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12 December 1950

SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

USSR

1. Soviet notes and declarations give no firm indication as to what course of action the USSR will pursue if its current diplomatic efforts to forestall West German remilitarization are unseccussful. The USSR, realizing that large scale West German remilitarization can not materialize during 1951, may feel under no compulsion to take drastic action. On the other hand, there is a possibility that failure of its diplomatic efforts will be used by the USSR as basis for an ultimatum to the West in regard to West Germany rearmament.
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2. The tone of Soviet propaganda during the past week revealed Moscow's uncompromising attitude toward the Korean situation, and tended toward a stepped-up psychological preparation for eventual Soviet participation in a war.
(Page 8)

3. Two recent reports appear to indicate that Moscow has sent out a new directive urging West European Communist leaders to prepare the rank and file for the possibility of Soviet aggressive action.
(Page 9)

4. The Soviet Orbit countries have been developing both new and old routes for the acquisition of strategic commodities. Anticipated and actual strengthening of Western export controls has brought about this effort which has been markedly successful in maintaining the flow of desired goods to the Orbit countries.
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
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DOCUMENT NO. 2
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 NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1967
 AUTH: HR 70-2
 DATE: 3 Dec 79 REVIEWER: 008514

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EASTERN EUROPE
FINLAND

6. Announcement has been made that the Government-
appointed Economic Committee has unanimously reach agree-
ment on a stabilization program for Finland. While it is
known that the Prime Minister is displeased with this agree-
ment for political reasons, it is likely that he will be
forced to accept the plan and to broaden his cabinet to im-
plement it.

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BULGARIA

7. The adoption of a Bulgarian law "for the settlement

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of the status of Soviet nationals in Bulgaria" strongly suggests that the USSR desires to provide Bulgarian legal status for any number of Soviet citizens who may be required to implement Soviet objectives in that country.

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YUGOSLAVIA

8. The Yugoslav attempt to renew and expand its military machine will be difficult of fulfillment and will probably result in the Yugoslav government favoring military preparedness at the expense of its general economic well-being. The resultant shortages of consumer goods, coupled with the poor crops of this year, will probably create some popular unrest.

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RUMANIA

9. The election of 80,000 Democratic Front candidates to People's Councils throughout Rumania, completed without incident on 3 December, indicates a significant accomplishment for the Communist regime. The acknowledgement in election campaign speeches that future consumer shortages would be necessary to carry out the industrialization programs emphasizes Party confidence in its ability to control the populace.

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ALBANIA

10. The USSR apparently is uneasy over Albania's strategic isolation from the Cominform orbit which has been emphasized recently by improved Yugoslav-Greek relations. Cominform propaganda regarding "aggression" against Albania by a US-backed Yugoslav-Greek alliance is probably meant as warning that the USSR stands behind the Hoxha regime.

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SPECIAL ARTICLE

11. It is probable that following Stalin's death the USSR will be ruled by a Committee. However, it is unlikely that such a Committee can remain unified indefinitely. A struggle among the leaders will probably result with one man again emerging as dictator.

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U S S R

Possible significance of Soviet diplomatic steps
regarding West German rearmament

In May 1950 the three Western Powers sent a note to the USSR which stated that the Soviet Union was re-militarizing East Germany. The USSR, in its reply of 18 October, 1950, denied the Western accusation and termed it an obvious attempt to justify the remilitarization which the US, Great Britain, and France had already begun in West Germany. The note stated that the USSR could "not reconcile itself" to the reconstitution of a regular Germany army.

Almost simultaneously with the sending of this note, the USSR and its European Satellites, including East Germany, held a Foreign Minister's Conference at Prague. The conference issued a declaration which stated that the Western decision to remilitarize West Germany as announced in the September, 1950 declaration of the three Western Foreign Ministers constituted a "threat of fresh aggression and of fresh war adventures in Europe." The Prague declaration proposed that the Four Powers, as a matter of "immediate necessity": (1) state that they would not permit the re-militarization of Germany, the restoration of the German war potential, or the inclusion of Germany in any aggressive plans, (2) conclude a peace treaty with Germany which would, "in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement", restore German unity and result in the withdrawal of occupation troops within one year after the conclusion of the treaty, and (3) create an all-German Constituent Council, with parity representation between East and West Germany, for the "purpose of preparing the formation of a provisional all-German Government." The Constituent Council would submit its proposals concerning the formation of an all-German Government to the Four Powers, and would, until an all-German Government was formed, be consulted by them on the preparation of a peace treaty.

