages caused by 6 different factors: bad weather, 100 hours; damaged tractor, 140 hours; damaged machine, 60 hours; lack of fuel, 40 hours; needless travel, 160 hours; and lack of work, 100 hours. In this instance the efficiency of tractor use, based on the time allotted, was only 80 percent. Forty percent of the time lost can be charged directly or indirectly to machine failure, damaged tractor, damaged machines, and lack of fuel.

Mechanization makes for increased efficiency in agricultural operations only if there are enough tractors, as in the US, to meet requirements. In Bulgaria, with 8,769 tractors allocated to the socialist sector of 2,512,500 hectares, the average area for each tractor, assuming no loss to depreciation, is 287 hectares, and if the entire agricultural area (4.9 million hectares) is taken, each tractor has an allocation of 559 hectares. In either case, a very low degree of mechanization exists. These figures do not in any way favorably compare with the 180 hectares of land per tractor in Czechoslovakia in 1951, or the 104 hectares of land per tractor in the Czechoslovak

* This would be true as of this date (1953) of many of the tractors which were confiscated from the peasants in 1948. The average useful life of a tractor in Bulgaria probably does not exceed 6 or 7 years.

** The pressure exerted by the government for repair of tractors during the off season (generally the winter) indicates that a tractor is expected to be operated almost continuously once the spring, harvest, and fall campaigns begin, assuming there is no serious breakdown.

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1953 plan, 90/ an indication that an optimum number of hectares per tractor had not been reached in 1951. The above figures are in marked contrast to the 46 hectares of cropland per tractor in the US in 1950. 91/

The Bulgarian regime claimed that in 1952 over-all mechanization had reached 34.7 percent. This figure implies a marked increase in the use of machines other than plows. The percent of land mechanically plowed was 5.1 in 1947, 6.4 in 1948, and 8.3 in 1949. This rate of increase in mechanical plowing (less than 25 percent per year) could have accounted for only about half of the 34.7 percent of mechanization claimed in 1952. 92/

By the end of 1957 (the end of the Second Five Year Plan) there are to be 23,000 15-horsepower tractor units in the collective sector compared with 13,051 in 1953. 93/ Data on the quantity and type of complementary equipment for use with tractors by that date are not available. If Bulgaria is able to fulfill its plan by the end of the Second Five Year Plan, its mechanization will include autumn deep plowing, 75 percent; presowing, 60 percent; sowing of industrial and fodder crops, 67 percent; inter-tilling, 60 percent; machine harvesting, 56 percent; other harvesting, 95 percent; mowing, 50 percent; and cultivating, 75 percent. 94/

One objective of the mechanization of agricultural operations is timeliness of operation, which the Communists believe will result in increased yields. This objective seems feasible, but it is doubtful whether immediate results will be obtained; the problem of sufficient tractors and skilled personnel to operate them does not appear to have been solved. In the US, the tractor has contributed to higher yields per acre by permitting more timely field operations than are possible with horses. This timeliness of operation has been purchased at the cost of maintaining a large tractor park, which has been operated a low number of hours per tractor per year. Bulgaria apparently has tried to utilize its tractor park more fully (because of the inadequate number) and so has sacrificed the possibility of performing each operation at the best possible time. (The same thing has been true in the USSR since its first attempt at mechanization.) 95/

If the Bulgarian government's official statistics are used, 12,295 tractors of 15-horsepower units in 1952 made possible 34.7 percent mechanization. 96/ Assuming that a 100-percent increase

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in tractors (with no loss to depreciation) would double the percent of mechanization, 69-percent mechanization could be attained. The 1957 goal of 23,000 15-horsepower tractor units represents an 87-percent increase over 1952, and would require the importation of 2,141 tractors per year from 1952, even assuming that none of the imported tractors is for replacement of worn-out tractors. The average number of tractors imported per year since 1950 has been less than 1,500. Unless there is a great increase in the number of tractors imported, the 1957 goal cannot be met. Recognizing that many of the imported tractors must be used for replacement purposes, it is doubtful that the planned tractor inventory can be maintained. It does not appear likely that with 69-percent mechanization, or less, there would be sufficient tractors to reduce the intensity of use of tractors to the extent that the timeliness of operations can be improved appreciably. With the present rate of imports, it would take 10 years rather than 5 to realize increased yields from more timely agricultural operations.

IV. Effects of Socialization.

A. Peasants.

The aim of land reform and later of collectivization was the intensification of agriculture. The factors necessary for intensive cultivation, however, were not made available, and the peasants, both on and off the collective farms, suffered a decline in their standard of living.

Although peasants on the collective farms retain title to their land, they have essentially no voice in the determination of the amount of rent they are to receive from the state for its use. A new ruling on 3 December 1953 changed the 1950 rent rate, set by law, from 30 to 25 percent of the net profit from the land. ^{97/} Independent peasants can neither hire labor nor rent additional land. If their land-holding happens to be in the midst of or near land owned by a collective farm, it is expropriated, and the peasant may get in return less fertile land in some other location. On less fertile land, he is still expected to meet the compulsory quotas originally levied on his former, more fertile property. ^{98/}

The most disillusioned peasants were those who joined collective farms and made their contributions to the state in the belief, inspired by the Communists, that they were joining one of

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Bulgaria's original cooperatives. The poor crops and structural changes made in all the realms of the economy by the Communists brought about a chaos which would have caused a revolution had not the heavily armed militia and partly Communized army been in the area to maintain order. 99/ The best defense the peasants have been able to muster has been that of passive resistance -- producing no surplus, making no improvements, and eating grain instead of feeding it to livestock.

The freedom of the independent peasant to remain outside the collective has been purchased at a high price -- high taxes; assignment of high compulsory delivery quotas; confiscation of private woods without reimbursement for the lumber; expulsion of members of the family from universities, high schools, and professional training schools; and the sending of many farmers to concentration camps. 100/

In the collectives, production has advanced little, if any, above that of the independent sector in spite of all the claimed advantages of modern agrotechniques. Some reasons follow:

1. Incompetence of the collective farm directors, who lack authority and are frequently not familiar with farm work.
2. Too large an administrative staff. Each collective farm has a chairman, a director general, deputy directors, accountants, secretary-stenographers, comptrollers, inspectors, political propagandists, agrotechnical instructors, and (Communist) Party secretaries and delegates.
3. Resistance of the peasants to change. The peasants are unable, even after one or two years of collective farm experience, to rid themselves of traditional ideas, habits, and prejudices. Moreover, the peasant women, who formerly did a considerable amount of work in the fields, now refuse to do similar work for the collectives.
4. Lack of individual initiative. All operations are carried out strictly on orders from the central committee. If the orders are not received, sowing, haymaking, and even harvesting are neglected.

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B. Agricultural Production.

1. Field Crops.

Bulgaria, more than any other Satellite country in the postwar period, would have shown considerable progress in increasing agricultural production if agrotechniques, fertilizers, machinery, and other inputs had been applied to the pre-Communist type of cooperative system. Instead, the Communist program limited availability of fertilizers, superior seed and breeding stock, machinery, and credit to the socialized sector, with the result that as late as 1953, production had still not regained prewar levels, as may be seen in Figure 4.*

The claims of higher yields of crops by the Communists early in the collectivization drive have not been reflected in the national totals subsequently announced for the production of the principal crops. The Two Year Plan (1947-48) called for a 34-percent increase in agricultural production over prewar. This was not accomplished. Agricultural production for 1948 as a whole, however, was slightly above the prewar level. The Five Year Plan (1949-53) envisaged an extension of the cultivated area and a large rise in crop yields. Total grain production was to increase 1 million tons, or 30 percent, over prewar. 101/ This goal likewise was not attained.

