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
NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FEB 15 1950

WORKING PAPER

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

For Week Ending  
15 February 1950

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*Vol II, No. 6*


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## NEAR/EAST AFRICA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

### GREECE

Communist election aims: Although its illegal status prevents the Greek Communist Party (KKE) from participating directly in the parliamentary elections to be held 5 March, Greek Communists are hopeful of obtaining some benefits from the balloting. The primary object of Communist support is the fellow-travelling ex-Foreign Minister John Sophianopoulos, whose new "Democratic Front," a combination of leftist splinter groups studied with minor luminaries from the old Communist-led National Liberation Front (EAM), represents the farthest left of the legal Greek parties. Since the "Democratic Front" lacks the strength to win more than a few seats, however, the Communists are also keeping an eye on the possibility of eventually obtaining a working arrangement with former Premier (and retired general) Nicholas Plastiras. Plastiras and his Progressive Liberal cohorts may win as many as 20 or 25 seats and could thus provide fairly formidable support for such immediate Communist objection as a "general amnesty" (permitting the return of the KKE leaders from exile), a sweeping relaxation of security measures, and the restoration of legal status to the Communist Party. While Plastiras seems anti-Communist at heart and not inclined to exaggerate his leftist tendencies so long as he feels able to make a considerable inroad into the Liberal vote, he may be more open to negotiations with the "Democratic Front" at some time after the election, particularly if he feels that he could thereby improve his stature within the government and possibly affect the balance of power.


### TURKEY

Turkish-Italian relations: From the Turkish point of view, the soon-to-be concluded Italo-Turkish friendship agreement is useful chiefly as a means of strengthening Turkey's relationships with the Western powers. The Turks have been deeply resentful of the fact that another Mediterranean power--and a former enemy power to boot--was admitted to the North Atlantic Pact when "benevolently" neutral Turkey was excluded. Despite this feeling, they have realistically gone ahead with negotiations for the agreement, which appears to make no provisions for mutual defense guarantees such as are incorporated into Turkey's still valid 1939 treaty with France and the UK. The Turks evidently feel that even so apparently innocuous a document at least serves to bind them closer to the Western community.

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NOTED IN BRIEF

Turkey has reportedly made a direct offer to Syria of free-port privileges in the harbor of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). The idea of making such an offer has long appealed to many Turks, inasmuch as Syrian acceptance of such privileges would tend to represent de facto recognition of Turkey's sovereignty over Hatay province, which Syria has never formally accepted.


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Imports of grain into Turkey, on hand or expected, appear to have solved the problem of food shortages created by last year's bad harvests. There is talk of hunger in the Black Sea coastal area, but the situation does not appear to be bad. With the aid of ECA-financed agricultural machinery and expert advice--and given a continuation of the excellent weather conditions which have so far obtained--Turkey's grain harvest during the coming months may well provide a sizable exportable surplus.

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\* \* \*

The "Bring back Quwwatli" movement appears to be increasing in strength in certain Syrian political and military circles. The ex-President, ousted by Zaim in the first of last year's military coups, symbolizes not only republican sentiment and anti-Iraqi union tendencies but also a degree of political stability that has been generally lacking since his ouster; in addition, he is a friend of Ibn Saud and, by virtue of his current residence in Egypt, an obvious recipient of Egyptian sympathy. Quwwatli thus is an appealing figure to Syrian politicians and army officers who have grown weary of participating in governments marked by ineffectiveness and dissent. The catch is, of course, that even an attempt to bring back

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the relatively stable conditions of the old regime might stir up trouble; the return of Quwwatli might provoke still another coup.

\* \* \*

Severe floods are forecast for Iraq as a result of unusually heavy snow-fall in northwest Iraq and the mountains of Iran and Turkey. Storms have already exceeded those of 1946, which brought widespread devastation.

\* \* \*

Italy's withdrawal of General Nasi's appointment as Administrator of Somaliland should clear another boulder from the rocky road to Italo-Ethiopian rapprochement. The Ethiopian Government had strongly protested this appointment, denouncing General Nasi for his active participation in the Italo-Ethiopian War and for his subsequent conduct as Vice Governor of Italian East Africa. It also stated that it considered his return to East Africa a menace to the security of Ethiopia.

\* \* \*

The existence of linguistic and ethnic differences among the Iranians has finally been publicly recognized by the Iranian Government. Radio Tehran now includes in its repertory Kurdish programs in various dialects, and it has doubled the length of its Turkish program. Since the 1920's the government has strenuously promoted the concept of a monolithic social structure in Iran. Nevertheless, the native tongues persisted, and the Soviets made special language broadcasts to the Kurdish and Turkish-speaking people of northwestern Iran. The broadcasts now coming from Tehran, together with the government's current policy of conciliation toward the tribal groups which speak Kurdish and Turkish, should help to counter Soviet radio agitation.

\* \* \*

The Iranian Chief of Staff, General Razmara, has urged that he be given some idea of Iran's position in the US strategic concept. Specifically, he wants to know what US assistance would be immediately forthcoming if the Soviet Army should invade Iran. Razmara feels that he cannot build an effective army or justify the proposed increase in Iran's military budget without high-level discussion (which the US military mission in Iran cannot undertake) of US-Iranian military plans. The Iranian search for greater US support, whether in the form of material aid, military guarantees, or closer high-level cooperation, reflects the feeling of insecurity which persistently unsettles Iranian leaders and their dependence on constant reassurances of US interest in Iran.

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The subservience of Iran's banned Tudeh Party to the USSR is underlined by a recent pronouncement of the Central Committee of the party. The Committee included the Tudeh among those national Communist Parties which have declared that their countries will never fight Soviet Russia, and it also asserted that the Shah in no way represents the Iranian nation. The vehemence of the statement and the clear indication of the Tudeh's complete allegiance to the USSR are bound to alienate certain elements which, although non-Communist, favored the Tudeh Party because they felt that it offered the only sincere program of internal reforms. Thus the pronouncement, which was probably prepared at the behest of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, indicates a high-level decision to pare the party down to a hard core of loyal Communists.

\* \* \*

Relations between India and Pakistan continue to show serious strain, the focal point of tension this time being located in the area in and about East Pakistan. During the past week, serious communal rioting, followed by small-scale minority migrations across the border, took place in Calcutta (India), Dacca (East Pakistan), and in several smaller places, and though the provincial and central governments of both countries showed considerable energy in combatting lawlessness, feeling among many elements of the populace remains high. Elsewhere in India and Pakistan manifestations of hostility have subsided somewhat as both sides await the outcome of UN consideration of the Kashmir dispute. UN progress toward the settlement of that dispute still appears unlikely, however, and the other matters of contention between the two countries remain equally unsolved. From no less an authority than Field Marshal Auchinleck--former Commander in Chief of the Indian Army--who has just completed a tour of Pakistan Army units, comes a private expression of opinion that war in the early spring is inevitable.