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Shortly after the Prague Conference, the USSR presented a note to the three Western Powers which requested a Foreign Minister's Conference to discuss the Prague Declaration as a basis for settlement of the German problem. The note, even though it requests a conference on Germany as a whole, is so worded as to indicate that the Soviet Union's chief interest in such a conference is to discuss the Western decision to remilitarize West Germany.

The recent letter of East German Premier Grotewohl to Federal Chancellor Adenauer is the latest step in this series of diplomatic actions which the USSR began with its note of 18 October, 1950. In his letter, Grotewohl proposed that each German Government appoint six representatives to discuss the establishment of an all-German Constituent Council. The Grotewohl letter, which proposes a Council "formed on a basis of parity from representatives of East and West Germany" and states that "under certain circumstances a plebiscite of the German people could be held", closely parallels that section of the Prague Declaration which deals with the formation and purposes of such a Council. Both the Prague Declaration and the East German proposal make vague reference to a plebiscite of the German people. There is, however, no elaboration on this theme and no indication as to what the "certain circumstances" might be.

Although the USSR has coupled its condemnation of West German remilitarization with an apparent plan for German unification in this series of notes and declarations, there is no reason to believe that the Kremlin is interested at this time in German unity on terms that could possibly be acceptable to the West. The USSR is undoubtedly aware that its proposal, which makes no provision for free elections throughout Germany and which suggests a Constituent Council with parity representation of East and West Germany, is unacceptable to the West. The Soviet Union's "offer" of unification seems, therefore, nothing more than a propaganda

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device designed to bolster its claim that the West is not interested in German unity.

The real purpose of these diplomatic moves seems to be to forestall, or at least postpone, a West German military contribution to Western defense. They were undoubtedly designed to exploit opposition in France and West Germany to West German rearmament. The USSR may believe that these notes and declarations, which serve as a warning to the West regarding West German remilitarization and, at the same time, give a surface indication of Soviet "willingness" to settle the German problem in the interest of German unity and peace, will increase French and West German fear of provoking Soviet military action by West German rearmament and will arouse hope in West Germany of obtaining unity by peaceful means. The USSR might even believe, in view of Communist military successes in Asia and Western European fear of Soviet military aggression against Europe itself, that its diplomatic campaign will force the West to postpone indefinitely any implementation of West German remilitarization.

The Soviet notes and declarations give no firm indication as to what course of action the USSR will pursue if its current diplomatic efforts to forestall West German remilitarization are unsuccessful. The USSR, realizing that large scale West German remilitarization cannot materialize during 1951, may feel under no compulsion to take drastic action. On the other hand, there is a possibility that failure of its diplomatic efforts will be used by the USSR as basis for an ultimatum to the West in regard to West German rearmament. The USSR might believe that an ultimatum would force the defenseless continental members of the North Atlantic Treaty to abandon the issue. The USSR might also believe that the US and Great Britain, in order to preserve NATO and to avoid an immediate global war, would accept the Soviet ultimatum.

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The USSR must either accept West German remilitarization or take action, such as an ultimatum, which would presuppose Soviet willingness to involve the USSR directly in a military conflict. As long as Soviet troops remain in Germany, it is almost impossible for the USSR to instigate Satellite military action against West Germany without involving its own military forces. (SECRET)

New trend in Soviet propaganda regarding Korean situation

The publication on 3 December of a PRAVDA editorial denouncing President Truman's press conference statements of 30 November marked a departure from Moscow's recent propaganda policy of playing down the Korean war, especially to the domestic audience. This editorial, Moscow's first authoritative policy statement on the Korean situation, acridly denounced President Truman and US ruling circles for their "promise of continued imperialist maneuvers in Korea and with regard to China." For the first time, the domestic audience was made aware of the numbers of Chinese "volunteers" and the scope of Red successes in Korea.