Production of breadgrains during the period of the Five Year Plan (1949-53) was to have been achieved by increasing the yields, and the area thus saved was to be diverted to the production of industrial crops. A 9-percent increase in the area of breadgrains was required to offset an 8-percent reduction in yields, however. Estimated production by the end of 1953 was approximately 77 percent of the plan.


The per capita production during the Five Year Plan, based on the average production for the periods under consideration, was 12 percent below 1948 and 14 percent below prewar. Except for the favorable 1951 crop year, production of breadgrains during the Five Year Plan was not sufficient to provide for the increase in population.

* Following p. 22.

Figure 4

BULGARIA
INDEX OF AREA, YIELD, PRODUCTION,
AND PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES
1948, and 1949-53 AVERAGE
 1935-39 = 100

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Notwithstanding Communist claims, there appears to be an inverse relationship between per capita production and collectivization. While the 6 percent of the total agricultural land collectivized by 1948 increased to 51.3 percent in 1953, the per capita production index of breadgrains, taking 1948 as 100, decreased to 88 in 1953. If 1935-39 production is taken as 100, that for 1948 and 1949-53 is equal to 97 and 88, respectively.

State farms and then collective farms have priority in the use of farm machinery, seeds, and breeding stock and are given cheaper credit. They are assigned smaller delivery quotas and have lower tax assessments. Thus more inputs of labor, capital, and management are available to the socialized sector. In addition, the socialized sector includes a large percentage of Bulgaria's most fertile land. Could all these factors favoring the socialized sector be assigned a proportionate value, the negative effect of socialization on agricultural production would be substantially greater than is indicated by available statistics.

Although the services of the MTS's theoretically are available to the private farmer, prices demanded for materials and services are exorbitant. Thus the decreased production in the independent sector likewise reflects the adverse effects of socialist control.

The production of coarse grains fared even worse under socialization than did breadgrains. Production of these grains (barley, oats, corn, and mixed grains), which had regained prewar volume by 1948, had dropped 13 percent from 1948 by 1953.

To meet growing demands for industrial crops, the production of sunflowers, sugar beets, and cotton was to be substantially increased during the Five Year Plan. The area devoted to production of sunflowers was 34 percent greater during 1949-53 than before the war. Decreased yields, however, more than offset the increase in area, and production increased by only 10 percent, falling about 11 percent short of production in 1948. The average per capita production during 1949-53 failed to reach prewar levels by 3 percent and was 14 percent below the 1948 level.

Only in the case of sugar beets did per capita production during the course of the Five Year Plan exceed the prewar levels, but it was the increased area, not yields, that accounted for the larger production. The area and yield of sugar beets during the Five Year Plan were not maintained at the 1948 level. Ninety percent as much land

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during 1949-53 produced only 74 percent as much sugar beets as in 1948, despite continued emphasis on increasing sugar production. This same pattern applied to cotton. The 1949-53 average area allocated to cotton was 2.8 times that of 1935-39. Yields for the latter period, however, amounted to 35 percent of the average for 1949-53.

Figure 4 represents indexes of the production of agricultural commodities for the prewar years (average figures for 1935-39), the early postwar period (1948), and the period of the First Five Year Plan (average figures for 1949-53). The 1935-39 average is a convenient prewar base for comparison, since it is used for this purpose by the Communists. The year 1948 is selected to indicate the substantial postwar recovery made in agricultural production, which generally reached prewar levels before the effects of collectivization were reflected in the Bulgarian agricultural economy. The year 1948 is a suitable year for this purpose, since it was a year of average weather conditions. For the Five Year Plan period (1949-53) the average production is used, which is substantially the same as production for the single year, 1953. It is not practicable to indicate the effects of the progress of socialization over this 5-year period. They probably were not great, and they cannot be distinguished from the effects of other variables, such as weather, labor, prices, and crop rotation.

2. Livestock.

The effect of socialization on livestock is somewhat clearer than that on field crops. Premier Chervenkov's summary of livestock conditions on 25 February 1954 reveals a "serious lagging in the field of stockbreeding" and states that the "decrease in numbers of cattle, horses, and sheep took place exactly in the accountable period" (1949-53). He further states that "cattle-breeding, sheep-breeding, and pig-breeding farms* were set up in almost all LCAF's ... more than 13,000 stockbreeding farms were built in LCAF's and state farms ... the number of cattle as well as

* The term farm in this connection means that the LCAF has a cattle barn, a sheep barn, and a pig barn. No separate area of land except the usual pasture is set aside for livestock breeding.

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cattle productivity in the LCAF's is lagging" While over half the agricultural land was in the socialized sector, "only 23.8 percent of the cattle, 34.1 percent of the sheep, 18.3 percent of the pigs, and 42.6 percent of the horses were to be found in the LCAF's in 1953." Reasons given for nonfulfillment of plans were that "the sterility and mortality of domestic animals are still high while their productivity is still low. The fodder basis of our stock-breeding is entirely inadequate. This for the time being is the weakest spot in our agriculture." 102/

Table 3* gives a comparison of livestock numbers in the prewar period (1935-39 average) and in 1948 and 1953 (end-of-year numbers).** Numbers of cattle, sheep, and horses were far below the 1948 level; hog numbers were increased considerably; and numbers of goats, which were to have decreased, actually increased instead. In comparison with 1948 numbers, the 1953 plan for horses failed by 25 percent. A larger percentage of horses were on collective farms than any other category of livestock, according to official announcement. 103/ Cattle numbers were 11 percent lower in 1953 than in 1948 and were 14 percent below the 1953 plan. Sheep numbers in 1953 were 15 percent below those for 1948 and 27 percent below the plan goal.*** The production of hogs came nearest fulfilling 1953 plans, but in this instance plans were underfulfilled by 11 percent. The number of goats, contrary to plan, increased above the prewar level. Lack of feed and fodder has accounted in part for the failure of livestock as a whole to increase, but lack of feed cannot be blamed for the dislocation of livestock throughout the country. Although the raising of sheep and goats is confined primarily to the grazing areas, which are not yet socialized, it is expected that the majority of cattle and hogs would be in the socialized sector, since that sector produces feed for these animals, which are counted on to make up the present meat deficit. Since households on the collective farms are allowed to keep some animals on their private farmsteads, it is likely that a large number of hogs and probably some cattle and sheep, which are not entered in official statistics, are produced in the collectivized area.

* Table 3 follows on p. 26.

** Considered to be the same as 1 January figures for 1949 and 1954.

*** The percentages of failure, increases in livestock by 1953, and the proportion of various categories of livestock in 1953 to 1948 are not official statistics but are calculated from official statistics and from data in Table 3.

