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WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 20

Proposed reduplication of EEC


For week ending 17 May 1949

Volume II

The International Week

The three Western Powers conferred in Paris so as to prepare a united front for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. In the UN, the General Assembly voted to admit Israel (37-12-9); approved a convention on press freedom (33-6-13); invited India, Pakistan and South Africa to enter round table discussions on the treatment of Indians in South Africa (47-1-10); but rejected the proposal to lift the ban on chiefs of diplomatic missions in Spain (26-15-16).

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Future SC lineup. The UK is considering various means of counteracting the effect of a Communist shift in the Chinese Government on the political composition of the Security Council. Hitherto, a Soviet Satellite has always been elected to the SC, giving the Slav bloc two sure votes. During the 1947 GA, the Ukraine and India were deadlocked for many ballots before the former finally won out as a replacement for Poland. Now a UK delegate suggests that if a Communist China should bring a second "automatic" vote to the USSR, the fourth GA should replace the Ukraine with India, thus restricting the Soviet bloc to its

present two votes. Since China is a permanent SC member, however, the USSR could occasionally abstain, thereby sharing the onus of the veto with the Chinese. Prior to this suggestion, it had been anticipated that India might replace Canada and that the Ukraine would be succeeded by another Eastern European state, thus maintaining the geographic balance set forth in the Charter.

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Press freedom advanced by GA approval of convention. Against bitter Slav opposition, the General Assembly approved 33-6-11 a Convention on the International Transmission of News and Right of Correction which, although considerably weaker than the US would have desired, is sufficiently free from serious objections to justify US ratification. The Convention extends to news, radio and film correspondents in all adhering countries the rights and privileges they now enjoy in the US. The chief US victories were: (1) omission of peace-time censorship, except that directly related to national defense; (2) placing the "right of correction" on a voluntary, not a compulsory, basis; (3) defeating Soviet-backed bans on "war propaganda" and "fascist propaganda" which might have opened the way to "back-door censorship"; and (4) placing the duties of correspondents on a basis of professional ethics rather than upon legal obligation.

While the Convention becomes effective upon the adherence of six states, ratification will not begin until after the regular 1949 GA acts upon the companion Freedom of Information Convention. The USSR, however, has stated that it will not sign the present Convention and it will thus not apply behind the Iron Curtain where it is most needed.

The debates on the Convention developed somewhat surprisingly the existence of strongly-held views on press censorship in countries where one would hardly suspect such notions to thrive. Consequently, the extension of Anglo-Saxon ideas of freedom of information and freedom of the press will undoubtedly, in the immediate future, have to be effected more widely by bilateral than by multilateral treaties.

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Soviet motives at Red Cross Conference. At the current Geneva conference drafting a new Red Cross convention setting up protections for civilian populations and prisoners in wartime, the USSR has aligned itself with the Scandinavians and Swiss in seeking the broadest application of these humanitarian rules. The USSR wishes to apply these self-denying regulations not only to regular warfare between armies, but to civil conflict and colonial wars. While such an extension of the laws of war makes an idealistic appeal to the Scandinavians and Swiss who have no colonies, the USSR undoubtedly has other fish to fry in assuming

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this position. Since its long range plans embrace incitation of insurrection and colonial conflicts against non-Communist governments, the proposed broadening of humanitarian rules would benefit the USSR by (1) extending protection to its agents and instrumentalities of subversion; (2) permitting it to bring charges before the UN whenever any government, seeking to maintain its authority, refused to treat saboteurs and traitors as "prisoners of war"; and (3) thus tying the hands of established regimes in repressing revolts. On the other hand, despite any provision to the contrary, it would, as a practical matter, be impossible to enforce observance of such regulations by Soviet-sponsored terrorists and revolutionaries who would be left with a free hand. Accordingly, the British oppose any rigid formula which would effectively restrict their freedom of action in such situations and wish to confine the rules to regular warfare. The US, China and Canada feel that the new rules should apply to internal warfare only after insurgents have achieved such de facto authority as to justify recognition of their belligerency. The Scandinavians, however, with memories of the German occupation still fresh, are anxious that genuine resistance movements against hostile occupations be cloaked with the protection of a new Geneva convention.

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Democratic Women's Federation launches drive in Asia. The Communist drive for new adherents in the Middle and Far East will be reinforced during coming months by the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), a powerful front organization claiming thirteen national women's organizations in Asia. In addition to its fully matured groups in China and India, the WIDF has well-established links with the women of Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Siam and Israel, and, during recent months, has for the first time contacted women's organizations in the Philippines, Ceylon and Cyprus. It is currently concentrating on: (1) preparations for a Conference of the Women of Asia to be held before September 1949, probably in China; (2) organization of National Women's Committees to ensure support for this conference; and (3) establishment of contact with Asian women's groups not yet in the WIDF fold, particularly in Japan, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq. The campaign to extend WIDF influence in these areas will be entrusted to an "International Commission of the Women of Asia and Africa." Formation of this Commission, already functioning provisionally in Paris, parallels the recent establishment by the World Federation of Democratic Youth of a "Bureau of Students Fighting Against Colonization" and reflects the Kremlin's apparent determination to organize the widest possible support for Soviet objectives in the Middle and Far East.