The tone of this most widely distributed article and of subsequent TASS reports on Western press reactions to President Truman's statements, revealed the uncompromising attitude of the USSR towards the Korean situation. It implied that this "war hysteria trend" lessens the possibility of a prevention of the outbreak of hostilities on a larger scale, and implied imminence of a possible full scale conflict between the US and China. In this connection, there has been a noteworthy trend away from the customary "peace" line, namely, that the vast numbers of Peace Partisans and their cohorts will prevent such a conflict. At the same time, however, the Russian people were told that the West was weakened by disagreements among the Western governments and between the people and their governments.

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Thus, Soviet propaganda continues to condition the Russian people for eventual hostilities and can be expected to exploit every event and utilize any medium to label the US as aggressor and attempt to split the Western camp, thereby laying the moral groundwork, both at home and abroad, for Soviet-initiated war. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Soviet Orbit continues to acquire strategic commodities from Western sources

The Soviet Orbit countries have been developing both new and old routes for the acquisition of strategic commodities. Anticipated and actual strengthening of Western export controls has brought about this effort which has been markedly successful in maintaining the flow of desired goods to the Orbit countries. Such activities as the recent stoppage of shipments by the US authorities in Salzburg and at the borders in the US Zone of Germany, plus the fear of tightening controls which may follow the present meeting of the COCOM, have caused the Orbit countries to improve their procurement techniques.

As a direct result of the US action in Salzburg, which stopped the diversion of a shipment of strategic goods from the US to Hungary, the US Zone of Austria is now being frequently by-passed. Some goods are now being routed from Chiasso (Switzerland) to Tarvisio (Italy) to Arnoldstein (British Zone of Austria) and thence to Hgyshalom (Hungary). This route has been used for the shipment of French ball bearings. The present and probable future success of the use of this route is a result of the lack of supervision of transit traffic in both Italy and the British Zone of Austria.

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Particularly sensitive purchases can be shipped to intermediaries in Spain, Italy, or Portugal, and then routed by water to Gdynia, and through Poland to Hungary. The extra charges involved would not be a serious problem, because they could be paid in zloties.

An illustration of the extremes to which the Communists will go to circumvent the security control program has developed in connection with the methods of procurement used by the Chinese Communists. In cases where goods would be denied them, they plan to have cover companies arrange purchase of full cargo lots. When the ship is at sea, the Chinese Communists plan to purchase both the cargo and the ship, and then divert them to Taku Bar, or to other convenient ports.

In the past, it has been a normal procedure for the shipments from West Germany to be diverted en route to Berlin. This system is also used in Austria, where a car loaded with goods consigned to a Vienna firm is dropped off at the Sovzone border. The goods are paid for and unloaded at that time, and the car is later attached to a train returning to the Western Zones of Austria.

In addition to these innovations, the usual transshipment points such as the free ports at Basle, Antwerp, Zurich, and Aschaffenberg continue their operations unabated.

In Western Germany, where repeated official protests have been heard against Allied-imposed controls, which are alleged to be stricter than those in force in other European countries, there is a complete mockery of the security control policy. Against the background of a volume of smuggling (estimated in hundreds of millions of dollars) three firms are presently cooperating on the production of a seamless tube mill for the Soviet Zone, and for similar equipment for Czechoslovakia. A blooming mill for Czechoslovakia is also under production, but this may be stopped by US intervention.

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The global aspects involved in trying to constrict these operations are indicated by a recent increase in applications for controlled equipment from Germany by India, Egypt, and South America, and the suspicion that the goods will be diverted to the Soviet Orbit as they pass through Switzerland.