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Table 3

Livestock Numbers in Bulgaria
1935-39 Average, 1939, 1948, and 1955 e/

End of Year (except as noted b/)	Horses	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Hogs
1935-39 Average	532 <u>104/</u>	1,822 <u>c/ 105/</u>	8,746 <u>106/</u>	812 <u>c/ 107/</u>	833 <u>108/</u>
1939 (September)	584 <u>109/</u>	1,512	9,935	581	752
1948	549 <u>110/</u>	1,754 <u>111/</u>	8,942 <u>112/</u>	1,000 <u>d/</u>	1,073 <u>e/</u>
1953	460 <u>116/</u>	1,568 <u>117/</u>	7,600 <u>118/</u>	1,000 <u>f/</u>	1,335 <u>120/</u>
1953 (Plan) <u>g/</u>	613	1,814	10,432	465	1,504

Thousands

- a. Adjusted to postwar boundaries.
- b. Bulgaria's livestock inventory is completed in December, but figures are published as of the first of the following year. Thus, for example, end-of-year figures for 1948 appear as 1 January 1949 data.
- c. Less than 5-year average.
- d. Source 113/ gives Minister of Agriculture estimate for 1947. There was no indication of any substantial change in goat numbers during 1948, so the 1947 figure is used.
- e. This figure is obtained by prorating the increase in numbers of hogs between the 825,000 hogs reported for 1947 114/ and the 1,320,000 reported for 1949. 115/
- f. The Communist government of Bulgaria has been very careful not to disclose the goat situation. Available sources do not indicate any substantial decrease in goat numbers despite the government plan to reduce the number of goats. Most of the goats are in the independent zone, which comprises the poorer agricultural and mountainous (grazing) areas. Peasants in these areas have undoubtedly increased goat numbers to replace the decrease in milk supply resulting from the loss of milk cows.

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Table 3

Livestock Numbers in Bulgaria.
1935-39 Average, 1939, 1948, and 1955 a/
(Continued)

According to Chervenkov's report to the Sixth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party on 25 February 1954, milk-cow numbers have not reached prewar levels. 119/
g. Calculated on the basis of official percentages, changes in numbers of livestock as of 1939: horses, 5-percent increase; cattle, 20-percent increase; hogs, 100-percent increase; sheep, 5-percent increase; and goats, 20-percent decrease. 121/

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The proportionately smaller livestock numbers in the socialized sector measure the peasant's protest against collectivization. During the collectivization drive, peasants who entered the collective farm slaughtered or sold their livestock rather than surrender or sell them to the collective farm. As members of the collective farm, peasants do not take the same personal interest in community-owned livestock as they do in their own, and the neglect at critical times and improper care of breeding stock and the young result in abnormal losses. The private peasant, realizing that government policy still looks to eventual nationalization of his holdings, is not inclined to increase his livestock. In many instances, because of lack of capital and feed supplies (also the result of collectivization), he is limited as to the numbers of livestock he can afford to carry. In spite of the government's apparent concern for increasing livestock, the policies followed in the earlier stages of collectivization were not conducive to attaining this result. Peasants will get along without livestock and livestock products when animal and peasant have to compete for the land as a means of sustaining life.* At the same time, with industrialization there arises a much larger demand for meat and animal products. During the Five Year Plan, when the supply of animal products was declining, the requirements were increasing.

The future of Bulgaria's livestock production will depend to a large extent on the resources required for increasing livestock numbers. Because of the nature of the climate and soil in Bulgaria, there may be some question as to the ability of the country to maintain the type of intensified programs required to sustain a flourishing livestock industry. 122/ To obtain the desired goal might require a volume of inputs larger than the Communists could or would be willing to make, considering the value of expected returns.

3. Food Availabilities.

After 1948, when total agricultural production recovered to the prewar level, it remained at about this level, and gross per capita production declined. As shown in Table 4,** the gross per capita production of the major food commodities in 1948 had failed

* In a country such as Bulgaria where fodder and grain resources are limited, the production of grain for food is the most efficient, but when fed to livestock it provides a better balanced and more nutritious diet. Where man and animal compete for the land an unbalanced diet usually results.

** Table 4 follows on p. 29.

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to reach the 1935-39 average by only 4 percent. Weather conditions in 1952 were below normal. With the deterioration of the farm labor effort and the increase in population, per capita production was reduced to 71 percent of the 1935-39 average and was 26 percent below that of 1948. Weather in 1953 was more favorable to crop production than in 1952, but, with an increase in population and low morale among peasants, per capita gross production of the major foodstuffs recovered to only 83 percent of the 1935-39 average and was 14 percent below that of 1948.

Table 4

Per Capita Production of Selected Food Commodities
in Bulgaria ^{a/}
1935-39 Average, 1948, 1952, and 1953

Selected Commodities ^{b/}	Kilograms			
	Average 1935-39	1948	1952 ^{123/}	1953 ^{124/}
Breadgrains	330.5 ^{125/}	321.6 ^{126/}	266.4	284.0
Coarse Grains ^{c/}	216.2 ^{127/}	203.9 ^{128/}	118.4	167.1
Rice	3.3 ^{129/}	2.0	3.1	3.2
Total Grains	<u>550.0</u>	<u>527.5</u>	<u>387.9</u>	<u>454.3</u>
Sugar	3.6 ^{130/}	8.5	4.8	7.6
Potatoes	17.4 ^{131/}	15.4	8.3	11.8
Meat	20.1 ^{132/}	18.4	17.0	12.9
Fats and Oils	8.0 ^{133/}	8.1	8.6	9.0
Total Other Foods	<u>49.1</u>	<u>50.4</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>41.3</u>
Total Per Capita Production	<u>599.1</u>	<u>577.9</u>	<u>426.6</u>	<u>495.6</u>
Percent of Prewar	100	96	71	83

a. Figures in this table are calculated from data in sources indicated.

b. These commodities account for approximately 95 percent of the food in the Bulgarian diet.

c. Includes barley, oats, and corn.

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The per capita supply of food available for human consumption dropped somewhat less in the postwar period than per capita production, as is shown in Tables 4 and 5, which give prewar average availability and comparable figures for selected postwar consumption years (1 July to 30 June).*

Table 5

Gross per Capita Availability of Selected Food Commodities
for Human Consumption in Bulgaria
1933-37 Average, 1948/49, 1952/53, and 1953/54

Selected Commodities <u>a/**</u>	Kilograms			
	Average 1933-37 <u>b/</u>	1948/49 <u>c/</u>	1952/53 <u>d/</u>	1953/54 <u>e/</u>
Breadgrains <u>f/</u>	198.5	208.4	188.8	191.2
Other Grains <u>g/</u>	62.1	55.2	29.3	54.1
Total Grains	<u>260.6</u>	<u>263.6</u>	<u>218.1</u>	<u>245.3</u>
Sugar	3.7	3.8	4.1	5.0
Potatoes	10.2	9.2	3.1	6.7
Meat	22.6	18.5	17.0	10.9
Fats and Oils	8.9	7.6	7.0	6.3
Total Other Foods	<u>45.4</u>	<u>39.1</u>	<u>31.2</u>	<u>28.9</u>
Total	<u>306.0</u>	<u>302.7</u>	<u>249.3</u>	<u>274.2</u>
Percent of Prewar	100	99	81	90

* In comparing prewar and postwar acreages and production in the European Satellites and Western Europe, it is the practice of the interdepartmental agencies (State and Agriculture among others) to use 1935-39 as the comparison base. In comparing the food supply available for human consumption, however, it is necessary to employ the 1933-37 average because there are no reliable international trade statistics available for Eastern Europe after 1937. Per capita production in 1933-37 was 1.7 percent below that of 1935-39.

** Footnotes for Table 5 follow on p. 31.

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Table 5

Gross per Capita Availability of Selected Food Commodities
for Human Consumption in Bulgaria
1933-37 Average, 1948/49, 1952/53, and 1953/54
(Continued)

-
- a. These commodities make up almost 95 percent of the food in the Bulgarian diet.
 - b. Calculated from source 134/.
 - c. Estimated.
 - d. Calculated from source 135/.
 - e. Calculated from source 136/.
 - f. Grain equivalent of flour extracted at 80 percent before the war and 85 percent after the war.
 - g. Including rice.

