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26 December 1950

SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

USSR

1. Although the USSR still values UN membership, Soviet withdrawal may occur: (1) if the USSR estimates that this action would destroy the UN as such, or (2) if Chinese Communist aggression in Asia eventually results in UN counter-action which would impel the USSR to withdraw. In this eventuality the USSR would probably have expanded the recently created World Peace Council and could organize under it an "International Brigade" to provide military opposition to UN action against Communist aggression.

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2. Soviet strategy in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Near East (Arab States and Israel) has remained essentially unchanged since 1945. The tactics implementing this strategy have varied from time to time and from country to country according to the existing situations which were susceptible of exploitation along these lines.

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3. To better its ability to detect and destroy deviations from Government or Communist Party dictates, the Polish Government has issued a resolution the result of which will be to draft the entire population into a Soviet system of mutual spying and reporting.

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SPECIAL ARTICLE

4. The effect on the internal stability and policies of the USSR of a struggle for power following Stalin's death is directly related to the length of time necessary for resolution of the struggle and the degree to which the existence of this struggle becomes evident outside the top leadership. Of the possible alternatives, the most likely is that such a struggle will remain a family affair within the Committee. Therefore, little change in stability or policy should be expected, even though a temporary period of relative isolation might occur pending resolution of the struggle.

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U S S R

Circumstances affecting possible Soviet
decision to withdraw from the UN

Although the USSR still values UN membership, Soviet withdrawal may occur if the USSR estimated that this action would destroy the UN as such. The Soviet estimate would be that its withdrawal would effect an increase of neutrality or "third force" sentiment in some countries, particularly Asian and Arab, to the extent that they would also withdraw from the UN to avoid taking sides in a formal break between the Western and Soviet worlds. This Soviet action would represent a final diplomatic attempt to split off a number of nations that might otherwise join in a UN action against aggression and become committed to side eventually with the US in a war with the Soviet Union.

Barring such circumstances, the USSR probably still attaches considerable value to UN participation for obstruction and weakening of anti-Communist action, for divisive tactics to prevent development of a strong Western coalition, and for propaganda issued under UN auspices. The Soviet attitude with respect to UN action in Korea has indicated a Soviet desire to avoid a formal challenge of the UN by claiming that only "volunteers" have entered Korea and by attacking "intervention" in Korea mainly as being US and not UN.

It is also possible that Chinese Communist aggression in Asia may eventually result in UN counteraction which would impel the USSR to withdraw from the UN. The Kremlin must realize that a spreading conflagration in Asia, progressively involving Korea, Indochina, Hongkong, Burma, or Thailand, could not be accepted indefinitely by the UN without some type of counteraction. In supporting Chinese Communist aggression, the USSR must be willing to risk eventually having UN measures taken against China that would impel the USSR to withdraw.

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In the eventuality of withdrawal from the UN, the USSR would probably have expanded the functions of the recently created World Peace Council so as to have a Communist-dominated rival organization. The purpose of the WPC is presently described in Soviet bloc propaganda as being to "assist" the UN in fulfilling its functions. The Peace Council is not now an organization of states, but it provides a framework for such an organization, and in the meantime furnishes the propaganda advantage of claiming to represent large groups of manpower, including colonial and dependent peoples not represented in the UN.

The World Peace Council could also perform an effective function in that it could organize not only political but also military opposition to UN police action against Communist aggression. For example, Soviet spokesmen have recently drawn an analogy between the Korean war and the Spanish civil war and have referred to the "International Brigade" in which volunteers from many countries participated. In time a Soviet-sponsored "International Brigade" may be organized which could provide large-scale military opposition to a UN force and could also claim to be an international "peace" action. In line with Soviet strategy to wage undeclared war, this device would permit a large commitment of troops from various Satellite countries and from "peace" organizations under the guise of fighting for "peace" without any formal commitment to global war. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Soviet strategy and tactics in
Greece, Turkey, Iran and the Near East

Soviet strategy in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Near East (Arab States and Israel) has remained essentially unchanged since 1945. Soviet objectives include the rounding out and safeguarding of its control over the Balkans through the conquest of Greece; a double-barrelled approach to Turkey through Greece and Iran; control of the Dardanelles; extension

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of Soviet influence into the eastern Mediterranean; and the constant improvement of the USSR's position with respect to the all-important oil resources of this area. In general, this strategy has recognized the fact that Communism could only achieve successes in the area if accompanied by direct power thrusts from the Soviet Union and its orbit. In order, however, to make such thrusts feasible without an immediate expansion into general war, this strategy has been mainly divisive in nature -- aimed at splitting off the countries in the area from the West (primarily the US and Great Britain), their principal support in times of trouble, and from one another.

The tactics implementing this strategy have varied from time to time and from country to country according to the existing situations which were susceptible of exploitation along these lines.

The failure of the Greek guerrilla campaign has been accepted by the USSR as a temporary setback, but the remnants of the guerrilla forces remaining in the Soviet orbit constitute an important reservoir upon which to draw when and if the USSR should decide that conditions in the Balkans are favorable for a resumption of the guerrilla war, perhaps supported by "volunteers" from the Satellite armed forces. Meanwhile, Soviet strategy with respect to Greece has aimed at strengthening the Communist Party by rebuilding its underground apparatus and reestablishing a broad popular support through the infiltration of leftist political parties, labor unions, cultural organizations, and the Greek National Army.

Improved relations between Greece and Yugoslavia provide the basis for charges of planned aggression against Albania and could be utilized to justify simultaneous (but not necessarily similar) action against both countries at some future time.