The variety of methods and routes and the particular problem represented by free ports, demonstrate the difficulties involved in trying to stop the acquisition of strategic goods by the Orbit countries. Individual end-use checks by the US and the Frankfurt authorities are fairly effective, but the alternative sources of supply and the relative success of procurement of even US equipment and supplies through transshipment procedures demonstrate that unilateral action is insufficient to deny strategic commodities to the Soviet Orbit. A recent transaction involved a shipment of US bearings diverted to the USSR, although dual end-use checks had been made. Only if all sources of supply cooperate and exercise control of the commodities at the point of origin and, in addition, assume the responsibility of exercising surveillance over transit shipments through their ports, will the existing export controls achieve their purpose of denying the Soviet Orbit those goods which contribute directly to its economic potential for war. (SECRET)

EASTERN EUROPE

FINLAND

Political-Economic stabilization near in Finland

A Government appointed, four-man Economic Committee, consisting of two Social Democrat and two Agrarian Party representatives, has announced its unanimous agreement on an economic stabilization plan for Finland. It is likely that Agrarian Prime Minister Kekkonen will be forced to accept the plan, and to broaden his minority cabinet to include Social

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Democrat, Progressive, and Coalition Party members in order to implement it successfully.

Kokkonen is known to be displeased (for political and party reasons) that an agreement has been reached, but it is difficult to imagine a suitable pretext by means of which he might gain rejection of the plan. Several Agrarian Ministers are known to support the plan and to desire a broadened cabinet. Because of his overweening political ambition, it is very improbable that Kekkonen will place himself in a position which could lead to his parliamentary overthrow.

Should Kekkonen be able to obtain the unqualified support of his party for rejection of the unanimously agreed program, it is expected that he would lose the parliamentary support of the Swedish People Party. It was only the unexpected support of this party which was responsible for Kekkonen gaining a confidence vote last month. Under the new circumstances, Kekkonen would face a certain non-confidence vote and loss of the premiership - a most unpalatable prospect for him. (CONFIDENTIAL)

BULGARIA

Soviet nationals granted legal status in Bulgaria

The enactment on 3 November of a Bulgarian law "for the settlement of the Status of Soviet nationals in Bulgaria" indicates Kremlin desire to provide legal status for any number of Soviet nationals who may be required to implement Soviet objectives in that country. For at least three years Soviet "specialists" in increasing numbers have enjoyed not only equal but preferential treatment in Bulgaria without necessity for social legislation. The raising of the "status" issue at this time strongly suggests that the number of Soviet nationals already present or to be imported no longer can be covered by the protective screen of the specialist classification.

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The unpublicized decree grants to all Soviet citizens in Bulgaria full rights of employment and the "rights and obligations under the law on social security and the other laws on an equal basis with Bulgarian nationals." Soviet nationals are specifically exempted from any Bulgarian restrictions established for aliens.

Since a large part of Bulgaria including border areas is a restricted zone, not only to foreigners but to most of the Bulgarian population, the opportunity exists for the infiltration of large numbers of Soviets with little danger of detection. Recent reports indicate large scale evacuation of Bulgarians from areas adjoining the Greek and Yugoslav borders and of Bulgarian-Turks from the strategic Dobrudja area. The possibility that Soviets are being introduced into these areas should not be overlooked.

The loose wording of the law whereby Soviets assume the same obligations as Bulgarian citizens under "other laws" of Bulgaria could also prove a convenient device for camouflaging the presence of Soviet nationals in the Bulgarian army.

The attempts to provide a "legal" status for as many Soviets in Bulgaria as Soviet policy demands, concurrently with the strengthening of the Bulgarian army and the heightened campaign of invectives charging the Western Powers with intent of immediate aggression through the Athens-Belgrade axis, confirms Soviet intention to build up Bulgarian potential for aggression as quickly as possible. (SECRET)

YUGOSLAVIA

Tito faces problem of building armed strength while maintaining precarious economic stability

The Yugoslav attempt to renew and expand its military machine will be difficult of fulfillment and will probably

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result in the Yugoslav government favoring military preparedness at the expense of its general economic well-being. The resultant shortages of consumer goods, coupled with the poor crops of this year, will probably create some popular unrest. Despite these conditions, however, the Yugoslav populace will probably back the Tito regime rather than succumb to Soviet pressures.