The small difference between the two indexes at the bottom of Tables 4 and 5 is accounted for by the small fluctuation in the proportion of food exported or used for nonfood purposes -- 48 percent of total production in 1948/49, 42 percent in 1952/53, and 46 percent in 1953/54, as compared with 48 percent in 1933-37. Although the proportion of food production available for human consumption from 1948/49 to 1953/54 (Table 5) was somewhat higher than in the prewar period, the fact remains that in absolute terms the per capita availability of food fell during this period. The per capita availability of food for 1948/49 was only 1 percent below that for 1933-37, but in 1952/53 it was 19 percent and in 1953/54 10 percent below prewar. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that there was a considerable deterioration of the quality of the diet in 1952/53 and 1953/54.

This analysis points up the inflexibility of government control in Bulgaria under socialism. Once the harvest had been gathered, government demands and commitments had to be fulfilled ahead of food requirements.

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Aside from the effects of weather, many other factors have affected food availabilities. Government policy has had a depressing effect on agricultural production by providing for the confiscation of machinery, establishment of delivery quotas, and discriminatory taxes and fines. There were moreover two drastic currency reforms, and administrative action has discriminated continually against independent peasants in the allocation of fertilizer, credit, tractors and other machines, seed, and breeding stocks.

4. Food Availability Potential.

There is practically no new land in Bulgaria that can be brought into cultivation. Increased production must be obtained through intensified cultivation of the land. This would require larger capital inputs. Although the main emphasis now is on increasing livestock production, the basis of the farm system must remain the production of grain, and livestock fodder will have to be produced in an unfamiliar rotation.^{137/} An adequate fodder base to sustain the planned number of livestock will be difficult to obtain, since the climate throughout Bulgaria is too dry for good hay and root crops. Unless the government is willing to finance the livestock program, its rapid progress is questionable. The purchase of breeding stock by the peasant requires a sizable monetary outlay, which the peasant is unlikely to make, in view of the threat of continued collectivization.

Nor does it appear likely that the independent peasant will exert extra effort -- if indeed as much -- to increase the production of agricultural crops so long as there is no official retraction of the collectivization program. Recognizing that future collectivization drives may come at any time, the independent peasant is not likely to operate his farm enterprise in a manner that will give an unnecessary advantage to the Communist government. Food availabilities, therefore, can be expected to be low for some time to come, unless unusually favorable weather conditions occur which will increase production without extra effort on the part of the peasant -- both in and out of the collective.

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V. Future Developments of Collectivization in Bulgaria.

Although collectivization in Bulgaria is presently in a state of so-called consolidation, to gain the final Communist goal of state ownership will require a continuation of collectivization, which will eventually eliminate the kulak.* Nationalization of the land, by which the state will gain full ownership, may be the final step in socializing Bulgaria's agricultural resources. The implementation of further collectivization will depend largely upon the degree of progress the regime has made in its consolidation of present collective holdings and in inducing the malcontent peasants to join the collectives and the degree of success obtained in increasing the efficiency of operation and crop production on the collective and state farms. These programs have been in effect since 1951 but have met with little success.

The "new course" announced in 1953 eliminated many of the coercive measures previously enforced by the government for the purpose of discriminating against recalcitrant peasants, but it still provides more favors for the peasant on the collective farm. Concessions to independent peasants seem to be made only as a means of stimulating greater effort toward increasing the production of crops and livestock, which is needed to reverse the sagging living standards.

Soon after the announcement of the "new course," important changes, some concessionary and some obligatory, were registered in the exemplary statutes for LCAF's.** On the concessionary side, LCAF members may now own on their private plots 2 sows with suckling pigs, whereas formerly they could have 1 sow, and in the eastern areas members may keep as many as 5 sows. In the mountainous regions, LCAF members may now own 5 to 10 sheep, whereas previously they were allowed 3 to 5. The fund for assisting LCAF members who are unable to work is to be increased, and motherhood and pregnancy leaves are to be considerably extended.

The lowering of the age limit for membership in the LCAF from 18 to 16 years and the trend toward allowing all household members now to perform work which previously only members might do may indicate a labor shortage.

* A kulak is any person who hires labor or owns large amounts of land. The term also is applied to persons who differ from the Party line.

** Announced on 3 December 1953. 138/

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On the obligatory side, rents paid to LCAF members are lower, members leaving the collective may transfer their land but not sell it, and members' livestock and equipment brought in to the collective for the common use are to be designated as LCAF property.

The new grain delivery quotas announced in December 1953 demand deliveries from previously exempt small, independent farms and raise the compulsory delivery quotas of other independent peasants on a proportionate scale so that less is required from a large holding or from one of better land. This move is further evidence that the regime intends to force the small, less fortunate independent farmers to merge their small uneconomical holdings, join collective farms, or shift production from grain to vegetables or industrial crops. 139/ With a large portion of the remaining independent peasants in collectives, the Communist government would be in a much stronger position to deal more directly with the kulaks. It is not likely, however, that an active campaign of further collectivization will be initiated until an adequate food supply can be assured. Nor does it appear likely that any large-scale collective drive will be undertaken until the socialized sector is in a position to guarantee the volume of agricultural production that such a drive would require.

The Second Five Year Plan in Bulgaria is aimed primarily at insuring an increased standard of living through more efficient agricultural practices which will increase production of grains and industrial crops, and especially increase the livestock base.* Also during this period emphasis is to be on strengthening state farms and MTS's and on training large numbers of cadres -- all things which would materially help a future collectivization drive.

Although only voluntary collectivization is provided for in the Second Five Year Plan, there is evidence that the Communists plan eventually to bring all peasants into the collectives 141/ and to nationalize the land. Premier Chervenkov stated, "The socialist basis is developing and becoming stronger all the time, while the principle of the right to private property will gradually contract ... to become cooperative property -- to attain such a state

* An analysis of the Second Five Year Plan, however, indicates that by 1957 the independent sector will still own less than 50 percent of the livestock and that total livestock numbers will be about equal to those of 1939. 140/

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of affairs when it becomes de facto state property. The question as to nationalization will be solved in practice when all the land will be used in perpetuity by LCAF's." 142/

VI. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.

A. Capabilities.

After a 3-year period of consolidation (1952-54) collective farms have not yet come up to the production standard which would afford the Bulgarian people an increase in standards of living. Dissatisfaction and outright resistance among the peasants, as well as among the noncollectivized farmers, continue to retard the achievements which the Communists seek.

The "new course" as adopted in Bulgaria has, to a limited extent, tried to meet many of the criticisms of the peasants, especially those within the socialist sector, with the apparent hope that the tactical retrenchment would soften the peasant's negative attitude toward the regime and consequently improve his willingness to cooperate. Socialization of agriculture has advanced further and more rapidly in Bulgaria than any of the other European Satellites. Although methods of socializing Bulgaria's agriculture depart somewhat from those used by the USSR, the goals are the same. An analysis of the effect of the socialization of agriculture on the Bulgarian economy may well represent the results that may be expected from the pursuit of a similar course of action in other European Satellites.

B. Vulnerabilities.

It appears that Bulgaria has recognized that the agricultural sector is vulnerable. Dissident peasants and decreasing food supplies indirectly affect the morale and productivity of the industrial workers upon whose favor the Communist Party depends for much of its support. This decrease in living standards is apparent in all sectors of the economy.

The regime has further shown concern over its vulnerable position in agriculture by halting collectivization and by directing its attention to consolidating and strengthening the existing

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collectives. (See Figure 5* for administrative structure of agriculture in Bulgaria.)

It is felt, however, that while the Communists have made a number of concessions to the peasants through the "new course," more concessions must be made before the peasants' negative attitude will change toward the whole Communist program.