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USSR permits continued Satellite participation in ILO. The Czech Minister of Social Welfare's recent visit to Moscow to ascertain the Soviet attitude towards Czech and Polish participation in the International Labor Organization apparently elicited a "go-ahead" from the USSR. Despite its obvious irritation at ILO acceptance of an ECOSOC mandate to investigate slave labor, the USSR raised no objection to continued Satellite membership in the ILO for the time being. This decision, which may reflect a Soviet desire to maintain the current ILO-WFTU liaison, will allow both Czechoslovakia and Poland to press for ILO technical aid and for participation in the training-within-industry plan at the forthcoming ILO conference in Geneva. Recent Czech inquiries concerning alleged cancellation in the UK of ILO conventions against night work by women and children suggest that the Satellite delegations at Geneva will attempt to magnify their own "social achievements" and to contrast the prompt ratification of ILO conventions in Eastern Europe with the difficulties encountered elsewhere.

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IOG NOTES

✓ Proposed reshuffling of EEC. In an effort to curb, in at least one small corner of the UN, the time-consuming interjection of ideological propaganda into purely technical matters, a committee of the UN Economic and Employment Commission has recommended by a straight East-West vote the abolition of two subsidiary bodies. It is planned to replace the Economic Development and the Employment and Economic Stability Subcommissions with groups of experts selected on the basis of special qualifications in the fields concerned rather than on the principle of geographic distribution.

"Peace" offensive on skis. The cold war may henceforth be prosecuted on skis. The International Ski Federation at its recent Oslo meeting has admitted the USSR to full membership, a move which may presage Soviet participation in the 1952 Winter Olympic games. The Soviets have also manifested increasing gregariousness in sports like wrestling, weightlifting, swimming and track where they have joined international athletic federations. Even in the sporting world, the USSR could not wholly abandon the political slant for at Oslo it unsuccessfully sought to exclude Spain from the ski federation. The Kremlin has not yet demanded a veto over the referee's decisions.

Failure of Evatt's Balkan conciliation anticipated. The only positive result expected from GA President Evatt's conciliation efforts in the Balkan dispute is Greek acceptance of the proposed Greek-Albanian agreement. Although reportedly stating that he would facilitate Albanian and Bulgarian admission to the

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UN if these states would adopt a more conciliatory attitude, Evatt also scored the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav representatives for holding out for Greek renunciation of its claims to Northern Epirus. The Satellites will change their position only on orders from Moscow which, despite the current Soviet peace offensive, are unlikely.

Prospects for Indonesian case. Although the UN GA has postponed action on Indonesia until its regular fall session, possible Assembly consideration at that time serves as a threat still hanging over the Netherlands -- the effect desired by the Australian-Indian sponsors of the original proposal. The continuance of the case on the GA agenda should help ensure that the recent gains achieved in Batavia will not be lost through second thoughts at The Hague.

Kremlin rules out Western dictation. Izvestia's shrill protest against any "Western Diktat" for Germany may reflect Soviet awareness that the climate of negotiation in Paris has changed radically from that of London. The USSR is approaching the CFM meeting under adverse political and economic pressures which did not obtain at earlier conferences.

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ECONOMIC ISSUES AT THE CFM

Recent Soviet overtures for the reduction of economic controls between East and West indicate that economic considerations played a large part in the Soviet decision to lift the Berlin blockade and convene the CFM. Not only has the Western counter-blockade been detrimental to the economy of the Soviet zone of Germany, but the Western export controls arising from the cold war have hampered the development of the Soviet bloc economy as a whole. Those Soviet industries which depend on Western imports, for example, have had the poorest production records. That the USSR is greatly concerned over these developments is indicated by (1) its proposal that reparations and reciprocal deliveries from the Eastern and Western zones be resumed; (2) recent Polish and Czech overtures for increased trade with the West; (3) Soviet bloc attacks on Western export controls, combined with the relatively cooperative attitude at the current ECE session. These factors lead to the conclusion that the USSR is strongly feeling the pinch of the Western blockade and seeks to alleviate it. Moreover, the USSR must be concerned over the growing economic consolidation and recovery in Western Europe as opposed to the unhappy state of affairs in the East, and fears the effect of this on the Satellites.

If the USSR recognizes the failure of its present policies in Europe and seeks a detente with the West as a preliminary to a period of consolidation in the Soviet sphere, then a major aspect of any such policy shift will be to seek reduction of the existing East-West economic barriers. As revealed in the ECE report on the European economy in 1948, Satellite recovery progress is behind that of the West, and there are other indications of increasing economic difficulties in such countries as Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Consequently the USSR must feel that if it is to carry out its planned economic development in the Satellites and at home, it urgently needs Western goods and credits. The USSR may therefore seek at the CFM a mutual reduction of trade barriers and a stimulation of East-West trade. Beyond this, the USSR may hope, as a result of its new tactics, to persuade the West to grant economic development assistance to the Satellites. While the USSR could hardly permit its Satellites to join the ERP, it might seek such aid through agencies like the ECE and the International Bank.

Moreover, the USSR may hope that through an accord on Germany it will gain certain economic weapons which can be used against the West. First, the USSR may estimate that an economically revived Germany would inevitably gravitate eastward for markets, particularly since Western European fear of German competition is freezing Germany out of its prewar markets in the non-Soviet world. The Soviet bloc's insatiable demands for capital goods, on the other hand, will provide a major market. Second, the USSR might be able, through its new voice in Germany, to reduce Germany's key contribution to the ERP and to obstruct the full economic integration of Germany with the Western OEEC bloc. Third, the USSR might seek in any accord on Germany to prevent the application in that area of the present Western export controls. Germany would then be a major breach in the export barrier and its industry would provide the Soviet sphere with many of the products now barred to it by the West. Under these circumstances, it is quite possible that the USSR looks on the CFM meeting as an opportunity to (1) circumvent the present East-West economic barriers and secure much-needed capital goods for Eastern Europe; (2) obstruct the recovery of Western Europe; and (3) gradually orient Germany economically toward the East.