Current Yugoslav commercial negotiations with the French and Belgians have included sizeable amounts of military plant equipment and end-items. These products, relieving pressing short-range Yugoslav military needs, are being obtained on long-term credits. Thus Tito plans to spread payments on his immediate military requirements over a longer period when the Yugoslav economy may be in a better position to meet such commitments.

It is obvious that a strong Yugoslav military establishment is needed to stave off Soviet pressure and possible aggression. Yugoslavia's ability to meet her military needs is limited, however, and is already overtaxed by the maintenance of a large army and a large investment program in capital industry. The internal support of the regime could be considerably strengthened if the Yugoslav government were free to divert its efforts to the improvement of the living standard instead of utilizing its resources for non-consumer goods. Under currently growing Cominform-Yugoslav tension, however, the Tito regime is forced to assume the internal problems resulting from maintaining its military strength in spite of economic difficulties. (SECRET)

RUMANIA

Local Rumanian elections reflect
Communist control of population

The election, without incident, of 80,000 Democratic

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Front candidates to municipal, district, and regional People's Councils in Rumania on 3-December was a significant accomplishment for the Communist regime. Results show that the highest percentage was obtained by the relatively popular Gheorghiu-Dej in a Bucharest precinct, while the poorest showing (94.7%) was made in the oil district of Prahova. The announced results showed a small percentage of votes "against" (ballots containing names scratched out) or "void" (ballots improperly folded).

The successful performance was the result of a carefully staged campaign, in which intensive propaganda work was carried on throughout the country. Although most of the election speeches followed standard lines calling on the people to vote for a new life under Socialism aided by the Soviet Union, the speeches of some leaders occasionally touched upon more lively themes. Ana Pauker admitted that present consumer shortages are the result of emphasis on industrialization and large construction, and Gheorghiu-Dej went even further by attributing some supply difficulties to bureaucratic tendencies in the Communist Party and Government.

The conduct of the elections was a manifestation of increased Communist control in Rumania. Communist leaders not only staged the mass spectacle without incident, but were so confident of their ability to manipulate the population that at the height of the campaign they acknowledged that their program would work further hardships on the people. (RESTRICTED)

ALBANIA

USSR reveals increased concern over Albania in view of Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement

Soviet anxiety over maintaining the pro-Soviet Hoxha regime in Albania has become more noticeable following

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the successful rapprochement recently achieved between the Greek and Yugoslav Governments. A mounting campaign of Cominform propaganda is attempting to "document" a strong case of Yugoslav-Greek plans for imminent aggression against Albania with US backing. Yugoslav and Greece are accused of plotting to dismember Albania.

Albania's geographic isolation from the remainder of the Soviet orbit was recently emphasized by the Yugoslav closing of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade, rendering difficult any Cominform air traffic to Tirana via Yugoslavia because of the involved negotiations now required to obtain transit visas. The USSR was recently forced to submit an "urgent request" to the Italian Government for a special flight over Italian territory in order to transport officials to Albanian Liberation Day festivities. Some surreptitious Cominform flights from Bulgaria to Albania apparently have occurred along the Yugoslav-Greek border, but with the steady improvement in Yugoslav-Greek relations, such clandestine flights will become increasingly hazardous.

Yugoslav obstruction of air flights to Albania, however, has not materially affected overall links between Albania and the Soviet orbit. Available information on Soviet-Satellite shipping to Albania indicates that it has maintained its frequency of approximately six ships monthly over recent months, and this may even have increased slightly. Cargoes consist of tools and supplies for light industry, consumer goods, and military equipment.

The current Cominform propaganda campaign regarding Albania is probably designed to warn Belgrade, Athens and their alleged backer, the US, that the USSR stands firmly behind the Hoxha regime. While this campaign may represent heightened concern over Albania's isolated position, it is probably also aimed at enlisting the support of the non-Communist Albanian population on the issue of preserving the territorial integrity of their country. In the event that

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the Kremlin decides on aggressive action against Tito, the latter's alleged machinations to overthrow Hoxha and partition Albania would provide ostensible justification for "defensive counteraction" by the Cominform. (SECRET)

SPECIAL ARTICLE

Succession to power in the USSR

With each passing year, the question of who will succeed Stalin as the ruler of the USSR becomes increasingly acute. It is most unlikely that Stalin will voluntarily relinquish his power while still alive, and it is improbable that he could be compelled to do so. Therefore, any settlement of this problem will presumably be postponed until his death, following which the two most probable alternatives would be: (1) the transfer of his power to an individual, thus continuing the one-man dictatorship, or (2) the division of his powers among several of the present Politburo members who could then rule jointly.