C. Intentions.

The "new course" of the Bulgarian government may be a deviation, even if temporary, from the Communist plan of completely socializing agriculture. Investment funds are diverted from the industrial sector to the agricultural sector with the hope of improving the standard of living.

The long-run goal of the government continues to be the complete socialization of agriculture. A temporary relaxation in the method and rate of collectivization occurred with the announcement of the "new course" in 1953. The intention to continue with collectivization, however, still exists. As Premier Chervenkov stated above, "the rights to private property will gradually continue to contract ... (and) the question as to nationalization will be solved ... when all the land will be used in perpetuity by LCAF's."

The types of investments in the agricultural sector, although said by the Communists to improve the standard of living, tend to strengthen the government's position in its long-run intention of socializing agriculture.

* Following p. 38.

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APPENDIX A

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The socialization of agriculture in Bulgaria is directed and controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Communist Party (see Figure 5*).

A. Ministry of Agriculture.

Agricultural affairs in Bulgaria are under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is responsible to the Council of Ministers. 143/ The Minister of Agriculture, his deputies, and his selected advisors receive their appointments from the Council of Ministers. The highest and final authority within the agricultural ministry is vested in the Minister, although he, his deputies, and his advisors form a collegium and together are charged with the responsibility of receiving all recommendations and suggestions from the subordinate ministerial bodies before submitting them to the Council of Ministers. They also review all recommendations and decisions coming from the Council of Ministers for the action of the Ministry.

Responsible to the Minister of Agriculture is a central administration which consists of 9 directorates,** 8 departments,*** and a number of special organizations, such as those for maintenance of the General Chancellery, for land surveys, and for over-all planning. 146/ It is through this structural network that the Ministry of Agriculture implements the decisions of the Council of Ministers.

* Following p. 38.

** The nine directorates 144/ are: Plant Culture, Animal Husbandry, Veterinary Service, Collective Farms (LCAF's -- Labor Cooperative Agricultural Farms), State Agricultural Farms, Machine Tractor Stations, Agricultural Supplies and Graded Seed, Veterinary Supplies, and Water Economy.

*** The eight departments 145/ are: Economic Planning, Land Distribution and Crop Rotation, Construction, Personnel Training, Personnel Administration, Scientific Research, Finance and Accounting, and Maintenance.

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To insure the successful execution of the policy directives of the Council of Ministers, the Communist Party maintains a group of monitors and inspectors who are assigned to the Ministry, many times to insignificant positions, to check on the activities of those who are politically unreliable. ^{147/} These undercover agents are to increase efficiency and maintain the political reliability of the functionaries in the Ministry.

By the nature of the central government apparatus through which Bulgarian governmental policy evolves, there is essentially no initiation of legislation or method of procedure emanating from the regional or local levels of government. The scope and detail of national decrees and directives include directions for the most detailed operations. The organizations responsible for agricultural affairs in the okrugs (districts), okoliyas (counties), and obshtinas (townships) are mainly local agencies of the central government.

B. Collective Farms.


Until the establishment of the Communist-controlled Fatherland Front in late 1944, ^{148/} the Bulgarian Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives* had been operating within the over-all structure of the cooperative movement. In that period the cooperative movement, which was one of the most advanced in the Balkans, was organized through a network of centers and associations along the lines found in Western European cooperatives. ^{149/} There was a national center which handled the affairs of the cooperative on the national level and with the central government. The local administrative centers directed respectively the cooperative affairs on the okrug, okoliya, and obshtina levels.

* In the pre-Communist period, the Bulgarians had already established a number of agriculture producer cooperatives. These cooperatives were patterned after Western cooperative organizations, being set up as voluntary associations of peasants united together under a common program to raise their living standard. They were based on the independent voluntary action and initiative of the individual; yet they gave valuable assistance to him in providing many of the factors of production, which, as an independent subsistent peasant, he was unable to provide for himself. Administration was conducted by persons duly elected by the membership. Over-all organization and operation proceeded according to general lines laid down by the government. For the most part, though, the cooperatives received only paternal guidance from the government.

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Figure 5
Bulgaria: Administrative Organization
of Agriculture 1959
1954



Legend
 Management and operational control
 Party control (enforcement through liaison and monitoring) - - - - -

- a. Elected governmental body representing all the people of Bulgaria. Administratively it is responsible for the governmental affairs of the capital at Sofia.
- b. Elected governmental body representing the people from only one okrug (district). It is delegated responsibility for the governmental affairs of many large cities.
- c. Elected governmental body representing the people of only one okoliya (county). It is delegated responsibility for the governmental affairs of most of the cities large enough to have separate city governmental units and not controlled by the Okrug People's Soviet.
- d. Elected governmental body representing the people of only one obshchina (township).
- e. The President is the collective farm's representative on the Obshchina Soviet.
- f. The Executive Committee of the Obshchina People's Soviet represents the farm in the Obshchina People's Soviet. Management control, however, is administered by the Okoliya Agriculture Section.
- g. The Okrug Agriculture Section is attached to the Okrug People's Soviet. The supervision of the work of the section is generally handled by an appointee or appointees from the Ministry of Agriculture. The section is responsible to the People's Soviet as well as the Ministry of Agriculture.
- h. The Okoliya Agriculture Section is similar in organization to that of the Okrug Agriculture Section. It differs in that it is responsible to three governmental units, namely the Okoliya People's Soviet, the Okrug Agriculture Section, and the Ministry of Agriculture.
- i. The MTS's are directly responsible to the Ministry of Agriculture.
- j. The State farms are directly responsible to the Ministry of Agriculture.
- k. The Central Committee of Party N/1 maintains a personal outlook over the affairs of the government. By means of liaison with other governmental and Party units, it influences the political appointments and policies of the government. It also controls efficiency, loyalty, and discipline through a program of monitoring.

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Figure 6* shows the organization which continued throughout the administration of the Fatherland Front Coalition.** The agriculture producer cooperatives were changed into LCAF's by decree in April 1945. 151/ Under this statute, the expansion and direction of collectives continued theoretically under the old form already well established in the countryside. In practice, however, this was not the case. Collectives were promiscuously expanded and those existing were rapidly converted into collectives similar to the kolkhozy of the USSR. The Dimitrov Constitution, which was adopted in December 1947, rearranged the whole governmental structure in accordance with that found in the USSR. 152/ The independent nature of the pre-Communist cooperative movement no longer existed; however, organizationally it remained the same.

In 1951 the government issued a decree for the establishment of a Model Statute for Collective Farms. 153/ This decree separated the labor cooperative farm program from the cooperative movement (see Figure 7*). The directorate for collectives with its regional offices became the responsible organ for handling LCAF affairs. All collectives were to establish themselves along the lines outlined in this statute (see Appendix B). A properly established collective, having filed its statutes with the government, finally would receive a charter recognizing its existence.

The collective farm by law is a legal entity of the government directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. Its operation theoretically remains under the control of the farm's collective assembly, but in actual practice, control is exercised by the central government through the machinery and activities of the Communist party.

The Bulgarian collective farm organization (see Figure 8*) is patterned after the kolkhozy of the USSR and is based upon the law setting forth the proper provisions for forming a collective. 154/

* Following p. 40.