Soviet strategy in regard to Turkey has been limited

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largely to recurrent threatening gestures at the Dardanelles and the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan. This is largely due to the relative stability of Turkey and the lack of any substantial Communist "fifth column." The Soviet view is that, for the present, Turkey must wait on the success of flanking movements into Greece and Iran.

Soviet strategy with respect to Iran has been one of intermittent pressure and conciliation, combined with more or less continual aid to local subversive groups. In past months the USSR has been pursuing an official policy of conciliation in order to promote pro-Soviet sentiment and intensify anti-Western sentiment. The signing of the Soviet-Iranian trade treaty will facilitate economic penetration of Iran, possibly aid Communist subversive activities, and afford the USSR propaganda opportunities of which it will take the fullest possible advantage.

In the Near East the USSR has endeavored to maneuver itself favorably with respect to both Israel and the Arab States. While making covert approaches to the Arab States, the USSR has continually proposed or voted in the UN for unworkable "solutions" to the Palestine problem, evidently calculating that Israeli and Arab resentment would be directed principally against the Western powers.

Communist activity in the Near East takes the form of a long-range program aimed at preparing a solid foundation for exploiting the eventual opportunities which are confidently expected in this area. (SECRET)

EASTERN EUROPE

POLAND

Polish Government sets up new bureau to repress people

Under the guise of improving the functioning of

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the Government the Polish Council of State has issued a resolution the eventual result of which will be to draft the entire population into a Soviet system of mutual spying and reporting. The resolution creates a new Bureau of Letters and Complaints having criminal jurisdiction within the Council of State.

Once in operation, the Bureau will enable the central government to detect and destroy more efficiently any deviation from its or the Communist Party's dictates. The Bureau is required to take corrective action within one month on all criticisms in the press of "defects in the state machine," and will supervise the general implementation of the resolution. The Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party has described in detail the duties of its members and the members of the many Communist-controlled mass organizations in utilizing this decree. The Communists will be the chief agents for detecting administrative shortcomings in the Government and deviations from stated doctrines and directives by the population.

The immediate effects of this resolution will be dismissals from and purges of Government offices. The long run result will be to create a nation-wide spy net with neighbor reporting on neighbor to the Security Police and growth of the daily, crushing oppression and terror under which Polish citizens live. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SPECIAL ARTICLE

The effect on the internal stability and policies of the USSR of a struggle for power following Stalin's death

For the purposes of this article it is assumed that, following Stalin's death, the USSR will be ruled by a committee within the Politburo composed of at least Molotov, Malenkov, and Beriya. However, this period of committee rule is unlikely to be of long duration. Once

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Stalin's stabilizing influence is removed, jealousies, rancors and disagreements are almost certain to appear. A struggle for power within the committee will probably result.

The question of how seriously such a struggle might affect the internal stability of the Soviet Union and consequently Soviet foreign policy, is directly related to the length of time necessary for resolution of the struggle and the degree to which the existence of this struggle would be evident outside the existing top leadership. The problem, therefore, must be reduced to several possible alternatives.

During the period of committee rule, particularly while the committee members maintained a united front, Soviet policy would probably remain unchanged. Subsequently, the degree to which policy might be affected would depend on how smoothly an aspiring dictator could resolve a struggle for power within the committee and assume full power. Thus, a smooth and easy transfer of power from Stalin to the committee and then to an eventual successor such as Molotov or Malenkov would leave Soviet policy virtually untouched. Similarly, the regime would remain stable and even in the event of disunity and a struggle for power among the leaders, the general stability would not be lessened so long as the authority of the Politburo remained unshaken. If, however, as a result of a struggle, the leaders were obliged to seek support in the Central Committee or in the lower echelons of the Party, Soviet policy in terms of strategy and tactics might accordingly be affected in one or more of the following ways:

1. In the period before any single member of the Politburo was able to secure full power for himself, a transitional phase might develop during which short-range policies would undergo some modification. The leadership's divided and uncertain exercises of power would necessarily preoccupy the various Politburo members with the domestic

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situation and the effect which internal events might have upon their individual positions. There would probably be an even stronger tendency to assess international affairs in terms of their impact upon the domestic situation. During this transitional phase, Soviet policy might reveal a trend toward increasing "isolationism" without, however, necessarily bringing about any more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Soviet Government.

2. If the struggle between factions in the Party hierarchy for control of the regime became particularly intense, there might be an effort to obtain mass support from the Party and Government rank-and-file, or even from beyond the borders of the USSR. Such an effort would be directed, above all, toward the Communist governments of the Statellite orbit and might lead to policy differences in the Soviet Politburo over the degree of national independence to be allowed the "people's democracies." Titoism would be further encouraged by a split in the top Soviet hierarchy over this issue, and the eventual result might be a disintegration of Soviet control over the Orbit countries.

3. Once the struggle had been decided, the Soviet regime or any regime replacing it might find itself so weakened that the present aggressive policies would be at least temporarily inexpedient. In this case, policies might be changed in order to postpone internal and external tensions and obtain foreign assistance and credits for rehabilitation purposes.

4. Whatever results from the transition of power following Stalin's death, it is inevitable that a new leader will bring to his position a personality different from that of Stalin, and a capacity which may or may not be equal to the responsibility he assumes. It is, therefore, conceivable that his personal inexperience, his less seasoned judgment, or his more youthful impatience or fanaticism might lead to a serious miscalculation. If, after such a miscalculation, no retreat were possible without considerable sacrifice of

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prestige or damage to the interests of the Soviet regime, World War III might result.

5. At this time the most logical possibility is that any such struggle will remain a family affair within the committee, with one member, probably Malenkov, emerging the victor. In this event, little change is anticipated in the internal stability of the foreign policy of the USSR, expect for a temporary period of relative isolation while the struggle is being resolved. (SECRET)

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