The continuation of a one-man dictatorship has strong historical precedent. Life under both the Tsarist and Soviet regime, while perhaps not preconditioning the Russian people to the concept of the autocratic ruler, has served to prevent the Russian people from gaining a first-hand understanding of a less dictatorial type of government. The experience of the Stalinist regime indicates that the structure of the USSR can best be administered by a single head. The fact that the present dictatorship has successfully withstood the strains created by the collectivization of agriculture, the purges of the 1930's, and World War II must appear to Stalin as a convincing argument for one-man control. It would seem logical, therefore, that Stalin, in planning the USSR's administrative future, would give serious thought to the continuation of this principle.

However, the substance of Stalin's power is such

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that automatic transfer to another individual would be difficult. Although machinery exists in both the Party and Government for choosing Stalin's successor as Secretary General of the Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, there is no such machinery for the transfer of those other powers he has collected, which though less tangible, are in fact more effective than those derived from his titular positions. These less tangible powers are based on his success over a period of years in eliminating all rivals, both real and potential, and replacing them with men who owe their advancement solely to his favor and who presently hold high office by his sufferance. Today, the members of the Politburo, the highest policy organ of the USSR, seemingly function as a selfless, dedicated, and unified group because of Stalin's supreme control.

Owing to the high degree of compartmentalization both of knowledge and authority below the Politburo level, it would appear impossible for non-members to figure prominently in the succession. It is extremely unlikely that this group would automatically transfer this allegiance to another member simply because he had been designated by the departed ruler. It would appear that any one man aspiring to Stalin's power would have to "create" anew his own claims by eliminating his rivals and forging his own "unified" Politburo.

There is, of course, the possibility that immediately after Stalin's death, one man might take over the state apparatus by force. Beriya is usually mentioned as the individual who could accomplish this because of his control of the secret police. This all-power organization with its vast and pervasive network of informers, security troops, and system of slave labor camps is generally considered to supply those components of coercion and fear without which the present regime could not operate. Beriya, though no longer ministerially responsible for the police set-up, is undoubtedly that member of the Politburo charged with its direction. However, it is an over-simplification and a

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fallacy to consider the police as a self-sufficient force, separate from and opposed to the Party. The responsible officers of the secret police are almost all Party members. Not only is their allegiance primarily to the Party, but the Party organizations within the various administrative subdivisions of the police have such importance that the organization secretary ranks with the administrative chief of his division in prestige. Furthermore, many MGB workers are assigned to their jobs by the Party, and there are indications that a section of the Party's Central Committee Apparatus ratifies appointments of police officials on at least the responsible levels. In these ways the police organization is controlled by and becomes responsible to the Central Committee Apparatus, over which Malenkov, as the leading Party bureaucrat under Stalin, probably has the most control. Under such conditions, it would appear impossible for Beriya to plan and organize a coup in the necessary secrecy. The possibility that at the crucial moment Malenkov and Beriya might undertake such action together is also unlikely. Mutual trust is not stimulated by the Soviet system, by the history of the Party, nor by Stalin's technique of playing off one lieutenant against another in order to avoid just such a contingency.