** Agrarians, Social Democrats, and Communists.

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The collective farm affairs are subject to the approval or disapproval of the collective farm assembly, which is composed of the members.* This body elects a president, a board of managers, and a board of auditors who perform the daily executive tasks on the farm. In addition, the assembly performs the following functions 156/:

1. Accepts new members, expels members from the ranks of the farm.
2. Determines the extent of the entrance inventory payment.
3. Confirms the production plan, the budget of revenues and expenditures, the construction plan, the labor norms and the conversion of work performed by individuals into labor days, the norms for crop yields, and the extent of additional remuneration of labor.
4. Confirms the contracts concluded by the farm with the MTS's, and with other organizations and institutions.
5. Approves the annual report of the managing and auditing boards and the reports on important agricultural campaigns of the board of managers.
6. Establishes the extent of the rent within the limits determined in the bylaws.
7. Confirms the distribution of the revenues in cash and in kind.
8. Approves the regulation for the internal order of the farm.
9. Determines the extent of remuneration in labor days of permanently engaged regular personnel.

* Membership is granted on the following basis 155/:

1. Any farmer, regardless of whether he possesses personal land or not, who is 16 years old and who invests his personal labor in agricultural production is a member of the collective farm.
2. Members of his family, male and female, who invest their personal labor in agricultural production are admitted to membership in the collective farm.
3. Any farmer who owns land and lives within the zone of the collective farm but who is unable to contribute labor because of public, Party, or officially approved work elsewhere is accepted on general principle as a member of the collective farms.
4. Kulaks are not admitted.


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S-E-C-R-E-T

Figure 6

Bulgaria: Cooperative Movement
before 1951



Legend


- Appointments or direction of representation ————
- Direction of control by government inspectors - - - - -
- Direction of control by cooperative inspectors - - - - -

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Figure 7

Bulgaria: Cooperative Movement since 1951



Legend a/

Party control _____
 Government control - - - - -


a. Party control is primarily an enforcement function. Government control is a management function.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Figure 8

Bulgaria: Collective Farm Organization



S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

The decisions of the farm assembly are binding upon all members. The board of managers is expected to act for the assembly when not in session. Its decisions are subject, however, to the approval of the assembly. The accounting staff is subject to the supervision of the board of managers. An auditing board selected by the farm's assembly is charged with the responsibility of reviewing the financial activity of the board of managers and reporting their findings every two or three months to the members at the assembly meeting.

The board of managers generally consists of 5 to 7 members, 157/ each of whom supervises one or more brigade leaders. The brigades may be assigned to certain areas of the farm or to specific jobs, such as tending livestock, milking, and planting. The brigades, depending upon the type of work, are often broken into groups for purposes of supervision, competition, and discipline.

C. State Farms.

The Land Reform Law of March 1946 permitted for the first time the establishment of state farms in Bulgaria. 158/ These farms were established under the control of a directorate of state farms within the Ministry of Agriculture. Figure 9* shows the administrative organization of the state farms on the national level, and Figure 10* shows the functional organization at the farm level.

The state farm, unlike the collective, is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture. The farm manager, his assistant directors, an agronomist or veterinarian, and the farm's accountant are all appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture, with the farm manager and directors approved by the Communist Party. Between September 1951 and 1953, 159/ there was an assistant director for political affairs established at the state farms. In 1953, the responsibility for political education and agitation was returned to the local Communist Party and the farm manager. The brigades are usually no larger than 20 to 30 workers and are supervised by a brigadier, who is generally a member of the local Party organization.

* Following p. 42.

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D. MTS's.

Bulgarian MTS's were established by law in 1945. They expanded slowly at first and were not of major significance until the Requisition Law of 1948, which forced all private peasants to sell their machinery to the government.

The governmental organization of MTS's is similar to that for state farms (see Figure 11*). The MTS manager and assistant directors receive their appointments from the Ministry of Agriculture with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and are subordinate in administrative affairs to the directorate of MTS's. The manager is responsible for the implementation of all decrees and plans and is personally responsible for their enforcement and accomplishments.

Before the establishment of the political directorate in MTS's in 1951, 161/ the local Party committees monitored and carried on party work; however, because of inefficiencies and lack of Party orientation among the workers, a political directorate was established in each MTS. This directorate was abolished in 1953. Political responsibility in the MTS has probably reverted back to the local Party organization.

The individual MTS** includes tractors, combines, and other agricultural machinery along with operating personnel such as tractor and combine operators. All auxiliary personnel, however, is furnished by the collective. 163/*** Figure 12* shows the structural organization of a typical MTS.

The MTS has a section for repairs, an agronomy section, and an administrative and office section. Presumably there is a central coordinating group within the MTS which is assigned the function of planning, contracting, coordinating, and controlling the work of the various sections and brigades. Such a group would maintain statistics and make reports to higher echelons of control.

* Following p. 42.


** Very little information is available on the organization of Bulgarian MTS's. The information contained in this report has been taken from source 162/.

*** It is not clear how many brigade members are full-time employees of the MTS, but available information substantiates the fact that the tractor drivers are controlled by the MTS.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Figure 9

Bulgaria: Administrative Organization
of State Farms



Legend


Party control —————
Government control. . . - - - - -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Figure 10

Bulgaria: Functional Organization of State Farms 160/



Legend


Appointment responsibility _____
Management responsibility - - - - -

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Figure 11

Bulgaria: Administrative Organization
of Machine Tractor Stations



Legend


Party control ———
Government control - - - - -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Figure 12

Bulgaria: Functional Organization
of Machine Tractor Stations



Legend

Appointment responsibility ———
Management responsibility - - - -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX B

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF A BULGARIAN COLLECTIVE FARM

At the center of Bulgaria's program for the socialization of agriculture is the collective, 164/ which differs in organization and operation from the kolkhoz type of collective in the USSR in that the collective farm member retains an equity in the land that he contributes and receives annual remuneration in the form of rent. (See Figure 13* for the distribution of collective farms in Bulgaria.) Following the advent of the Communist regime, collective farms were fostered in all rural areas in Bulgaria. Initially they were established on land confiscated from the large landowners and from persons who had supported the wartime government. Large collectivization drives, however, soon followed, which by means of threats and economic discrimination drove many poor and less fortunate peasants into the collective farms.

Upon the formation of a collective farm, each member must submit the following 165/:

1. A written application for membership giving details concerning land, machinery, implements, and livestock owned by him.
2. A transfer of land to the name of the LCAF.**
3. A payment of a designated sum of money, about 1,500 to 2,000 leva per decare*** 166/ of invested land, which is returnable (less amortization) in case of withdrawal.****

* Inside back cover.

** Members joining the LCAF without land usually receive fund land from the state or rented land against payment of rent. All members have some land unless decided otherwise by the farm assembly.

*** A decare of land is equal to one-tenth of a hectare.

**** This payment may be in cash or its equivalent in livestock or agricultural machinery. If a member is unable to meet these requirements, his payment is forwarded for him by the collective farm with the stipulation that it shall be deducted from the applying member's future profits. If a member brings in more than his payment in the form of livestock or agricultural machinery, he is paid the additional worth by the collective farm over a period of 4 to 7 years.

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After receipt of 15 applications plus an agreed statute subscribing to the provisions of the model statute of the country, the government issues a certificate which establishes the collective as a legal entity.

When a member enters a collective farm, his land, livestock, and machinery are transferred to the enterprise and are used as common property. Each household is allowed to retain 2 to 5 decares* of land for personal use, along with some small agricultural equipment, 1 cow with calf, 1 or 2 female goats with kids, 2 sows with litters, 5 to 10 sheep with lambs, an unlimited number of poultry and rabbits, and 20 beehives. 167/

The acceptance of the land by the collective is usually handled by a special group made up of members of the cooperative and an agronomist or land surveyor from the agricultural section of the District People's Soviet. The special group is delegated to measure, classify, and categorize each parcel of land coming into the farm. The action of this group governs the amount of rent payable each year to the peasant.

