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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 26

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
The International Week

The moral authority of the Security Council decision recommending armed assistance to the Republic of Korea was greatly increased by the concurrence of India. To date, 43 UN members have voiced their support.

THE UN AND KOREA

Broad support given UN action. The first week after UN intervention in the Korean crisis brought virtual blanket endorsement from non-Soviet UN members and some offers of military assistance as well. India's declaration of support more than counter-balanced Egypt's embittered abstention and this move of India, Asia's largest non-Communist state, will significantly undermine the contention that UN measures merely express the policy of Western imperialists. There is some basis for hope that Egypt's position will not set the pattern for all Moslem states. Pakistan has denounced Egypt's attitude as "foolish and illogical" and has taken the initiative in approaching Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile in Washington and Lebanese and Syrian Ministers have privately condemned the Egyptian position. Reaction in the Far East is one of relief at prompt US action.
Burma's Prime Minister declared that a folded arms policy would have made it impossible for him to have resisted current efforts of Burmese leftists to align Burma with the Soviet bloc. Even Yugoslavia followed its negative SC vote with a noteworthly effort to explain to the US that, although open alignment with the West would have undermined Tito's ideological warfare with the USSR, it privately welcomed UN action as reinforcing Yugoslavia's security against attack. The Yugoslavs have now gone a step farther and a Belgrade press release hints approval of the UN decision.





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This almost universal endorsement of vigorous UN action constitutes a development highly favorable to US security. For the first time the UN has sanctioned the use of military force to resist aggression, and the wide approval of international public opinion will weigh heavily on the crucial ideological level. Thus what would otherwise be a unilateral armed intervention by the US in a disputed area of power politics rises to the dignity of a collective international effort to uphold law and order.

Ad hoc UN armed forces. The prompt emergence of an ad hoc UN armed force to deal with the Korean situation demonstrates the ability of the UN to respond to vigorous leadership under a flexible interpretation of the Charter and in the absence of Soviet obstruction. Under Article 43 of the Charter UN members undertook to make available to the SC, on its call, and in accordance with special agreements, "armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage." Since from the outset Soviet non-cooperation has prevented the Military Staff Committee from assisting the Security Council on UN military planning matters under its Charter mandate, no special agreements have yet been concluded. In this situation the need for immediate action compelled the SC to rely on general Charter provisions and ad hoc arrangements in calling on UN members to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack...."

In order to counter Soviet efforts to exploit any tendency to view US action as unilateral, and to emphasize and formalize the UN's role in the military aspects of the Korean **Eikik** crisis, some UN members are actively considering the creation of a SC coordination committee to screen offers of military aid and receive reports from the field forces. Some officials also favor the formal designation of General MacArthur as UN Commander-in-Chief and the display of the UN flag by armed contingents defending South Korea. All such efforts to put the UN stamp on measures taken in Korea will strengthen the prestige of the UN and also place US action on a high moral plane.

Lie, the UN Secretariat and the Korean Sanctions. Throughout the Korean crisis, Secretary General Lie has demonstrated an uncompromising attitude in support of strong UN measures against aggression. With the chips down, Lie has again shown undivided loyalty to the UN, and his actions refute the frequent charges that he has pro-Soviet leanings. In fact his record in the Korean affair now makes it doubtful whether the USSR, in the event that it should attend the General Assembly, would accept an extension of his term of office as Secretary General.



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As for the Secretariat in general, its members are theoretically international civil servants obligated to put national allegiance to one side in the execution of their duties. Approximately eighy are nations of the USSR or its satellites, and in view of the universal character originally envisaged for the UN, naturally no attmept has ever been made to exclude communists as such. Furthermore, the important post of Assistant Secretary General for Security Council Affairs is held by Konstantin Zinchenko, a Soviet nation. As the Gubitchev case revealed, it is too much to expect that communists will place their loyalty to the UN above that to the Kremlin. Therefore at a time when the UN is Therefore a term a security standpoint to afford the secretariat access to any military information. Thus in setting up machinery to coordinate military contributions to the UN for use in Korea only carefully screened members of the secretariat will be used in conjunction with a new ad hoc organ.

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Effect of Korean crisis on the "peace" campaign. The immediate effect of the Korean war on the Communist "peace" campaign will be to decrease its effectiveness, and at the same time to increase its intensity.

The Communist invaision of South Korea hands the West a clear-cut issue with which to point up the hypocrisy of Communist peace pretensions. In the first place the UN Security Council, acting on information supplied by a UN Commission in Korea at the time of the attack, quickly branded the North Korean regime as the aggressor. Furthermore, this and subsequent UN action elicited overwhelming approval in the non-Soviet world. More specifically, the concurrence in UN action by India (a leading proponent of neutrality in East-West conflicts) should carry great weight with fence-sitters whose support the USSR seeks to enlist. These clear indications of North Korean culpability plus implicit Soviet inspiration in the now familiar pattern of Communist-organized civil strife reveal more clearly than ever the sharp contrast between Communist peace talk and aggressive actions.

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Facing what could prove to be a set-back to the peace campaign, the USSR will probably redouble its peace propagands in an attempt to shift the blame and dorwn out charges of Soviet complicity. Initial Soviet treatment of the Korean situation indicates that two main themes will probably be developed: 1) that the US has now moved from the stage of war preparations to "direct aggression," and 2) that the ramming through of "illegal" Security Council decisions under American pressure exposes US cynicism toward the peaceful pranciples of the UN. The basis for such charges has been proclaimed with increasing vigor in recent months, and US military action in Korea will be cited as proof of these standard peace campaign assertions.