The most likely alternative would, therefore, appear to be a division of Stalin's powers among several of the present Politburo members. Recently received evidence on the administrative setup within the Politburo up to 1939, suggests that a committee, composed of Molotov, Malenkov, and Beriya, may already exist which could immediately take over after Stalin's death. During the late 30's, the Politburo apparently handled most of the basic political decisions through a "Political Commission" consisting of Molotov, Beriya, and Zhdanov. Beneath the "Political Commission" were a number of specialized, functional committees each headed by a Politburo member, and probably containing Party experts from the Central Committee Apparatus. For example, the Foreign Affairs Committee was headed by Molotov; the Comintern Committee by Zhdanov; the Security Committee by

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Beriya; and the Military Committee by Voroshilov. Policy problems in foreign affairs would be discussed in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and recommendations passed on to the Political Commission which normally decided on the action to be taken. However, if the problem were particularly vital, or if agreement could not be reached between the three members of the Commission, the matter would receive Stalin's arbitration in a plenum of the Politburo. There seems little reason to suppose that this system has been materially altered, and assuming that Malenkov has now filled Zhdanov's vacancy, Stalin's three top aides appear to be the logical group to run the empire after Stalin's death.

Molotov, who is now 60 years old, is Stalin's closest and perhaps oldest associate. He is always ranked next to Stalin in the Soviet hierarchy, whether in official photographs, public appearances, or in the press. He presently occupies the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the most important governmental position in the USSR next to that of Chairman Stalin. During the year since he was relieved of his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, there have been several indications, culminating with his preelection speech in March, that Molotov has been concerned with the widest range of Soviet internal and external problems.

Malenkov, at 48 one of the youngest members, is presently considered third in the official hierarchy. His background is almost exclusively that of the Party bureaucrat. His responsibilities in the fields of Party organization and the development and control of Party cadres have given him a good opportunity to build a personal following among the middle and lower Party bureaucracy, an opportunity markedly similar to that which Stalin exploited in the 1920's. According to reports, he is shrewd, capable, ruthless, and is gifted with a remarkable memory. During the war he gained experience in industrial management, reputedly being in charge of tank and plane manufacturing. As Chairman of the Committee for Restoration of National Economy in

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areas liberated from Germany, he must also have been concerned with agricultural matters. In this position he had as subordinates Khrushchev, Ponomarenko, and Suslov, the three other present Secretaries of the Central Committee beside himself and Stalin. His outlook is apparently that of a practical politician rather than a theoretical Marxist, a factor which may account for his partial eclipse in 1946 by the late ideologist Zhdanov. Since the latter's death in August 1948, however, Malenkov has rapidly gained ground and last November was accorded the unusual honor, reserved in the past for Stalin, Molotov, and once for Zhdanov, of making the principal address on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Beriya, with his responsibility for the secret police, would undoubtedly be a necessary addition to any inner committee. Although both Malenkov and Beriya are comparatively recent members of the Politburo, having attained their status of full membership only in March 1946, they now hold between them the two major components of control and force (Party and police) upon which the stability and security of the present regime are based. Without their active support, Molotov's "committee" could not exercise even nominal power.

It is possible, of course, that other Politburo members might be co-opted to the Commission in order to alleviate dangerous jealousies and gain a majority in the present Politburo. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and perhaps Khrushchev would all be possible candidates, but it is unlikely that the Commission would contain more than seven members. Such older members of the Politburo as Kaganovich and Mikoyan, with their long experience in heavy industry and foreign trade, could provide the working, economic components of the collective leadership.

It is possible that Bulganin might be included for his general ability and his contacts with military leaders resulting from a two-year stint as Minister of the Armed

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Forces. Although Khrushchev has not generally be considered among the most capable of the top leaders, his recent appointment as a member of the Party Secretariat and his shift from the Ukraine to head the important Moscow Party organization has increased his prestige to the point where his membership must be considered a possibility.

It does not seem likely that the ensuing period of rules by committee would be long lasting. Jealousies, rancours, and disagreements among these top leaders most certainly exist today, even though reliable evidence is lacking. The possibility that these discords will remain dormant and that personal ambition will bow to altruistic motivations or even uneasy cooperation is not borne out by the past history of the Party. A struggle for power will almost certainly result. If one man, such as Molotov, can act as a unifying force, this struggle might conceivably be postponed, coming to the fore only after his disappearance from the political scene. In any event, it would appear that this rule by committee would in time be again replaced by an individual dictatorship. At present, it would seem that Malenkov with his authority over the Party apparatus and reputed ability would be the most likely to emerge as victor. (SECRET)

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