A similar evaluation is drawn up covering the value of a member's livestock and machinery contribution. A group elected by the farm's assembly, along with a representative from the District People's Soviet is responsible for this evaluation. The value of livestock and machinery is based on average market prices.

In addition to land, livestock, and machinery, each property owner must provide enough seed and fodder, which is placed in a common fund, to plant his land and feed his livestock for a year or until the next crop.

Membership in the collective is governed by the farm statute, which follows the model statute for collective farms. This law requires a member to be 16 years of age* and to agree to membership for 3 years. Membership is not based on land ownership, although each household generally has some land. A person, with permission of the board of managers and with the approval of the Farm Assembly, may be accepted to membership on the basis of contributing only labor. This group consists mainly of landowners'

* See source 153/.

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families but may include those without land.* In a similar way, a person who contributes land but is unable to contribute labor because of employment elsewhere may be accepted for membership. Admittance as well as expulsion from the collective is contingent upon a two-thirds vote by a quorum of the Farm Assembly. No kulak or person deprived of voting rights may be admitted. Expulsion may be appealed no higher than the District People's Soviet.

Work on the collective farm is performed by the members with the following exceptions: technical work such as that done by agronomists, engineers, and MTS brigades (see Figure 14**) and special work which because of its urgency requires the hiring of temporary laborers, particularly the seasonal work connected with crop planting and the harvest. Women as well as men are encouraged and expected to enter the production activities of the collective farm.

The labor activity of a collective farm is regulated in strict conformity with the laws, ordinances, and instructions of state authorities. Hence all work is done according to the plan established by the central government and its subsidiary units in the local government bodies. The method of work also follows those recommendations made by state authorities.

All work in agriculture and livestock is measured by the piece or unit method both by group or by individual, depending upon the nature of the specific task. Each task is defined, and a model norm is assigned. These model norms are predetermined amounts of work-hours needed for one unit of remuneration and are published by the Ministry of Agriculture and confirmed by the farm assembly. The number of work-hours is recorded, and at the end of the year, the total number of work-days per person is announced. Each member's share in the profits of the collective is ascertained on the basis of the number of work-days accredited to him. Outstanding work performed by the workers is generally recognized before the collective assembly, and a special reward of additional work-hours is given.

The distribution of revenue on the collective is based on the principle that obligations to the state are to receive first priority and that payments shall be in kind and in cash. There are

* For instance, persons working for the Party or serving in the armed forces, workers in factories, and functionaries of the government may own land in the collective but not contribute any labor.

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three categories in the distribution of the collective farm's total gross product, the state, the collective, and the peasant.

From animal and crop production, state compulsory quotas are fulfilled immediately. Grain is often turned over to state authorities in the field. Repayment of seed loans from the state and payment of MTS work are met. Seed for the next year's sowing and fodder for feeding the livestock are set aside. The remainder of the grain is distributed to the members.

From cash revenues, a portion is paid out for taxes, insurance, repayment of state loans, and sometimes for MTS work. An amount is set aside to cover current expenditures for such things as repairs of agricultural machinery and control of animal diseases and parasites. Enough is retained to cover administrative costs.

What remains in cash and in kind after the above, is distributed as follows: 90 percent for labor and land, 7.5 percent for indivisible fund (construction, new equipment), 1.2 percent for fund covering crop losses and calamities, and 1.3 percent for fund covering social and cultural activities. The 90 percent in cash and in kind allocated to the member peasants as payment for their labor and land contribution is allotted in several ways. ^{168/} The most common way is a 20- to 30-percent allocation for rent as prescribed by the model statute and as determined by the quality and quantity of land brought into the collective; between 70- to 80-percent allocation is distributed to the individual peasant for labor on the basis of accumulated work-hours.

All members are to safeguard cooperative property, to work honestly, and to submit to bylaws and decisions of the farm assembly and the elected officials. If carelessness is shown, absenteeism is prevalent, quality of work is poor, and if bylaws and decisions are not followed, the board of managers may use the following disciplinary measures: warning, reprimand, condemnation before the assembly, posting of names on bulletin board, fine of 5 labor-days not to exceed 15 in 1 year, and temporary dismissal from work. If no correction is evident, the member may be charged with sabotage and found guilty of treason to the country, under which condition he will be handed over to the courts for further punishment.

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APPENDIX C

STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 6
Progress of the Socialization of Agriculture in Bulgaria.
1944-53

Date ^{a/}	Households on Collective Farms			Area in Collective Sector				
	Total Number of Collective Farms	Number of Collective Farms Formed per Year	Average Number per Collective Farm	Percent of Total Agricultural Land ^{b/}	Accumulative Area ^{c/} (Hectares)	Percent of Total Agricultural Land ^{d/}	Average Area per Collective Farm (Hectares)	Average Area per Household (Hectares)
9 September 1944	28 ^{173/}	1,677 ^{174/}	60	0.2	4,014 ^{175/}	0.1	143	2.4
1944	110 ^{176/}	7,200 ^{177/}	65	0.6	25,700 ^{178/}	0.5	234	3.6
1945	382 ^{179/}	34,362 ^{180/}	90	3.1	146,570 ^{181/}	3.0	384	4.3
1946	480 ^{182/}	41,027 ^{183/}	85	3.7	172,498 ^{184/}	3.5	359	4.2
1947	549 ^{185/}	44,100 ^{186/}	80	4.0	180,400 ^{187/}	3.7	329	4.1
1948	1,100 ^{188/}	78,900 ^{189/}	72	7.2	292,380 ^{190/}	6.0	266	3.7
Plan by end of 1948	800 ^{191/}	60,000 ^{192/}	75	5.5	200,000 ^{193/}	4.1	250	3.3
1949	1,605 ^{194/}	156,000 ^{195/}	97	14.2	551,000 ^{196/}	11.2	343	3.5
1950	2,562 ^{197/}	525,171 ^{198/}	205	47.7	2,070,000 ^{199/}	42.2	808	3.9
1951	2,649 ^{200/}	575,947 ^{201/}	217 ^{e/}	52.4	2,238,405	45.7	845 ^{203/}	3.9
1952	2,747 ^{204/}	552,968 ^{205/}	201	50.3	2,512,500 ^{206/}	51.3	915	4.5
1953	2,747 ^{207/}	568,989 ^{208/}	207	51.7 ^{f/}	2,512,500 ^{209/}	51.3 ^{g/}	915	4.4
Plan by end of 1953	4,000 ^{212/}	660,000	165	60.0 ^{213/}	3,000,000 ^{214/}	61.2	750	4.5

a. End-of-year figures except where noted.
 b. For calculating percentages, the figure used for total households was 1.1 million. ^{169/}
 c. Land in collective farms is referred to as a certain percent of arable, agricultural, tillable, or cultivable land. One definition of this might include in addition to arable land, that area devoted to meadows, vineyards, orchards, and gardens.
 d. For calculating percentages, the figure used for total agricultural land was 4.9 million hectares. This figure was selected because it was the most representative of all the sources available. For instance, FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) gives a figure of 4,537,000 hectares. ^{170/} CIA documents give figures ranging from 4.6 million ^{171/} to 5.1 million. ^{172/}
 e. As of 1 May 1951, there were 220 households per collective farm. ^{202/}
 f. The Bulgarian literature reports quite consistently that 52.5 percent of Bulgarian households are collectivized. In light of the 51.7 calculation determined here, it seems that either the Communists are reporting percentages wrongly or that the wrong total household figure is used. The actual figure for total households should probably be smaller.
 g. Most of the information coming out of Bulgaria indicates a collectivized percentage figure of 60.5 percent. If this figure is correct then there is a discrepancy between the total agricultural land used in its calculation and that used for calculating earlier percentages. There is some basis for thinking that this change in total agricultural land figures has taken place. The assistant minister of agriculture asserted on 30 November 1953 that Bulgaria's cooperative farms comprised 51.53 percent of total arable land. ^{210/} Since there has been no information about a collectivization drive in 1953, it is felt that the 51.3 percent derived here is within a close range of error. Another source reports 51.53 percent in 1953. ^{211/}

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Table 7

Area of Selected Crops in Bulgaria
1935-39 Average, 1949-53 Average, and Annual 1948-53

Year	Thousand Hectares					
	Breadgrains	Coarse Grains	Sunflowers	Sugar Beets	Cotton	
Prewar Average 1935-39	1,618.0	1,246.0	152.0	9.3	40.0	a/ 219/
Average 1949-53	1,756.0	1,252.0	204.0	32.2	112.9	b/
1948	1,779.0	1,271.0	200.0	35.6	43.0	224/
1949	1,780.0	1,252.0	200.0	30.8	77.0	229/
1950	1,780.0	1,258.0	200.0	32.0	92.5	234/
1951	1,740.0	1,250.0	210.0	32.4	132.0	239/
1952	1,740.0	1,250.0	210.0	32.7	150.0	244/
1953	1,740.0	1,250.0	200.0	33.0	N.A.	

a. 1934-38 average.

b. Four-year average.

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Table 8

Yields of Selected Crops in Bulgaria a/
1935-39 Average, 1949-53 Average, and Annual 1948-53

Year	Quintals ^b /per Hectare				
	<u>Breadgrains</u>	<u>Coarse Grains</u>	<u>Sunflowers</u>	<u>Sugar Beets</u>	<u>Cotton</u>
Prewar Average 1935-39	13.4	11.4	8.6	163.5	2.3
Average 1949-53	12.3	9.6	7.0	113.5	0.8
1948	12.9	11.4	8.0	139.1	1.5
1949	12.1	10.6	8.0	116.9	1.0
1950	12.1	8.7	6.0	93.8	0.9
1951	13.4	11.6	8.0	126.0	0.9
1952	11.5	7.1	6.0	99.4	0.7
1953	12.4	10.1	7.0	131.3	N.A.

a. Calculated from acreage figures in Table 7 and production figures in Table 9.
b. In the metric system a quintal is 220.46 pounds.

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Table 9

Production of Selected Crops in Bulgaria
1935-39 Average, 1949-53 Average, and Annual 1948-53

Year	Thousand Metric Tons				
	Breadgrains	Coarse Grains	Sunflowers	Sugar Beets	Cotton
Prewar Average 1935-39	2,163.0	250	130.0	152.1	9.2
Average 1949-53	2,158.4	1,205.2	142.8	365.4	9.5 a/
1948	2,295.0	1,455.0	160.0	495.3	6.5
1949	2,154.0	1,323.0	160.0	360.2	7.5
1950	2,154.0	1,100.0	120.0	300.3	8.1
1951	2,334.0	1,448.0	168.0	408.2	12.5
1952	1,993.0	886.0	126.0	325.0	10.0
1953	2,157.0	1,269.0	140.0	433.3	N.A.

a. Four-year average.

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APPENDIX D

METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed to determine the progress of collectivization and its effect on agricultural production was to trace the development of the socialization of agriculture from 1947 to 1953 in all available published data. By grouping data according to production and consumption years and by using plan and plan fulfillment data for the 1947-48 and the 1949-53 plans, comparisons were made from which a fairly reliable figure could be given to indicate the effect of collectivization on production of agricultural commodities.

Most of Bulgaria's statistical data since 1947 has been in the form of percentages based on a prewar figure. Where these percentages have been applied to known bases, they have tended to bear out Communist announcements, especially those announcements dealing with the shortcomings of certain segments of the agricultural sector. Recently announced percentages, when applied to Bulgaria's livestock data, substantiate the deplorable state of livestock since 1948. Where practicable, this method has been applied in analyzing other sectors of agricultural production.

In most instances, estimates have been used in assessing the effects of collectivization on agricultural production. These estimates were made at a specific time each year and were based on the factors which affected agricultural production for that year plus a close analysis of Communist propaganda, particularly of the failures admitted during the course of the estimating period. In all instances the Communists have constantly referred to prewar for comparisons. The same procedure was used in this report. Recognizing that the Communist claims of attainments have been for some areas exceptional, the over-all picture has been used as a guide in estimating area, yields, and production. Throughout the period under consideration, estimates have borne out admissions by the Communists of their failures to regain prewar levels of production.

To ascertain and evaluate the effect of socialization on agriculture the periods 1935-39 (average), 1948, and 1949-53 (average) were used. This eliminated the effects of the war, since 1948 was

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marked as the year in which prewar levels of production were obtained, and the 1935-39 average, as well as 1948, provided a basis by which to judge the performance for the period 1949-53 -- the first 5-year period under complete Communist domination.

Population figures used in the per capita analysis were estimates. The 1935-39 and 1933-37 population figure used was 6,544,000 for 1 July 1938. The 1 January 1949 population of 7,137,000 was used for 1948, since it represents an average of the population for the 1948/49 consumption year. A calculated average population including 1 January 1950 to 1 January 1954 was used for the 1949-53 period. This figure of 7,401,000 is comparable to the 1935-39 population as to time. The 1935-39 population is a median, while that for 1949-53 is an average.

The 1 January population figures are used in assessing per capita production as well as per capita availabilities to provide a common denominator for comparison.

Analysis of the organization of the socialization of agriculture is based on information regarding the structure and function of the agencies which carried out collectivization and which now direct production in the collectivized sector.

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APPENDIX E

GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE

An important gap in information on Bulgaria is the lack of first-hand observations in the field. Since the US has no diplomatic representation in Bulgaria, official propaganda and refugee reports must provide most of the data.

Agricultural data reported by the Communists in Bulgaria are based on country and civil divisions and not on the socialist and independent sectors. Furthermore, most of the data are expressed as percentages of earlier periods. These gaps in some instances prevented analysis of the effect of socialization on the socialized sector as well as on the independent sector.

There is also a lack of specific information on the legal history of Bulgaria since the Communist rise to power. As a result of this gap, there is little knowledge about the structural organization of the Communist regime. A few documents have been published with analysis limited to the over-all organization. Much work remains to be done on the organization of individual ministries, particularly on the okrug, okoliya, and obshtina levels. Data are also lacking on the relationship of the Party to the governmental machinery.

Most of the data used in Section IV, B, "Effects of Socialization -- Agricultural Production," were taken from ORR Project 21.147, Food Situation in the Soviet Bloc, 1953-54 (to be published) and ORR Project 21.145, Preliminary Estimate of 1953/54 Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils in the Soviet Bloc (unpublished). Gaps in intelligence relating to these data are attached to the respective reports.

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APPENDIX F

SOURCE REFERENCES

Overt sources including books, periodicals, and newspapers, together with various governmental agency reports and monitored foreign broadcasts, have furnished the information for this report.

Covert sources (primarily defector reports) were searched, and some information from these sources was used. Most covert sources were limited as to area covered and type of data, and although this source did not add considerably to the quantitative data, it did influence the qualitative analysis.

Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
Doc. - Documentary	1 - Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable	2 - Probably true
B - Usually reliable	3 - Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable	4 - Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable	5 - Probably false
E - Not reliable	6 - Cannot be judged
F - Cannot be judged	

"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer; all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."

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
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Figure 14

Bulgaria: Distribution of Machine Tractor Stations, May 1949



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